Feldman - Blue Sky Big Questions
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Blue Sky 19/09/16 Plenary 1
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Feldman - Blue Sky Big Questions
- 1. Blue Sky Big Questions Maryann Feldman University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill NSF Science of Science & Innovation Policy Program Blue Sky III Ghent – 19 September 2016
- 2. Making Evidence-Based Decisions for Science • Murray-Ryan Commission on the Evidence Based Policymaking • Administrative records availability • Federal Science Agencies • Recommendations for State and Local governments • Administrative data to make better decisions for science • Improve project selection • Project monitoring - ARPA model
- 3. Open Data Initiatives • Changing Locus of Innovation • User Innovation, Hobby Innovation, Citizen Science • Weather Channel - uses by private enterprise • Underestimate returns to government investment • Water, Water, Everywhere (Van Tuyl & Whitmire 2016) • Push for Replicability & Reliability
- 4. R&D Agenda Setting • Change the discussion • Increased scrutiny • Budgetary justifications • ROI on science? • Making a Better Case for Science • NIH Director’s Office Value of Scientific Research • NAS, Narratives with Numbers Workshop
- 5. The Folly of Rewarding A while Hoping for B (Kerr 1975) • What we measure (A) • publications, patents, citations, expenditures, graduation rates, program participation • What we want (B) • scientific progress, productive careers, quality, inclusivity, economic prosperity
Editor's Notes
- Professor Mariana Mazzucato THE ENTREPRENEURIAL STATE: DEBUNKING PUBLIC VS. PRIVATE SECTOR MYTHS
- Steven Kerr highlights discrepancies with the reward system across a range of industries. Using illustrative examples, including orphanages, hospitals, the US defense, and business practices, he argues that there exists a common practice in the “reward systems that ‘pay off’ for one behavior even though the rewarder is hoping dearly for another” (1975, p.769). Using the example of orphanage practices, he argues that directors are often faced with a dilemma between the primary goal of placing children in suitable homes and the conflicting incentive of maintaining a certain level of enrollment (because this directly correlates with the size of the budget). As Kerr notes, “to the extent that staff size, total budget, and personal prestige are valued by the orphanage’s executive personnel, it becomes rational for them to make it difficult for children to be adopted” (p. 772). In this example, the orphanage is rewarded according to its size, rather than according to the number of children placed in homes, which is its primary goal. We argue that his theory also applies to science research and development.