More Related Content
Similar to Pojman ethics 8e_ppt_ch13
Similar to Pojman ethics 8e_ppt_ch13 (20)
Pojman ethics 8e_ppt_ch13
- 2. Chapter Thirteen: The
Fact–Value Problem
Rants are pervasive in discussions of moral issues—such
as abortion, euthanasia, sexual morality, and capital
punishment—in the media and in personal dialogue.
Frequently, our moral assessments are not really factual
judgments.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 3. The Fact–Value Problem
The problem of determining whether values are
essentially different from facts, whether moral
assessments are derived from facts, and whether moral
statements can be true or false like factual statements.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 4. Metaethics
Metaethics is the method of inquiry that addresses the
fact–value problem.
Many contemporary philosophers focus on the
metaethical functions of ethical terms, the status of
moral judgments, and the relation of ethical judgments
to nonethical factual statements.
What, if anything, is the meaning of the terms good and
right?
How, if at all, can we justify our moral beliefs?
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 5. Hume and Moore: The
Problem Classically Stated
David Hume: The fallacy of deriving ought from is
George Edward Moore: The naturalistic fallacy
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 6. The Fallacy of Deriving
Ought from Is (1 of 3)
David Hume (1711–1776)
Moral theories begin by observing some specific facts
about the world, and then they conclude from these same
statements about moral obligation.
In other words, they move from statements about what is
the case to statements about what ought to be the case.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 7. The Fallacy of Deriving
Ought from Is (2 of 3)
Examples of this fallacy in ordinary theories:
God exists; therefore, we should obey God’s moral
commands.
God will punish and reward us in the afterlife; therefore,
we should behave morally.
People are sociable creatures; therefore, we should
behave morally.
Without rules, society would fall into chaos; therefore, we
should behave morally.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 8. The Fallacy of Deriving
Ought from Is (3 of 3)
Examples of this fallacy in sophisticated theories:
Through reason we can detect eternal truths about fit
behavior; therefore, we should behave morally as
informed by our reason.
There is a kind of sixth sense that detects inappropriate
conduct; therefore, we should behave morally as informed
by this sixth sense.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 9. Hume’s Solution
Moral assessments are not rational inferences; they are
emotional reactions—feelings of pleasure and pain we
experience when we witness or hear about some event.
If we witness a concrete “fact,” such as a vengeful, cold-
blooded killing.
We feel that it is wrong.
The feeling introduces the new and distinctly moral
element.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 10. The Naturalistic Fallacy
(1 of 2)
G.E. Moore claims philosophers have been entangled in
ethical problems because they have not clearly defined the
territory of ethics.
Ethics involves arriving at decision-making procedures for
morally good behavior.
We need to discover the meaning of the term good.
The foundation of ethics is an understanding of the term good.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 11. The Naturalistic Fallacy
(2 of 2)
It is a fallacy to identify “good” with any specific
natural property such as “pleasure” or “being more
evolved.”
Moore claims that a concept like the “Good” is
indefinable because it is a simple property, a property
that has no parts and thus cannot be defined by
constituent elements.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 12. Open-Question Argument
The open-question argument is a test to help determine
whether a moral theory commits the naturalistic fallacy.
For any property that we identify with “goodness,” we
can ask, “Is that property itself good?”
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 13. Moore and Hume
Like Hume’s fallacy of deriving ought from is, Moore’s
naturalistic fallacy is another way of articulating the
fact–value problem.
Regardless of how many things we intuitively recognize
as being accompanied by moral goodness, there will
always be a gap between the facts we examine and the
value we find within them.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 14. Ayer and Emotivism
Alfred Jules Ayer (1910–1989) was influenced by Hume
and Moore.
Ayer’s two pronged approach:
He argues that the fact–value problem arises because
moral statements cannot pass a critical test of meaning
called the verification principle.
His solution is that moral utterances are only expressions
of feelings, a position called emotivism.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 15. Ayer’s Theory(1 of 2)
All meaningful sentences must be either tautologies or
empirically verifiable.
His argument:
1. A sentence is meaningful if and only if it can be verified.
2. Moral sentences cannot be verified.
3. Therefore, moral sentences are not meaningful.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 16. Ayer’s Theory(2 of 2)
Philosophers distinguish between cognitive and
noncognitive statements.
Traditional moral theories claim to be cognitivist; Ayer
says they are misguided.
Ayer says moral utterances express our feelings and are
not factually meaningful, morality doesn’t involve our
reasoning ability, and ethical disagreement is a
disagreement in attitude.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 17. Criticisms of Emotivism
The verification theory of meaning doesn’t pass its own
test.
There is a problem with the view that ethical
disagreements are disagreements in attitude.
It cannot distinguish between reasons and causes that
change our attitudes.
Morality seems deeper than mere emotions or acting on
feelings or attitudes.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 18. Stevenson’s Moderate
Emotivism
Charles Leslie Stevenson (1908–1979) says moral
utterances can include noncognitive and cognitive
elements.
Specific components of typical moral utterances:
Emotive expression (noncognitive)
Report about feelings (cognitive)
Description of other qualities (cognitive)
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 19. Hare and Prescriptivism
Ayer’s prescriptive function of moral utterances: They
recommend or command that others adopt our attitude.
Richard Mervyn Hare (1919–2002): Four important
features about moral judgments:
They are prescriptive.
They exhibit logical relations.
They are universalizable.
They involve principles.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 20. Prescriptivity
Moral judgments have both a descriptive (fact) and
prescriptive (value) element.
The descriptive element involves the facts about a
particular action, such as “charity maximizes pleasure.”
The prescriptive element is conduct guiding and
recommends that others adopt our value attitude.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 21. The Logic of Moral Reasoning
(1 of 2)
There is a logic to prescriptive judgments.
Moral judgments do not have truth value, but they do
have a logical form.
Thus, we can argue about particular judgments and use
arguments to reach particular prescriptions.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 22. The Logic of Moral Reasoning
(2 of 2)
Hare holds two theses about the distinction between is
and ought—between descriptive and prescriptive
statements as they pertain to logical form:
1. No indicative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set
of premises that cannot be validly drawn from the
indicatives among them alone.
2. No imperative conclusion can be validly drawn from a set
of premises that does not contain at least one imperative.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 23. Universalizability
In making moral judgments, one should make the same
judgment in all similar cases.
A judgment is not moral unless the agent is prepared to
universalize his or her principle.
Universalizability is a necessary condition: If a principle is
moral, then it applies universally.
Universalizability is a sufficient condition: If a principle
applies universally, then it is moral.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 24. Principles
Principles are central to moral reasoning.
They serve as major premises in our moral arguments.
We acquire or learn a basic set of principles.
We learn when to use or to subordinate those principles.
We choose our own principles, and we must commit to
them, universalizing them.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 25. Criticisms of Prescriptivism
It is too broad and allows for conduct that we typically
deem immoral.
It permits trivial judgments to count as moral ones.
It allows the moral substance in life to slip away from
ethical theory.
There are no constraints on altering one’s principles.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 26. Naturalism and the
Fact–Value Problem
All the noncognitivist solutions to the fact–value
problem are troubling:
Reducing moral utterances to emotional outbursts or
universal prescriptions destroys many elements we find
essential to morality.
The fact–value problem still demands some answer—one
that matches our conceptions of what morality should do.
Naturalism provides one such answer.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 27. Naturalism
Naturalism links moral terms with some kind of natural
property.
Natural in that they are found in the natural world,
specifically the natural realms of human psychology and
society.
Geoffrey Warnock argues that morality is linked with “the
betterment of the human predicament.”
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 28. Naturalism and the
Open-Ended Question
Moore would charge that Warnock commits the
naturalistic fallacy.
Moore’s theory regards the idea of goodness as though it
was a thing, the fallacy of hypostatization.
It’s a category mistake to treat a functional term as
though it was a thing.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
- 29. Conclusion
Possible solutions to the fact–value problem:
Hume—Value judgments are emotional reactions to
specific facts.
Moore—Value judgements involve intuitively recognizing
value within facts.
Ayer—Value statements are expressions of feelings in
response to facts, emotivism.
Hare—Moral statements have descriptive and prescriptive
elements.
© 2017 Cengage Learning. All Rights Reserved.
