3. Key Concepts
• Specific types of compensation agreements
» Fixed price compensation arrangements:
– Firm fixed price contracts
– Fixed price with economic adjustment contracts
– Fixed price redetermination contracts
» Incentive arrangements
– Fixed price incentive
– Cost plus incentive fee arrangements
» Cost-type arrangements:
– Cost reimbursement
– Cost sharing
– Time and materials
– Cost plus fixed fee arrangements
– Cost plus award fee arrangements
– Cost without fee
• Considerations when selecting contract types
15-3
4. Introduction to Compensation Agreements
• The compensation arrangement
determines:
» Degree and timing of the cost responsibility
assumed by the supplier
» Amount of profit or fee available to the
supplier
» Motivational implications of the fee portion of
the compensation arrangements
15-4
5. Example 1: Low Level of Uncertainty
Potential
Outcomes Seller’s Cost Seller’s Price Seller’s Profit
Low $950,000 $1,100,000 $150,000
Most Likely 1,000,000 1,100,000 100,000
High 1,050,000 1,100,000 50,000
Firm Fixed Price Contract
15-5
6. Example 2: High Level of Uncertainty
Potential
Outcomes Seller’s Cost Seller’s Price Seller’s Profit
Low $500,000 $1,100,000 $600,000
Most Likely 1,000,000 1,100,000 100,000
High 1,500,000 1,100,000 (-400,000)
Same FFP Contract as 19-1
15-6
7. Example 2: Continued
• Most sellers are unwilling to large risks
» The supplier will not want to offer the contract
at $1,100,000 due to this additional uncertainty
• In this case, the seller studies the
distribution of likely cost outcomes and
concludes that, 9 times out of 10, the
actual cost will be $1,400,000 or less
• Based on the risk aversion, the seller may
demand a firm fixed price of $1,540,000
» $1,400,000 plus $140,000 (10 percent profit on
this cost)
» The supplier will not lose money on the
contract 15-7
8. Example 2: Continued
Potential
Outcomes Seller’s Cost Seller’s Price Seller’s Profit
Low $500,000 $1,540,000 $1,040,000
Most Likely 1,000,000 1,540,000 540,000
90% Level 1,400,000 1,540,000 140,000
High 1,500,000 1,540,000 40,000
Firm Fixed Price Contract
15-8
9. Example 2: Continued
Potential
Outcomes Seller’s Cost Seller’s Price Seller’s Profit
Low $500,000 $550,000 $50,000
Most Likely 1,000,000 1,050,000 50,000
90% Level 1,400,000 1,450,000 50,000
High 1,500,000 1,550,000 50,000
Cost Plus $50,000 Fixed Fee
15-9
10. Example 2: Continued
Potential
Outcomes Seller’s Cost Seller’s Price Seller’s Profit
Low $500,000 $550,000 $50,000
Most Likely 1,000,000 1,100,000 100,000
90% Level 1,400,000 1,540,000 140,000
High 1,500,000 1,650,000 150,000
Cost Plus Fixed 10% Fee
15-10
11. Contract Cost Risk Appraisal
• Technical Risk
» Risk associated with the nature of the item
» Technical risk appraisal:
– Type and complexity of the item or service
– Stability of design specifications or statement of
work
– Availability of historical pricing data
– Prior production experience
• Contract Schedule Risk
» Anticipate material and labor cost increases
– Forward pricing is common
» Anticipate possible schedule slippages
15-11
12. General Types of Contract Compensation
Arrangements
• Fixed Price Contracts
• Incentive Contracts
• Cost-Type Contracts
Buyer Risk
Supplier Risk
Low
High
High
Low
Fixed
Price
Contracts
Cost
Type
Contracts
Incentive Contracts
15-12
13. Firm Fixed Price Contracts
• A firm fixed price (FFP) contract is an
agreement to pay a specified price when
the items (services) specified by the
contract have been delivered (completed)
and accepted
• Common types:
» Firm fixed price
» Fixed price with economic price adjustment
» Fixed price redetermination
15-13
14. When to Use FFP
• Specifications are well defined
• Cost risk is low
• Schedule risk is low
• Technical risk is low
• Competition has established pricing
15-14
16. Reasons Why Firm Fixed Price Contracts Do Not
Always Remained Fixed
• A supplier losing money may request
relief if:
» Customer contributed to the loss
» Customer badly needs the items
– Assumes other suppliers are not available
» Supplier has unique facilities and time is short
» Customers representatives do not employ
sound supply management practices
15-16
17. Fixed Price and Economic
Price Adjustment Contracts (FPEPA)
• (FPEPA) contracts are used to recognize
economic contingencies, such as unstable
labor or market conditions
• FPEPA is an FFP contract that includes
economic price adjustment clauses
» Escalator clauses are for price increases
» De-escalator clauses are for price decreases
15-17
18. Rules for Selecting Indexes for Price Adjustment
Clauses
• Select from the appropriate Bureau of Labor
Statistics category
• Avoid broad indexes; use the lowest-level
classification
• Develop a weighted index for materials in a
product
• Select labor rate indexes by type and location
• Define energy indexes by fuel type and location
• Analyze the past history of each index versus
actual price change of the item being indexed
15-18
19. Fixed Price Redetermination Contracts (FPR)
• A FFP is set for an initial contract period
• A redetermination (upward or downward)
occurs at a stated time during the contract
• FPR prospective
» Occurs at a stated time during the contract
» Used where a fair and reasonable price can be
developed for initial periods but not subsequent periods
• FPR retroactive
» Occurs at the end of the contract
» Used when uncertainty exists as in the prospective, but
the amount of the contract is small and/or the
performance period is short
15-19
20. Incentive Arrangements
• Used to motivate the supplier to:
» Control costs
» Encourage good supplier performance
• Contract price will usually be higher
• Ceiling price is usually fixed during
negotiations
• Cost responsibility is shared
• Two primary types:
» Fixed price incentive
» Cost plus incentive fee
15-20
21. Elements of a Simplified Incentive Contract
• Target cost
» Cost outcome both buyer and supplier feel is
the most likely outcome
• Target profit
» Amount considered fair and reasonable
• Allocating costs above or below target
» Recognizes the target most likely will not be
met
» A sharing arrangement is agreed upon that
reflects the sharing of the cost responsibility
15-21
23. Cost Plus Incentive Fee Arrangements
• Combine the incentive arrangement and
the cost plus fixed fee arrangement
• Under a CPIF arrangement, an incentive
applies over part of the range of cost
outcomes
• The fee structure resembles a cost plus
fixed fee contract at both the low-cost and
high-cost ends of the range
15-23
28. Cost-type Arrangements
• Used when:
» Research and development increases technical risk
» Project completion is in doubt
» Product specifications are incomplete
» High-dollar, highly uncertain procurements are involved
• Common types are:
» Cost reimbursement
» Cost plus fixed fee
» Cost plus award fee
» Cost without fee
» Cost sharing
» Time and materials
15-28
29. Cost Plus Fixed Fee Arrangements (CPFF)
• Buying firm pays a fixed fee and all costs
beyond fee
• Fee is for specified scope of work
• Supplier has no incentive to control costs
• Characterized by low supplier profit
• A total liability limit is usually established
Optimistic Most likely Pessimistic
Final cost $800 $1,000 $1,200
Fixed fee 50 50 50
Price $850 $1,050 $1,250
CPFF Example
(not in text)
15-29
30. Cost Plus Award Fee (CPAF)
• The award fee is a pool of money
established by the buyer to reward the
supplier in meeting the buyer’s stated
needs
• Receipt of the fee is based on the buying
firm’s subjective evaluation
• CPAF works as a flexible tool
15-30
31. Cost Without Fee
• Used primarily by nonprofit institutions
• Used for research work without the
objective of making a profit
• Institutions recover all overhead costs
• In recent years, high-technology firms
have increased their use of this contract
type
15-31
32. Cost Sharing
• In some situations, a firm doing research
under a cost type of contract stands to
benefit if the product developed can be
used in its own product line
• Under such circumstances, the buyer and
the seller agree on what they consider to
be a fair basis to share the costs (most
often it is 50-50)
• The electronics industry has found this
type of contract especially useful
15-32
33. Considerations When Selecting Contract Types
• Unstable labor conditions
• Unstable market conditions
• Improvement in production is required
• Complexity of product or service
• Product or service requires development
• Design is not completed or may change
• Learning must take place
• Short time to prepare for a bid or negotiation
• Short delivery period
» Which may require additional resources to meet
deadlines
15-33
34. Concluding Remarks
• Sound application of the compensation
methods presented will significantly
reduce expenditures when cost risk is
present
• Compensation agreements must result in
a reasonable allocation of the cost risk
• Agreements should also provide adequate
motivation to the supplier to assure
effective performance
15-34