1. Disobedient Objects, Resistant Bodies:
A Deconstruction of Agency and the Body within
Actor-Network Theory
Timothy Coventry
Previous degree in Bachelor of Communications (Media and Culture)
Supervisor: Dr Katrina Jaworski
Honours thesis written in accordance with the completion of Bachelor of
Arts (Honours)
School of Communication, International Studies and Languages,
University of South Australia
2. 1
Contents
STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP............................................................................................... 2
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ........................................................................................................3
Introduction........................................................................................................................ 4
A Body of Work: Literature Review....................................................................................... 8
Deconstruction as Methodology......................................................................................... 20
Mechanical Flesh: Deconstructing ANT and the Leviathan.................................................... 26
Anatomy, Actors, Agency and Acts...................................................................................... 36
Bodily Acts and Resistance................................................................................................. 45
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 54
References........................................................................................................................ 59
3. 2
STATEMENT OF AUTHORSHIP
This thesis does not contain any material that has been accepted for the award of any
other degree or diploma in any tertiary institution and, to the best of my knowledge and
belief, this thesis contains no material previously published or written by another
person, except where due reference is made in the text of the thesis/exegesis.
Timothy Coventry
Signed _________________________
Date __/__/__
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I wish to thank my supervisor Katrina Jaworski and my editor Lexy Richardson.
Thank you also to my loving wife Sarah and my family for your support,
And of course Mima, thank you for giving me the time and the space.
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Introduction
Objects are everywhere. There is not a day where we are not surrounded by them.
Objects are the focus of our attention as we strive to create them and consume them. As
human beings we take them for granted by assuming that it is us who takes advantage
of them. So to say an object acts upon us, that it possesses some kind of agency might
seem absurd. We act upon them but in doing so we acknowledge their existence and the
limitations of our own reality.
The environment, and the objects that reside within it, both cause and effect our own
actions. Objects are not mere things that can be taken for granted as they are the limits
of our own experience and reality. The strategic deployment of objects can be used to
shape our environment and in turn shape our perception of reality. As examples
something as simple as a fork can shape the way we eat food, a door can permit or deny
entrance into a space, roads can allow for new modes of transport and when blocked
can deny entire populations access to certain areas. When practiced long enough we
convince ourselves that this the way it has always been, this is normal. If governments,
institutions or corporations use objects as a means of power how can people resist?
While this is an important question it still misses the crux of the situation namely that
governments, institutions and corporations must use objects as a means of power as
objects cannot be separated from society. A sentiment shared by Bruno Latour (1993)
who continues the argument by stating that society cannot exist without objects and so
they should not be excluded from studies of society.
To amend this oversight Actor-Network Theory (ANT) was developed to incorporate
both objects and people into a methodological approach to the study of social
phenomenon. To achieve the inclusion of objects into the study of society ANT uses the
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concept of ‘actor’ for both people and objects, placing both as possessing equal
influence within an actor-network. But what are the consequences of this? Feminist
scholars have criticised ANT scholars for not taking into account marginalised
perspectives (Quinlan 2014) which is central to the struggle of power within society and
closely related to the body. Worse yet is the idea that ANT is perpetuating
marginalisation or ignoring those voices completely. The problem ANT faces is how to
account for marginalised perspectives while keeping objects as part of the social. It is
for this reason it is important to answer can a reconceptualization of the body and its
relation to agency and objects, within the methodology of ANT better account for
resistance? And if so how?
Problems arising in attempting to answer the question appear philosophical in dealing
with epistemic stances involving the analyst and their relation to the subject studied. As
a result a philosophical approach embedded in deconstruction is needed to unpack the
underpinnings of ANT. In doing so I argue that it is the analytical stance of ANT that
not only produces marginalised perspectives but that through doing so is a major
shortcoming for ANT in its attitude to issues of power and resistance. Furthermore I
argue that the positioning of ontological equivalence between object and humans is in
serious doubt as while objects are needed for the creation of society it is the nature of
actor-networks to remain anthropocentric to cater for the needs of human necessities.
But before continuing further it is necessary to define central concepts underpinning the
trajectory of this thesis: actor, agency, object and body
By ‘actor’ I am referring to anything that can cause change. This can refer to an object,
a person, or an institution the list can go on. It is derived from the work of Latour (2005)
who describes the actor as what is made to act by many others. An actor can be a person
or an object so long as it is able to cause change. Within ANT if the actor is considered
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as being human the actor has no identifiable characteristics as gender, class or race are
not mentioned. This complicates things further as people cannot be simply swapped or
replaced by another as their body plays an important part of their lived experience.
By ‘agency’ I mean the act of causing change. My definition is again taken from the
work of Latour (2005) who describes agency as an account of doing something. Not
only does an actor cause change but if it does it is considered as possessing agency.
Agency is thus the practice between two actors. It is for this reason that both objects
and people can be considered as possessing agency. Although agency thought of in this
way is an attempt at creating a general concept of agency it is limiting to human beings
as it does not take into account behaviour or emotions instead reducing them to mere
acts.
By ‘object’ I mean more than just a physical thing. An object has materiality but also a
phenomenological aspect to it as it is called to the mind. Taken from the work of Latour
and Woolgar (1986) the object possesses both a materiality and a body of knowledge.
While an object could include those things deemed natural, for the purposes of this
thesis an object is what has been created by human beings through a process of
production. It is the process of production, the interaction with human beings that the
object is deemed part of the social.
The ‘body’ is a term with mixed definitions. Within ANT the body is regarded as a
machine (Callon & Latour 1981) however my definition of the word is different and is
in direct conflict with the idea of the object. I define the body as that which first
possesses an epistemic view of which a consciousness is required, is performative, tied
to acts of necessity and possesses recognition of its own place within space and time.
To achieve this I draw upon ideas taken from many areas including, contemporary
8. 7
feminism, phenomenology and philosophy. It should be noted that the ideas taken only
lightly touch on the vast amount of work done on the body. I recognise studies of the
body have developed further than what has been eluded within this thesis. However it is
for this reason that the body needs to be further developed and taken into account
within the work of ANT.
To develop the argument, Chapter One will narrate the developments of ANT in
existing literature describing how it has been utilised in scholarly articles and its
criticisms emphasising ANTs limitations. Chapter Two will then outline the
methodology and methods used to analyse ANT as a body of work. In particular I
discuss how I have utilised a philosophical approach to qualitative methodology where
deconstruction runs through a critical inquiry into the discourse of ANT. This will be
followed by Chapter Three where the philosophical underpinnings of ANT as theorised
by Bruno Latour, Michel Callon and John Law are stretched to their limits exposing the
shortcomings of ANT all which relate to the body. Chapter Four outlines several
approaches to the body from Simone de Beauvoir, Hanna Arendt, Judith Butler and
Elizabeth Grosz that can be utilised to solve the shortcomings of ANT. Finally Chapter
Five will combine the ideas pertaining to the body as discussed in Chapter Four into
ANT using Hong Kong’s Umbrella Movement as a site of resistance.
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A Body of Work: Literature Review
This chapter will argue that agency is not contained in either the body or the object but
rather it is located between the two. To develop the argument I will first provide a
general overview of the problem of agency within the humanities. This will be followed
by an examination of the development of ANT, its key terms and concepts and its main
contribution to the debate on agency. I will then examine the responses. Finally, using
critique I will argue the use of agency within Actor-Network Theory is problematic as it
relies on a generalised concept of agency incorporating both objects and humans with
the same equivalence to one another. A generalised concept of agency fails to take into
account the complexities of the body instead reducing the body to the notion of a
machine.
The world is presented as a chaotic mess where what is unknown is made knowable
through different methods and methodologies (Law 2006a). The scientific positivist
approach to the creation of facts creates a world of order, one that is predictable based
on cause and effect. However such a view of the world fails to take into account agency,
or agency is explained as something that can be dismissed as already predetermined.
The concept of agency becomes problematic as it breaks the mould of a determinist
reality of cause and effect. Callon (1980, p. 197) claims scientists place social factors
against technical or cognitive ones which are experiencing increasing difficulty in
holding out against sociological ventures. As scientific approaches attempt to
understand everything about the nature of reality they begin to unravel when it comes to
the social. At what point do we take responsibility for our own actions if all things can
be explained through a determinist position of cause and effect? In other words, an
argument is presented where if one isn’t free to choose one’s actions then one can’t
10. 9
really be held responsible for them (Kramnick 2010, p. 4).This may seem like an
extreme point of view but it is one that has defined the distinction between object and
human, the inanimate and the living. If the material can be explained through cause and
effect then the social appears as another matter. Thus agency within the social sciences
has traditionally been taken to be synonymous with human agency (Youatt 2007, p. 19).
However the concept of agency is far more complex to define and is drawn from many
fields of inquiry. When agency is thought of as an exclusively human quality it runs the
possibility of denying a general category of agency of which human agency might be
only one modality among many (Youatt 2007, p. 20). If agency is to be dissociated
from an anthropocentric equivalence to human agency it must also avoid both
anthropomorphism: in which other entities are projected as having human-style agency;
and anthropodenial: in which commonalities between humans and other biological
entities are systematically underestimated (Youatt 2007, p. 21). Ultimately, however, a
general concept of agency defines the ability to act. Such a summary begs further
questions: who or what can act? Is action caused by an internal drive or by external
causes? Is agency found in the freedom to act or not to act? Is agency found in the
ability to cause change rather than the act itself? These complex questions, however
interesting, all presume that agency is more than likely to be a human quality, one that
requires a conscious, thinking subject with the capacity to choose their actions with
freewill, power and intentionality (Youatt 2007, p. 19). Agency thought of in this way
can be explained as the ability to act upon things. However this requires the freedom
and choice to act as well as the ability for retrospection to recognise one has indeed
acted (Kramnick 2010, p. 46).
When agency is considered as a human quality, one of the key areas of debate is the
role of cause and effect in one’s actions. In other words, if I act, are my actions my own
11. 10
or is something else creating the cause, and thereby causing me to act (Butler 1997,
p.4 )? Kramnick (2010) argues that causes never exist on their own as they are paired to
effects or their outcomes, and are presumably, also caused by something else. In the
physical environment causes can be seen as objects interacting with one another but
there are also the causes within the mind. What is being referred to here is mental
causation, the reasons for acting, which extend from our past experiences, desires and
intentions to external objects and back (Kramnick 2010, p. 6). In this sense, every event,
object, or idea is linked together in a long chain of causation so that ideas and intentions
ultimately affect the physical environment (Kramnick 2010, p. 6). So, if I act, it is most
likely in response to the environment I find myself in. However, by acting I am also
impacting upon, and possibly changing significantly the very environment. As a result,
the origin of agency is difficult to define.
If human agency, and by extension human behaviour, can be altered by the environment
and the environment can in turn also be affected by human agents is it possible that the
scientific laboratory can also be affected by social influences? This is a serious question
as the laboratory is an environment designed for the production of scientific facts. This
was a question raised by Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar in Laboratory Life (1986), a
seminal text that spurred the development of Actor-Network Theory (ANT), an
approach to the rapidly changing developments in science and technology (Quinlan
2014, p. 197).
The three main authors of ANT include Bruno Latour (2005), Michel Callon (1986) and
John Law (1991). ANT investigations first began in the field of sociology of science
and technology originating from the ethnographic study conducted by Bruno Latour and
Michel Callon within scientific laboratories (Cockburn & Ormrod 1993, p. 9). Latour
and Woolgar (1986) argued that knowledge is a social product rather than something
12. 11
generated through the operation of a privileged scientific method (Law 1992, p. 381).
Latour and Woolgar’s (1986) ethnographic study of the laboratory describes the process
of how knowledge is created. Within the laboratory this is achieved through rigorous
testing and experimenting to create an object, namely texts (Law 2006a). Thus
knowledge takes on material form as a product or an effect of a network of
heterogeneous materials. The laboratory is one example representing a site of practice
where the production of knowledge takes place (Law 1992, p. 381).
While Law (1992, 2006b) refers to a ‘network of heterogeneous materials’ Latour
(1993, p. 24) and Latour and Callon (1981) use the colourful term ‘leviathan’. Callon
and Latour (1981) describe the leviathan as a monstrous body with steel plates, palaces,
rituals and hardened habits that float on the surface of a vicious-like gelatinous mass
which functions at the same time like the mechanism of a machine (pg. 294). The
description of the leviathan depicts society as the union of both human and object where
it is unclear who acts. People who appear to be in a position of power only have as
much power as those beneath them give to them. So a sovereign is only in power if
everyone else obeys his commands (Callon & Latour 1981, p. 284). In a similar vein
Law (1992, p. 380) tells us that one of the core assumptions of ANT is that Napoleons
are no different in kind to small time hustlers, and IBMs to whelk-stalls. In other words
all elements have similar status (Law 2006b, p. 52). There is no difference between the
privileged and the marginalised, the powerful and the powerless. Under the concept of
the leviathan people are seen as equal to one another. Only differences being those in
power have more black boxes.
Black boxing is another common term used within ANT (Callon 1980, p. 197) and is
defined by Callon and Latour (1981, p. 285) as, “that which no longer needs to be
reconsidered, those things whose contents have become a matter of indifference.” In
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other words things that are taken for granted or believed in without question (Bonner
2013, p. 113). Once created and embedded within actor-networks black boxes inscribe
behaviour and become obligatory passage points (Bonner 2013, p. 113). Such black
boxes could include but are not limited to modes of thoughts, habits, forces and objects
just to name a few (Callon & Latour 1981, p. 285). An object can become a black box
as it may represent years of research and technological development that is not
questioned.
Objects used in Latour and Woolgar’s (1986) description represent past research and
the knowledge invested in their creation is taken for granted (Latour & Woolgar 1986, p.
63). In this way, objects are termed as inscription devices and gain their agency through
representing the past (Latour & Woolgar 1986, p. 51). For example: the mass
spectrometer has been developed through years of study. The knowledge is packaged
within the object. Whatever information the device produces, it is taken as truth.
Because of this, choices of human actors are altered. Therefore, the object has exerted
its agency over humans through its incorporation into human action, and as a result,
mutual practice with human actors (Latour & Woolgar 1986, p. 65).
The idea of objects possessing agency is the main contribution of ANT to the debate on
agency. The idea that objects have agency was well received in science and technology
studies, and beyond (Kirsch & Mitchell 2004, p.688). Despite ANT’s growing
popularity over the last few decades, its contribution to social sciences has been more
controversial than anywhere else. This is because Latour accuses traditional sociologists
of focusing solely on people and excluding objects from the social (Latour 2000,
p.108). In his accusations, Latour insisted that it is the actions and capacities of
nonhuman entities that are seen as a condition for the possibility of the formation of
human society (Sayes 2014, p.137) . For Latour (2005) this is only possible if
14. 13
nonhuman actors are considered as possessing agency, meaning they are able to act, and
in so doing, demand new modes of action from others (Sayes 2014, p.138). Law
(2006b) and Callon (1991) argue machines prescribe roles that it, the machine, expects
other elements in the network to play. The notion of roles becomes problematic as there
is a degree of interpretation over how the machine can be used which may differ from
the intention of the machine’s author.
Latour (2005) extends the concept of agency to objects but removes notions of
behaviour only to reduce agency to action only. For Latour (2005), agency is seen in
acts that cause change and within ANT the term ‘actor’ can refer to anyone or anything
that enables others to act including objects, humans or a combination of both as all are
equally able to act upon one another (Bonner 2013, p. 112; Law 2006b, p. 52).
Furthermore, Latour’s (2005) conceptualisation of agency is reliant on the external
environment, meaning it is the objects that cause agency rather than some internal
origin residing in the human mind. It is only when human actors are asked for a reason
that an “alien entity” comes forth (Latour 2005). “Alien entity” means that action and
the cause of that action is an interpretation which is in turn an act that is dependent on
time. That is, agency and its interpretation is all in retrospect: the interpretation of
agency depends on what has caused an act, rather than what will. If an act must occur in
order for agency to be understood, then this ignores mental causation, or what occurs
within the mind. However mental causation must be taken into account, because
without it there would be no concept of agency but only descriptions of events
(Kramnick 2010, p. 8).
The concept of objects possessing agency and the reconfiguring of the body as a
heterogeneous network raises important questions. The distinction of whom or what is
acting at any moment is blurred. How big is the network? It is possible the network can
15. 14
be all encompassing to the point that it is unusable. Yet at some point a decision must
be made, the edges of the network must be defined for the body of the leviathan to take
shape. If new actors, both object and human, are identified and included into the
description of the network the result could mean an entirely different leviathan could
take shape. If the material human body is the effect of a heterogeneous network of
material products then defining how the body is viewed as it enters and exits new
networks is critical in understanding the differing perspectives of the same entity. It is
here that objects exert their agency on the body as the body exits one heterogeneous
network and enters another only to be redefined, reproduced, with the potential for new
agencies to emerge. It is for this reason that ANT should not be considered as a theory
in the conventional sense of a proposition or hypothesis that can be empirically tested
(Bleakley 2012, p. 464). Although Bleakley (2012) and Law (2006b) would argue ANT
is better understood as a practice or a method, Bonner (2013); Callon and Law (1995)
propose that ANT also be recognised as a methodology as it shapes the knowledge
gained offering different perspectives and results.
Every leviathan appears different depending on what actors the analyst chooses to
follow. This argument is also shared by Cockburn and Ormrod (1993, p. 9) who argue
that if the network were to extend further beyond the design office other actors would
come into view. These actors not only include assembly line workers, distribution and
sales personnel but also the consumers of the objects produced (Cockburn & Ormrod
1993). In contrast Callon (1998) calls the entities outside of the actor-network
externalities (Callon 1998, p. 247). According to Callon (1998) actors within the actor-
network negotiate and work together. The results of the collaboration may have positive
or negative effects on other agents external to the actor-network who are not involved in
the negotiations, either because they have no way of intervening or because they have
16. 15
no wish to do so (Callon 1998, p. 247). Callon’s (1998) description of externalities
contradicts Callon and Latour’s (1981) previous explanation of the leviathan where
macro-actors can be treated as acting in the same way as micro-actors. The concept of
externalities becomes problematic as either the concept of the leviathan has limitations
or externalities are made redundant as the actor-network is extended further
incorporating all other actors and acting as one macro-actor. All other ‘externalities’
become agents of their own expressing their agency as they interact with the larger
macro-actor and in turn contributing to a much larger leviathan of their own making. In
other words the size of the actor-network being analysed alters the results.
While Law (2006) and Latour and Woolgar (1986) describe the laboratory as a site of
production for texts, ANT has been used to describe other objects that have been
produced in similar ways such as the computer (Law 2006a, p.33), the cheeseburger
(Quinlan 2014, p.200), the stethoscope (Matthewman 2014) and the sewing machine
(Cockburn & Ormrod 1993, p.12). Furthermore, Latour mentions how the production of
feminist sociological literature has altered scientific practice, as they have raised new
questions on their own terms and have forced the social and natural scientists to retool
the whole of their intellectual equipment (Latour 2000, p.116).
In an attempt to resolve ANT’s problems without disregarding the theory altogether,
some feminist scholars have attempted to integrate it with feminist methodology, most
notably feminist standpoint theory. Feminist standpoint theory begins with the
assumption that the oppressed and/or marginalised people see relations of power most
clearly (Alcoff & Potter 1993, p.5; Quinlan 2014, p.198). Standpoint theory criticises
science as positing itself as value-free. However in reality science possesses a
perspective involving assumptions and values based on the kinds of activities of a
particular dominant group of men (Alcoff & Potter 1993, pp.5-6).
17. 16
This is well and good, but as Quinlan (2014, p.201) asks, how do we identify or find
marginal actors? This question has serious consequences, as marginal actors in this
context are human actors not object actors. The structure of the privileged against the
marginalised does not include objects. Having said this, can objects be included in such
a structure? This becomes one of the strange criticisms of ANT as ANTs approach does
not make an ontological distinction between, say a ‘sociologist’ and a ‘computer’
(Kirsch & Mitchell 2004, p.689). Both human and object actors are considered as equal.
Strangely reminiscent of Foucault’s (1978) understanding of power relations, Latour
argues there is no difference in power between the powerful and the powerless, the
marco-actors and the micro-actors (Callon & Latour 1981, p.279). It is from this
perspective that feminists accuse ANT of being apolitical while ANT sociologists
accuse feminists of being too political (Quinlan 2014, p.204). What happens to the
agency of objects and questions of power and resistance in the middle of such
accusations?
Scholars familiar with the work of Michel Foucault find synergies between his work
and ANTs treatment of power. Indeed, Matthewman (2014) is one such scholar, who
offers a brilliant account of Foucault’s ideas within ANT. Matthewman (2014, p.278)
argues that issues raised by ANT have already been conceptualised in Foucault’s
Discipline and Punish and Birth of the Clinic by describing how technology shapes
society and affects what it is to be human in the world. Objects mentioned include the
prison cell, the rifle and the stethoscope. However, while Foucault was interested in the
ways in which techniques resocialise human subjects, ANT’s interest lies in the
resocialisation of non-human subjects (Matthewman 2014, p.283). Thus, while there
may be qualitative similarities between the two, there are also methodological
differences.
18. 17
The panopticon can be regarded as an actor-network where the objects involved, the
prison cell, lights, the central tower, laws and prison guards are arranged in such a way
as to produce a particular subject. It was, as Foucault stated, a laboratory where
experiments could be carried out to alter, train or correct behaviour (1995, p.203). The
product produced in this case was not an object but a subject, along with the techniques
used to create the subject. The body in this sense was reduced to a simple object of the
actor-network even though it was a site of a particular kind of subjectivity, namely,
docile and obedient. However as useful as Matthewman’s (2014) inclusion of Foucault
into ANT is, especially because it gives an explanation of power structures, it does not
account for social and cultural effects of gender, race or class. While an object actor
maybe described as a stethoscope, cheeseburger, sewing machine or something else, the
same consideration should also apply to human actors and their bodies. It is one thing to
say ‘scientist’ but without context who is the ‘scientist’? If context is important to
sustaining an actor-network, then contextual facets such as gender, race or class need to
be included. As Cockburn and Ormrod (1993, p.9) argue “the white-coated scientist are
almost all men”. Once again the arguments posited by feminism arise from the
disregard of the marginal actor.
By paying attention to the marginal actor, feminist scholars argue that an entirely
different actor-network could be realised (Quinlan 2014, p.200). This argument,
however, is incomplete if we ignore the possibility that from the position of the object
an entirely different actor-network could yet again be realised. It is realities that are
being constructed however it is not people that construct these realities but the practices
and methods used within science that help produce the reality they understand (Elder-
Vass 2008, p.457; Law 2006a, p.21).
19. 18
Within ANT anything can be considered an actor and the distinction between body and
objects becomes blurred as they are considered both as an actor and a heterogeneous
network, hence the hyphen in actor-network (Law 1992). Under this conceptualisation
of ANT an object can be considered a body. What is confusing about viewing the body
as a network is where the body begins or ends. ANT has the appearance of trying to be
all-encompassing, a god like concept that attempts to appropriate itself into any field in
an attempt to answer everything. Where is the human being if we can still call it that?
Are all bodies, whether they are object, human or organisation, equal to one another as
ANT claims (Law 2006b, p. 52)? If ANT treats the heterogeneous network as a body in
the same way as an individual, can the human body in turn be treated as a site of
production of both material and knowledge? In this sense the human body both
produces knowledge and well as its bodily discarded filth. Surely the leviathan or the
heterogeneous network produces discarded objects just as much as the romanticised
technological object, knowledge and skills? Latour and Woolgar (1986) mention the
removal of waste from the laboratory but there is no further mention of it. Do these
objects not have agency? Clearly they must if dog excrement can be the focus of an
ANT study (Gross 2015). Latour (1992, p. 157) also mentions the thousands of human
grooms (people whose job it is to open doors) who are made redundant, rejected by the
actor-network, by non-human hydraulic door closers which in turn discriminate against
the weak such as small children, the elderly and working class people carrying
packages.
Waste of an actor-network is the necessary outcome of socially profitable production, it
is the inevitable by-product of cleanliness, order and beauty (Laporte 1978, p. 14). If the
leviathan supposedly offers exactly what I want, what I know, what I can do and marks
out what is possible and impossible as the correct translation of my unformulated
20. 19
wishes (Callon & Latour 1981, p. 288) then why or how is there resistance against it? If
the main focus of ANT is power as Law (1992) argues there must be resistance. But
what resists, the object or the human actor?
The actor-network may create knowledge and black boxes but it can only do so by
simultaneously creating that which is rejected and deemed illegitimate. If the rejected
waste of the actor-network has agency I will argue that which is deemed as a by-
product of the actor-network would also resist its rejection. Black boxes in the form of
objects are an attempt to be made durable which problematizes the temporal aspect to
the human body. It is human actors, with their differing epistemic views derived from
gender, age, race and class that agency shifts and cracks occur within the concretised
material network that makes up the leviathan. While an actor-network might explain
how methods of science and technology advance knowledge what does it say about the
human experience of such a network? In other words is ANT’s use of the body purely
conceptual? ANT frames the agency of objects as equal to human agency. While useful,
the problem with this approach is that it makes it difficult to examine power relations
between human and nonhuman actors. This is problematic because there is no room for
adequately understanding how bodies might resist even though ANT demonstrates that
material objects are part of resistance.
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Deconstructionas Methodology
The aim of my project is to critically examine ANT’s treatment of bodies and objects in
relation to resistance. The following describes the process that will be undertaken to
answer the research question: Can a reconceptualization of the relationship between the
body and object in ANT account for resistance? If so, how? The chapter will begin by
outlining a qualitative methodology informed by deconstruction and providing
definitions of key terms that will guide this approach. Following this, a method of
collecting and analysing data will be outlined. Methodology will refer to the approach
to research design (Bryman 2012; Denzin & Lincoln 2011) and method will refer to the
approach of collecting data (Bryman 2012).
The methodology of the following project will take a qualitative approach that is
informed by deconstruction. Qualitative research requires the researcher to study things
in their natural settings, attempting to make sense of or interpret phenomena in terms of
the meanings people bring to them (Denzin & Lincoln 2011, p. 3). Under the umbrella
of qualitative methodology, my use of deconstruction should not be considered as
destroying but rather as unpacking how meaning works in a body or system of
knowledge. As Culler (2008, p.86) argues, to deconstruct is to undermine the
philosophy the system of knowledge asserts and to identify the rhetorical operations
that ground the argument. In this project, the body of knowledge to undergo the process
of deconstruction is ANT. I will deploy key terms such as objects, agency, bodies and
resistance as means of guiding my methodological approach.
Difficulties arise when ANT is also considered as a methodology. The proposed
strategy is to use one methodology to critique another. The use of deconstruction in this
22. 21
instance is appropriate as the object of analysis is a body of knowledge (ANT) along
with the meanings associated within it which requires a qualitative technique.
ANT has been used in variety of ways, one of which entails a qualitative methodology.
This is perhaps because it has been developed out of ethnographic studies of the science
laboratory with the aim to show how scientific facts are socially constructed (Elder-
Vass 2008, pp.456-457). By using ANT as a methodology or an approach to research
design, it is assumed ANT can provide a particular epistemic view of the world (Tatnall
& Gilding 1999). ANT focuses on the relationships between actors, both human and
object, rather than the actors themselves. The interpretation of facts comes from the
researcher conducting the research (Elder-Vass 2008, p.457). This maintains the
qualitative aspect, which is why using ANT can be confusing. For instance, if I am to
use ANT to conduct an investigation of how scientific facts arise, what I am studying is
how the network of scientists and objects came to their interpretation of a fact. However,
I must also take into account my own interpretation of how the scientists came to their
interpretation. Thus, at some point, ANT as methodology can be both concrete and
abstract, slipping into the territory of analysis. My use of deconstruction will be as a
means of examining and unpacking the complexities of ANT to analyse structures of
power and resistance, and the role of the following key ideas of bodies, objects and
agency.
The idea of the object can be conceptualised as physical and phenomenological. In
other words, objects can be empirically sensed and envisioned in the mind. ANT
describes the process of object creation as a practice where materials, processes,
inscription devices and people are assembled or put together to create a final product
(Law 2006a, p.19). This product, or object, may include previously mentioned
technological innovations such as the computer (Law 2006a, p.33), stethoscope
23. 22
(Matthewman 2014), or sewing machine (Cockburn & Ormrod 1993, p.12) just to name
a few. More mundane objects are also part of the picture, including the cheeseburger
(Quinlan 2014, p.200) and most recently, dog poo (Gross 2015). The importance about
this understanding of objects is that they are sensed, and importantly, the ideal of the
object is envisioned through the techniques of creation. The process of creation is
important for it eliminates the need to question the constitution of the object any further
even though this does not stop future innovations (Bonner 2013, p.113; Callon &
Latour 1981, p.285; Law 2006a, p.33). This approach to understanding objects is
important because the physical and the ideal are not the same. In fact, the two might
differ, which will offer the room to examine whether this difference has something to
do with power and resistance.
Central to ANT’s argument is how objects exert their agency over society because of
their ability to influence the actions of others (Latour 2005, pp.52-53; Sayes 2014,
p.141). In other words, objects do not just allow action to pass through them. Instead,
objects change action in unpredictable ways. For instance, the introduction of the fridge
changed household cooking as food could be kept fresh for longer, inciting new recipe
books informing people how to use the product and changing eating habits. Here,
agency is described as part of the practice between objects and human beings. This
view of agency is important for my research project because resistance might actually
be more possible to conceptualise in ANT. This is because the idea of agency is not
simply dependent on the actor, but also on something in relation to the actor, namely an
object. In this sense, agency is not only about what the actor intends, but also how
something related to the actor enables action to occur. This is only realised in practice
and may be unrealised and unpredictable, which is important for social movements, and
24. 23
protests in particular, because change often arises out of the unpredictability of events
(Butler 2004b; Flood & Grindon 2014, p. 14).
I argue the body is not well conceptualised in ANT which is a main contributing factor
to ANT’s short comings. Within ANT there is no ontological difference between a
sociologist and a computer. To fill this gap, this project will draw on de Beauvoir’s
(2011) phenomenological account of the body. While philosophy has largely ignored de
Beauvoir’s work, arguing it that it simply applied Sartre’s ideas to women’s issues,
contemporary feminism argues otherwise (Andrew 2003, p.32). Bryant, Srnicek and
Harman (2011, p. 5) suggest that de Beauvoir’s work could contribute to the
phenomenological background of the new materialist movement of which Latour and
ANT are a part. In The Ethics of Ambiguity, de Beauvoir (1976) writes that the choices
made by human beings are limited by their environment. De Beauvoir (1976, p. 28)
argues that the world is disclosed through the resistance against it and that the will is
defined by raising obstacles. The freedom of man is infinite but his power is limited (De
Beauvoir 1976). The possibilities for agency, for change, are boundless but they are
limited by the environment one finds their self in. This resonates with the relationship
between the object and body with regards to agency because human agency is shaped
by the material environment. But de Beauvoir’s conceptualisation of the body does not
stop there because for her the body is a situation, always under construction (Heinamaa
2003, p. 67). Butler (1990, p. 11) takes this idea further and explains that the body as a
situation then there is no recourse to a body that has not already always been interpreted
by cultural meanings. In other words the body finds itself already within a discursively
conditioned experience (Butler 1990, p. 12). Where the body represents a kind of
meeting point of the physical and the psychical (Heinamaa 2003, p.68) unlike ANT
which treats the psychical aspect of the body purely as a result of a heterogeneous
25. 24
network. Following this I will argue the concept of the body needs to be further
developed and supplemented within ANT.
While Latour and Callon speak of power, they do not see a specific difference between
the marginalised and the privileged (Callon & Latour 1981, p.285). In particular, a
powerful person is only considered as holding power because others do their bidding,
which means their power is made of the combined wills of others (Cressman 2009, p.5).
This take on power is macro, taking a bigger picture in and as a result it ignores micro
acts of resistance. Butler’s (1997) conceptualisation of power is useful here for it asks
who has agency. To draw on Butler, is it the institution that enforces their power onto
others, or is it within the individual who ultimately accepts or declines the enforcement
(Butler 1997, p.14)? Butler’s (1997) line of questioning is important for this project
because by questioning who possess power, resistance can be thought of as a
phenomenon of conflicting agencies between objects and human actors.
Discourse analysis is the method chosen for the project. Again, this method is informed
by deconstruction, as the aim of my use will be to examine the causes that are imagined
after the effects have occurred within a system of knowledge (Culler 2008, p.86).
However, my use of discourse analysis will involve the study not of the direct structure
of the written text, but rather to discover recurring patterns of meaning derived from
reading. This is because ANT has been interpreted in different ways based on the text
alone (Underwood 2014, p.357). The texts I will analyse will be taken from the body of
work from three ANT theorists: Bruno Latour, Michael Callon, and John Law (Callon
& Latour 1981; Latour 2005; Law 2006a). This is because these three theorists are
identified as major contributors to ANT (Ponti 2012). Deconstructing the discourse of
ANT is important as ANT posits the agency of objects as central to its own
methodological approach to viewing the social which is also central to the project
26. 25
question. Paying particular attention to the concept of an object as possessing agency
will require an understanding of the relationship between objects and bodies. Thus the
purpose of using discourse analysis will be to discover the boundaries and limits within
ANT’s notion of object agency to reconsider the place of the body and resistance in its
structure (Culler 2008, p.86).
The project’s method of analysis will undertake a process of deconstruction as informed
by Foucault’s (2003) approach to critique. To critique, as Foucault (2003) suggests, is
to return to texts, and to seek out what is really written in them (Foucault 2003, p.265).
In this sense, Foucault’s (2003) idea of critique involves understanding how a body of
knowledge works in the first place so that cracks and rifts can be traced and exploited to
further the way we think about a given phenomenon or an idea. Foucault argues that
critique is where the subject gives himself the right to question truth in relation to its
effects of power and question power on its discourses of truth (Foucault 2003, p.266).
Butler takes the practice of critique further by arguing that one can only critique within
a discourse, turning the discourse against itself in radical appropriation (Butler 2004a,
p.303). This is important for this project because I will endeavour to work out how
ANT works as a system of knowledge, and then trace the limits of this system to see
how we can productively rethink what is missing from ANT’s picture: bodies and
resistance.
27. 26
Mechanical Flesh: Deconstructing ANT and the Leviathan
The following is an attempt to deconstruct the body of work of Bruno Latour, Michel
Callon and John Law on the subject of Actor-Network Theory (ANT). The aim of this
chapter is to find the limits to ANT which will be addressed in the chapters to follow.
At the end of this chapter I argue that the short comings of ANT begin with the body,
both of the analyst and ANT’s attempt to reduce the body to an actor, an analytical
stance that dehumanises the body by reducing it to a mere actor on equal grounds with
other material objects.
There is something peculiar in the way ANT as a methodology positions itself. From
the beginning the analyst approaches the subject as a spectator, always from the outside
looking in. While this is not uncanny from the perspective of other methodological
approaches, the premise of ANT however is to view society as a large heterogeneous
network for which the analyst, it seems, is not present. A heterogeneous network is
explained by Law (1992, p. 380) as a way of describing society, organisations, agents
and machines as effects generated in patterned networks of diverse (not simply human)
materials. To record how the analyst is involved within such a network would require
an entirely different methodological approach that would involve ethnographic
techniques concerning participant observation that entails the extended involvement of
the researcher in the social life of those he or she studies (Bryman 2012, p. 431).
Despite originating from an ethnographic study of the laboratory (Latour & Woolgar
1986) ANT has evolved into a methodology that excludes the analyst from the subject
studied. In the production of scientific texts Latour and Woolgar (1986, p. 63) argue
that once the end product is available all the intermediary steps which made its
production possible are forgotten. This would be an attempt to appear objective and
28. 27
involves the removal of the analyst’s perspective. ANT is no different and appears in
this instance to bear some resemblance to the hard sciences while also being aware of
the processes of knowledge production.
However the absence of the analyst isn’t what was intended by Bruno Latour (2005)
who insists the ANT researcher keep four diaries to record the development of their
research, the fourth of which tracks of how the analysts research, made durable in the
form of a text, has influenced the subject studied (Latour 2005, pp. 133-135). This
would seem like an impossible task as how does one keep track of all those who have
read the text, who have been influenced directly or indirectly whether they are aware of
the intrusion or not? And what of those who ignore the text or don’t have access to it?
In short, the text must show some sort of influence, not to those involved, but to the
analyst. The text must reveal its existence through its agency upon others, or else there
is nothing at all to report. In this way the text also exerts its agency on the analyst who
created it.
Law (2006a, p. 21) argued that what is being created by scientific texts are realities.
Law (2006a, p. 21) argues these realities are made possible by networks of elements
that make up an inscription device, an object, with texts being an example. In other
words there are raw materials that come together and through a practice create an object.
Consider a cake, milk, eggs, butter, flour and other raw materials are combined together
and through a process of baking two things are created, the physical cake and the
method of its creation: the recipe. The cake is the reality of the knowledge and skills in
material form while the recipe is the abstract text describing that reality. Remove one of
the raw materials and an entirely different cake, a different reality can be revealed. A
new text must be written. The agency of texts is not to create realities but to differ from
the one already established. Differentiation can only be achieved if the analyst is aware
29. 28
of it. There are two ways a text can express agency: By causing change and challenging
what is taken for granted, or by adding and strengthening the vast amount of pre-
established knowledge. In other words the text could become part of the background,
invisible and taken for granted, the ‘right’ way of doing things, or standout and become
something that is not considered normal and must be dealt with. If the task of the
analyst is to discover new knowledge it is in relation to what the analyst already knows
of the subject studied. Thus the phenomena studied is not only thoroughly constituted
by the material setting of the network Latour and Woolgar (1986, p. 64) but is also the
knowledge and the perceived reality as situated by the analyst. The analyst becomes an
integral part of knowledge production as the text is the epistemic view of the researcher
of the phenomenon studied. If this is the case then the analyst cannot be considered as
merely an actor within the actor-network as analysts bring with them their own situated
lived experiences. In turn the term ‘actor’ must be purely conceptual for the idea of the
actor-network to work and be able to be applied to both objects and bodies.
When Latour (2005) asks for the analyst to “follow the actors” this is perhaps
misleading. Law (1991, p. 11) tells us that when we follow the actors it becomes
difficult to sustain any kind of critical distance. In other words we take on their
categories and see the world through their eyes, adopting a point of view of those we
are studying. Law (1991, p. 11) continues to explain that certain things that are of no
concern to the actor become invisible. Law (1991, p. 11) uses Edison as an example
asking the question, “Did Edison care about gender? I don’t know, but it would be
surprising if he did”. This is followed by an explanation claiming, the method of
following the actors of, which Edison is an example, is blind to the pain of gender
distribution. However this is not the case. Just because gender distribution is not made
apparent to the analyst does not mean it does not exist. It would become apparent if it
30. 29
were a differentiation from the norm of the analysts epistemic view. Instead Edison’s
lack of concern for gender distribution only strengthens the analyst’s normative view
and is made apparent by it invisibility. By stating that he does not know if Edison cared
about gender distribution Law (1991) revels his own normative stance, that gender is
something that only appears if it makes a difference in relation to his own epistemic
standpoint.
There is another issue with the motto to ‘follow the actors’ and that is which actors to
follow. Quinlan (2014) argues if we were to follow different actors then an entirely
different actor-network would be created. But this does not address the fundamental
problem of how to follow actors not just who. How to follow actors becomes a problem
when there is no difference between an object and people. An example is given by Law
(1992, p. 384) who explains,
“…for most of us most of the time a television is a single and coherent object with
relatively few parts. On the other hand when it breaks down, for that same user – and
still more for the repair person – it rapidly turns into a network of electronic
components and human interventions.”
Followed by,
“And again, for the healthy person, most of the workings of the body are concealed,
even from them. By contrast, for someone who is ill and even more so for the physician,
the body is converted into a complex network of processes, and a set of human,
technical, and pharmaceutical interventions.”
Law (1992, p. 383) admits this is an analytical stance. However if there is no
ontological difference between a human body and a television set and both can be
31. 30
considered as an actor, then there should be no difference in how to follow either of
them. Latour (2000, p. 108) gives an example of a cyclist having an accident by hitting
a rock. Which actor should be followed the human actor, the bike or the rock? Latour
(2000, p. 108) accuses social scientists of having nothing to say about the incident as
they focus solely on the human to human interaction while disregarding the material
objects. For ANT sociologists Latour (2000, p. 108) argues, what is considered as the
social should be extended to include the mechanisms of the bicycle, the paving of roads,
the geology of rocks, the physiology of wounds and so on. The argument proposed is
that it is the capacities of nonhuman actors that are seen as a condition for the
possibility of the formation of human society (Sayes 2014, p. 137). This maybe the case
but how does the ANT sociologist follow object actors? It is possible to follow the
human actor and record their interactions with material objects but what of the bicycle
or the rock? The bike would only express agency as it is used, the rock only has agency
once the bike and human actor interact with it. It is when all elements, the human, the
bike and the rock come together in one harmonious instant that anything happens.
Agency reveals itself. No one actor holds agency before the accident nor do either of
them hold agency after the accident. Yet some change has occurred to each in different
ways. The same agentic force that causes change in the human actor also causes change
in the rock but not in the same way.
In another example Callon (1991) describes the use of a fork to mash potatoes. In
Callon’s (1991, p. 139) description the fork supposedly assigns the human actor a role,
that of a human being with a number of options and rights. However the role assigned
to the human actor depends on how the person understands what the fork is, what it is
used for, how to use it, when and where. There is a cultural aspect to the fork, a material
32. 31
discourse that the human actor enters and subverts for their own use. The fork may have
been created with a specific purpose in mind both offering and limiting possibilities for
its use but ultimately it is up to the human actor to decide how to use it, if at all. In other
words it is not possible to assume that the same relationship from the human actor to the
object actor is the same as if it were from the object actor to the human actor. The
nonhuman actor might not be aware of the influence of the human actor; to say
otherwise is to risk anthropomorphism.
Alternatively agency may have to be thought of in varying degrees. Callon and Law
(1995, p. 482) both disagree arguing that there is no distinction between human agency
and nonhuman agency as this would assume that humans are special and particular. The
problem with this line of thought involves the perception of agency. What counts for
agency is what is revealed to the analyst. The further away from the analysts own
human agency the more abstract agency appears to the point where it becomes
unintelligible to the human agent. This does not mean that these unintelligible agencies
do not exist but rather they cannot be perceived. Instead non-human agencies are made
intelligible through methodological tools such as ANT but always in relation to, or its
effect on, human agency. By treating all agencies and actors as equal the flat
ontological world ANT describes is a product of its own making. As Law (2006a, p. 5)
states such methodological rule following not only describe but also help produce the
reality that they understand.
To follow one actor is to record the bombardment of agencies it incurs from others that
interact with it. Within ANT an actor is an effect produced by a patterned network of
heterogeneous relations and are never located in bodies alone (Law 1992, p. 384). The
actor is always surrounded by the agencies of its current network. However a question
arises, do all actors experience an equal amount of agentic force? Actors may be
33. 32
influenced by other actors but the amount of agency an actor endures may differ. Latour
(1991, p. 107) talks about what he calls ‘programs of action’ where the agency of many
objects are combined together to towards producing the same result. For now what is of
concern is the agency of a single object. While actors may be discussed as being equal
to each other within the actor-network, their agency is an entirely different matter. I am
not referring to different modes of agency but to the strength of their agency. To Callon
and Latour (1981, p. 285) the only difference between the powerful and the
marginalised is the amount of black boxes the powerful possess. As Callon and Latour
(1981, p. 284) argue,
“A difference in relative size is obtained when a micro-actor can, in addition to
enlisting bodies, also enlist the greatest number of durable materials. He or she thus
creates greatness and longevity making the others small and provisional in comparison.”
The use of black boxes in this way is teleological, in other words the objects are used as
a means for a desired result, a perceived ‘reality’. To achieve this ‘reality’, black boxes
must be constantly enlisted, meaning realities are never secure but always in a continual
state of practice (Law 2006a). Black boxes, and similarly inscription devices, are short
cuts of knowledge and in their material form are created for a purpose, to be used in a
specific way to achieve a specific goal. Their continual practice is due to demands and
requirements that need to be constantly met. The reality black boxes create are from the
understanding that there is no other way without dismantling and recreating. Instead it
is easier to enlist what has already been built. The same teleological line of thought is
seen in Latour and Woolgar’s (1986) laboratory texts, Latour’s (1991) ‘programs of
action’ and Callon’s fork (1991).
34. 33
The object maybe used in a teleological fashion but its agency does not stop there. Once
the object accomplishes its role its materiality continues to pose a problem. It must be
discarded, removed, reused, consumed, displaced or so on in a similar fashion to a
waste product. However what might be waste to one actor might not be waste to another.
Another concern that complicates the issue further focuses on the body as the body is
not an object that can be used in a teleological fashion as it cannot be discarded after its
use. Instead the body gains its meaning and significance through its use. This is
important to note as within ANT the heterogeneous network (Law 1992) that is the
actor-network or leviathan (Callon & Latour 1981) is considered in the same vein as a
body where a micro-actor can be considered in the same way as a macro-actor (Callon
& Latour 1981, p. 286) and the distinction between object and human is blurred.
Although to say that the body or the object acquires meaning through its use is to
answer the philosophical conundrum of whether meaning is inherent in the world, or do
we invent it and impose it upon the world (Glenn & Hayes 2007, p. 11)? In opposition
to the belief that things have meaning that can be discovered Latour (2004) offers the
alternative that things should be considered as an association, a network, a gathering
(Glenn & Hayes 2007, p. 17; Latour 2004, p. 233). It is through a network where
participants gather in a thing that make it exist and maintain its existence (Glenn &
Hayes 2007, p. 17). In other words objects acquire meaning through their use as well as
through their construction which problematizes the teleological line of thought that
appears so popular within ANT. Against the Foucauldian view as mentioned previously
by Matthewman (2014) what is missing from ANT is how technology shapes and
affects what it is to be human in the world. Meaning is created through interaction
within the actor-network. This is a continual creative practice that never fully ends. As
such the body, however defined, is not simply an actor or an object. The use of the
35. 34
‘actor’ in this sense only serves to represent the role the human being plays within the
actor-network being analysed and cannot represent the human person fully. This is
because the human body is more than mere acts of perceived agency.
If an object is used as a means for an end it loses its meaning when its use is finished.
Beliefs, scientific concepts that are made durable through an object’s materiality mean
particular constructed objects hold more meaning over others. These are the black
boxes which vary in strength of agency over the human actors as an object that has
more meaning will in turn acquire more agency. This is how an object can carry
significance over others of its kind through its use it gains meaning. A meaningless
object is one we have no attachment to and can be easily discarded.
If the aim of ANT is to bring objects into the social through the analytical concept of
the ‘actor’, then this should be achieved without losing the idea of humanity. It is from
the human actor of the ANT sociologist that the idea of objects with agency arises.
There is a severing from the analyst and the analytical tool where the ANT sociologist
views society through an empirical positivist lens. By empirical I refer to the view that
reliable knowledge is derived from sensory experience-if it can’t be sensed, it is
nonsense (Fopp 2008, p. 66). By positivism I am speaking of the view that the most
valid knowledge is acquired via the scientific method (Fopp 2008, p. 66). Together
empirical positivism is claimed to offer certain, reliable and valid knowledge and
represents the popular view of science in the West (Fopp 2008, p. 66).
The paradox the methodology of ANT causes involves the analyst’s own situated body,
its epistemological standpoint and perception of others agency in relation to its own. In
short the limits of ANT as a methodology are first and foremost the limits of the body.
Dehumanising the body by reducing it to a mere actor on equal grounds with other
36. 35
material objects, only serves to limit the methodology even further. Instead the
complexities of the body need to be embraced, not as mere sites of action but as a
bricolage of performative agencies, where the human condition plays out its temporal
aspect amongst a world of things made durable. Only then can ANT answer questions
of class, race, and gender.
37. 36
Anatomy, Actors,Agency and Acts
The body is an area of study that spans across many fields of inquiry. Issues relating to
the body include but are not limited to, race, gender, materiality, epistemology and
ontology. In regards to ANT the body holds a special relation to agency. The following
chapter explores some of these themes and ideas from literature external to ANT.
Focusing on writings from Simone de Beauvoir, Hanna Arendt, Judith Butler and
Elizabeth Grosz ideas surrounding the body will be brought up to date from historical
backgrounds to contemporary philosophical thought. By exploring the body within
feminist thought it will be shown that ANT employs a strong phallocentric position that
is the cause of many of its shortcomings.
According to ANT when an actor exerts agency it does so in a seemingly unpredictable
manner (Latour 2005, p. 59). If the actor does not change action then it is not seen as
acting. It is an intermediary not a mediator, meaning action flows through it and it
becomes predictable (Latour 2005, p. 58). Only when there is an unexpected change
does an actor become a mediator and agency is perceived. From where does this
unpredictable nature of agency arise from? And who deems it unpredictable to?
Cockburn and Ormrod (1993, p. 9) shed light on the subject by stating that there is a
degree of interpretive flexibility as technological projects can be taken up and
developed, and artefacts used, in more than one way. As such a technology’s
consequences maybe unintended as its impacts cannot always be read off from the
interests of its originators (Cockburn & Ormrod 1993). It is suggested by Cockburn and
Ormrod (1993) that the network of actors needs to be extended beyond the design office
or scientific laboratory to include different spheres of social life including marketing,
distribution, manufacturing and the domestic household. Extending the network to
38. 37
include other areas of the social comes quite easily to ANT. That’s not the problem;
instead the problem lies in the situated epistemic experiences of the human actors
within those differing social spheres.
Bodies are situated possessing an epistemological standpoint something ANT seems to
ignore. What may seem reasonable to one person might seem unrealistic to another.
What is considered as a black box, things that have become a matter of indifference
(Callon & Latour 1981, p. 285), might be questioned by someone who sees the very
same black box as incompatible as it becomes significant compared to their own world
view. Just because someone does not challenge what is taken for granted does not mean
it is not significant to their lives.
Scientists and engineers whose job it is to create innovations of technology do so from a
privileged position (Cockburn & Ormrod 1993). They are the authors and originators of
technological objects who think how they themselves would use the object and expect
others to follow (Callon 1991, p. 141). But this is simply not the case. If the object were
used in the correct manner as the author expects then the object only exerts the agency
of the author as an intermediary not from itself as a mediator. The object has many
possible uses and each use could be seen as an act of agency but only if the human actor
thinks of it. The object’s agency is seen in how it limits human agency. The author of
the object is severed, non-existent in the moment of the object’s use. The author is not
present to correct behaviour as the object must stand for itself.
The reasoning of scientists and engineers and others on the fringe of knowledge
production is not relevant to the reality of those outside the position of technological
innovation (De Beauvoir 2011, p. 655). To those of the domestic sphere, workers and
others of areas where thinking does not flow into any project, accepting black boxes
39. 38
occurs without a problem as they do not care about clarifying the mysteries of a sphere
of knowledge (De Beauvoir 2011, p. 655). For these people are dominated by a
knowledge production that is beyond their reach. They are not fighting with matter but
with life (De Beauvoir 2011, p. 654). For ANT sociologists to focus on the ‘heroes’
(Law 1991, p. 12) they only see those dealing with matter and the materiality of things.
Of what does ANT have to say of the marginalised, of gender, class, and race? Areas
that ANT scholars are guilty of saying little about (Law 1991, p. 2). Nothing, because
the projects of the marginalised are never towards creating durable objects but are
always seen in the monotonous repetition of life in its contingency and facticity (De
Beauvoir 2011, p. 659). Those dealing with life are never spoken of. The reason why
the agencies of objects appear unpredictable is because they were constructed by those
who were unable to think of such agencies. There is a whole region of human
experience that the privileged deliberately chooses to ignore because they fail to think it:
this experience, the marginalised live (De Beauvoir 2011, p. 666). The agency of
objects is the resulting effect of human actors living in different epistemic realities.
The distinction between objects being created and consumed as part of necessity against
those made for permanence and durability is argued by Hanna Arendt (Moran 2000, p.
310). Arendt argues,
“Viewed as part of the world, the products of work – and not the products of labor –
guarantee the permanence and durability without which a world would not be possible
at all” (Arendt 1998, p. 94)
Here Arendt’s (1998) argument reflects Latour’s (Latour 1993, p. 111; Sayes 2014, p.
137) in that objects are needed for society to exist. However unlike Latour (1993),
Arendt (1998) has split objects into two classes, those that are durable and those that are
40. 39
consumed. This is similar to a Latour’s (2004) observation of Heidegger’s ‘thing’ and
‘object’ where a ‘thing’ is a unique work similar to a handcrafted jug while an ‘object’
is a work of repetitive production similar to a can of coke (Latour 2004, p. 233). By
comparison the nonhuman actors that ANT predominantly takes into account when
referring to the social are the products of work. To Arendt work comes to an end with
the production of an object, it then becomes independent of the producers as it takes on
a life of its own (Moran 2000, p. 311). Objects of labour are the necessities of life, of
the human condition (Arendt 1998, pp. 83-84). Labour ends only to commence again
while work creates a human world as opposed to labour which struggles with nature
(Moran 2000, p. 311). A further distinction is made as labour is that which should be
hidden in privacy while work is that which should be seen, heard and remembered
(Arendt 1998, p. 85). By focusing on the objects of work of which is seen and observed,
that allow realities to exist, ANT dismisses the objects of labour, of those things done in
private that allow the conditions of life. This is because once an object of labour is
consumed it no longer exists as an actor to follow.
If ANT is to use the idea of a monstrous body of human and object elements (Callon &
Law 1995, p. 294) then it must take into account the conditions required for such a body
to exist. It is not enough to say that the leviathan exists because of its negotiated
relations between the social and technical (Callon & Law 1995). It exists as both a work
of durable materials, its materiality, and as a labour of repetition, its condition of life.
The leviathan is a strange creature. On one hand it is the heterogeneous network that
supposedly creates individual bodies and objects as an effect (Law 1992, p. 380). On
the other hand it is made up of the very bodies and objects it has created. Its movement
is unpredictable and is described as possessing no mind of its own (Callon & Latour
1981, p. 295). Its size is unpredictable, unmeasurable and unstable and yet it is still a
41. 40
thing (Callon & Latour 1981, p. 296). Callon (1991) speaks of roles being assigned to
people and objects but what of the leviathan? Who assigns the leviathan a role? A
much larger leviathan? No. The role of the leviathan comes from its parts, not just the
relationships between people and objects, but from what they have in common. There is
internality to the leviathan which must be practiced, repeated and reiterated. While
durable objects, the products of work have an author and an intended purpose there is
still the problem of the body. The leviathan is the combined relationship between the
objects of work which have an intended purpose and the labour of the body in using
those very objects.
While objects are made with an intended purpose the body is a different matter. Who is
the author of my own body? If the body is the effect of a heterogeneous network then
there is an intended use of my body that is not of my own intention. It is within the
heterogeneous network that I find myself surrounded and oppressed by discourses for
which I must enter in order to act and in turn participate in the very terms of that
oppression (Butler 1990, p. 157). This is where ANT employs the idea of bodily
inscription from the heterogeneous network. However the body may be surrounded by a
network of material discourses but it still involves the interaction of the person for those
discourses to emerge, their interpretation and reiteration that is then expressed through
the body in relation to the surrounding network. As Butler (1997, pp. 14-15) writes,
“the subject emerges both as the effect of a prior power and as the condition of
possibility for a radically conditioned form of agency.” The human body as the ‘effect’
(inscription) vs the human body as the ‘result’ of interaction within an actor-network
(performative). We enter the discourse the actor-network provides only to subvert the
discourse for our own needs and desires. As Butler (1990) argues,
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“This repetition is at once a re-enactment and re-experiencing of a set of meanings
already socially established; and it is the mundane and ritualized form of their
legitimation.”
Although Butler (1990) was speaking of the performativity of gender the same can be
said of leviathans and heterogeneous networks. Objects carry with them meanings,
discourses that people enter into when using them. But they are not inscribed upon the
object’s body instead they are seen as effects.
As the human being is an actor within the heterogeneous network they too shape its
effects as well as being affected by it. The same discourses and meanings are altered as
people enter and leave actor-networks. They leave with new meanings attached only to
enter other actor-networks and acquire ever more meanings. If entering the same
heterogeneous network several times human actors do not interact with it in the same
way. Human actors do not repeat what transpired previously instead they reiterate and
redefine with the potential for new agencies to emerge based on new agencies as
experienced in other actor-networks. The body, unlike the object, collects experiences
over time for reiteration. By reiteration I am making a differentiation from repetition.
Repetition is an exact copy while reiteration is a copy that has a slight change. It is not
simply the movement from A to B and B to A but instead involves the movement of A
to B, B1 to A1, A2 to B2 and so on (Youatt 2007, p. 38). In this theorisation, agency
lies within the minute changes. For example the practicing of music over and over
always involves moments of newness, perhaps moments of improvement or perhaps
moments of regression (Youatt 2007, p. 38). These minute changes are where
something has been created out of nothing but they are interpreted as intended despite
their unpredictability. As Zizek (2014, p. 111) writes: “When something radically New
emerges, this New retroactively creates its own possibility, its own causes/conditions”.
43. 42
The past incorporates this new act into itself and presents the conditions of the act as if
it has always been or going to happen (Zizek 2014, p. 111).
While (Callon & Latour 1981) treat the leviathan as the combination of social and the
technical there is also another aspect, the relational. It is within the relationships
between object and body where agency resides. The durable materials made from actor-
networks are the product of work but their use by human actors is the product of labour.
It is the relationships between object and human actors that must be practiced. It must
be reminded that not all objects are material, some are phenomenological as they reside
in the mind as knowledge and discourses. For example: The body is an intersection of
discourses that one cannot escape. The ‘sex’ is a discourse that I am forced to inhabit as
part of my body. The meanings that are attributed to my sex are ones that I live, I am
assigned a sex from birth from an infant an ‘it’ to a ‘she’ or ‘he’ and through being
named ‘boy’ I am ‘boyed’ (Butler 1993, p. xvii). The heterogeneous network creates the
effect of what it means for me to be labelled a male but I also inhabit and exercise that
discursive maleness. It is not teleological in that my body does not lose its ‘maleness’ it
is durable without the work involved. Instead the meanings of my body are laborious,
repetitive. The practice of reality is a laborious act.
The leviathan is an effect of performative agencies acting in common with one another.
Just as one act does not make something performative (Butler 1990, p. 191), one actor
does not make a leviathan. As the leviathan is made of many actors acting in unison
they all share a particular epistemic view. It is what drives and defines the body of the
leviathan. A commonly shared epistemology that is performative. But not every actor
that makes up the leviathan shares the same epistemic view. If they did the leviathan
would be a hollow vessel with no substance. Instead it is the struggle with each actor to
locate and define their place within the leviathan. Certain objects are removed, practices
44. 43
are prohibited, truths and falsehoods defined. It is not that certain materials or relations
no longer exist but that they are actively sort out and removed, labelled as the ‘Other’
through exclusion and domination (Butler 1990, p. 182). All things play a part, waste is
no different. Roles are not assigned to objects or people as Callon (1991) suggests but
are created, through interaction, retrospection and reiteration as there is a temporal
aspect to both agency and the body.
When referring to the temporality of the body I am not speaking of just the human body.
Not if I am to incorporate temporality into ANT. Not only are there the bodies of
humans but also the bodies of other actors both human and nonhuman. There is also the
body of the leviathan to consider. Each one of these actors both micro and macro
occupies a space and experiences time individually and differently (Grosz 1995, p. 92).
This is because the objects positioned within space along with the relations the subject
has to those objects shape the ways in which space is perceived and represented (Grosz
1995, p. 92). Space is conceived as a mode of exteriority, and time as the mode of
interiority (Grosz 1995, p. 98). Certain actors exist long before the human body, cities,
technology and the natural environment, while other actors exist for only a short
amount of time such as food and clothing and animals, even leviathans such as social
movements, corporations and governments occupy space and in so doing experience
time differently. Thinking of agency in regards to space and time is difficult as space is
the mode of apprehension of exterior objects, while time is the mode of apprehension of
the subject’s own interior (Grosz 1995, p. 98). In regards to ANT time is the interior
experience of agency. Space, the exterior, is the empirical noted changes and influences
of agency. As each actor expresses their agency their acts can unfold at different rates.
Some actions are quicker while others can take a life time to recognise. Regardless it is
space and time that are needed as they are the pure forms of perception imposed on
45. 44
appearances which agencies in turn rely on in order to make them accessible to
experience (Grosz 1995, p. 94). A city can shape the lives of those who inhabit it, trees
can grow and give different environmental effects, people can tear down and rebuild
according to how they see fit. But all act at different rates and at different times. An
actor’s agency might appear to remain dormant until some change occurs but the truth
maybe that it has always been acting. It is only when some change occurs that time is
made apparent to the subject within its interior and it is only when it acts upon the space
it occupies that its agency is perceived.
ANT’s use of the term ‘actor’ maybe able to answer questions arising from a general
concept of agency, but agency as theorised by ANT is from the beginning shaped to suit
the actor as conceptualised by ANT. It is a peculiar kind of agency one that does not
require intentionality, consciousness or retrospection from the actor. Agency within
ANT is conceptual, limited to a linear concept of time involving cause and effect,
predetermined and illusionary. Alternatively agency is when the actor interacts with the
discourse provided by the actor-network where time is not external and predetermined
by cause and effect but internal. The nature of the actor-network both provides and
limits possibilities of action for the actor. However there must be recognition of these
possibilities for reiteration not repetition. It is for this reason that the body, while able to
be conceptualised as an actor, is not simply an actor who acts.
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Bodily Acts and Resistance
According to John Law (1992) ANT is a theory of power. But as argued in previous
chapters ANT as a methodology is severely limited by its conceptualisation of the body.
In reducing the human body to an actor in an attempt to make the body equal to other
objects ANT has removed the problems of lived experience. ANTs focus on power and
resistance is not based on the struggles of class, race or gender but of an abstract notion
of human and nonhuman actors. I will argue that incorporating the ideas of the body as
discussed in the previous chapter into ANT will allow ANT to discuss issues that better
relate to the human condition without excluding objects from the social. By using the
Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong as an example of a leviathan I can explore notions
of power within an active site of resistance as opposed to peaceful constructions of
society. To achieve this I will take three different approaches to discussing power and
resistance. The first approach will discuss the body and the object; the second will focus
on the body within the leviathan, while the third will discuss the leviathan within the
city.
The body and the object
Callon, in his simplified example of the fork mashing potatoes, argued that the fork
assigned roles to the human actor (Callon 1991). Latour in a different vein described
how a mechanical device replaced a human actor with his example of the groomsmen
(Latour 1992). I will examine the two examples of one human actor interacting with
one object actor by offering another example, the umbrella in Hong Kong’s Umbrella
Movement. The argument of objects and resistance is that a person can use an object to
resist a power; however the reverse is also true. An object can be used against people.
47. 46
In the Umbrella Movement it was the object of the umbrella that was used to resist a
power. The umbrella was originally used to deflect pepper spray from armed police
officers (Lim 2015, p. 84; Ortmann 2015, p. 33). Pepper spray and tear gas were the
weapons of choice, the objects, for deterring activists. The umbrella was the counter
object.
What is interesting about the object of the umbrella is that it is not one umbrella but
many. In Callon’s (1991) fork example there is equivalence between the human and the
fork. In Latour’s (1992) groomsmen example there is equivalence between the human
actor serving many customers and his replacement by the object serving just as many.
With the umbrella we see a shift in agency. There is not one umbrella amongst many,
but many umbrellas that represent the one. The one in this case is the people and other
actors, the leviathan. It is much harder to encapsulate the myriad of perspectives, every
singular story and opinion, the individualism of each actor. Instead the umbrella
represents all, not because of its numbers but because of its repetition.
Callons fork does not assign roles to the human actor. The fork is an object whose
meaning and use, its discourse, is repeated. The human actor enters the discourse
through engaging with it and in turn subverts that discourse for their own use. The
power of the object is seen as external to the subject, ‘acting on,’ while the power of the
subject is seen as ‘acted by’ (Butler 1997, p. 15). In both cases they are acts and so both
power and agency are linked. Objects repeat discourse, they don’t reiterate. The more
durable an object appears the more it repeats. When agency occurs it is not through
repetition as no change follows, meaning the actor is an intermediary, rather it is seen
through reiteration where the actor is a mediator (Latour 2005).
48. 47
The material object of the umbrella stands not just as an object but as a representation
of an ideal. Through practice with the object the ideal gains meaning and discourse.
However the object and the ideal it represents might differ. The use of the umbrella in
repeated acts of resistance in the Umbrella Movement might represent dissent. However
the idea of dissent is not held by the umbrella it is within how it is used. As a result the
idea of dissent shifts from the people, who reiterate agency, to the object that repeats
agency.
However not all objects are able to be reused as some are consumed. These objects also
play a part in resistance. The consumption practices of food and clothing, cleaning
products, the necessities of living should also be taken into account not just the durable
objects. (Hou et al. 2015) tells of how food prices can cause wide spread panic and
resistance to an authoritative power. Ortmann (2015, p. 34) also tells how consumer
goods of Hong Kong played a part in creating a divide between mainland China and the
inhabitants of Hong Kong. These are not the objects valorised in ANT in the same way
as the spectrometer or the electric vehicle. They are destroyed. Their agency occurs
only once but it is repeated in its creation. The cooking of a meal, the washing of
clothes, the cleaning of a home, all involve the creation of objects and contribute to
realities in the same way as durable objects but with a difference. All durable objects
exist as an extension of repetitive labour, the conditions of life. The electric vehicle is
an extension of travel, the stethoscope contributes to the health of the body, the
groomsman replaces the repetitive labour of the human actor, the fridge, oven,
microwave, the electrical conduits, nuclear reactors, farming equipment and arrays of
other objects contribute to the necessities of food production and consumption. What is
being described is the leviathan as an androcentric construction based on the necessities
of the human condition. Despite durable objects being a part of the leviathan’s body
49. 48
they do not act in this manner as they have no need to. If human necessities are placed
under threat a leviathan will emerge, such is the case of Hong Kong’s Umbrella
Movement (Hou et al. 2015; Ortmann 2015, p. 34).
Human actorand the Leviathan
Within the idea of the leviathan lies ANT’s conception of power. The leviathan is a
body designed in the image of a machine (Callon & Latour 1981, p. 293). It is
considered as a living thing as it can move, build and repair itself although the operator
is absent (Callon & Latour 1981, p. 294). Callon and Latour (1981, p. 293) compare the
leviathan to the biological body claiming the body is once again a machine but one of
chemical exchanges and physical interactions. I have argued earlier that the leviathan
must have boundaries, small struggles within the leviathan creates its mass. For this
reason I define the Umbrella Movement in Hong Kong as a leviathan. But as argued
previously the body is not the effect of a heterogeneous network but the result of the
body’s interaction with the network. Thus the leviathan is performative in that it is
many bodies and actors engaging with the discourse already laid out by the city.
Does or can a leviathan have an epistemic view on the world? Latour and Callon (1981)
have argued that social scientists don’t use the same tools when analysing micro and
macro actors. The body and the leviathan should not differ. It is the methodological
framing of ANT that allows it to examine macro-actors in the same vein as micro-actors
by treating all elements with equal value. But there is a difference between the
epistemic views of individual bodies which in turn causes conflict and resistance. From
this dilemma a question is raised, can the same tools we have used to establish
50. 49
epistemic views in individual bodies be used to examine larger bodies such as a
leviathan? To answer this question there are obstacles about epistemology to overcome.
The epistemological problem involves the apparent lack of an ‘operator’ (Callon &
Latour 1981). By this it is meant that no one person holds the complete picture of the
leviathan (Callon & Latour 1981). This makes sense if we take into account Callon and
Latour’s (1981) and Law’s (1992) understanding of the body as a machine of different
parts. No one part would understand the full functioning of the body-machine and yet
the machine requires all the parts for it to function. This is where the Foucauldian
concept of inscription upon the body makes sense but only to a point. The movement of
the leviathan could be contributed to the effects of its parts but in reality it is the
participation of its parts that causes the results of its movement. The leviathan is more
than the sum of its parts. In the same way as the laboratory is more than the scientists
and objects and a person is more than their material body, it is the practices of
established discourses and the reiterations of those practices. In short the leviathan is
performative. It enters a pre-established discourse of how it should act brought about by
the needs of those within it. Its very shape and movement is situated by its surroundings.
A social protest in China would be different to a protest in America. It might take on
similar tactics but its shape, movement and size would be vastly different. It is a
reiteration of the discourse of protests. Just as no two bodies are the same no two
leviathans are the same either.
The leviathan of the social movement arises out of and is in parallel to the authoritative
regime. In the sense of the umbrella movement it arose out of the city of Hong Kong
and the city’s involvement with mainland China (Hui 2015, p. 112; Ortmann 2015, p.
32). It is not the goals of the Umbrella Movement leviathan that separated itself from
the city but the acts. If the acts of the umbrella movement leviathan were the same as
51. 50
those of the city it would not have come to the fore front and would have remained
invisible. However that does not mean the agencies for the leviathan to emerge would
not exist. Even amongst those who did not join the Umbrella Movement there were
those who still held the same sentiments of those who did. So there is a separation
between those who did act and those who did not. Resistance is complicated even
further as it is not the city versus the state but also those within the city versus the city
itself. We should not forget the leviathan as a city in this example.
There are many other leviathans at play in this scenario. The police, corporations, the
media, families, schools, the list could go on. As mentioned earlier the size of the
leviathan studied affects the results. What I wish to examine by focusing on the three
leviathans of the city of Hong Kong, the Umbrella Movement and mainland China, is
Callon’s (1998) idea of externalities.
Callon (1998) argued there are those outside the actor-network, externalities, that
cannot resist because they have no means or desire to. However the Umbrella
Movement offers a contradiction to the idea of externalities. Power is not solely held by
those within the leviathan of the city or state but by ordinary citizens who could be
considered as externalities as they have no decision making power over the politics of
Hong Kong. Regardless they resist and through their resistance they are able to make
change. What occurred was the combining of many micro-actor externalities to form
one macro-actor. Callon and Latour (1981 p 288) argued the leviathan supposedly
offers exactly what I want, what I know and what I can do as the correct translation of
my unformulated wishes. The Umbrella Movement shows this maybe the case of
people entering the leviathan but does not account for the leviathan’s creation. The
creation of the Umbrella Movement leviathan came as an unprecedented result of the
Hong Kong people not being offered what they wanted, based on what they knew as a
52. 51
denial of their formulated wishes. Being ignored and rejected from the actor-network
and treated as an externality they resisted.
Leviathan in the city
Time, the internal experience of agencies within the body, makes itself known through
its inscription on space and is witnessed as empirical evidence. Time’s inscription upon
space is a necessary structure that conditions the possibility for the experience of
objects (Grosz 1995, p. 94). As Grosz has argued if space is the exteriority of the
subject and time its interiority, then the ways this exteriority and interiority are
theorised will effect notions of space and time (Grosz 1995, p. 99). In other words the
city, viewed as a body, gives birth to the leviathan. If we are to consider the Leviathan
as a body is must be 'born' within a prior established body that will either accept it as a
natural occurrence or a reject it as an abomination. Just as there are no meaningless
objects there are no meaningless leviathans. It enters a discourse of meaning that exists
before it. It is already labelled and can either accept this label or attempt to change it.
The space an actor occupies plays an important part as for the subject to take up a
position as a subject he must be able to situate himself as a being located in the space
occupied by his body. This is the condition for the subject to have a perspective on the
world (Grosz 1995, p. 89). Perspective is needed for there to be a concept of agency.
Space maybe what is needed for the subject to be situated but time represents the
mental causation of what occurs within the mind of which without there would be no
concept of agency only descriptions of events (Kramnick 2010, p. 8).
The birth of the leviathan is visceral and messy as the leviathan grows and fills space
because its presence has yet to be normalised. In this sense it is a parody of the city,
53. 52
where the orderliness of the city is not shocking because it represents the norm of order
(Butler 1990, p. 189). It begins as an abject body where it experiences an ‘expulsion’
followed by ‘repulsion’ as it is identified as the ‘Other’ (Butler 1990, p. 182). What is
experienced in the birth of the leviathan is the excretion of agency where inner agency
‘time’ is effectively expressed as the outer ‘space’ (Butler 1990, p. 182). Its repetition
continues until it is normalised or it is dealt with. The city offers nourishment to the
leviathan or it is rejected, as Hui (2015, p. 112) writes,
“For two and a half months, people contributed to the protests according to their ability.
Doctors and nurses organised first-aid teams. Able-bodied men reinforced barricades
and served as marshals. Semi-retirees made and repaired makeshift study corners.
Teachers and professors staged teach-ins. College students helped high-school students
with their homework.”
People must be feed and sheltered. If there is no support from others the leviathan can
effectively be ‘starved’ to death as people lose access to shopping complexes. As Chan
(2014) writes, “It is difficult to sustain a movement by continuous blockage of main
roads, as the inconvenience to the public means that the movement loses popular
support.” In this example the leviathan, while within the city, is not a part of the city but
as identified as the Other is distinctly separate from it. Not in its material manifestation
but in its ideal as practiced. If the leviathan is a body then not only are there durable
aspects to its materiality but also a repetitive labour for its conditions of life.
ANT’s concept of the actor is not adept in answering issues relating to reasons of why
the Umbrella Movement occurred. Instead by reconceptualising the actor by
incorporating ideas pertaining to the body as discussed in the previous chapter I have
been able to discuss issues relating to the Umbrella Movement. Such issues involved
54. 53
objects and acts of human necessity which were identified as key reasons behind the
Umbrella Movement. By using the Umbrella Movement as a site of analysis I was able
to examine ideas of power and resistance relating to the body and objects and as a result
bring ANT out of abstract concepts and closer to reasoning with lived experience.
55. 54
Conclusion
What was demonstrated in this thesis was that ANT as a methodology contains
shortcomings that prevented it from effectively analysing marginalised perspectives in
sites of resistance. ANTs shortcomings stemmed from a poor conceptualisation of the
body, in particular by reducing the body to an ‘actor’ and assigning it the same
characteristics as an object. However another cause for ANTs shortcomings was also
found in the Cartesian view of the body as a machine. Studies of the body have
developed away from the Cartesian view and towards contemporary investigations of
performativity and corporality of the body. By introducing ANT to contemporary
debates surrounding the body ANT is better equipped to deal with subjects of power
and resistance.
By utilising a deconstructive methodology I have argued that key concerns regarding
the body within ANT lie in the situated epistemic views of both the analyst and the
human actors within the actor-network. While ANT may claim that both object and
human actors possess equal agency upon the actor-network, I argue that the very actor-
network is androcentric and is constructed on the necessities of life namely human life.
As a result any understanding of agency is by extension also androcentric as agency is
always perceived in relation to the analysts own agency. ANT is a tool to further extend
the perception of agency to objects, but this perception is distorted as it relies on
denying human beings certain characteristics by simultaneously reducing human beings
and elevating objects to equal status.
By using ideas drawn from de Beauvoir I have argued that the body is unique by
comparison to the object as the body’s epistemic view is situated. No two bodies are the
same. Material bodies, the ‘machine’, may possess similarities to one another but how
