"Abstract The private sector is vital to building and sus-" "taining peace. These efforts are often recognized as" "‘‘Business for Peace’’ or ‘‘Peace through Commerce.’’ Academic research on Business for Peace is almost twenty years old and tends to be theoretical. This paper is the first to present qualitative findings on businesses operating in an active violent conflict such as the case of Iraq. Companies in Iraq operate under the constant threat of violence and yet many still try to enhance peace through operations. We interviewed more than 40 participants who were business owners, managers, government officials, and international policymakers who were active in the Iraqi theater. We discuss our findings that relate to the perception of com- pany activities as peace enhancing into four categories: capacity building, rule of law, social cohesion, and local engagement. Our findings support the existing business and peace categories of rule of law and social cohesion. Our findings also suggest that current theory may be missing capacity building and local engagement as important business activities to promote peace. We conclude by noting the limitations of the paper and the need for more" "qualitative research."

1. 1 23
Journal of Business Ethics
ISSN 0167-4544
J Bus Ethics
DOI 10.1007/s10551-017-3513-7
Business in War Zones: How Companies
Promote Peace in Iraq
John E. Katsos & Yass AlKafaji

2. 1 23
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3. ORIGINAL PAPER
Business in War Zones: How Companies Promote Peace in Iraq
John E. Katsos1 • Yass AlKafaji2
Received: 3 November 2016 / Accepted: 16 March 2017
Ó Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht 2017
Abstract The private sector is vital to building and sus-
taining peace. These efforts are often recognized as
‘‘Business for Peace’’ or ‘‘Peace through Commerce.’’
Academic research on Business for Peace is almost twenty
years old and tends to be theoretical. This paper is the first
to present qualitative findings on businesses operating in an
active violent conflict such as the case of Iraq. Companies
in Iraq operate under the constant threat of violence and yet
many still try to enhance peace through operations. We
interviewed more than 40 participants who were business
owners, managers, government officials, and international
policymakers who were active in the Iraqi theater. We
discuss our findings that relate to the perception of com-
pany activities as peace enhancing into four categories:
capacity building, rule of law, social cohesion, and local
engagement. Our findings support the existing business and
peace categories of rule of law and social cohesion. Our
findings also suggest that current theory may be missing
capacity building and local engagement as important
business activities to promote peace. We conclude by
noting the limitations of the paper and the need for more
qualitative research.
Keywords Peace through Commerce Á Peacebuilding Á
Business for Peace Á Iraq Á ISIS
Introduction
‘‘Business for Peace’’ (B4P) or ‘‘Peace through Commerce’’
as a field is almost twenty years old. International organi-
zations such as the United Nations (Rasche and Kell 2010)
and International Alert (International Alert 2005) have
noted the central role business can and should play in peace.
Corporate initiatives at Unilever and Abraaj Capital among
others show that many in the private sector take this role
seriously. Nobel Prize winners in Peace and Economics
grant the ‘‘Business for Peace Award’’ each year to those
business leaders who are promoting peace (Business for
Peace Foundation 2016; Katsos and Fort 2016). Special
reports by AACSB International (2006) and PRME (2015)
show the consensus on the importance of B4P to business
schools. Special issues in Journal of Business Ethics (Oetzel
et al. 2009; Forrer 2009; Fort 2009; Getz and Oetzel 2009;
Levy and Hawkins 2009), Academy of Management Per-
spectives (Haufler 2015; Ford 2015a, b; Forrer and Katsos
2015; Kolk and Lenfant 2015; Milliken et al. 2015;
Westermann-Behaylo et al. 2015), and Business Horizons
(Kanashiro and Starik 2016; Banks 2016; Trivedi 2016;
Katsos and Fort 2016; Kolk and Lenfant 2016; Forrer and
Fort 2016; Rettberg 2016; Melin 2016) and myriad books
(Nelson et al. 2000; Haufler 2001; Fort and Schipani 2004;
Sweetman 2009; Fort 2007; Ford 2015a, b; Williams 2008)
indicate the depth of theoretical work on B4P.
The literature in the last decade has sought to craft
theories related to private sector enhancement of peace,
based on literature in economics, political science, man-
agement, and psychology (Forrer and Katsos 2015;
Westermann-Behaylo et al. 2015). The quantitative litera-
ture should serve to test theory, but instead, it has primarily
examined the perceptions of managers at multinational
enterprises (MNEs) operating in conflict and buffer states
& John E. Katsos
jkatsos@aus.edu
1
Department of Management, American University of
Sharjah, Sharjah, United Arab Emirates
2
Department of Accounting, American University of Sharjah,
Sharjah, United Arab Emirates
123
J Bus Ethics
DOI 10.1007/s10551-017-3513-7
Author's personal copy

4. (Getz and Oetzel 2009; Darendeli and Hill 2015). The
expansiveness of theory and the limitations of quantitative
work are due to the lack of qualitative data. The qualitative
literature in B4P is mostly anecdotal. It is rarely, if at all,
connected with the theoretical literature in the field (Katsos
2016). Only one study gathered data systematically in a
conflict zone (Katsos and Forrer, 2014). Katsos and For-
rer’s (2014) main limitation is that the conflict zone in their
study—Cyprus—has been nonviolent for over 30 years.
Further muddling the qualitative picture is publications by
NGOs, companies, and international organizations that
portray isolated CSR initiatives as evidence of peace
enhancement.
This paper is the first to present qualitative findings on
businesses operating in an active violent conflict such as in
Iraq. Companies in Iraq operate under the constant threat of
violence, yet many still try to enhance peace through opera-
tions. This is the first study that we are aware of that conducts
an in-depth examination of the challenges of businesses
operating in conflict zones from management strategy, gov-
ernment policy, and on-the-ground tactical operations.
The paper proceeds as follows. First, we detail the
existing literature in the Business for Peace field, high-
lighting a major gap. It is currently unclear how business
can operate in an active conflict zone in a way that
enhances peace. Current theory places business and peace
activities into one of four categories: economic develop-
ment, rule of law, social cohesion, and track-two diplo-
macy (Oetzel et al. 2009; Forrer and Katsos 2015).
The second section of this paper discusses the relevant
conflict context in Iraq. After highlighting the relevant
conflict context, we detail our method. We conducted in-
depth, open-ended interviews with over 40 participants. The
participants were business owners, managers, government
and international policymakers. We pay special attention to
the facts that came up repeatedly in our interviews.
We then detail our findings that the perception of
company activities as peace enhancing related to four
categories: capacity building, rule of law, social cohesion,
and local engagement. Our findings support the existing
business and peace categories of rule of law and social
cohesion. Our findings also suggest that current theory may
be missing capacity building and local engagement as
important business activities to promote peace. We con-
clude by noting the limitations of the paper, namely its
generalization, and the need for more qualitative research.
Business and Peace Theory
Oetzel et al.’s (2009) review of the business and peace
literature remains the primary expression of how busi-
nesses can positively promote peace. Oetzel et al. (2009)
highlight four ways that business can achieve peace pro-
motion: through promoting economic development,
engaging in track-two diplomacy, enhancing rule of law
through adoption of international codes of conduct and risk
assessment, and promoting a sense of community.
First, business promotes economic development. This is
the most basic form of violence reduction a business can
engage in, yet it is also one of the most powerful. Firms
generate economic benefits for the societies in which they
operate by design. Economic development in this context is
simply business doing what it does naturally: creating
value for shareholders (Friedman 2009), employing local
workers (Milliken et al. 2015), transferring valuable tech-
nology (Spencer 2008), and making foreign direct invest-
ment (Buckley 2014; Getz and Oetzel 2009). By providing
these basic inputs in conflict-sensitive regions, business
helps advance economic development and reduces pro-
spects for violent conflicts. Multinational companies reg-
ularly look to developing economies as a source of greater
global growth gains (Haufler 1997; Obstfeld 1994;
Borensztein et al. 1998). Although there can be tremendous
growth opportunities in developing countries, the risk of
conflict reemerging in post-conflict countries often scares
away substantial business activities. Developing countries
have a 40% risk of returning to violence, whereas all others
have only a 9% risk (Collier et al. 2008). This troubling
condition is counterbalanced by recognizing that even
modest increases in economic growth greatly reduce the
likelihood that those countries will revert to conflict (Col-
lier 2007). There are great opportunities and risks for
business to achieve substantial growth rates and, at the
same time, reduce the risk of violence in communities
throughout the world. Business operations themselves
could enhance peace by adopting specific management
practices such as enhancing employee voice within the
company (Milliken et al. 2015).
Second, business can engage in track-two diplomacy.
Track-two diplomacy is usually defined as informal, non-
binding negotiations that are explicitly intended to reduce
conflict through face-to-face meetings (Diamond and
McDonald 1996; Westermann-Behaylo et al. 2015), but it
also refers to any time corporations act as brokers between
sides in a conflict (Galtung 1996; Ramsbotham et al. 2011;
Montville 1991; Oetzel et al. 2007). Of the four factors,
this is the highest level of explicit engagement that busi-
ness has in the political process (Montville 1991; Oetzel
et al. 2009; Westermann-Behaylo et al. 2015). Within
track-two diplomacy, however, there are multiple levels of
engagement. Business can engage in conflict resolution
through NGO partnerships that help to alleviate the causes
of conflict (Kolk and Lenfant 2015; Oetzel and Doh 2009;
Westley and Vredenburg 1991), participation in global
multilateral agreements (Oetzel et al. 2007), and direct
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5. informal negotiations between the two sides engaged in
active conflict (Lieberfeld 2002). Westermann-Behaylo
et al. (2015) have further suggested that multinationals
could have greater influence on peace through the pursuit
of corporate diplomacy.
Third, business can promote rule of law by adopting
third-party standards such as international codes of conduct
(Emmelhainz and Adams 1999; Kolk and Tuldere 2002;
Steelman & Rivera 2006) and engaging in conflict risk
assessment before entering and while operating within
conflict countries (Anderson et al. 2010; Guaqueta 2008;
O’Neill 2008). By adopting what the literature terms
‘‘principles of external valuation,’’ companies can advance
the rule of law within countries by binding themselves to
more stable international norms. This is often called ‘‘hard
trust,’’ indicating the need for stakeholders to know that
companies are bound by legally enforceable mechanisms
that compel them to follow rules of operations (Bies et al.
2007). Examples of external valuations include Interna-
tional Organization for Standardization (ISO) 26000, the
UN Global Compact, the UN Guiding Principles on Busi-
ness and Human Rights (sometimes referred to as the
Ruggie Principles), and the International Labor Organiza-
tion’s labor standards. Principles of external valuation not
only set a model of behavior that engenders social and
economic justice but also are a way for business to con-
tribute to peace (by setting examples of good citizenship).
Often, business unintentionally generates more conflict in a
region through missteps that could be avoided by better
understanding the consequences of its policies and prac-
tices. Guidance documents such as conflict-sensitive busi-
ness practice (International Alert 2005) and the guidance
on responsible business in conflict-affected and high-risk
areas (Compact 2010) are just two examples of resources
available to firms to assess and manage risk in conflict
countries.
Fourth, business can contribute to a sense of community
and enhance social cohesion (Dworkin and Schipani 2007;
Fort and Schipani 2004; Spreitzer 2007). Management
theorists are perhaps most familiar with the notion of
contributing to a sense of community as it is embedded
within the literature on corporate social responsibility
(CSR) (Aguilera and Rupp 2005; Davies et al. 2003;
Freeman and McVea 2001). By taking all stakeholders into
account, rather than just owners of the firm (Freeman
1983), businesses can obtain their ‘‘social license’’ to
operate in a foreign country (Gunningham et al. 2003).
This is especially important for reducing operational risks
in conflict-sensitive regions (Oetzel and Getz 2012). Mil-
liken et al. (2015) also note the importance of incorporating
employee voice into management of companies in conflict-
affected regions as an important way to enhance the sense
of community.
In recent years, scholars have highlighted some excep-
tions to the four methods proposed in Oetzel et al. (2009),
but without challenging the core of the theory (Wester-
mann-Behaylo et al. 2015; Forrer and Katsos 2015). For
instance, Oetzel et al. (2009) acknowledged the realities of
persistent structural violence and argued that basic peace-
building practices by the private sector will be effective
only when conflicts are in the lowest three levels of
intensity on the Heidelberg Institute’s (2016) Conflict
Barometer and not in its highest two levels of intensity,
termed ‘‘War’’ and ‘‘Limited War.’’ This means that the
recommendations are tailored to areas with limited vio-
lence. Forrer and Katsos (2015) noted that it was precisely
in these three areas that businesses could have their greatest
impact on peace and further noted a triadic construct that
presents countries as existing in three basic conditions—
war, buffer condition, and peace—that has several advan-
tages for businesses to understand how they can best pro-
mote peace. They convincingly assert that the buffer
condition is the most effective time for business to enhance
peace.
The buffer condition also allows businesses to better
integrate addressing structural violence (Farmer et al. 2006;
Galtung 2006) in their peacebuilding operations. The buf-
fer condition has six research-backed characteristics: less
than a decade since war or limited war (Collier et al.
2008, 2009; Elbadawi et al. 2007), political and economic
uncertainty (Mills and Fan 2006), disrespect for rule of law
(Mills and Fan 2006; Santos 2003), depleted physical and
human capital (Santos 2003), a damaged financial system
(Mills and Fan 2006; Santos 2003), and heavy reliance on
foreign aid (Elbadawi et al. 2007). The buffer condition
retains many of the traits of violence and the war economy
even after war or limited war has ceased (Ballentine 2005).
Major differences among war, buffer, and peace economies
can be captured by the levels of informal and black-market
activity. Buffer economies, for instance, often have high
levels of black economic output because the government
monopolizes the formal economy, forcing anti-government
groups to use the informal and black economies to fund
their activities (Fearon 2004; Winer and Roule 2003).
Sometimes black markets have been found to provide
benefits for certain types of legal activities (Andreas 2009;
Baumol 1996), but generally black-market activity is
viewed as a hindrance to transitioning toward peace
(Bannon and Collier 2003; Farmer et al. 2006; Reade and
Lee 2012). These elements of the buffer economy do not
simply vanish when the intensity level of the conflict
declines from war to buffer condition. In buffer economies,
consumption and investment decline and there is mass
movement of people as either refugees or internally dis-
placed persons (IEP, 2014). Social, political, and economic
processes are hindered, and prospects for sustainable
Business in War Zones: How Companies Promote Peace in Iraq
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6. growth and development are reduced. All of these factors
prevent business from operating efficiently (Compact
2010).
Another major theory explains why companies and their
leaders pursue peace promotion (Fort 2015). Companies
can contribute to peace using one of three aims: peace-
making, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding (Fort 2015;
Ganson (ed.), 2013). Companies promoting peace fall into
one of three categories: peace entrepreneurs, instrumental
businesses, and unintentional contributions to peace. (Fort
2015).
‘‘Peacemaking’’ and ‘‘peacekeeping’’ are straightfor-
ward concepts. In these categories, businesses set out
intentionally to lessen conflict. This could occur in helping
parties settle disputes and could also include helping
maintain peace after a peace accord. Peacebuilding is long
term and incremental. Corporate culture and operations are
peacebuilding when they model nonviolence (Fort 2015;
Forrer and Fort 2016). This approach shares much with the
idea of being ‘‘businessworthy’’ (Business for Peace
Foundation 2016). Peacebuilding needs not be in a conflict
zone. Ethical business conduct could occur anywhere and
still be labeled ‘‘peacebuilding’’ insofar as it incrementally
enhances peace through culture and operations.
Different kinds of businesses can also be peace
enhancing. Peace entrepreneurs are those companies and
leaders who set out to make some intentional contribution
to peace. It is an essential aspect of the firm’s DNA, and
they seek ways to use their operations to contribute to
peace. Peace instrumentalists are more likely to use ‘‘cor-
porate diplomacy’’ (Fort 2015; Westermann-Behaylo et al.
2015). Instrumentalists make a rational calculation that the
company performs better in peacetime. These companies
take action that aligns the firm’s strategic interests with
society’s peace interests. Finally, ‘‘unconscious peace-
builders’’ contribute to peace without awareness of it.
Unconscious peacebuilders often use self-perceived ethical
business conduct that also happens to correlate with peace
contribution.
The Iraqi Context
We conducted our study over a roughly six-month period
from the end of 2015 to the middle of 2016. Iraq has been
at war every year but two since 2003. During those years
(2013 and 2014) Iraq was a buffer country, as defined by
Forrer and Katsos (2015), with the residual effects of
conflict. During the time of the study, ISIS—an ultra-
orthodox, Sunni Muslim militant group—was at war with
the government of Iraq (HIIK 2015). In 2015 alone, the
conflict killed over 12,000 Iraqis and displaced another 4
million. (HIIK 2015). At the time of the study, Iraqi forces
were making a major offensive against ISIS-controlled
territories in Iraq (HIIK 2015). Ramadi’s recapture was of
particular importance as home to the Baiji Oil Refinery,
Iraq’s largest (Gordon 2015). At the time of this writing,
Iraqi forces are battling ISIS in taking back the city of
Mosul, the largest city in Iraq after Baghdad.
From Iraq’s founding as an independent state, conflict
has defined it (Makiya 1998; Said 2006; Younis 2011). Iraq
became a republic in 1958 and experienced four coups
d’etat leading to the 1968 takeover of the country by the
Ba’ath party. In 1979, Saddam Hussein was declared
President by the party. Shortly thereafter and largely as a
consequence of the Iranian Revolution that same year, Iran
and Iraq engaged in the longest interstate war of the
twentieth century. Though it was largely confined to border
regions shared by the two countries, the Iran–Iraq War
killed over 1 million people. In spite of these conflicts, Iraq
in 1991 had the healthiest, wealthiest, and best-educated
population in the region (Mensah et al. 2005). When the
Saddam Hussein invaded neighboring Kuwait, a major US
ally, the USA waged the First Gulf War. Saddam Hussein
remained in power in spite of major damage to Iraq’s major
infrastructure and military (Makiya 1998). Twelve years of
sanctions followed that crippled Iraq’s economy and its
people (Makiya 1998). By 2003, the population of Iraq was
one of the region’s poorest, least healthy, and least edu-
cated (Mensah et al. 2005).
The Second Gulf War of 2003 removed Saddam Hus-
sein from power. The US’ ‘‘coalition of the willing’’ (Ca-
vanagh et al. 2003) occupied the country, dissolved its
military, and removed all politicians and technocrats. The
US administration banned all members of the Ba’ath party
from public service including the army (Pfiffner 2010).
This so-called de-ba’athification policy hit Sunnis partic-
ularly hard, especially the Anbar Governorate and its
capital Ramadi (Boyle 2009). The arrival of non-Iraqi
Sunni Salafis into Anbar Governorate further complicated
matters: an al-Qaeda affiliate was created by Jordanian Abu
Musab al-Zarqawi with these non-Iraqi fighters and ‘‘de-
ba’athified’’ Iraqi soldiers (Kirdar and CSIS 2011). Coali-
tion forces and the remaining Sunnis in Anbar united to
drive out al-Qaeda in 2007 (Kirdar and CSIS 2011). This
was followed by a widespread withdrawal of coalition
troops.
The remnants of al-Qaeda in Iraq continued on and
renamed itself the Islamic State of Iraq (Wood 2015). It
later merged with large groups of the Syrian al-Qaeda
affiliate (Wood 2015) to become ISIS (Al-Hashimi 2014).
After 2007, the remnants continued to provoke sectarian
violence with Shiites and Kurds, the other two major
groups in Iraq. In 2014, ISIS took large pieces of Iraqi
territory including Mosul, the second largest city with 2.5
million people. For the first year and a half of the
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7. occupation, the government of Iraq continued to pay the
salaries of government employees in Mosul and other ISIS-
controlled territories (Coles 2015). This had stopped
around the time of our first interviews.
Iraqi Business Environment
In 1991, Iraq had a strong economy with an educated
population and natural resources including water and oil
(Makiya 1998). The per capita GNP in 1989 was $2304,
but never exceeded $500 after the UN sanctions began in
1991 (CIA World Factbook). Businesses today face the
dual challenges of operating under both conflict and pov-
erty. The vast majority of the population of Iraq is at the
‘‘base of the pyramid’’ (Kolk et al. 2013; Anderson et al.
2010). Iraq is consistently ranked as one of the most dif-
ficult countries to conduct business in the world (World
Bank 2017). Challenges facing companies include poor
infrastructure (World Bank 2017), shortage of electricity
(World Bank 2017), lack of physical security (World Bank
2017), and corruption (Transparency International 2016).
Prevailing theory predicts the absence of legitimate
private enterprise and the prevalence of violence in such an
environment (Bannon and Collier 2003). In fact many
businesses have thrived, especially as the oil and security
sectors have moved toward privatization. Many businesses
are resilient and accustomed to do business in Iraq in the
worst of situations. Many Iraqi companies are also opti-
mistic and well aware of the needs and challenges of the
business environment (Mace 2014). Iraqi businesses also
believe that they can positively influence government
policies and build trust through business associations and
chambers of commerce (Mace 2014). The same survey
uncovered that more than half of Iraqi businesses are not
registered with the government. This is evidence that more
than half of the business activities are within the informal
or gray market. The owners of these businesses believe that
they get nothing by registering with the local governments.
Instead, they will avoid paying registration fees and taxes
and avoid bringing unwanted attention to themselves (i.e.,
away from political parties, militias, and gangs) (Mace
2014).
Doing Business in ISIS-controlled Territories
The brutalities of ISIS are well established (McCoy 2014;
Gerth and Warrick 2016). The organization was mostly
built on the ruin of al-Qaeda in Iraq. The core group who
formed the organization is mostly former Saddam Ba’athist
lieutenants (Al-Hashimi 2014). Our participants often
compared the brutality of ISIS to Saddam Hussein’s
regime. Like Saddam’s regime, the use of brutality was to
intimidate the population into submission. ISIS allied with
enough locals to know the situation on the ground imme-
diately—some of them even allied with ISIS before they
took over making the taking over of cities easier, especially
Mosul. According to our participants, non-Sunni Muslims
bore the brunt of violence perpetrated by ISIS in Mosul.
But the remaining people—largely Sunnis—could count on
safety if they obeyed. The interviewees made it clear that
ISIS-controlled territories are substantially safer in an
everyday sense than many parts of government-controlled
Iraq. Iraqis had learned obedience in the face of terror
under Saddam and now are doing it again under ISIS, as
stated by our interviewees.
ISIS’s acts are barbaric by any standard, yet they are
comprised of highly sophisticated and intelligent actors
many of whom believe in their cause (Wood 2015; Al-
Hashimi 2014). They control in part through fear and in
part through better administration (Al-Hashimi 2014). All
of our Iraqi interviewees made it clear that the failure of the
Iraqi government to provide a meaningful governance
alternative to ISIS is the strongest component of ISIS’s
continued control over Iraqi territory.
Unlike al-Qaeda which relied on outside donations and
functioned more as a militia, ISIS has many of the capa-
bilities of a state. ISIS raises revenues through taxation and
from various sources including oil, agriculture, kidnapping,
and stolen antique selling (Giovanni et al. 2014). ISIS
relies on a complex system to manage its far-reaching
networks by dealing with cash, crude, and contraband
which allows it to operate outside the legitimate banking
channels (Giovanni et al. 2014). ISIS uses more than 1600
currency exchange offices throughout Iraq, Jordan, Syria,
and Turkey to transfer millions of dollars across borders
(Coker 2016). ISIS even has an immigration office where it
stamps passports when individuals leave or enter its terri-
tories (Engel 2015).
Research Design
The authors used a grounded theory approach (Glaser et al.
1968; Strauss and Corbin 1994) to understand the impact
that companies thought they were having on conflict in
Iraq. We gathered data without predetermined biases in an
attempt to build theory within the field about how busi-
nesses operate in war and limited war environments. The
prevailing literature and theory in business and peace are
based on theoretical, quantitative, and anecdotal evidence
in other fields not directly related to business promotion of
peace and often done without explanation of methodology
(Katsos 2016) with few exceptions (Oetzel and Doh 2009;
Katsos and Forrer 2014; Getz and Oetzel 2009). Specifi-
cally, the prevailing business and peace literature do not
address how a business could promote peace in a war
Business in War Zones: How Companies Promote Peace in Iraq
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8. environment, as classified by the HIIK Conflict Barometer.
Prevailing theory, in fact, argues that there is little if
anything a company can do in such environments (Oetzel
et al. 2009; Forrer and Katsos 2015). In this research
context, the authors felt that the grounded theory approach
was most appropriate as no theory has been adequately
developed to explain how businesses can promote peace in
war zones.
Participant Selection
Our data are derived from in-depth, semi-structured inter-
views, conducted on condition of anonymity, with 45
individuals who were actively engaged in or with the pri-
vate sector in Iraq as well as others from international
organizations. The participants were selected for interviews
based on recommendations from educational institutions,
non-governmental organizations, and international organi-
zations that operate in Iraq in a peacebuilding context. The
authors looked to these organizations for recommendations
because of their central role in peacebuilding in Iraq and
because of the relative lack of government responsiveness
and control over the private sector especially outside of the
oil industry. These organizations acted as insiders to assist
in finding appropriate participants for the current research.
The research participants were recommended by these
organizations as leaders in the private sector who were also
greatly concerned with peacebuilding issues. The envi-
ronment in Iraq is not a ‘‘normal’’ or recurring case, and
thus, participant selection was done as applied for ‘‘ex-
treme/deviant cases’’(Flyvbjerg 2006; Seawright 2016).
The data are thus not representative of all private sector
actors in Iraq nor even of all of the private sector actors
who might be promoting peace.
Companies
The participating interviewees came from a range of
industry sectors at the senior executive level and above to
ascertain whether and how business might enhance peace
in Iraq. Table 1 shows the participant and company
descriptors including information about industry, size,
international or domestic (Iraq) focus, and position within
the organization of the interviewee. Thirteen of the par-
ticipants worked as senior executives with large private
sector portfolios in nonprofit-making entities, i.e., aid
organizations, international organizations, and government.
The remaining 32 were at the senior executive level or
above at for-profit entities. Companies were divided by size
based on number of employees instead of revenue as the
authors felt that indicating revenues of companies in cer-
tain industries would make clear which companies the
interviewees came from.
Interviewees and Interviews
All interviewees were senior executives as they have a
major role in developing corporate policies. For interna-
tional organizations, senior executives responsible for Iraq
were interviewed even if based outside of Iraq, as was often
the case. For smaller companies, the founder/CEO and
majority shareholder—who were always the same person
among the participating companies—were interviewed. Of
the interviewees, 39 were Iraqi nationals (though many also
held a second nationality), with 14 self-identified Sunnis,
16 Shi’as, and 9 Kurds. Of the six non-Iraqis, two were
from other Arab League nations, while the remaining four
were nationals of Turkey, the US, and the UK.
The objectives of the interviews were to learn about how
companies in Iraq might enhance peace given the chal-
lenges of the conflict against ISIS. Interview questions
were centered on these issues, and the interviews were
semi-structured. Each interview was conducted by one or
both of the authors and lasted 40–60 min. All interviews
were conducted in English, though six interviewees
requested an Arabic speaker, provided by the authors, to
assist in translating certain words into English. Twenty-
three of the interviews were conducted in person, while the
remaining were conducted via video conference.
Data Analysis Methodology
All interviews were digitally recorded, transcribed, and
coded. Codes were created at the same time as the study of
the data (Bryant and Charmaz 2007; Charmaz 2006).
Interviews were first coded for any information related to
potential peacebuilding strategies by businesses. Portions
of the interviews were tagged with one or more codes to
organize the data. After the first round of coding, related
codes were grouped or sharpened into more descriptive
codes. Codes were combined, added, and refined as dif-
ferent or new themes emerged. The final set of codes
regarding how and why companies sought to enhance
peace falls into four categories: capacity building, rule of
law, social cohesion, and local commitment.
Research Findings
Capacity Building
Company managers noted that they found capacity build-
ing as a useful tool for peace promotion. They would do
this in two ways. One way was through internal company
training programs that ostensibly focused on teambuilding
and also included large elements of conflict resolution. A
manager at a large multinational with substantial work in
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9. Table 1 Interviewee Characteristics by Organization Industry, Organization Size, Organization Location, Organization Position, For-profit
status, and Sect/Religious Affiliation
Industry/type of organization Size Primary business
location
Level of individual spoken with For-
profit?
Sect/religious
Affiliation
Architecture, construction Small Domestic Founder, senior executive, major shareholder Yes Sunni
Energy Large International Senior executive Yes Sunni
Food and beverage Large International Senior executive Yes Sunni
Food and beverage Small Domestic Founder, senior executive, major shareholder Yes Sunni
Food and beverage Large International Senior executive Yes Sunni
Manufacturing Medium Domestic Founder, senior executive, major shareholder Yes Sunni
Manufacturing Medium International Senior executive Yes Sunni
Telecommunications Small Domestic Founder, senior executive, major shareholder Yes Sunni
Aid organization Small Domestic Founder and senior executive No Sunni
Government Large Federal Member of Parliament No Sunni
Government Small Local/provincial Leader No Sunni
International organization Large International Senior executive No Sunni
International organization Large International Senior executive No Sunni
International organization Large Domestic Senior executive No Sunni
Energy Large International Senior executive Yes Shi’a
Energy Small Domestic Founder, senior executive, major shareholder Yes Shi’a
Energy Small Domestic Founder, senior executive, major shareholder Yes Shi’a
Finance Medium Domestic Founder, senior executive, major shareholder Yes Shi’a
Finance Large International Senior executive Yes Shi’a
Food and beverage Small Domestic Founder, senior executive, major shareholder Yes Shi’a
Medical Large International Senior executive Yes Shi’a
Medical Large International Senior executive Yes Shi’a
Security Large International Senior executive Yes Shi’a
Transportation/logistics Large Domestic Senior executive Yes Shi’a
Transportation/logistics Large Domestic Founder, senior executive, major shareholder Yes Shi’a
Aid organization Small Domestic Founder and senior executive No Shi’a
Government Large Federal Minister No Shi’a
Government Small Local/Provincial Leader No Shi’a
International organization Large International Senior executive No Shi’a
International organization Medium Domestic Founder and senior executive No Shi’a
Aid organization Large International Founder and senior executive Yes Non-Iraqi
Finance Large International Senior executive Yes Non-Iraqi
Security Large International Senior executive Yes Non-Iraqi
Transportation/logistics Large International Senior executive Yes Non-Iraqi
Transportation/logistics Large International Founder, senior executive, major shareholder Yes Non-Iraqi
International organization Large International Senior executive No Non-Iraqi
Architecture, design, construction Medium Domestic Senior executive Yes Kurd
Food and beverage Small Domestic Founder, senior executive, major shareholder Yes Kurd
Medical Medium Domestic Founder, senior executive, major shareholder Yes Kurd
Telecommunications Medium Domestic Founder, senior executive, major shareholder Yes Kurd
Telecommunications Medium Domestic Senior executive Yes Kurd
Government Small Local/Provincial Leader No Kurd
Energy Medium Domestic Founder, senior executive, major shareholder Yes Kurd
Manufacturing Small Domestic Founder, senior executive, major shareholder Yes Kurd
Transportation/logistics Large International Senior executive Yes Kurd
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10. Iraq noted that capacity and knowledge transfer is ‘‘a key
for [transferring] our success…from the company to the
communities.’’ Each of the company programs on capacity
building mentioned by participants was either run outside
of Iraq—with Dubai, Beirut, Istanbul, and Amman all
mentioned as training locations—or was run in the Kur-
distan region. One founder of an Iraqi company noted that,
although he believed team building training was the key to
his company’s success, ‘‘I had spent a lot [of money] just to
build the team.’’
The second way to build capacity was through similar
training for stakeholders, especially subcontractors. One
manager from a Western multinational attributed the
importance of adequately training subcontractors and other
stakeholders. This is largely because of employment
requirements in many contracts (issued by the Iraqi gov-
ernment) which stipulated that at least 10% of the work-
force must be Iraqi. Most of these are oil service contracts
in southern Iraq, where, as companies often complain, local
workers do not possess adequate training. When the Wes-
tern multinational hired Iraqis from other regions, espe-
cially Kurdistan, it caused widespread resentment among
Iraqis closer to their operations in the south of the country.
This resentment itself led to protests and violence, so the
company shifted tactics and engaged in a training program
to build the capacity of Iraqis from the south, with special
focus on those with engineering backgrounds. One other
participant, a manager from a local NGO, noted the lack of
exactly these types of programs among other companies in
Iraq. These types of programs were perceived of as a real
need by many of our participants.
Rule of Law
For all participants, including politicians and businessmen,
rule of law was a primary concern. Of all of the rule of law
issues, corruption was the top challenge repeatedly men-
tioned as a hindrance to any type of peacebuilding. Closely
linked with corruption were non-merit-based hiring and
procurement decisions, which took the form of sectarian-
ism, cronyism, nepotism, or combinations of these. One of
our interviewees noted in detail that ‘‘some politicians have
set up private companies and hired their brothers or their
relatives, have created fictitious businesses, and suddenly
[these new companies are] taking contracts, taking the
money, delivering maybe 10% of the quality and service,
and then expatriating money.’’
The corruption was described as endemic to almost
every ministry and federal government departments. This
was a main reason that some businesses had a policy that
refused to do direct contracts with the government. One
CEO of a medical device company described how his
company refused to directly engage with the Ministry of
Health after middle and lower managers repeatedly asked
for ‘‘under the table money’’ in exchange for getting paid
what was owed under their preexisting government con-
tracts. After rebuffing these requests, the CEO noted, ‘‘I
didn’t want my business [in Iraq to have] corruption, so
[even though] the Ministry of Health sent me some people
to help them and do new projects, I told them ‘Sorry, I have
faced an issue related to corruption, there are some [in your
Ministry] who are looking for their personal benefit’ so I
refused to engage with them again.’’ Stories like this were
quite common among our participants, though others noted
that they depend so much on government contracts that
they have no choice but to pay the bribes requested.
Problems with rule of law though were consistently
described as recent occurrences that were identified as
having begun with the overthrow of Saddam Hussein by
the US coalition in 2003. Before that, there was what one
participant called ‘‘rule-based corruption.’’ Another par-
ticipant described it similarly noting that, ‘‘corruption in
Iraq…was very rare before 2003, [and everyone knew] that
minister, or that person is corrupted….there was a sys-
tem…[and] whoever take bribes, there is a court, and they
were always punished eventually.’’ Whether or not the
perception matches the reality is unclear, but the partici-
pants’ outlook revealed that violence in particular unlea-
shed a chaos that was not prevalent before. It was the chaos
post-violence that led to corruption at the highest levels.
‘‘We had false stability,’’ one participant noted, ‘‘But now
we have parasites who became billionaires’’ by running
government offices. In addition to this, another participant
noted, ‘‘when the government could not pay salaries any-
more…that’s when the corruption started.’’
An additional rule of law problem that was noted by the
majority of our participants was the lack of clear regulations
in almost every area. ‘‘There is no regulatory body that we
can depend on,’’ noted the CEO of a large Iraqi company.
The CEO of a medium-sized Iraqi company detailed his
frustration: ‘‘Iraq has a tiny office which looks into the
budgets and balance sheets of [all of] the companies, and if
they [make a mistake] or you don’t give them every-
thing…you are imprisoned, because it’s a crime. So you go
to that office to make sure everything is in order and they
throw your budget and balance sheets in the waste basket
and they tell you ‘Give me a million dinars, otherwise I
won’t give you the piece of paper you need.’ And you have
to give them the million dinars to get your piece of paper.
That’s not the way to run the private sector.’’ Another
participant noted that his and many other businesses had
taken to setting up one licensed company and numerous
unlicensed companies simply to avoid this problem. He
understood though that this meant substantially less revenue
because, in his words, ‘‘If you do not support business by
having a clear regulation, whom are you going to tax?’’
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11. The final rule of law challenge noted by participants in
certain industries dominated by the government—espe-
cially energy and health—was that government officials
talked about developing the private sector even though the
government itself acted more like a ‘‘loan shark’’ in doing
so. Another participant, a senior manager from a large
international firm, told us that ‘‘the government, instead of
being the regulator and monitor of the private sector,
basically tries to compete with us and extract the most out
of us as they can.’’
Some of our participants saw themselves as examples to
the community and so believed they were promoting peace
by refusing to pay bribes and refusing—for at least three of
the companies—to do business directly with the govern-
ment at all. Of those three companies, two were local and
one a multinational subsidiary. The local companies’ senior
managers expressed their desire to make their community
better and promote peace by refusing to ‘‘line the pockets’’
of corrupt officials and thereby in their view reduce the
chaos and violence. The subsidiary’s senior manager,
however, noted that the reason for not dealing directly with
the government was not for peacebuilding purposes; rather,
the company was worried about its potential liability
exposure for corruption in their home country.
Social Cohesion
For many of our participants, building social cohesion was
used as the essential tool for business to enhance peace.
One participant described social cohesion as a ‘‘trust
bridge’’ between and among communities that business is a
key component in building. Another interviewee put it even
more bluntly: ‘‘peace [in Iraq] is not predicated on the
economy only. Peace depends on whether there is social
cohesion in a society, and that’s the main problem with
lack of peace that we try to address [in Iraq].’’ Most
interesting about the perception of social cohesion as a
primary peacebuilding tool in business’ toolbox was that
those who believe in social cohesion thought it was the
most important role for the private sector in Iraq (ten of the
32 for-profit entities). The remaining interviewees from
for-profit entities did not mention social cohesion at all.
This should not be surprising considering Iraq is a collec-
tivistic (versus individualistic) society.
When pressed about what they use to promote social
cohesion, businesses mentioned a variety of business
activities. Three companies had an official policy forbid-
ding discussion of religious, sectarian, or political issues in
the workplace. One senior manager at a different Iraqi
company further noted: ‘‘In our company you can find
Kurdish, Arabic, Muslim, Christians, Yazidi…and it works
because the policy is simple: if you are here, talk business,
talk [about] what you would add to the company. When
you go back to your house, talk about whatever you want.
It’s not our business there.’’ The same senior manager
credited this policy as the main reason the company still
had operations in the country.
Other businesses noted that they strictly enforced anti-
discrimination policies as key to promoting social cohe-
sion. One CEO told us that his company refused to ask any
employee for sect or religious identification. Many of the
participants from for-profit entities that did not mention
social cohesion as a key to peacebuilding by business
explicitly noted that they try to hire within the prevailing
ethnic or religious group in the region where their offices
are located. One senior manager described how the two
offices in regions dominated by Kurds and Sunnis,
respectively, were entirely staffed by those groups with the
intent of reducing conflicts in the workplace. When chal-
lenged that this might lead to resentment of the business
and its hiring practices, he (stated that he) saw it as a means
of ‘‘assuring local commitment.’’
Local Commitment
Some of those who mentioned social cohesion as important
also indicated local commitment as a key element. There
were sharp disagreements about the peacebuilding capacity
of multinationals and non-Iraqi companies in this context,
especially with respect to employing Iraqi workers and
repatriating profits to home countries.
Almost all participants mentioned the employment and
training of Iraqis from the region within which a company
operated as crucial to peacebuilding. There was a sub-
stantial split between Iraqi and non-Iraqi companies (those
with global headquarters not in Iraq) as to this issue. Iraqi
companies complained, often bitterly, that non-Iraqi com-
panies were ‘‘bringing in people from outside.’’ The non-
Iraqi companies that most reported using foreign workers
were in the energy and security sectors. Non-Iraqi com-
panies repeatedly indicated that they brought in foreign
workers to bridge what they say was a capacity gap among
local workers, particularly in more technical areas. One
Iraqi founder and major shareholder indicated that he
believed non-Iraqi firms regularly use foreign workers ‘‘to
inflate service costs, because [the government] won’t go for
the very inexpensive contractors…So, for [non-Iraqi com-
panies], it’s not in their interest to find cost-effective ways
to [working in Iraq].’’
Other non-Iraqi companies emphasized that due dili-
gence requirements in their home countries made the
employment of locals for tasks such as security nearly
impossible, requiring the hiring of non-Iraqi security con-
tractors. This process, an Iraqi participant noted, ‘‘increases
resentment, the resentment increases perceived unfairness.
Now that will be used by certain leaders, by certain groups
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12. who want to have influence in the region at a local level.’’
One senior manager from an international company indi-
cated that hiring and promoting ‘‘the local regional work-
force would create an environment where they have a stake
in the success of the business, which has a major impact on
the stability of Iraq,’’ but added that his company was
regularly frustrated with the lack of local talent, as a
majority of the most talented Iraqis have left Iraq.
Reinvesting profits in the local environment was also
seen as vital, especially by the Iraqi companies. All of our
Iraqi for-profit business participants noted a strong com-
mitment to reinvesting profits in local operations and local
charities. This was very often presented as a patriotic and/
or religious duty to the community. Some non-Iraqi com-
panies used this language, especially because most of the
regional heads were Iraqi themselves. When pressed on
repatriating profits, all were clear that it is a necessity to
continuing operations, with two senior managers at dif-
ferent companies indicating that repatriation of profits was
the main reason they remained in Iraq despite difficulties.
Discussion
Our study revealed four areas where private sector actors
believed they were contributing to peace in Iraq: capacity
building, rule of law, social cohesion, and local engage-
ment. Two of these categories—rule of law and social
cohesion—provide new evidence to support existing B4P
theory. Rule of law and social cohesion are mentioned in the
prevailing business and peace literature (Oetzel et al. 2009;
Bies et al. 2007; Fort 2015; Fort and Schipani 2002; Fort
2009) as likely to support peace promotion. The theoretical
assumption with regard to rule of law throughout prior
articles and books was that it could promote peace in a war
environment (in addition to the other four less violent HIIK
(2015) categories of conflict) and our study seems to sup-
port this proposition. Companies that have strong internal
due diligence processes and that support anti-corruption
efforts in the business community were perceived by our
participants as enhancing peace. This suggests that they are
more generalizable to contexts outside of Iraq. Local
commitment and capacity building as such are not explicitly
identified in prevailing theory. The absence of these factors
seems likely for one of two reasons: theoretical treatments
may have overlooked or not had access to this kind of
evidence or these two factors are context specific and
therefore not generalizable. In addition, two categories
often mentioned in the prevailing literature—risk assess-
ment and track-two diplomacy—were unmentioned and
viewed as negative impacts on peace, respectively.
Although social cohesion (or ‘‘community building’’)
was mentioned in the literature (Oetzel et al. 2009), it is not
seen as a viable peacebuilding strategy in a war or limited
war environment. Our study is the first to provide evidence
that social cohesion much like rule of law is applicable in
all conflict environments. Almost all of our participants
noted that business is a core actor in society. Their
descriptions further provided evidence of business as a
‘‘mediating institution’’ (Fort 1999), a concept that under-
pins much of B4P theory. Based on our study, this
assumption seems entirely justified. An important caveat is
that social cohesion initiatives should not simply take the
form of CSR initiatives but should use operations to target
the underlying sources of conflict. Multiple interviewees
noted that the CSR activities of most companies had no
impact on the conflict. Instead, they mostly targeted the
negative aspects of poverty.
This may reflect a base-of-the-pyramid and resource-
based view toward the firm and its role in conflict allevi-
ation as noted by some scholars (Tashman and Marano
2009; Kolk et al. 2013). In particular, it appears that this
may be further evidence of what Kolk and Lenfant (2016)
describe as ‘‘hybrid business model for peace and recon-
ciliation.’’ The interviewees’ criticism of businesses only
using CSR programs as poverty alleviation appears direc-
ted to ‘‘mainstream’’ and ‘‘mainstream social’’ firms which
have a primary focus on profit making and only a medium
to low secondary focus on social aims (Kolk and Lenfant
2016). This might constitute a legitimacy concern for those
firms that have low hybridity scores in operating in high-
intensity identity conflicts like Iraq.
Operations were seen as far more vital to impacting
peace. Small and medium enterprises almost all indicated
their operations were targeted explicitly and intentionally
toward peace enhancement, employment of workers, and
earning profit. Representatives from multinational compa-
nies spoke of these sorts of impacts, but, when pressed on
examples of operational attempts to do so, they all relied on
economic development alone as the peace impact. There
was no attempt to adjust contracts, change security proto-
cols, or engage in diversity training for workers—all
examples that small and medium enterprises noted made
their companies different from multinationals. One multi-
national company noted that the only time operations were
adjusted to be peace enhancing was when pressed by
protests and government pressure related to its operations
in southern Iraq.
Fort (2015) describes businesses that use this opera-
tional, intentional approach as ‘‘peace entrepreneurs.’’
Though Fort (2015) allows that ‘‘peace entrepreneurs’’ may
also be multinationals, our study indicates that small and
medium enterprises with strong local ties are much more
likely to be peace entrepreneurs than multinationals. Our
participants from multinationals almost described their
companies in ways that meet Fort (2015)’s description of
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13. ‘‘unconscious peacebuilders,’’ where those companies that
act ethically in a conflict zone which then has unintended
peacebuilding impacts. Our non-multinational participants
seemed not to view ‘‘unconscious peacebuilding’’ as
peacebuilding at all. Rather, the intentionality of compa-
nies in peacebuilding was seen as having the strongest
impact, as opposed to economic development alone. As
one interviewee put it, ‘‘jobs are great, but they are not
enough.’’
Local commitment and capacity building as such are not
explicitly identified in prevailing theory. When capacity
building was mentioned by our participants, it was always
in reference to multinationals training locals, whether they
were employees or other stakeholders. Our participants
from multinational companies never mentioned trainings as
a part of peacebuilding. This may be another example of
‘‘unconscious peacebuilding’’ mentioned by Fort (2015).
Capacity building may be absent from the prevailing theory
because multinationals do not view it as peacebuilding.
Local companies and employees do, though. Local com-
mitment seems to reflect a similar disconnection between
what multinationals and local actors think are important for
peace. Repatriation of profits is a requirement for many
multinationals to justify the often sizable expense of
operating in conflict zones, especially for publicly traded
companies. Substantial reinvestment of those profits, sug-
gested by some of our participants, may be a nonstarter for
multinationals, especially in the extractive sector. Yet these
same multinationals are often investing heavily in CSR
initiatives in Iraq as a cost of doing business in Iraq. Put
differently, what the multinationals are viewing as ‘‘project
costs’’ might be what local actors mean by ‘‘reinvesting
profits’’—they are just not using the same terms. This
disconnection between how multinationals view their own
peacebuilding efforts and operations and how local actors
view them might explain why theoretical treatments may
have missed this means of enhancing peace.
Risk assessment, viewed as one of the two peace-pro-
moting activities that business could engage in during
conflict, was not mentioned at all by our participants. Our
interviewees assessed their own company’s risk but saw it
as a necessary business expense, not a core component of
adding value or of promoting peace. Iraqi participants
never mentioned risk assessment or anything remotely
related. It is difficult to know what this lack of mention
means. This could be explained by their less objective and
more direct involvement in business activities in which
they assessed risk unknowingly. It could also mean that
risk assessment is less valuable to those with large, pre-
existing local knowledge. Whenever pressed about ‘‘risk
assessment,’’ local Iraqi participants either said they did not
engage in it or took it to mean assessment of investment
risk generally. It may also reflect the fatalistic cultural and
religion believes of Iraqis that the future is in the hands of
Allah (God) and that there is nothing one can do to change
it.
Furthermore, track II diplomacy, when mentioned, was
seen by our study participants as little more than corruption
and lobbying for personal gain. Interviewees were very
uncomfortable with the idea of business brokering any sort
of agreement between ISIS and the government. Almost all
who mentioned such a possibility assumed that a company
would only engage in such actions if there were a profit
motive. However, there is clear evidence that many busi-
nesses in ISIS territories are continuously operating and
negotiating informally with the Iraqi government and ISIS
to keep certain businesses operational (especially those
related to healthcare). At least six different business owners
continued their operations in Mosul and Ramadi after ISIS
had taken control of those cities. It seems unlikely that
track-two diplomacy will have its intended peace-promot-
ing effect in countries like Iraq with systemic corruption.
Another possible explanation is that track-two diplomacy
does have this effect but, when engaged in by businesses, it
is highly unlikely to be perceived as peace promoting.
The findings of other case studies give a sense of which
of the findings in the current paper are more likely to be
generalizable. For businesses operating in conflict zones,
this study provides assistance in tempering expectations on
which peace outcomes are possible based on conflict
intensity, conflict type, and type of firm. In general, con-
flicts vary in type among those based primarily on identity,
interests, or resources (Rothman 1997; Diamond and
McDonald 1996; HIIK 2015). Conflicts also vary in
intensity with the three most relevant categories being war/
limited war, ‘‘buffer,’’ and nonviolent (HIIK 2015; Forrer
and Katsos 2015). The current study of Iraq provides a case
study on business operations in an identity conflict that is a
war zone.
Identity conflicts (Azar 1985; Burton 1987; Rothman
1997) are noted in the literature as the most impervious to
standard conflict resolution methods (Rothman 1997). This
may help explain our findings in Iraq that track-two
diplomacy was not viewed as a means for business to
promote peace, an element of the current literature that was
also absent in Cyprus. Track-two diplomacy was used with
great impact, however, in Colombia (Gua´queta 2007;
Guaqueta 2008; Gua´queta 2013; Miklian 2016), Papua
New Guinea (McKenna 2014, 2016), and South Africa
(Diamond and McDonald 1996), three conflicts that were
primarily over interests and resources. Interestingly, all
three countries were also ‘‘buffer states’’ (Forrer and Kat-
sos 2015) between all-out war and nonviolence. This sug-
gests that business may only be able to engage in conflict
negotiations between conflict actors in the buffer condition
when conflict is primarily over interests or resources. In
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14. Cyprus, a nonviolent identity-based conflict, Katsos and
Forrer (2014) detail various business practices that inter-
viewees viewed as promoting peace. Of the eight practices
identified, four related to social cohesion and four to
capacity building. None related to rule of law. In another
identity-based conflict, Bosnia, Andreas (2009) found that
attempts to promote peace via rule of law mechanisms
often had the opposite effect, instead encouraging legiti-
mate local businesses to cooperate with illicit businesses in
order to operate. Instead, social cohesion and capacity
building efforts are noted as more likely to promote peace
and eliminate cooperation with illicit businesses.
When read together, the findings from different studies
reveal a more nuanced perspective on business promoting
peace than that originally proposed by Oetzel et al. (2009).
The typology of Oetzel et al. (2009) suggests that the peace
impacts a business might expect to achieve are determined
by the conflict intensity—war, buffer, nonviolent. The
studies since 2009 seem to indicate that intensity is only
one of three major factors, the other two being conflict type
and company type. With additional studies, especially with
qualitative studies of local small and medium enterprises
companies that tend to be missing from current scholarly
treatments, the original operating theory of Oetzel et al.
(2009) will be due for revision to include the two additional
elements.
Limitations and Future Research
There are a few limitations to the current study. First, as
noted above, the participants were sought out through
recommendations and referrals by targeted organizations.
This was done because Iraq and war zones generally are
not ‘‘normal’’ cases, and thus, participant selection was
done based on the process described by Flyvbjerg (2006)
for ‘‘extreme/deviant cases.’’ While this may have been
appropriate for the subject of the study—a war zone—it
may nonetheless restrict the ability to more widely apply
the study’s findings. An additional limitation is that the
threat of violence became more apparent as we spoke to
more businesses. As the study progressed, participants
were increasingly concerned with having full anonymity.
After receiving information as to some of the threats and
their credibility, we felt compelled to make all of our
interviewees anonymous. An additional limitation on the
research is that interview requests were made in English,
though an Arabic translator was provided if necessary. This
naturally limited interviewees to those who could read or
speak English well enough to respond to the interview
request.
An important avenue for future research is that this
study guides researchers toward investigating the possible
disconnection between complicity in human rights abuses
and peace enhancement. When taken together, the findings
related to track II diplomacy and risk assessment challenge
the fundamental assumption in the business and peace lit-
erature that doing business in areas where human rights
abuses are known to occur is inherently peace negating.
This assumption is largely based on the potential legal
consequences of doing so, particularly under the Alien Tort
Claims Act in the USA (Natour and Nestor 2011) and the
public pressure on multinational companies to avoid doing
business in such locations. The current thriving debate on
the meaning of business complicity in human rights vio-
lations in the business ethics and law literature highlights
the issues brought up by our interviewees who continued to
operate in ISIS-controlled territories (Roos 2013; Baur and
Arenas 2014; Gonzalez-Perez 2013; Schrempf-Stirling and
Palazzo 2013; Preuss and Brown 2012; Baur and Palazzo
2011; Bishop 2012; Baur 2012; Wood 2012; Wettstein
2010; Clough 2007; McCorquodale and Simons 2007;
Ruggie 2008; Beauchamp et al. 2004; Chambers 2005;
Ratner 2001; Clapham and Jerbi 2001; Zerk 2014).
This debate has entirely focused on multinational com-
panies operating outside of the home environments. It fails
to take into account those local businesses that are far more
deeply embedded in their communities. Our business
owner interviewees noted that they made no profits from
those operations because of the excessive tax burden
placed on them by ISIS combined with the costs of paying
for goods to be smuggled across borders. Participants noted
moral obligations to their employees to continue operating.
Most, if not all, employees caught in ISIS territories did not
have the financial means to smuggle themselves and their
families out. All of the business owners we interviewed
who still had some sort of operations in ISIS-controlled
territories noted the ethical conflict that they themselves
perceived. As one noted, ‘‘we know where our money
goes…but it keeps our people alive.’’ If business is a
mediating institution and a member of society as the lit-
erature suggests, it seems problematic to require them to
withdraw from those communities because the ruling
authority commits human rights abuses. At the same time,
operating under such a ruling authority means conveying
legitimacy and funds to it. The same problems arise for
business when operating under authoritarian regimes
accused of human rights abuses. Although the business
ethics debate over human rights complicity is resolved, the
answer it seems will not de facto indicate an answer to
whether a peace impact exists. It could be equally likely, in
other words, that complicity in human rights abuses could
be peace enhancing or peace negating. This is a troubling
conclusion but one that future research should not ignore.
Our interviews with SMEs indicated another potentially
fruitful avenue for research, namely the impact of SMEs in
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15. conflict zones on peacebuilding. More specifically, we saw
the strength of family firms in encouraging peacebuilding
yet business groups were often seen by local communities
as negatively contributing to the conflict through rent-
seeking behavior particularly toward the federal govern-
ment. This is largely in line with business group theory, but
a future avenue of research analyzing business groups’
impact on peace outcomes might lead to important con-
tributions in both fields. In particular, our findings in Iraq
indicated that business group concentration in industries
with large levels of federal regulation and with government
representatives who were members of owning families
were more likely to contribute to corruption and be targets
of conflict actors and popular resentment. Comparing these
findings to business group research in other conflict zones
could identify an avenue of peacebuilding currently
ignored completely by the prevailing business and peace
research.
The final area of research that could lead to more
rewarding conclusions is to systematically interview com-
panies in different conflict zones with different violence
intensity levels. This would help to test which recom-
mendations in the current business and peace literature are
appropriate for which levels of conflict.
Funding The author(s) received no financial support for the research,
authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Compliance With Ethical Standards
Conflict of interests The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of
interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of
this article.
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