Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association, Vol. 32, No. 2, 20.docx

Journal of the Abraham Lincoln Association, Vol. 32, No. 2,
2011
© 2011 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois
Battle for the War Department
Rewards for the Capture
of John Wilkes Booth
ROBERT G. WICK
Almost two weeks elapsed before the news of Abraham
Lincoln’s
assassination reached the northern Virginia tobacco farm of
Richard
Garrett. Although located just sixty miles south of Washington,
it
might well have been on the other side of the world. One
Garrett
family member would later recall that a lack of mail service, no
tele-
graph wires to speak of, and few travelers making their way
through
conspired to keep news under wraps.1
A day earlier a stranger was left at Garrett’s front door.
Identified as
an injured Confederate soldier headed home, the handsome man
ap-
peared rough and haggard. Most likely thinking of his own two
sons
recently returned from the war, Richard Garrett graciously
offered

his hospitality. As the Garrett family and the stranger sat down
for
lunch the next day, the family had no idea their guest already
knew
what had happened to the president. Amidst the clamor of a
large
family partaking of its noonday meal, the talk soon turned to the
War
Department’s $100,000 reward offered for the assassin’s
capture.
“I wish he would come this way. I’d like to get that amount,”
Wil-
liam H. Garrett recalled saying. Without betraying a hint of
emotion,
John Wilkes Booth, known to his host as James W. Boyd, asked
William
if he would really betray the assassin for that amount. “He’d
better
not tempt me, for I haven’t a dollar in the world,” William
replied.
Richard Garrett harrumphed that his son was “young and
foolish. He
does not mean what he says.”2
As Booth enjoyed what would be one of his final meals,
Lafayette
Baker was in Washington, D.C., paying the price for the poor
reputa-
tion he had among his fellow soldiers. Called to the capital by
Secre-
1. Betsy Fleet, ed., “A Chapter of Unwritten History: Richard
Baynham Garrett’s
Account of the Flight and Death of John Wilkes Booth,”
Virginia Magazine of History
and Biography 71 (October 1963): 394.
2. Ibid, 394; William Garrett, “True Story of the Capture of

John Wilkes Booth,”
Confederate Veteran 29 (1921): 129.
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tary of War Edwin M. Stanton to help find Lincoln’s assassin,
Baker
was met with stiff resistance from fellow investigators. His luck
would
change, however, when word came from southern Maryland that
two
men matching the description of Booth and David Herold were
seen
crossing the Potomac River on Sunday, April 16, headed into
the area
of Virginia known as the Northern Neck.
That this information proved wrong would become irrelevant.
Un-
til investigators learned that Booth had suffered a broken leg,
they
feared he could have been as far south as Mexico. Baker,
prompted
by the supposed crossing, called in a former Civil War officer
who at
one time had field command of the cavalry unit that Baker
created in
1863 to help with the investigations he undertook on behalf of
the War
Department. Everton Judson Conger was a diminutive fireball
who
had been shot twice during the war and was finally declared
unfit
for service in 1864. He left the First District of Columbia
Cavalry to

become a detective in Baker’s National Detective Police.
Baker sent Conger to General Christopher Columbus Augur to
re-
quest a detachment of soldiers to accompany Conger and
Baker’s cousin,
Luther Byron Baker, on the expedition. Byron Baker had served
under
Conger as quartermaster of the First District of Columbia
Cavalry and
was now also a detective with the National Detective Police.
Soon, the
pair was joined by Lieutenant Edward P. Doherty of the
Sixteenth New
York Cavalry, who had been dispatched to Baker’s office. Plans
were
discussed, and the posse, composed of twenty-five cavalrymen
and the
two government detectives, soon boarded the steamer John S.
Ide, taking
one day to get to the same spot it had taken Booth twelve days
to reach.
Riding through northern Virginia, Conger and Byron Baker
some-
times impersonated soldiers looking for a lame man with whom
they
had served during the war. Although that ruse didn’t work, the
patrol
hit a streak of luck when they found a fisherman, William
Rollins, who
the previous day had seen two men fitting the description of
Booth
and Herold. Rollins’s wife, Bettie, helpfully informed the men
that
they were taken across in the company of three Confederate
soldiers,
one of whom, Willie Jett, she knew to have a girlfriend farther

up
the road. William Rollins, fearful what neighbors might think,
only
agreed to help the patrol if he was placed under arrest. The
party also
interrogated a free black, James Thornton, who operated the
ferry
which had taken Booth, Herold, and their new-found
Confederate
compatriots across the Rappahannock.3
3. Edward J. Steers Jr., Blood on the Moon: The Assassination
of Abraham Lincoln (Lex-
ington: University of Kentucky Press, 2001), 197.
2 War Department Rewards for Booth
JALA 32_2 text.indd 2 5/26/11 1:52 PM
The patrol stopped at a roadside house where ladies of the
evening
had entertained some soldiers earlier. The ladies were hesitant
to talk
lest it be bad for business. Conger broke their silence by telling
the
madam, a Mrs. Carter, that they were searching for some men
who
had horribly violated a woman. With that news, she suddenly
became
helpful, telling the soldiers that the men who visited her house
were
not lame, meaning that they must have deposited Booth
somewhere
in the area. They rode further south to Bowling Green, Virginia,

where
Jett received a rousing wake-up, staring down the barrel of
Conger’s
pistol. Jett decided he had better talk. Asking if he could speak
to
Conger alone, Jett told him that he had left Booth at Richard
Garrett’s
farm. Assuming that Conger had come up from Richmond, Jett
said
he had no way to know if Booth was still there.4
Booth was still there, although the Garretts, suspicious of their
guest
after seeing his reaction to the federal troops who had passed by
ear-
lier, had locked him in a tobacco barn to keep him from stealing
their
horses. Surrounding the Garrett house shortly after midnight,
Conger,
Byron Baker, and Doherty scattered the twenty-four soldiers at
various
points around the farm. For the next few hours, Byron Baker
talked
with Booth, demanding that the fugitive give himself up. The
ordeal
finally proved too much for Herold, who surrendered. By this
time,
convinced that Booth was not coming out, and likely in intense
pain
due to his wounds, Conger set fire to the barn. Booth at first
attempted
to see if he could put the flames out, but failing that, he headed
toward
the door. Saying he was fearful that Booth planned to shoot his
way
out, Sergeant Boston Corbett immediately fired one shot that hit
Booth

in the neck, dropping him. Paralyzed and slowly, painfully
choking to
death, Booth attempted to talk with Conger. “Tell mother I die
for my
country,” he whispered. Looking at his hands, he muttered
“Useless,
useless.” Later that morning Booth died.5
Not only did the Garrett family not get any of the reward
money, the
family’s brief encounter with Booth and Herold almost put
Richard
Garrett at the end of a rope. While Lafayette Baker would
receive part
of the money, he got far less than he believed he deserved, as
did Byron
Baker and Doherty. The promise of $100,000 from the War
Department
filled the Virginia and Maryland countrysides with thousands of
of-
4. Testimony of Everton J. Conger in Benjamin Perley Poore,
The Conspiracy Trial for
the Murder of the President (Boston: J. E. Tilton, 1865), 1:312.
5. Everton J. Conger, May 14, 1867, Impeachment
Investigation, Testimony Taken Before
the Judiciary Committee of the House of Representatives in the
Investigation of Charges Against
Andrew Johnson, 39th Cong., 2d sess., 40th Cong., 1st sess.
(Washington: Government
Printing Office, 1867), 328.
Robert G. Wick 3
JALA 32_2 text.indd 3 5/26/11 1:52 PM

ficial and non-official searchers. The reward, however, had no
effect
in capturing the two fugitives, and, it could be argued, allowed
them
to remain free for twelve days given the hesitancy of many to
share
information that they believed might have lessened their claim
to the
money. Paradoxically, because so many people hungered to line
their
pockets, their usually worthless tips tied up investigators who
might
have better spent their time on more promising leads.
In 1866 Judge Advocate General Joseph Holt found that “no
party
is strictly entitled to any reward for information which
conduced to
the capture of Booth and Herold, inasmuch as no claimant is
found
to have furnished on or after April 20 . . . any such intelligence
as can
be deemed to have led to the arrest as actually made.” For most
his-
torians who have written on the subject, questions surrounding
the
War Department rewards ended on July 28, 1866, when the
United
States Senate passed a bill allotting the shares to the twenty-
seven men
who made up the Garrett Farm Patrol. Over the next several
years,
however, those who participated argued, fought, and slandered
one
another to the point where the details of how Booth and Herold
were

captured became fuzzied.
Very few academic historians have studied Lincoln’s
assassination
in any depth. While not the only professor holding this view,
one only
has to remember James G. Randall’s stern intonation that he
focused
on “the living Lincoln” to see how the field was opened to all
kinds of
cranks, pseudo-historians, and other charlatans. Many of those
latched
onto the story of the battle for the War Department rewards as a
cudgel
used to slam the character and motives of those who sought to
capture
Booth, mistaking their actions after the capture for their
motives before.
In the meager number of volumes dealing responsibly with
Lincoln’s
death, the main question that has interested historians is the
fight be-
tween Conger and Byron Baker against Doherty over who held
primacy
in the expedition and therefore was entitled to the largest share
of the
money. A secondary study is the contempt of many for
Lafayette Baker
and how that led to his share of the reward being gutted. From
there,
interest has waned. The most logical reason for this, says Mark
Neely
Jr., is that the parties involved were at the outset obscure
figures who
went on to lead obscure lives in a time when great social
movements,
and the people behind them, became the focus of historians.

Even those
who have contributed to the historiography in a responsible
manner
don’t dwell very long on the question of the rewards.6
6. Mark E. Neeley Jr., “The Lincoln Theme Since Randall’s
Call: The Promises and
Perils of Professionalism,” Journal of the Abraham Lincoln
Association 1 (1979): 41–2;
JALA 32_2 text.indd 4 5/26/11 1:52 PM
As the field of study into Lincoln’s murder continues to expand
into
a more scholarly arena, it should come as no surprise that the
ques-
tions do not end where originally believed. Just how was the
reward
money distributed? What later happened to it, and how would
that
lead to the disputed facts as to what happened when Booth was
killed
and Herold captured? What effect, if any, did the offer of the
reward
have on the Garrett Farm Patrol before Booth was captured?
While the offer of $100,0007 brought thousands of people into
the
search, too much has been made of the effect the offer of the
rewards
had on the Garrett Farm Patrol before the capture. At the time,
it would
have been hard to foresee just how the reward would be

distributed,
or even if any money would be forthcoming. Indeed, after Booth
was
killed, a number of governmental agencies that offered rewards
went
back on their promises, prompting at least one unsuccessful
lawsuit.8
Given the excitement of the chase and the utter exhaustion it
brought
(no one, except possibly Conger, rested over a sixty-hour
period), it
is doubtful that the reward money was uppermost in anyone’s
mind
at the time the events played out.
One explanation for the belief that the reward was a factor to
the
searchers before Booth was killed is yet another remnant from
Otto
Eisenschiml’s grand conspiracy theory proffered in his 1937
“Why
Was Lincoln Murdered?” Eisenschiml, trying to prove that
Conger
shot Booth on orders from Secretary of War Stanton, attempted
to
make something of Conger getting the largest portion of the
reward
(conveniently forgetting that Lafayette Baker got much less
than his
subordinate). Later, in questioning why Booth had not been
taken
alive, Eisenschiml asked, “Was it fear that the rewards would
have
to be shared with reinforcements, which might arrive, that made
the
two detectives take such precipitate action?”9

Edward J. Steers Jr. notes the rewards in conjunction with the
commission set up to
receive claims. Blood on the Moon, xii; Michael Kauffman
devotes just two pages to the
reward fight. American Brutus (New York: Random House,
2004), 281–2; George S. Bryan
discusses the myth that the rewards were never paid in The
Great American Myth (New
York: Carrick & Evans, 1940), 284.
7. While the War Department offered $100,000, it was broken
down by fugitive, so
there was an offer of $50,000 for the capture of Booth, $25,000
for the capture of Herold,
and $25,000 for the capture of John Surratt. Thus the actual
amount under consideration
was $75,000.
8. Baker v. Doherty. District of Columbia Equity Court, case
no. 790. The author is
grateful to Michael W. Kauffman for providing to him the case
file.
9. Otto Eisenschiml, Why Was Lincoln Murdered? (Boston:
Little Brown, 1937), 157–60.
For refinements of Eisenschiml’s view that Conger shot Booth,
see also Eisenschiml,
Historian Without an Armchair (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill,
1963), 159–68, and Eisen-
Robert G. Wick 5
JALA 32_2 text.indd 5 5/26/11 1:52 PM
While Eisenschiml was the first to raise the issue for dubious if
not
downright false accusations, he certainly wasn’t the first to

stress
the influence the rewards had on the Garrett Farm Patrol. In
1909
Clara Laughlin wrote (in a reference also found in
Eisenschiml’s
research material) that Conger “was in mad haste to get to
Secretary
Stanton and tell him the reward of $75,000 had been earned.”
David
DeWitt, whose history was also published in 1909, was one of
the
first to document the bitter battle between Conger and Doherty,
as
well as the utter contempt of many congressmen for Lafayette
Baker.
DeWitt, in a note in his appendix concerning the rewards,
writes, “a
perusal of the testimony that has come down to us gives a
sickening
sense of the unreliability of witnesses when striving with each
other
for the biggest share of a large reward. Every one appears
unable to
resist the temptation to magnify his own exploits at the expense
of
those of his competitors. In the clouds of dust raised by the
ignoble
contention, the truth is either obscured beyond recognition or
disap-
pears altogether.”10
Most recently, in Manhunt, James Swanson repeats the old
canard
against the Garrett Farm Patrol. After Booth was killed,
Swanson writes,
“Thousands and thousands of dollars were exactly what Conger,
Baker,

Doherty, and the men of the Sixteenth New York had in mind.”
Yet, like
all others before him, Swanson provides no evidence other than
his
opinion. While there can be no doubt many people were seduced
by
the lure of a large cash prize, to insinuate that soldiers who only
weeks
before were willing to die for Lincoln were now trying to find
his killer
just to line their own pockets demands further evidence before
such
views can be sustained. We are asked to believe it simply
because it fits
in with the prejudices and personal beliefs of the authors, who
provide
no documented proof of their assertions. It is relegated to that
darkest
of Lincoln corners—the thing that everyone knows.11
Historically, the idea of a reward as a tool of law enforcement
has
produced a general ambivalence from some portions of the
populace.
Ideas of “blood money” and the lack of honor amongst thieves
often
schiml, “Addenda to Lincoln’s Assassination,” Journal of the
Illinois State Historical Society
43 Autumn (1950): 205–14.
10. Clara E. Laughlin, The Death of Lincoln (New York:
Doubleday, Page, 1909), 152;
The Conger quotation is also found in Laughlin, Hampton’s
Magazine (1909, p. 1) in Otto
Eisenschiml Papers, Box 8, Assassination Research Materials,
Article File 1, Abraham
Lincoln Presidential Library, Springfield. David Miller De Witt,

The Assassination of
Abraham Lincoln and its Expiation (New York: MacMillan,
1909), 279.
11. James Swanson, Manhunt: The 12–Day Chase For Lincoln’s
Killer (New York: Harper
Collins, 2006), 348–9.
JALA 32_2 text.indd 6 5/26/11 1:52 PM
made people look down on those who would use the promise of
a
cash award to induce them to turn someone in. Legally, a
reward at
the time Booth was captured was viewed as a contract. As is the
case
with all contracts, offer and acceptance were required before it
was
considered valid. In the case of government-sponsored rewards,
of-
fer was simply the proclamation that a reward was available for
a
particular act. Acceptance was the fulfillment of the
requirements set
out in the announcement.12
On November 24, 1865, the War Department issued an order
an-
nouncing that anyone who felt entitled to a share of the rewards
had
to file a claim by the end of the year. Because of the numerous
claims
submitted, the decision on how to distribute the rewards was
left to

the commission headed by Holt and his assistant, E. D.
Townsend.
Scores of people claimed they had in some way earned a portion
of the
money. Many members of the Sixteenth New York Cavalry,
several of
whom had been nowhere near Washington, applied in the
mistaken
belief that every member of the regiment would be eligible.
Most hired
agents to help facilitate their claims, and it seems likely that
many of
the agents were simply after a share of any money forthcoming.
The
widow of the veterinary surgeon of the Sixteenth New York,
who
had died in November 1865, even claimed that she should
receive her
husband’s share, if any was to be distributed.13
While most of the applicants were people who in good faith
thought
they should be compensated, one stands out as a blatant attempt
at theft.
Captain James B. Smith of the Sixth West Virginia Cavalry,
whose unit
arrived in Surratsville, Maryland, the day after Booth had been
killed
and Herold captured, wrote to West Virginia Congressman
George R.
Latham, promising Latham a “handsome reward” if he used his
influ-
ence to get some of the money for Smith’s company. “My
Company, as
you are aware, received comparatively small bounties and I
would like
to add something from this “sick bay” as a reward for their

arduous
services elsewhere,” Smith wrote. Obviously, his request was
ignored.14
After the application deadline passed, Holt and Townsend went
to
12. Shuey, Executor v. U.S., 92 US 75 (1875).
13. Awards for the Capture of Booth and Others: Letter from
the Secretary of War in Answer
to A Resolution of the House of the 10th Instant Calling for the
Findings of the Commission for
the Capture of J.W. Booth and D.E. Herold, 39th Cong. 1st
sess., ex. doc. no. 90 (Washing-
ton: Government Printing Office 1865), p. 1; Mary Grant,
widow of George W. Grant,
veterinary surgeon of the Sixteenth New York Cavalry letter to
War Department, ,
microcopy 619 roll 455, frames 302–3, RG 94, National
Archives.
14. Letter from James B. Smith to George R. Latham, January
1, 1866, microcopy 619,
roll 455, frame 557, RG 94, National Archives.
Robert G. Wick 7
JALA 32_2 text.indd 7 5/26/11 1:52 PM
work. Reflecting the commissioner’s military background, the
tradi-
tion of distributing prize money by rank was favored as the
fairest
arrangement. Using that logic, the reward scheme favored
Doherty,
who was awarded $7,500 compared to Lafayette Baker’s $3,750

and
the $4,000 each given to Conger and Byron Baker.15
Doherty worked hard to get that share. He first submitted his
official
report to his commanding officer on April 26, 1865. On May 9,
1865,
he submitted his claim for the reward to J. H. Taylor, assistant
adjutant
general and chief of staff in Washington. “My command and
myself
claim the honor of having effected the capture of the assassins
and we
respectfully ask that the reward offered be properly distributed
where
it belongs,” Doherty wrote. A number of Doherty’s men
supported
the general claim that he was the first to get information about
Booth
and Herold’s whereabouts.16
Clearly concerned that all of the credit (not to mention a good
chunk
of the money) would be going to Doherty, Lafayette Baker had
Con-
ger and Byron Baker issue a report that he submitted to Stanton
on
December 27, 1865. The detailed report, which appears in
Lafayette
Baker’s autobiography, had attached to it his own
“observations.” In
it, he said regardless of whether those involved were “citizen,
soldier,
or alien,” whoever participated in the capture deserved a share
com-
mensurate with that person’s role. Since it was his plan, and
since
he sent the men into the field, Lafayette Baker said he was

entitled
to the largest portion of the reward, followed by Conger and
Byron.
Doherty and his men were mere subordinates, “though
necessary,
instruments” to his own detectives.17
When he learned of this attempt to downplay his role, Doherty
wrote to Stanton on March 24, 1866. “As the award is still kept
open
in order to do justice to all claimants, and as I understand that
argu-
ments have been filed by other parties in support of their claims
I
hope that you will give the following from me your
consideration.
15. Awards for the Capture of Booth, 39th Cong., 1st sess., no.
90, p. 10.
16. Edward P. Doherty, “Capture of J. Wilkes Booth and David
E. Herold, at Gar-
rett’s Farm, near Port Royal Va.” In The War of the Rebellion:
A Compilation of the Official
Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (Washington:
Government Printing Office,
1880–1901), ser. 1, vol. 46, pt. 1, 1317–22; Doherty to J. H.
Taylor, Assistant Adjutant
General, Chief of Staff, May 9, 1865, Affidavit of Louis
Savage, May 29, 1865, Company
A, Sixteenth New York Cavalry, Affidavit of Adolph Singer,
May 30, 1865, Company
M, Sixteenth New York Cavalry. All located in Edward P.
Doherty Papers, Abraham
Lincoln Presidential Library, Springfield.
17. L. C. Baker, History of the United States Secret Service
(Philadelphia: King & Baird,
1867), 532–40.

JALA 32_2 text.indd 8 5/26/11 1:52 PM
An effort is made to show that I was only an escort to two
detectives
and that they commanded.”18
Doherty made his case that this was a “fallacy” based on
several
points. First, as the writ of habeas corpus had been suspended
by
President Lincoln, Doherty argued it would have been “beyond
prec-
edent” for a citizen to be in command of military forces. He had
been
ordered to report to Lafayette Baker, and only Baker had given
him
orders and pictures. Doherty pointed out that the captain of the
John
S. Ide was given written instructions to report to Doherty, and
Doherty
had given the captain orders directing his movement after
arriving at
the Belle Plain landing. Finally, it was Doherty’s belief that had
he only
been an escort, “there would have been no necessity of my
receiving
instructions from Captain [sic] Baker as to the route” the party
was
to take.
Doherty’s objections were not just the rants of a greedy soldier.
He was trained as a lawyer. Of all his objections, the only one
that

might have merit is the first—the argument that martial law
would
put the military in charge of all legal procedures in the District
of
Columbia and elsewhere. For all his legal training, Doherty,
who was
a Canadian, seriously misread the intent and letter of martial
law
and did not appear to be familiar with an opinion written in
1854 by
then-Attorney General Caleb Cushing, who argued that members
of the army could be used as a posse comitatus under the
command
of civilian officials. “The posse comitatus comprises every
person in
the district or county above the age of fifteen years, whatever
may be
their occupation, whether civilians or not and including the
military
of all denominations, militia, soldiers, marines, all of whom are
alive
bound to obey the commands of a sheriff or marshal. The fact
that
they are organized as military bodies, under the immediate
command
of their own officers, does not in any wise affect their legal
character,”
Cushing wrote.19
Herein lies one point of rebuttal to Doherty’s argument: even
though
the men of the Sixteenth New York Cavalry were under the
immedi-
ate command of Doherty, it would have been legal for the entire
unit,
organized as a posse comitatus, to be under the field command
of the

civilian Conger, who was under Lafayette Baker, head of the
civilian
National Detective Police (although he held the rank of colonel)
and in
overall command under the direction of the secretary of war,
himself
18. Doherty to Edwin M. Stanton, March 24, 1866, Doherty
Papers.
19. Caleb Cushing, “Extradition of Fugitives from Service,” in
Official Opinions of the
Attorneys General of the United States (Washington: Robert
Farnham, 1856), 6:473.
Robert G. Wick 9
JALA 32_2 text.indd 9 5/26/11 1:52 PM
a civilian. Even in times of martial law, which Washington,
D.C., had
been under since 1863 20, there is no change in the fact that the
military
remains under civilian control.
In his memoirs, Baker claimed he had informed Doherty that
his
men would be operating under the orders of Conger and Byron
Baker,
although it seems likely that Lafayette Baker included his
cousin only
as added insurance to his own reward claims. In this expedition
Conger
had complete command. As an officer, Conger had field
command of
the First District of Columbia Cavalry, in the place of Lafayette

Baker.
For all his faults, Baker realized that the success of the
regiment came
because of Conger’s leadership, and he wanted that leadership
avail-
able to those men on their pursuit of Booth. That can be the
only logical
explanation why Lafayette Baker would allow a man like
Conger, who
had been wounded twice and was in no shape to ride, on the
hunt.21
When the Holt-Townsend report was finally issued in April
1866,
Doherty surely breathed easier, finding his claim had been
upheld.
However, his joy must have been short-lived. On May 7, 1866,
less
than a month after the Holt-Townsend report was issued,
Pennsylva-
nia Congressman William D. Kelley introduced a resolution
asking
the Committee of Claims to “inquire into the fairness and
propriety
of the distribution of the rewards offered for the arrest of
Jefferson
Davis and the conspirators to murder President Lincoln.”22
The Committee of Claims investigated and on July 24, 1866,
issued
its report. Baker’s argument that he, and not Doherty, was
entitled to
the bulk of the money fell on more favorable ears because the
commit-
tee wrote that it did not “regard the capture of Booth and Herold
as
purely military service, and do not feel bound to award
compensation

to mere rank, without regard to the extent and merit of the
service
performed.” Politics would soon trump all else.23
The committee suggested that Lafayette Baker receive $17,500
and
Conger, since he was by all official accounts except Doherty’s,
in charge
of the field unit, should also get $17,500. Byron Baker would
get $5,000
and Doherty would get $2,500. It also recommended that Major
James
O’Beirne, whose erroneous report of two men crossing the
Potomac
put Baker on the right track, receive $2,000.24
20. J. G. Randall, Constitutional Problems Under Lincoln, rev.
ed. (Urbana: University
of Illinois Press, 1951), 170; House Rep. No. 262, March 26,
1874, 43rd Cong., 1st sess.,
p. 6.
21. Baker, History of the Secret Service, 534.
22. House Reports, 39th Cong., 1st sess., Report No. 99, p. 1.
23. Ibid., 3.
24. Ibid.
JALA 32_2 text.indd 10 5/26/11 1:52 PM
When the bill came before the full House two days later,
Represen-
tative Columbus Delano of Ohio amended the proposal to cut
Con-
ger’s share to $15,000 while substantially decimating Lafayette

Baker’s
share to $3,750 and raising Doherty’s to $5,250. Michigan
Congressman
John F. Driggs offered an amendment to return Doherty’s share
to
$7,000 and cut Conger’s to $4,000. Driggs explained his action
saying,
“I do not want to see two or three men have $40,000 of the
reward.”
He added that Lafayette Baker was in the process of building a
hotel
outside of Lansing, Michigan, “with the money he has made off
the
Government, and yet it is proposed to pay him $17,500!”25
Even though Hotchkiss questioned the fairness of what Driggs
and
others who despised Lafayette Baker were trying to do, he
presented
only a token support of his own reward scheme. Hotchkiss said
that
if the House chose to deprive Baker of the money based on
Driggs’s
argument, they would have to answer for it without him.
Conger,
however, was another matter. “If personal sympathy was to be
al-
lowed to have anything to do with this matter, I should say that
Lieu-
tenant Colonel Conger was the most meritous man who had
aught
to do with this whole affair,” Hotchkiss said. “And with my
consent
he shall never be ignored in this matter with the paltry sum
given to
him under the rule prevailing in prize cases.”26
Driggs’s amendment was voted down while Delano’s was

approved
with eighty-seven affirmative votes. What was unknown to
many peo-
ple is that at what one observer termed as “the eleventh hour” a
com-
promise was worked out which would allow the bill to be
passed. It was
spearheaded by future president Rutherford B. Hayes, who was
from
Conger’s hometown of Fremont. Hayes, who knew Conger
through
Hayes’s uncle, Sardis Birchard, told Conger if he could be
patient, he
could get him a large portion if he would be willing to take just
a bit
less. Conger, tired of the battle, agreed. Hayes hammered out a
deal
that got Conger the $15,000.27 Debate moved to the Senate,
which took
up the question on July 28. With much less fanfare and vitriol
than had
marked its passage in the House, the Senate voted unanimously
to pass
the bill. The battle, it appeared, was over.
What has been left largely unexplored is what developed
between
the Bakers and Conger after the reward was distributed and how
that
25. Congressional Globe, June 26, 1866, 4183–6.
26. Ibid, 4187.
27. Ibid, 4188; Delano must have worked with Hayes on the
compromise, as his
amendment provided Conger with the $15,000. Hayes’s role in
this is spelled out in
an unpublished typescript provided to the author by Conger ’s

grandson, Everton
Ellsworth Conger.
Robert G. Wick 11
JALA 32_2 text.indd 11 5/26/11 1:52 PM
affected the story of the capture. From the available evidence it
ap-
pears that a rift began to grow between the three men, although
it
wouldn’t reach its full fruition until sometime around 1868,
after La-
fayette Baker’s death. It also appears that Lafayette Baker was
able to
recoup some of the money he lost on the floor of the House.
After Conger received his money, he put some of it into Baker
’s
hotel. Just how much he loaned Baker is unknown, but the best
esti-
mate would be nearly $12,000. This figure comes from a
newspaper
article published in 1874 after Conger was admitted to practice
law
by the Illinois Supreme Court. The Carmi Weekly Times,
quoting the
St. Louis Democrat, reported that “Among the foregoing names
will
be found that of E.J. Conger; a name with a story appended, he
being
the identical Conger that effected the capture of John Wilkes
Booth,
the assassin of President Lincoln.” Although the paper erred
when it

reported Conger received $12,000 instead of $15,000, the
remainder
of its account was remarkably detailed, leading one to believe
that
the source of the unsigned article could have been Conger.28
Conger loaned the money “to a friend, Col. Baker, who secured
the
loan by a mortgage on a piece of land in Michigan. Shortly after
the
execution of the mortgage, Baker died, and Conger, after the
maturity
of the debt, proceeded to foreclose. Unfortunately the land was
not
correctly located in the mortgage, and the Baker heirs contested
the
foreclosure. After a protracted series of efforts to recover,
Conger was
finally beaten and left penniless.”29
Unfortunately the hotel venture in Lansing proved a bitter
failure.
In addition to Conger’s loss of life savings, many of the
investors also
lost money, thus contributing to the already poor reputation of
Baker.
What effect did that have on the relationship between Conger
and the
Bakers? No record exists of a suit filed in Lansing during 1868
or 1869
by Conger. The only evidence of a breach comes in how the
stories
told by Conger and Byron Baker differed as the years passed.
To illustrate the rift, one need only look at the accounts written
by
the two men long after the rewards were distributed. The first
offi-
cial account was given aboard the monitor Montauk on April 27,

1865,
just after the events transpired. While Baker later complained
that his
version had been mysteriously destroyed (to deprive him, he
said,
of a proper share of the reward), it was actually located in the
Judge
Advocate General’s files on the assassination, next to Conger’s
report.
In his report, Conger told Judge Advocate General Holt and
John A.
28. St. Louis Democrat, quoted in Carmi Weekly Times, June
12, 1874, p. 2, col. 2.
29. Ibid.
JALA 32_2 text.indd 12 5/26/11 1:52 PM
Bingham that he had heard Baker’s statement and called it “in
the main,
accurate. . . .” There was, however, the first hint of a
discrepancy.30
Recall that Conger and Byron Baker initially submitted a joint
report
to bolster their own roles in the battle for the reward money.
There
is no mention in that report as to how Conger came to be in the
de-
tail, although in his autobiography, Lafayette Baker said he sent
for
both men independently of each other after he had spoken to “an
old

negro” who he claimed gave him the lead he was looking for. In
the
Montauk statement Conger said he had been summoned by
Lafayette
Baker on April 24, 1865, and that Byron Baker never entered
the room
until after Conger had spoken with General Augur to secure
soldiers
to make up the patrol. In their report, the two men were working
independently preparing for the mission.31
After the reward question had been settled, however, Byron
Baker
changed his story. Not called to testify at the trial of the
conspirators,
his only other official account was given (other than his own
statement
aboard the Montauk) during the impeachment investigation
against
President Andrew Johnson. At the end of his testimony Byron
Baker
said he had started out in command of the party but felt that
Conger’s
feelings had been hurt. “Colonel Conger is a good officer and a
pecu-
liar man,” Baker said. “I knew he was experienced, and was
familiar
with the country about Belle Plain, and as we came up on the
bluff,
it being then very dark, I said, ‘Colonel Conger, you take
charge of
the cavalry; you have been over the ground.’” In later years, the
story
changed even more, with Conger begging Byron Baker to make
him a
part of the detail. Byron Baker hesitated, he said, because of
Conger’s

two battle wounds.32
Whose account is accurate? The weight of the credible
evidence
must be given to Conger and Lafayette Baker. Even if one
dismissed
Lafayette Baker as the ultimate and consummate liar (as many
did),
Conger corroborated Lafayette’s account with his statement
aboard
the Montauk. Given that no one knew how the rewards would be
30. Testimony of L. B. Baker, May 22, 1867 in Impeachment
Investigation, 486; State-
ment of E. J. Conger before Brigadier General Holt, Judge
Advocate General, United
States Army, and the Honorable John A. Bingham, Special
Judge Advocate, on board
the monitor Montauk Washington, D.C., April 27, 1865 in
microcopy 619, roll 455, frame
725 (hereafter referred to as Montauk statement).
31. L. C. Baker, History of the Secret Service, 531; Conger,
Montauk statement; Report
of E. J. Conger and L. B. Baker in L.C. Baker, History of the
Secret Service, 533–40.
32. Testimony of L. B. Baker, May 22, 1867, Impeachment
Investigation, 490; L.B. Baker,
“An Eyewitness Account of the Death and Burial of J. Wilkes
Booth,” Journal of the Il-
linois State Historical Society 34 (1946): 428.
Robert G. Wick 13
JALA 32_2 text.indd 13 5/26/11 1:52 PM

distributed, what possible reason would Conger have for lying?
Even
Byron Baker ’s statement to the impeachment committee—forty-
two
years before publication of the article claiming Conger begged
to be
on the expedition—spoke only of the two’s role in the field and
not
before the expedition took place.
Also, the Baker family papers included an “Eyewitness
Account”
that served as the basis for an article written by Ray Stannard
Baker in
McClure’s Magazine in May 1897. Using the Jett account as an
example,
Byron Baker puts himself in the room while Jett agrees to tell
what he
knows, even though Conger and Doherty corroborate that
Conger was
the only one in the room. In 1960, Jacob Mogelever wrote one
of the
few biographies of Lafayette Baker, using as his main source
“manu-
scripts and unpublished letters held in the Baker family for
nearly a
century and unread by anyone except descendents of the
brothers,
sisters, and cousins of the detective chief.” In his
acknowledgements
Mogelever presents his biases early when he calls Byron Baker
“the
true hero of the events at Garrett’s farm.” Careful not to
overstate the
case in his narrative, however, Mogelever presents the two as
working
together, although only through the kindness of Byron Baker

who took
pity on his old friend. Only after Corbett shot Booth was it
“time for
[Conger] to assume command.”33
Conger’s memory could, at times, be selective. In none of his
ac-
counts does it mention his having to stop and rest for a time or
the
constant pain he was in because of his hip wounds. Both
Doherty
and Byron Baker mention this in their accounts, using it to
imply that
Conger was too hobbled to be an effective leader. There is
ample evi-
dence to show that Conger did indeed need a break from the
action,
although despite the severity of his wounds, his stamina was
keen.34
What one gathers from the actions of the three men during the
remainder of their lives is what one often sees between military
men
after the war—a continual effort to refight the battle, making
claims
for one’s own efforts and downgrading others. Both Doherty
and
Byron Baker mounted speaking tours, although Baker ’s was by
far
the better known. Conger, whether suffering from his war
wounds
33. Baker, “Eyewitness Account,” 432; Mogelever, Death to
Traitors, 11; ibid., 342–69.
34. In his testimony in the trial of John H. Surratt, Conger
admitted to being “a little
lame” which, according to his medical records, completely
understated the severity of

his wounds. Throughout his life, Conger would suffer from their
effects, turning at times
to morphine and alcohol as palliatives. See The Reporter: A
Periodical Devoted to Religion,
Law, Legislation, and Public Events (Washington, D.C.: R.
Sutton, 1867) 3:262. Conger’s
medical files are located in his pension application file, RG 92,
National Archives.
JALA 32_2 text.indd 14 5/26/11 1:52 PM
or content in his knowledge of his role, never mounted a
national
tour. Byron Baker died in 1896 followed by Doherty in 1897.
Conger
outlived his two rivals by nearly twenty years, dying in 1918.
As to the effect that the rewards had on the men before the
capture,
the claim that their minds were focused on the money as they
entered
the field cannot be sustained. It would be beyond human nature
to
suggest that in those two days no one thought in the back of his
mind
how much money he might see should the patrol be successful.
But
that is a far cry from the claims of many writers that there was
some-
how a “mad scramble” to kill or capture Booth before anyone
else
could arrive and have a legitimate claim to the money.
There is little doubt that Conger received the largest portion of

the
reward through the influence of political allies. In the final
analysis,
there can also be little doubt that each man contributed to the
suc-
cess of the capture of Booth, but in any expedition of this scope
there
has to be one person in charge. Lafayette Baker wanted that
person
to be Conger. To bypass healthier men and place on the
expedition
someone whose wounds made the simple act of walking difficult
shows either a determined faith in Conger ’s ability or an utter
lack
of intelligence. Whatever one feels about Lafayette Baker, very
few
people questioned his intelligence. Conger ’s role doesn’t take
away
from the contributions of those others, but neither should
Conger ’s
political connections take away from his unqualified leadership.
All
can coexist peacefully.
Robert G. Wick 15
JALA 32_2 text.indd 15 5/26/11 1:52 PM
Colleague Joy
group research design and data collection method from those
outlined in the Resources you selected as appropriate for the
“Social Work Research: Planning a Program Evaluation” case
study and why.
The group research design and data collection method that was

used by the social worker, Joan, for the foster care training
program was documentation review, observation and
questionnaires (McNamara, 2006; Plummer, Makris &
Brocksen, 2014). The reasons why are that Joan mentions how
she has done significant literature research on foster care
training. Secondly, the observation involved Joan’s observing
the new group of foster care parents and their training on how
they reacted to the new training program. The last is the
questionnaires and surveys. The questionnaires/surveys were
when she states that she will do a Likert-type measurement
program to find out if the new training program is successful
(McNamara, 2006; Plummer, Makris & Brocksen, 2014).
Then, generate criteria to be measured using the research design
by identifying a specific outcome and a method for measuring
that outcome.
According to the case study, the specific outcome for the foster
care training program study is to “reduce foster placement
disruptions, improving the quality of services delivered, and
increasing child well-being through better trained and skilled
foster families” (Plummer, 2014, p. 66). The method for
measuring that outcome is through the Likert scale. The Likert
scale can measure the success of the training program on the
participants. Also, the observations of the success of the
program will help to analyze the new training program. Finally,
the review of the literature provided from the training sessions
such as the workbooks and quizzes if they are being done for
the group.
Specify who will collect the data and how the data will be
collected.
The data will be collected by the agency administering the
intervention which allows flexibility in the methods of data
collection and analysis (Dudley, 2016). This data collection
procedure is called the formative evaluation and a formative
evaluation can identify any glitches the foster care training
program. The formative evaluation can also recognize a
breakdown in the delivery of service which means that the

training program may not be successful if there are lower scores
on the Likert scales (Dudley, 2016). Another benefit to the
formative evaluation is that the training material may go off
course and not stick to its original design. The evaluation can
help to fix any inconsistences for achieving the goals of the
training program.
References:
Dudley, J. R. (2016). Social Work Evaluation, Second Edition.
[Chegg]. Retrieved
from https://ereader.chegg.com/#/books/978019068533
McNamara, C. (2006a). Contents of an evaluation plan. In Basic
guide to program evaluation (including outcomes evaluation).
Retrieved from http://managementhelp.org/evaluation/program-
evaluation- guide.htm#anchor1586742
Plummer, S., Makris, S., Brocksen, S. M. (2014). Social Work
Case Studies: Concentration Year [VitalSource Bookshelf
version]. Retrieved from vbk://9781624580055
Colleague Marla
Top of Form
Research Design & Data Collection Method for the Case Study
and Why
"The overall goal in selecting evaluation methods (s) is to get
the most useful information to key decision makers in the most
cost-effective and realistic fashion" (McNamara, 2006a, p.
5). A formative evaluation involving quantitative and
qualitative information would be recommended for this specific
case study's research design, since the agency being researched
has decided they want to start a new training program
(Plummer, Makris, & Brocksen, 2014b). "Formative
evaluations mostly focus on planning for a program or
improving the implementation or delivery of services. The

evaluations tend to be exploratory in nature and may need either
qualitative or quantitative methods or both" (Dudley, 2014, p.
255). In fact, it is during the planning stage of a formative
evaluation that triangulation is recommended, in order to seek
multiple sources of information and compare them (Dudley,
2014). Data collection could occur through administering
surveys or questionnaires with forced-response and/or open-
ended questions, a Likert scale standardized assessment tool,
observations, analyzing secondary data, conducting focus
groups and/or individual interviews with community members,
and/or consult other local experts about services needed and
how to secure funding resources (Dudley, 2014). "The
combination of qualitative and quantitative methods in
evaluations offers several advantages to evaluations, including
complementary, triangulation, and accountability" (Dudley,
2014, p. 272). Quantitative and qualitative methods offer
distinct kinds of data that provide numeric measures of aspects
such as client satisfaction, outcomes, and profiles of
prospective program participants (Dudley, 2014). Qualitative
data tends to answer the question "why" and provide a more
humanistic, holistic understanding to the data collected
(Dudley, 2014). "Qualitative and quantitative findings on the
same topic can be helpful in triangulation of the findings. Use
of both methods can provide two types of information sources
on the same topic" (Dudley, 2014, p. 273). In order to more
accurately and efficiently assess or interpret qualitative data
collected for the study, it may be necessary to condense
responses into general categories or identify common themes or
patterns present in the data collected (Dudley, 2014).
Specific Outcome & Method for Measuring that Outcome
Summative evaluations look at outcomes of programs and help
determine whether or not the intervention was effective
(Dudley, 2014). Further, "Outcomes evaluation looks at
impacts/benefits/changes to your clients (as a result of your
program's efforts) during and/or after their participation in your
program" (McNamara, 2006b, p. 2). Outcomes components

include inputs, activities, outputs, and outcomes (McNamara,
2006b). An outcome evaluation of quasi-experimental or
experimental design using qualitative and quantitative
measurements for this specific case study would help determine
whether or not the primary goals of the new training program
were being met: reducing foster placement disruptions,
improving the quality of services delivered, and increasing child
well-being through better trained and skilled foster families
(Dudley, 2014; Plummer, Makris, & Brocksen, 2014b). A
quasi-experimental or experimental group design would also
take into account and control for outside factors that may
influence the data (Dudley, 2014). Data can be compiled from
multiple sources for triangulation (Likert scale questionnaires,
existing documentation, participant observation, and in-depth
interviews, for example), and the data can be measured through
condensing responses into general categories, conducting a
theme analysis, and/or conducting a descriptive analysis. There
are also different types of hypothesis testing that can be
completed in order to determine whether or not there is a
relationship between the outcome and intervention applied, and
a correlation test reflects the strength of a relationship that
exists (Dudley, 2014). A paired-samples t-test could be used to
assess the outcomes of the specific case study from this week's
readings. Pretest and posttest scores from the group would be
compared to evaluate the effects of program participation on
reducing foster placement disruptions, improving the quality of
services delivered, and increasing child well-being through
better trained and skilled foster families (Dudley, 2014;
Plummer, Makris, & Brocksen, 2014b).
Who Will Collect the Data and How
Summative evaluations are usually conducted by an outside
source to ensure objectivity. Data can be collected through
several means, such as conducting questionnaires, satisfaction
surveys, interviews, and/or administering pretests and
posttests with participants at the beginning and again at
termination, either in person, via telephone calls, and/or other

mail or electronic communication.
References:
Dudley, J.R. (2014). Social work evaluation: Enhancing what
we do. (2nd ed.). Chicago, IL: Lyceum Books.
McNamara, C. (2006a). Contents of an evaluation plan. In Basic
guide to program evaluation (including outcomes
evaluation). Retrieved from
http://managementhelp.org/evaluation/program-evaluation-
guide.htm#anchor1586742.
McNamara, C. (2006b). Reasons for priority on implementing
outcomes-based evaluation. In Basic guide to outcomes-based
evaluation for nonprofit organizations with very limited
resources. Retrieved from
http://managementhelp.org/evaluation/outcomes-evaluation-
guide.htm#anchor30249.
Plummer, S.-B., Makris, S., & Brocksen, S. (Eds.).
(2014b). Social work case studies: Concentration
year. Baltimore, MD: Laureate International Universities
Publishing. [Vital Source e-reader].
Bottom of Form

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