This document provides an overview of Plato and his major works represented in this collection. It discusses Plato's life, the division of his works into early, middle and late periods, and his development of Socratic philosophy. Specifically, it outlines three of Socrates' philosophical doctrines - that genuine moral knowledge requires a rational account, that virtue is a type of knowledge, and that it is better to suffer than commit injustice. It then explains Plato's theory of Forms and how they ground objective ethics and can be known through recollection, as depicted in dialogues like the Meno, Phaedo and Republic.
1. Ahun MN, Consoli A, Pingault J, Falissard B, Battaglia M, Boivi.docx
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Boivin M, Tremblay RE, Côté S,M. Maternal depression
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of maternal and family factors. Eur Child Adolesc Psychiatry
2018;27(7):921-32.
2. Garg A, Toy S, Tripodis Y, Cook J, Cordella N. Influence of
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Impact of maternal depression on perinatal outcomes in
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Health 2019;22(1):85-91.
4. Jensen HM, Grøn R, Lidegaard O, Pedersen LH, Andersen
PK, Kessing LV. The effects of maternal depression and use of
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Kecskeméti A, Szabó L, Somogyvári Z, Baji I. Effect of
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Classics of Western philosophy / edited by Steven M. Cahn. —
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1. Philosophy. I. Cahn, Steven M.
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6. Confessions (Book XI)
Plotinus
Enneads (selections)
Boethius
Consolation of Philosophy (selections)
Anselm
Proslogion
Gaunilo’s Reply on Behalf of the Fool
Anselm’s Reply to Gaunilo
Moses Maimonides
The Guide of the Perplexed (selections)
6
Thomas Aquinas
Summa Theologiae (selections)
Levi Gersonides
The Wars of the Lord (selections)
William of Ockham
Summa Logicae (selections)
René Descartes
Discourse on Method
Meditations on First Philosophy
Thomas Hobbes
Leviathan (selections)
7. Baruch Spinoza
Ethics (Parts I, II)
Gottfried Leibniz
Discourse on Metaphysics
Monadology
John Locke
An Essay Concerning Human Understanding (selections)
George Berkeley
A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge
Three Dialogues between Hylas and Philonous
David Hume
An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding
A Treatise of Human Nature (selections)
Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion
Immanuel Kant
Prolegomena to Any Future Metaphysics
Critique of Pure Reason (selections)
Grounding for the Metaphysics of Morals
G.W.F Hegel
Phenomenology of Spirit (selections)
Arthur Schopenhauer
The World as Will and Representation (selections)
Søren Kierkegaard
Concluding Unscientific Postscript (selections)
John Stuart Mill
Utilitarianism
On Liberty (selections)
8. Friedrich Nietzsche
7
Twilight of the Idols (selections)
Charles Sanders Peirce
The Fixation of Belief
How to Make Our Ideas Clear
William James
What Pragmatism Means
The Will to Believe
Bertrand Russell
The Problems of Philosophy (Chapters I–V)
Edmund Husserl
Paris Lectures (selections)
Jean-Paul Sartre
The Humanism of Existentialism
Ludwig Wittgenstein
Philosophical Investigations (selections)
J. L. Austin
Sense and Sensibilia (Chapters I–III, V)
8
9. Steven M. Cahn
Professor of Philosophy
The Graduate Center
The City University of New York
April 2012
Preface
Here in one volume are the complete texts or substantial
selections from sixty philosophical masterpieces.
Thirty-three of the world’s greatest philosophers are
represented, their writings spanning more than two
millennia. Crucial fields of philosophy are explored in depth:
metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, and
philosophy of religion. An introduction to each author contains
biographical data, philosophical commentary,
and bibliographical guides. Annotations are provided to clarify
textual references.
Marginal line numbers and references to them refer to the
original text and are only approximate in the
translations themselves. (In this ebook, the marginal numbers
are enclosed in square brackets and embedded
in the text.)
• • •
The eighth edition contains five major additions: Plato’s
Laches; Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics, III, 6–9;
Descartes’ Discourse on Method; Berkeley’s A Treatise
Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge (previously
included only in part), and Kant’s Prolegomena to Any Future
Metaphysics.
I very much appreciate the assistance of Richard Bett, Meredith
Williams, and Michael Williams of Johns
10. Hopkins University; Kathleen Higgins of the University of
Texas; Ruth Anna Putnam of Wellesley College;
Sara Ahbel-Rappe of the University of Michigan; Israel
Scheffler of Harvard University; David Shatz of
Yeshiva University; David Sherman of the University of
Montana; Jonathan Vogel of Amherst College; and
past and present faculty members at the University of Vermont:
Charles Guignon (now of the University of
South Florida), Patricia Kitcher and Philip Kitcher (both now of
Columbia University), William E. Mann,
Derk Pereboom (now of Cornell University), and George Sher
(now of Rice University). They have
contributed most of the introductions, thereby providing expert
commentary on the writings of each
philosopher.
I benefited greatly from advice by Professor Guignon regarding
the selections from Nietzsche; Professor
Higgins regarding the selections from Schopenhauer; Professor
Pereboom regarding the selections from Kant
and Kierkegaard; Professor Ahbel-Rappe regarding the
selections from Plotinus; and Professor Meredith
Williams regarding the selections from Wittgenstein. I
especially appreciated the advice from Professor
Andrea Tschemplik of American University regarding the
selections from Hegel and her willingness and that
of James H. Stam to give permission for use of their translation
of sections from the Phenomenology of Spirit.
Professor Mann, with whom I consulted on a variety of editorial
matters, furnished many of the translations
of Latin textual references. For additional suggestions regarding
the contents of the book, I am grateful to my
friends of many years John O’Connor, David Rosenthal, and the
late James Rachels, as well as to the
numerous philosophers who have taken the time and effort to
write and offer counsel.
11. Editing and production of the eighth edition were overseen by
Brian Rak and Liz Wilson. I appreciate
their conscientiousness and sound judgment.
I also wish to thank Jay Hullett and the late Frances Hackett,
who have led Hackett Publishing Company
and remained true to the values of its late founder, William H.
Y. Hackett. Thirty-five years have passed since
this work first appeared, and the kind reception it continues to
enjoy is a testament to the power of William
Hackett’s publishing vision.
9
Plato
Plato (427–347 B.C.) is surely the most famous of all
philosophers. Little is known of his early life, except that
he was born into a noble Athenian family and at some time in
his late teens came under the philosophical
spell of Socrates (469–399 B.C.), about whom valuable
information is contained in Plato’s Apology. The events
leading up to and culminating in the Athenian government’s
trial and execution of Socrates, when Plato was
twenty-eight, soured Plato on the idea of embarking on a life in
politics and resulted in his leaving Athens to
travel for a number of years in the Mediterranean region. Plato
returned to Athens in 387 and founded his
school, the Academy, in the belief that such an institution was
necessary for the education of political leaders
who would be morally excellent. The Academy attracted many
of the finest contemporary minds, including
Aristotle. Plato twice visited Syracuse in a futile attempt to
12. inculcate his moral and political ideas in Syracuse’s
young tyrant, Dionysius II.
Socrates wrote nothing: It is fortunate that his most illustrious
follower did not follow that example. At
least twenty-six of Plato’s dialogues have survived, ranging in
length from the brief Crito to the voluble Laws,
which is longer than the Republic. The dialogues are
customarily divided into three periods of Plato’s literary
career: early, middle, and late. The early dialogues—of which
the Laches, Euthyphro, Apology, and Crito are
examples—are taken to be accurate if not verbatim portrayals of
Socrates in philosophical action. The middle
dialogues, represented here by the Meno, Phaedo, and Republic,
display Plato at the height of his literary
abilities, seeking to further the projects inspired by Socrates
while at the same time introducing doctrines that
are extremely unlikely to have been Socrates’ own. The late
dialogues are dialogues in name only, quite often
technically demanding in nature. They appear to represent
Plato’s efforts to grapple with the critical issues
raised by the doctrines enunciated in the middle dialogues and
most likely raised by others in the Academy.
As the Apology makes clear, Socrates professed to be ignorant
of all matters philosophical, although not
disputing the Delphic oracle’s pronouncement that he was the
wisest of all men. He concluded that his
“wisdom,” compared to the pretenses of others, lay in knowing
the extent of his ignorance. Taking his mission
to be to show others the magnitude of their ignorance about the
most important matters of their lives,
Socrates relentlessly grilled his fellow Athenian citizens, using
rigorous argumentation to demonstrate that
uncritically accepted opinions about philosophically important
matters could lead to logical catastrophe: The
13. Laches, Euthyphro and the early pages of the Meno provide
excellent examples of Socrates’ technique.
Yet for all his professed ignorance, Socrates clung to several
distinctive philosophical doctrines. First, one
cannot have genuine knowledge about moral matters unless one
can give a rationally defensible account of
such notions as courage (Laches), piety (Euthyphro), justice
(Republic), and virtue or human excellence in
general (Meno). Socrates thus pitted himself against the
Sophists, a contemporary group of itinerant
professional teachers, many of whom fostered the belief in their
students that no objective knowledge was to
be had in ethics. Socrates believed that moral knowledge is
possible but difficult to acquire, and that his
method of exposing ignorance in others was a necessary first
step to their acquiring it. Second, as the Meno
intimates, in some way or other virtue (or excellence in humans)
is knowledge. The Laches, for example,
probes the hypothesis that courage is knowledge. That the
dialogue’s participants do not succeed in
identifying what kind of knowledge courage might be illustrates
the difficulty in acquiring moral knowledge
and the importance of becoming aware of one’s ignorance The
remarkable corollary of the claim that virtue is
knowledge is the thesis that all wrongdoing is the result of
ignorance. Third, as illustrated in the Crito and
argued for in the Republic, Socrates believed that it is better for
one to suffer injustice than to do injustice.
Plato came to believe that, if ethics is something more than the
product of arbitrary convention, and if
moral judgments are objective, then ethics must be grounded in
objects that are unchanging in character and
accessible to human minds. These objects are the Forms, the
perfect, abstract objects discussed in the Phaedo,
14. Symposium, and Republic. Humans can have knowledge of the
Forms by recollection, a process that Plato
describes in the Meno, alludes to in the Phaedo, and
presupposes in the Republic. The importance Plato assigns
to the Form of the Good in the Republic is designed to show
how the acquisition of knowledge of the Forms
provides one with the motivation to be virtuous. The connection
between intellectual knowledge and moral
motivation is also underscored in the Symposium, where Plato
argues that love, rationally pursued, will lead
the lover to its ultimate object, the Form of Beauty. The
doctrine of Recollection in turn presupposes that
humans have existed before their present lives. From there it
seems a small step to the thesis that the soul is
immortal. In the Phaedo, whose dramatic setting is the day of
Socrates’ execution, Plato has Socrates present
10
several arguments for the immortality of the soul. If the soul is
immortal, then care for it should be more
important than care for the body: One of the major themes of
the Republic is that behaving justly is at least as
valuable for the care of the soul, as well as for the care of the
state, as physical health is for the care of the
body.
• • •
The amount of excellent philosophical writings on Socrates and
Plato is far too large to list here but
certainly includes the following. On Socrates in general, see
Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral
Philosopher (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1991)
15. along with two collections of essays, Hugh Benson,
ed., Essays on the Philosophy of Socrates (New York: Oxford
University Press, 1992) and Gregory Vlastos, ed.,
The Philosophy of Socrates (Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday,
1971). Two studies on early dialogues appearing
here are C. D. C. Reeve, Socrates in the Apology (Indianapolis,
Ind.: Hackett Publishing Company, 1989) and,
on the Crito, Richard Kraut, Socrates and the State (Princeton,
N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1984).
Although somewhat demanding, the following works on Plato
are superb: R. E. Allen, ed., Studies in
Plato’s Metaphysics (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1965);
Gail Fine, ed., Plato 1: Metaphysics and
Epistemology, and Plato 2: Ethics, Politics, Religion, and the
Soul (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999);
Terence Irwin, Plato’s Ethics (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1995); Richard Kraut, ed., The Cambridge
Companion to Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1992); Gregory Vlastos, ed., Plato: A Collection
of Critical Essays: I: Metaphysics and Epistemology, and II:
Ethics, Politics, and Philosophy of Art and Religion
(Garden City, N.J.: Doubleday, 1970 and 1971); and Gregory
Vlastos, Platonic Studies, second edition
(Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981). Two books
devoted to the Republic are Julia Annas, An
Introduction to Plato’s Republic (Oxford: Clarendon Press,
1981) and Richard Kraut, ed., Plato’s Republic
(Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997).
William E. Mann
11
16. Laches*
LYSIMACHUS: You have seen the man fighting in [178a]
armor, Nicias and Laches. When Melesias and I
invited you to see him with us, we neglected to give the reason
why, but now we shall explain, because we
think it especially right to be frank with you. Now there are
some people who make fun of frankness and if
anyone asks their advice, they don’t say what they [b] think, but
they make a shot at what the other man
would like to hear and say something different from their own
opinion. But you we considered capable not
only of forming a judgment but also, having formed one, of
saying exactly what you think, and this is why we
have taken you into our confidence about what we are going to
communicate to you. Now the matter about
which I have been making such a long preamble [179a] is this:
we have these two sons here — this one is the
son of my friend Melesias here, and he is called Thucydides
after his grandfather, and this one is my son, who
also goes by his grandfather’s name—we call him Aristides
after my father. We have made up our minds to
take as good care of them as we possibly can and not to behave
like most parents, who, when their children
start to grow up, permit them to do whatever they wish. No, we
think that now is the time to [b] make a real
beginning, so far as we can. Since we knew that both of you had
sons too, we thought that you, if anyone,
would have been concerned about the sort of training that would
make the best men of them. And if by any
chance you have not turned your attention to this kind of thing
very often, let us remind you that you ought
not to neglect it, and let us invite you to care for your sons
along with ours. How we reached this conclusion,
Nicias and Laches, you must hear, even if it means my talking a
bit longer. Now you must know that Melesias
17. and I take our meals [c] together, and the boys eat with us. We
shall be frank with you, exactly as I said in the
beginning: each of us has a great many fine things to say to the
young men about his own father, things they
achieved both in war and in peace in their management of the
affairs both of their allies and of the city here.
But neither of us has a word to say about his own
accomplishments. This is what shames us in front of them,
and we blame [d] our fathers for allowing us to take things easy
when we were growing up, while they were
busy with other peoples’ affairs. And we point these same
things out to the young people here, saying that if
they are careless of themselves and disobedient to us, they will
turn out to be nobodies, but if they take pains,
perhaps they may become worthy of the names they bear. Now
the boys promise to be obedient, so we are
looking into the question what form of instruction or practise
would make them turn out best. Somebody
suggested [e] this form of instruction to us, saying that it would
be a fine thing for a young man to learn
fighting in armor. And he praised this particular man whom you
have just seen giving a display and proceeded
to encourage us to see him. So we thought we ought to go to see
the man and to take you with us, not only as
fellow-spectators but also as fellow-counsellors and partners, if
you should be willing, in the care of our sons.
This is what we wanted to share with you. So now is the [180a]
time for you to give us your advice, not only
about this form of instruction—whether you think it should be
learned or not—but also about any other sort
of study or pursuit for a young man which you admire. Tell us
too, what part you will take in our joint
enterprise.
NICIAS: I, for one, Lysimachus and Melesias, applaud your
plan and am ready to take part in it. And I
18. think Laches here is ready too.
LACHES: You are quite right, Nicias. As for what [b]
Lysimachus said just now about his father and
Melesias’ father, I think that what he said applied very well to
them and to us and to everyone engaged in
public affairs, because this is pretty generally what happens to
them—that they neglect their private affairs,
children as well as everything else, and manage them carelessly.
So you were right on this [c] point,
Lysimachus. But I am astonished that you are inviting us to be
your fellow-counsellors in the education of the
young men and are not inviting Socrates here! In the first place,
he comes from your own deme, and in the
second, he is always spending his time in places where the
young men engage in any study or noble pursuit of
the sort you are looking for.
LYSIMACHUS: What do you mean, Laches? Has our friend
Socrates concerned himself with any things of
this kind?
LACHES: Certainly, Lysimachus.
12
NICIAS: This is a point I can vouch for no less than Laches,
since he only recently recommended [d] a
man to me as music teacher for my son. The man’s name is
Damon, a pupil of Agathocles, and he is the most
accomplished of men, not only in music, but in all the other
pursuits in which you would think it worthwhile
for boys of his age to spend their time.
19. LYSIMACHUS: People at my time of life, Socrates, Nicias,
and Laches, are no longer familiar with the
young because our advancing years keep us at home [e] so much
of the time. But if you, son of Sophroniscus,
have any good advice to give your fellow-demesman, you ought
to give it. And you have a duty to do so,
because you are my friend through your father. He and I were
always comrades and friends, and he died
without our ever having had a single difference. And this
present conversation reminds me of something —
when the boys here are talking to each other at home, they often
mention Socrates and praise him highly, but
I’ve never though to ask if they were speaking [181a] of the son
of Sophroniscus. Tell me, boys, is this the
Socrates you spoke of on those occasions?
BOYS: Certainly, father, this is the one.
LYSIMACHUS: I am delighted, Socrates, that you keep up
your father’s good reputation, for he was the
best of men, and I am especially pleased at the idea that the
close ties between your family and mine will be
renewed.
LACHES: Don’t under any circumstances let the man get
away, Lysimachus—because I have seen him
elsewhere keeping up not only his father’s reputation [b] but
that of his country. He marched with me in the
retreat from Delium,1 and I can tell you that if the rest had been
willing to behave in the same manner, our
city would be safe and we would not then have suffered a
disaster of that kind.
LYSIMACHUS: Socrates, the praise you are receiving is
certainly of a high order, both because it comes
from men who are to be trusted and because of the qualities for
20. which they praise you. Be assured that I am
delighted to hear that you are held in such esteem, and please
consider me among those most kindly disposed
towards you. You yourself ought to have visited us long before
and considered us your [c] friends—that would
have been the right thing to do. Well, since we have recognized
each other, resolve now, starting today, to
associate both with us and the young men here and to make our
acquaintance, so that you may preserve the
family friendship. So do what I ask, and we in turn shall keep
you in mind of your promise. But what have you
all to say about our original question? What is your opinion? Is
fighting in armor a useful subject for young
men to learn or not?
SOCRATES: Well, I shall try to advise you about these things
as best I can, Lysimachus, in addition to [d]
performing all the things to which you call my attention.
However, it seems to me to be more suitable, since I
am younger that the others and more inexperienced in these
matters, for me to listen first to what they have to
say and to learn from them. But if I should have something to
add to what they say, then will be the time for
me to teach and persuade both you and the others. Come,
Nicias, why doesn’t one of you two begin?
NICIAS: Well, there is no reason why not, Socrates. I think
that knowledge of this branch of study is
beneficial for the young in all sorts of ways. [e] For one thing,
it is a good idea for the young not to spend
their time in the pursuits in which they normally do like to
spend it when they are at leisure, but rather in this
one, which necessarily improves [182a] their bodies, since it is
in no way inferior to gymnastic exercises and
no less strenuous, and, at the same time, this and horsemanship
are forms of exercise especially suited to a free
21. citizen. For in the contest in which we are the contestants and in
the matters on which our struggle depends,2
only those are practised who know how to use the instruments
of war. And again, there is a certain advantage
in this form of instruction even in an actual battle, whenever
one has to fight in line with a number of others.
But the greatest advantage of it comes when the ranks are
broken and it then becomes necessary for a man to
fight in [b] single combat, either in pursuit when he has to
attack a man who is defending himself, or in flight,
when he has to defend himself against another person who is
attacking him. A man who had this skill would
suffer no harm at the hands of a single opponent, nor even
perhaps at the hands of a larger number, but he
would have the advantage in every way. Then again, such a
study arouses in us the desire for another fine form
of instruction, since every man who learns to fight in armor will
want to learn the subject that comes next, that
is, the science of tactics; and when he has [c] mastered this and
taken pride in it, he will press on to the whole
art of the general. So it has already become clear that what is
connected with this latter art, all the studies and
pursuits which are fine and of great value for a man to learn and
to practise, have this study as a starting-point.
And we shall add to this an advantage which is not at all
negligible, that this knowledge will make every man
much bolder and braver in war that he was before. And let us
not omit to mention, even if to some it might
seem a point not worth making, that this art will give a man a
finer-looking appearance at the very moment
when he needs to have it, and [d] when he will appear more
frightening to the enemy because of the way he
13
22. looks. So my opinion, Lysimachus, is just as I say, that young
men should be taught these things, and I have
given the reasons why I think so. But if Laches has anything to
say on the other side, I would be glad to hear
it.
LACHES: But the fact is, Nicias, that it is difficult to maintain
of any study whatsoever that it ought not
to be learned, because it seems to be a good idea to learn
everything. So as far as this fighting in armor [e] is
concerned, if it is a genuine branch of study, as those who teach
it claim, and as Nicias says, then it ought to
be learned, but if it is not a real subject and the people who
propose to teach it are deceiving us, or if it is a real
subject but not a very important one, what need is there to learn
it? The reason I say these things about it is
that I consider that, if there were anything in it, it would not
have escaped the attention of the
Lacedaemonians, who have no other concern in life than to look
for and engage in whatever studies and
pursuits will increase their superiority in war. [183a] And if the
Lacedaemonians had overlooked the art, the
teachers of it would certainly not have overlooked this fact, that
the Lacedaemonians are the most concerned
with such matters of any of the Greeks and that anyone who was
honored among them in these matters would
make a great deal of money just as is the case when a tragic
poet is honored among us. The result is that
whenever anyone fancies himself as a good writer of tragedy, he
does not go about exhibiting [b] his plays in
the other cities round about Athens but comes straight here and
shows his work to our people, as is the
natural thing to do. But I observe that those who fight in armor
regard Lacedaemon as forbidden ground and
keep from setting foot in it. They give it a wide berth and prefer
23. to exhibit to anyone rather than the Spartans
—in fact they take pains to select people who themselves admit
that plenty of others surpass them in warfare.
Then again, [c] Lysimachus, I have encountered quite a few of
these gentlemen on the actual field of battle
and I have seen what they are like. This makes it possible for us
to consider the matter at first hand. In a
manner which seems almost deliberate, not a single practitioner
of the art of fighting in armor has ever
become renowned in war. And yet in all the other arts, those
who are well-known in each are those who have
practised the various ones. But the men who practise this art
seem to be those who have the worst luck at it.
For instance, this very man Stesilaus, whom you and I have
witnessed giving a display before such a large [d]
crowd and praising himself the way he did, I once saw in the
quite different circumstances of actual warfare
giving a much finer demonstration against his will. On an
occasion when a ship on which he was serving as a
marine3 rammed a transport-vessel, he was armed with a
combination scythe and spear, as singular a weapon
as he was singular a man. His other peculiarities are not worth
relating, but let me tell you how his invention
of a scythe plus a spear turned out. In the [e] course of the fight
it somehow got entangled in the rigging of
the other ship and there it stuck. So Stesilaus dragged at the
weapon in an attempt to free it, but he could not,
and meanwhile his ship was going by the other ship. For a time
he kept running along the deck holding fast
to the spear. But when the other ship was actually passing his
and was dragging him after it while he still held
onto the weapon, he let it [184a] slide through his hand until he
just had hold of the ferule at the end. There
was laughter and applause from the men on the transport at the
sight of him, and when somebody hit the
deck at his feet with a stone and he let go the shaft, then even
24. the men on the trireme could no longer keep
from laughing when they saw that remarkable scythe-spear
dangling from the transport. Now perhaps these
things may be of value, as Nicias maintains, but my own
experience has been of the sort I describe. So, as I
said in the [b] beginning, either it is an art but has little value,
or it is not an art but people say and pretend
that it is, but in any case it is not worth trying to learn. And
then it seems to me that if a cowardly man should
imagine he had mastered the art, he would, because of his
increasing rashness, show up more clearly the sort
of man he was, whereas in the case of a brave man, everyone …
