Theory in anthropology since the sixties sherry ortner
Theory in Anthropology since the SixtiesAuthor(s): Sherry B. OrtnerSource: Comparative Studies in Society and History, Vol. 26, No. 1 (Jan., 1984), pp. 126-166Published by: Cambridge University PressStable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/178524Accessed: 15/04/2010 21:25Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use, available athttp://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp. JSTORs Terms and Conditions of Use provides, in part, that unlessyou have obtained prior permission, you may not download an entire issue of a journal or multiple copies of articles, and youmay use content in the JSTOR archive only for your personal, non-commercial use.Please contact the publisher regarding any further use of this work. Publisher contact information may be obtained athttp://www.jstor.org/action/showPublisher?publisherCode=cup.Each copy of any part of a JSTOR transmission must contain the same copyright notice that appears on the screen or printedpage of such transmission.JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars, researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide range ofcontent in a trusted digital archive. We use information technology and tools to increase productivity and facilitate new formsof scholarship. For more information about JSTOR, please contact email@example.com. Cambridge University Press is collaborating with JSTOR to digitize, preserve and extend access to Comparative Studies in Society and History.http://www.jstor.org
Theory in Anthropologysince the SixtiesSHERRY B. ORTNERUniversityof MichiganEvery year, aroundthe time of the meetings of the AmericanAnthropologicalAssociation, the New YorkTimes asks a Big Name anthropologist contrib- toute an op-ed piece on the state of the field. These pieces tend to take a rathergloomy view. A few years ago, for example, Marvin Harrissuggested thatanthropologywas being taken over by mystics, religious fanatics, and Cal-ifornia cultists; that the meetings were dominatedby panels on shamanism,witchcraft,and "abnormalphenomena";and that "scientific papersbased onempirical studies" had been willfully excluded from the program (Harris1978). More recently, in a more sober tone, Eric Wolf suggestedthatthe fieldof anthropologyis coming apart. The sub-fields (and sub-sub-fields)are in-creasingly pursuingtheir specialized interests, losing contact with each otherand with the whole. There is no longer a shared discourse, a shared set oftermsto which all practitioners addressthemselves, a sharedlanguagewe all,however idiosyncratically, speak (Wolf 1980). The state of affairsdoes seem much as Wolf describesit. The field appearsto be a thing of shredsand patches, of individualsand small coteries pursuingdisjunctiveinvestigations and talking mainly to themselves. We do not evenhear stirringargumentsany more. Although anthropologywas never actuallyunified in the sense of adoptinga single sharedparadigm,there was at least aperiod when there were a few large categories of theoreticalaffiliation, a setof identifiablecamps or schools, and a few simple epithets one could hurl atThis essay contains much of my own intellectual history. There will be no more appropriatecontext in which to thank my teachers, Frederica de Laguna, Clifford Geertz, and DavidSchneiderfor having turnedme, for betteror for worse, into an anthropologist. addition,I wish Into thankthe following friends and colleagues for helpful contributions the developmentof this toessay: Nancy Chodorow, Salvatore Cucchiari, James Fernandez,Raymond Grew, Keith Hart,RaymondKelly, David Kertzer, RobertPaul, Paul Rabinow, Joyce Riegelhaupt,Anton Weiler,and HarrietWhitehead. Parts of this work were presentedat the Departmentof Anthropology,Princeton University; the Departmentof Social Anthropology, University of Stockholm; theSocial Science History Seminar(founded and coordinatedby Charlesand Louise Tilly), Univer-sity of Michigan;the HumanitiesSeminar, StanfordUniversity;and the Seminaron Theory andMethods in ComparativeStudies (coordinatedby Neil Smelser) at the Universityof California,Berkeley. I received valuable comments and reactions in all of these contexts.0010-4175/84/1709-0100 $2.50 ? 1984 Society for ComparativeStudy of Society and History 126
THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY SINCE THE SIXTIES 127ones opponents. Now there appears to be an apathy of spirit even at thislevel. We no longer call each other names. We are no longer sure of how thesides are to be drawnup, and of where we would place ourselves if we couldidentify the sides. Yet as anthropologistswe can recognize in all of this the classic symptomsof liminality-confusion of categories, expressions of chaos and antistruc-ture. And we know that such disordermay be the breedinggroundfor a newand perhapsbetterorder. Indeed, if one scrutinizesthe presentmore closely,one may even discern within it the shape of the new orderto come. That is"what I propose to do in this article. I will argue that a new key symbol oftheoretical orientation is emerging, which may be labeled "practice" (or "action" or "praxis"). This is neither a theory nor a method in itself, butrather, as I said, a symbol, in the name of which a variety of theories andmethods are being developed. In order to understand significance of this thetrend, however, we must go back at least twenty years and see where westartedfrom, and how we got to where we are now. Before launching this enterprise, however, it is importantto specify itsnature. This essay will be primarily concerned with the relations betweenvarious theoretical schools or approaches,both within periods of time, andacross time. No single approachwill be exhaustivelyoutlinedor discussed initself; rather,variousthemes or dimensionsof each will be highlightedinsofaras they relateto the largertrendsof thoughtwith which I am concerned.Everyanthropologistwill probablyfind his or her favorite school oversimplified,ifnot outrightdistorted, insofar as I have choosen to emphasizefeaturesthatdonot correspondto what are normallytaken, among the practitioners,to be itsmost importanttheoretical features. Thus readers seeking more exhaustivediscussions of particular approaches,and/or discussionspursuedfrom a pointof view more interior to the approaches, will have to seek elsewhere. Theconcern here, again, is with elucidating relations.THE SIXTIES: SYMBOL, NATURE, STRUCTUREAlthough there is always some arbitrariness choosing a startingpoint for inany historicaldiscussion, I have decided to begin in the early 1960s. For onething, that is when I started in the field, and since I generally assume theimportanceof seeing any system, at least in part, from the actors point ofview, I might as well unite theory and practicefrom the outset. It is thus fullyacknowledgedthatthis discussion proceedsnot from some hypotheticalexter-nal point, but from the perspective of this particularactor moving throughanthropologybetween 1960 and the present. But actors always wish to claim universalityfor theirparticular experiencesand interpretations.I would further suggest then that, in some relativelyobjective sense, there was in fact a majorset of revolutionsin anthropologicaltheory, beginning in the early sixties. Indeed it appearsthat such revisionist
128 SHERRY B. ORTNERupheaval was characteristicof many other fields in that era. In literarycrit-icism, for example,by the 1960sa volatilemixture linguistics, of psychoanalysis semiotics,struc- andturalism,Marxist and theory reception aesthetics begun replace oldermoral had to thehumanism. literary The text tendedto move towards statusof phenomenon: the a andsocio-psycho-culturo-linguisticideological event,arisingfromtheoffered compe-tenciesof language, available the taxonomies narrative of order,the permutations of optionsof structuralgenre,the sociological the formation, ideological constraints ofthe infra-structure.. . . [There was a] broad and contentious revisionist perception 1981:137).(Bradbury In anthropologyat the close of the fifties, the theoreticalbricoleurs kitconsisted of threemajor, and somewhatexhausted,paradigms-British struc-tural-functionalism (descended from A. R. Radcliffe-Brownand BronislawMalinowski), Americanculturaland psychocultural anthropology (descendedfrom MargaretMead, Ruth Benedict, et al.), and Americanevolutionist an-thropology (centered around Leslie White and Julian Steward, and havingstrong affiliations with archaeology). Yet it was also during the fifties thatcertain actors and cohorts central to our story were trainedin each of theseareas. They emerged at the beginning of the sixties with aggressive ideasabouthow to strengthenthe paradigmsof their mentorsand ancestors,as wellas with, apparently,much more combativestancesvis-a-vis the otherschools.It was this combination of new ideas and intellectual aggressiveness thatlaunched the three movements with which this account begins: symbolicanthropology,culturalecology, and structuralism.SymbolicAnthropology"Symbolic anthropology" as a label was never used by any of its mainproponentsin the formativeperiod-say, 1963-66. Ratherit was a shorthandtag (probablyinventedby the opposition), an umbrellafor a numberof ratherdiverse trends. Two of its major variantsappearto have been independentlyinvented, one by Clifford Geertz and his colleagues at the University ofChicago, and the other by Victor Turner at Cornell. The importantdif-ferences between the Geertzians and the Turneriansare probably not fullyappreciated by those outside the symbolic anthropology scene. WhereasGeertz was primarilyinfluencedby Max Weber (via TalcottParsons),Turnerwas primarilyinfluenced by Emile Durkheim.Further,Geertz clearly repre-sents a transformationupon the earlier American anthropologyconcernedmainly with the operationsof "culture," while Turnerrepresentsa transfor- For the discussion of the sixties and the seventies, I will for the most partinvoke only themost representativefigures and works. In an articleof this length, many interestingdevelopmentsmust be by-passed. One importantfigure of this period who gets left by the wayside is GregoryBateson (e.g., 1972), who, though himself clearly a powerful and original thinker,never reallyfounded a major school in anthropology.
THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY SINCE THE SIXTIES I29mation upon the earlierBritish anthropologyconcernedmainly with the oper-ations of "society." Geertzs most radicaltheoreticalmove (1973b) was to arguethat cultureisnot something locked inside peoples heads, but ratheris embodiedin publicsymbols, symbols throughwhich the membersof a society communicatetheirworldview, value-orientations,ethos, and all the rest to one another,to futuregenerations-and to anthropologists.With this formulation,Geertz gave thehithertoelusive concept of culture a relatively fixed locus, and a degree ofobjectivity, that it did not have before. The focus on symbols was for Geertzand many others heuristicallyliberating:it told them where to find what theywanted to study. Yet the point about symbols was that they were ultimatelyvehicles for meanings;the study of symbols as such was never an end in itself.Thus, on the one hand, Geertzians2have never been particularly interestedindistinguishing and cataloguingthe varietiesof symbolic types (signals, signs,icons, indexes, etcetera-see, in contrast, Singer 1980); nor, on the otherhand (and in contrastwith Turnerto whom we will get in a moment), havethey been particularly interestedin the ways in which symbols performcertainpracticaloperations in the social process-heal people throughcuring rites,turn boys and girls into men and women through initiation, kill peoplethroughsorcery-and so forth. Geertziansdo not ignore these practicalsocialeffects, but such symbols have not been their primary focus of interest.Rather, the focus of Geertziananthropologyhas consistently been the ques-tion of how symbols shape the ways social actors see, feel, and think aboutthe world, or, in other words, how symbols operateas vehicles of "culture." It is furtherworth noting, in anticipationof the discussion of structuralism,that Geertzs heart has always been more with the "ethos" side of culturethan with the "worldview," more with the affective and stylistic dimensionsthan with the cognitive. While of course it is very difficult (not to say unpro-ductive and ultimately wrong-headed)to separatethe two too sharply, it isnonetheless possible to distinguishan emphasis on one or the other side. ForGeertz, then (as for Benedict, especially, before him), even the most cogni-tive or intellectualof culturalsystems-say, the Balinese calendars-are ana-lyzed not (only) to lay bare a set of cognitive orderingprinciples, but (es-pecially) to understandhow the Balinese way of chopping up time stampstheir sense of self, of social relations, and of conduct with a particularcultur-ally distinctive flavor, an ethos (1973e).3 2 E.g., Ortner 1975; M. Rosaldo 1980; Blu 1980; Meeker 1979; Rosen 1978. 3 If culture itself had been an elusive phenomenon, one may say that Geertz has pursuedthemost elusive partof it, the ethos. It may also be suggested thatthis, among otherthings, accountsfor his continuing and broad-basedappeal. Perhaps the majorityof students who go into an-thropology, and almost certainly the majorityof nonanthropologists who are fascinatedby ourfield, are drawn to it because they have been struck at some point in their experience by the"otherness" of anotherculture, which we would call its ethos. Geertzs workprovidesone of thevery few handles for grasping that otherness.
I30 SHERRY B. ORTNER The othermajorcontribution the Geertzianframework of was the insistenceon studyingculture "from the actorspoint of view" (e.g., 1975). Again, thisdoes not imply that we must get "into peoples heads." What it means, verysimply, is thatcultureis a productof acting social beings tryingto make senseof the world in which they find themselves, and if we are to make sense of aculture, we must situate ourselves in the position from which it was con-structed. Culture is not some abstractlyordered system, deriving its logicfrom hidden structuralprinciples, or from special symbols that provide the "keys" to its coherence. Its logic-the principles of relations that obtainamong its elements-derives ratherfrom the logic or organizationof action,from people operating within certain institutionalorders, interpretingtheirsituations in order to act coherently within them (1973d). It may be notedhere, however, that while the actor-centeredperspective is fundamentaltoGeertzs framework,it is not systematicallyelaborated: Geertzdid not devel-op a theory of action or practice as such. He did, however, firmly plant theactor at the center of his model, and much of the laterpractice-centered workbuilds on a Geertzian(or Geertzo-Weberian) base, as we shall see. The othermajorfigure in the Chicago school of symbolic anthropology hasbeen David Schneider. Schneider, like Geertz, was a productof Parsons,andhe too concentratedprimarilyon refining the cultureconcept. But his effortswent toward understandingthe internal logic of systems of symbols andmeanings, by way of a notion of "core symbols," and also by way of ideasakin to ClaudeLevi-Strausssconcept of structure (e.g., 1968, 1977). Indeed,although Geertz prominentlyused the phrase "cultural system" (emphasisadded), he never paid much attentionto the systemic aspectsof culture,and itwas Schneider who developed this side of the problem much more fully.Schneider in his own work cut culture off from social action much moreradically than Geertz did. Yet, perhaps precisely because social action("practice," "praxis") was so radically separated from "culture" inSchneiderswork, he and some of his studentswere among the earliestof thesymbolic anthropologiststo see practice itself as a problem (Barnett 1977;Dolgin, Kemnitzer, and Schneider 1977). Victor Turner, finally, comes out of quite a different intellectual back-ground. He was trained in the Max Gluckmanvariantof British structural-functionalism,which was influencedby Marxism,and which stressedthatthenormalstate of society is not one of solidarityand harmoniousintegrationofparts, but ratherone of conflict and contradiction.Thus, the analyticquestionwas not, as for the straightline descendantsof Durkheim, how solidarityisfine-tuned, reinforced, and intensified, but ratherhow it is constructedandmaintainedin the first place over and above the conflicts and contradictionsthat constitute the normal state of affairs. To the Americanreader,this mayappearto be only a minor varianton the basic functionalistproject, since forboth schools the emphasis is on the maintenanceof integration,and specifi-
THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY SINCE THE SIXTIES 131cally on the maintenanceof the integrationof "society"-actors, groups, thesocial whole-as opposed to "culture." But Gluckman and his students(includingTurner)believed their differences from the mainstream be quite todeep. Moreover, they always constituteda minoritywithin the British estab-lishment. This backgroundmay account in partfor Turnersoriginalityvis-a-vis his compatriots,leading ultimatelyto his independentlyinventinghis ownbrandof an explicitly symbolic anthropology. Despite the relative novelty of Turnersmove to symbols, however, thereisin his work a deep continuity with British social anthropologicalconcerns,and, as a result, profounddifferences between Tumerianand Geertziansym-bolic anthropology.For Turner,symbols are of interestnot as vehicles of, andanalytic windows onto, "culture"-the integratedethos and worldview of asociety-but as what might be called operators in the social process, thingsthat, when put togetherin certainarrangements certaincontexts (especially inrituals), produceessentially social transformations.Thus, symbols in Ndem-bu curingor initiationor huntingritualsare investigatedfor the ways in whichthey move actors from one status to another, resolve social contradictions,and wed actorsto the categories and normsof their society (1967). Along theway toward these rather traditional structural-functional goals, however,Turneridentified or elaboratedupon certainritual mechanisms, and some ofthe concepts he developed have become indispensablepartsof the vocabularyof ritualanalysis-liminality, marginality,antistructure, communitas,and soforth (1967, 1969).4 Turnerand the Chicago symbolic anthropologistsdid not so much conflictwith one anotheras simply, for the most part, talk past one another.Yet theTurnerians5 added an important,and characteristically British, dimension tothe field of symbolic anthropologyas a whole, a sense of the pragmatics ofsymbols. They investigated in much more detail than Geertz, Schneider, etal., the "effectiveness of symbols," the questionof how symbols actuallydowhat all symbolic anthropologistsclaim they do: operate as active forces inthe social process (see also Levi-Strauss 1963; Tambiah 1968; Lewis 1977;Fernandez 1974). In retrospect, one may say that symbolic anthropologyhad a numberofsignificant limitations. I refer not to the charges that it was unscientific,mystical, literary, soft-headed, and the like leveled at it by practitionersofculturalecology (see below). Rather, one may point to symbolic anthropol- 4 Anotherpoint of contrastbetween Turnerand Geertz is thatTurners concept of meaning, atleast in those early works that launchedhis approach,is largely referential.Meanings are thingsthat symbols point to or refer to, like "matriliny" or "blood." Geertz, on the other hand, isprimarilyconcernedwith what might be called Meaning, with a capitalM-the purpose,or point,or largersignificance of things. Thus he quotes NorthropFrye: "You wouldnt go to Macbethtolearnaboutthe history of Scotland-you go to it to learnwhat a man feels like afterhes gained akingdom and lost his soul" (Geertz 1973f:450). 5 E.g., Munn 1969; Myerhoff 1974; Moore and Myerhoff 1975; Babcock 1978.
132 SHERRY B. ORTNERogys lack, especially in its American form, of a systematic sociology; itsunderdeveloped sense of the politics of culture; and its lack of curiosityconcerning the production and maintenance of symbolic systems. Thesepoints will be discussed more fully in the course of this article.CulturalEcology6Culturalecology representeda new synthesis of, and a furtherdevelopmentupon, the materialistevolutionismof Leslie White (1943, 1949), JulianStew-ard (1953, 1955), and V. Gordon Childe (1942). Its roots go back to LewisHenryMorganand E. B. Tylor in the nineteenthcentury, and ultimatelybackto Marx and Engels, although many of the 1950s evolutionists, for under-standable political reasons, were not encouraged to emphasize the Marxistconnection.7 White had been investigating what came to be labeled "general evolu-tion," or the evolution of culture-in-general,in terms of stages of socialcomplexity and technological advancement.These stages were subsequentlyrefinedby Elman Service (1958), and by MarshallSahlins and ElmanService(1960), into the famous bands-tribes-chiefdoms-states scheme. The evolu-tionary mechanisms in Whites frameworkderived from more or less for-tuitous events: technological inventionsthat allowed for the greater "captureof energy," and populationgrowth (and perhapswarfareand conquest) thatstimulatedthe developmentof more complex forms of social/political organi-zation and coordination.Steward(1953) attackedboth the focus on the evolu-tion of culture-in-general opposed to specific cultures), and the lack of a (asmore systematically operative evolutionarymechanism. Instead, he empha-sized that specific culturesevolve their specific forms in the process of adapt-ing to specific environmentalconditions, and that the apparentuniformityof toevolutionarystages is actually a matterof similaradaptations similarnatu-ral conditions in different parts of the world. If the idea thatculturewas embodied in public, observablesymbols was thekey to the liberationof symbolic anthropologyfrom earlierAmericanculturalanthropology,the concept that played a similar role in culturalecology was"adaptation." (See Alland 1975 for a summary.) Just as Geertz had trum-peted that the study of culture as embodied in symbols removedthe problemof getting inside peoples heads, so Sahlins proclaimedthe focus on adapta-tion to environmentalfactors as the way aroundsuch amorphousfactors ascultural gestalten and historical dialectics (1964). There was a large-scalerejection of the study of the inner workings of both culturein the Americansense and society in the British sense. Internaldynamicswere seen as hardto 6 This section is partly based on readings, partly on semiformalinterviews with ConradP.Kottak and Roy A. Rappaport, and partly on general discussions with Raymond C. Kelly.Absolution is extended to all of the informants. 7 White and Childe were fairly explicit about the Marxist influence on their work.
THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY SINCE THE SIXTIES 133measure, and even harder to choose among for purposes of assigning causalprimacy, whereas external factors of natural and social environment wereamenable to treatment as fixed, measurable, "independent variables:"For decades, centuries now, intellectual battle has been given over which sector ofculture is the decisive one for change. Many have entered the lists under bannersdiverse. Curiously, few seem to fall. Leslie White championstechnologicalgrowthasthe sector most responsible for culturalevolution; Julian Huxley, with many others,sees "mans view of destiny" as the deciding force; the mode of productionand theclass struggle are still very much in contention. Different as they are, these positionsagree in one respect, that the impulse to developmentis generatedfrom within ....The case for internalcauses of developmentmay be bolsteredby pointingto a mecha-nism, such as the Hegelian dialectic, or it may rest more insecurely on an argumentfrom logic. ... In any event, an unreal and vulnerableassumptionis always there,that culturesare closed systems. . . . It is precisely on this point that culturalecologyoffers a new perspective. . . . [I]t shifts attentionto the relationbetween inside andoutside; it envisions as the mainspringof the evolutionarymovement the interchangebetween culture and environment.Now which view shall prevail is not to be decidedon a sheet of paper. . . . But if adaptationwins over inner dynamism, it will be forcertain intrinsic and obvious strengths. Adaptation is real, naturalistic, anchoredto those historic contexts of cultures that inner dynamism ignores (Sahlins1964:135-36).8 The Sahlins and Service version of cultural ecology, which was also ad-hered to by the mainstream of the archaeology wing of anthropology, was stillfundamentally evolutionist. The primary use of the adaptation concept was inexplaining the development, maintenance, and transformation of socialforms. But there was another variant of cultural ecology, which developedslightly later, and which came to dominate the materialist wing in the sixties.Its position, expressed most forcefully by Marvin Harris (e.g., 1966) andperhaps most elegantly by Roy Rappaport (1967), drew heavily on systemstheory. It shifted the analytic focus away from evolution, and toward explain-ing the existence of particular bits of particular cultures in terms of theadaptive or system-maintaining functions of those bits. Thus, the Maringkaiko ritual prevented the degradation of the natural environment (Rappaport1967), the Kwakiutl potlatch maintained a balance of food distribution overtribal segments (Piddocke 1969), and the sacredness of the cow in Indiaprotected a vital link in the agricultural food chain (Harris 1966). In thesestudies, the interest has shifted from how the environment stimulates (orprevents) the development of social and cultural forms to the question of theways in which social and cultural forms function to maintain an existingrelationship with the environment. It was these latter sorts of studies that cameto represent cultural ecology as a whole in the sixties. One would have had to be particularly out of touch with anthropological 8 This was the programmatic position. In practice, Sahlins did pay a good deal of attentiontointernal social dynamics.
134 SHERRY B. ORTNERtheory at the time not to have been awareof the acrimoniousdebate betweenthe culturalecologists and the symbolic anthropologists. Whereasthe culturalecologists considered the symbolic anthropologiststo be fuzzy-headedmen-talists, involved in unscientific and unverifiable flights of subjective in-terpretation,the symbolic anthropologistsconsidered culturalecology to beinvolved with mindless and sterile scientism, countingcalories and measuringrainfall, and willfully ignoring the one truththat anthropologyhad presum-ably establishedby that time: that culture mediates all humanbehavior. TheManichean struggle between "materialism" and "idealism," "hard" and"soft" approaches, interpretive "emics" and explanatory "etics," domi-nated the field for a good part of the decade of the sixties, and in somequarterswell into the seventies. That most of us thought and wrote in terms of such oppositions may bepartly rooted in more pervasive schemes of Western thought: subjective/objective, nature/culture,mind/body, and so on. The practice of fieldworkitself may furthercontributeto such thinking,based as it is on the paradoxicalinjunctionto participateand observe at one and the same time. It may be thenthat this sort of polarized construction of the intellectual landscape in an-thropologyis too deeply motivated, by both culturalcategoriesand the formsof practiceof the trade, to be completely eliminated. But the emic/etic strug-gle of the sixties had a numberof unfortunate effects, not the least of whichwas the preventionof adequateself-criticismon both sides of the fence. Bothschools could luxuriatein the faults of the other, and not inspect their ownhouses for seriousweaknesses. In fact, both sides were weak not only in beingunable to handle what the other side did (the symbolic anthropologistsinrenouncingall claims to "explanation," the culturalecologists in losing sightof the frames of meaning within which humanaction takes place); both werealso weak in what neither of them did, which was much of any systematicsociology.9 Indeed, from the point of view of British social anthropology,the wholeAmerican struggle was quite meaningless, since it seemed to leave out thenecessary central term of all proper anthropologicaldiscussion: society.Where were the social groups, social relationships, social structures,socialinstitutions, that mediate both the ways in which people think ("culture")and the ways in which people experienceand act upontheirenvironment? Butthis set of questions could not be answered (had anybody bothered to askthem) in terms of British social anthropological categories, because the Brit-ish were having their own intellectualupheavals, to which we will returnindue course. 9 The early Turneris a partialexception to this point, but most of his successors are not.
THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY SINCE THE SIXTIES 135StructuralismStructuralism, the more-or-less single-handed invention of Claude Levi-Strauss, was the only genuinely new paradigmto be developed in the sixties.One might even say that it is the only genuinely original social scienceparadigm(and humanitiestoo, for that matter)to be developed in the twen-tieth century. Drawing on linguistics and communicationtheory, and consid-ering himself influenced by both Marx and Freud, Levi-Straussarguedthatthe seemingly bewilderingvariety of social and culturalphenomenacould berenderedintelligible by demonstratingthe sharedrelationshipsof those phe-nomena to a few simple underlying principles. He sought to establish theuniversal grammarof culture, the ways in which units of culturaldiscourseare created(by the principleof binaryopposition), and the rules accordingtowhich the units (pairs of opposed terms) are arrangedand combined to pro-duce the actual cultural productions (myths, marriage rules, totemic clanarrangements, the like) thatanthropologists and record.Culturesareprimarilysystems of classification, as well as the sets of institutionaland intellectualproductionsbuilt upon those systems of classification and performingfurtheroperations upon them. One of the most importantsecondary operationsofculture in relation to its own taxonomies is precisely to mediate or reconcilethe oppositions which are the bases of those taxonomies in the first place. In practice, structuralanalysis consists of sifting out the basic sets ofoppositions that underlie some complex cultural phenomenon-a myth, aritual, a marriage system-and of showing the ways in which the phe-nomenon in question is both an expression of those contrastsand a reworkingof them, therebyproducinga culturallymeaningfulstatementof, or reflectionupon, order. Even without the full analysis of a myth or ritual, however, thesheer enumerationof the importantsets of oppositionsin a cultureis takentobe a useful enterprisebecause it reveals the axes of thought, and the limits ofthe thinkable,within that andrelatedcultures(e.g., Needham 1973b). But thefullest demonstrationof the power of structuralanalysis is seen in Levi-Strausss four-volume study, Mythologiques (1964-71). Here the methodallows the orderingof data both on a vast scale (includingmost of indigenousSouth America, and partsof native North Americaas well), and also in termsof explicating myriad tiny details-why the jaguar covers his mouth whenlaughing or why honey metaphorsdescribe the escape of game animals. Thecombinationof wide scope and minute detail is what lends the work its greatpower. Much has been made of the point that Levi-Straussultimatelygroundsthestructures discernsbeneathsociety and culturein the structure the mind. he ofBoth the point itself, and the criticism of it, are perhapssomewhatirrelevantfor anthropologists. It seems incontrovertiblethat all humans, and all cul-tures, classify. This suggests in turnan innatementalpropensityof some sort,
136 SHERRY B. ORTNERbut it does not mean that any particular scheme of classificationis inevitable,no more than the fact that all humanseat motivates some universalsystem offood categories. The enduringcontributionof Levi-Straussianstructuralism in the per- liesception that luxuriantvariety, even apparent randomness,may have a deeperunity and systematicity, derived from the operation of a small number ofunderlyingprinciples. It is in this sense that Levi-Straussclaims affinity withMarx and Freud, who similarlyarguethatbeneaththe surfaceproliferation offorms, a few relatively simple and relatively uniformmechanismsare operat-ing (DeGeorge and DeGeorge 1972). Such a perception,in turn, allows us todistinguishmuch more clearly between simple transformations, which operatewithin a given structure,and real change, revolutionif you will, in which thestructureitself is transformed.Thus, despite the naturalisticor biologisticbase of structuralism,and despite Levi-Strausss personal predilection forconsidering that plus ca change, plus cest la meme chose, the theory hasalways had importantimplications for a much more historicaland/or evolu-tionary anthropologythan that practiced by the master. The work of LouisDumont in particularhas developed some of these evolutionaryimplicationsin analyzingthe structure the Indiancaste system, and in articulating of someof the profound structuralchanges involved in the transitionfrom caste toclass (1965, 1970; see also Goldman 1970, Barnett 1977, Sahlins 1981).10 Structuralism was never all that popularamong Americananthropologists.Although it was seen at first (mostly by the culturalecologists) as a variantofsymbolic anthropology, its central assumptions were in fact ratherdistantfrom those of the symbolic anthropologists(with the partialexception of theSchneiderians).There were a numberof reasons for this, which can be onlyvery briefly sketched:(1) the very pure cognitive emphasisof Levi-Strausssnotion of meaning, as againstthe Americans interestin ethos and values; (2)Levi-Strausssratheraustereemphasis on arbitrariness meaning (all mean- ofing is established by contrasts, nothing carries any meaning in itself), asagainst the Americans interest in relations between the forms of symbolicconstructs and the contents for which they are vehicles;" and (3) the ex-plicitly abstractlocus of structures,divorced in every way from the actionsand intentionsof actors, as against the symbolic anthropologistsfairly con-sistent, if variably defined, actor-centrism(again, Schneider is a partialex-ception to this point). For all these reasons, and probablymore, structuralismwas not as much embracedby American symbolic anthropologistsas might 10 Dumont is anotherof those figures who deserve more space than can be affordedhere. 11 This is not to imply that Americansymbolic anthropologists deny the doctrineof arbitrari-ness of symbols. But they do insist that the choice of a particularsymbolic form among severalpossible, equally arbitrary,symbols for the same conception, is not only not arbitrary, has butimportantimplications that must be investigated.
THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY SINCE THE SIXTIES 137have appearedlikely at first glance.12 It was grantedwhat might be calledfictive kinship status, largely because of its tendency to focus on some of thesame domains that symbolic anthropologists took as their own-myth, ritual,etiquette, and so forth. The main impactof structuralism outside of Francewas in England,amongsome of the more adventurousBritish social anthropologists(see especiallyLeach 1966). Levi-Straussand the British were in fact more truly kin to oneanother,bornof two lines of descent from Durkheim.In any event, structural-ism in the British context underwenta numberof important transformations.Avoiding the question of mind, and of universal structures, British an-thropologistsprimarilyapplied structuralanalysis to particularsocieties andparticularcosmologies (e.g., Leach 1966, 1969; Needham 1973a; Yalman1969; the point also applies to Dumont (1970) in France). They also focusedin more detail on the process of mediation of oppositions, and producedanumber of quite original ruminationsupon anomaly and antistructure,es-pecially Mary Douglass Purity and Danger (see also Turner 1967, 1969;Leach 1964; Tambiah 1969). However, there was also an importantway in which many of the Britishpurgedstructuralism one of its more radicalfeatures-the eradication the of ofDurkheimiandistinctionbetween the social "base" and the cultural "reflec-tion" of it. Levi-Strausshad claimed thatif mythic structures paralleledsocialstructures,it was not because myth reflected society, but because both mythand social organizationshared a common underlyingstructure.Many of theBritish structuralists (Rodney Needham is the majorexception), on the otherhand, went back to a position more in the traditionof Durkheimand MarcelMauss, and considered myth and ritual as reflecting and resolving "at thesymbolic level" oppositions taken to be fundamentallysocial.3 As long asBritish structuralism confined to the study of myth andritual,then, it was waspossible for it to fit nicely into British anthropologywithout having a veryprofoundeffect upon it. It became their version of culturalor symbolic an-thropology, their theory of superstructure. was only later, when a structural It(i.e., structural-Marxist) eye was turned on the British concept of socialstructureitself, that the sparksbegan to fly. In a numberof fields-linguistics, philosophy, history-there was a strongreaction against structuralismby the early seventies. Two interrelatedfea-tures-the denial of the relevance of an intentionalsubject in the social and 12 James Boon (e.g., 1972) has devoted a fair amount of effort to reconciling Levi-Straussand/or Schneideron the one side, with Geertz on the other. The outcome is generallyheavily infavor of structuralism.(See also Boon and Schneider 1974.) 13 Levi-Strauss himself movedfrom a Durkheim/Maussposition in "La Geste dAsdiwal"(1967) to the more radicalstructuralist position in Mythologiques.It is no accidentthatLeach, orwhoever made the decision, chose to present "La Geste dAsdiwal" as the lead essay in theBritish collection, The StructuralStudy of Myth and Totemism(1967).
138 SHERRY B. ORTNERcultural process, and the denial of any significant impact of history or "event" upon structure-were felt to be particularly problematic,not to sayunacceptable. Scholars began to elaboratealternativemodels, in which bothagents and events played a more active role. These models did not, however,get much play in anthropology until the late seventies, and they will bediscussed in the final section of the essay. In anthropology duringmost of thatdecade, structuralism itself, with all its flaws (and virtues), became the basisof one of the dominantschools of theory, structural Marxism.We move nowto that decade.THE SEVENTIES: MARXThe anthropologyof the 1970s was much more obviously and transparentlytied to real-worldevents than that of the precedingperiod. Startingin the late 1960s, in both the United States and France (less so in England), radicalsocial movements emerged on a vast scale. First came the counterculture,then the antiwarmovement, and then, just a bit later, the womens movement:these movements not only affected the academic world, they originatedingood part within it. Everythingthat was part of the existing orderwas ques-tioned and criticized. In anthropology,the earliest critiquestook the form ofdenouncing the historical links between anthropologyon the one hand, andcolonialism and imperialismon the other (e.g., Asad 1973, Hymes 1974).But this merely scratchedthe surface. The issue quickly moved to the deeperquestion of the natureof our theoreticalframeworks,and especially the de-gree to which they embody and carry forwardthe assumptionsof bourgeoisWestern culture. The rallying symbol of the new criticism, and of the theoreticalalternativesoffered to replace the old models, was Marx. Of all the great nineteenth-century antecedentsof moder social science, Marx had been conspicuouslyabsent from the mainstreamtheoreticalrepertoire.ParsonssStructureof So-cial Action, one of the sacred texts of the Harvard-trained symbolic an-thropologists, surveyed the thought of Durkheim and Weber, and of twoeconomic theorists, Alfred Marshalland Vilfredo Pareto,whose main signifi-cance in that context seemed to be that they were Not Marx. The British,including both the symbolic anthropologistsand the structuralists, were stillfirmly embeddedin Durkheim.Levi-Straussclaimed to have been influencedby Marx, but it took a while for anyone to figure out what he meantby that.Even the culturalecologists, the only self-proclaimedmaterialistsof the six-ties, hardlyinvoked Marx at all; indeed MarvinHarrisspecifically repudiatedhim (1968). One does not need to be an especially subtle analyst of theideological aspects of intellectual history to realize that the absence of asignificantMarxistinfluence before the seventies was just as much a reflex ofreal-worldpolitics as was the emergence of a strongMarxistinfluence in theseventies.
THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY SINCE THE SIXTIES I39 There were at least two distinct Marxistschools of anthropological theory:structuralMarxism, developed mainly in France and England, and politicaleconomy, which emerged first in the United States, and later in Englandaswell. There was also a movement that might be called cultural Marxism,workedout largely in historicaland literarystudies, but this was not pickedupby anthropologistsuntil recently, and will be addressedin the final section ofthe essay.Structural MarxismStructural Marxismwas the only one of the schools developed entirelywithinthe field of anthropology,and probablyfor thatreasonwas also the earliestinits impact. Within it, Marx was used to attackand/or rethink, or at the veryleast to expand, virtually every theoretical scheme on the landscape-sym-bolic anthropology,culturalecology, British social anthropology,and struc-turalism itself. StructuralMarxism constituted a would-be total intellectualrevolution, and if it did not succeed in establishingitself as the only alterna-tive to everything else we had, it certainly succeeded in shaking up most ofthe received wisdom. This is not to say that it was necessarily the actualwritingsof the structural Marxiststhemselves (e.g., Althusser1971; Godelier1977; Terray 1972; Sahlins 1972; Friedman1975) that had this effect; it wassimply that structural Marxismwas the originalforce within anthropology forpromulgating and legitimating "Marx," "Marxism," and "critical inquiry"in the discourse of the field as a whole (see also Diamond 1979). The specific advance of structuralMarxism over its antecedentforms ofmaterialistanthropologylay in its locating the determinative forces not in thenatural environment and/or in technology, but specifically within certainstructuresof social relations. Ecological considerationswere not excluded,but they were encompassedby and subordinated the analysis of the social, toand especially political, organization of production. Culturalecology wasthus attacked as "vulgar materialism," reinforcingratherthan undoing theclassical capitalist fetishization of "things," the dominationof subjects byobjects ratherthan by the social relations embodied in, and symbolized by,those objects (see especially Friedman1974). The critical social relationsinquestion, referredto as the mode(s) of production,are not to be confusedwiththe surface organization of social relations traditionallystudied by Britishsocial anthropologists-lineages, clans, moieties, and all the rest. These sur-face forms of what the British called "social structure"are seen as nativemodels of social organizationthat have been boughtby anthropologists the asreal thing, but that actually mask, or at least only partiallycorrespondto, thehiddenasymmetricalrelationsof productionthataredrivingthe system. Here,then, was situated the critique of traditionalBritish social anthropology(seeespecially Bloch 1971, 1974, 1977; Terray 1975). In addition to critiquing and revising both cultural ecology and British
140 SHERRY B. ORTNERsocial anthropology,structural Marxiststurnedtheir attentionto culturalphe-nomena. Unlike the culturalecologists, the structural Marxistsdid not dismisscultural beliefs and native categories as irrelevantto the real or objectiveoperations of society, nor, alternatively, did they set about to show thatapparentlyirrationalcultural beliefs, such as the sacred cow, actually hadpractical adaptive functions. Just as the New Left in the real world tookculturalissues (life style, consciousness) more seriouslythanthe Old Left haddone, so the structuralMarxists allocated to cultural phenomena (beliefs,values, classifications)at least one centralfunctionin theirmodel of the socialprocess. Specifically, culture was convertedto "ideology," and consideredfrom the point of view of its role in social reproduction:legitimating theexisting order, mediating contradictions in the base, and mystifying thesources of exploitationand inequalityin the system (OLaughlin1974; Bloch1977; Godelier 1977). One of the virtues of structural Marxism, then, was that there was a placefor everything in its scheme. Refusing to see inquiriesinto materialrelationsand into "ideology" as opposed enterprises, its practitionersestablished amodel in which the two "levels" were related to one anothervia a core ofsocial/political/economic processes. In this sense, they offered an explicitmediation between the "materialist" and "idealist" camps of sixties an-thropology. The mediation was rathermechanical, as we will discuss in amoment, but it was there. More important,to my mind, the structural Marxistsput a relativelypower-ful sociology back into the picture. They cross-fertilizedBritish social an-thropologicalcategories with Marxistones, and producedan expandedmodelof social organization("mode of production")which they then proceededtoapply systematicallyto particular cases. WhereasotherMarxismsemphasizedrelations of political/economic organization ("production") almost ex-clusively, the structuralMarxists were, after all, anthropologists,trainedtopay attentionto kinship, descent, marriage,exchange, domesticorganization,and the like. They thus includedthese elements within theirconsiderationsofpolitical and economic relations (often giving them a more Marxist ring bycalling them "relations of reproduction")and the total effect was to producerich and complex pictures of the social process in specific cases. Given therelative paucity, mentioned earlier, of detailed sociological analysis in thevarious sixties schools, this was an importantcontribution. All this having been said, one may nonetheless recognize that structuralMarxism had a number of problems. For one thing, the narrowingof theculture concept to "ideology," which had the powerful effect of allowinganalysts to connect culturalconceptions to specific structuresof social rela-tion, was too extreme, and posed the problem of relating ideology back tomore general conceptions of culture. For another, the tendency to see cul-ture/ideology largely in terms of mystification gave most of the culturalor
THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY SINCE THE SIXTIES 141ideological studies in this school a decided functionalist flavor, since theupshot of these analyses was to show how myth, ritual, taboo, or whatevermaintainedthe status quo. Finally, and most seriously, although structuralMarxists offered a way of mediating the materialand ideological "levels,"they did not actually challenge the notion that such levels are analyticallydistinguishable in the first place. Thus despite criticizing the Durkheimian(and Parsonian)notion of "the social" as the "base" of the system, theymerely offered a deeper and allegedly more real and objective "base." Anddespite attemptingto discover more importantfunctions for the "superstruc-ture" (or despite claiming that what is base and what is superstructure variesculturally and/or historically, or even occasionally and rathervaguely thatthesuperstructure part of the base) they continuedto reproducethe idea that it isis useful to maintainsuch a set of analytic boxes. In this sense, it may be seen that structural Marxism was still very muchrooted in the sixties. While it injected a healthy dose of sociology into theearlier scheme of categories, and while this sociology was itself relativelyoriginally conceived, the basic pigeonholes of sixties thoughtwere not radi-cally revised. Further, unlike the political economy school and other morerecent approaches to be discussed shortly, structuralMarxism was largelynonhistorical,a factor which, again, tied it to earlierforms of anthropology.Indeedone may guess thatit was in partthis comfortablemix of old categoriesand assumptions wrapped up in a new critical rhetoricthat made structuralMarxism so appealing in its day. It was in many ways the perfect vehicle foracademics who had been trainedin an earlierera, but who, in the seventies,were feeling the pull of critical thought and action that was exploding allaround them.Political EconomyThe political economy school has taken its inspirationprimarilyfrom world-systems and underdevelopmenttheories in political sociology (Wallerstein1976; GunderFrank 1967). In contrastto structural Marxism, which focusedlargely, in the mannerof conventional anthropologicalstudies, on relativelydiscrete societies or cultures, the political economists have shiftedthe focus tolarge-scale regional political/economic systems (e.g., Hart 1982). Insofarasthey have attemptedto combine this focus with traditional fieldworkin specif-ic communitiesor microregions,theirresearchhas generallytakenthe formofstudying the effects of capitalist penetrationupon those communities (e.g.,AmericanEthnologist 1978; Schneiderand Schneider1976). The emphasisonthe impact of external forces, and on the ways in which societies change orevolve largely in adaptationto such impact, ties the political economy schoolin certain ways to the culturalecology of the sixties, and indeed many of itscurrentpractitioners were trainedin thatschool (e.g., Ross 1980). But where-as for sixties cultural ecology, often studying relatively "primitive" so-
142 SHERRY B. ORTNERcieties, the importantexternal forces were those of the naturalenvironment,for the seventies political economists, generally studying "peasants," theimportant externalforces are those of the state andthe capitalistworld system. At the level of theory, the political economists differ from their culturalecology forebearspartly in showing a greaterwillingness to incorporate cul-tural or symbolic issues into their inquiries (e.g., Schneider 1978;Riegelhaupt 1978). Specifically, their work tends to focus on symbols in-volved in the developmentof class or group identity, in the context of politi-cal/economic struggles of one sort or another.The political economy schoolthus overlaps with the burgeoning "ethnicity" industry,althoughthe litera-ture in the latter field is too vast and too amorphousfor me to do more thannod to here. In any event, the willingness of the political economists to payattention,in however circumscribedfashion, to symbolic processes, is partofthe general relaxation of the old materialism/idealismwars of the sixties. The emphasisof this school upon largerregionalprocesses is also salutary,at least up to a point. Anthropologistsdo have a tendency to treat societies,even villages, as if they were islands unto themselves, with little sense of thelargersystems of relationsin which these units are embedded.The occasionalwork (e.g., EdmundLeachs Political Systems of Highland Burma) that hasviewed societies in larger regional context has been something of an un-classifiable (if admired) freak. To ignore the fact that peasants are part ofstates, and that even "primitive" societies and communitiesare invariablyinvolved in wider systems of exchanges of all sorts, is to seriouslydistortthedata, and it is the virtueof the political economiststhatthey remindus of this. Finally, the political economists must be given leading credit for stressingvery strongly the importanceof history for anthropologicalstudy. They arenot the first to have done so, nor are they the only ones doing so now, and Iwill say more aboutanthropologysrapprochement with historyin the conclu-sions of this essay. Nonetheless, it is certainlythe membersof this school whoappear the most committed to a fully historical anthropology,and who areproducing sustained and systematic work groundedin this commitment. On the negative side of the ledger, we may complainfirst that the politicaleconomy model is too economic, too strictlymaterialist.One hearsa lot aboutwages, the market, the cash nexus, economic exploitation, underdevelop-ment, and so forth, but not enough aboutthe relationsof power, domination,manipulation,control, and the like which those economic relationsplay into,and which for actors constitute much of the experienced pain of economicinjustice. Political economy, in other words, is not political enough. My main objection, however, is located deeper in the theoreticalmodel ofpolitical economy. Specifically, I find the capitalism-centered view of theworld questionable, to say the least, especially for anthropology.At the coreof the model is the assumptionthat virtuallyeverythingwe study has alreadybeen touched ("penetrated") by the capitalist world system, and that there-
THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY SINCE THE SIXTIES I43fore much of what we see in our fieldwork and describe in our monographsmust be understoodas having been shapedin responseto that system. Perhapsthis is true for Europeanpeasants, but even here one would want at least toleave the question open. When we get even further from the "center,"however, the assumptionbecomes very problematicindeed. A society, even avillage, has its own structureand history, and this must be as muchpartof theanalysis as its relations with the largercontext within which it operates. (SeeJoel Kahn (1980) for a more balanced view.) The problems derived from the capitalism-centered worldview also affectthe political economists view of history. Historyis often treatedas somethingthat arrives, like a ship, from outside the society in question. Thus we do notget the history of that society, but the impact of (our) history on that society.The accounts producedfrom such a perspectiveare often quite unsatisfactoryin terms of traditionalanthropologicalconcerns: the actual organizationandcultureof the society in question. Traditionalstudies of course had their ownproblemswith respect to history. They often presentedus with a thin chapteron "historical background" at the beginning and an inadequatechapteron "social change" at the end. The political economy study invertsthis relation-ship, but only to create the inverse problem. The political economists, moreover, tend to situatethemselves more on theship of (capitalist) history than on the shore. They say in effect that we cannever know what the other system, in its unique, "traditional," aspects,really looked like anyway. By realizing that much of what we see as traditionis in fact a responseto Westernimpact, so the argumentgoes, we not only geta more accuratepictureof what is going on, but we acknowledgeat the sametime the perniciouseffects of our own system upon others. Such a view is alsopresent, but in modes of anger and/or despair ratherthan pragmatism,in anumber of recent works that question philosophically whether we can evertruly know the "other"-Edward Saids Orientalismis the prime example(see also Rabinow 1977; Crapanzano1980; Riesman 1977). To such a position we can only respond:try. The effort is as important asthe results, in terms of both our theories and our practices. The attempttoview other systems from groundlevel is the basis, perhapsthe only basis, ofanthropologysdistinctive contribution the humansciences. It is our capac- toity, largely developed in fieldwork, to take the perspectiveof the folks on theshore, that allows us to learn anything at all-even in our own culture-beyond what we alreadyknow. (Indeed, as more and more anthropologists aredoing fieldwork in Westerncultures, including the United States, the impor-tance of maintaininga capacity to see otherness, even next door, becomesmore and more acute.) Further,it is our location "on the ground"thatputs usin a position to see people not simply as passive reactorsto and enactorsofsome "system," but as active agents and subjects in their own history. In concluding this section, I must confess thatmy placementof the political
144 SHERRY B. ORTNEReconomy school in the seventies is somethingof an ideological move. In factpolitical economy is very much alive and well in the eighties, and it willprobably thrive for some time. My periodization is thus, like that of allhistories, only partly related to real time. I have included political economyand structural Marxismwithin this period/categorybecauseboth schools con-tinue to share a set of assumptionsdistinctfrom what I wish to emphasizeforthe anthropologyof the eighties. Specifically, both assume, together withearlier anthropologies, that human action and historical process are almostentirely structurallyor systemically determined. Whether it be the hiddenhand of structureor the juggernautof capitalismthat is seen as the agent ofsociety/history, it is certainly not in any central way real people doing realthings. These are precisely the views from which at least some anthropolo-gists, as well as practitionersin many other fields, appearto be strugglingtobreak free as we move into the present decade.INTO THE EIGHTIES: PRACTICEI began this article by noting the apparentaccuracyof Wolfs remarksto theeffect that the field of anthropologyis disintegrating,even grantingthe lowdegree of integrationit had in the past. I also suggested that one could findscattered over the landscape the elements of a new trend that seems to begatheringforce and coherence. In this final section I call attentionto this newtrend, sketch it, and subject it to a preliminarycritique. For the past several years, there has been growing interest in analysisfocused through one or anotherof a bundle of interrelatedterms: practice,praxis, action, interaction,activity, experience, performance.A second, andclosely related, bundle of terms focuses on the doer of all that doing: agent,actor, person, self, individual, subject. In some fields, movement in this direction began relatively early in theseventies, some of it in direct reaction to structuralism.In linguistics, forexample, there was an early rejection of structurallinguistics and a strongmove to view language as communicationand performance(e.g., Baumanand Sherzer 1974; Cole and Morgan 1975). In anthropologytoo there werescatteredcalls for a more action based approach.In France, PierreBourdieupublished his Outline of a Theory of Practice in 1972. In the United States,Geertz attacked both hypercoherentstudies of symbolic systems (many ofthem inspiredby his own programmatic papers)and what he saw as the sterileformalismof structuralism, calling insteadfor anthropologists see "human tobehavior . . as . . . symbolic action" (1973a:10; see also Dolgin, Kem-nitzer, and Schneider 1977; Wagner 1975; T. Turner1969). In England,therewas a minoritywing thatcriticizedtraditionalviews of "social structure"notfrom the point of view of structuralMarxism, but from the perspective ofindividualchoice and decision making (e.g., Kapferer1976).14 14 The transactionalist tradition in British anthropology may of course be traced back further,
THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY SINCE THE SIXTIES 145 For much of the seventies, however, the structural Marxistsand, later, thepolitical economists, remained dominant, at least within anthropology.Forthem, social and culturalphenomena were to be explained largely by beingreferredto systemic/structural mechanismsof one sort or another.It was onlyin the late seventies that the hegemony of structuralMarxism, if not that ofpolitical economy, began to wane. An English translation Bourdieusbook ofwas published in 1978, and it was at aboutthat time that the calls for a morepractice-orientedapproachbecame increasingly audible. Here is a sampler:The instruments reasoning changing societyis less andless represented of are and asanelaborate machine a quasi-organism as a serious or than game,a sidewalk drama,ora behavioral (Geertz1980a:168). textWe needto watchthesesystems[of kinship] action,to studytacticsandstrategy, innot merelythe rulesof the game(Barnes1980:301).? . . genderconceptions in any society are to be understoodas functioningaspectsof acultural whichactors systemthrough manipulate, and legitimize, reproduce interpret,the patterns . . . that order their social world (Collier and Rosaldo 1981:311).5Whatdo actorswantandhow canthey get it? (Ortner 1981:366)If structural/semiotic analysis to be extended general is to anthropology themodel onof its pertinence "language," whatis lostis notmerely to then and history change, butpractice-humanactionin the world. Some mightthinkthatwhat is lost is whatanthropology all about(Sahlins1981:6). is As was the case with the strong revisionist trendin the sixties, the presentmovement appears much broader than the field of anthropologyalone. Inlinguistics, Alton Becker, in a much-cited article, has emphasizedissues oftext building over and against reification of The Text (1979). In spciology,symbolic interactionismand other forms of so-called microsociology appearto be attractingnew attention,16 and Anthony Giddens has dubbedthe rela-tionship between structureand "agency" one of the "central problems" ofmodem social theory (1979). In history, E. P. Thompsonhas railed againsttheorists (everything from Parsoniansto Stalinists) who treat "history as aprocess withouta subject [and]concurin the eviction fromhistoryof humanagency" (1978:79). In literarystudies, RaymondWilliams insists that litera-ture must be treatedas the productof particular practices, and accuses thosewho abstractliteraturefrom practice of performing "an extraordinary ideo-logical feat" (1977:46). If we push further-and here we skirt dangerousto Barthand to Bailey in the sixties, to the earlierworks of Leach (e.g., 1960), and ultimatelytoRaymond Firth (e.g., 1963 ). See also Marriott(1976) in the United States. 15 I would argue, if I had more space, that feminist anthropologyis one of the primarycontexts in which a practice approachhas been developing. The Collier and Rosaldo (1981)article is a good example. See also Ortner(1981). 16 MayerZald, personalcommunication,at the Social Science HistorySeminar(UniversityofMichigan), 1982.
146 SHERRY B. ORTNERground-we might even see the whole sociobiology movementas partof thisgeneral trend, insofar as it shifts the evolutionarymechanismfrom randommutation to intentional choice on the part of actors seeking to maximizereproductivesuccess. (I should probablysay, righthere and not in a footnote,that I have a range of very strong objections to sociobiology. Nonetheless, Ido not think it is too far-fetched to see its emergence as part of the broadmovement to which I am drawing attentionhere.) The practice approachis diverse, and I will not attemptto compare andcontrast its many strands. Rather I will select for discussion a number ofworks that seem to share a common orientation within the larger set, anorientationthat seems to me particularly promising. I do not wish to canonizeany single one of these works, nor do I wish to provide a label for the subsetand endow it with more reality than it has. What I do here is more likebeginning to develop a photograph, to coax a latent form into somethingrecognizable. We may begin by contrasting, in a general way, this (subset of) newerpractice-oriented work with certain more established approaches,especiallywith symbolic interactionismin sociology (Blumer 1962; Goffman 1959; seealso Berreman 1962, and more recently Gregor 1977 in anthropology)andwith what was called transactionalism anthropology(Kapferer1976, Mar- inriott 1976, Goody 1978, Barth 1966, Bailey 1969). The first point to note isthat these approacheswere elaboratedin opposition to the dominant, essen-tially Parsonian/Durkheimian,view of the world as ordered by rules andnorms.17 Recognizing that institutionalorganizationand culturalpatterningexist, the symbolic interactionistsand transactionalistsnonetheless sought tominimize or bracket the relevance of these phenomena for understandingsocial life: ofFrom standpoint symbolic the socialorganization a framework interaction, is insideof whichactingunitsdeveloptheiractions.Structural features,suchas "culture,""socialsystems," "socialstratification," "socialroles," set conditions their or foractionbutdo not determinetheiraction(Blumer 1962:152). The newer practice theorists, on the other hand, share a view that "thesystem" (in a variety of senses to be discussed below) does in fact have verypowerful, even "determining," effect upon human action and the shape ofevents. Their interestin the study of action and interaction thus not a matter isof denying or minimizing this point, but expresses ratheran urgent need tounderstandwhere "the system" comes from-how it is produced and re-produced, and how it may have changed in the past or be changed in thefuture. As Giddens argues in his importantrecent book (1979), the study of 17 Parsons and his colleagues gave the term "action" central place in their scheme (1962), but what they meant by this was essentially en-actmentof rules and norms. Bourdieu,Giddens, and others have pointed this out, and have cast their argumentsin part against thisposition.
THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY SINCE THE SIXTIES 147practiceis not an antagonisticalternativeto the study of systems or structures,but a necessary complement to it. The other major aspect of the newer practice orientation,differentiatingitsignificantly from earlier interactionistand transactionalistapproaches, re-sides in a palpable Marxist influence carrying through from the seventies.Partly this is visible in the way in which things like culture and/or structureare viewed. That is, although the newer practice theorists share with sixtiesanthropologya strong sense of the shaping power of culture/structure, thisshapingpower is viewed ratherdarkly, as a matterof "constraint," "hegem-ony," and "symbolic domination." We will come back to this position ingreaterdetail later. More generally, the Marxistinfluence is to be seen in theassumptionthat the most importantforms of action or interactionfor analyticpurposes are those which take place in asymmetricalor dominatedrelations,that it is these forms of action or interactionthatbest explain the shapeof anygiven system at any given time. Whetherit is a matterof focusing directlyoninteraction (even "struggle") between asymmetrically related actors, orwhether it is more broadly a matter of defining actors (whatever they aredoing) in terms of roles and statuses derived from asymmetricalrelationsinwhich they participate,the approachtends to highlight social asymmetryasthe most importantdimension of both action and structure. Not all of currentpractice work manifests the Marxistinfluence. Some ofit-like symbolic interactionismand transactionalism themselves-is more inthe spirit of Adam Smith. The members of the subset with which I amconcerned, however, implicitly or explicitly shareat least the criticalflavorofseventies anthropology, if not a systematic allegiance to Marxist theory perse. Yet to speak of a Marxist influence in all of this is actually to obscure animportantaspect of what is going on: an interpenetration, almost a merger,between Marxist and Weberian frameworks. In the sixties, the oppositionbetween Marxand Weber, as "materialist"and "idealist," had been empha-sized. The practice theorists, in contrast, draw on a set of writers who in-terpretthe Marxistcorpus in such a way as to renderit quite compatiblewithWebers views. As Weber put the actor at the center of his model, so thesewritersemphasize issues of human praxis in Marx. As Weber subsumedtheeconomic within the political, so these writersencompasseconomic exploita-tion within political domination. And as Weber was centrallyconcernedwithethos and consciousness, so these writers stress similar issues within Marxswork. Choosing Marx over Weber as ones theoristof reference is a tacticalmove of a certainsort. In reality, the theoreticalframeworkinvolved is aboutequally indebted to both. (On theory, see Giddens 1971; Williams 1976;Avineri 1971; Ollman 1971; Bauman 1973; Habermas1973; Goldmann1977.For substantivecase analyses in this Weberian-Marxist vein, see Thompson1966; Williams 1973; Genovese 1976.)
148 SHERRY B. ORTNER I will proceed to explicate and evaluate the "new practice" position byway of posing a series of questions:What is it that a practiceapproachseeksto explain?What is practice?How is it motivated?And what sorts of analyticrelationshipsare postulatedin the model? Let me emphasizevery stronglythatI do not offer here a coherenttheoryof practice.I merely sortout anddiscuss,in a very preliminaryfashion, some of the central axes of such a theory.What is Being Explained?As previously indicated, modem practicetheory seeks to explain the relation-ship(s) that obtain between human action, on the one hand, and some globalentity which we may call "the system," on the other. Questionsconcerningthese relationshipsmay go in either direction-the impact of the system onpractice, and the impactof practiceon the system. How these processes workwill be taken up below. Here we must say a few words about the natureof "the system." In two recent works in anthropologythat explicitly attemptto elaborateapractice-basedmodel (Bourdieu 1978 ; and Sahlins 1981), the authorsnominallytake a Frenchstructuralist view of the system (patternsof relationsbetween categories, and of relationsbetween relations). In fact however bothBourdieus habitus and Sahlinss "cosmological dramas" behave in manyways like the American concept of culture, combining elements of ethos,affect, and value with more strictly cognitive schemes of classification. Thechoice of a French or an American perspective on the system does havecertainconsequences for the shape of the analysis as a whole, but we will notpursue these here. The point is that practice anthropologistsassume thatsociety and historyare not simply sums of ad hoc responsesand adaptations toparticular stimuli, but are governedby organizational evaluativeschemes. andIt is these (embodied, of course, within institutional,symbolic, and materialforms) that constitute the system. The system, further,is not broken up into units like base and superstruc-ture, or society and culture, but is rather a relatively seamless whole. Aninstitution-say, a marriagesystem-is at once a system of social relations,economic arrangements,political processes, culturalcategories, norms, val-ues, ideals, emotional patterns,and so on and on. No attemptis made to sortthese componentsinto levels and to assign primacyto one or the other level.Nor, for example, is marriage as a whole assigned to "society," whilereligion is assigned to "culture." A practice approachhas no need to breakthe system into artificial chunks like base and superstructure (and to argueover which determineswhich), since the analytic effort is not to explain onechunk of the system by referringit to anotherchunk, but ratherto explain thesystem as an integral whole (which is not to say a harmoniouslyintegratedone) by referringit to practice. But if the system is an integral whole, at the same time all of its parts or
THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY SINCE THE SIXTIES 149dimensions do not have equal analyticsignificance. At the core of the system,both forming it and deforming it, are the specific realities of asymmetry,inequality, and dominationin a given time and place. RaymondWilliams, aMarxist literary/culturalhistorian, sums up both the insistence upon holismand the privileged position of dominationcharacteristic this view. Picking ofup Antonio Gramscis term "hegemony" as his label for the system, heargues that"hegemony" is a concept which at once includes and goes beyond two powerfulearlierconcepts: that of "culture" as a "whole social process," in which men defineand shape their whole lives; and that of "ideology" in any of its Marxist senses, inwhich a system of meanings and values is the expression or projectionof a particularclass interest. "Hegemony" goes beyond "culture" in its insistenceon relatingthe "whole socialprocess" to specific distributionsof power and influence. To say that men define andshape their whole lives is true only in abstraction. In any actual society there arespecific inequalities in means and therefore in capacity to realize this process....Gramscithereforeintroducesthe necessary recognition of dominanceand subordina-tion in what has still, however, to be recognized as a whole process. It is in just this recognition of the wholeness of the process that the concept of"hegemony" goes beyond "ideology." What is decisive is not only the conscioussystem of ideas and beliefs, but the whole lived social process as practicallyorganizedby specific and dominantmeanings and values. ... [Hegemony] is in the strongestsense a "culture," but a culturewhich has also to beseen as the lived dominance and subordination of particular classes (Williams1977:108-109, 110).What a practice theory seeks to explain, then, is the genesis, reproduction,and change of form and meaning of a given social/cultural whole, definedin-more or less-this sense.What is Practice?In principle, the answer to this question is almost unlimited:anythingpeopledo. Given the centrality of domination in the model, however, the mostsignificant forms of practice are those with intentionalor unintentional politi-cal implications. Then again, almost anything people do has such implica-tions. So the study of practice is after all the study of all forms of humanaction, but from a particular-political-angle. Beyond this general point, furtherdistinctionsmay be introduced.There isfirst of all the question of what are taken to be the acting units. Most practiceanthropologyto date takes these units to be individualactors, whetheractualhistorical individuals, or social types ("women," "commoners," "work-ers," "junior siblings," etcetera). The analyst takes these people and theirdoings as the reference point for understandinga particularunfolding ofevents, and/or for understanding processes involved in the reproduction the orchange of some set of structural features. In contrastto a large body of workin the field of history, there has been relatively little done in anthropologyon
150 SHERRY B. ORTNERconcertedcollective action (but see Wolf 1969; Friedrich1970; Blu 1980; seealso the literature cargo cults, especially Worsley 1968). Even in studiesof oncollective action, however, the collectivity is handledmethodologicallyas asingle subject. We shall be discussing, throughoutthis section, some of theproblemsthat arise from the essential individualismof most currentforms ofpractice theory. A second set of questions concerns the temporal organizationof action.Some authors(Bourdieuis an example) treat action in terms of relatively adhoc decision making, and/or relatively short-term"moves." Otherssuggest,even if they do not develop the point, that humanbeings act within plans orprogramsthat are always more long range than any single move, and indeedthat most moves are intelligible only within the context of these largerplans(Sahlins (1981) implies this, as do Ortner(1981) and Collier and Rosaldo(1981); for an older example, see Hartand Pilling (1960)). Many such plansare culturally provided (the normative life cycle, for example), but manyothers must be constructedby actors themselves. Even projects generated("creatively") by actors, however, tend to take stereotypedforms, insofarasthe constraints and the resources of the system are relatively constant foractors in similar positions. In any event, an emphasis on larger "projects"rather than particular "moves" underlines the point that action itself has(developmental) structure, as well as operating in, and in relation to,structure. Finally, there is the question of the kinds of action takento be analyticallycentralto the currentapproach.Everyone seems to agree in opposing a Parso-nian or Saussurianview in which action is seen as sheeren-actmentor execu-tion of rules and norms (Bourdieu 1978; Sahlins 1981; Giddens 1979). More-over, everyone seems also to agree that a kind of romantic or heroic "voluntarism," emphasizing the freedom and relatively unrestrictedin-ventiveness of actors, will not do either (e.g., Thompson1978). Whatis left,then, is a view of action largely in terms of pragmaticchoice and decisionmaking, and/or active calculating and strategizing. I will have more to sayabout the strategic model in the next section, when I discuss the views ofmotivation entailed in practice theory. Here, however, I wish to questionwhether the critique of en-actmentor execution may not have gone too far.Indeed, despite the attackson Parsonsby Bourdieuand Giddens, both recog-nize the central role of highly patternedand routinizedbehaviorin systemicreproduction.It is precisely in those areasof life-especially in the so-calleddomestic domain-where action proceeds with little reflection, that much ofthe conservatism of a system tends to be located. Either because practicetheorists wish to emphasize the activeness and intentionalityof action, orbecause of a growing interestin change as againstreproduction,or both, thedegree to which actors really do simply enact norms because "that was theway of our ancestors" may be unduly undervalued.
THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY SINCE THE SIXTIES 151 WhatMotivates Action? A theory of practice requires some sort of theory of motivation. At the moment, the dominant theory of motivation in practice anthropologyis de- rived from interesttheory. The model is that of an essentially individualistic,.and somewhat aggressive, actor, self-interested,rational,pragmatic,and per- haps with a maximizing orientationas well. What actorsdo, it is assumed, is rationallygo after what they want, and what they want is what is materially and politically useful for them within the context of their culturaland histor- ical situations. Interesttheory has been rakedover the coals many times before. Here it is sufficient simply to note a few points that have particularrelevance for an- thropological studies of practice. Insofar as interest theory is, even if it pretendsnot to be, a psychological theory, it is clearly far too narrow. In particular, although pragmaticra- tionalityis certainlyone aspect of motivation, it is never the only one, and not always even the dominantone. To accordit the statusof exclusive motivating force is to exclude from the analytic discourse a whole range of emotional terms-need, fear, suffering, desire, and others-that must surely be partof motivation. Unfortunately, anthropologistshave generally found that actors with too much psychological plumbingare hardto handlemethodologically,and prac- tice theorists are no exception. There is, however, a growing body of litera- ture which explores the variable constructionof self, person, emotion, and motive in cross-culturalperspective (e.g., M. Rosaldo 1980, 1981; Friedrich 1977; Geertz 1973a, 1975; Singer 1980; Kirkpatrick1977; Guemple 1972). The growth of this body of work is itself part of the larger trend toward an interestin elaboratingan actor-centered paradigm,as is the fact that the sub- field of psychological anthropology seems to be enjoying something of a renaissance (e.g., Paul 1982; Kracke 1978; Levy 1973). One may hope for some cross-fertilization between the more sociologically oriented practice accounts, with their relatively denaturedviews of motive, and some of these more richly textured accounts of emotion and motivation. If interesttheory assumes too much rationalityon the partof actors, it also assumes too much active-ness. The idea that actors are always pressing claims, pursuinggoals, advancing purposes, and the like may simply be an overly energetic (and overly political) view of how and why people act. We may recall here the distinction, underscored Geertz, between interesttheo- by ry and strain theory (1973c). If actors in interest theory are always actively striving for gains, actors in strain theory are seen as experiencingthe com- plexities of their situations and attemptingto solve problemsposed by those situations. It follows from these points that the strain perspective places greateremphasis on the analysis of the system itself, the forces in play upon
152 SHERRY B. ORTNERactors, as a way of understanding where actors, as we say, are coming from.In particular,a system is analyzedwith the aim of revealingthe sortsof bindsit creates for actors, the sorts of burdensit places upon them, and so on. Thisanalysis, in turn, provides much of the context for understandingactorsmotives, and the kinds of projectsthey constructfor dealing with their situa-tions (see also Ortner 1975, 1978). While strain theory does not rectify the psychological shortcomings ofinteresttheory, it does at least make for a more systematicexplorationof thesocial forces shaping motives than interesttheory does. Indeed, one may saythat strain theory is a theory of the social, as opposed to psychological,productionof "interests," the latterbeing seen less as direct expressions ofutility and advantagefor actors, and more as images of solutions to experi-enced stresses and problems. Finally, an interestapproachtends to go handin handwith seeing action interms of short-termtactical "moves" ratherthan long-term developmental"projects." From a tactical point of view, actors seek particulargains,whereas from a developmentalpoint of view, actors are seen as involved inrelatively far-reachingtransformations their states of being-of their rela- oftionships with things, persons, and self. We may say, in the spiritof Gramsci,that action in a developmentalor "projects" perspectiveis more a matterof"becoming" thanof "getting" (1957). Intrinsicto this latterperspectiveis asense of motive and action as shapednot only by problemsbeing solved, andgains being sought, but by images and ideals of what constitutesgoodness-in people, in relationships, and in conditions of life. It iS a peculiarityof interesttheorythat it is sharedacross a broadspectrumof analysts, Marxist and non-Marxist, "old" and "new" practicetheorists.The popularityand durabilityof the perspective,despite numerousattacksandcriticisms, suggest that especially deep changes in our own practiceswill berequiredif anything is to be dislodged in this area.The Nature of Interactions between Practice and the System 1. How does the systemshape practice? Anthropologists-American ones,anyway-have for the most partlong agreedthat cultureshapes, guides, andeven to some extent dictates behavior. In the sixties, Geertzelaboratedsomeof the important mechanismsinvolved in this process, and it seems to me thatmost moder practice theorists, including those who write in Marxistand/orstructuralist terms, hold an essentially Geertzianview. But there are certainchanges of emphasis, derived from the centralityof dominationwithin thepracticeframework.For one thing, as noted earlier, the emphasishas shiftedfrom what culture allows and enables people to see, feel, and do, to what itrestrictsand inhibitsthem from seeing, feeling, and doing. Further,althoughit is agreed that culture powerfully constitutesthe reality that actors live in,this reality is looked upon with criticaleyes: why this one and not some other?And what sorts of alternativesare people being dis-abled from seeing?
THEORY IN ANTHROPOLOGY SINCE THE SIXTIES 153 It is important note that this view is at least partlydistinctfrom a view of tocultureas mystification. In a mystificationview, culture(= "ideology") tellslies aboutthe realities of peoples lives, and the analyticproblemis to under-stand how people come to believe these lies (e.g., Bloch 1977). In the ap-proach under discussion here, however, there is only one reality, and it isculturally constituted from top to bottom. The problem is not that of thesystem telling lies aboutsome extrasystemic"reality," but of why the systemas a whole has a certain configuration, and of why and how it excludesalternativepossible configurations. In any event, in termsof the specific questionof how the system constrainspractice, the emphasis tends to be laid on essentially culturaland psychologi-cal mechanisms: mechanisms of the formationand transformation "con- ofsciousness." Although constraintsof material and political sorts, includingforce, are fully acknowledged, there seems to be general agreement thataction is constrainedmost deeply and systematically by the ways in whichculturecontrols the definitions of the world for actors, limits their conceptualtools, and restricts their emotional repertoires.Culturebecomes part of theself. Speaking of the sense of honor among the Kabyle, for example, Bour-dieu says:? . . honour a permanent is disposition, embedded the agentsverybodiesin the informof mental dispositions, schemes perception thought, of and extremelygeneralintheirapplication, such as those whichdivideup the worldin accordance the withoppositions between maleandthe female,eastandwest, future past,topand the andbottom, rightandleft, etc., andalso, at a deeperlevel, in theformof bodilyposturesandstances,waysof standing, or sitting,looking,speaking, walking. Whatis calledthe sense of honour nothing is otherthanthe cultivated disposition, in inscribed thebodyschemaandthe schemesof thought (1978:15).In a similar vein, Foucault says of the discourse of "perversions":Themachinery powerthatfocuseson thiswholealienstrain notaimto suppress of didit, butrather give it ananalytical, to visible,andpermanent it reality: wasimplantedinbodies,slippedin beneath modesof conduct,madeintoa principle classification ofandintelligibility, established a raisondetreanda natural as order disorder.... ofThestrategy behind dissemination to strewreality this was withthemandincorporatethemintothe individual (1980:44).Thus insofar as dominationis as much a matterof culturaland psychologicalprocesses as of material and political ones, it operates by shaping actorsdispositions such that, in the extreme case, "the agents aspirationshave thesame limits as the objective conditions of which they are the product"(Bour-dieu 1978:166; see also Rabinow 1975; Barnettand Silverman1979; Rabinowand Sullivan 1979). At the same time, however, those authorswho emphasizeculturaldomina-tion also place importantlimits on the scope and depth of culturalcontrols.The extreme case is never reached, and often never even approached.Thuswhile accepting the view of culture as powerfully constraining, they argue
154 SHERRY B. ORTNERthat hegemony is always more fragile than its appears,and never as total as it(or as traditionalculturalanthropology)would claim. The reasons given forthis state of affairs are various, and relate directly to the ways in which thedifferent authorsconceptualize systemic change. This brings us to our finalset of questions. 2. How does practice shape the system?Therearereallytwo considerationshere-how practice reproduces the system, and how the system may bechanged by practice. A unified theory of practice should ideally be able toaccount for both within a single framework.At the moment, however, it isclear that a focus on reproductiontends to producea ratherdifferentpicturefrom a focus on change, and we will thus take these issues separately. Beginning with reproduction,there is of course a long traditionin an-thropologyof asking how it is thatnorms, values, and conceptualschemes getreproducedby and for actors. Prior to the sixties, at least in American an-thropology, emphasis was laid upon socialization practices as the primaryagents of this process. In England,however, the influenceof the Durkheimianparadigmgenerated an emphasis on ritual. It was throughthe enactmentofritualsof various kinds that actors were seen as coming to be wedded to thenormsand values of theirculture, and/or to be purged,at least temporarily,ofwhatever dissident sentiments they might harbor(e.g., Gluckman 1955; V.Turner1969; Beidelman 1966). The ritualfocus, or what might be called forfocus on extraordinarypractice, became even stronger in the sixties andseventies. Americansymbolic anthropologists took up the view thatritualwasone of the primary matrices for the reproductionof consciousness (Geertz1973b;Ortner1978), even if they dissentedfromcertainaspectsof the Britishapproach.And the structural Marxiststoo placed greatweight on the power ofritual to mediate social structural contradictionsand mystify the workingsofthe system.Ritualin factis a formof practice-people do it-and to studythe re-productionof consciousness, mystified or otherwise, in the processes of ritualbehavioris to study at least one way in which practicereproducesthe system. The newer practiceapproaches,by contrast,place greateremphasison thepracticesof ordinaryliving. Althoughthese were not by any means ignoredinearlierwork, they assume greaterprominencehere. Thus despite his stress onthe highly intentionalized moments of practice, Bourdieu also pays closeattention to the little routines people enact, again and again, in working,eating, sleeping, and relaxing, as well as the little scenariosof etiquettetheyplay out again and again in social interaction. All of these routines andscenariosare predicatedupon, and embody withinthemselves, the fundamen-tal notions of temporal,spatial, and social orderingthatunderlieand organizethe system as a whole. In enacting these routines, actorsnot only continuetobe shaped by the underlying organizationalprinciples involved, but con-tinually re-endorse those principles in the world of public observationanddiscourse.