Erving Goffman (1922–1982) developed a dramaturgical theory of.docx

Erving Goffman (1922–1982) developed a dramaturgical theory
of the self and society
inspired by Mead’s basic conception of social interaction. In the
selection below,
excerpted from the book The Presentation of Self in Everyday
Life, Goffman presents a
theory that likens social interaction to the theater. Individuals
can be seen as performers,
audience members, and outsiders that operate within particular
“stages” or social spaces.
Goffman suggests that how we present our selves to others is
aimed toward “impression
management,” which is a conscious decision on the part of the
individual to reveal certain
aspects of the self and to conceal others, as actors do when
performing on stage.
THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE
Erving Goffman
The Framework
A social establishment is any place surrounded by fixed barriers
to perception in which a
particular kind of activity regularly takes place. I have
suggested that any social establishment may
be studied profitably from the point of view of impression
management. Within the walls of a social
establishment we find a team of performers who cooperate to
present to an audience a given
definition of the situation. This will include the conception of
own team and of audience and

assumptions concerning the ethos that is to be maintained by
rules of politeness and decorum. We
often find a division into back region, where the performance of
a routine is prepared, and front
region, where the performance is presented. Access to these
regions is controlled in order to prevent
the audience from seeing backstage and to prevent outsiders
from coming into a performance that is
not addressed to them. Among members of the team we find that
familiarity prevails, solidarity is
likely to develop, and that secrets that could give the show
away are shared and kept. A tacit
agreement is maintained between performers and audience to act
as if a given degree of opposition
and of accord existed between them. Typically, but not always,
agreement is stressed and
opposition is underplayed. The resulting working consensus
tends to be contradicted by the attitude
toward the audience which the performers express in the
absence of the audience and by carefully
controlled communication out of character conveyed by the
performers while the audience is
present. We find that discrepant roles develop: some of the
individuals who are apparently
teammates, or audience, or outsiders acquire information about
the performance and relations to the
team which are not apparent and which complicate the problem
of putting on a show. Sometimes
disruptions occur through unmeant gestures, faux pas, and
scenes, thus discrediting or contradicting
the definition of the situation that is being maintained. The
mythology of the team will dwell upon
these disruptive events. We find that performers, audience, and
outsiders all utilize techniques for
saving the show, whether by avoiding likely disruptions or by
correcting for unavoided ones, or by

making it possible for others to do so. To ensure that these
techniques will be employed, the team
will tend to select members who are loyal, disciplined, and
circumspect, and to select an audience
that is tactful.
These features and elements, then, comprise the framework I
claim to be characteristic of
much social interaction as it occurs in natural settings in our
Anglo-American society. This
framework is formal and abstract in the sense that it can be
applied to any social
establishment; it is not, however, merely a static classification.
The framework bears upon
1
dynamic issues created by the motivation to sustain a definition
of the situation that has been
projected before others.
The Analytical Context
This report has been chiefly concerned with social
establishments as relatively closed
systems. It has been assumed that the relation of one
establishment to others is itself an
intelligible area of study and ought to be treated analytically as
part of a different order of
fact—the order of institutional integration. It might be well here
to try to place the perspective
taken in this report in the context of other perspectives which
seem to be the ones currently
employed, implicitly or explicitly, in the study of social

establishments as closed systems.
Four such perspectives may be tentatively suggested.
An establishment may be viewed “technically,” in terms of its
efficiency and inefficiency as an
intentionally organized system of activity for the achievement
of predefined objectives. An
establishment may be viewed “politically,” in terms of the
actions which each participant (or class
of participants) can demand of other participants, the kinds of
deprivations and indulgences which
can be meted out in order to enforce these demands, and the
kinds of social controls which guide
this exercise of command and use of sanctions. An
establishment may be viewed “structurally,” in
terms of the horizontal and vertical status divisions and the
kinds of social relations which relate
these several groupings to one another. Finally, an
establishment may be viewed “culturally,” in
terms of the moral values which influence activity in the
establishment—values pertaining to
fashions, customs, and matters of taste, to politeness and
decorum, to ultimate ends and normative
restrictions on means, etc. It is to be noted that all the facts that
can be discovered about an
establishment are relevant to each of the four perspectives but
that each perspective gives its own
priority and order to these facts.
It seems to me that the dramaturgical approach may constitute a
fifth perspective, to be
added to the technical, political, structural, and cultural
perspectives.1 The dramaturgical
perspective, like each of the other four, can be employed as the
end-point of analysis, as a final
way of ordering facts. This would lead us to describe the

techniques of impression
management employed in a given establishment, the principal
problems of impression
management in the establishment, and the identity and
interrelationships of the several
performance teams which operate in the establishment. But, as
with the facts utilized in each
of the other perspectives, the facts specifically pertaining to
impression management also play
a part in the matters that are a concern in all the other
perspectives. It may be useful to
illustrate this briefly.
The technical and dramaturgical perspectives intersect most
clearly, perhaps, in regard to
standards of work. Important for both perspectives is the fact
that one set of individuals will be
concerned with testing the unapparent characteristics and
qualities of the work-
accomplishments of another set of individuals, and this other set
will be concerned with giving
the impression that their work embodies these hidden attributes.
The political and
dramaturgical perspectives intersect clearly in regard to the
capacities of one individual to
direct the activity of another. For one thing, if an individual is
to direct others, he will often
find it useful to keep strategic secrets from them. Further, if one
individual attempts to direct
1 Compare the position taken by Oswald Hall in regard to
possible perspectives for the study of closed
systems in his “Methods and Techniques of Research in Human
Relations”(April, 1952), reported in E. C.
Hughes et. al., Cases on Field Work (forthcoming)

2
the activity of others by means of example, enlightenment,
persuasion, exchange,
manipulation, authority, threat, punishment, or coercion, it will
be necessary, regardless of his
power position, to convey effectively what he wants done, what
he is prepared to do to get it
done and what he will do if it is not done. Power of any kind
must be clothed in effective
means of displaying it, and will have different effects
depending upon how it is dramatized.
(Of course, the capacity to convey effectively a definition of the
situation may be of little use
if one is not in a position to give example, exchange,
punishment, etc.) Thus the most
objective form of naked power, i.e., physical coercion, is often
neither objective nor naked but
rather functions as a display for persuading the audience; it is
often a means of
communication, not merely a means of action. The structural
and dramaturgical perspectives
seem to intersect most clearly in regard to social distance. The
image that one status grouping
is able to maintain in the eyes of an audience of other status
groupings will depend upon the
performers’ capacity to restrict communicative contact with the
audience. The cultural and
dramaturgical perspectives intersect most clearly in regard to
the maintenance of moral
standards. The cultural values of an establishment will
determine in detail how the participants

are to feel about many matters and at the same time establish a
framework of appearances that
must be maintained, whether or not there is feeling behind the
appearances.
Personality-Interaction-Society
In recent years there have been elaborate attempts to bring into
one framework the
concepts and findings derived from three different areas of
inquiry: the individual personality,
social interaction, and society. I would like to suggest here a
simple addition to these inter-
disciplinary attempts.
When an individual appears before others, he knowingly and
unwittingly projects a
definition of the situation, of which a conception of himself is
an important part. When an
event occurs which is expressively incompatible with this
fostered impression, significant
consequences are simultaneously felt in three levels of social
reality, each of which involves a
different point of reference and a different order of fact.
First, the social interaction, treated here as a dialogue between
two teams, may come to an
embarrassed and confused halt; the situation may cease to be
defined, previous positions may
become no longer tenable, and participants may find themselves
without a charted course of
action. The participants typically sense a false note in the
situation and come to feel awkward,
flustered, and, literally, out of countenance. In other words, the
minute social system created
and sustained by orderly social interaction becomes

disorganized. These are the consequences
that the disruption has from the point of view of social
interaction.
Secondly, in addition to these disorganizing consequences for
action at the moment,
performance disruptions may have consequences of a more far-
reaching kind. Audiences tend
to accept the self projected by the individual performer during
any current performance as a
responsible representative of his colleague-grouping, of his
team, and of his social
establishment. Audiences also accept the individual’s particular
performance as evidence of
his capacity to perform the routine and even as evidence of his
capacity to perform any
routine. In a sense these larger social units—teams,
establishments, etc.—become committed
every time the individual performs his routine; with each
performance the legitimacy of these
units will tend to be tested anew and their permanent reputation
put at stake. This kind of
3
commitment is especially strong during some performances.
Thus, when a surgeon and his
nurse both turn from the operating table and the anesthetized
patient accidentally rolls off the
table to his death, not only is the operation disrupted in an
embarrassing way, but the
reputation of the doctor, as a doctor and as a man, and also the
reputation of the hospital may
be weakened. These are the consequences that disruptions may

have from the point of view of
social structure.
Finally, we often find that the individual may deeply involve his
ego in his identification
with a particular part, establishment, and group, and in his self-
conception as someone who
does not disrupt social interaction or let down the social units
which depend upon that
interaction. When a disruption occurs, then, we may find that
the self-conceptions around
which his personality has been built may become discredited.
These are consequences that
disruptions may have from the point of view of individual
personality.
Performance disruptions, then, have consequences at three
levels of abstraction:
personality, interaction, and social structure. While the
likelihood of disruption will vary
widely from interaction to interaction, and while the social
importance of likely disruptions
will vary from interaction to interaction, still it seems that there
is no interaction in which the
participants do not take an appreciable chance of being slightly
embarrassed or a slight chance
of being deeply humiliated. Life may not be much of a gamble,
but interaction is. Further, in
so far as individuals make efforts to avoid disruptions or to
correct for ones not avoided, these
efforts, too, will have simultaneous consequences at the three
levels. Here, then, we have one
simple way of articulating three levels of abstraction and three
perspectives from which social
life has been studied.

Comparisons and Study
In this report, use has been made of illustrations from societies
other than our Anglo-
American one. In doing this I did not mean to imply that the
framework presented here is
culture-free or applicable in the same areas of social life in non-
Western societies as in our
own. We lead an indoor social life. We specialize in fixed
settings, in keeping strangers out,
and in giving the performer some privacy in which to prepare
himself for the show. Once we
begin a performance, we are inclined to finish it, and we are
sensitive to jarring notes which
may occur during it. If we are caught out in a misrepresentation
we feel deeply humiliated.
Given our general dramaturgical rules and inclinations for
conducting action, we must not
overlook areas of life in other societies in which other rules are
apparently followed. Reports
by Western travelers are filled with instances in which their
dramaturgical sense was offended
or surprised, and if we are to generalize to other cultures we
must consider these instances as
well as more favorable ones. We must be ready to see in China
that while actions and décor
may be wonderfully harmonious and coherent in a private
tearoom, extremely elaborate meals
may be served in extremely plain restaurants, and shops that
look like hovels staffed with
surly, familiar clerks may contain within their recesses,
wrapped in old brown paper,
wonderfully delicate bolts of silk.1 And among a people said to
be careful to save each other’s
face, we must be prepared to read that:

1 Macgowan, J. Sidelights on Chinese Life (Philadelphia.
Lippincott, 1908).
4
Fortunately the Chinese do not believe in the privacy of a home
as we do. They do not
mind having the whole details of their daily experience seen by
everyone that cares to
look. How they live, what they eat, and even the family jars that
we try to hush up
from the public are things that seem to be common property,
and not to belong
exclusively to this particular family who are most concerned.2
And we must be prepared to see that in societies with settled
inequalitarian status systems
and strong religious orientations, individuals are sometimes less
earnest about the whole civic
drama than we are, and will cross social barriers with brief
gestures that give more recognition
to the man behind the mask than we might find permissible.
Furthermore, we must be very cautious in any effort to
characterize our own society as a
whole with respect to dramaturgical practices. For example, in
current management-labor
relations, we know that a team may enter joint con sultation
meetings with the opposition with
the knowledge that it may be necessary to give the appearance
of stalking out of the meeting

in a huff. Diplomatic teams are sometimes required to stage a
similar show. In other words,
While teams in our society are usually obliged to suppress their
rage behind a working
consensus, there are times when teams are obliged to suppress
the appearance of sober
opposition behind a demonstration of outraged feelings.
Similarly, there are occasions when
individuals, whether they wish to or not, will feel obliged to
destroy an interaction in order to
save their honor and their face. It would be more prudent, then,
to begin with smaller units,
with social establishments or classes of establishments, or with
particular statuses, and
document comparisons and changes in a modest way by means
of the case-history method.
For example, we have the following kind of information about
the shows that businessmen are
legally allowed to put on:
The last half-century has seen a marked change in the attitude
of the courts toward the
question of justifiable reliance. Earlier decisions, under the
influence of the prevalent
doctrine of “caveat emptor,” laid great stress upon the
plaintiff’s “duty” to protect himself
and distrust his antagonist, and held that he was not entitled to
rely even upon positive
assertions of fact made by one with whom he was dealing at
arm’s length. It was assumed
that anyone may be expected to overreach another in a bargain
if he can, and that only a
fool will expect common honesty. Therefore the plaintiff must
make a reasonable
investigation, and form his own judgment. The recognition of a
new standard of business

ethics, demanding that statements of fact be at least honestly
and carefully made, and in
many cases that they be warranted to be true, has led to an
almost complete shift in this
point of view.
It is now held that assertions of fact as to the quantity or quality
of land or goods
sold, the financial status of the corporations, and similar
matters inducing commercial
transactions, may justifiably be relied on without investigation,
not only where such
investigation would be burdensome and difficult, as where land
which is sold lies at a
distance, but likewise where the falsity of the representation
might be discovered with
little effort by means easily at hand.3
2 Ibid., pp. 180–81.
3 Prosser, William L., Handbook of the Law of Torts. (St. Paul,
Minnesota, West Publishing, 1941), pp.
749–50.
5
And while frankness may be increasing in business relations, we
have some evidence that
marriage counselors are increasingly agreed that an individual
ought not to feel obliged to tell
his or her spouse about previous “affairs,” as this might only
lead to needless strain. Other
examples may be cited. We know, for example, that up to about
1830 pubs in Britain provided

a backstage setting for workmen, little distinguishable from
their own kitchens, and that after
that date the gin palace suddenly burst upon the scene to
provide much the same clientele with
a fancier front region than they could dream of.4 We have
records of the social history of
particular American towns, telling us of the recent decline in
the elaborateness of domestic
and avocational fronts of the local upper classes. In contrast,
some material is available which
describes the recent increase in elaborateness of the setting that
union organizations employ,5
and the increasing tendency to “stock” the setting with
academically-trained experts who
provide an aura of thought and respectability.6 We can trace
changes in the plant layout of
specific industrial and commercial organizations and show an
increase in front, both as
regards the exterior of the head-office building and as regards
the conference rooms, main
halls, and waiting rooms of these buildings. We can trace in a
particular crofting community
how the barn for animals, once backstage to the kitchen and
accessible by a small door next
the stove, has lately been removed a distance from the house,
and how the house itself, once
set down in an unprotected way in the midst of garden, croft
equipment, garbage, and grazing
stock, is becoming, in a sense, public-relations oriented, with a
front yard fenced off and kept
somewhat clean, presenting a dressed-up side to the community
while debris is strewn at
random in the unfenced back regions. And as the connected byre
disappears, and the scullery
itself starts to become less frequent, we can observe the up-
grading of domestic

establishments, wherein the kitchen, which once possessed its
own back regions, is now
coming to be the least presentable region of the house while at
the same time becoming more
and more presentable. We can also trace that peculiar social
movement which led some
factories, ships, restaurants, and households to clean up their
backstages to such an extent that,
like monks, Communists, or German aldermen, their guards are
always up and there is no
place where their front is down, while at the same time members
of the audience become
sufficiently entranced with the society’s id to explore the places
that had been cleaned up for
them. Paid attendance at symphony orchestra rehearsals is only
one of the latest examples. We
can observe what Everett Hughes calls collective mobility,
through which the occupants of a
status attempt to alter the bundle of tasks performed by them so
that no act will be required
which is expressively inconsistent with the image of self that
these incumbents are attempting
to establish for themselves. And we can observe a parallel
process, which might be called
“role enterprise,” within a particular social establishment,
whereby a particular member
attempts not so much to move into a higher position already
established as to create a new
position for himself, a position involving duties which suitably
express attributes that are
congenial to him. We can examine the process of specialization,
whereby many performers
come to make brief communal use of very elaborate social
settings, being content to sleep
alone in a cubicle of no pretension. We can follow the diffusion
of crucial fronts—such as the

4 M. Gorham and H. Dunnett, Inside the Pub (London: The
Architectural Press, 1950), pp. 23-24.
5 See, for example, Floyd Hunter, Community Power Structure
(Chapel Hill: University of North
Carolina Press, 1953), p. 19.
6 See Wilensky, op. cit., chap. iv, for a discussion of the
“window-dressing” function of staff experts.
6
laboratory complex of glass, stainless steel, rubber gloves,
white tile, and lab coat—which
allow an increasing number of persons connected with unseemly
tasks a way of self-
purification. Starting with the tendency in highly authoritarian
organizations for one team to
be required to spend its time infusing a rigorously ordered
cleanliness in the setting the other
team will perform in, we can trace, in establishments such as
hospitals, air force bases, and
large households, a current decline in the hypertrophic
strictness of such settings. And finally,
we can follow the rise and diffusion of the jazz and “West
Coast” cultural patterns, in which
terms such as bit, goof, scene, drag, dig, are given currency,
allowing individuals to maintain
something of a professional stage performer’s relation to the
technical aspects of daily
performances.

The Role of Expression Is Conveying Impressions of Self
Perhaps a moral note can be permitted at the end. In this report
the expressive component
of social life has been treated as a source of impressions given
to or taken by others.
Impression, in turn, has been treated as a source of information
about unapparent facts and as a
means by which the recipients can guide their response to the
informant without having to
wait for the full consequences of the informant’s actions to be
felt. Expression, then, has been
treated in terms of the communicative role it plays during social
interaction and not, for
example, in terms of consummatory or tension-release function
it might have for the
expresser.1
Underlying all social interaction there seems to be a
fundamental dialectic. When one
individual enters the presence of others, he will want to
discover the facts of the situation.
Were he to possess this information, he could know, and make
allowances for, what will come
to happen and he could give the others present as much of their
due as is consistent with his
enlightened self-interest. To uncover fully the factual nature of
the situation, it would be
necessary for the individual to know all the relevant social data
about the others. It would also
be necessary for the individual to know the actual outcome or
end product of the activity of
the others during the interaction, as well as their innermost
feelings concerning him. Full
information of this order is rarely available; in its absence, the

individual tends to employ
substitutes—cues, tests, hints, expressive gestures, status
symbols, etc.—as predictive devices.
In short, since the reality that the individual is concerned with
is unperceivable at the moment,
appearances must be relied upon in its stead. And,
paradoxically, the more the individual is
concerned with the reality that is not available to perception,
the more must he concentrate his
attention on appearances.
The individual tends to treat the others present on the basis of
the impression they give
now about the past and the future. It is here that communicative
acts are translated into moral
ones. The impressions that the others give tend to be treated as
claims and promises they have
implicitly made, and claims and promises tend to have a moral
character. In his mind the
individual says: “I am using these impressions of you as a way
of checking up on you and
your activity, and you ought not to lead me astray.” The
peculiar thing about this is that the
individual tends to take this stand even though he expects the
others to be unconscious of
1 A recent treatment of this kind may be found in Talcott
Parsons, Robert F. Bales, and Edward A. Shils,
Working Papers in the Theory of Action (Glencoe, Ill.: The Free
Press, 1953), Chap. II, “The Theory of
Symbolism in Relation to Action.”
7

many of their expressive behaviors and even though he may
expect to exploit the others on the
basis of the information he gleans about them. Since the sources
of impression used by the
observing individual involve a multitude of standards pertaining
to politeness and decorum,
pertaining both to social intercourse and task-performance, we
can appreciate afresh how daily
life is enmeshed in moral lines of discrimination.
Let us shift now to the point of view of the others. If they are to
be gentlemanly, and play
the individual’s game, they will give little conscious heed to the
fact that impressions are
being formed about them but rather act without guile or
contrivance, enabling the individual to
receive valid impressions about them and their efforts. And if
they happen to give thought to
the fact that they are being observed, they will not allow this to
influence them unduly, content
in the belief that the individual will obtain a correct impression
and give them their due
because of it. Should they be concerned with influencing the
treatment that the individual
gives them, and this is properly to be expected, then a
gentlemanly means will be available to
them. They need only guide their action in the present so that
its future consequences will be
the kind that would lead a just individual to treat them now in a
way they want to be treated;
once this is done, they have only to rely on the perceptiveness
and justness of the individual
who observes them.

Sometimes those who are observed do, of course, employ these
proper means of
influencing the way in which the observer treats them. But there
is another way, a shorter and
more efficient way, in which the observed can influence the
observer. Instead of allowing an
impression of their activity to arise as an incidental by-product
of their activity, they can
reorient their frame of reference and devote their efforts to the
creation of desired impressions.
Instead of attempting to achieve certain ends by acceptable
means, they can attempt to achieve
the impression that they are achieving certain ends by
acceptable means. It is always possible
to manipulate the impression the observer uses as a substitute
for reality because a sign for the
presence of a thing, not being that thing, can be employed in the
absence of it. The observer’s
need to rely on representations of things itself creates the
possibility of misrepresentation.
There are many sets of persons who feel they could not stay in
business, whatever their
business, if they limited themselves to the gentlemanly means
of influencing the individual
who observes them. At some point or other in the round of their
activity they feel it is
necessary to band together and directly manipulate the
impression that they give. The
observed become a performing team and the observers become
the audience. Actions which
appear to be done on objects become gestures addressed to the
audience. The round of activity
becomes dramatized.

We come now to the basic dialectic. In their capacity as
performers, individuals will be
concerned with maintaining the impression that they are living
up to the many standards by
which they and their products are judged. Because these
standards are so numerous and so
pervasive, the individuals who are performers dwell more than
we might think in a moral
world. But, qua performers, individuals are concerned not with
the moral issue of realizing
these standards, but with the amoral issue of engineering a
convincing impression that these
standards are being realized. Our activity, then, is largely
concerned with moral matters, but as
performers we do not have a moral concern with them. As
performers we are merchants of
morality. Our day is given over to intimate contact with the
goods we display and our minds
are filled with intimate understandings of them; but it may well
be that the more attention we
give to these goods, then the more distant we feel from them
and from those who are believing
8
enough to buy them. To use a different imagery, the very
obligation and profitability of
appearing always in a steady moral light, of being a socialized
character, forces one to be the
sort of person who is practiced in the ways of the stage.
Staging and the Self
The general notion that we make a presentation of ourselves to

others is hardly novel;
what ought to be stressed in conclusion is that the very structure
of the self can be seen in
terms of how we arrange for such performances in our Anglo-
American society.
In this report, the individual was divided by implication into
two basic parts: he was
viewed as a performer, a harried fabricator of impressions
involved in the all-too-human task
of staging a performance; he was viewed as a character, a
figure, typically a fine one, whose
spirit, strength, and other sterling qualities the performance was
designed to evoke. The
attributes of a performer and the attributes of a character are of
a different order, quite
basically so, yet both sets have their meaning in terms of the
show that must go on.
First, character. In our society the character one performs and
one’s self are somewhat
equated, and this self-as-character is usually seen as something
housed within the body of its
possessor, especially the upper parts thereof, being a nodule,
somehow, in the psychobiology
of personality. I suggest that this view is an implied part of
what we are all trying to present,
but provides, just because of this, a bad analysis of the
presentation. In this report the
performed self was seen as some kind of image, usually
creditable, which the individual on
stage and in character effectively attempts to induce others to
hold in regard to him. While this
image is entertained concerning the individual, so that a self is
imputed to him, this self itself
does not derive from its possessor, but from the whole scene of

his action, being generated by
that attribute of local events which renders them interpretable
by witnesses. A correctly staged
and performed scene leads the audience to impute a self to a
performed character, but this
imputation—this self—is a product of a scene that comes off,
and is not a cause of it. The self,
then, as a performed character, is not an organic thing that has a
specific location, whose
fundamental fate is to be born, to mature, and to die; it is a
dramatic effect arising diffusely
from a scene that is presented, and the characteristic issue, the
crucial concern, is whether it
will be credited or discredited.
In analyzing the self then we are drawn from its possessor, from
the person who will profit
or lose most by it, for he and his body merely provide the peg
on which something of
collaborative manufacture will be hung for a time. And the
means for producing and
maintaining selves do not reside inside the peg; in fact these
means are often bolted down in
social establishments. There will be a back region with its tools
for shaping the body, and a
front region with its fixed props. There will be a team of
persons whose activity on stage in
conjunction with available props will constitute the scene from
which the performed
character’s self will emerge, and another team, the audience,
whose interpretive activity will
be necessary for this emergence. The self is a product of all of
these arrangements, and in all
of its parts bears the marks of this genesis.
The whole machinery of self-production is cumbersome, of

course, and sometimes breaks
down, exposing its separate components: back region control;
team collusion; audience tact;
and so forth. But, well oiled, impressions will flow from it fast
enough to put us in the grips of
one of our types of reality—the performance will come off and
the firm self accorded each
performed character will appear to emanate intrinsically from
its performer.
9
10
Let us turn now from the individual as character performed to
the individual as performer.
He has a capacity to learn, this being exercised in the task of
training for a part. He is given to
having fantasies and dreams, some that pleasurably unfold a
triumphant performance, others
full of anxiety and dread that nervously deal with vital
discreditings in a public front region.
He often manifests a gregarious desire for teammates and
audiences, a tactful considerateness
for their concerns; and he has a capacity for deeply felt shame,
leading him to minimize the
chances he takes of exposure.
These attributes of the individual qua performer are not merely
a depicted effect of
particular performances; they are psychobiological in nature,
and yet they seem to arise out of
intimate interaction with the contingencies of staging
performances.

And now a final comment. In developing the conceptual
framework employed in this report,
some language of the stage was used. I spoke of performers and
audiences; of routines and parts; of
performances coming off or falling flat; of cues, stage settings
and backstage; of dramaturgical
needs, dramaturgical skills, and dramaturgical strategies. Now it
should be admitted that this
attempt to press a mere analogy so far was in part a rhetoric and
a maneuver.
The claim that all the world’s stage is sufficiently commonplace
for readers to be familiar
with its limitations and tolerant of its presentation, knowing
that at any time they will easily be
able to demonstrate to themselves that it is not to be taken too
seriously. An action staged in a
theater is a relatively contrived illusion and an admitted one;
unlike ordinary life, nothing real
or actual can happen to the performed characters—although at
another level of course
something real and actual can happen to the reputation of
performers qua professionals whose
everyday job is to put on theatrical performances.
And so here the language and mask of the stage will be dropped.
Scaffolds, after all, are to
build other things with, and should be erected with an eye to
taking them down. This report is
not concerned with aspects of theater that creep into everyday
life. It is concerned with the
structure of social encounters—the structure of those entities in
social life that come into being
whenever persons enter one another’s immediate physical
presence. The key factor in this

structure is the maintenance of a single definition of the
situation, this definition having to be
expressed, and this expression sustained in the face of a
multitude of potential disruptions.
A character staged in a theater is not in some ways real, nor
does it have the same kind of
real consequences as does the thoroughly contrived character
performed by a confidence man;
but the successful staging of either of these types of false
figures involves use of real
techniques—the same techniques by which everyday persons
sustain their real social
situations. Those who conduct face to face interaction on a
theater’s stage must meet the key
requirement of real situations; they must expressively sustain a
definition of the situation: but
this they do in circumstances that have facilitated their
developing an apt terminology for the
interactional tasks that all of us share.
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EMBARRASSMENT AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION

ERVING GOFFMAN
ABSTRACT
Embarrassment, a possibility in every face-to-face encounter,
demonstrates some generic properties of
interaction. It occurs whenever an individual is felt to have
projected incompatible definitions of himself
before those present. These projections do not occur at random
or for psychological reasons but at certain
places in a social establishment where incompatible principles
of social organization prevail. In the forestall-
ing of conflict between these principles, embarrassment has its
social function.
An individual may recognize extreme
embarrassment in others and even in himself
by the objective signs of emotional dis-
turbance: blushing, fumbling, stuttering,
an unusually low- or high-pitched voice,
quavering speech or breaking of the voice,
sweating, blanching, blinking, tremor of the
hand, hesitating or vacillating movement,
absent-mindedness, and malapropisms. As
Mark Baldwin remarked about shyness,
there may be "a lowering of the eyes, bowing
of the head, putting of hands behind the
back, nervous fingering of the clothing or
twisting of the fingers together, and stam-
mering, with some incoherence of idea as
expressed in speech."' There are also symp-
toms of a subjective kind: constriction of the
diaphragm, a feeling of wobbliness, con-
sciousness of strained and unnatural ges-
tures, a dazed sensation, dryness of the
mouth, and tenseness of the muscles. In

cases of mild discomfiture these visible and
invisible flusterings occur but in less per-
ceptible form.
In the popular view it is only natural to
be at ease during interaction, embarrass-
ment being a regrettable deviation from the
normal state. The individual, in fact, might
say he felt "natural" or "unnatural" in the
situation, meaning that he felt comfortable
in the interaction or embarrassed in it. He
who frequently becomes embarrassed in the
presence of others is regarded as suffering
from a foolish unjustified sense of inferiority
and in need of therapy.2
To utilize the flustering syndrome in
analyzing embarrassment, the two kinds of
circumstance in which it occurs must first
be distinguished. First, the individual may
become flustered while engaged in a task of
no particular value to him in itself, except
that his long-range interests require him to
perform it with safety, competence, or
dispatch, and he fears he is inadequate to
the task. Discomfort will be felt in the situa-
tion but in a sense not for it; in fact, often
the individual will not be able to cope with
it just because he is so anxiously taken up
with the eventualities lying beyond it.
Significantly, the individual may become
"rattled" although no others are present.
This paper will not be concerned with
these occasions of instrumental chagrin but
rather with the kind that occurs in clear-cut

relation to the real or imagined presence of
others. Whatever else, embarrassment has
to do with the figure the individual cuts be-
1 James Mark Baldwin, Social and Ethical Inter-
pretations in Mental Development (London, 1902), p.
212.
2 A sophisticated version is the psychoanalytical
view that uneasiness in social interaction is a result
of impossible expectations of attention based on
unresolved expectations regarding parental support.
Presumably an object of therapy is to bring the indi-
vidual to see his symptoms in their true psycho-
dynamic light, on the assumption that thereafter
perhaps he will not need them (see Paul Schilder,
"The Social Neurosis," Psycho-Analytical Review,
XXV [19381, 1-19; Gerhart Piers and Milton Singer,
Shame and Guilt: A Psychoanalytical and a Cultural
Study [Springfield, Ill.: Charles C Thomas, 1953],
esp. p. 26; Leo Rangell, "The Psychology of Poise,"
International Journal of Psychoanalysis, XXXV
[1954], 313-32; Sandor Ferenczi "Embarrassed
Hands," in Further Contributions to the Theory and
Technique of Psychoanalysis [London: Hogarth
Press, 19501, pp. 315-16).
264
2013 16:58:18 PM

EMBARRASSMENT AND SOCIAL ORGANIZATION 265
fore others felt to be there at the time.3 The
crucial concern is the impression one makes
on others in the present-whatever the
long-range or unconscious basis of this con-
cern may be. This fluctuating configuration
of those present is a most important refer-
ence group.
VOCABULARY OF EMBARRASSMENT
A social encounter is an occasion of face-
to-face interaction, beginning when indi-
viduals recognize that they have moved into
one another's immediate presence and end-
ing by an appreciated withdrawal from
mutual participation. Encounters differ
markedly from one another in purpose,
social function, kind and number of per-
sonnel, setting, etc., and, while only con-
versational encounters will be considered
here, obviously there are those in which no
word is spoken. And yet, in our Anglo-
American society at least, there seems to be
no social encounter which cannot become
embarrassing to one or more of its partici-
pants, giving rise to what is sometimes
called an incident or false note. By listening
for this dissonance, the sociologist can gen-
eralize about the ways in which interaction
can go awry and, by implication, the condi-
tions necessary for interaction to be right.
At the same time he is given good evidence
that all encounters are members of a single
natural class, amenable to a single frame-

work of analysis.
By whom is the embarrassing incident
caused? To whom is it embarrassing? For
whom is this embarrassment felt? It is not
always an individual for whose plight
participants feel embarrassment; it may be
for pairs of participants who are together
having difficulties and even for an encounter
as a whole. Further, if the individual for
whom embarrassment is felt happens to be
perceived as a responsible representative of
some faction or subgroup (as is very often
the case in three-or-more-person interac-
tion), then the members of this faction are
likely to feel embarrassed and to feel it for
themselves. But, while a gafe or faux pas
can mean that a single individual is at one
and the same time the cause of an incident,
the one who feels embarrassed by it, and the
one for whom he feels embarrassment, this is
not, perhaps, the typical case, for in these
matters ego boundaries seem especially
weak. W"Then an individual finds himself in a
situation which ought to make him blush,
others present usually will blush with and
for him, though he may not have sufficient
sense of shame or appreciation of the cir-
cumstances to blush on his own account.
The words "embarrassment," "discom-
fiture," and "uneasiness" are used here in a
continuum of meanings. Some occasions of
embarrassment seem to have an abrupt
orgasmic character; a sudden introduction

of the disturbing event is followed by an
immediate peak in the experience of em-
barrassment and then by a slow return to
the preceding ease, all phases being en-
compassed in the same encounter. A bad
moment thus mars an otherwise euphoric
situation.
At the other extreme we find that some
occasions of embarrassment are sustained at
the same level throughout the encounter,
beginning when the interaction begins and
lasting until the encounter is terminated.
The participants speak of an uncomfortable
or uneasy situation, not of an embarrassing
incident. In such case, of course, the whole
encounter becomes for one or more of the
parties an incident that causes embarrass-
ment. Abrupt embarrassment may often be
intense, while sustained uneasiness is more
commonly mild, involving barely apparent
flusterings. An encounter which seems likely
to occasion abrupt embarrassment may,
because of this, cast a shadow of sustained
uneasiness upon the participants, transform-
ing the entire encounter into an incident
itself.
In forming a picture of the embarrassed
individual, one relies on imagery from
3 The themes developed in this paper are exten-
sions of those in the writer's "On Face-Work,"
Psychiatry, XVIII (1955), 213-31; "Alienation
from Interaction," Human Relations (forthcom-
ing); and The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life

(University of Edinburgh, Social Sciences Research
Centre, Monograph No. 2 [Edinburgh, 1956]).
2013 16:58:18 PM
266 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF SOCIOLOGY
mechanics: equilibrium or self-control can
be lost, balance can be overthrown. No
doubt the physical character of flustering in
part evokes this imagery. In any case, a
completely flustered individual is one who
cannot for the time being mobilize his
muscular and intellectual resources for the
task at hand, although he would like to; he
cannot volunteer a response to those around
him that will allow them to sustain the con-
versation smoothly. He and his flustered
actions block the line of activity the others
have been pursuing. He is present with
them, but he is not "in play." The others
may be forced to stop and turn their atten-
tion to the impediment; the topic of
conversation is neglected, and energies are
directed to the task of re-establishing the
flustered individual, of studiously ignoring
him, or of withdrawing from his presence.
To conduct one's self comfortably in
interaction and to be flustered are directly
opposed. The more of one, the less, on the

whole, of the other; hence through contrast
each mode of behavior can throw light upon
the characteristics of the other. Face-to-
face interaction in any culture seems to re-
quire just those capacities that flustering
seems guaranteed to destroy. Therefore,
events which lead to embarrassment and
the methods for avoiding and dispelling it
may provide a cross-cultural framework of
sociological analysis.
The pleasure or displeasure a social en-
counter affords an individual, and the affec-
tion or hostility he feels for the partici-
pants, can have more than one relation to
his composure or lack of it. Compliments,
acclaim, and sudden reward may throw the
recipient into a state of joyful confusion,
while a heated quarrel can be provoked and
sustained, although throughout the indi-
vidual feels composed and in full command
of himself. More important, there is a kind
of comfort which seems a formal property of
the situation and which has to do with the
coherence and decisiveness with which the
individual assumes a well-integrated role
and pursues momentary objectives having
nothing to do with the content of the actions
themselves. A feeling of discomfiture per se
seems always to be unpleasant, but the cir-
cumstances that arouse it may have immedi-
ate pleasant consequences for the one who is
discomfited.
In spite of this variable relation between

displeasure and discomfiture, to appear
flustered, in our society at least, is con-
sidered evidence of weakness, inferiority,
low status, moral guilt, defeat, and other un-
enviable attributes. And, as previously sug-
gested, flustering threatens the encounter
itself by disrupting the smooth transmis-
sion and reception by which encounters are
sustained. When discomfiture arises from
any of these sources, understandably the
flustered individual will make some effort to
conceal his state from the others present.
The fixed smile, the nervous hollow laugh,
the busy hands, the downward glance that
conceals the expression of the eyes, have be-
come famous as signs of attempting to con-
ceal embarrassment. As Lord Chesterfield
puts it:
They are ashamed in company, and so dis-
concerted that they do not know what they do,
and try a thousand tricks to keep themselves in
countenance; which tricks afterwards grow
habitual to them. Some put their fingers to their
nose, others scratch their head, others twirl their
hats; in short, every awkward, ill-bred body has
his tricks.4
These gestures provide the individual with
screens to hide behind while he tries to bring
his feelings back into tempo and himself
back into play.
Given the individual's desire to conceal
his embarrassment, given the setting and
his skill at handling himself, he may seem
poised according to some obvious signs yet

prove to be embarrassed according to less
apparent ones. Thus, while making a public
speech, he may succeed in controlling his
voice and give an impression of ease, yet
those who sit beside him on the platform
may see that his hands are shaking or that
4 Letters of Lord Chesterfield to His Son (Every-
man's ed.; New York: E. P. Dutton & Co., 1929),
p. 80.
2013 16:58:18 PM
facial tics are giving the lie to his composed
front.
Since the individual dislikes to feel or
appear embarrassed, tactful persons will
avoid placing him in this position. In addi-
tion, they will often pretend not to know
that he has lost composure or has grounds
for losing it. They may try to suppress signs
of having recognized his state or hide them
behind the same kind of covering gesture
that he might employ. Thus they protect his
face and his feelings and presumably make
it easier for him to regain composure or at
least hold on to what he still has. However,
just as the flustered individual may fail to

conceal his embarrassment, those who per-
ceive his discomfort may fail in their at-
tempt to hide their knowledge, whereupon
they all will realize that his embarrassment
has been seen and that the seeing of it was
something to conceal. When this point is
reached, ordinary involvement in the inter-
action may meet a painful end. In all this
dance between the concealer and the con-
cealed-from, embarrassment presents the
same problem and is handled in the same
ways as any other offense against propriety.
There seems to be a critical point at
which the flustered individual gives up
trying to conceal or play down his uneasi-
ness: he collapses into tears or paroxysms
of laughter, has a temper tantrum, flies into
a blind rage, faints, dashes to the nearest
exit, or becomes rigidly immobile as when in
panic. After that it is very difficult for him
to recover composure. He answers to a new
set of rhythms, characteristic of deep
emotional experience, and can hardly give
even a faint impression that he is at one
with the others in interaction. In short, he
abdicates his role as someone who sustains
encounters. The moment of crisis is of
course socially determined: the individual's
breaking point is that of the group to whose
affective standards he adheres. On rare oc-
casions all the participants in an encounter
may pass this point and together fail to
maintain even a semblance of ordinary
interaction. The little social system they
created in interaction collapses; they draw

apart or hurriedly try to assume a new set of
roles.
The terms "poise," "sang-froid," and
"aplomb," referring to the capacity to
maintain one's own composure, are to be
distinguished from what is called "gracious-
ness," "tact," or "social skill," namely, the
capacity to avoid causing one's self or
others embarrassment. Poise plays an im-
portant role in communication, for it
guarantees that those present will not fail
to play their parts in interaction but will
continue as long as they are in one another's
presence to receive and transmit disciplined
communications. It is no wonder that trial
by taunting is a test that every young per-
son passes through until he develops a
capacity to maintain composure.5 Nor
should it come as a surprise that many of
our games and sports commemorate the
themes of composure and embarrassment:
in poker, a dubious claim may win money
for the player who can present it calmly; in
judo, the maintenance and loss of com-
posure are specifically fought over; in
cricket, self-command or "style" is supposed
to be kept up under tension.
The individual is likely to know that cer-
tain special situations always make him un-
comfortable and that he has certain
"faulty" relationships which always cause
him uneasiness. His daily round of social
encounters is largely determined, no doubt,

by his major social obligations, but he goes a
little out of his way to find situations that
will not be embarrassing and to by-pass
those that will. An individual who firmly
believes that he has little poise, perhaps
even exaggerating his failing, is shy and
bashful; dreading all encounters, he seeks
always to shorten them or avoid them alto-
5 One interesting form in which this trial has been
institutionalized in America, especially in lower-
class Negro society, is "playing the dozens" (see
John Dollard, "Dialectic of Insult," American
Imago, I [1939], 3-25; R. F. B. Berdie, "Playing the
Dozens," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychol-
ogy, XLII [1947], 120-21). On teasing in general see
S. J. Sperling, "On the Psychodynamics of Teasing,"
Journal of the American Psycho-analytical Associa-
tion, I (1953), 458-83.
2013 16:58:18 PM
gether. The stutterer is a painful instance
of this, showing us the price the individual
may be willing to pay for his social life.6
CAUSES OF EMBARRASSMENT
Embarrassment has to do with unful-

filled expectations but not of a statistical
kind. Given their social identities and the
setting, the participants will sense what sort
of conduct ought to be maintained as the
appropriate thing, however much they may
despair of its actually occurring. An indi-
vidual may firmly expect that certain others
will make him ill at ease, and yet this
knowledge may increase his discomfiture
instead of lessening it. An entirely unex-
pected flash of social engineering may save
a situation, all the more effectively for being
unanticipated.
The expectations relevant to embarrass-
ment are moral, then, but embarrassment
does not arise from the breach of any moral
expectation, for some infractions give rise to
resolute moral indignation and no uneasi-
ness at all. Rather we should look to those
moral obligations which surround the indi-
vidual in only one of his capacities, that of
someone who carries on social encounters.
The individual, of course, is obliged to re-
main composed, but this tells us that things
are going well, not why. And things go well
or badly because of what is perceived about
the social identities of those present.
During interaction the individual is ex-
pected to possess certain attributes, capaci-
ties, and information which, taken together,
fit together into a self that is at once co-
herently unified and appropriate for the
occasion. Through the expressive implica-
tions of his stream of conduct, through

mere participation itself, the individual
effectively projects this acceptable self into
the interaction, although he may not be
aware of it, and the others may not be
aware of having so interpreted his conduct.
At the same time he must accept and honor
the selves projected by the other partici-
pants. The elements of a social encounter,
then, consist of effectively projected claims
to an acceptable self and the confirmation of
like claims on the part of the others. The
contributions of all are oriented to these and
built up on the basis of them.
When an event throws doubt upon or dis-
credits these claims, then the encounter
finds itself lodged in assumptions which no
longer hold. The responses the parties have
made ready are now out of place and must
be choked back, and the interaction must be
reconstructed. At such times the individual
whose self has been threatened (the indi-
vidual for whom embarrassment is felt) and
the individual who threatened him may
both feel ashamed of what together they
have brought about, sharing this sentiment
just when they have reason to feel apart.
And this joint responsibility is only right.
By the standards of the wider society, per-
haps only the discredited individual ought
to feel ashamed; but, by the standards of
the little social system maintained through
the interaction, the discreditor is just as
guilty as the person he discredits-some-
times more so, for, if he has been posing as a

tactful man, in destroying another's image
he destroys his own.
But of course the trouble does not stop
with the guilty pair or those who have
identified themselves sympathetically with
them. Having no settled and legitimate ob-
ject to which to play out their own unity,
the others find themselves unfixed and dis-
comfited. This is why embarrassment seems
to be contagious, spreading, once started,
in ever widening circles of discomfiture.
There are many classic circumstances
under which the self projected by an indi-
vidual may be discredited, causing him
shame and embarrassment over what he has
or appears to have done to himself and to the
interaction. To experience a sudden change
in status, as by marriage or promotion, is to
acquire a self that other individuals will not
fully admit because of their lingering attach-
ment to the old self. To ask for a job, a
loan of money, or a hand in marriage is to
6 Cf. H. J. Heltman, "Psycho-social Phenomena
of Stuttering and Their Etiological and Therapeutic
Implications," Journal of Social Psychology, IX
(1938), 79-96.
2013 16:58:18 PM

project an image of self as worthy, under
conditions where the one who can discredit
the assumption may have good reason to do
so. To affect the style of one's occupational
or social betters is to make claims that may
well be discredited by one's lack of familiar-
ity with the role.
The physical structure of an encounter
itself is usually accorded certain symbolic
implications, sometimes leading a partici-
pant against his will to project claims about
himself that are false and embarrassing.
Physical closeness easily implies social close-
ness, as anyone knows who has happened
upon an intimate gathering not meant for
him or who has found it necessary to carry
on fraternal "small talk" with someone too
high or low or strange to ever be a brother.
Similarly, if there is to be talk, someone
must initiate it, feed it, and terminate it;
and these acts may awkwardly suggest
rankings and power which are out of line
with the facts.
Various kinds of recurrent encounters in
a given society may share the assumption
that participants have attained certain
moral, mental, and physiognomic standards.
The person who falls short may everywhere
find himself inadvertently trapped into
making implicit identity claims which he
cannot fulfil. Compromised in every en-

counter which he enters, he truly wears the
leper's bell. The individual who most iso-
lates himself from social contacts may then
be the least insulated from the demands of
society. And, if he only imagines that he
possesses a disqualifying attribute, his
judgment of himself may be in error, but in
the light of it his withdrawal from contact is
reasonable. In any case, in deciding whether
an individual's grounds for shyness are real
or imaginary, one should seek not for "justi-
fiable" disqualifications but for the much
larger range of characteristics which actual-
ly embarrass encounters.
In all these settings the same fundamen-
tal thing occurs: the expressive facts at
hand threaten or discredit the assumptions
a participant finds he has projected about
his identity.7 Thereafter those present find
they can neither do without the assumptions
nor base their own responses upon them.
The inhabitable reality shrinks until every-
one feels "small" or out of place.
A complication must be added. Often im-
portant everyday occasions of embarrass-
ment arise when the self projected is some-
how confronted with another self which,
though valid in other contexts, cannot be
here sustained in harmony with the first.
Embarrassment, then, leads us to the matter
of "role segregation." Each individual has
more than one role, but he is saved from role
dilemma by "audience segregation," for,

ordinarily, those before whom he plays out
one of his roles will not be the individuals
before whom he plays out another, allowing
him to be a different person in each role
without discrediting either.
In every social system, however, there
are times and places where audience segre-
gation regularly breaks down and where
individuals confront one another with selves
incompatible with the ones they extend to
each other on other occasions. At such
times, embarrassment, especially the mild
kind, clearly shows itself to be located not
in the individual but in the social system
wherein he has his several selves.
DOMAIN OF EMBARRASSMENT
Having started with psychological con-
siderations, we have come by stages to a
structural sociological point of view. Prece-
dent comes from social anthropologists and
their analyses of joking and avoidance. One
assumes that embarrassment is a normal
7 In addition to his other troubles, he has dis-
credited his implicit claim to poise. He will feel he
has cause, then, to become embarrassed over his em-
barrassment, even though no one present may have
perceived the earlier stages of his discomfiture. But
a qualification must be made. When an individual,
receiving a compliment, blushes from modesty, he
may lose his reputation for poise but confirm a more
important one, that of being modest. Feeling that
his chagrin is nothing to be ashamed of, his embar-

rassment will not lead him to be embarrassed. On the
other hand, when embarrassment is clearly expected
as a reasonable response, he who fails to become em-
barrassed may appear insensitive and thereupon be-
come embarrassed because of this appearance.
2013 16:58:18 PM
part of normal social life, the individual be-
coming uneasy not because he is personally
maladjusted but rather because he is not;
presumably anyone with his combination of
statuses would do likewise. In an empirical
study of a particular social system, the first
object would be to learn what categories of
persons become embarrassed in what re-
current situations. And the second object
would be to discover what would happen to
the social system and the framework of
obligations if embarrassment had not come
to be systematically built into it.
An illustration may be taken from the
social life of large social establishments-
office buildings, schools, hospitals, etc. Here,
in elevators, halls, and cafeterias, at news-
stands, vending machines, snack counters,
and entrances, all members are often formal-
ly on an equal if distant footing.8 In Benoit-

Smullyan's terms, situs, not status or locus,
is expressed.9 Cutting across these relation-
ships of equality and distance is another set
of relationships, arising in work teams whose
members are ranked by such things as
prestige and authority and yet drawn to-
gether by joint enterprise and personal
knowledge of one another.
In many large establishments, staggered
work hours, segregated cafeterias, and the
like help to insure that those who are ranked
and close in one set of relations will not have
to find themselves in physically intimate
situations where they are expected to main-
tain equality and distance. The democratic
orientation of some of our newer establish-
ments, however, tends to throw differently
placed members of the same work team to-
gether at places such as the cafeteria, caus-
ing them uneasiness. There is no way for
them to act that does not disturb one of the
two basic sets of relations in which they
stand to each other. These difficulties are
especially likely to occur in elevators, for
there individuals who are not quite on
chatting terms must remain for a time too
close together to ignore the opportunity for
informal talk-a problem solved, of course,
for some, by special executive elevators.
Embarrassment, then, is built into the
establishment ecologically.
Because of possessing multiple selves the
individual may find he is required both to be

present and to not be present on certain oc-
casions. Embarrassment ensues: the indi-
vidual finds himself being torn apart, how-
ever gently. Corresponding to the oscilla-
tion of his conduct is the oscillation of his
self.
SOCIAL FUNCTION OF EMBARRASSMENT
When an individual's projected self is
threatened during interaction, he may with
poise suppress all signs of shame and em-
barrassment. No flusterings, or efforts to
conceal having seen them, obtrude upon the
smooth flow of the encounter; participants
can proceed as if no incident has occurred.
When situations are saved, however,
something important may be lost. By show-
ing embarrassment when he can be neither
of two people, the individual leaves open the
possibility that in the future he may effec-
tively be either.'0 His role in the current
interaction may be sacrificed, and even the
encounter itself, but he demonstrates that,
while he cannot present a substainable and
coherent self on this occasion, he is at least
disturbed by the fact and may prove worthy
8 This equal and joint membership in a large or-
ganization is often celebrated annually at the office
party and in amateur dramatic skits, this being ac-
complished by pointedly excluding outsiders and
scrambling the rank of insiders.
9 fmile Benoit-Smullyan, "Status, Status Types,

and Status Interrelations," American Sociological
Review, IX (1944), 151-61. In a certain way the
claim of equal institutional membership is rein-
forced by the ruling in our society that males ought
to show certain minor courtesies to females; all other
principles, such as distinctions between racial groups
and occupational categories, must be suppressed.
The effect is to stress situs and equality.
10 A similar argument was presented by Samuel
Johnson in his piece "Of Bashfulness," The Rambler
(1751), No. 139: "It generally happens that assur-
ance keeps an even pace with ability; and the fear of
miscarriage, which hinders our first attempts, is
gradually dissipated as our skill advances towards
certainty of success. The bashfulness, therefore,
which prevents disgrace, that short temporary
shame which secures us from the danger of lasting
reproach, cannot be properly counted among our
misfortunes."
2013 16:58:18 PM
at another time. To this extent, embarrass-
ment is not an irrational impulse breaking
through socially prescribed behavior but
part of this orderly behavior itself. Fluster-
ings are an extreme example of that im-
portant class of acts which are usually quite

spontaneous and yet no less required and
obligatory than ones self-consciously per-
formed.
Behind a conflict in identity lies a more
fundamental conflict, one of organizational
principle, since the self, for many purposes,
consists merely of the application of legiti-
mate organizational principles to one's self.
One builds one's identity out of claims
which, if denied, give one the right to feel
righteously indignant. Behind the ap-
prentice's claims for a full share in the use of
certain plant facilities there is the organiza-
tional principle: all members of the estab-
lishment are equal in certain ways qua
members. Behind the specialist's demand for
suitable financial recognition there is the
principle that the type of work, not mere
work, determines status. The fumblings of
the apprentice and the specialist when they
reach the Coca-Cola machine at the same
time express an incompatibility of organiza-
tional principles."1
The principles of organization of any
social system are likely to come in conflict
at certain points. Instead of permitting the
conflict to be expressed in an encounter, the
individual places himself between the oppos-
ing principles. He sacrifices his identity for a
moment, and sometimes the encounter, but
the principles are preserved. He may be
ground between opposing assumptions,
thereby preventing direct friction between
them, or he may be almost pulled apart, so

that principles with little relation to one
another may operate together. Social struc-
ture gains elasticity; the individual merely
loses composure.
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF MENTAL HEALTH
BETHESDA, MARYLAND
11 At such moments "joshing" sometimes occurs.
It is said to be a means of releasing the tension
caused either by embarrassment or by whatever
caused embarrassment. But in many cases this kind
of banter is a way of saying that what occurs now is
not serious or real. The exaggeration, the mock in-
sult, the mock claims-all these reduce the serious-
ness of conflict by denying reality to the situation.
And this, of course, in another way, is what embar-
rassment does. It is natural, then, to find embarrass-
ment and joking together, for both help in denying
the same reality.
2013 16:58:18 PM
http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jspArticle
Contentsp. 264p. 265p. 266p. 267p. 268p. 269p. 270p. 271Issue
Table of ContentsAmerican Journal of Sociology, Vol. 62, No. 3
(Nov., 1956), pp. 253-352Careers, Personality, and Adult
Socialization [pp. 253-263]Embarrassment and Social
Organization [pp. 264-271]The Value Concept in Sociology [pp.
272-279]Democracy Unlimited: Kurt Lewin's Field Theory [pp.
280-289]Authority and Power in "Identical" Organizations [pp.
290-301]The Voter and the Non-Voter [pp. 302-
307]Relationships of Married Offspring and Parent: A Test of
Mead's Theory [pp. 308-319]Continuing Urbanization on the

Pacific Coast [pp. 320-328]Letters to the Editor [p.
329]Additional Higher Degrees in Sociology Conferred in 1955
and Doctoral Dissertations in Progress, 1955 [p. 330]News and
Notes [pp. 331-334]Book ReviewsReview: untitled [p.
335]Review: untitled [pp. 335-336]Review: untitled [pp. 336-
345]Review: untitled [p. 345]Review: untitled [pp. 345-
346]Review: untitled [pp. 346-347]Review: untitled [p.
347]Review: untitled [pp. 347-348]Review: untitled [p.
348]Current Books [pp. 349-351]Back Matter [p. 352-352]
Cit r23_c34:1:
1. What does Goffman mean when he suggests that we perform
all of our actions? Further, what does he mean when he
suggests we are consistently trying to manage the impressions
of those with whom we interact? How can our actions be
impacted by the cues delivered to us by our audience? What
does this have to do with the concepts of idealization and
negative idealization?
2. What does Goffman mean when he suggests that the self is a
social construction? What does this have to do with different
settings and stages we all perform on? Explain the difference
between the front stage and the back stage. Legitimacy is
connected to misrepresentation. Explain what misrepresentation
is, how it relates to the front and back stages, and how it can
impact an individual’s legitimacy. (Think about the variety of
roles we play and what might happen to our legitimacy if we
have a major blunder on a particular stage.)
3. Why, according to Marwick, is fashion a really interesting

cultural product to study in relation to authenticity? What are
the concerns for the fashion industry when attempting to
perform authentically? What are the three ways fashion
bloggers define their authenticity?
Be sure to answer every part of the question; you should be able
to answer each of these in around 1 page (double spaced, one
inch margins, 12 point Times New Roman font (points will be
taken off for not following this format)). For full credit, answer
the question fully, use examples, cite sociological and media
articles, refer to the discussion boards when necessary and be
sure to use your own language. That is, do not simply copy my
Power Point notes; doing that does not demonstrate an
understanding of the course material. Once again, attach a file
as well as paste the text directly into the submission text box in
this assignment.

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