After The Armada The Resilience And Resurgence Of The Spanish Monarchy During The Anglo-Spanish War

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After the Armada: The Resilience and Resurgence of the Spanish Monarchy during the Anglo-
Spanish War.
Student Name: Fearghal Fitzgibbon
Student ID: 0900 4556
Supervisor: Dr. Odette Clarke
Student Course: English and History
Date: 6/3/14

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Author's Declaration:
I hereby declare that this project is entirely my own work, in my own words, and that all
sources used in researching it are fully acknowledged and all quotations properly identified. It
has not been submitted, in whole or in part, by me or another person, for the purpose of
obtaining any other credit / grade. I understand the ethical implications of my research, and
this work meets the requirements of the Faculty of Arts, Humanities and Social Sciences
Research Ethics Committee.
Signature: Fearghal Fitzgibbon Date: 6th March 2014

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INTRODUCTION
The sixteenth century in Europe was to see the might of Habsburg Spain dominate. Its empire
was at its zenith with territories in the East Indies, Americas, the Low Countries, as well as
possessions in both modern-day France and Germany. The union of the Portuguese and
Spanish crowns in 1581 after the death of Sebastian I would see the dominions of the
Portuguese Empire come under its sway, a boundary that had been traditionally kept separate
by the Treaty of Tordesillas. In size and power it was unmatched by any single power in
Europe but its supremacy was threatened at home and abroad.
In the Mediterranean a near perpetual war had been fought with the Ottoman Empire
and other Muslim states, one that had its origins in the Reconquista and Crusades.1
While the
Habsburgs had emerged supreme, at Vienna, Malta, and Lepanto, to list their most famous
victories, the threat to the south and east always remained. From the ashes of these
Mediterranean wars would emerge another generational conflict, that of the Dutch revolt,
while traditional rivals such as France or newly nascent powers like England would clash with
Spanish imperial interests as they attempted to expand their influence.
So just as Spain was seen as the bulwark for Catholics in France and Ireland, so did
England assume the mantle to defend and aid Protestants in France and the Netherlands. The
continental intrigues would soon come to the fore as Henri of Navarre was beseeched to
petition Elizabeth for funds to recruit mercenaries. The fall of Antwerp was to be followed
three days later by the signing of the Treaty of Nonsuch between English and Dutch on the 20
August 1585. It guaranteed the deployment of an English army of 1,000 horse and 5,000 foot
1
Crowley, Roger. Empires of the Sea. p. 26

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in the Low Countries as well as the garrisoning of the ports of Flushing and Brill by English
troops.2
Spain had established itself as a supporter of their co-religionists in France, England
now had done likewise, backing their allies of the United Provinces against Spanish rule.
Tension had already been mounting with English piracy endemic against Spanish possessions
in the Americas, part of the policy of 'no peace beyond the line'. The dispatching of an English
expeditionary force as well as a treaty with the United Provinces was a declaration of war.
Over two decades of constant conflict were to arise from this building tension from the
1580s to the early 1600s, a time which saw Spain assailed on all fronts. Despite a superior
military, it possessed a largely antiquated navy, one more suited for smaller-scale conflict in
the Mediterranean, and its land forces were heavily reliant on foreigners and mercenaries. It
was also forced to police and safeguard a vast amount of scattered territories from newer
colonial possessions to holdings in Italy, France, Germany, the Netherlands, and North Africa.
This work undertakes to examine the conflict on sea and land, to see how the Spanish
monarchy was able to recover, and even thrive, in the wake of the 1588 Armada’s defeat.
2
Elliot. Europe Divided. p. 311.

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Chapter One: The War At Sea, Defeat to Victory
On the naval front, the common or populist trend in history has been to view the crisis of the
1590s as disastrous for not just the Spanish land campaigns but also their forays at sea. The
truth shows us that while at land the Spanish military still struggled, at sea even despite the
defeat of the Armada, Spain was able to use the defeat as an impetus for a mass rearmament;
much like the Ottomans did after the climactic battle of Lepanto some seventeen years
earlier.3
Much is written about the Armada, little is written about the English counter-armada
that floundered off the northern coast of Galicia in 1589.4
The Spanish Armada has traditionally been the subject of the bulk of the literature
referring to the Anglo-Spanish War of 1585-1604, fitting since it was the largest engagement
of the entire conflict. Philip II had been a co-monarch of England until the death of his
spouse, Mary I and thus had a claim to the English throne. Elizabeth I was also actively
supporting the Protestant cause in the Netherlands by backing the Dutch Revolt. Invading
England would not only allow for the cutting of resources to the rebellious United Provinces,
it would also put an end to English piracy against Spanish imperial possessions.5
The
Armada's mission, the conquest of England, came to be seen in a similar context to that of the
prior conquest of Portugal, the only means of assuring imperial security, the expense of the
expedition being justified in the overall strategic context that “to fight a purely defensive war
against England is to court a huge and permanent expense, because we have to defend the
Indies, Spain and the convoys travelling between them”.6
The Armada itself was to be only the conveyer of the invasion force. Only 28 out of
the 151 vessels were actually dedicated warships. The remainder were merely armed
3
Goodman. Spanish Naval Power. p. 2.
4
Fischer. English Warfare. p. 158.
5
Elliot. Europe Divided, 1559-1598. p. 306.
6
Parker. 'David or Goliath?'. P. 257.

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merchantmen and civilian ships. The Army of Flanders was positioned on the coast, having
sourced its own transport for the invasion. The Armada's main purpose was to ensure naval
superiority, sheltering the invasion fleet as it moved to its designated landing points near
London. The Armada was outnumbered by the opposing English fleet, though it did outgun it.
Similar to the Spanish, only 34 of the English ships were royal warships, the rest were a
mixture of armed merchantmen and privateers7
.
The arrival of the Spanish Armada succeeded in catching the English off guard as
despite a system of warning beacons, the news reached them late. Trapped by an incoming
tide at harbour in Plymouth, the Spanish had an opportunity to come in with the tide and
cripple the English fleet. This was overruled at the council of war and the fleet sailed
eastward, handing the initiative to the English. Anchored upwind at Eddystone Rocks, the
Armada remained unaware of the English fleet beating upwind the entire night to allow them
to gain the weather gage. This would be a critical factor in the coming conflict, a northern
navy showing the importance of agility and seamanship against an upgunned opponent.
At Gravelines the Armada, again anchored, were easy targets for the swifter English
fleet, succeeding in scattering them first with fireships (a tactic that had been utilized with
success) at Antwerp before closing in to engage them close-in as part of accepted doctrine. It
was a victory for the English fleet, forcing the Spanish ships to weigh anchor and venture into
the North Sea, attempting a long and dangerous voyage around Scotland and Ireland before
heading south for Spain.8
The failure of the Armada was the crux of a string of defeats to what could be termed
as an antiquated and backward navy. The traditional focus of the Habsburg navy had always
been the Mediterranean and remained so until 1580 in the reign of Philip II. With the focus on
war switching to the Atlantic, the Mediterranean saw little action save that of ferrying Spanish
7
Rodgers. 'Myth of Naval Power'.
8
Fallon. Ireland and the Armada.

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soldiers to Italy to begin their march north to Flanders.9
But the doctrine and influence of the
Mediterranean campaigns remained. Earlier Habsburg naval deficiencies, particularly in the
region of north-western Europe had already been keenly felt in wars with France from 1512-
1559.10
Traditionally this had been the preserve of their maritime possessions in Flanders,
Zeeland and Holland but the advent of the Dutch Revolt made this approach quite problematic
with their subjects sailing against the Crown rather than for it.11
Within Europe there had also been the common view that actions at sea were of only
secondary concern to the operations being conducted on land. There was little glory at sea, a
view which harkened back to the Middle Ages. Secondly, there was little understanding of the
overall strategic advantage nor potential force projection offered by a strong navy. This view
would not improve till a century later, “in the present state of Europe, it is colonies, trade and,
in consequence, sea power which must determine the balance of power upon this continent”12
.
The late sixteenth century was to at last see a revolution within the accepted doctrine and
practice, naval warfare finally evolving into its own sphere separate from that of land
operations.13
The Habsburg navy and its rival, the Ottomans, had traditionally focused on the galley
as the backbone of their sea-borne forces.14
Within the enclosed sea of the Mediterranean, a
vessel that utilized both oar and sail was at a distinct advantage.15
The difference between the
Habsburg view and that of their northern rivals was clear. A separation existed between the
poles of northern and southern European seamanship with the different conditions resulting in
different styles of ship. The northern ships used by the Dutch and English typically had a
9
Braudel, Ferdinand. The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II. P. 1188.
10
Glete, Jan. War and the State in Early Modern Europe. p. 87.
11
Ibid. p. 87.
12
Parker, Geoffrey. The Military Revolution. p. 82.
13
Development of Broadside Gunnery. p. 301.
14
Goodman. Spanish Naval Power, 1589-1665. p.2.
15
Ibid. p. 13.

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much higher freeboard than their southern rivals and were possessed of a much more suitable
keel for deep water voyaging than the xebecs and galleys favoured by the Spanish.16
The
galley had proven itself as an effective assault vessel and excellent for inshore fighting and
amphibious operations within the Mediterranean. But the greater effect of tidal currents and
inclement wind of the Atlantic coasts was not suitable for a primarily oar-driven craft.
The greater seaworthiness of northern vessels allowed for easier manipulation of the
weather gage, the greater agility afforded by being sited to windward of your target.17
Sea
battles had evolved to be based around tactical agility and out-sailing your opponent as
opposed to the positively medieval style of massed lines of galleys advancing on each other,
akin to the lines of battle formed on land. Galleys were habitually mounted with heavier guns,
especially at the bow (something impossible to do on a carrack) but they were fast becoming
an antiquated design.
The naval revolution was not pioneered by new ship designs nor new tactics, but a
mixture of the pair. A battle of manoeuvre required faster and more agile ships. Boarding
actions remained a viable tactic but the mounting of heavier cannon increased the risk of
closing in to grapple and board. Similarly, a fast ship with light cannon would be able to out-
sail a larger opponent and by remaining outside the arc of its cannon, thus disable it with
close-in broadsides.
The English had pioneered this modern naval warfare with innovators such as John
Hawkins and Francis Drake, decried as pirates by the Spanish but feted at home by
Elizabeth.18
Much of this English fighting experience with their smaller ships had been gained
in the undeclared war fought by privateers in the 1570s and 1580s in the vicinity of the
Spanish colonies. The practice of 'no peace beyond the line' referred to a belated recognition
16
Development of Broadside Gunnery. p. 302.
17
tBurgess, F.H. A History of Sailing. p. 220.
18
The New Atlantic: Naval Warfare in the 16th
Century. p. 238.

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of a near perpetual low intensity conflict that recognized no European treaties west and south
of the intersection of the Tropic of Cancer and the prime meridian passing through Ferro in
the Canary Islands.19
It relied on utilizing speed and surprise to maximum effect, allowing a
battle at sea to be won with inferior firepower.20
The psychological effect of closing in to
make the shot of a broadside count before tacking away to reload again.21
Spanish observers
described it as “small ships so swift that they gain the weather-gage and therefore victory”.22
It was the same tactics that were to be used against the Armada at Gravelines, mounting
squadron assaults and attempting to submit each ship to a constant hail of shot.23
Unlike in England or the United Provinces, ship-building in Spain had undertaken a
renaissance as the traditional craftsman culture was subverted by modern, mathematical
influenced designs. This was to have a major influence on the design of the new fleet after the
defeat of the Armada. Prior to it, most Spanish ships had been built with transatlantic voyages
in mind with large hulls capable of carrying immense amounts of stores and cargo.24
While
ship designs did improve towards the reign of Philip III, Spanish shipwrights still attempted to
create a ship capable of everything, whether it was speed, capacity, manoeuvrability or
stability, thus making it impossible to optimise one characteristic without costing another.25
Merchantmen required capacity, warships needed speed and manoeuvrability while stability
was vital to fishermen and upgunned galleons.26
The geo-political situation in western Europe took on another dimension when Philip
II annexed the Portuguese throne in 1581 after the death of its king Sebastian in Morocco.27
This added Portugal's extensive overseas colonies to Habsburg possessions as well as several
19
Mattingly, Garrett. 'No Peace Beyond What Line?' p. 145
20
Development of Broadside Gunnery. p. 307
21
22
Goodman. Spanish Naval Power. P. 6.
23
The New Atlantic. p. 309.
24
25
Ibid. p. 115.
26
Stradling. The Armada of Flanders. p. 165.
27
Parker. 'David or Goliath? Philip II and his world in the 1580s'. pp. 245-246.

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hundred miles of Atlantic coastline and naval ports.28
Unlike Spain, Portugal had a rich
history of deep ocean seafaring and had navigated successfully to India and Japan. Their
Atlantic experience was invaluable to the newly created sailing navy Spain had, the Spanish
inheritance as welcome addition to a military arm that was still struggling with basic
doctrine.29
Another major difference between the Mediterranean and Atlantic spheres of
operations was manifested in their traditional governance. The Mediterranean was an
enclosed sea and there was a rough line of demarcation between the Christian and Muslim
powers, akin almost to a frontline.30
Barbary piracy was a constant source of conflict as they
waged an intermittent war against Christian states, fronted by the North African regencies of
Tunis, Tripoli, and Algiers.31
The maintenance of fortresses and strategic ports on the
Mediterranean islands allowed for more effective policing of the sea and tighter control.32
The Atlantic, similar to its wilder weather, was much more lawless. Both English and
French monarchs had attempted to assert authority on the sea but the geographical situation
meant it was near impossible to police.33
Piracy was an accepted fact of life and not even
recognized as a crime until 1536 in English courts.34
At sea a certain degree of undeclared war
existed and whenever a formal state of war did exist between two nations, all vessels that flew
under one of their flags would use it as an opportunity to raid the commercial shipping lines
of their rivals.
A new example of this unrestricted warfare, were the so-called Waterguzen. The Sea
Beggars had been a constant thorn in the side of northern Spanish vessels since their capture
28
Glete. War and the State. p. 87.
29
Ibid. p. 89.
30
Crowley. Empires of the Sea. p. 33.
31
32
33
34
Ibid. p. 238.

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of the ports of Brill and Flushing in 1572.35
Though nominally under letters of marque
granted by William of Orange, their activities were nothing short of piracy.36
The failed Spanish invasion of England turned out to be a blessing in disguise as it
called for a severe restructuring in the Spanish navy. To safeguard the approach of the treasure
fleet from the Americas, a more efficient convoy system was put in place to guard against the
depredations of the privateers that constantly preyed on the Atlantic trade routes. The
predictability of the routes was so well known that English privateers were such a constant
sight off Cape St. Vincent lying in wait for Spanish traders that sailors nicknamed it 'the Cape
of Surprises'.37
The destruction of the Armada also allowed for the Spanish to redesign and refit their
navy, inspired by their defeat by their English counterparts. Despite a formal state of war
existing between England and Spain, English privateering success would not match its earlier
days in the Caribbean with many assaults on the Spanish treasure fleet being repulsed.38
The
repulse of the Armada saw over twenty galleons laid down at Spanish harbours in 1589, as
well as the appointment of a new admiral, Don Alonso de Bazan, one who had much
experience not just in the Mediterranean but more crucially, Atlantic waters.39
France seemed best suited for combating Spanish naval resurgence with its hundreds
of miles of coastline along the Mediterranean and Atlantic. The strife of civil and religious
war however had ensured that French naval power was at its lowest ebb during the 1590s, a
time when the Spanish control of the seas seemed impossible to contest.40
Similar to how they had suffered unrestricted warfare against their commercial
shipping by Protestant raiders, the Spanish now adopted a tactic from their enemies. The port
35
Goodman, David. Spanish Naval Power. p. 4.
36
37
Rodger. Weather, Geography and Naval Power in the Age of Sail. p. 189.
38
39
Ortzen. Famous Fighting Ships. p. 13.
40
James, Alan. French Naval Power. P. 1.

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of Dunkirk became an important base for privateers to operate against Dutch and English
shipping.41
Comprised mostly of locally recruited Flemings, the Dunkirkers were an apt
successor to the Sea-Beggars. Though blockaded constantly by the Dutch fleet, the
Dunkirkers showed consummate skill in breaking through to the open sea.42
An English counter-armada was attempted in the wake of the Armada's defeat, striving
to lay waste to Galicia and Portugal.43
Galicia was selected as it was an important centre for
Spanish Atlantic ship-building while a landing in Portugal was favoured in order to foment
discord and encourage a revolt against Spanish rule.44
The expedition was split down two
poles, that of Crown forces and adventurers, the latter being more interested in plunder than
gaining a strategic advantage.45
The presence of this mercenary element damned the
expedition to failure and squandered any attempt at opening an Iberian front, the privatisation
of the war had ruined a strategic opportunity.46
La Coruna had been besieged for little effect,
lip service to the Crown at attempting destruction of the Spanish fleet, most of which was at
anchor in Santander.47
The failed English expedition against Galicia and Portugal in 1589 gave a significant
advantage to Spanish naval resurgence as their opponents now retreated to port to re-arm and
re-supply their fleets. Despite the defensive war waged by the Royal Navy, English and Dutch
privateers continued to maintain a semi-regular presence off the Iberian coast, raiding Spanish
commercial shipping. Between 1589-91, English vessels captured 300 prizes worth to the
total of £400,000 with a regular £100,000 being plundered there upon each year after.48
English strategy was again steered by Sir John Hawkins, aiming to keep small squadrons of
41
Stradling. Armada of Flanders. p. 178.
42
Ibid. p. 13.
43
44
45
46
Ibid. p. 161.
47
Hernán, Enrique. Ireland and Spain in the Reign of Philip II. P. 180.
48
Parker. 'David or Goliath?'. p. 262.

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English ships between Spain and the Azores, seeking to sack the Spanish treasure fleet as they
made the final approach for Spanish ports.49
This unrelenting piracy was to force the Spanish
fleet to keep a squadron constantly on anti-piracy duties off the Iberian peninsula.
Lastly for the personnel that served within the ranks. Both Spain and Portugal had
inherent social stigmata attached to manual labour, which adversely affected the trade of
seamanship.50
Despite the ability for a Spanish nobleman to begin a career as a common
soldier on land, these social values did not exist within the navy, rarely did competent
gunners, seamen, or masters of ships get commissioned to officer status afloat.51
The
Mediterranean school of war again stuck to tradition with it being commonplace to promote
infantry captains to command Spanish warships, men who would possess prestige and were
capable of enforcing discipline and lead men into combat.52
Whatever benefit this was, it
meant a Spanish naval tradition of navigation and seamanship was lacking, explaining why
they were frequently out-sailed if not out-fought by their English and Dutch adversaries.
Spain was to gain invaluable naval experience in the Atlantic from waging its war
against England and the United Provinces. The organizational framework that had designed
Europe's best infantry and galley squadrons did not work in the north-west, forcing for the
creation of a new tradition.53
Despite numerous setbacks in the 1580s, Spain's naval strength
was to be supreme throughout the 1590s and constantly mounted operations against an
English navy that for all the myths of its superiority was nearly constantly on the defensive.54
49
Ortzen. Famous Fighting Ships. p. 11.
50
Glete. War and the State. P 89.
51
Ibid. p. 89.
52
Stradling. Armada of Flanders. p. 161.
53
54
Rodgers. The Myth of Seapower during the Reign of Queen Elizabeth. p. 157.

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Chapter Two: The War on Land, Failure to Adapt
By comparison with Spanish nautical endeavour, Habsburg prowess on land was well noted
and feared. The 16th
century had been one in which the Habsburg star had risen and on the
battlefield Spanish infantry were rightly feared. The war was to be fought in the main on the
European mainland with the conflict concentrated in the Netherlands and Normandy along
with sporadic actions in Brittany, Cornwall, Germany, and Ireland.
Spain itself had become a united domain only in 1492 with the fall of the last Moorish
stronghold in Granada but the close of that medieval conflict would be contrasted with a
military revolution in just over a decade later with the Spanish victory at Cerignola during the
Italian Wars. The Spanish commander Gonzalo Fernández de Córdoba fought a commendable
action, forming his infantry into mixed detachments that would be the predecessor to the
famous tercio. Facing a still medieval French force comprised of heavy gendarme cavalry and
Swiss mercenaries, he used combined arms skilfully to win what is widely hailed as the first
battle ever won by gunpowder. 55
The Swiss were the first to show that the pike square could
be used both offensively and defensively and still win56
. The tercio model would build on it
and add the striking power of firearms that the pike lacked.
To understand the tercio system is to understand the Spanish imperial success. The
early modern period saw the first real transition from a feudal style of warfare where
mercenaries and local levies predominated; to one where a nation’s military was centred on a
core of professional volunteers.57
Though the élite of the army was Spanish, recruitment was
made from a number of nations, the practice of which was especially noted in Army of
Flanders, in its own way a microcosm for the rest of the Imperial land forces, particularly as
55
Hall. Renaissance Weapons & Warfare. p. 167.
56
Hayes-McCoy, G.A. Irish Battles. p. 94.
57
Tallett, Frank. War and Society in Early Modern Europe. p. 88.

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they found themselves shouldering the brunt of the conflict. A strict hierarchy was maintained
relating to the nationality of recruits with Spaniards considered the best, closely followed by
Italians, British (used to encompass Irish, Welsh, Scottish and English), and Burgundians,
with Germans and Walloons at the bottom of the ranking.58
The Spanish troops deserved their
reputation, being rightly feared on the battlefield. Nicknames such as ‘The Invincibles’ or
‘The Immortals’ were not uncommonly attributed to certain tercios. Despite the large
mercenary or expatriate complement present within units, the Spanish core was meant to
provide a model for discipline and cohesiveness on the battlefield for the foreigners. In the
words of Philip II, they were considered “the sinews of the army and a true wall for the
conservations of those provinces”59
.
The Army's composition in 1588 at the height of the war accurately depicts this. On
paper with a strength of 63,455 men in total, only 9,668 of these soldiers were Spanish, less
than a sixth. Locally recruited soldiers from the Netherlands formed nearly half the army,
numbering at 30,211 while the Germans came second with 11,309 in the ranks. The other
nations with numbers large enough to be organized into distinct formations were 5,339
Italians, 1,722 British, and lastly 1,556 Burgundians60
. The remaining 3,650 were cavalry,
showing the low priority and usefulness for them in the Dutch Revolt. At various times there
would be regiments from Albania, Croatia, France, Liege, Lorraine, or Switzerland but they
never reached the status of 'nation' within the Army of Flanders.61
The tercio itself was an imposing formation, centred round a hollow square of
pikemen and swordsmen. The harquebusiers and musketeers then formed into smaller mobile
units known as sleeves that were arranged along the square. The pikes presented a deterrent
to any mounted assault, the swordsmen allowed for a quick counter-attack, and the firepower
of the muskets and harquebuses allowed for the tercio to threaten targets avoiding hand to
58
Tallett, Frank. War and Society in Early Modern Europe. p. 89.
59
De Léon, Fernando Gonzalez. The Road to Rocroi. P. 95.
60
Parker, Geoffrey. The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road. P. 272.
61
De Léon. Road to Rocroi. p. 95.

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hand combat. 62
The effect to the enemy was to perceive a moving bastion that resembled a
glacier in its speed.
On standard lines, the tercio was meant, albeit on paper, to number 3,000 men. This
was further split in 12 individual companies of which 10 were pike and 2 shot. Both types of
company possessed 11 officers to coordinate their efforts. A pike company was comprised of
219 pikemen supplemented by 20 musketeers to provide some local fire support. The shot
company then was made up of 224 arquebusiers, supplemented by a further 15 musketeers in
order to increase its striking power.63
How this ratio was only true on paper as attrition as
well as desertion meant companies normally numbered in the 120-150 range for manpower,
meaning the overall tercio was frequently closer in number to 1,500. Spanish commanders in
this period also complain of the poor quality of recruits from the Netherlands, meaning that
the heavier muskets were generally replaced by the lighter harquebuses as local recruits
struggled with the weight of the musket which could weigh up to double that of the lighter
firearm.64
Officers also appeared to encourage (or at the very least, turn a blind eye) in favour
of a higher ratio of shot to pike, a telling sign of their priorities with shot being of much more
use in smaller skirmishes. As one officer in the Army of Flanders blithely put it 'Captains are
especially required to be men of long experience and to understand the military art better than
their subordinates'.65
The Spanish infantry were not the only ones to be formed up in this style. Italian and
British infantry were also organized into tercio units, hoping to emulate the success of the
Spanish. At the turn of the century, the Burgundian and Walloon infantry were also organized
into tercios, with only the German infantry remaining in a regimental organization. The
blocks were typically arranged in a staggered formation with two forward and one back. This
see-saw or dragon tooth formation allowed for enfilading lines of fire against central assaults
62
Hayes-McCoy. Irish Battles. p. 164.
63
Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe. P. 178.
64
Hammer. Early Modern Warfare. p. 242.
65
Gonzalez de León. Technical Expertise. p. 66.

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and the ponderous weight of the tercios to swamp an opponent into submission.66
But despite the unparalleled success of the tercio on the battlefield, its opponents had
wisely learned to avoid fighting it where possible. The Dutch Revolt was to see the United
Provinces avoid conflicting with the Spanish military in set-piece battles. Instead the Army of
Flanders was to find itself fighting a guerrilla war with most of its strength scattered in
garrisons and the nature of the conflict made up by a series of skirmishes and ambushes. The
campaigning of the 1580s was instead to be of a slogging nature with drawn-out sieges from
Ypres in the south to Deventer in the north.67
It was a protracted, drawn out conflict with no
single decisive victory to end it.
As the bounds of the war extended, the Army of Flanders was to find itself engaging
in different theatres that required different approaches. South of Flanders when the Army
clashed with French forces was a campaign drastically different from that in the north. The
French were famous for their cavalry, in particular the heavy gendarmes, and the Spanish
were forced to make use of locally recruited Walloon cavalry to match them.
France had only declared war officially on Spain in 1595, despite frequent Spanish
intervention on the side of the Catholic League.68
The Spanish intervention into French
internal problems meant the opening up of four more spheres of operations in addition to that
of Holland and naval actions, Languedoc, Lombardy, Franche-Comté, and Brittany were now
all areas of conflict.69
The latter had been invested by a Spanish landing which had succeeded
in limiting Anglo-French control to the port of Brest.70
Likewise Spain had tipped the balance
in battles at Craon and Blaye in 1592 and 1593 respectively.71
Their taking of Calais in 1596
gave them a stranglehold on the English Channel for the two years they controlled the port. It
also showed the force projection of the land forces as they had been able to directly aid their
naval brethren by securing a viable port for them. Their English adversaries faced similar
66
Hayes-McCoy. Irish Battles. p. 164.
67
Parker, Geoffrey. The Dutch Revolt. p. 212.
68
Garrisson, Janine. A History of Sixteenth Century France, 1483-1598. p. 386.
69
Parker, Geoffrey. The Grand Strategy of Philip II.
70
Garrisson. A History of Sixteenth Century France. p. 387.
71
Knecht, Rupert, J. The French Wars of Religion: 1559-1598. p. 72.

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concerns, fighting not just in the Low Countries but also Normandy, Brittany, Ireland, the
Scottish Borders, and the sea.72
The French tradition of horsemanship invariably came off the worse when they
clashed with the Habsburg infantry.73
One observer described an affray how
'of all the combatants the French horse found matters most deadly for all around them were
the trained Spanish spraying on both sides volleys of deadly lead shot. Thus the field was
covered with the pitiful carnage of dying noble knights as well as with heaps of dying
horses'74
The French may have replaced the lance with the pistol but there was still a tendency
for them to fight battles in a medieval fashion, commanders leading cavalry charges from the
front rather than directing the battle from safely behind their lines, this tendency for bravery
led the Duke of Parma to remark of Navarre, “I expected to see a general, this is only an
officer of light cavalry”.75
Interestingly, it appears that at a time when Spanish military supremacy was being
challenged by innovative developments such as the reforms of Maurice of Nassau, official
policy kept the tercio system stagnant with its pike to shot ratio, while it was line
commanders who encouraged a larger proliferation of gunpowder weapons within their
ranks.76
Nieuwpoort in 1600 illustrates the growing military revolution that was leaving Spain
behind. In the context of the campaign, it was merely a tactical success but for the purpose of
military reform and advances, it was a glimpse into the future. Maurice of Nassau's reforms
had been born of classical imitation, reorganizing his formations into smaller 550 man
battalions that resembled the Roman cohort.77
Their depth was shallower than the larger
Spanish tercios, allowing for a wider frontage that allowed more firearms to be brought to
72
73
Hall. Renaissance Weapons & Warfare. p. 168.
74
Renaissance Arms and Armour. p. 182
75
Baumgartner, Frederic J. France in the Sixteenth Century. p. 255.
76
77
Van der Hoeven. Exercise of Arms. p. 80.

Fitzgibbon 19
bear on the encroaching enemy.78
At Nieuwpoort the Dutch and English allied troops (making
up half the contingent) were drawn up in three lines, again similar to the classic legionary
model utilized by the Romans.79
In addition to this, Maurice had adopted a countermarch
method for his musketeers, emulating the technique used by Roman slingers and javelineers
where six rotating ranks would provide a near continuous storm of shot. It turned out that ten
ranks would be required80
.
The victory went to Maurice. His troops had defeated a Spanish army and driven
them from the field, a feat of arms that few other armies were able to match in the 16th
century.81
Then he was to be stricken by the curse that damned all warfare in the
Netherlands, winning a tactical victory but unable to exploit it for strategic gain in the greater
context of the campaign. Yet despite the success of his reforms, the veteran Spanish infantry
had weathered the storm of shot and pushed through it.82
Only for being outnumbered and
exhausted from a succession of forced marches, they might yet have carried the day.
Regardless of the weight of firepower, Nieuwpoort illustrated the tenacity of the average
Spanish soldier as well as the irresistible force of the tercio when it impacted. The Walloon
infantry too had performed exemplary on the field.
Indeed the Spanish reputation for soldiering deserves much of the credit in these
campaigns. One officer summed up the hardship his men endured with 'the cold of the sentry-
go, the danger of the assaults, the horror of the battles, the hunger of the sieges, the
destruction of the mines'.83
Another admitted amazement at the endurance of his rank and file
who 'resisted the enemy's attacks with an empty belly'.84
Unlike many other nation-states who
had their senior ranks comprised of nobles, dilettantes, and adventurers, Spanish officers
tended to be hard-nosed professionals who had served in numerous campaigns. Though
78
Ibid. p. 81.
79
80
Military Revolution. p. 19.
81
Van der Hoeven. Exercise of Arms. p. 106.
82
83
Parker, Geoffrey. Army of Flanders. p. 185.
84
Ibid. p. 185.

Fitzgibbon 20
nepotism and the buying of commissions was still common, it was nowhere near as endemic
in other armies. Don Sancho de Londono exemplified this model with his pronouncement of
'individual captains must be selected from among the fittest and most capable found in the
military profession, and they must be either known personally by those who select them or by
sufficient reports from trustworthy persons of the same profession, because he who is not a
soldier can hardly vouch for he who is'.85
Their enemies facing similar conditions did not rise
to the task with the majority of English casualties attributed to disease, forced marches and
bad rations.86
Though generally of gentle birth, many started off their service as private
soldiers, known as particulares. These gentlemen-rankers were a prized addition in the
Spanish infantry as their zest for promotion lent them a certain élan on the field.87
The idea
above all was to ensure that the infantry received commanders who were competent as “it
would be much better if they were given to captains and old soldiers who have served well”88
A typical example of the Spanish officer in this period was Juan Del Áquila. Enlisting
at the age of 18, he was to see action in Sicily, Malta, Corsica, North Africa, northern Italy,
the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, France, Ireland, and England.89
Del Áquila was to serve in
the Netherlands from 1567 and be witness to most of the major military events of his day.
From the pacification of rebels on the Mediterranean islands, to the relief of stricken
fortresses or the storming of breaches, Del Áquila was famously presented at the court of
Philip II as “Your Majesty, meet a man born without fear”90
. Del Áquila was a perfect
example of the standard officer of the day who was ruthlessly efficient, a consummate
professional and practical above all else91
.
The aforementioned nationality conflicts also sporadically paralyzed the Habsburg
plans. Friction was most noticed within the infantry who were segregated along national
85
86
87
De León. Road to Rocroi. p. 125.
88
89
90
Fischer, Mark Charles. English Warfare: 1511-1642. p.226.
91
Ibid. p. 227.

Fitzgibbon 21
lines. The support arms of cavalry and artillery were much more cohesive and rarely an issue.
Indeed prior to the 1590s, foreigners had been held in derision within the Habsburg high
command. Italians were “very disorderly people”, locals from the Netherlands whether
Flemish or Walloon were dubbed as “mediocre and less than mediocre” while the Germans
were rated as “good only for parades”92
. The tercio began as an exclusively Spanish system
but it was eventually opened to foreigners, causing resentment amongst the Spanish élite.
This along with the ending of the traditional granting of the vanguard to a Spanish tercio
would be a source of constant divisiveness throughout campaigns.
The Spanish privilege continued to the traditional practice of granting Spanish officers
superior status over that of a foreign officer of equal rank. At one point 36 out of 66 Walloon-
Flemish companies were commanded by Spanish officers while out of 11 regimental
commands, 4 were awarded to veteran Spaniards. A reform was made in the 1580s to make
seniority the sole deciding factor but it nonetheless left an ugly atmosphere with the
veterans93
. Though by the late 1580s, more equality was achieved within the ranks, the army
had split into three distinct national groups. The Spaniards (including the Portuguese after
their annexation in 1580), Italians (generally Sicilians and Neapolitans), and the Walloon-
Flemish, derisively referred to as “los nativos” (the natives) by the expatriate soldiers.
This division within the army meant that senior officers would countermand or ignore
orders from officers they disliked with the conflict between Mansfelt and Mondragón a
particularly bad example. With the army paralyzed in this fashion, it was a simple matter for
the more cohesive Dutch under Maurice of Nassau to sweep southward and capture towns
such as Breda, Zutphen, Nijmegen, and Deventer in a series of brilliantly organized
campaigns94
. This feud escalated to political concern when provincial councils in Spanish
Flanders sent a petition to the court referring to the appointment of Spanish colonels who did
not speak the language of their Walloon-Flemish or German troops. In reality, it was a thinly
92
Parker. Army of Flanders. p. 97.
93
94
Road to Rocroi. p. 100

Fitzgibbon 22
veiled attempt to challenge the supremacy of the Spanish language which was the official
language of the army, the one all soldiers were expected to understand for the purpose of
comprehending orders and instruction even though Spaniards themselves never made up
more than 15% of the complement in the northern forces95
.
As such, the war at land for the Habsburgs throughout the 1580s and 1590s was to
follow the familiar pattern of the odd set-piece battle coupled with grinding sieges and
mounting expense. The strategic emphasis on land operations was evident with the constant
build-up and transport of soldiers to the Flanders front. And of the troops transported during
this time, only some 10% were sent via sea, showing the ever growing importance of the land
link with the northern Spanish possessions.96
While the Habsburg infantry were still proving
their quality, it was clear that the superiority of the vaunted tercio was being slowly eroded by
the increasing power of gunpowder, previously the architect in Spanish success. Dutch
reforms along with the attrition of fighting on several fronts stretched the impressive
Habsburg military machine to the limit.
95
Ibid. 101. 96.
96
Stradling, R.A. The Armada of Flanders. p. 241.

Fitzgibbon 23
CHAPTER THREE. The Long Road To Peace
By the 1590s, the impetus for the war was beginning to wane. The Habsburg empire was
fighting the might of three nations, the French intervention having developed into a full-scale
war with the accession of Navarre to the throne. The first treaty was signed in 1598, the Peace
of Vervins between France and Spain.97
The war was one that Philip II had begun, his death
in 1598 meant his successor would be eager to conclude it. The coronation of Philip III
showed a strategic shift with the war entering its final phase as he strove to conclude it.
Above all, one simple fact of the war stood out amongst the rest. The vast imperial
treasury was finally running dry. Despite the securement of the supply lines and treasure
fleets coming from abroad, the truth remained that the Habsburg crown were spending more
than could be sustained. Before the war, in just over two and a half years between late 1577
and early 1580, the crown had spent 516, 189 escudos in pattards of 20. With the
intensification of the war between 1585 and 1590, they had spent a further 1,014,557 escudos
in pattards of 5798
. The paymaster of the Army of Flanders had estimated that 8.4 million
escudos would be required a year.99
In reality, he received the much lower amount of 3.69
million, a sign of the crippling financial trouble the Habsburg military were subject to.100
Unable to operate within parameters, the Spanish garrisons and commands were prone to
desertion or the more crippling scourge of mutiny.
Naturally it was not just the Habsburgs who were vulnerable to these crushing costs of
warfare. Their enemies too suffered from crippling debt and were to be anxious for a
resolution of the conflict. In 1589 the crown had paid £5,111 to Drake and Hawkins for
fireships, £50,909 to the Treasurer of the Fleet, £17,757 to the Irish garrisons, as well as a
97
Munck. Seventeenth-Century Europe. p. 9.
98
99
Ibid. p. 288.
100

Fitzgibbon 24
substantial £77,422 to support the revolt in the Low Countries.101
The Dutch meanwhile were
paying annually over 9 million guilders to sustain their standing army, a staggering cost from
a population of less than 2 million.102
Despite the terrible debt they were in, Spain had held its own thus far in the war. It
had not lost much ground and had successfully prevented a Protestant France and retaken
much of the Low Countries, Ireland too was in open rebellion. However they had failed to
land a decisive blow against their enemies, with the war having dragged on interminably. Of
course while much Spanish success during this period was rightfully attributed to the
common soldiers and junior officers who fought in the conflict, as much blame must be laid
on them for that peculiar phenomenon that was a character trait of the time and undoubtedly
crippled Spanish operational efforts, that which was mutiny. The reports seemed almost
impossible to more sheltered courtiers further south in Madrid,
'I was forgetting to you a dreadful and most unworthy thing that His Excellency
Resquesens said to me: he insisted that it was not the prince of Orange who had the lost the
Low Countries, but the soldiers born in Vallodolid and Toledo, because the mutineers had
driven money out of Antwerp and destroyed all credit and reputation, and he believed that
within eight days His Majesty would not have anything left here, it was a speech of almost
three hours.'103
Such was the worrying nature of dire reports from the north. Mutinies had always been apart
of the northern Spanish forces, but in the conflict of the 1580/90s, they seemed to take on
almost epidemic proportions. Between 1572 and 1607, more than 45 mutinies were to take
place, but of these, more than half took place in the period 1596-1607.104
The effects of a
prolonged crises des subsistances in the Low Countries had much to blame for this plague of
insubordination. Invariably the mutinies were centred around what could be described as
expatriate troops who had come from Britain, Ireland, Spain, Italy, Germany and so on who
101
Fischer, Mark Charles. English Warfare: 1511-1642. p. 163.
102
Munck.Seventeenth-Century Europe. p. 38.
103
104
Ibid. p. 186.

Fitzgibbon 25
were finding themselves billeted amongst a hostile civilian population.105
Spanish and
German troops in particular were guilty of organized mutiny in an effort to improve their
lot.106
Here the harshness of the regular officers could backfire as often it only took a spark to
set off the conflagration. In the words of one officer 'upon men who are depressed by the ruin
of the hopes they had founded on the last offensive, exhausted by years of war, small
incidents have large effects'.107
The scourge of mutiny could affect all. At Weert in 1600, 1,927 soldiers mutinied. 504 were
Walloons, another 480 Italians while only 104 Spaniards, 42 Irish and 44 Germans and
Burgundians were party to it.108
Interestingly, 744 of the mutineers were cavalrymen,
nominally seen as higher status and generally better paid than the common foot soldier. The
multi-national nature of the later mutinies was in response to the high command's tactic of
attempting to suppress mutinies with a different nationality. If a mutiny occurred in a garrison
amongst one nationality, they would attempt to sway others. Similarly if the pikemen
mutinied, the cavalry or musketeers would join as there was little to lose. What crippled the
Habsburg efforts most was that mutiny was unpredictable and it could hamper or hamstring
plans before they were even mounted. A unit could wait until it was ordered to move out of
garrison quarters before taking its chance at mutiny.
As mentioned above, mutinies were becoming epidemic in the northern forces. However it is
important to state that despite the near bankrupt state of the Imperial treasury, money was not
the sole motive for mutineers in the tercios. If it were, the entire Habsburg military from
Hungary to the New World would have revolted. Pay in arrears was nothing new and many
units remained loyal despite substantial payments owed to them. Paradoxically, units who had
been paid up to date and owed little would mutiny at the slightest provocation. And when the
mutiny was settled, the cost was extortionate. The first at Diest in 1590-91 cost 750,000
105
Hammer. Early Modern Warfare. p. 220
106
Ibid. p. 221.
107
108
Ibid. p. 197.

Fitzgibbon 26
florins while the second between 1599-1601 cost 1.3 million florins, an unsustainable cost.109
War-weariness had begun to seep in to the character of the Spanish military. This
malaise had been growing since the 1570s in what was becoming to many, a perpetual war.
The tercio mutinies seemed to show frustration at the duration of the war and disgust at its
conduct and futility. The bravery of the common infantry was not in question, at Haarlem and
Zierkikzee the infantry did not mutiny until after the victory and it was quite common for the
tercios to discharge their duty in battle before expressing their displeasure. The lack of leave
for soldiers serving in the Netherlands was accepted practice but such was the deprivations of
winter campaigning that mutineers begged that
'His Excellency should not keep the soldiers more than six months in the field unless
there is great necessity on account of the great sufferings caused by the frosts and the cold
which have caused many soldiers to die, frozen to death on the open road or keeping watch in
the trenches'110
.
While Spanish naval strength had seen a resurgence throughout the 1590s, their force
projection ashore was as much a hindrance as a help. Brittany had been successfully invested
for the French Catholic League and the successful raid on Cornwall in 1595 was an example
of effective combined arms.111
It was the Spanish intervention in Ireland though that stretched
too far. Spain had proven itself of achieving victory in theatres of conflict but the sheer scale
of the war and their numerous commitments meant sapping one zone of conflict of resources
in order to strengthen another. Commands had to be maintained not just in the Netherlands,
Brittany and Normandy but also the Langeudoc region.112
Garrisons also demanded upkeep
in Italy and in the various Mediterranean fortresses while fleets for both the Mediterranean
and Atlantic required servicing. Ironically England had the same difficulty. In addition to
their expeditionary forces in France and Holland, they were forced to strengthen a substantial
military fighting in Ireland. Spanish naval endeavour also necessitated the keeping of a
109
110
Parker, Geoffrey. The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road. P. 199
111
Rodgers. Myth of Elizabethan Seapower. p.
112
Glete. War and State. p. 112.

Fitzgibbon 27
garrison along the southern coasts in addition to the regular garrisons on the Scottish Border.
The logistical strains of such campaigns were an enormous cost, particularly on nations that
had yet to fully develop a fiscal military.
Habsburg aid to Ireland had been ongoing since the 1570s, their co-religionists
receiving aid of arms and supplies in a constant trickle. Similar to Protestantism in the
Netherlands, Catholicism in Ireland had drawn strength from its identification with
nationalism.113
What the Netherlands was to Spain, so Ireland was to England. Landings had
been attempted before, most notably at Smerwick during the Desmond Wars where 600
Italian and Spanish soldiers were butchered after their surrender114
. Spanish infantry
instructors, along with Irish veterans of Flanders had provided instruction for the northern
lords, Hugh O'Neill's.
At Clontribert in1595, the Spanish training had definitely had an effect as English
survivors of the battle attested to Irish soldiery and skill “that in no place wheresoever he had
served in all his life he never saw more readier or perfecter shot”.115
The effect of Spanish
drill ensured that the best of the Irish household troops could match an English garrison man
for man though the Irish remained content to maintain a constant gruelling state of guerrilla
actions against the English columns. Victories at Yellow Ford and Moyry Pass showed that
battles could be won this way but not wars due to Hugh O'Neill's reluctance to match the
English in a pitched battle. An English chronicler lamented the fact that “he will not fight
upon the plain, however great advantage he has, but will lay all passes and streights for her
Majesty's forces”116
. O'Neill's traditional gallowglasses and kerns had been modernized to
become pikemen and calivermen, akin almost to their Spanish allies and English foes in
appearance if not professionalism.117
113
Elliot. Europe Divided. p. 302.
114
Berleth, Richard. The Twilight Lords. p. 173.
115
116
117
Falls. Elizabeth's Irish Wars. p. 268.

Fitzgibbon 28
The Irish conflict was to aid Spain substantially. Though English aid to the Dutch rebels had
proceeded throughout the 1580s and beyond, their expeditionary force in the Netherlands
never exceeded 12,000 men. Such was the situation in Ireland that at its height, 18,000
soldiers were deployed to fight the rebels under the Earl of Essex. Essex had at his disposal
16,000 infantry, 1,300 cavalry as well as ancillary support staff and officers.118
Elizabeth was
also forced to send raw replacements to the Dutch expeditionary force while sending the
veterans to Ireland, weakening the overall strength of the allied units in the Netherlands.
Essex was also a mediocre and amateur commander at best, prompting horror from his peers
on previous campaigns in Galicia and Brittany where he'd challenged opponents to single
combat.119
This was partially responsible for Maurice of Nassau proceeding with his reforms
to create a professional standing army for the United Provinces.
Despite being a sideshow to the continental and naval war, the Irish conflict remained
a constant drain on both sides resources, even though it was of greater benefit to Spain. Essex
was to bemoan the constant strain on his forces campaigning in Ireland as his troops “had
neither bodies, spirits, nor practice of arms” while the revolting Gaels had “able bodies, good
use of the arms, boldness enough to attempt and quickness in apprehending any
advantage”.120
It was Philip II's failure to provide sustained and substantial support to the
rebellion that would in the end doom it to defeat and be one of the great lost strategic
opportunities of the 1590s.121
It was his successor who would mount the only successful
landing, one which was inevitably too late.
Even in areas near the Pale, the traditional stronghold of English power, an English
column was harassed and harried till it broke in Wicklow, its ammunition and powder
expended in an effort to keep the Irish at bay with repeated volleys. The lack of experienced
officers saw it break under the strain.122
A worse disaster took place in the Curlew hills where
118
Fischer, Mark Charles. English Warfare: 1511-1642 p. 222
119
Ibid. p. 165.
120
121
Parker. 'David or Goliath?'. p. 261.
122
Ibid. p. 224.

Fitzgibbon 29
once again an English column had wasted much of its powder in inconclusive defensive
skirmishing. The slackening off in fire allowed Irish rebels to break the English line and force
a rout, swarming in to kill 231 enlisted and 10 officers in the carnage.123
This meant that by the close of 1599, the English expeditionary force was compelled
to remain in garrison quarters, allowing Irish forces the freedom of the countryside as
venturing out merely led to constant ambush and harassment.124
The situation in Ireland had
reached a critical stage, one that Spain had the potential to tip in favour of the Irish, causing
more of a strategic drain on the English crown. The mounting of an expeditionary force to
Ireland was battered by inclement weather but the Spaniards still succeeded in landing a force
of between 3,800-5,000 men at Kinsale.125
The conflict not only drew the English
commander Mountjoy southward to invest the town but also the main Gaelic army under
O'Neill and O'Donnell.
Besieged, the Spanish force under Del Aquila made numerous sorties while the
besiegers suffered from disease and desertion. Great spirit was shown by the English
storming parties, the quality of the Brittany and Low Countries veterans being remarked upon
by their adversaries when they attempted storming the breach. “and Don Jean after professed
that hee never saw any come more willingly to the sword, then our men did”.126
Similarly the
English besiegers found the Spanish veterans made for a spirited and aggressive defence.
Numerous sallies were made by the besieged, the Spanish being as fierce in retreat as they
were on the attack,
'Seeing the Spaniards come up close with their pikes to give a charge, [our men] did
beate them back to their seconds, making them retire hastily, the Spaniards then playing upon
our men with shot from every house in that part of the Towne'.127
When an English fort was constructed in front of Kinsale, Del Aquila led a sally out at
123
Ibid. p. 224.
124
Falls. Elizabeth's Irish Wars. p. 270
125
Falls. Elizabeth's Irish Wars. p. 275
126
Moryson, Fynes. 'An Englishman's Siege and Battle Diary'. Wars of the Irish Kings. p. 287.
127
Morryson, Fynes. An Englishman's Diary. p. 291.

Fitzgibbon 30
dusk of 1,500 Spaniards, stormed the position, spiked the guns and then withdrew in good
order against superior English numbers.128
Whatever the skill of the Spanish infantrymen, they were too few ultimately to make a
difference. The Battle of Kinsale was lost by the inexperienced Irish infantry, men more
accustomed to hit and run warfare than standing in battle to meet a charge, despite O'Neill's
best efforts. It saw the relieving Irish force routed and the Spanish force compelled to
negotiate terms. With the effective end of the war in Ireland and succession of a new monarch
to the throne of England, two theatres of conflict for England had been closed, the Scottish
Borders being pacified with James I becoming king of both England and Scotland while in
Ireland the resistance dwindled to raids and ambushes with the official end of the war at the
Treaty of Mellifont in 1603.129
With the defeat of his Irish proxies and a chance at peace, Philip III was swift to
pursue the possibility, mindful of the continuing conflict in the Low Countries. The timely
death of Elizabeth I and the accession of James Stuart to the throne of England now offered
Spain a chance at disentanglement from a war that was becoming an impossible drain on
resources. The prophesied knock-out blows offered by the Armadas were expensive failures
and the war had descended into one of attrition, an unacceptable scenario for all warring
parties. Elizabeth's successor was also an advocate of Christian peace and unity as well as
being the son of Mary, Queen of Scots, the former spouse of the deceased Philip II. Philip III
warmly echoed his sentiments and the Treaty of London was signed in 1604. It cancelled out
the Treaty of Nonsuch and enabled over two decades of peace between Spain and England.
128
129
Hayes-McCoy. Irish Battles. p.272.

Fitzgibbon 31
Conclusion
The Treaty of Rome in 1604 officially ended hostilities between England and Spain. Peace
had been concluded between France and Spain some six years earlier. Only the war in the
Low Countries remained. Although the status quo ante bellum was restored, it had been an
extremely wasteful conflict for both sides.
Spain had failed to restore Catholicism in England, forcing it to recognize the
Protestant monarchy that now ruled England and Scotland. The failure of the rebellion in
Ireland also brought it under tighter Crown control. Spain had ensured the safety of its
maritime shipping lanes and colonies but the war had devastated its merchant marine.
On the other side of the coin, the English Channel was now open again to Spanish
shipping with only the threat of Dutch ships to harass any voyages northward. As Spain had
abandoned support for the Gaelic lords in Ireland, so too had England withdrawn its backing
of the Dutch whether military or financial.
The end of the sixteenth century would see the major western European powers all of
whom were at war, begin negotiations with Hapsburg Spain. France was the first, England
followed and eventually even the United Provinces all made peace with Habsburg Spain.130
The war had seen Spain engage on numerous fronts. The Spanish monarchy had not
emerged supreme from the conflicts but it had survived, and in some cases even thrived.
Conversely, the sheer array of threats meant that the Spanish could not achieve a deciding
victory and were thus forced to resort to a negotiated peace. The defeat of the 1588 Armada
was only a temporary setback when the greater strategic situation was taken into
consideration.
130
Carter. The Secret Diplomacy of the Habsburgs, 1598-1625. p. 11.

Fitzgibbon 32
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