RA7277

1. LANDINGIN VS. REPUBLIC (GR No. 164948 6/27/06)
RA 8552 Domestic Adoption Act of 1998
FACTS: On February 4, 2002, Diwata Ramos Landingin, a citizen of the United States of America
(USA), of Filipino parentage and a resident of Guam, USA, filed a petition for the adoption of
minors Elaine Dizon Ramos who was born on August 31, 1986; Elma Dizon Ramos, who was
born on September 7, 1987; and Eugene Dizon Ramos who was born on August 5, 1989. The
minors are the natural children of Manuel Ramos, petitioner’s brother, and Amelia Ramos.
Landingin, as petitioner, alleged in her petition that when Manuel died on May 19, 1990, the
children were left to their paternal grandmother, Maria Taruc Ramos; their biological mother,
Amelia, went to Italy, re-married there and now has two children by her second marriage and no
longer communicated with her children by Manuel Ramos nor with her in-laws from the time she
left up to the institution of the adoption; the minors are being financially supported by the petitioner
and her children, and relatives abroad; as Maria passed away on November 23, 2000, petitioner
desires to adopt the children; the minors have given their written consent to the adoption; she is
qualified to adopt as shown by the fact that she is a 57-year-old widow, has children of her own
who are already married, gainfully employed and have their respective families; she lives alone
in her own home in Guam, USA, where sheacquired citizenship,and works as a restaurant server.
She came back to the Philippines to spend time with the minors; her children gave their written
consent to the adoption of the minors. Petitioner’s brother, Mariano Ramos,who earns substantial
income, signified his willingness and commitment to support the minors while in petitioner’s
custody.
ISSUES:WON(a) whether the petitioner is entitled to adopt the minors without the written consent
of their biological mother, Amelia Ramos; (b) whether or not the affidavit of consent purportedly
executed by the petitioner-adopter’s children sufficiently complies with the law; and (c) whether
or not petitioner is financially capable of supporting the adoptees.
RULING: The petition is denied for lack of merit.
It has been the policy of the Court to adhere to the liberal concept, as stated in Malkinson v.
Agrava,28
that adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interest and welfare of the
child to be of paramount consideration and are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of society and
family in the person of the adopter as well as to allow childless couples or persons to experience
the joys of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the adopted for the
manifestation of their natural parental instincts. Every reasonable intendment should thus be
sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate objectives of the law.
 (a)Section 9 of Republic Act No. 8552, otherwise known as the Domestic Adoption Act of
1998, provides:

2. Sec. 9. Whose Consent is Necessary to the Adoption. - After being properly counseled and
informed of his/her right to give or withhold his/her approval of the adoption, the written consent
of the following to the adoption is hereby required:
(a) The adoptee, if ten (10) years of age or over;
(b) The biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the legal guardian, or the proper
government instrumentality which has legal custody of the child;
(c) The legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the
adopter(s) and adoptee, if any;
(d) The illegitimate sons/daughters, ten (10) years of age or over, of the adopter, if living
with said adopter and the latter’s souse, if any;
(e) The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be adopted.
The general requirement of consent and notice to the natural parents is intended to protect the
natural parental relationship from unwarranted interference by interlopers, and to insure the
opportunity to safeguard the best interests of the child in the manner of the proposed adoption.
Clearly, the written consent of the biological parents is indispensable for the validity of a
decree of adoption. Indeed, the natural right of a parent to his child requires that his consent
must be obtained before his parental rights and duties may be terminated and re-established in
adoptive parents. In this case, petitioner failed to submit the written consent of Amelia Ramos to
the adoption.
Petitioner, nonetheless, argues that the written consent of the biological mother is no longer
necessary because when Amelia’s husband died in 1990, she left for Italy and never came back.
The children were then left to the guidance and care of their paternal grandmother. It is the
paternal relatives, including petitioner, who provided for the children’s financial needs. Hence,
Amelia, the biological mother, had effectively abandoned the children.
Petitioner’s contention must be rejected. When she filed her petition with the trial court,
Rep. Act No. 8552 was already in effect. Section 9 thereof provides that if the written consent
of the biological parents cannot be obtained, the written consent of the legal guardian of the
minors will suffice. If, as claimed by petitioner, that the biological mother of the minors had indeed
abandoned them, she should, thus have adduced the written consent of their legal guardian.
Ordinarily, abandonment by a parent to justify the adoption of his child without his consent, is a
conduct which evinces a settled purpose to forego all parental duties. The term means neglect
and refusal to perform the filial and legal obligations of love and support. If a parent
withholds presence, love, care, the opportunity to display filial affection, and neglects to lend
support and maintenance, the parent, in effect, abandons the child.
Merely permitting the child to remain for a time undisturbed in the care of others is not
such an abandonment. To dispense with the requirement of consent, the abandonment must be
shown to have existed at the time of adoption.

3. In this case, petitioner relied solely on her testimony and that of Elaine Ramos to prove her claim
that Amelia Ramos had abandoned her children.
 (b) Petitioner failed to offer in evidence Pagbilao’s Report and of the Joint Affidavit
of Consent purportedly executed by her children; the authenticity of which she,
likewise, failed to prove. The joint written consent of petitioner’s children was notarized
on January 16, 2002 in Guam, USA; for it to be treated by the Rules of Court in the same
way as a document notarized in this country it needs to comply with Section 2 of Act No.
2103, which states:
“Section 2. An instrument or document acknowledged and authenticated in a foreign country shall
be considered authentic if the acknowledgment and authentication are made in accordance with
the following requirements:
(a) The acknowledgment shall be made before (1) an ambassador, minister, secretary of
legation, chargé d affaires, consul, vice-consul, or consular agent of the Republic of the
Philippines, acting within the country or place to which he is accredited, or (2) a notary
public or officer duly authorized by law of the country to take acknowledgments of
instruments or documents in the place where the act is done.
(b) The person taking the acknowledgment shall certify that the person acknowledging the
instrument or document is known to him, and that he is the same person who executed it,
and acknowledged that the same is his free act and deed. XXXXX ”
As the alleged written consent of petitioner’s legitimate children did not comply with the
afore-cited law, the same can at best be treated bythe Rules as a private document whose
authenticity must be proved eitherby anyone who saw the document executed or written;
or by evidence of the genuineness of the signature or handwriting of the makers.
Since, in the instant case, no further proof was introduced by petitioner to authenticate the written
consent of her legitimate children, the same is inadmissible in evidence.
 (c ) Since the primary consideration in adoption is the best interest of the child, it follows
that the financial capacity of prospective parents should also
be carefully evaluated and considered. Certainly, the adopter should be in a position to
support the would-be adopted child or children, in keeping with the means of the family.
According to the Adoption Home Study Report forwarded by the Department of Public Health &
Social Services of the Government of Guam to the DSWD, petitioner is no longer supporting her
legitimate children, as the latter are already adults, have individual lives and families. At the time
of the filing of the petition, petitioner was 57 years old, employed on a part-time basis as a
waitress, earning $5.15 an hour and tips of around $1,000 a month. Petitioner’s main intention in
adopting the children is to bring the latter to Guam, USA. She has a house at Quitugua Subdivision
in Yigo, Guam, but the same is still being amortized. Petitioner likewise knows that the limited
income might be a hindrance to the adoption proceedings.

4. Given these limited facts, it is indeed doubtful whether petitioner will be able to sufficiently handle
the financial aspect of rearing the three children in the US. She only has a part-time job, and she
is rather of age. While petitioner claims that she has the financial support and backing of her
children and siblings, the OSG is correct in stating that the ability to support the adoptees is
personal to the adopter, as adoption only creates a legal relation between the former and the
latter. Moreover, the records do not prove nor support petitioner’s allegation that her siblings and
her children are financially able and that they are willing to support the minors herein. The Court,
therefore, again sustains the ruling of the CA on this issue.
While the Court recognizes that petitioner has only the best of intentions for her nieces
and nephew, there are legal infirmities that militate against reversing the ruling of the CA.
In any case, petitioner is not prevented from filing a new petition for adoption of the herein minors.
ADOPTION OF LIM (G.R. NOS. 168992-93;
MAY 21, 2009)
CASE DIGEST: IN RE: PETITION FOR ADOPTION OF
MICHELLE P. LIM AND MICHAEL JUDE P. LIM; MONINA
LIM, PETITIONER.
FACTS: Monina and Primo Lim were married. Two children whose
parents were unknown and whose whereabouts were unknown were
brought to them. They TOOK care of the two kids. Primo died in 1998
but Monina got married to Angel Olario, an American citizen. When the
children were brought to them, they registered them making it appear
that they were the natural parents. Monina decided to adopt the two (2)
children by availing of the amnesty under RA 8552 to those individuals
who simulated the birth of a child, hence, she filed the petition on April
24, 2002. Michelle was 25 years old and already married at the time of
the filing of the petition. Michael was 18 years old. The husband of
Michelle gave his consent to the adoption.
The DSWD issued a certificationthat they were abandoned children.
After trial, the RTC dismissed the petition on the ground that the
husband of Monina did not join her in the petition as required by Section
7(c), Article III, RA 8552 and Article 185 of the Family Code. She filed a

5. Motion for reconsideration as she did not fall under any of the
exceptions provided for by the law. (Sec. 7(c), Article III, RA 8552). It
likewise ruled that the contention that mere consent of her husband
would suffice was untenable because, under the law, there are additional
requirements, such as residency and certification of his qualification,
which the husband, who was not even made a party in this case, must
comply.
As to the argument that the adoptees are already emancipated and joint
adoption is merely for the joint exercise of parental authority, the trial
court ruled that joint adoption is not only for the purpose of exercising
parental authority because an emancipated child acquires certain rights
from his parents and assumes certain obligations and responsibilities.
Hence, she filed a petition with the Supreme Court raising the sole issue
of whether or not petitioner, who has remarried, can singly adopt.
She contended that the rule on joint adoption must be relaxed because it
is the duty of the court and the State to protect the paramount interest
and welfare of the child to be adopted. She argued that the legal maxim
“dura lex sed lex” is not applicable to adoption cases. She argued that
joint parental authority is not necessary in this case since, at the time the
petitions were filed, Michelle was 25 years old and already married,
while Michael was already 18 years of age. Parental authority is not
anymore necessary since they have been emancipated having attained
the age of majority.
ISSUE: Is the petition proper?
HELD: The answer is in the negative. The husband and wife
should have jointly filed the petition for adoption. The
principle of dura lex sed lex is applicable as the law is explicit
that the husband and wife shall jointly adopt.

6. The use of the word “shall” means that joint adoption by the husband
and the wife is mandatory. This is in consonance with the concept of
joint parental authority over the child which is the ideal situation. As the
child to be adopted is elevated to the level of a legitimate child, it is but
natural to require the spouses to adopt jointly. The rule also insures
harmony between the spouses. (Rep. v. Toledano, G.R. No. 94147, June
8, 1994, 233 SCRA 9).
The law is clear. There is no room for ambiguity. Petitioner, having
remarried at the time the petitions for adoption were filed, must jointly
adopt. Since the petitions for adoption were filed only by petitioner
herself, without joining her husband, the trial court was correct in
denying the petitions for adoption on this ground.
Neither does petitioner fall under any of the three exceptions
enumerated in Section 7. First, the children to be adopted are not the
legitimate children of petitioner or of her husband. Second, the children
are not the illegitimate children of petitioner. And third, petitioner and
her husband are not legally separated from each other.
The fact that her husband gave his consent to the adoption as shown in
his Affidavit of Consent does not suffice. There are certain requirements
that her husband must comply being an American citizen. He must meet
the qualifications set forth in Section 7 of RA 8552 such as: (1) he must
prove that his country has diplomatic relations with the Republic of the
Philippines; (2) he must have been living in the Philippines for at least
three continuous years prior to the filing of the application for adoption;
(3) he must maintain such residency until the adoption decree is entered;
(4) he has legal capacity to adopt in his own country; and (5) the adoptee
is allowed to enter the adopter’s country as the latter’s adopted child.
None of these qualifications were shown and proved during the trial.
These requirements on residency and certification of the alien’s
qualification to adopt cannot likewise be waived pursuant to Section 7.

7. The children or adoptees are not relatives within the fourth degree of
consanguinity or affinity of petitioner or of her husband. Neither are the
adoptees the legitimate children of petitioner.
PFRDigest - In Re Adoption of Stephanie Nathy AstorgaGarcia, G.R. No. 148311,
March 31, 2005
Facts:
On August 31, 2000, Honorato B. Catindig, herein petitioner, filed a petition to
adopt his minor illegitimate child Stephanie Nathy Astorga Garcia. He alleged
therein among others, that Stephanie was born on June 26, 1994, that her mother
is Gemma AstorgaGarcia; thatStephanie hasbeen using her mother’smiddlename
and surname, and that she is now a widower and qualified to be her adopting
parent. He prayed that Stephanie’s middle name Astorga be changed to Garcia her
mother’s surname and that her surname Garcia be changed to Catindig, his
Surname.
The trial court rendered the assailed decision granting the adoption, however, the
trial Courtdid notallow the useof her mother’ssurnameas her middle name. Thus,
petitioner filed a motion for clarification and reconsideration praying that
Stephanie should be allowed to use the surnameof her natural mother (Garcia) as
her middle name.
Issue:
Whether or not an illegitimate child may use the surname of her mother, as her
middle name, when she subsequently adopted by her natural father.
Ruling:
As correctly submitted by parties, there is no law regulating the use of a middle
name. Notably, the law is likewise silent as to what middle name an adoptee may
use. The Court ruled that sinceno law granting an illegitimate child adopted by her
natural father, as in this case, to use as middle name the mother’s surname, the
Court found no reason why Stephanie should not allowed to use her mother’s
surname Garcia as her middle name

8. G.R. No. 188801, October 15, 2014
ROSARIO MATA CASTRO AND JOANNEBENEDICTA CHARISSIMA M. CASTRO, A.K.A. "MARIASOCORRO
M. CASTRO" AND "JAYROSEM.CASTRO," Petitioners,v. JOSE MARIA JED LEMUEL GREGORIOAND ANA
MARIA REGINAGREGORIO, Respondents.
Doctrine: The policy of the law is clear. In order to maintain harmony, there must be a showing
of notice and consent. This cannot be defeated by mere procedural devices. In all instances
where it appears that a spouse attempts to adopt a child out of wedlock, the other spouse and
other legitimate children must be personally notified through personal service of summons. It is
not enough that they be deemed notified through constructive service.
Facts: Thisis a petitionforreviewonCertiorari assailingthe decisionof the CA whichdeniedthe petition
forannulmentof judgmentfiledbypetitioners.The petitionbefore the appellate courtsoughttoannul
the judgmentof the trial court thatgrantedRs’ decree of adoption.
Atty.CastrowasallegedlymarriedtoRosarioCastro(Petitioner).Unfortunately,theyseparatedlateron
due to theirincompatibilitiesandJose’sallegedhomosexual tendencies. Theirmarriage bore two
daughters:Rose Marie,whosuccumbedtodeathafternine daysfrombirthdue tocongenital heart
disease,andJoanne BenedictaCharissimaCastro(Petitioner).
On August2000, A petitionforadoption of Jose MariaJedGregorio(Jed) andAnaMaria ReginaGregorio
(Regina) wasinstitutedbyAtty.Jose Castro.Atty.CastroallegedthatJedandReginawere hisillegitimate
childrenwithLilibethGregorio(Rosario’shousekeeper).AfteraHome StudyReportconductedbythe
Social Welfare Officerof the TC,the petitionwasgranted.
A disbarmentcomplaintwasfiledagainstAtty.CastrobyRosario.She allegedthatJose hadbeenremiss
inprovidingsupporttohisdaughterJoanne forthe past36 year;that she single-handedlyraisedand
providedfinancial supporttoJoanne while Josehadbeenshoweringgiftstohisdriverandallege lover,
Larry, and evenwenttothe extentof adoptingLarry’stwochildren,JedandRegina,withoutherand
Joanne knowledge andconsent.Atty.Castrodeniedthe allegationthathe hadremisshisfatherlyduties
to Joanne.He allegedthathe alwaysofferedhelpbutitwasoftendeclined.He alsoallegedthatJedand
Reginawere hisillegitimate childrenthat’swhyhe adoptedthem. LateronAtty.Castrodied.

9. RosarioandJoanne filedapetitionforannulmentof judgmentseekingtoannul the decisionof the TC
approvingJedandRegina’sadoption.
Petitionerallege thatRosario’sconsentwasnotobtainedandthe documentpurportingasRosario’s
affidavitof consentwasfraudulent.PalsoallegethatJedandRegina’sbirthcertificatesshowsdisparity.
One setshowsthat the fathertoisJose,while anothersetof NSOcertificatesshowsthe fathertobe
Larry. PfurtherallegedthatJedandReginaare notactuallyJose’sillegitimate childrenbutthe
legitimatechildrenof LilibethandLarry whowere marriedatthe time of theirbirth.CA deniedthe
petition.
CA heldthatwhile nonotice wasgivenbythe TCto RosarioandJoanne of the adoption,itruledthat
there is“no explicitprovisioninthe rulesthat spousesandlegitimate childof the adopter... shouldbe
personallynotifiedof the hearing.”
CA alsoruledthatthe allegedfraudulentinformationcontainedinthe differentsetsof birthcertificates
requiredthe determinationof the identitiesof the personsstatedthereinandwas,therefore,beyond
the scope of the actionfor annulmentof judgment.The allegedfraudcouldnotbe classifiedasextrinsic
fraud,whichisrequiredinanactionforannulmentof judgment.
Issue: Whether consent of the spouse and legitimate children 10 years or over of the adopter is
required?
Held: YES. RA 8552 requires that the adoption by the father of a child born out of wedlock
obtain not only the consent of his wife but also the consent of his legitimate children. (Art. III,
Sec. 7, RA 8552)
As a rule, the husband and wife must file a joint petition for adoption. The law, however,
provides for several exceptions to the general rule, as in a situation where a spouse seeks to adopt
his or her own children born out of wedlock. In this instance, joint adoption is not necessary.
But, the spouse seeking to adopt must first obtain the consent of his or her spouse.
In the absence of any decree of legal separation or annulment, Jose and Rosario remained legally
married despite their de facto separation. For Jose to be eligible to adopt Jed and Regina, Rosario
must first signify her consent to the adoption. Since her consent was not obtained, Jose was
ineligible to adopt.

10. The law also requires the written consent of the adopter’s children if they are 10 years old or
older (ART. III, Sec. 9, RA 8552).
For the adoption to be valid, petitioners’ consent was required by Republic Act No. 8552.
Personal service of summons should have been effected on the spouse and all legitimate children
to ensure that their substantive rights are protected. It is not enough to rely on constructive notice
as in this case. Surreptitious use of procedural technicalities cannot be privileged over
substantive statutory rights.
Since the trial court failed to personally serve notice on Rosario and Joanne of the proceedings, it
never validly acquired jurisdiction.