-3 Constructivism A Users Manual N

-
3
C
onstructivism
: A
U
ser's M
anual
N
icltolas O
ituf
C
onstructivism
is a w
ay of studying social relations-any
kin~ of so~a~
relations. W
hile it draw
s from
a variety of other w
ays of studying sue

d
broad and com
plex subject, it stands on its ow
n as a system
of conctts
an
propositions. C
onstructivism
is not a theory as _su~h. It doenot erg:~~
• 1ex lanations for w
hat people do, w
hy soc1et1es differ,
ow
t e w
o
~;,aan e~. Instead, constructivism
m
akes it feasible to theoriz~ _about matters
that ;eem
to be unrelated because the concepts and propos1ttons norm
ally
used to talk about such m
atters are also unrelated.
.

.
.
A
s presented here, constructivism
applies to all fields of ~oc1al inqu~~
In recent years dissident scholars in m
any fields have selecttvely used
d
language of so~ial construction to criticize existing social
arrangem
en;s an!
scholarly practices. A
great deal of discord has ens_ued. (~!so se tt
o'.
Introduction.) W
hen constructivism
is used system
atically,_ ti has t~re ~~ne
site effect. It finds value in diverse m
aterials and forges hnks w
h
seem
ed possible.
,
ti Id

h' I
Full of discordant voices, International R
_e!ations 1s the
ie I'
this particular system
of concepts and propostt1ons_
w
as ti~st~pP;. b'ts of
this m
anual is intended for the use of anyone w
ith m
et 10. tea
t
m
ind its users are m
ost likely to have an interest in the subiect of,inte~~:
tio11al relations. T
hey m
ay have also had som
e exposure to tl:e field s sc to
arly controversies. If this is indeed the case, they w
ill soon d1scobver
thlatdthte
.

.
.
I x
than they have
een e
0
subject is less d1st1nct1ve, but m
ore com
p e '
believe.
C
O
N
ST
R
U
C
T
IV
ISM
: A
U
SE
R

'S M
A
N
U
A
L
59
-
O
verview
Fundam
ental to constructivism
is the proposition that hum
an beings are social
beings, and w
e w
ould not be hum
an but for our social relations. In other w
ords,
sociaf relations m
ake or co1is1111ct
people-ow

:re/ves-into
the kind of beings
that w
e are. C
onversely, w
e m
ake the w
orld w
hat it is, from
the raw
m
aterials
that nature provides, by doing w
hat w
e do w
ith each other and saying w
hat w
e
say to each other. Indeed, saying is doing: talking is
undoubtedly the m
ost
im
portant way that w
e go about m

aking the w
orld w
hat it is.
C
ountries such as France, the U
nited States, and Z
im
babw
e are am
ong
the social constructions, or societies, that people m
ake through w
hat w
e do.
C
ountries arc self-contained w
orlds because people talk about them
that
w
ay and try to keep them
that w
ay. Y
et they are only relatively self-contained.
R

elations am
ong countries--intem
ational relations-constitutes
a w
orld in
its ow
n right. T
his is a self-contained w
orld for the sim
ple reason that it
covers the earth, but it is still nothing m
ore than a w
orld of our m
aking-a
society of relatively self-contained societies.
C
onstructivism
holds that people m
ake society, and society m
akes peo-
ple. T
his is a continuous, tw
o-w
ay process. In order to study it, w

e m
ust
start in the m
iddle, so to speak, because people and society, alw
ays having
m
ade each other, are already there and just about to change. T
o m
ake a
virtue of necessity, w
e w
ill start in the m
iddle, betw
een people and society,
by introducing a third elem
ent, rules, that alw
ays links the other tw
o ele-
m
ents together. Social rules (the term
rules includes, but is not restricted to,
legal rules) m
ake the process by w
hich people and society constitute each

other continuous and reciprocal.
A
rule is a statem
ent that tells people w
hat w
e should do. T
he "w
hat" in
question is a standard for people's conduct in situations that w
e can identify
as being alike, and can expect to encounter. T
he "should" tells us to m
atch
our conduct to that standard. If w
e fail to do w
hat the rule tells us to, then
w
e can expect consequences that sonie other rule w
ill bring into effect w
hen
other people follow
the rule calling for such consequences. A
ll the w
ays in

w
hich people deal w
ith rules--w
hether w
e follow
the rules or break them
,
w
hether w
e m
ake the rules, change them
, or get rid of them
-m
ay
be called
practices.E
ven w
hen w
e do not know
w
hat a rule says, w
e can often guess
w
hat it is about by looking at people's practices.

A
m
ong m
uch else, rules tell us w
ho the 'active participants in a society
are. C
onstructivists call these participants agents. People are agents,
but
only to the extent that society, through its rules, m
akes it possible for us to
participate in the m
any situations for w
hich there are rules. N
o one is an
agent for all such situations.
•60 NIC
IIO
L
A
S O
N
U
F

O
rdinarily, w
e think of agents as people w
ho act on behalf of oth~r
people. C
onsidering the m
atter m
ore abstractly, w
e see that rules m
ake tt
possible for us to act on behalf of social constructions, w
hich m
_ay be
ourselves, other hum
an beings, or even collections of people, along w
ith the
rules, the practices, and the actual things that w
e m
ake and use. C
onversely,
agents need not be individual hum
an beings to be able to_ act on behalf of
others (here l refer to agents in the third person to em
phasize that_ the terrm

people and agents arc not com
pletely interchangeable). Agency ts a social
condition. T
hus the governm
ent of a country is a collection of people and a
social construction. A
ccording to the relevant rules, these people act, to-
gether and in various com
binations, on behalf of that country as a m
uch
larger collection of people.
.
R
ules give agents choices. A
s w
e have already seen, the m
ost baste
choice is to follow
the rule--to
do w
hat. the rule says the agent should
do-or
not. O

nly hum
an beings can actually m
ake choices, because w
e
alone (and not all of us) have the m
ental equipm
ent to consider the probable
consequences of m
aking the choices that are available to us. N
evertheless,
w
e alw
ays m
ake such choices on behalf of, and in the nam
e of, social
constructions, w
hether ourselves, other people or collections of other peo-
ple, or practices and artifacts.
,
A
gents act in society to achieve goals. T
hese goals reflect p7 ople s needs
and w
ishes in light of their m

aterial circum
stances. Every society has rules
telling agents w
hich goals are the appropriate ones for t~em
to pursue. O
f
course there are situations in w
hich people are perfectly aim
less. For exam
-
ple, w
l1cn w
e freeze up in fear or fall asleep from
exhaustion, w
e are no
longer agents or, for that m
atter, social beings.
.
.
.
W
hen w
e, as hum
an beings, act as agents, w

e have goals m
m
tnd, eve? tf
w
e are not fully aw
are of them
w
hen w
e act. If som
eone asks us to _thtnk
about the m
atter, w
e can usually form
ulate these goals m
ore or less tn ~he
order of their im
portance to w
hom
ever w
e are acting as agents for, s~artm
g
w
ith ourselves. M
ost of the tim

e, agents have lim
ited, inaccurate, or incon-
sistent inform
ation about the m
aterial and social conditions that affect the
likelihood of reaching given goals. N
evertheless, agents do the b_est they
can 10 achieve their goals w
ith the m
eans that nature and society (to-
gether-alw
ays
together) m
ake available to them
. A
:~_chi~~e_g~als_is
rational conduct and agents faced w
ith choices w
ill act rationally. V
iew
ed
fro;1 ~~utsiJc, th~se choices m
ay appear to be less than rational, but this is
due to the com

plexities of agency and hum
an fallibility.
A
gents m
ake choices in a variety of situations. R
ules help ~o d?fine
every such situation from
any agent's po_int of view
. In m
an~ s1tuat1ons,
rules arc directly responsible for presenting agents w
ith choices. A
gents
C
O
N
ST
R
U
C
T
IV
ISM

: A
U
SE
R
'S M
A
N
U
A
L
61
-
have m
ade or acknow
ledged these rules in the belief that follow
ing rules
generally helps them
reach their intended goals.
In these situations, rules are related to agents' practices, a11d to
each
other, through the consequences that agents intend their acts to
have.
W
hether by accident or by design, rules and related practices

frequently
f~111!a__S(~bJe (but never fixed) pattern suiting agents~
intenttons-:-'ffiese
l /
~att~i:t)Sa.rei'.1stit111ions.
A
s recogniiab!e-paffem
s of ~Jes ~nd r~lated prac-
tices, institutions m
ake people into agents and constitute an environm
ent
":'ithin w
hich agents conduct them
selves rationally. W
hile it is alw
ays pos-
sible, and often useful, to think of agents-all
agents-as
institutions in
~hei: o~n right, w
e m
ore com
m
only think of agents as operating in an
m

stttutlonal context that gives them
at least som
e opportunities for choice.
~xercising choices, agents act on, and not just in, the context w
ithin
w
hich they operate, collectively changing its institutional features
and
the~selves, !n the process. N
evertheless, from
any agent's point of ~iew
,
socte~ consists of diverse institutions that seem
, for the m
ost part, to be
hel~ m
_ pl~ce b~ rules _linking them
to other institutions. A
ny stable pattern
of m
st1tut1ons (t~clu~m
~ agents of all sorts) is also an institution. A
gents
are aw

are of the m
st1tu_t1ons
populating their environm
ents, and not sim
ply
because the rules form
tng these institutions directly bear on their conduct.
T
o the extent that som
e agents m
ake choices, and other agents are affected
by these choices, institutions produce consequences for other
agents that
they cannot help but be aw
are of and respond to.
In a com
plex w
orld, agents often m
ake choices that have consequences,
for them
selves and others, that they had not anticipated or do not care
very
m
uch about. U
nintended consequences frequently form

stable patterns w
ith
respect to their effect on agents. A
perfect m
arket provides a com
pelling
illustration of this phenom
enon. O
ne by one, a large num
ber of sellers and
buyers _are inca~able. of affect_ing the supply of, and dem
and for, a good.
~ollect1:ely, their rational choices have the unintended
consequence of set-
ting a pnce for that ~ood w
hich they m
ust individually accept as fixed.
A
nyone m
ay notice such stable patterns of unintended consequences. In
th~ case of a ~arket, no one could fail to notice it in the form
of a good's
p~ce, over w
hich no agent seem

s to have any control. Som
etim
es agents
:v1t1 choose to prev_ent changes in such patterns by adopting
rules that are
m
ten~~d to_ have this effect. A
rule fixing the, price of a good under certain
conditions ts only the m
ost obvious exam
ple .
. A
ny s~able pattern of rules, institutions, and unintended
consequences
, _,,
gives society ~.E
!:!!E
!_1re,recognizable as such 'ioaiiy obsi,rver.-A
ge.nts ·are-
·
alw
ays observers. I_nsofar as they observe consequences that they
had not
intended, and accept them
, such consequences are no longer unintended in

63
62
N
IC
I IO
LA
S
-
O
N
U
F
the usual sense of the w
or<l. If agents <lccide that these consequences are
hat! for them
, they w
ill act to change them
, perhaps w
ith other unforeseen
consequences rcsu lting.
O

utside observers (agents from
a different society) m
ay recognize a
m
ore com
plex structure than agents do as observers. O
utsiders can stand
back, so to speak, and see patterns that insiders cannot see
because they are
too close to them
. A
s agents on the inside becom
e aw
are of w
hat observers
have to say, observers becom
e agents, w
hatever their intentions. W
hen
agents in general take this new
infonnation into account in m
aking their
choices, an even greater com
plexity of structure results.

Scholars w
ho think of them
selves as constructivists have given a good
deal of attention to the "agent-structure problem
." (Sec H
arry G
ould's con·
tribution to this volum
e in C
hapter 4 for a thorough review
of these discus·
sions.) T
he tenn structure is the source of m
uch confusion (an ontological
confusion), because scholars cannot agree on w
hether structures exist in
reality or only in their m
inds. T
he im
portant point to rem
em
ber is that
structure is w
hat observers see, w

hile institutions are w
hat agents act
w
ithin. N
evertheless, structure can affect agents. W
e are often affected by
phenom
ena, natural and social, that w
e do not or cannot see, but w
e then
respond as agents by putting w
hat has happened to us in an institutional
context. W
hen agents do this, they institutionalize
structure by bringing
rules to bear on their situations.
G
enerally speaking, scholars today tend to think that the structure
of
international relations is not institutionalized to any great
degree. T
his is so
even for som
e scholars w
ho think of them

selves as constructivists. T
hey
believe that countries are highly institutionalized as states, but
that states,
through their agents, conduct their relations in an anarchic w
orld. T
he term
anarchy points to a condition of rule am
ong states in w
hich no one state or
group of states rules over the rest. It also :m
p lies that there is no institution
above states ruling them
. W
hen w
e say that states are sovereign, w
e are
saying the very sam
e thing.
B
y calling international relations anarchic, scholars are not
saying that
there is an absence of rule. T
his w

ould be chaos, not anarchy. Instead, they
seem
to be saying that structure-and
especially a stable pattern of unin·
tended consequences-rules
the day. In the sam
e sense, w
e m
ight say that
the m
arket rules the behavior of sellers and buyers.
Starting w
ith rules, as constructivists often do, leads quickly enough to
patterns of relations that w
e can only describe as a condition of rule. U
su-
ally this condition is sufficiently institutionalized that w
e can recognize
specific agents as rulers. Som
etim
es there is very little evidence of institu·
tion.alization, as in m
ob rule, but there is also little reason to think that this
C

O
N
S
TR
U
C
TIV
IS
M
: A
U
S
E
R
'-N
U
A
L
condition w
ill persist as a stable pattern w
ithout institutions em
erging. In
other w
ords, w

here there are rules (and thus institutions), there is rulc--n
condition in w
hich som
e agents use rules to exercise control and obtain
advantages over other agents. R
ule is a stable pattern of relations, but not a
sym
m
etrical one.
A
narchy is a condition of rule in w
hich rules are not directly responsible
for the w
ay agents conduct their relations. T
o be sure, there are rules in the
background. T
hey m
ake sure that the unintended consequences of agents'
m
any choices, and not rulers, do the job of ruling. If unintended
conse-
quences seem
to rule, it is because som
e agents intend for them

to do so.
Som
e agents w
ant to be ruled in this indirect sort of w
ay because it suits
their goals m
ore than any other arrangem
ent w
ould. O
ther agents have little
or no choice in the m
atter. Perhaps patterns just happen, but agents m
ake
arrangem
ents. A
rranging for anarchy is just one possibility.
C
onstructivists should seriously consider dropping the w
ord structure
from
their vocabularies. Social arrangem
ent is a better choice. A
ppearances
aside, international anarchy is a social arrangem

ent-an
institution-on
a
grand scale. W
ithin its scope, m
any other institutions are recognizably con·
nected. In every society, rules create conditions of rule. T
he society that
states constitute through their relations is no exception.
W
hether w
e, as constructivists, start w
ith agents or w
ith social arrange·
m
ents, w
e com
e quickly enough to particular institutions and thus to rules.
If w
e start w
ith rules, w
e can m
ove in either direction-tow
ard

agents and
the. choices that rules give them
an opportunity to m
ake, or tow
ard the
social arrangem
ents that em
erge from
the choices that agents are m
aking all
the tim
e. W
hichever w
ay w
e go, w
e ought to keep in m
ind that rules yield
rule as a condition that agents (as institutions) can never
escape.
T
he practical problem
is that, as constructivists w
e w
ant to m

ove in both
directions at the sam
e tim
e. Y
et ifw
e try to dos~, w
e com
e up against the
staggering com
plexity of the social reality that w
e w
ant to know
about. It is
im
possible to do everything. T
he practical solution is to start w
ith rules and
show
how
rules m
ake agents and institutions w
hat they are in relation to
ea~h other, T
hen w

e can show
how
rules m
ake rule, and being ruled, a
um
versal social experience.
T
he rem
ainder of this user's m
anual is dedicated to these tw
o tasks. T
o
m
ake points as clear and understandable as possible, it repeats m
ost of w
hat
t~e reader has now
had a taste of. In the 'process, it introduces m
any addi-
ttonal concepts and propositions, expressed in the sim
plest term
s that its
author can think of. U
sed consistently and system

atically related, these
concepts and propositions constitute a com
prehensive fram
ew
ork for under-
standing the w
orld in constructivist tenns.
65
-64 NIC
H
O
L
A
S O
N
U
F
R
ules M
ake A
gents, A
gents M
ake R

ules
R
ules m
ake agents out of individual hum
an beings by giving them
opportu-
nities to act upon the w
orld. T
hese acts have m
aterial and social conse-
quences, som
e of them
intended and som
e not. T
hrough these acts, agents
m
ake the m
aterial w
orld a social reality for them
selves as hum
an beings.
B
ecause agents are hum

an beings, acting singly or together on behalf of
them
selves or others, they act as they do for hum
an purposes-they
have
goals reflecting hum
an needs and w
ishes. The tangled connections betw
een
agency (w
ho is acting on w
hose behalf?), goals (w
hose goals are affected
by w
hat acts?), and circum
stances (w
hich features of the w
orld actu'ally
m
atter?) m
ake it difficult for agents to explain fully and convincingly w
hy
they act as they do. E
ven if they seem

confused, observers can often figure
the reasons for their conduct from
the evidence at hand.
A
gents use w
hatever m
eans are available to them
to achieve their goals.
T
hese m
eans include m
aterial features of the w
orld. B
ecause the w
orld is a
social place, at least for hum
an beings, rules m
ake the w
orld's m
aterial
features into reso11rcesavailable for agents' use. Som
e resources are not
directly m
aterial---rules also constitute agents and institutions as
resources.

W
hether agents are able to spell out their reasons for using the
resources
available to them
, or observers figure them
out from
the evidence, recogniz-
able patterns in the results constitute agents' interests.
A
gents need not know
w
hat their interests are to act on them
. O
nce they
learn m
ore from
other agents (as observers) about their ow
n interests, they
m
ay act differently. Indeed, hum
an beings do not need to think about them
-
selves as agents to be agents. W
hile being an agent does not require the

degree of self-consciousness that w
e associate w
ith having an identity,
agents are usually aw
are enough of their identities, singular and collective,
to have an interest in fostering those identities.
A
s agents, people can m
ake other people into agents by giving the latter
the opportunity to act on the farm
er's behalf for particular purposes. T
he
form
er m
ay do so individually or collectively, and the latter m
ay be one or
m
ore individuals acting on the form
er's behalf. A
gents acting collectively
becom
e a singular agent. B
y using resources, they acquire a m
aterial exis-

tence, and, as the previous paragraph suggests, they becom
e objects of
identification.
A
gency is alw
ays lim
ited. A
gents are never free to act upon the w
orld in
all the w
ays that they m
ight w
ish to. M
any lim
its have a m
aterial com
po-
nent. W
e need air to breathe; w
e do not have w
ings to fly. N
o rule can
readily m
ake things otherw

ise, even though rules allow
us, agents, to use
resources to alter these lim
its, for exam
ple, by fashioning scuba gear and
C
O
N
ST
R
U
C
T
IV
ISM
: A U
SE
R
"'N
U
A
L
airplanes. R

ules that give any agent an opportunity to act create lim
its for
other agents. R
ules in general lim
it the range of acts that other agents arc
free to take.
It follow
s from
this proposition that no individual hum
an being, as an
agent, has full autonom
y. B
y the sam
e token, agents acting together never
h?ve full independence. A
s noted, agents are alw
ays lim
ited by rules thnt
give other agents opportunities to act. A
gents acting together arc addition-
ally lim
ited by the very rules that give them
the opportunity to act collec-
tively. R

ules allow
ing other agents, individual and collective, to act on their
behalflim
it them
even further.
W
hen a very large num
ber of people collectively operate as an agent,
w
hen they have agents acting for them
, w
hen they have som
e considerable
m
easure of identity (including som
e place identified as theirs), and w
hen
they are free to act w
ithin very w
ide lim
its, these people constitute a coun-
try. For several centuries, agents have had a consistent interest
in talking
about countries as if they are independent of each other and any
other social

~onstruction. T
his is m
ade clearest by defining sovereignty as absolute
m
dependence and describing countries as sovereign states. A
s constructiv-
ists, how
e_ver, we should alw
ays bear in m
ind that full independence is a
useful fictton, and sovereignty is a m
atter of degree.
T
h~ freedom
that agents do have depends on their ability to recognize the
m
atenal and social lim
its that apply to them
. T
hey m
ust also be able to
evaluate the consequences of exceeding those lim
its. T
o be an agent re-

quires the m
ental equipm
ent that individual hum
an beings norm
ally develop
over ~he course of their social lives. A
gents exercise their freedom
by
choosing to act one w
ay or another, in an unending series of situations that
m
a~e choosing unavoidable. It hardly needs saying that not
choosing is a
choice, presum
ably taken, as all choices are, to advance agents' goals.
A
gents m
ake choices in light of the skills that they possess and the re-
sourc~s that they have access to, for reasons that they are m
ore or less able
to articulate. In short, they m
ake choices in pursuit of their interests.
R
ules o~er agents the sim

plest kind of choices. A
gents m
ay choose to
follow
a given rule, or to break it. C
om
pared to m
ost situations in w
hich
?gents m
ake choices, the choice of follow
ing a rule or not follow
ing it
m
volves consequences that are easy to calculate. W
hile unintended conse-
qu~nccs are. alw
ays ~ossible, rules give agents the opportunity to m
ake
rational choices-<:hoices dictated by reference to goals-w
ith
som
e assur-
ance that they are m

aking the best choices available to them
.
A
~le
m
akes rational choice relatively easy by telling the agents to
w
hom
it refers w
hat they should do in som
e sort of situation that they m
ight
find them
selves in. T
hese agents m
ay act on the contents of the rule w
ithout
67
6/,
N
IC
I IO
L

IS
-
O
N
U
F
realizing that the contents form
a rule. In principle, how
ever, any agent
(including any observer w
ith enough inform
ation) can form
ulate contents of
a rule in the form
of a rule. T
here is nothing tricky about this. Saying w
hat a
rule is--putting its contents in the right form
-is
exactly the sam
e as speak-
ing in a fonn that gets anyone w
ho is listening to respond to w
hatever w

e
arc saying. T
he point of speaking in this w
ay is to have som
ething take
placc--to accom
plish som
ething w
ith the assistance of som
eone else.
T
he act of speaking in a form
that gets som
eone else to act is com
m
only
called a speech act. T
he form
that a speech act m
ust have w
ill be clear from
the follow
ing exam

ples: (I) Y
ou assert that duck season has begun (you
m
ight actually say, "D
uck season has begun!"). (2) She dem
ands that w
e all
go duck hunting (she m
ight actually say, "L
et's go duck hunting!"). (3) I
prom
ise to roast duck for dinner (I m
ight actually say, "I'll cook!"). T
he
generic form
for a speech act is: I (you, etc.) hereby assert (dem
and, prom
-
ise) to anyone hearing m
e that som
e state of aIT
airs exists or can be
achieved. T
he three exam

ples suggest that speech acts fall into three catego-
ries, here called assertive speech acts, directive speech acts, and
com
m
is-
sive speech acts.
W
hether speech acts accom
plish anything depends on w
hether others
respond to w
hat they hear. T
he response to your assertion about duck sea-
son w
as obviously positive. I, at least, accepted her inclusive but im
perative
dem
and to go hunting w
hen I prom
ised to cook. W
e m
ay surm
ise that both
of you accepted m

y offer, and w
e all three w
ent duck hunting, perhaps after
w
e checked the new
spaper to be sure that duck season had indeed begun.
W
hatever category a particular speech act falls w
ithin, particular speech
acts im
ply nothing about future situations. W
e start all over again w
hen
deer season begins. A
speaker m
ay assert the existence of som
e state of
affairs and others m
ay agree, or m
ay request som
ething and others m
ay
com
ply, or m

ay m
ake a com
m
itm
ent that others accept, w
ithout any neces-
sary consequences in the long run.
If, how
ever, speakers frequently repeat a particular speech act w
ith the
sam
e general effect, everyone involved begins to think that the
repetition
becom
es significant. W
e end up hunting w
ith each other all the tim
e be-
cause w
e go through the sam
e cycle of speech acts w
henever hunting sea-
son begins. C
onstantly repeated, the sam

e old speech acts turn into
conventionas everyone com
es to believe that the w
ords them
selves, and not
the speakers m
outhing them
, are responsible for w
hat happens. H
unting
together is w
hat w
e do at certain tim
es, w
hether any of us even have to say
anything m
uch about it anym
ore.
C
onventions com
e close to being rules. R
ecall that rules tell agents w
hat
they should do. A

convention rem
inds agents w
hat they have alw
ays done.
C
O
N
ST
R
U
C
T
IV
ISM
: A
U
SE
R
'S M
.L
T
he bordcrl_ine bcm
1ecn kno"'.ing that W
C

have alw
ays done som
ething and
probably w
,11 continue to do 1t, and believing that w
e should do it because
w
e have al~ays done it, is exceedingly fuzzy. If a convention
prom
pts
agents to think t~at t~e~ should do som
ething that they have alw
ays done,
then the convention 1s indeed a nile. W
e should consider the rule in qucs-
t10n a w
eak rule because it is norm
ative,w
hich m
eans that agents accept the
"should" elem
ent, only to the extent that the regular pattern of conduct
(such as hunting together) continues.
A

_s agents begin to realize that they should act as they alw
ays have, and
not Just because they alw
ays have acted that w
ay, the convention gains
stren_gthas a rule. R
ules keep the form
of a speech act by generalizing the
relat1~n betw
een speaker and hearer. W
ithin the general form
of a speech
act, given rules rna~e hearers into agents to w
hom
those rules apply. Fi-
nally, agents recognize that they should follow
the rules in question because
they are rules and for no other reason.
R
ules can take the general form
of speech acts in each of the three
catego_ric_spresented above: assertive speech acts, directive
speech acts, and
cornrn1ss1vespeech acts. R

ules in the form
of assertive speech acts inform
agents about the w
orld---!he w
ay things are, the w
ay it w
orks--and inform
them
w
ha! consequences are likely to follow
if they disregard this inform
a-
tion. T
~e m
f~rm
ation contained in such rules m
ay be stated in very general
term
s, _m
w
hich _case w
e m

ight call it a principle.T
he principle of sover-
eignty 1s a conspicuous exam
ple.
A
t_the other end of the spectrum
of possibilities, rules in the form
of
assert,:'e speech acts m
ay be stated in very specific term
s. Instructions for
oper~tlng appliances, filling com
m
ittee seats, or presenting diplom
atic cre-
dentials are useful ex~rnples. W
herever rules in this fonn fall on the spec-
trui:n, they arc m
s11,1ct1on-n,/es.
Providing inform
ation is not norm
ative, but
telling agents w
hat they should do w

ith that inform
ation is. A
gents alw
ays
know
w
hat they should do because the rule tells them
som
ething useful
about their relation to the w
orld.
D
irective speech acts are recognizable as im
peratives. If the speaker says
that you n:iust do s_om
ething,the speaker w
ants you to believe that you
should ~o it. R
ules 1?the fonn of directive speech acts, directive-rules,are
em
phatically nonnative. B
y telling agents w
hat they m
ust do (no hunting')

thes~ rul_es leave _no doubt as to w
hat they should do. D
irective-rules oft~~
prov_1demfo~aho_n about th_e ~o~sequences 'for disregarding
them
. H
aving
this_in~orm
at'.o? (sixty days m
Jail!) helps rational agents to m
ake the right
choiceIn dec1dm
g whether to follow
these rules or not.
C
om
rnissive spcec~ a~ts involve prom
ises. Speakers m
ake prom
ises that
hearers accept. C
ornrn1ss1ve speech acts give form
to rules w
hen hearers as
'

69
68
N
IC
IIO
L
A
S O
N
U
F
-
. h
ises of their ow
n. O
nce these w
ebs of prom
ises
speakers, respond w
it
prom
,. d

d nonnative in their ow
n term
s, they
Suffi ciently genera ,ze
an
.
h
I
becom
e
t likely to recognize t ese ru es
becom
e co111111it111ent-ru/es.
d d
that agents know
they
A
gents ar~ m
os
.
T
h
effects are the rights an
utres

in their effects.
ese
.
agent's rights constitute
s w
ith respect to other agents. A
ny given
posses
.
rty-no
hunting!).
duties for other agents (pnvate prope
.
them
to specific benefits. R
ights
R
ights m
ay entitle the agents possessm
dg other agents in specific w
ays.
agents to act tow
ar
1

m
ay a so em
pow
er
.
.
o
ers tum
people into agents. M
ore
O
bviously, pow
ers and 1tm
1ts on ~e ~nto agents by defining opportunities
generally, right and duties tum
,r~p struction-ru!es and directive-rules also
for them
to act upon the w
or
.
n
.
ts for exactly the sam
e reason.

tum
people into agen
.
b cause they perform
different
Speech acts fall in_to three c~tegsor;:~er: and hearers together
in three,
fi111ctions-they get things done hor p t gon· es hold for ni!es
because they
h
ays T
he sam
e t ree ca e
b
1
and on y t ree, w
·
h
ch acts do-they
get things done
Y
w
ork in the sam

e three w
ays t a_t ~pee
nts A
s observers w
e see rules in
·
d. e t·ng and com
m
itting age
·
'
h
instructing, ,r c,
, .
different functions for society. Q
uite~ few
sc o_- 1
each category perform
ing
d
..
lo y have w
orked out variattons on this
ars in such fields as law

an hsoc10 g
'
sed all three of these categories,
functional schem
e, but they
ave nev_eru
and just these categori~s, ?tt~e s;i~:r~:e~chem
e for categorizing rules, and
Philosophers have
evise
a
d
d it O
n functional grounds,
a num
ber of constructivist scholars have ?tuotpvtee
rul~s and regulative rules.
cries of rules· const1
1
there are tw
o categ
d"
.
f

cial construction. R
egulative rules
C
onstitutive rules are the m
e lllm
o
so
are the m
edium
of social_ cttrol.
to be constructivist it is actually a source
W
hile this schem
e m
ig t seem
.
. t
f view
' all rules are alw
ays
of confusion. From
a construct1v1st poi?
o B
y definition rules regulate

.
.
d
u!ative at the sam
e t1m
e.
'
const1tut1vean
reg
ative--they tell agents w
hat
the conduct of agents because rules al r~ nnorm
t·
conduct constitutes the w
orld
F rtherm
ore the regu at10 o
.
l
Id
d
they s 1ou
o.
u

'
w
hether agents intend this conse-
1
w
ithin w
hich such conduct takes Pace,
.
h
Id often as an
.
.
the w
orld m
eans acting on t e w
or
'
quence or not. A
cting m
.
. ht be a useful w
ay to categorize
· tended consequence. Intentions m

1g
. .
unm
d
. .
b
1
·s for categonzm
g rues.
acts, but they are never a
ec1S1ve as,
.
I
rule serve only to regulate
E
ven w
hen ag~nts intend that a pa::u
~~w
art by choosing, for exam
-
conduct (an intention that other ag~nts .
y
estion w

ill have the effect of
pie, to disregard the ru!e),c~~o~~~o
~~::;g:
it) w
eakening the rule. In the
strengthening or (,fagents
.
I t
be constitutive w
ill have to affect
a rule that agents intcnc c,
.
I
sam
e w
ay, '
'
O
"
ts intend rules to be sim
ultaneous y
conduct if it is to succeed.
,ten agen
C

O
N
ST
R
U
C
T
IV
ISM
: A
U
SE
R
'S-U
A
L
constitutive and regulative. T
o give an obvious exam
ple, w
hen agents called
players take turns in playing a gam
e, the rule instructing them
to do so

constitutes the gam
e as one in w
hich players regularly take turns.
A
s w
e have seen, rules serve three possible functions. A
gents m
ake rules
and use them
for instruction, direction, and com
m
itm
ent. W
ithin each of
these three functional categories, rules differ in the extent to w
hich they
have been fonnalizcd. R
ules are form
al if agents encounter them
as fixed
and unavoidable features of their w
orld. R
ules also differ in the extent
w

hich they are linked to other rules. A
gents often discover that particular
rules are linked to other rules telling other agents w
hat to do in the event
that the relevant agents disregard the particular rules in
question. Form
al
rules that are effectively backed up by other rules are legal.
Form
ality strengthens a rule by m
aking its nonnative character clearer,
in the process separating it from
rules that are norm
atively m
ore am
biguous
(conventions, for exam
ple). A
rule supporting another rule strengthens the
latter by increasing the chances that agents w
ill choose to follow
the latter
rule. T
he m

ore frequently agents follow
a rule, the stronger the rule w
ill be,
norm
atively (and the easier it w
ill be to m
ake it form
al). For exam
ple, the
principle of sovereignty is a highly form
al instruction-rule constituting the
society of states. It is supported by com
m
itm
ent-rules em
pow
ering states, as
agents, to bring new
m
em
bers into this society. T
hese supporting rules,
w
hich w

e know
as rules of recognition, are supported by instruction-rules
that spell out a num
ber of social and the m
aterial conditions that m
ust be
satisfied before statehood is possible.
A
gents are inclined to m
ake rules legal and to follow
them
if they are
legal because they know
w
hat the rules are, how
m
uch they m
atter to other
agents, and w
hat consequences they can expect from
not follow
ing them
.
W

hen agents find them
selves in a legal environm
ent, it is rational for them
to follow
rules as a general proposition. It costs them
less than careless
conduct w
ill. International relations is a peculiar environm
ent in this re-
spect, but still a legal environm
ent. W
hile there are very few
fonnal direc-
tive-rules to be found, there are large num
bers of other, quite form
al rules
intricately linked in support of each other. R
elevant agents are perfectly
aw
are of the situation and proceed accordingly.
R
ules Form
Institutions, Institutions Form

Societies
R
ules are linked to each other in content as w
ell as function-both
by w
hat
they say and by w
hat they do. Standing back, agents can easily identify the
w
ays that rules reinforce each other in w
hat they say and do. Speaking
figuratively,w
e m
ight say that rules com
e in fam
ilies, and that som
e fam
i-
70
.L
A
S

O
N
U
F
lies of rules com
e w
ith rules docum
enting the fam
ily pedigree. O
ther fam
i-
lies of rules depend on observers to docum
ent fam
ily resem
blances. T
hese
and m
any other practices help to give farr.ilies of rules their
distinguishing
features. R
ules and related practices arc alm
ost im
possible to separate in
practice, because every tim
e agents respond to rules, w

hether by m
aking
choices or by observing the choices that other agents m
ake, they have an
effect on those rules and on their places in fam
ilies of rules.
13y recent convention, scholarly observers of international
relations call
these fam
ilies of rules and related practices "regim
es." A
t an earlier tim
e,
they called them
"institutions," and this rem
ains the usual term
for m
ost
scholars w
ho devote their attentions to social relations. In practice, the. tw
o
tenns are indistinguishable. International regim
es are said to consist of
principles, rules, nom

1s, and procedures. B
y w
hatever nam
e, these are all
categories of rules. Principles and procedures anchor the tw
o ends of a
spectrum
of possibilities distinguishable by how
general they are in content.
R
ules and nonns are distinguishable by how
fonnal they are, norm
s being
sufrtciently infonnal that observers are not alw
ays sure that they are rules
until they see how
other agents respond to them
.
International regim
es differ in size. T
hey have rules that w
ork in differ-
ent w
ays (assertive-, directive-, and com

m
itm
ent-rules) in different propor-
tions. A
dditionally, regim
es differ in the extent to w
hich they have rules
backing up other rules. Institutions differ in exactly the sam
e w
ays. T
hey
are m
ade up of rules that vary, not just in generality and form
ality but also
in num
ber and arrangem
ent.
Som
e sim
ple institutions consist of a sm
all num
ber of rules w
hose con-
tent m

akes them
a fam
ily, even if the rules seem
to give little support to
each other, and to get little support from
other institutions to w
hich they are
connected. In the w
orld of international relations, the balance of pow
er is an
exam
ple of such an institution. Instruction-rules constitute, and
regulate, the
balance of pow
er. T
hese rules tell the great pow
ers w
hat to expect w
hen
they choose allies and go to w
ar. Y
et even the balance of pow
er, as an
institution, is not as sim

ple as it seem
s. T
reaties give allies rights and duties.
R
ules lim
iting the conduct of w
ar help to keep the balance from
being
perm
anently upset.
In the context of international relations, spheres of influence are
also
sim
ple institutions m
ade up of inform
al directive-rules. These rules direct
w
eak states w
ithin the sphere to carry out a m
uch stronger state's w
ishes.
W
hen these rules are backed up by principles justifying such
arrangem
ents,

the sphere of influence is no longer quite so sim
ple an institution. A
s fonnal
equals, states m
ay also adopt treaties distributing rights and duties that have
unequal consequences w
ithin the sphere. T
reaties are them
selves sim
ple
C
O
N
ST
R
U
C
T
IV
ISM
: A
U
SE
R

'S
--MAN
U
A
L
71
institutions m
inim
ally consisting of fonnal com
m
itm
ent-rules that apply
o~ly_ to the states adopting such treaties. T
he principle that treaties are
bm
dm
g, and therefore legal, autom
atically provides them
w
ith support from
other, highly form

al rules.
Institutions such as the balance of pow
er, spheres of influence and trea-
ties are sim
ple only because observers can easily pick them
~ut of an
institutional environm
ent characterized by a large num
ber of linked rules
and. rel_ated practices. A
gents act as observers w
hen they recognize any
m
st1tut1onas such, no m
atter how
com
plex it is. Scholars often think of
international regim
es as som
ething that they alone can see, w
hile agents can
see only the sim
pler institutions m
aking up the regim

e. Y
et observers be-
com
e agents, and regim
es becom
e institutions, w
hen other agents !cam
w
hat observers have to say.
.
l~te:national regim
es are hard to see because the rules connecting the
m
stitut1ons that m
ake them
up tend to be infonnal. A
gents take them
for
granted. Form
al rules m
ake things clearer, and agents need not stand back.
For a long tim
e in the context of international relations, agents have had

access to a legal institution, conventionally know
n as the sources of interna-
tional law
, through w
hich they can m
ake legal rules and thus institutions
w
hose existence no one can doubt. T
reaties are one such institution thanks
to the legal principle that treaties are binding on the states
adopting them
:
A
gents respond to rules w
ith goals in m
ind; institutions serve their inter-
ests .. A
s a general, ~atter, sim
ple institutions have a m
ore straightforw
ard
relation to agents
interests than do m
ore com
plex and m

ore difficult to
'.ecog~i~e instituti_ons. We think of relatively sim
ple institutions as perfonn-
1ng distinct fun~t1ons for agents and for other institutions. D
epending on
w
hat these relatively sim
ple institutions do, they give priority to rules in one
of the functional categories that w
e have already identified.
W
hen instruction-rules are m
ost in evidence, agents are situated in net-
w
orks of ruies and related practices. 'rhe balance of pow
er is an exam
ple.
Its rules assign ~n elevated status to a few
great pow
ers (ideally five states)
that m
ust act as 1fthey are roughly equal in the resources available to
them
.

If state~' ~gents act as, instructed, the consequences are
supposed to be an
ever-sh1ftm
g and re!attvely peaceful balance of alliances am
ong the great
po~ers, w
hatever the im
m
ediate intentions of their agents m
ight be. R
ecog-
nizing the balance of pow
er as an institution w
hose function suits their
interests, agents intentionally foster those sam
e consequences in the nam
e
of the balance.
W
hen directive-rules are m
ost in evidence, agents are situated in a chain
of com
m
and, a firm
, or an organization.A

sphere ofinnucnce is a rudim
en-
tary institution of this sort. Its very inform
al rules assign each agent to an
72 -NIC
IIO
L
A
S O
N
U
F
office, as w
e w
ould call it in a m
ore form
al organization. O
fficers rep_ort up
the chain of com
m
and and carry out orders that com
e dow

n the chain. B
y
this ogic, the top officer decides w
hat the organization's function is. In
practice, m
ost organizations are m
ore com
plex tha~ this. N
_everthe!ess, _a
sphere of influence is so rudim
entary in organization that its function 1s
nothing m
ore than to fulfill the w
ishes of a leading pow
er, as top officer,
over the w
eaker states w
ithin the sphere.
Finally, w
hen com
m
itm
ent-rules are m
ost in eviden:e, ~ge~ts end up in

partnerships, or associations,w
it_h other agents. I~ the 1nst1tut1onal
cont~xt
of international relations, the pnnc1plc of sovereignty and the
supporting
rules of recognition m
ake states into form
al equals. W
hen tw
o or m
ore
states adopt a treaty, they act as m
em
bers of an associatio~ giving them
at
least som
e rights in com
m
on, including the right to com
m
it t~~m
sel v~s to
each other. U
nder the term
s of the treaty, all parties take on add1t10nal rights

and duties w
ith respect to the others. In this situation, states are form
ally
equal because they all have the sam
e _role.T
he_ function of any association
is to distribute roles to agents through its com
m
ttm
ent-rues.
O
nly states (and the associations that _they have cre~ted_ by
tr~aty) can
adopt treaties, because there is a corrum
tm
ent-rule assigning thrs :ale to
them
exclusively. T
o return to an earher exam
ple, m
arkets function by
assigning agents either of tw
o roles-they
are either sellers or _buyers.

E
very seller is form
ally equal in possessing the right to buy, a~d so 1s every
buyer. N
ote, how
ever, that neither sellers nor buyers have a nght to a fix:d
price. Form
ally speaking, agents in these roles are free to com
pete w
ith
e
h other presum
ably for the good of every agent in the association. T
he
ac
,
,
h
function of this, or any, association is im
plied by the com
m
itm
ents t at
agents have m

ade to a given distribution of roles.. .
,
,
It is im
portant to note, how
ever, that an assoc1at1on s roles are not gener·
ally equal in the rights and duties that they create. T
hink, for exam
ple, of
the roles that m
em
bers of m
ost households have. For that m
atter, agents
holding the sam
e status (for exam
ple, w
hite m
ales) are equal to each oth~r
w
ithin the term
s of that status, even if different statuses are unequal in
relation to each other. T
his is no less true for agents holding the s~m

e or
sim
ilar offices (for exam
ple, foreign m
inisters). N
evertheless, com
m
1tm
ent-
rues are especially useful for m
aking large num
bers of agents form
ally
equal for lim
ited purposes.
.
.
.
A
gency consists of statuses, offices, and roles. D
epending on the m
st1tu-
tional context, every agent m
ust have a status, an office, or a role. M

ost,
perhaps all, agents have all three in som
e com
bination. !hi~ is ?ecause m
ost
people are agents in a variety of institutions, and m
any 1nst1tut10ns
com
bine
features of netw
orks, organizations, and associations.
C
O
N
ST
R
U
C
T
IV
ISM
: A
U
SE

R
'S
-
M
A
N
U
A
L
71
Institutions such as these arc com
plex in function and structure. Instruc-
tion-, directive-, and com
m
itm
ent-rules arc all present, even if the propor-
tions differ from
institution to institution. O
bservers usually have no
difficulty in picking out the pattern of rules, because
institutions are social
arrangem
ents that alw
ays reflect agents' interests. From

an observer's point
of view
, institutions have purposes. It seem
s this w
ay even if the observer is
an interested agent.
A
com
plex institution w
ill have general instruction-rules, or principles,
telling agents w
hat the purposes of that institution are. D
etailed instruction-
rules m
ay provide support for these principles by spelling out all
relevant
statuses. D
irective-rules m
ay also repeat and elaborate on w
hat these princi-
ples have to say and then support them
by dem
anding that officers do w
hat

these rules say that they should. In situations w
here there are no conspicu-
ous instruction-rules or directive-rules supporting principles,
com
m
itm
ent-
rules create roles for agents that have, from
any one agent's point of view
,
the unintended effect of supporting the institution's principles.
R
ules
in all three categories
often w
ork together
to support
an
institution's principles. Som
etim
es, how
ever, institutions develop in such a
w
ay that rules from

one or even tw
o categories are scarce or not to be found
at all. If w
e consider international relations as taking place w
ithin a single,
overarching institution, its rules constitute a conspicuously
lopsided ar-
rangem
ent. T
hanks to the principle of sovereignty, there are few
if any
form
al directive-rules. O
bservers w
ill discover inform
ar directive-rules in
practice, even if som
e agents routinely deny that such rules exist.
C
onsidered as a com
plex institution, international relations takes
place in a context w
here agents and observers find a large num
ber of
form

al com
m
itm
ent-rules (rules of international law
), behind w
hich
there is an even larger num
ber of instruction-rules. T
hese latter rules
differ enorm
ously in form
ality (quite a few
are legal rules), detail, and
the degree to w
hich they are linked to each other. T
hey support the
principle of sovereignty and a few
other principles m
ore or less directly
and effectively. T
hanks again to the principle of sovereignty, states are
com
plex institutions w
ithin w

hich form
al directive-rules allow
agents to
act on behalf of states in their relations.
T
he context w
ithin w
hich any institution functions as an agent is itself an
institution. Society is a com
plex institution w
ithin w
hich m
any other related
institutions are to be found. A
gents are likely to act as if their society's
boundaries are clear and accepted, even if observers, including
agents, have
a hard tim
e specifying those boundaries to anyone's satisfaction. States
are
societies that have exceptionally clear boundaries as w
ell as highly devel-
oped institutions for conducting relations w
ith other states.

-74 NICIIO
L
A
_S O
N
U
F
T
he com
plex institution w
ithin w
hich states function as relatively self-
contained societies is itself a society. W
ithin international society, states
function as prim
ary agents sim
ply by conducting relations w
ith each other.
International society includes m
any other, m
ore or less self-contained insti-
tutions. Som
e of them

add secondary agents, such as officers of interna-
tional organizations, to that society. T
he sum
total of institutions and their
relations add up to a society of staggering com
plexity and constant change,
even though its large patterns seem
at least to som
e observers to call for
generalization.
R
ules Y
ield R
ule
W
e have seen that institutions consist of related rules and
practices. It is
possible to think of a single rule as an institution. A
s a practical m
atter, w
e
never find a single rule standing by itself. E
very rule gives the agents to
w

hom
it applies the choice of follow
ing the rule, or not, w
ith m
ore or less
predictable consequences.
M
ost of the tim
e, agents choose to follow
the rule. T
he pattern of agents'
choices has a general consequence, w
hether or not it is intended by particu-
lar agents--it
has the effect of distributing m
aterial and social. benefits
am
ong agents. A
n extrem
ely im
portant category of such benefits 1s control
over resources and control over other agents and their activities.
Som
e

agents benefit m
ore than other agents. O
ver tim
e, institutions w
ork to the
advantage of som
e agents at the expense of other agents.
A
s rational beings, those agents w
ho benefit the m
ost from
the rules that
apply to them
are the m
ost inclined to follow
those rules. ~gents w
ho
benefit less are still inclined to follow
the rules because doing so still
benefits them
m
ore than not doing so. N
evertheless, agents m
ay proceed to

break any given rule after w
eighing the consequences of either choice for
them
selves. A
s a general consequence, rule breaking is likely to involve a
loss of benefits to other agents.
A
gents w
ho are negatively affected by the breaking of a rule also have a
choice. They m
ay accept the consequences (including a w
eakened faith in
the broken rule and a greater chance of its being broken again).
A
lterna-
tively, they m
ay choose to follow
a rule that has the consequence of pre-
senting the rule breaker w
ith a loss of benefits, w
hich the rule breaker ·is
either prepared to accept or had thought w
ould not be likely to occur. T
he
second choice, w

hich w
e think of as enforcing the rule, involves using
resources that m
ight otherw
ise have been put to beneficial use. T
his loss of
benefits is still less than the loss that com
es from
not enforcing the rule.
. --~·~
.,,t.,..
A
"
..,,...t h""""fitfrf'lm
fn11nW
·
C
O
N
ST
R
U
C
T

IV
ISM
: A U
SE
R
'S - M
A
N
U
A
L
75
ing it m
ay choose to use w
hatever resources are needed to change that nile,
and thus to change the distribution of benefits that results from
the rule's
existence. If som
e agents try to change the rule, other agents w
ho w
ould
benefit less from

the changes m
ay choose to use the necessary resources to
keep the rule from
changing. Furtherm
ore, those agents w
ho benefit 1hc
m
ost from
a given rule w
ill probably have to use few
er of the resources
available to them
to keep the rule.from
changing than w
ill agents w
ho w
ant
to change the rule. C
learly, rules say w
hat they say, and institutions are
slow
to change, because agents m
ake rational choices in circum
stances that

alw
ays give the advantage to som
e agents over others.
T
he general consequence of agents' responding to rules w
ith the re-
sources available to them
is that som
e agents exercise greater control over
the content of those rules, and over their success in being
follow
ed, than
other agents do. In other w
ords, rules yield rule. B
y m
aking agents and
society w
hat they are, rules m
ake rule inevitable. R
ule is som
ething that
agents do to, and for, other agents, and they do it by follow
ing rules. R
ule is
som

ething that happens to agents w
hen they follow
rules or w
hen they
suffer the consequences ofnot follow
ing rules.
Specific institutions m
ay form
alize rule by seem
ing to lim
it its exercise
to a particular agent or set of agents-lo
rulers. Just because w
e can identify
rulers, w
e should not conclude that they alone do the ruling. W
herever there
are inform
al rules (w
hich is everyw
here), there is inform
al rule, either sup-
porting or undercutting form
al institutions of rule, or both (probably in a

com
plex and hard to observe pattern), E
ven if the form
alities of rule are
now
here to be found, rule rem
ains a pervasive condition for that society.
L
oaded w
ith rules but lacking rulers, international society is a case in
point.
R
ules in different functional categories yield different form
s of rule.
W
here instruction-rules are param
ount and status is a defining feature of
society, ideas and beliefs seem
to do the ruling. D
espite appearances, agents
actually do the ruling by getting other agents to accept their
ideas and
beliefs. T
hey do so by exam
ple and by indoctrination. R

ule in this form
is
hegem
ony.
A
ny society w
here principles get m
ost of their support from
detailed
instruction-rules is hegem
onically ruled. C
aste societies are exam
ples. E
ach
hegem
onically ruled caste has clear boundaries and a fixed position in
the
netw
ork of castes constituting the society, M
em
bership in a caste gives
agents so m
uch of their identity, defined as a set of ideas about self and
position in society, that caste identity seem

s to rule the society as a w
hole.
H
egem
onically ruled institutions exist in societies w
here other sorts of insti-
tutions and a m
ixed form
of rule can be identified. The professions offer an
exam
nle. D
etailed instruction-rules, ordinarily learned through a long an-
-76 NIC
I IO
LA
S
O
N
U
F
prenticcship, support professional standards and rule agents to
their advan·
tagc in their relations w

ith clients needing their professional services.
In institutions w
here directive-rules are param
ount and office is a defining
feature of society, offices are vertically organized in a chain of
com
m
and.
O
fficers at each position in the chain use resources that their
offices m
ake
available to them
to carry out the rules that their offices require them
to carry
out. From
top to bottom
, such an arrangem
ent of offices is called a hierar-
chy, and so m
ight w
e call the form
of rule that results w
hen officers carry out

directive-rules. T
he state as a legal order exem
plifies hierarchical rule.
W
hen directive-rules are legal, hierarchy is form
al. D
espite the m
inim
al
description of the state as a legal order, form
al hierarchies rarely stand
alone. 1legcm
onical ideas typically reinforce form
al hierarchy. T
he result is
a,1thority, conventionally defined as legitim
ate control. M
ilitary officers
possess authority according to their rank, w
hich is their status and office
form
ally joined together in m
utual reinforcem
ent. Finally, inform

al hierar-
chy m
ay reinforce hegem
ony that has achieved a relatively high level of
form
ality. A
fter W
orld W
ar ll, the so-calledpax A
m
ericana m
ay be thought
of as a condition of rule in w
hich the U
nited States ruled, in the nam
e of
freedom
and prosperity, by intervening w
henever and w
herever it chose.
Proclaim
ing principles had the effect (perhaps initially unintended) of
for-
m
alizing the status of the U

nited States as leader of"the free w
orld," w
hile
acting on those principles gave it an inform
al office.
W
here com
m
itm
ent-rules are param
ount and role is a defining feature of
society, agents hold a variety of roles that are defined by
reference to the
roles that other agents hold. N
o one role, or institution, even com
es close to
m
aking particular agents into rulers. O
n the contrary, form
al com
m
itm
ent-
rules m

ostly seem
to reinforce form
al hierarchy. T
hey do so by granting
officers w
ell-defined pow
ers to help them
issue orders and carry them
out,
and by granting agents w
ell-defined rights to help protect them
from
offi-
cers abusing their pow
ers. T
he result is a constitutional state, in w
hich the
constitution form
alizes com
m
itm
ent-rules that lim
it the governm
ent of the

state and m
ake it responsible.
T
aken as a w
hole, roles m
ay yield rule on their ow
n, and not just because
they reinforce other form
s of rule. A
gents in association are the rulers--all
of them
together-even
if none of them
have the status or office to m
ake
them
rulers. R
uled by association, agents do not see rule in their roles. A
s
agents, they are m
ostly concerned w
ith their roles and w
hat they are free to
do w

ithin them
. T
o return once m
ore to the exam
ple of a m
arket, agents
participating in it generally have the sense that this is an
institution free of
rule. A
s sellers and buyers, they are nevertheless ruled as an
unintended
·····•·•
~r ,ho overri<e of their right to buy and sell. A
dam
Sm
ith's
C
O
N
S
TR
U
C
TIV
IS

M
: A
U
S
E
R
'S
M
A
N
U
A
L
77
-
invisible hand is a hand that rules and it
agents over others.
. '
rules to the advanlagc of som
e
A
s w
e saw
, quite a few

sch 1
d
.
.
anarchical. A
n anarchy is rule bo a;s
csc:tbe to_tcrnational relations as
everyone in association
as
y . o one to particular, and therefore by
,
an unintended conseq
f
h .
uncoordinated acts. R
ecall that a
ucnce o
t etr m
any,
1
unintended consequences can n
rnts
w
10 o~serve a ge_neral paltern of

consequences even if the
o anger be said to act w
ithout intending
intend to be 'ruled
for g~ c~nttoue to act as they had been acting. T
hey
O
reasons
and if they d'd
h
reasons, they w
ould m
ake other choice's.
,
not
ave good
If anarchy is a condition of rule un
1
then international
relations .
re ated to any agent's intentions
.
.

1s no anarchy
W
e need
1
'
todtcate the form
of rule in w
h' h
:
anot 1cr term
to
w
hat seem
to be unintended
tc
agents totend that they be ruled by
consequences of excrc. .
h .
.
eteronom
y is a better term
A
t
,sing t etr rights.

H
eronom
ous agents cannot a~t
o~om
~uagents
act freely, w
hile het-
society. From
a constructivist
rec y ..
ot
term
s refer to agents, not
autonom
ous, but their autono:rs~:ctve,
ho"'.e".er, agents arc alw
ays
autonom
y of other agents
T
h
y
w

ays ltm
tted by the (lim
ited)
.
e exercise of autonom
k
h
om
y a social condition
w
h' h
Y
m
a es
eteron-
'
tc
agents accept as an a
l
.
ten ed consequence of their ind'
'd
p_rarent y un1n-

d
~nt~m
ational society is heter~~:;~~~;utonom
ous
choices.
their todependence under the p .
. l
f y ruled because states exercise
of com
m
itm
ent-rules grantin
~nctp
o
sovereignty and under a num
ber
other. O
ne state's independc g
~m
nl~h'.s and duties w
ith respect to each
nee ts a
im
tt on every othc '

d
1
agents accept the unintended
rs,
an
a 1states'
vidual choices. W
ithin this gcc:c"selquend~e~
that result from
their m
any indi-
ra con 1t1on of rule arc to b
r,
d
1
num
er of institutions contributin to rul
.
.
'
e oun
a arge
b
not just states'

agents) constantf
e to a vanety of w
ays. A
gents (and
w
ithin them
. D
espite their n
b
Y
~ork _on these institutions and w
ork
relations, they are arranged a~~h er an
vanety, and the com
plexity of their
. .
ey are on purpose by age t , ·
.
serve th etr toterests--including the'
h
d.
, .
. n s tntent1ons, to
tr s are

tnterest m
betog ruled.
N
ote
K
urt B
~rch, H
arry G
ould, and V
endulka K
ubal
expos,tion of constructivism
as I h d d
1
~o_vapersuaded m
e to w
rite a concise
result is "A
C
onstructivist M
anifes:o" ("c;~uor:i ti m
1¥_orldof O
ur M
aA

ing ( 1989). The
for a scholarly audience introduc·
97), w
hich I w
rote in a telegraphic slyle
'I
I
'
m
g som
e new
m
at
. I
d I
.
t e
had planned m
y essay for th' b
k
ena an
eavm
g a great deal out
W

h
the .".M
anifesto" for a larger audie~ee o~ e~d:;entence-~y-sent~ncc
reconstruction of
add1t1onsond changes, and I deleted ali of.
I ~p m
aking quite n few
substantive
Its re atlvely few
citations. I am
grateful to
m
em
bers of the M
in.m
i International Relations G
roup for their questions and suggcs~
tions.
llibliograplly
· I
I
G

d
J989
W
orld o,f O
ur M
aking: R
ules and R
ule in Social
O
nuf N
ie 10 as
rccnw
oo ,
·
,
C
I'
p
T
l;eorv and International Relations. C
olum
bia:U

niversity of South a:o m
a re~~-
--
'1997, "A
C
onstructivist M
anifesto." In C
onstituting lntem
at1onal ~o/w
cal
£ c:onom
y,
.
·
ed
K
urt B
urch and R
obert A
. D
enem
ark, 7-17. B
oulder, C
O

. L
ynne
R
ienner.
-
4
W
hat Is at Stake in the
A
gent-Structure D
ebate?
H
arnJD
. G
ould
Introduction
A
s notedin the introductory chapter to this volum
e, the division of interna-
tional relations (IR
) into a series of debates has becom
e a conventional
device for m

aking sense of the field. B
eyond the "great debates," at least
three and possibly five in num
ber (W
rever 1997, 12-25), tw
o debates arc of
interest here: the "levels of analysis" debate touched off by D
avid Singer in
I 961 and especially the "agent-structure" debate initiated by A
lexander
W
endt in 1987.
Sim
ply put, the conceptual problem
at the heart of the agent-structure
debate is: H
ow
arc agents nnd structures related? O
ver the course of the
debate, this problem
has disappeared from
view
, or, m
ore to the point, the

debate itself has becom
e problem
atic. There are several problem
s: the posi-
tions held by som
e of the participants have changed over tim
e, the tenns of
debate have changed, and the serial subdebates have becom
e further re-
m
oved boih from
the core issue and from
IR
's substantive concerns.
T
he purpose of this paper is to put O
nurs constructivism
into the context
of the agent-structure debate, expanding on his contribution to
this book, his
book W
orld of O
ur M
aking (1989), and several articles w
hich have also

served to refine his position (O
nuf 1994, 1995, I 996, 1997). This w
ill entail
a brief review
of constructivism
, as w
ell as a detailed analysis in w
hich I
shall put constructivism
into dialogue w
ith the various positions staked out
during the debate. T
he concluding discussion w
ill look at the levels of
79
Anarchy is what states make of it: the
social construction of power politics
Alexander Wendt
The debate between realists and liberals has reemerged as an
axis of contention
in international relations theory. 1 Revolving in the past around
competing
theories of human nature, the debate is more concerned today

with the extent
to which state action is influenced by "structure" ( anarchy and
the distribution
of power) versus "process" (interaction and learning) and
institutions. Does
the absence of centralized political authority force states to play
competitive
power politics? Can international regimes overcome this logic,
and under what
conditions? What in anarchy is given and immutable, and what
is amenable to
change?
The debate between "neorealists" and "neoliberals" has been
based on a
shared commitment to "rationalism." 2 Like all social theories,
rational choice
directs us to ask some questions and not others, treating the
identities and
interests of agents as exogenously given and focusing on how
the behavior of
This article was negotiated with many individuals. If my
records are complete (and apologies if
they are not), thanks are due particularly to John Aldrich, Mike
Barnett, Lea Brilmayer, David
Campbell, Jim Caporaso, Simon Dalby, David Dessler, Bud
Duvall, Jean Elshtain, Karyn Ertel,
Lloyd Etheridge, Ernst Haas, Martin Hollis, Naeem Inayatullah,
Stewart Johnson, Frank Klink,
Steve Krasner, Friedrich Kratochwil, David Lumsdaine, M. J.
Peterson, Spike Peterson, Thomas
Risse-Kappen, John Ruggie, Bruce Russett, Jim Scott, Rogers
Smith, David Sylvan, Jan Thomson,
Mark Warren, and Jutta Weldes. The article also benefited from
presentations and seminars at the

American University, the University of Chicago, the University
of Massachusetts at Amherst,
Syracuse University, the University of Washington at Seattle,
the University of California at Los
Angeles, and Yale University.
1. See, for example, Joseph Grieco, "Anarchy and the Limits of
Cooperation: A Realist Critique
of the Newest Liberal Institutionalism," International
Organization 42 (Summer 1988), pp. 485-507;
Joseph Nye, "Neorealism and Neoliberalism," World Politi cs 40
(January 1988), pp. 235-51; Robert
Keohane, "Neoliberal Institutionalism: A Perspective on World
Politics," in his collection of essays
entitled International Institutions and State Power (Boulder,
Colo.: Westview Press, 1989), pp. 1-20;
John Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe
After the Cold War," International
Security 13 (Summer 1990), pp. 5-56, along with subsequent
published correspondence regarding
Mearsheimer's article; and Emerson Niou and Peter Ordeshook,
"Realism Versus Neoliberalism:
A Formulation," American Journal of Political Science 35 (May
1991), pp. 481-511.
2. See Robert Keohane, "International Institutions: Two
Approaches," International Studies
Quarterly 32 (December 1988), pp. 379-96.
International Organization 46, 2, Spring 1992
© 1992 by the World Peace Foundation and the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology
392 International Organization

agents generates outcomes. As such, rationalism offers a
fundamentally
behavioral conception of both process and institutions: they
change behavior
but not identities and interests. 3 In addition to this way of
framing research
problems, neorealists and neoliberals share generally similar
assumptions
about agents: states are the dominant actors in the system, and
they define
security in "self-interested" terms. Neorealists and neoliberals
may disagree
about the extent to which states are motivated by relative versus
absolute gains,
but both groups take the self-interested state as the starting
point for theory.
This starting point makes substantive sense for neorealists,
since they believe
anarchies are necessarily "self-help" systems, systems in which
both central
authority and collective security are absent. The self-help
corollary to anarchy
does enormous work in neorealism, generating the inherently
competitive
dynamics of the security dilemma and collective action
problem. Self-help is
not seen as an "institution" and as such occupies a privileged
explanatory role
vis-a-vis process, setting the terms for, and unaffected by,
interaction. Since
states failing to conform to the logic of self-help will be driven
from the system,
only simple learning or behavioral adaptation is possible; the
complex learning

involved in redefinitions of identity and interest is not. 4
Questions about
identity- and interest-formation are therefore not important to
students of
international relations. A rationalist problematique, which
reduces process to
dynamics of behavioral interaction among exogenously
constituted actors,
defines the scope of systemic theory.
By adopting such reasoning, liberals concede to neorealists the
causal
powers of anarchic structure, but they gain the rhetorically
powerful argument
that process can generate cooperative behavior, even in an
exogenously given,
self-help system. Some liberals may believe that anarchy does,
in fact,
constitute states with self-interested identities exogenous to
practice. Such
"weak" liberals concede the causal powers of anarchy both
rhetorically and
substantively and accept rationalism's limited, behavioral
conception of the
causal powers of institutions. They are realists before liberals
(we might call
them "weak realists"), since only if international institutions
can change
powers and interests do they go beyond the "limits" ofrealism. 5
3. Behavioral and rationalist models of man and institutions
share a common intellectual
heritage in the materialist individualism of Hobbes, Locke, and
Bentham. On the relationship
between the two models, see Jonathan Turner, A Theory of
Social Interaction (Stanford, Calif.:

Stanford University Press, 1988), pp. 24-31; and George
Homans, "Rational Choice Theory and
Behavioral Psychology," in Craig Calhoun et al., eds.,
Structures of Power and Constraint
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991), pp. 77-89.
4. On neorealist conceptions of learning, see Philip Tetlock,
"Learning in U.S. and Soviet
Foreign Policy," in George Breslauer and Philip Tetlock, eds.,
Learning in U.S. and Soviet Foreign
Policy (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1991), pp. 24-27. On
the difference between behavioral
and cognitive learning, see ibid., pp. 20-61; Joseph Nye,
"Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet
Security Regimes," International Organization 41 (Summer
1987), pp. 371-402; and Ernst Haas,
When Knowledge Is Power (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1990), pp. 17-49.
5. See Stephen Krasner, "Regimes and the Limits of Realism:
Regimes as Autonomous
Variables," in Stephen Krasner, ed., International Regimes
(Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press,
1983), pp. 355-68.
Anarchy 393
Yet some liberals want more. When Joseph Nye speaks of
"complex
learning," or Robert Jervis of "changing conceptions of self and
interest," or
Robert Keohane of "sociological" conceptions of interest, each
is asserting an
important role for transformations of identity and interest in the

liberal
research program and, by extension, a potentially much stronger
conception of
process and institutions in world politics.6 "Strong" li berals
should be troubled
by the dichotomous privileging of structure over process, since
transformations
of identity and interest through process are transformations of
structure.
Rationalism has little to offer such an argument, 7 which is in
part why, in an
important article, Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie argued
that its
individualist ontology contradicted the intersubjectivist
epistemology necessary
for regime theory to realize its full promise. 8 Regimes cannot
change identities
and interests if the latter are taken as given. Because of this
rationalist legacy,
despite increasingly numerous and rich studies of complex
learning in foreign
policy, neoliberals lack a systematic theory of how such
changes occur and thus
must privilege realist insights about structure while advancing
their own
insights about process.
The irony is that social theories which seek to explain identities
and interests
do exist. Keohane has called them "reflectivist"; 9 because I
want to emphasize
their focus on the social construction of subjectivity and
minimize their image
problem, following Nicholas Onuf I will call them
"constructivist." 10 Despite
important differences, cognitivists, poststructuralists,

standpoint and postmod-
ern feminists, rule theorists, and structurationists share a
concern with the
basic "sociological" issue bracketed by rationalists-namely, the
issue of
identity- and interest-formation. Constructivism's potential
contribution to a
strong liberalism has been obscured, however, by recent
epistemological
debates between modernists and postmodernists, in which
Science disciplines
Dissent for not defining a conventional research program, and
Dissent
celebrates its liberation from Science.11 Real issues animate
this debate, which
6. See Nye, "Nuclear Learning and U.S.-Soviet Security
Regimes"; Robert Jervis, "Realism,
Game Theory, and Cooperation," World Politics 40 (April
1988), pp. 340-44; and Robert Keohane,
"International Liberalism Reconsidered," in John Dunn, ed., The
Economic Limits to Modem
Politics (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), p.
183.
7. Rationalists have given some attention to the problem of
preference-formation, although in
so doing they have gone beyond what I understand as the
characteristic parameters of rationalism.
See, for example, Jon Elster, "Sour Grapes: Utilitarianism and
the Genesis of Wants," in Amartya
Sen and Bernard Williams, eds., Utilitarianism and Beyond
(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1982), pp. 219-38; and Michael Cohen and Robert
Axelrod, "Coping with Complexity: The
Adaptive Value of Changing Utility," American Economic

Review 74 (March 1984), pp. 30-42.
8. Friedrich Kratochwil and John Ruggie, "International
Organization: A State of the Art on an
Art of the State," International Organization 40 (Autumn 1986),
pp. 753-75.
9. Keohane, "International Institutions."
10. See Nicholas Onuf, World of Our Making (Columbia:
University of South Carolina Press,
1989).
11. On Science, see Keohane, "International Institutions"; and
Robert Keohane, "International
Relations Theory: Contributions of a Feminist Standpoint,"
Millennium 18 (Summer 1989), pp.
245-53. On Dissent, see R. B. J. Walker, "History and Structure
in the Theory of International
Relations," Millennium 18 (Summer 1989), pp. 163-83; and
Richard Ashley and R. B. J. Walker,
also divides constructivists. With respect to the substance of
international
relations, however, both modern and postmodern constructivists
are interested
in how knowledgeable practices constitute subjects, which is
not far from the
strong liberal interest in how institutions transform interests.
They share a
cognitive, intersubjective conception of process in which
identities and inter-

ests are endogenous to interaction, rather than a rationalist-
behavioral one in
which they are exogenous.
My objective in this article is to build a bridge between these
two traditions
(and, by extension, between the realist-liberal and rationalist-
reflectivist
debates) by developing a constructivist argument, drawn from
structurationist
and symbolic interactionist sociology, on behalf of the liberal
claim that
international institutions can transform state identities and
interests. 12 In
contrast to the "economic" theorizing that dominates
mainstream systemic
international relations scholarship, this involves a "sociological
social
psychological" form of systemic theory in which identities and
interests are the
dependent variable. 13 Whether a "communitarian liberalism" is
still liberalism
does not interest me here. What does is that constructivism
might contribute
significantly to the strong liberal interest in identity- and
interest-formation
and thereby perhaps itself be enriched with liberal insights
about learning and
cognition which it has neglected.
My strategy for building this bridge will be to argue against the
neorealist
claim that self-help is given by anarchic structure exogenously
to process.
Constructivists have not done a good job of taking the causal
powers of anarchy

seriously. This is unfortunate, since in the realist view anarchy
justifies
disinterest in the institutional transformation of identities and
interests and
thus building systemic theories in exclusively rationalist terms;
its putative
causal powers must be challenged if process and institutions are
not to be
subordinated to structure. I argue that self-help and power
politics do not
follow either logically or causally from anarchy and that if
today we find
ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to process, not
structure. There is no
"Reading Dissidence/Writing the Discipline: Crisis and the
Question of Sovereignty in Interna-
tional Studies," International Studies Quarterly 34 (September
1990), pp. 367-416. For an excellent
critical assessment of these debates, see Yosef Lapid, "The
Third Debate: On the Prospects of
International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era," International
Studies Quarterly 33 (September 1989),
pp. 235-54.
12. The fact that I draw on these approaches aligns me with
modernist constructivists, even
though I also draw freely on the substantive work of
postmodernists, especially Richard Ashley and
Rob Walker. For a defense of this practice and a discussion of
its epistemological basis, see my
earlier article, "The Agent-Structure Problem in International
Relations Theory," International
Organization 41 (Summer 1987), pp. 335-70; and Ian Shapiro
and Alexander Wendt, "The
Difference That Realism Makes: Social Science and the Politics

of Consent," forthcoming in
Politics and Society. Among modernist constructivists, my
argument is particularly indebted to the
published work of Emanuel Adler, Friedrich Kratochwil, and
John Ruggie, as well as to an
unpublished paper by Naeem Inayatullah and David Levine
entitled "Politics and Economics in
Contemporary International Relations Theory," Syracuse
University, Syracuse, N.Y., 1990.
13. See Viktor Gecas, "Rekindling the Sociological Imagination
in Social Psychology," Journal
for the Theory of Social Behavior 19 (March 1989), pp. 97-115.
Anarchy 395
"logic" of anarchy apart from the practices that create and
instantiate one
structure of identities and interests rather than another;
structure has no
existence or causal powers apart from process. Self-help and
power politics are
institutions, not essential features of anarchy. Anarchy is what
states make of it.
In the subsequent sections of this article, I critically examine
the claims and
assumptions of neorealism, develop a positive argument about
how self-help
and power politics are socially constructed under anarchy, and
then explore
three ways in which identities and interests are transformed
under anarchy: by
the institution of sovereignty, by an evolution of cooperation,

and by inten-
tional efforts to transform egoistic identities into collective
identities.
Anarchy and power politics
Classical realists such as Thomas Hobbes, Reinhold Niebuhr,
and Hans
Morgenthau attributed egoism and power politics primarily to
human nature,
whereas structural realists or neorealists emphasize anarchy.
The difference
stems in part from different interpretations of anarchy's causal
powers.
Kenneth Waltz's work is important for both. In Man, the State,
and War, he
defines anarchy as a condition of possibility for or "permissive"
cause of war,
arguing that "wars occur because there is nothing to prevent
them." 14 It is the
human nature or domestic politics of predator states, however,
that provide the
initial impetus or "efficient" cause of conflict which forces
other states to
respond in kind. 15 Waltz is not entirely consistent about this,
since he slips
without justification from the permissive causal claim that in
anarchy war is
always possible to the active causal claim that "war may at any
moment
occur." 16 But despite Waltz's concluding call for third-image
theory, the
efficient causes that initialize anarchic systems are from the
first and second
images. This is reversed in Waltz's Theory of International
Politics, in which first-

and second-image theories are spurned as "reductionist," and
the logic of
anarchy seems by itself to constitute self-help and power
politics as necessary
features of world politics.17
This is unfortunate, since whatever one may think of first- and
second-image
theories, they have the virtue of implying that practices
determine the
character of anarchy. In the permissive view, only if human or
domestic factors
cause A to attack B will B have to defend itself. Anarchies may
contain
dynamics that lead to competitive power politics, but they also
may not, and we
can argue about when particular structures of identity and
interest will emerge.
14. Kenneth Waltz, Man, the State, and War (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1959),
p.232.
15. Ibid., pp. 169-70.
16. Ibid., p. 232. This point is made by Hidemi Suganami in
"Bringing Order to the Causes of
War Debates," Millennium 19 (Spring 1990), p. 34, fn. 11.
17. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Boston:
Addison-Wesley, 1979).
In neorealism, however, the role of practice in shaping the

character of anarchy
is substantially reduced, and so there is less about which to
argue: self-help and
competitive power politics are simply given exogenously by the
structure of the
state system.
I will not here contest the neorealist description of the
contemporary state
system as a competitive, self-help world; 18 I will only dispute
its explanation. I
develop my argument in three stages. First, I disentangle the
concepts of
self-help and anarchy by showing that self-interested
conceptions of security
are not a constitutive property of anarchy. Second, I show how
self-help and
competitive power politics may be produced causally by
processes of interac-
tion between states in which anarchy plays only a permissive
role. In both of
these stages of my argument, I self-consciously bracket the
first- and second-
image determinants of state identity, not because they are
unimportant (they
are indeed important), but because like Waltz's objective, mine
is to clarify the
"logic" of anarchy. Third, I reintroduce first- and second-image
determinants
to assess their effects on identity-formation in different kinds of
anarchies.
Anarchy, self-help, and intersubjective knowledge
Waltz defines political structure on three dimensions: ordering
principles (in

this case, anarchy), principles of differentiation (which here
drop out), and the
distribution of capabilities. 19 By itself, this definition predicts
little about state
behavior. It does not predict whether two states will be friends
or foes, will
recognize each other's sovereignty, will have dynastic ties, will
be revisionist or
status quo powers, and so on. These factors, which are
fundamentally
intersubjective, affect states' security interests and thus the
character of their
interaction under anarchy. In an important revision of Waltz's
theory, Stephen
Walt implies as much when he argues that the "balance of
threats," rather than
the balance of power, determines state action, threats being
socially con-
structed.20 Put more generally, without assumptions about the
structure of
identities and interests in the system, Waltz's definition of
structure cannot
predict the content or dynamics of anarchy. Self-help is one
such intersubjec-
tive structure and, as such, does the decisive explanatory work
in the theory.
The question is whether self-help is a logical or contingent
feature of anarchy.
In this section, I develop the concept of a "structure of identity
and interest"
and show that no particular one follows logically from anarchy.
A fundamental principle of constructivist social theory is that
people act
toward objects, including other actors, on the basis of the
meanings that the

18. The neorealist description is not unproblematic. For a
powerful critique, see David
Lumsdaine, Ideals and Interests: The Foreign Aid Regime,
1949-1989 (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton
University Press, forthcoming).
19. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, pp. 79-101.
20. Stephen Walt, The Origins of Alliances (Ithaca, N.Y.:
Cornell University Press, 1987).
Anarchy 397
objects have for them. 21 States act differently toward enemies
than they do
toward friends because enemies are threatening and friends are
not. Anarchy
and the distribution of power are insufficient to tell us which is
which. U.S.
military power has a different significance for Canada than for
Cuba, despite
their similar "structural" positions, just as British missiles have
a different
significance for the United States than do Soviet missiles. The
distribution of
power may always affect states' calculations, but how it does so
depends on the
intersubjective understandings and expectations, on the
"distribution of
knowledge," that constitute their conceptions of self and other.
22 If society
"forgets" what a university is, the powers and practices of
professor and
student cease to exist; if the United States and Soviet Union

decide that they
are no longer enemies, "the cold war is over." It is collective
meanings that
constitute the structures which organize our actions.
Actors acquire identities-relatively stable, role-specific
understandings and
expectations about self-by participating in such collective
meanings. 23 Identi-
ties are inherently relational: "Identity, with its appropriate
attachments of
psychological reality, is always identity within a specific,
socially constructed
21. See, for example, Herbert Blumer, "The Methodological
Position of Symbolic Interactionism,"
in his Symbolic Interactionism: Perspective and Method
(Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall, 1969),
p. 2. Throughout this article, I assume that a theoretically
productive analogy can be made between
individuals and states. There are at least two justifications for
this anthropomorphism. Rhetori-
cally, the analogy is an accepted practice in mainstream
international relations discourse, and since
this article is an immanent rather than external critique, it
should follow the practice. Substan-
tively, states are collectivities of individuals that through their
practices constitute each other as
"persons" having interests, fears, and so on. A full theory of
state identity- and interest-formation
would nevertheless need to draw insights from the social
psychology of groups and organizational
theory, and for that reason my anthropomorphism is merely
suggestive.
22. The phrase "distribution of knowledge" is Barry Barnes's, as

discussed in his work The
Nature of Power (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1988); see also Peter
Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The
Social Construction of Reality (New York: Anchor Books,
1966). The concern of recent interna-
tional relations scholarship on "epistemic communities" with
the cause-and-effect understandings
of the world held by scientists, experts, and policymakers is an
important aspect of the role of
knowledge in world politics; see Peter Haas, "Do Regimes
Matter? Epistemic Communities and
Mediterranean Pollution Control," International Organization 43
(Summer 1989), pp. 377-404; and
Ernst Haas, When Knowledge Is Power. My constructivist
approach would merely add to this an
equal emphasis on how such knowledge also constitutesthe
structures and subjects of social life.
23. For an excellent short statement of how collective meanings
constitute identities, see Peter
Berger, "Identity as a Problem in the Sociology of Knowledge,"
European Journal of Sociology, vol.
7, no. 1, 1966, pp. 32-40. See also David Morgan and Michael
Schwalbe, "Mind and Self in Society:
Linking Social Structure and Social Cognition," Social
Psychology Quarterly 53 (June 1990), pp.
148-64. In my discussion, I draw on the following interactionist
texts: George Herbert Mead,Mind,
Self, and Society (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1934);
Berger and Luckmann, The Social
Construction of Reality; Sheldon Stryker, Symbolic
Interactionism: A Social Structural Version (Menlo
Park, Calif.: Benjamin/Cummings, 1980); R. S.
Perinbanayagam, Signifying Acts: Structure and
Meaning in Everyday Life (Carbondale: Southern Illinois
University Press, 1985); John Hewitt, Self

and Society: A Symbolic Interactionist Social Psychology
(Boston: Allyn & Bacon, 1988); and Turner,
A Theory of Social Interaction. Despite some differences, much
the same points are made by
structurationists such as Bhaskar and Giddens. See Roy
Bhaskar, The Possibility of Naturalism
(Atlantic Highlands, N.J.: Humanities Press, 1979); and
Anthony Giddens, Central Problems in
Social Theory (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979).
world," Peter Berger argues. 24 Each person has many identities
linked to
institutional roles, such as brother, son, teacher, and citizen.
Similarly, a state
may have multiple identities as "sovereign," "leader of the free
world,"
"imperial power," and so on. 25 The commitment to and the
salience of
particular identities vary, but each identity is an inherently
social definition of
the actor grounded in the theories which actors collectively hold
about
themselves and one another and which constitute the structure
of the social
world.
Identities are the basis of interests. Actors do not have a
"portfolio" of
interests that they carry around independent of social context;
instead, they
define their interests in the process of defining situations. 26 As
Nelson Foote

puts it: "Motivation ... refer[ s] to the degree to which a human
being, as a
participant in the ongoing social process in which he necessarily
finds himself,
defines a problematic situation as calling for the performance of
a particular
act, with more or less anticipated consummations and
consequences, and
thereby his organism releases the energy appropriate to
performing it." 27
Sometimes situations are unprecedented in our experience, and
in these cases
we have to construct their meaning, and thus our interests, by
analogy or invent
them de novo. More often they have routine qualities in which
we assign
meanings on the basis of institutionally defined roles. When we
say that
professors have an "interest" in teaching, research, or going on
leave, we are
saying that to function in the role identity of "professor," they
have to define
certain situations as calling for certain actions. This does not
mean that they
will necessarily do so ( expectations and competence do not
equal perfor-
mance), but if they do not, they will not get tenure. The absence
or failure of
roles makes defining situations and interests more difficult, and
identity
24. Berger, "Identity as a Problem in the Sociology of
Knowledge," p. 111.
25. While not normally cast in such terms, foreign policy
scholarship on national role

conceptions could be adapted to such identity language. See Kai
Holsti, "National Role
Conceptions in the Study of Foreign Policy," International
Studies Quarterly 14 (September 1970),
pp. 233-309; and Stephen Walker, ed., Role Theory and Foreign
Policy Analysis (Durham, N.C.:
Duke University Press, 1987). For an important effort to do so,
see Stephen Walker, "Symbolic
Interactionism and International Politics: Role Theory's
Contribution to International
Organization," in C. Shih and Martha Cottam, eds., Contending
Dramas: A Cognitive Approach to
Post-War International Organizational Processes (New York:
Praeger, forthcoming).
26. On the "portfolio" conception of interests, see Barry
Hindess, Political Choice and Social
Structure (Aldershot, U.K.: Edward Elgar, 1989), pp. 2-3. The
"definition of the situation" is a
central concept in interactionist theory.
27. Nelson Foote, "Identification as the Basis for a Theory of
Motivation," American
Sociological Review 16 (February 1951), p. 15. Such strongly
sociological conceptions of interest
have been criticized, with some justice, for being
"oversocialized"; see Dennis Wrong, "The
Oversocialized Conception of Man in Modern
Sociology,"American Sociological Review 26 (April
1961), pp. 183-93. For useful correctives, which focus on the
activation of presocial but
nondetermining human needs within social contexts, see
Turner,A Theory of Social Interaction, pp.
23-69; and Viktor Gecas, "The Self-Concept as a Basis for a
Theory of Motivation," in Judith
Howard and Peter Callero, eds., The Self-Society Dynamic

(Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1991), pp. 171-87.
Anarchy 399
confusion may result. This seems to be happening today in the
United States
and the former Soviet Union: without the cold war's mutual
attributions of
threat and hostility to define their identities, these states seem
unsure of what
their "interests" should be.
An institution is a relatively stable set or "structure" of
identities and
interests. Such structures are often codified in formal rules and
norms, but
these have motivational force only in virtue of actors'
socialization to and
participation in collective knowledge. Institutions are
fundamentally cognitive
entities that do not exist apart from actors' ideas about how the
world works.28
This does not mean that institutions are not real or objective,
that they are
"nothing but" beliefs. As collective knowledge, they are
experienced as having
an existence "over and above the individuals who happen to
embody them at
the moment." 29 In this way, institutions come to confront
individuals as more or
less coercive social facts, but they are still a function of what
actors collectively
"know." Identities and such collective cognitions do not exist

apart from each
other; they are "mutually constitutive." 30 On this view,
institutionalization is a
process of internalizing new identities and interests, not
something occurring
outside them and affecting only behavior; socialization is a
cognitive process,
not just a behavioral one. Conceived in this way, institutions
may be coopera-
tive or conflictual, a point sometimes lost in scholarship on
international
regimes, which tends to equate institutions with cooperation.
There are
important differences between conflictual and cooperative
institutions to be
sure, but all relatively stable self-other relations-even those of
"enemies"-
are defined intersubjectively.
Self-help is an institution, one of various structures of identity
and interest
that may exist under anarchy. Processes of identity-formation
under anarchy
are concerned first and foremost with preservation or "security"
of the self.
Concepts of security therefore differ in the extent to which and
the manner in
which the self is identified cognitively with the other,3' and, I
want to suggest, it
28. In neo-Durkheimian parlance, institutions are "social
representations." See Serge Moscov-
ici, "The Phenomenon of Social Representations," in Rob Farr
and Serge Moscovici, eds., Social
Representations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1984), pp. 3-69. See also Barnes, The

Nature of Power. Note that this is a considerably more
socialized cognitivism than that found in
much of the recent scholarship on the role of "ideas" in world
politics, which tends to treat ideas as
commodities that are held by individuals and intervene between
the distribution of power and
outcomes. For a form of cognitivism closer to my own, see
Emanuel Adler, "Cognitive Evolution: A
Dynamic Approach for the Study of International Relations and
Their Progress," in Emanuel
Adler and Beverly Crawford, eds., Progress in Postwar
International Relations (New York: Columbia
University Press, 1991), pp. 43-88.
29. Berger and Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality,
p. 58.
30. See Giddens, Central Problems in Social Theory; and
Alexander Wendt and Raymond Duvall,
"Institutions and International Order," in Ernst-Otto Czempiel
and James Rosenau, eds., Global
Changes and Theoretical Challenges (Lexington, Mass.:
Lexington Books, 1989), pp. 51-74.
31. Proponents of choice theory might put this in terms of
"interdependent utilities." For a
useful overview of relevant choice-theoretic discourse, most of
which has focused on the specific
case of altruism, see Harold Hochman and Shmuel Nitzan,
"Concepts of Extended Preference,"
is upon this cognitive variation that the meaning of anarchy and

-3 Constructivism A Users Manual N

-3 Constructivism A Users Manual N

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to -3 Constructivism A Users Manual N

Similar to -3 Constructivism A Users Manual N (20)

More from MartineMccracken314

More from MartineMccracken314 (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

-3 Constructivism A Users Manual N