The Concept of Program ReengineeringBased on the Case Study.docx

The Concept of Program Reengineering
Based on the Case Study: Mayor Schell’s Zero Homeless Family
Strategy (PDF), write a 4-5 page paper in which you:
PLEASE FOLLOW INSTRUCTIONS BELOW BEFORE
GETTING STARTED.
· APA Style 4 - 5 pages excluding title and reference page
· No Page Number on Title Page
· No Page Number on Reference Page / References APA Style
· Add Abstract!!!
· Running Head on ALL PAGES including title page and
reference page.
1. Analyze four (4) policy choices of Mayor Schell that were
made as part of the strategy for the homeless.
2. Analyze the Pre-Implementation and Design Strategies of
Mayor Schell and interpret four (4) practical outcomes of his
choices.
3. Reconstruct four (4) steps taken by Mayor Schell to
reengineer the program in order to fit the new objectives.
4. Analyze four (4) reasons for the importance of conducting
assessments prior to new program implementation.
5. Research at least four (4) peer-reviewed academic sources.
Your assignment must:
· Be typed, double spaced, using Times New Roman font (size
12), with one-inch margins on all sides; references must follow
APA or school-specific format. Check with your professor for
any additional instructions.
· Include a cover page containing the tile of the assignment, the
student’s name, the professor’s name, the course title, and the
date. The cover page and the reference page are not included in
the required page length.
The specific course learning outcomes associated with this
assignment are:

· Analyze and apply concepts of planning, reengineering,
implementation, and program evaluation essential to the study
of public administration as it relates to political choice.
· Use technology and information resources to research issues in
modern public administration.
· Write clearly and concisely about modern public
administration using proper writing mechanics.
Bottom of Form
Case Study 1: A Change Management
This case was prepared in 1987 for the National Association of
Educational Broadcasters by Dan H. Fenn, Jr., retired faculty of
the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard
University, and faculty for the Cascade Center for Public
Service Executive Programs. This case study is intended as a
basis for class discussion and is not intended to suggest correct
or incorrect handling of the situation depicted.The Electronic
Hallway is administered by the University of Washington's
Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs. This material may not
be altered or copied without written permission from The
Electronic Hallway. For permission, email [email protected], or
phone (206) 616-8777.
Electronic Hallway members are granted copy permission for
educational purposes per Member’s Agreement
(www.hallway.org). Copyright 1996 The Electronic Hallway
A CHANGE OF MANAGEMENT
After the announcement of his successor as Executive Director
of New Jersey Public Television (NJPTV) on March 20, 1979,
Dr. Lawrence T. Frymire busied himself cleaning up the loose
ends of the position which he had held since the system had
become operational some nine years before. Looking ahead to
April 30, his last day in office, he still wondered what had
happened -- why the Commissioners of the Public Broadcasting
Authority had suddenly requested his resignation some four
months before.The newspapers thought they had the answer:
Governor Brendan T. Byrne was seeking to establish political

control over the state's public broadcasting system. As
evidence, they noted that the leading contenders for the job
were Herbert Wolfe, Byrne's first information director, and
former Democratic Assemblyman Gordon MacInnes, both
politically involved with the Governor. Frymire thought the
papers might be right -- but he was not completely sure.
NJPTV had come into existence in 1969 as the result of a
citizens' study made in 1967-68 at the instigation of then
Governor Richard J. Hughes. Governor Hughes had requested a
distinguished group of 18 men and women including the Provost
of Princeton, the Poetry Editor of the Saturday Review, five
members of his cabinet and TV personalities like Dallas
Townsend and Dionne Warwick to produce a set "of policies,
plans and recommendations for the development of public radio
and television for the state." To head the Commission he
selected Dr. Edward J. Meade, Jr., then Program Officer in
charge of Public Education for the Ford Foundation. The
Commission issued its report in May, 1968 and the Governor
quickly followed through with its recommendations, filing the
necessary legislation to establish a
Public Broadcasting Authority. Late that year, the Act was
passed and signed, and the Governor made the first
appointments of ten public members which were duly confirmed
by the Senate. In addition, five cabinet members (Commissioner
of Education, State Treasurer, Chancellor of Higher
2. A Change Of Management
Education, Attorney General and Commissioner of Community
Affairs) served ex officio. The first Chairman was Dr. Meade;
the Vice-Chairman was George Connett, Vice President for
personnel administration of the Prudential Insurance Company.
(Other members, and those appointed by subsequent Governors,
are listed in Attachment 1.) The Commission plan recommended
a capital budget of $16 million, half to be raised in a bond issue
and the other half to come from federal funds, and an annual
operating budget of about $6 million. However, the plan was

reduced to $7.5 million in capital, financed totally by a bond
issue, and the operating budget to barely $6 million. By the fall
of ‘69, a new Governor, William J. Cahill took office.While
somewhat interested, Cahill was not as enthusiastic about the
project as had been his predecessor. Wanting to see the station
for himself, the new Governor made a visit to the rebuilt
bowling alley in a rural area outside Trenton which served as
headquarters for the fledgling operation. To make sure he saw
something more than just empty space, Chairman Meade
persuaded RCA to lend some equipment to provide the flavor of
an actual operating station.
The Governor then decided to proceed with the idea, but more
slowly than had been originally planned because of the
financially and politically controversial nature of the
undertaking. As with any major new program in New Jersey, the
legislature was especially wary of this one, uncertain as they
were that it could be run in a non-political, non-partisan
fashion.About this time, Dr. Meade and the Authority began
conducting a search for a person to head up the staff and get the
station on the air. After an extensive search, the position was
offered to Dr. Larry Frymire, a professor of communications at
the University of Illinois, who had done a study for the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting, worked for the FCC, and
worked on the New Jersey legislation setting up the
Authority.In selecting Frymire, Meade was impressed by his
high degree of technical competence and his intimate knowledge
of the administrative steps necessary to put a station on the air.
"I didn't know a tube from a transmitter," Meade said later. In
addition, given the potentially controversial nature of the effort,
the Authority wanted a person of extraordinary integrity and
prudence, someone who did not seek or attract personal
visibility but who would rather concentrate his energies in a
steady and well-organized way on the launching and operation
of the station.Initially Frymire turned Meade down, but by early
spring of 1970, with capital funds of $7.5 million and an
operating budget of $2.2 million assured, he decided to leave

Illinois and take on the responsibility on June 15, 1970. By
April of 1971, he had Channel 52 in Trenton (the State capitol)
on the air; Channel 23 in Camden followed in October of 1973
and Channels 58 (New Brunswick) and 50 (Montclair) started
operation in June of 1974.
In those first few months, following the recommendations of the
study, the Commissioners made
a number of key policy decisions. First of all, they decided to
focus programming on the State
3. A Change of Management
of New Jersey, rather than on regional, national or international
events and interests. They recognized full well that northern
New Jersey was considered by many to be the flagship of
educational broadcasting. Similarly, the southern part of the
state had access to the Philadelphia commercial stations and to
Channel 12. Thus they were faced from the start with staunch
competition. To make matters worse, they were UHF in a state
where few sets were equipped to pick up that signal; they were
brand new; they had to meet the interests of an area with
marked sectional differences, especially between north and
south Jersey; and they had no real constituency, or enthusiastic
base of support in the state. Given this situation, the decision to
aim programs at the state itself rather than the region seemed a
necessary one.Secondly, in the face of potential political
difficulties, the Commissioners prohibited staff from lobbying
the legislature in Trenton. Clearly, they could and should
respond to initiatives from elected officials, but the Commission
reserved for itself the contacts with the New Jersey elected
political leadership. (In May, 1977, this prohibition was lifted
for Frymire as the Authority matured and the lack of such
contacts began hindering them in the annual competition for
budget support among the various state agencies.)
Third, they decided that they should not exercise any direct
personnel authority themselves.While they required Larry
Frymire to submit a staffing pattern as well as an annual budget

for their review, the selection of people to fill the various
authorized positions was left solely to his discretion. Though all
staff members came from the state's civil service system, only
the clerical personnel were to come off registers and have
tenure. When politicians and other public figures would suggest
people to be appointed to the station, Commissioners would
simply accept a resume and pass it along to Frymire and his
staff for decision.
Finally, they determined that they would not involve themselves
in specific program decisions, although program policy --
balance of different kinds of shows, overall quality, New Jersey
emphasis, etc. -- would concern them. At the same time, they
encouraged Frymire to seek outside funding sources in order to
expand their offerings. As part of his early effort, Frymire
worked with a group of people who were supportive of public
broadcasting. Early in 1971, the Friends of New Jersey Public
Broadcasting was formed and incorporated with its own Board
and set of activities in support of NJPTV.The first years were
very difficult indeed. Budgets continued to be small (annual
promotion allocation, for example, was typically $25,000) and
added production equipment was hard to come by. Nevertheless,
as the Authority’s 1977 annual report showed, the progress was
steady. Though explicitly not a national production center,
NJPTV believed it was the most active local-production
educational station in the nation with nearly 30% of its prime-
time hours filled with its own material. During the first year the
station was awarded the Alfred I. DuPont Columbia Award, the
first in a long run of national recognition that was to come their
way.
In 1974, according to an Eagleton Institute survey, NJPTV was
attracting 940,000 viewers. By 1977, the number had grown to
over 1.5 million New Jersey viewers, plus over 500,000
students being served by the NJPTV educational services
division. In addition, over 2,000 students enrolled in eleven

New Jersey colleges in televised credit courses, as well as
business and industry, were served by three courses required for
middle management training purposes.News and sports
continued to do particularly well. All in all, most observers and
the Commission felt NJPTV was doing solid and respectable
programming, highlighted by some especially appealing shows.
Annually
established objectives (1) for the system were regularly met,
with the exception of the implementation of the Commission's
desire for a more effective development program and of the
establishment of a new headquarters. But, as Frymire pointed
out, state-supported systems generally have little success
raising money from private sources because they are perceived
as being well-supported with taxpayer dollars.From all
appearances, there was no reason for Frymire to feel anything
but pleased with the work he had done and there was no
indication that the Commissioners were anything but satisfied
with the enterprise over which they presided. With few
exceptions through the years, the Commissioners did not appear
to him to be participating in any NJPTV activities other than the
Board and Committee meetings, although there were, in fact, a
number of informal meetings and telephone conversations
between many of them from time to time. It was left to the
Chairman, Vice Chairman and Frymire to carry on the business
of the Authority.
Their public meetings, held for two or three hours every two
months, addressed constraints, reports on the various divisions
of NJPTV, and plans to expand service through both technical
additions and new locations for crews and cameras. So
everything stood until the election, in 1974, of a new Governor,
Brendan T. Byrne. It was not long before both Meade and
Frymire became aware that the new Governor, or at least some
people close to him, looked with considerable disfavor on the
nature and direction of NJPTV:• Byrne called Meade shortly
after his election on another topic, and did some probing about
Frymire. "How good is that fellow Frymire?" the Governor

asked. “Very good," was Meade's response, "despite fiscal
constraints and freezes on personnel.”
Two close political friends of the new Governor, former CBS-
TV New York Commentator, Jerome Wilson, who was to
become producer-host of WNET's new weekly
program,“Dateline New Jersey," and Richard Leone of
Princeton’s Woodrow Wilson School, and subsequently State
Treasurer (thus a member of the NJPTV Commission), met with
Meade to discuss the situation. Both men were very critical
especially of the quality of the public affairs
programming.Given inadequate budgets and continuing
struggles by staff to keep a respectable operation going, Meade
was not especially receptive to their complaints.
5 A Change Of Management
Leone, who was interested in the field, and had done a study of
cable TV, showed no confidence in the Eagleton Institute
audience studies, stating that he simply did not believe that
NJPTV had the audiences it claimed. He felt it was not
adequately related to its particular market.
At the first formal meeting between the Commissioners,
Frymire and Governor Byrne, the Governor was presented with
a tennis bag with the legend: “I Love New Jersey Public
Television.” “Huh,” snorted the Governor, “I'm not sure love
it!” In spite of the tone of this encounter, no overtly threatening
actions ensued, although the Governor did begin to appoint a
different type of person to the Authority than had his
predecessors (see Attachment 1). Frymire didn’t sense anything
more direct than vague hints that the new leadership was
dissatisfied with his stewardship. The Commissioners, at least
the veteran ones, appeared to Frymire to be as supportive as
ever. What he was not aware of, however, was the rumblings of
dissatisfaction being expressed in conversations among the
Commissioners. Since no formal meetings were set up to discuss
the complaints with him or to lodge any formal complaints,
Frymire assumed all was well. Furthermore, Frymire felt some

satisfaction and relief that the Governor seemed to be very
pleased by the results of his first “call-in” report to the people
over NJPTV airwaves. The volume of calls was so huge that the
telephone company was crippled. Each time the Governor
returned every three or four months to repeat the format, the
results were the same, proving to the Governor, as he said to
Frymire, that NJPTV did indeed have a sizable state-
wideaudience.
Then two events occurred which seemed to Frymire to signal
that the incipient dissatisfaction might erupt into specific
negative actions. The first came as part of the budget cycle in
1975; the second was the sudden enthusiasm on the part of the
Administration and Commissioners for a combined news show
with WNET which would replace NJPTV's own program.For
years, New Jersey had been able to avoid a state income tax, but
Governor Byrne felt, in view of the State’s perilous financial
picture, that the time had come. When it was not forthcoming,
he was faced with a $285 million deficit
in the statebudget and, pointing out New Jersey’s constitutional
balanced budget requirement, he said he would have to cut
expenses.Following precedent established by many political
leaders before him, he slashed the most visible and popular
accounts: the extension service, libraries, mental institutions
and so on.Public television's request was cut from $3.8 million
to $1 million, a figure clearly below the minimum needed to
maintain operation. Although the Commissioners ultimately
persuaded the Governor and the legislature to restore their
allocation to $3 million, the Authority went through a painful
and debilitating exercise responding to both the threatened cut
and to the Governor's instructions to come up with an
alternative method of providing services to the people of the
state.
To many observers, including Frymire, the Governor’s action
and attitude appeared to be something more than standard

political budgetmanship. They wondered if it was not a
deliberate threat on the Governor's part, a warning that unless
they became more responsive to his concepts, he would move
against them. Some saw his behavior as the first serious attempt
to shake up public broadcasting in New Jersey and force it to
rethink its mission. At a minimum, it seemed to be a vote of no
confidence in the Authority’s staff leadership.The second
incident involved the station's news program, far and away the
most popular show it had on the air. Called "New Jersey News
Report,” it offered a half-hour week-night review of up to 35
"hard" news stories about New Jersey happenings and
personalities, including weather stations (commercial and
educational) which showed virtually no interest in their New
Jersey constituency. There was no attempt at analysis, little
feature material, and its budget did not permit it to become as
slick as regular commercial shows. Even so, it was extremely
popular in southern New Jersey, an established, mostly UHF
area (unlike its northern counterpart). The show was clearly the
star performer for NJPTV, and represented the best audience
builder they had. Much to the surprise of Frymire and the staff,
in the fall of 1976, Channel 13 suddenly offered to provide $1
million for a jointly produced nightly half-hour show which
would be carried on both WNET and NJPTV. NJ PTV would
contribute $1.5 million. The show would be controlled by an
independent editorial board to be selected by both stations.
When it became very clear that the Governor and his appointees
on the Authority favored the idea, some staff members
suspected that the initiative for the whole idea had, in fact,
come from Trenton.
Certainly it was true that Governor Byrne had asked the General
Manager of WNET "When are you guys finally going to do
something about New Jersey coverage?"Dr. Meade and the staff
both took a stand in opposition to the initial proposal, but as it
was refined, the Chairman became increasingly supportive,
favoring at least a detailed exploration, and Frymire became
increasingly opposed. In a memorandum to the Commissioners

in late December, 1976 -- nearly two months after the first
discussions of the plan -- Frymire wrote:We have not, due to
time factors, given joint study to any other proposals or to any
budget less than the $2.5 million proposed by Channel 13. There
are other alternatives which would, in my opinion, bring
significantly improved coverage of New Jersey through joint
use of the $1 million offered by Channel 13 in the news
proposal. Staff will ask you to consider some of them today.But
first, unless Channel 13 accepts the positions below, I
recommend that the Authority reject the Channel 13 joint news
proposal. The joint news proposal should be rejected on the
basis of the requirement for Channel 13 to provide $1 million
contingent upon NJPTV providing $1.5
million and giving up control of NJPTV's most important
program service to an equally weighted editorial board. Under
any circumstances, the Executive Producer should be in charge
of the daily operation of the news program, but he should be
responsible to the NJPTV Director of News and Public Affairs
for administrative functions and through him to any editorial
board for policy matters. To do otherwise would be to create
severe personnel and management problems for NJPTV
administration and for the Authority itself.
The joint news proposal should be rejected due to the negative
impact it would have on NJPTV audience building efforts for
Channel 50 and Channel 58."I did not want to give our top
programs to our principal competitor in that part of our
market."Frymire said later. "Furthermore, I had a series of other
options for joint ventures, other ways to use that $1 million
from WNET which I thought would be much better from our
standpoint. For example, I thought we could staff up our
Newark studio and co-produce selected programs with WNET in
both the cultural and public affairs areas; or we could expand
both the equipment and manpower in the Newark facility
significantly and let WNET use it two days a week.

In that way, I thought we could make the Newark operation
really operational, maintain our own control over our popular
news show, avoid all the problems of a continuing joint
production effort, and sidestep the need to allocate or raise
additional dollars. But I could hardly get the Commissioners to
listen to me, much less take my ideas seriously. I think my
attitude on all this left some Commissioners alienated, feeling
that I was being obstructionist."Ultimately, the Commissioners
voted to enter into negotiations with WNET along the general
lines of their proposal, and a negotiating committee of
Commissioners subsequently worked out an agreement. Frymire
participated, but had no vote. The staff was given the
responsibility of hammering out a specific contract which some
Commissioners later felt gave away more control than they
needed to. The new program was on the air in May, 1978
(2).The difficulties over the WNET arrangement were followed
by a series of events. For example, Senate President Joseph
Merlino of Trenton, characterized as the “second most powerful
man in the state,” put in a bill which would require the
Governor approve the Minutes of the Authority before any of
their actions could take effect. Frymire suspected that his
antagonism developed out of a pair of incidents: An NJPTV
reporter asked Senator Merlino a question as he came out of a
session. Apparently it offended him because he turned on him
and said "You are an employee of the state, and you have no
right to ask me that kind of question.”
Mrs. Merlino, in charge of the annual state teenage art festival,
asked the station to cover a portion of the event in which she
had particular interest, but was told they could not do so on
what was only a single day’s notice.
It was during this period, 1976-78, that some observers noted a
growing difference of opinion between Frymire and members of
the Authority over a variety of issues. Some felt that it was the
legacy of what they saw as the continuing resistance of the staff

to the WNET idea even after it became obvious that the
Commissioners wanted to go ahead. Others felt that Frymire
was not sensitive enough to the public relations activities of the
station, that the press they were getting was neither adequate,
nor imaginative enough, and that the PR staff was not
sufficiently active or energetic. Following that was a lengthy
series of discussions at Authority meetings about the opposition
of staff to the broadcasting of certain public service
announcements. In 1973, the Secretary of State called to ask
that the station air a series of announcements about where and
how to register by mail for the upcoming election, but was
turned down by Douglas Leonard, Program Manager. The
Secretary ultimately complained to Chairman Meade and his
announcements were broadcast.
In 1978, a task force, made up of Commissioners, Friends and
staff, was established to conduct a one year, long-range review
of the Station’s fiscal and physical planning. As a part of that
effort, the issue of the Community Services Department came
up. Disbanded in 1976 in response to a $390,000 reduction in
state funds, Community Services was now being given serious
consideration for revival. Authority meeting discussion of the
task force findings are exerpted below from the May, 1978
Authority Minutes: Once again the issue relating to the
disbanding of the Department of Community Services two years
ago was discussed. Dr. Frymire thanked both Mr. Aumente and
Commissioner Broadwater for their input. The question is how
NJPTV should respond to community groups and organizations.
Dr. Frymire reported that NJPTV is performing the essential
functions and he recommended that no further specific staff be
allocated at this time. He is sensitive to these needs as are the
Executive Staff, Programming Department and the new
Executive Assistant will also be assigned these duties.
Dr. Meade added that community service is a function
distributed throughout NJPTV and, therefore, we are responding
without any specific staff allocated to such service.
Commissioner Broadwater felt that it is too much to expect the

Executive Director to reach out to maintain contact with people
in the community, but Dr. Frymire assured her that we have a
responsible staff and both Focal Point and Express Yourself are
Black shows that are produced through this type of contact and
also our Spanish speaking staff are responding to such needs
through the Images Latinas programs.
Dr. Frymire added that news and public affairs programs also
deal with community-oriented subjects. Chairman Meade said
we do not have the capacity to meet all the community needs
but we are doing more local programming than other PBS
stations and that there are other services we deliver besides
programming.Mr. Aumente (representing the Chancellor of
Higher Educationed.) said that he agreed with the Task Force
recommendation and he still feels we need a Community
Services Department in our budget. He is aware of the fact that
we do not have the resources for it but he felt that to drop the
search for a solution would be bad and that dialogue should
continue on this subject.
More important, however, were the growing problems with
Commissioner Stephen Adubato who opposed Frymire from his
first day as a member of the Authority. Characterized as a
feisty, bright, street-smart, effective community leader in
Newark, Adubato wanted NJPTV to broadcast more ethnic
programs and, according to some observers, felt that the
station’s programming department was unresponsive and did not
take his concern seriously. Otherstraced his growing antagonism
to the fall of 1977 when his brother, an Assemblyman, was
embarrassed on a candidate’s show when one of his opponents
suddenly pulled out a plucked chicken, waved it before the
camera, and said that this is what the current incumbent was
doing to his constituents.
Whatever the source of the antagonism, it was overt. Adubato
suggested to Frymire that he resign when they met September
12, 1978 at the first Authority meeting he had attended in nearly

a year.Shortly before the regular Authority meeting scheduled
for September 12, 1978, Commissioner
Adubato called Chairman Meade and said he was planning to
offer a motion of no-confidence in Larry Frymire. Meade
suggested to him that the situation be reviewed instead.
Consequently, at the September meeting, the Commissioners
went into executive session for an hour, emerging to vote
favorably on a motion made by Commissioner Adubato calling
for "a committee to evaluate the management requirements for
the future in relation to the goals which have been established
by the Authority.” Dr. Meade then appointed a committee to be
headed by vice Chairman George Connet and to be made up of
Adubato, Attorney General John Degnan (Governor Byrne’s
onetime chief counsel and chief of staff, attending his first
meeting of the Authority) and Robert Comstock (Governor
Byrne’s former press secretary, also attending his first
meeting).
“I saw that action as a real challenge, not at all as a threat,”
Larry Frymire said later. “I was assured by George Connett that
it was not a ‘get Frymire’ move, but a serious and responsible
attempt to look at our situation in light of the future needs of
NJPTV.
"Furthermore, I knew that we had met all of our stated goals and
objectives, with the exception of the new headquarters building,
that almost all the recommendations coming from a long-range
planning task force of the Authority, and the Friends and
Staffhad been adopted and put in place, and that the
establishment of a Long-Range Planning Committee of the
Authority insured continuing self-analysis. Only last June, we
had held a day-long intensive review of our programming, and
in August we spent another full day reviewing other functions
with the Commissioners. No serious criticisms were raised, and

we all agreed on a set of positive plans, which have been or are
being implemented.
“As the process went along, I saw no reason to be concerned.
The group told me their meeting with the Associate Executive
Director was ‘frank and positive’, and their meeting with the
director of programming was ‘friendly and good.’ My session
featured a 45 minute harangue by Adubato, so it didn't really go
anywhere and the Chairman adjourned it. But the next time
lasted an hour and a half and it was a good discussion.
“I really can't figure out what is Adubato's problem, what he
wants. He talks about being dissatisfied with the Newark
coverage, both before and after the establishment of a new
WNET show. He wants more ethnic programming, but our Black
and Hispanic staff have been producing half-hour weekly
programs for nine years. He's a volatile man with strong
opinions who has provided a unique service for the people of
Newark; a real self-made leader. But I don't know really what
he wants. When he asked me to resign back in September, all he
said was: 'changing needs and changing times -- people ought to
recognize that, and move on.'"It was after Frymire’s second
meeting with the Connett Committee that he began to feel he
had reason to be concerned. Connett, an old friend and
supporter, drew him aside and said, "You know, Larry, we’ve
been getting a lot of negative vibes from a lot of people about
NJPTV and its management.
People just don't know you, and even the Friends aren’t
positive." Frymire pointed out that he didn’t always agree with
the Friends, and the discussion ended there.In November, 1978,
the Board, at its regular meeting, went into executive session to
receive an interim report from the Committee. Discussion was
limited to a review of a list of interviews that had been held,
and those that the Committee planned to conduct. The group
reported that they hoped to finish their work by mid-December.
A few weeks later, Frymire, who had heard nothing further of or
from the Committee, called Meade to ask him what was going
on and to suggest that a meeting be held. In early December,

Connett and the Committee met with Frymire and then asked
Meade to call a special executive session of the Board to hear
its report. At the ensuing session, held shortly thereafter, the
Commissioners met in executive session for about an hour to
hear and discuss the Committee's report, and Frymire talked to
them for about an hour, reviewing his accomplishments and the
challenges ahead. They then went back into executive session
for another hour. The Commissioners, for their part, had two
complaints, as Frymire recalled:
They said I was not a statewide personality, that no one knows
me among the state's leadership. Therefore, NJPTV was not well
known. They said I had not successfully penetrated the business
and foundation community for financial support. I pointed out
that no one in the other state-supported systems has
either.That’s all they said, but it was clear that the situation was
untenable. It was kind of like trying to get rid of a
superintendent of schools or a minister. No one wants him
around, but no one wants to hurt him either. So I talked to
Meade, and told him I would resign.The Associate Executive
Director resigned too, and we’ll both be gone by April 30. On
March 20, 1979, the Authority made its formal announcement of
the appointment, with the approval of the Governor, of Gordon
MacInnes as the new Executive Director of NJPTV.
(See Attachments 2 and 3)
(1) Divided into capital plans and operational plans, these
formal statements signed by the Chairman and the Executive
Director laid out objectives, backed by a description of how
New Jersey citizens would benefit from the proposed action.
(2) The new show received mixed reviews at best, especially
from the audience for the old show. There was an emphasis on
analysis, a number of promotional spots, no weather, and a

diminished coverage of sports. On the other hand the talent was
excellent, the research and writing more professional, and
research component and reporter quality substantially upgraded.
At any rate, Frymire and his staff bore the brunt of the critical
comments.
Attachment 1: NJPTV - Board of CommissionersAppointments
by Governor Hughes: 1969-70Dr. Edward J. Meade, Jr. Program
Officer Public Education, Ford Foundation George ConnettVice
President Personnel-Administration Prudential Insurance
Company of America John McDonald Special Assistant to the
President for Community Relations Rutgers University Carlos
Peay Attorney Maurice Veneri AFL-CIO President Industrial
Union Council Mrs. Anne Martindell Owner Who’s Who in
America Donald Wilson Vice President Time- Life
Appointments by Governor William Cahill - 1971-72-73 Henry
Becton Owner, Chairman of Board Becton- Dickinson Industries
Nathan Friedman Attorney Robert Crager Commercial
Broadcaster William Hatchett Manager, Special Employment
Programs RCA Calvin Louderback Vice President, New Jersey
Manufacturers Association
Attachment 1 NJPTV - Board of Commissioners (cont.)Mrs.
Rosemary FruehlingAssistant ProfessorSecretarial Science
County College of MorrisRichard Schoch Senior Vice
President,Creative DirectorCompton AdvertisingAppointments
by Governor Brendan Byrne - 1974-75-76-77-78-79Stephen
AdubatoDirectorNorth Ward Education & Cultural Center,
NewarkHenry Becton ReappointedEdward
MeadeReappointedGeorge Connett ReappointedRobert
CragerReappointedDonald WilsonReappointedEdith
LurayProducer, NBC-TVCampaign Manager, Mrs. English
campaign for State Senator(English is present special Assistant
to the Governor)Barbara BroadwaterAdministrative AideMayor

Errichetti - Camden State Senator Errichetti Robert Comstock
Executive Editor -The Bergen Record Former Press Secretary,
Governor Byrne Charles Nathanson Private Consultant for City
Planning Personal Associate of Mercer County and State
Democratic Leaders
Attachment 1 NJPTV - Board of Commissioners (cont.)Susan
ThomasesAttorney - Campaign ManagerUnited States Senator
BradleyThomas ErhardtBusinessman, Union County National
Democratic Committeeman, Campaign Manager, various Union
County Democratic politiciansBy state statute, the following
Cabinet Officers are members of the Authority, ex-officio with
full voting rights:Attorney GeneralTreasurerCommissioner of
Department of Community AffairsChancellor of Higher
EducationCommissioner of Education
Attachment 2: Trenton Times,Trenton, N.J.- Thursday, March
15, 1979MACINNES SLATED FOR STATE TV JOBBy Jim
GoodmanStaff WriterFormer state legislator Gordon A.
MacInnes Jr. is expected to be the next executive director of the
New Jersey Public Broadcasting Authority.MacInnes, 37, a
former Democratic assemblyman from Morris County, has been
recommended by the authority’s screening committee. The
authority board will vote on the recommendation on
Tuesday.Gov. Brendan T. Byrne met with MacInnes recently
and told him he had no objections to the appointment.MacInnes
was a member of the State Assembly in 1974 and 1978, and he
was previously a special assistant to Gov. Richard J. Hughes.
Before that he was an official in United Progress, Inc.,
Trenton’s anti-poverty agency.For the last eight years,
MacInnes has directed the Fund for New Jersey, a private
foundation. The Foundation's principal client was the Center for
Analysis of Public Issues in Princeton.MacInnes said today that
the foundation gave the center an average of $75,000 a year

during his tenure.
MacInnes has no direct experience in television, but has served
as a consultant for WNET-TV (Channel 13) in New York and
was a director of the Fair Broadcasting Coalition in New Jersey.
Sources said that the main reason for MacInnes selection was
that the committee felt he would be able to raise private money
for the television authority which operates a network of four
stations within the state. The station now operates almost
entirely on public funds and has had little success in getting
donations from its viewers.MacInnes was one of three finalists
interviewed more than a week ago by the screening committee.
Sources said the other two finalists were from out of state.A
former Byrne aide who had sought the job, Herbert Wolfe, was
not among the finalists. Wolfe is a former editor of the Trenton
Times and was Byrne’s first information director. Edward
Meade, Authority chairman, refused to confirm that MacInnes
has been recommended by the screening committee. He said he
has not seen the committee's final report and pointed out that
the committee is made up of a minority of the authority. Other
sources said, however, that there was very little chance of the
authority overruling the screening committee. MacInnes was
elected to the Assembly in the 1973 Democratic landslide led by
Byrne.
The Morris County Democrat was identified as part of the
Byrne team early in his tenure in the Assembly, but split with
the governor several times and was not considered a "team
player" by administration officials. MacInnes sought reelection
in 1975 but was defeated in his heavily republican district.
Administration sources have insisted that the governor would
not attempt to influence the selection of the new director, but
Byrne did retain his right to veto any appointment. The
governor reportedly told MacInnes last week that he would not
object to his nomination. The new director will replace
Lawrence Frymire, the first director of the authority. Frymire
was forced to resign in December after a management study
report charged that the Authority lacked strong leadership and

had not attracted many viewers. Frymire’s resignation is
effective April 30.
Attachment 3:
The Star Ledger Thursday, March 15, 1979
JERSEY TV MAY PICK EX- LEGISLATOR AS CHIEF by Dan
Weissman Former Assemblyman, Gordon A. MacInnes, Jr. will
be the next director of the state's Public Broadcasting
Authority, a job that pays in the mid-$40,000 range, sources
said yesterday.According to the sources, MacInnes, who was
among the strongest supporters of Gov. Brendan Byrne’s
income tax while he was in the Legislature, will get the
appointment confirmed Tuesday when the authority meets. One
source said “that information is impeccable.”
The sources said MacInnes was supposed to be named to the job
last Tuesday. But the action was delayed because “three
members of the authority wanted to talk to him first.”MacInnes
would say only: "All I know is I was asked to be one of three
finalists to be interviewed last Saturday.” The commission is
meeting next Tuesday, when it hopes to reach a decision.
MacInnes said he had no knowledge of who would get the job,
which becomes vacant April 30 when Larry Frymire will leave.
MacInnes served one term in the Assembly, winning election in
a predominately republican Morris County district in the Byrne
1974 landslide. MacInnes quickly became one of Byrne’s
staunchest legislative allies.Prior to his election victory, the 38-
year old MacInnes was a special assistant to former Gov.
Richard J. Hughes.A graduate of the Woodrow Wilson School of
Princeton University, MacInnes was considered one of the so-
called "Woody Wilson gang” when he worked for Hughes, now
Chief Justice of the State Supreme Court. Also counted in the
association were Byrne’s former treasurer, Richard C. Leone
and Treasurer Clifford Goldman.“The Governor's office has
nothing to do with it. The authority had a search committee, and
it put ads in the papers,” said one source, who added: "But I'm

not going to say MacInnes didn't see the Governor."
Case Study 2: Mayor Schell’s Zero Homeless Family Pledge
This case was written by Eileen Norton, J.D. and former Seattle
City Council Member Thomas Weeks, Ph.D.The case is intended
solely as a vehicle for classroom discussion, and is not intended
to illustrate either effective or ineffective handling of the
situation described.
The Electronic Hallway is administered by the University of
Washington's Daniel J. Evans School of Public Affairs. This
material may not be altered or copied without written
permission from The Electronic Hallway. For permission, email
[email protected] or phone (206) 616-8777. Electronic Hallway
members are granted copy permission for educational purposes
per Member’s Agreement (www.hallway.org). Copyright 2006
The Electronic Hallway
MAYOR SCHELL’S ZERO HOMELESS FAMILY PLEDGE
On June 2nd, 1998, Mayor Paul Schell spoke to the press about
the needs of homeless families, women and children. He asked
for the City Council’s support in providing “immediate
emergency assistance to homeless families and single women, a
critical step in providing lasting housing solutions for these
families and individuals.” He noted that“the problem continues
to grow and we absolutely must find better ways to help people
find and keep housing.” He closed his remarks with a firm
pledge that there will be no homeless families with children or
homeless single women on the streets of Seattle by Christmas
1998. His pledge made headlines in both Seattle papers the next
day Alan Painter, Director of the Community Services Division
of the Department of Housing and Human Services, listened
attentively to the new Mayor’s remarks. Painter has dedicated
his professional career to serving the needs of homeless people.
He was proud and excited to hear Schell’s passion and
commitment to addressing homelessness in Seattle.
At the same time, he viewed the pledge with some trepidation.
Counting the number of homeless people on the street at any
given time is notoriously tricky, influenced by many factors.

Further, he wondered how this pledge would dovetail with City
priorities and plans for dealing with homelessness. These plans
emphasize services to homeless people rather than just
providing beds and they stress the need for other jurisdictions to
share in funding homeless services. The next six months
promised to keep Alan Painter very busy.Homeless People in
Seattle Homelessness in King County:
A Background Report, was published in February 1998 by the
Seattle-King County Homelessness Advisory Group. The report
begins with a profile of King County demographics and
housing, and then describes the numbers and characteristics of
the homeless population. Subsequent sections describe existing
homelessness programs and their funding. Most of the data
presented here comes from this report. According to the Seattle-
King County consolidated plan, there are at least 5,500 people
who are homeless in King County on any given night. Of these,
over 1,300 are on the streets, while almost 4,200 have
temporary housing in shelters or transitional units. Thousands
of people seeking shelter are turned away each year, primarily
due to lack
Mayor Schell’s Zero Homeless Family Pledge
2 space. In 1993, Operation Night watch assisted 16,615 people
seeking shelter in Seattle. By 1997, the total climbed to 45,529.
The majority of homeless people range from 22 to 44 years old.
Sixty-three percent (63%) of those receiving shelter are single
males, 17% single females, with the remaining 20% spread
among families and youth. Fifty-nine percent (59%) of people
sheltered in King County in 1997, and 46% of youth sheltered in
1996 were people of color. Of the approximately 1,300 people
sleeping on the streets (not in shelters) on any given night in
King County, 300 are families, 360 are youth and teen parents
and 700 are single adults. Over 700 of these 1,300 homeless
people are the “homeless families with children or homeless
single women” Schell promised to get off the street in his June
2nd speech; the remainder are single men, or live in the county
outside Seattle.

The shelter capacity in Seattle is higher for single males than
for other groups. In 1997, 54% of homeless family units turned
away from emergency shelter were single females, and 35%
were families with children. Two-thirds of homeless families
are single women with children. One quarter of all shelter
clients is children. Over 2,000 youth living outside a family
structure are estimated to be homeless in Seattle during a year.
Over 90% of the shelters in King County are located in Seattle,
but the homeless people in Seattle shelters come from a broad
geographic area (Figure One). Homeless youth apparently travel
farther to reach the streets of Seattle.
Figure One
Previous Residence of King County Homeless Last permanent
residence of homeless person being served in King County All
homeless people (1997 survey) Homeless youth (1996 survey)
Seattle 53 28 King County, outside Seattle 16 35 Outside King
County 31 37 The three major factors contributing to
homelessness in King County are inadequate income, the high
cost of housing, and personal or family problems, such as
domestic violence, drug and alcohol abuse or mental illness.
Surveys of homeless people show rates of drug and alcohol
addiction at about 65%. Research indicates that approximately
50% of homeless adults have a mental illness. Prominent
reasons for homelessness among youth include emotional
conflict in homes, drug or alcohol problems, physical abuse by
a parent, and depression.
Seattle’s response to homelessness, 1980-1997
Under the leadership of Mayor Charles Royer (1978-1989),
Seattle developed a national reputation for its comprehensive
approach to homelessness. Seattle citizens approved two Last
permanent residence of homeless person being served in King
County All homeless people (1997 survey) Homeless youth
(1996 survey) Seattle King County, outside Seattle Outside
King County
significant property tax increases to support low income

housing during the 1980s, raising $50 million in 1981 and
another $50 million in 1986. Seattle received the National
Alliance to End Homelessness Public Sector Achievement
Award in 1990. The awardees noted Seattle’s creative and
coordinated approach as well as its financial commitment to
fight the problem. Numerous individual housing and homeless
projects in Seattle have received awards as well. Mayor Norm
Rice (1990-1997) continued this commitment to fight
homelessness. Although King County voters rejected a
countywide property tax increase to support low income housing
in 1992, Seattle voters renewed their commitment to low income
housing by passing a third levy in 1995. Reflecting the City’s
thoughtful approach and willingness to dedicate local funding to
address the problem, Seattle receives one of the largest
McKinney awards each year (federal money to support programs
for homeless people). In 1998 Seattle received the eighth largest
award in the nation.
Each year in King County, many millions of dollars are devoted
to addressing homelessness. Major funders include the federal,
state, city and county governments as well as United Way,
public housing authorities and private foundations. The annual
funding to operate and support homeless shelters in King
County from all sources exceeds $6 million. In addition, $8
million is allocated each year to operate transitional housing
units. Figure Two presents the distribution of the 4,073 units of
housing for homeless people in King County by type and
location. Ninety-one percent (91%) of all units are in Seattle,
although Seattle represents less than one-third of King County’s
total population.
Figure Two Housing Capacity for Homeless People in King
County
In 1998, the City of Seattle spent approximately $7.8 million on
services for homeless people, nearly twice as much as it did in
1989. This includes over $4 million for emergency shelter and

transitional housing, $1.3 million for emergency food services
and $1.4 million for housing-related social services. In addition,
since 1987 the City has helped fund the development of more
than 4,000 units of permanent low-income housing. The 1995
housing levy approved by the voters is expected to create 1,360
additional units of affordable housing. Type of Shelter/Housing
Total Number in King County % of County total in Seattle
Emergency shelter and vouchers 2,236
Transitional housing Permanent housing targeted for homeless
people Total number of units for homeless people
Over the years, City of Seattle staff have developed a
comprehensive approach to the problem of homelessness, going
far beyond the provision of shelter beds. In December 1995, the
King County Community Homelessness Advisory Committee
articulated the preferred strategies for approaching
homelessness, including: The community needs to build a more
regional, client-focused, coordinated network of homeless
services.
The strategies call for maintaining but not increasing the
existing shelter capacity at this time, even though the shelters
regularly turn away people due to lack of space. This will allow
additional resources to flow to other needed services and
housing.
It is vital that the community place attention on those housing
and services that help people regain long-term stability and
address the underlying causes of homelessness, such as
transitional housing and related services, employment services,
and assistance in making a successful transition into permanent
housing.
•[B]emoreproactiveinpreventinghomelessness ... •[E]mphasize
approaches that follow clients as they progress throug hout the
continuum of care , including assistance to people once they
enter permanent housing. •[D]irect resources toward sub-groups

of the homeless who are underserved relative to others,
including children in homeless families, single men, and both
youth and adults who are leaving institutional settings.
Mayor Paul Schell
Paul Schell is an attorney who first entered the public eye in
Seattle in the 1970s as Director of the Department of
Community Development under Seattle Mayor Wes Uhlman.
When Uhlman did not seek a third term, Schell ran for Mayor in
1977, losing in the general election to television commentator
Charles Royer. After his defeat, Schell dropped out of public
life and worked as a developer. Many of his successful
developments were small, high-end hotels scattered across the
Pacific Northwest. In the mid-1980s, Schell was elected to the
part-time Port Commission. As a Commissioner, he spearheaded
the redevelopment of the Seattle waterfront, adding a new
headquarters for the Port, a trade center, office buildings and
residential units. Although his primary occupation was real
estate development, Schell also served as interim Dean of the
University of Washington School of Architecture for two years
in the early 1990s.
In 1997 Norm Rice did not seek a third term as Mayor and
Schell decided to run, twenty years after his mayoral defeat.
Schell attracted support from Republicans and Democrats alike.
The press liked the concept of a developer with a heart and a
soul. Portrayed as a no-nonsense visionary, Schell swept to
victory by wide margins in both the primary and general
elections. After the cautious reign of Norm Rice, there was
enthusiasm for Schell’s willingness to take risks. In his first
months in office, Schell demonstrated a penchant for publicly
testing partially developed ideas.
A high priority during Schell’s mayoral campaign was his
commitment to housing. The economic boom in greater Seattle
in the 1990s drove up housing prices at double-digit annual
rates. Many middle-class Seattleites were priced out of the
market. Schell promised to convene a housing summit

immediately after his inauguration to develop strategies to
address the unmet demand for affordable housing. While he
talked about housing affordability often during the campaign,
homelessness was rarely mentioned.
Alan Painter
Alan Painter grew up in Southeast Seattle with a passion for
politics, hydroplane racing and baseball games at Sick’s
Stadium. After Franklin High School, Alan went on to graduate
from Yale University in 1976. While his love of hydros and
baseball remain, the demise of the Seattle Pilots and the death
of several leading hydro racers during the 1960s soured Painter
on careers in both fields. He focused his professional energies
instead on supporting liberal Democratic causes, especially the
provision of housing and services to homeless people. In the
1980s, he served as District Manager for Seattle Democratic
Congressman Mike Lowry, one of the most liberal members of
Congress. During his Lowry years, Painter assisted in building
coalitions, including the Washington State Coalition for
Homeless and the Fair Budget Action Campaign. Lowry was one
of the primary authors of the 1987 McKinney Act, which
continues to be the most significant federal legislation aimed at
homelessness prevention. In 1990 Painter began working on
homeless issues for the City of Seattle in the Office of
Management and Budget as the City’s Homeless Coordinator.
He later shifted to the Department of Housing and Human
Services, where he is now the Director of the Community
Services Division. He has worked on the design and
implementation of services and programs to assist homeless
people for over a decade.
Alan Painter is not flashy or a headline grabber. He thinks and
plans long-term, and has the patience to build coalitions. Very
detail-oriented, Painter keeps score of every baseball game he
attends, and then saves the scorecard. He places great emphasis
on coordinated, integrated, comprehensive policy development.
The consummate bureaucrat, Painter is probably not enough of a
risk-taker to have been a particularly effective hydroplane pilot.

Steady and effective, Painter consistently delivers on his
promises. In The Seattle Times dated December 13, 1990, staff
reporter Barbara Serrano wrote an article commending Painter:
“Bureaucrat lauded for Tent City solution: Mild-mannered style
works for homeless coordinator.” She describes him as follows:
Honest. Straightforward. Sensitive. Politically gutsy. All are
among the most common ways people describe Painter. Scott
Morrow, as staff member for SHARE – the group that built Tent
City- lauds Painter as “a good bureaucrat” who knows how to
make government work effectively.
It was the homeless coordinator’s mild-mannered style, Morrow
said, that helped defuse tensions between determined men and
women at Tent City and the buttoned-down types in City Hall.
“He never promised anything he couldn’t deliver,” Morrow
said... To no surprise of those who know him, Painter bristles at
public attention. During an interview in his house earlier this
week, he gave credit to everyone else for addressing
homelessness in Seattle: to the city officials he works with, to
Mayor Norm Rice and his staff, and mostly to the nonprofit
social providers on the front lines of service...“Because Seattle
has been so responsive in the past, there’s a tendency to let the
city provide all the resources,” Painter said. “The challenge
next year is to get others to put as much of an increase and
emphasis on housing and homelessness as we have.”...“Seattle’s
been extraordinarily successful in leveraging state and federal
money for initiatives,” Painter said. “Unfortunately, what we’ve
all learned is that it takes a long time to get things done.”
The recognition Seattle has received for high-quality, well-
coordinated, strategically- linked programs for homeless people
is attributable to a strong network of community non-profit
organizations working in close collaboration with a core group
of outstanding City staff, Painter chief among them.
June 2, 1998: The Mayor’s Pledge
Alan Painter listened to Mayor Schell’s June 2nd public pledge
that there will be no homeless families with children or

homeless single women on the streets by Christmas. Walking
back to his office following the speech, Painter is thrilled by
Schell’s commitment to homelessness. At the same time, Painter
recognizes the tension between Schell’s pledge and several of
the Advisory Committee’s guiding strategies (as described in
the section on Seattle’s response to homelessness). Increasing
shelter capacity is quite expensive. The most recent new shelter
in Seattle, housing 20-40 women, costs over $300,000 per year
to staff, even though it is only open at night. This figure does
not include rent or other associated capital costs.
Painter understands the political power of counting and publicly
emphasizing the size of the homeless population in Seattle.
Even so, the practice makes him uncomfortable. Schell’s pledge
raised the stakes and the scrutiny of the homeless street count.
He wonders what effect the pledge will have on the supply and
demand of shelter space. Even if additional shelter space is
developed, Painter fears that some of the target population still
might choose the streets. Furthermore, factors beyond the City’s
control have a significant impact on the number of homeless
people.
According to the best estimates, of the 1,300 homeless people
living on the streets without shelter on a given night, over 700
are homeless families with children or single women in Seattle,
the categories described in Schell’s pledge. Painter wonders
what it will take to bring that number down to zero. He also
wonders who will be counting and how they will do so.
..

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