ENGL 101 Fall 2017 Double-Entry Journal Guide

ENGL 101 Fall 2017
The Double-Entry Journal for Essay 2
What to Do:
The “double-entry journal” is a tool for tracking your research
and your responses to the ideas you encounter in your research
for Essay 2. As you research, write the MLA citations for the
sources you’re consulting in the left-hand column and below
them jot down quotes, paraphrases, and bits of information (at
least 3 for each source). In the right-hand column, type your
commentary on these quotes and paraphrases. Be sure to place
quotation marks around any exact phrasing borrowed from a
source, and do include page numbers as applicable (some
sources don’t have page numbers, so you can’t give page
numbers).
As Ballenger discusses in The Curious Researcher, “diving
deep” into your topic helps you become knowledgeable about
your topic. Therefore, include entries for at least 2 books or
ebooks, at least 2 internet sources, at least 3 scholarly journal
articles, and at least 5 other sources of any kind (internet
sources, interviews you conduct, additional news items or
scholarly journal articles, etc.). Your double-entry journal
should have at least 12 sources. The “sources of any kind” may
include the TED Talk you have chosen to write about as well as
TED Talks you watched in consideration for the essay.
Due Date: By 10 p.m. on Thursday, October 26th. Please upload
your double-entry journal to the Dropbox.
Value: 25 points. (5 for correctly formatted works cited entries,
5 for quoting and paraphrasing correctly, and 15 for
thoughtfulness of the commentary).
In this column, write each Source’s MLA works cited entry.
Then, below each entry, write at least 3 quotes or paraphrases
from each source. Include page numbers.

In this column, write your commentary on the quotes and
paraphrases in the other column. Commentary may be what you
notice, what you’re confused by, what is surprising, what you
initially agree with, what you initially dispute, what you want to
learn more about, what you might want to use for Essay 1 and
how, etc.
9B14M107
FACEBOOK AND WHATSAPP: ACQUIRE OR ALLY?1

Meeta Dasgupta wrote this case solely to provide material for
class discussion. The author does not intend to illustrate either
effective or ineffective handling of a managerial situation. The
author may have disguised certain names and other identifying
information to protect confidentiality.
This publication may not be transmitted, photocopied, digitized
or otherwise reproduced in any form or by any means without
the
permission of the copyright holder. Reproduction of this
material is not covered under authorization by any reproduction
rights
organization. To order copies or request permission to
reproduce materials, contact Ivey Publishing, Ivey Business
School, Western
University, London, Ontario, Canada, N6G 0N1; (t)
519.661.3208; (e) [email protected]; www.iveycases.com.
Copyright © 2014, Management Development Institute Gurgaon
and Richard Ivey School of Business Foundation Version: 2014-
09-02
It was February 2014, and Mark Zuckerberg and Jan Koumhad
decided to work together, with the latter
giving his consent to Facebook’s takeover of WhatsApp.
Zuckerberg, founder of Facebook, believed
WhatsApp was a company that would strategically fit
Facebook’s business. He had decided that until
2018, he would allow WhatsApp to focus not on making money
but on expanding its user base.2 Of the
global population, 70 per cent was still without Internet access
and access, according to Zuckerberg, “was

growing slower than what many people in the Internet-
connected world believed.”3 The Internet already
connected the wealthiest members of the world’s population.
Connecting further users and also reaping
profits through them was perceived to be a challenge.4
WhatsApp had started with no users and no
product. The company still had no marketing and had relied
mostly on word of mouth to gather its 465
million active users. For Koum, India was a critical market and
he had hoped to achieve the goal of
having one billion WhatsApp users in India.5 Should WhatsApp
sell its assets to Facebook? Should the
company have insisted for an equity alliance instead? In the
face of both positive and negative industry
sentiments about the deal, both Zuckerberg and Koum were
challenged to make the best of it.
THE MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY
The mobile communications industry was witnessing heady
growth, with more than half of the earth’s
population using mobile communications by 2013. In addition,
there were many who appreciated the
various benefits of mobile technology but had no access to it.
An AT Kearney report forecasted that by
2017, a further 700 million subscribers would be added and by
2018, the figure would exceed 4 billion.
Surprisingly, although the over-18 age group was enthusiastic
about smartphones, “globally the over-60
age group was growing faster than the total population.”6
Subscribers were growing four times faster than
the global population (see Exhibit 1). Whereas on one hand the
connections and subscriber growth in the
developed markets was slowing down, emerging markets were
becoming centres for growth in

subscribers and mobile connections. The Asia Pacific region,
with a share of just under 50 per cent of the
global total, was leading. Declining prices and progressing
disposable income was driving people to own
and use mobile technology.
New business models delivering services in communication and
adjacent services emerged to take
advantage of the continuously evolving technology and the
falling average revenue per subscriber (see
Exhibits 2 and 3). Strong value propositions to deliver new and
innovative services to users were being
A
ut
ho
riz
ed
fo
r
us
e
on
ly
in
th
e
co
ur

se
In
te
gr
at
ed
B
us
. P
ol
ic
y
&
S
tr
at
eg
y
at
K
en
t S
ta
te

U
ni
ve
rs
ity
ta
ug
ht
b
y
M
. J
am
es
S
m
as
f
ro
m
A
ug
2
8,

2
01
7
to
D
ec
1
2,
2
01
7.
U
se
o
ut
si
de
th
es
e
pa
ra
m
et

er
s
is
a
c
op
yr
ig
ht
v
io
la
tio
n.
mailto:[email protected]
http://www.iveycases.com/
Page 2 9B14M107
continuously developed by network operators. Competition
among device manufacturers and operating
system (OS) developers focused on driving innovation by
building faster and lighter smartphones. With
increasing use of smartphones, OS platforms —including
Android, iOS and Windows — were driving the
purchase decisions of customers. Demand for lower prices was

forcing network infrastructure vendors to
improve operational efficiency. Content providers were
innovating hardware and software while a new
community of developers was growing to deliver advanced
services and products to consumers through
mobile technology. The widespread deployment of mobile
broadband networks and new technologies,
such as 4G, combined with the advent of smartphones, led to a
rocketing use of mobile data services.
While 2G services were declining at a compound annual growth
rate (CAGR) of 1 per cent, both 3G and
4G services were increasing at a CAGR of 20 per cent and 64
per cent, respectively. The total revenue of
the mobile ecosystem was expected to reach US$2 trillion7 by
2017, with revenues of mobile operators
contributing 1.4 per cent to global gross domestic product in
2012 (see Exhibit 4). Data was driving
growth, with the maximum consumption being video content
(see Exhibit 5).8
THE MESSAGING AND SOCIAL APPLICATIONS BUBBLE
In 2013, the overall usage of mobile applications for
smartphones saw a 115 per cent increase, primarily
led by an explosion in use of messaging and social applications
(See Exhibits 6 and 7). The year-over-
year usage growth of the applications had been 203 per cent. “In
all, Flurry Analytics tracked 1.126
trillion ‘app sessions’ in calendar 2013, with 4.7 billion
sessions tracked on December 31 alone.”9
A report by British consultancy firm Ovum saw social
messaging volumes surpass short messaging
services (SMS) numbers in 2013, and the coming years were
expected to produce a strong growth in

traffic. Research firm Informa forecasted that global annual
SMS revenues would fall from $120 billion in
2013, to $97 billion by 2018, due to increasing adoption of
over-the-top messaging applications in
developed and emerging markets.10
The mobile communications industry forecasted that due to
growth in user base from more than1 billion
in 2014, to 2.9 billion in 2017, the annual revenue generated by
chat applications would increase from $1
billion in 2013, to almost $25 billion. Chat applications were
increasingly evolving into advertising
networks, games platforms and other services, especially in
Asian countries where the messaging services
had placed more emphasis on revenue generation; these services
were evolving from just messaging
services to full social services that were encroaching on the
existing social network(s).11 According to
analysts, increased revenue for messaging services was expected
to come from advertising.12 Overall, the
return on equity in the Internet software and services sector was
11.75 per cent in 2014.13
ABOUT FACEBOOK
Established by Mark Zuckerberg in 2004, by November 2013,
Facebook was valued at $113 billion and
had 1.1 billion users worldwide who accessed its various
applications on their phones.14 As of December
31, 2013, Facebook had 93 million users in India who accessed
the world’s largest social networking site
at least once a month and 31 million mobile users who visited
the site daily.15
According to Eden Zoller, analyst at Ovum, “Zuckerberg has

come a long way in the mobile world in a
short time. When Facebook sold its shares to the public in an
initial public offering (IPO) in May 2012, it
literally had no mobile advertising revenues.”16 She further
added that Facebook had a fairly strong
mobile user base at IPO but it had failed to monetize those
mobile users. With the market worried that the
mobile business would not contribute to revenue, the shares of
the company had slid. However, by the
end of 2013, mobile devices brought in $1.2 billion in the last
quarter and more than $3 billion over the
A
ut
ho
riz
ed
fo
r
us
e
on
ly
in
th
e
co
ur

er
s
is
a
c
op
yr
ig
ht
v
io
la
tio
n.
Page 3 9B14M107
whole year.17 This accounted for 53 per cent of Facebook's
advertising revenue (see Exhibit 8). In 2013, it
boasted of a return on equity of 11.39 per cent (see Exhibit
9).18
The company had acquired Instagram in 2012, for about $700
million, and had made a “failed bid to
acquire the highly popular photo-sharing application Snapchat
for what was then considered an
astronomical sum of $3 billion.”19 In August 2013, to expand

Internet access to 5 billion people, primarily
in emerging markets, Facebook formed Internet.org with other
technology companies such as Samsung
Electronics Co., Nokia Ovj (NOK1V), and chipmaker
Qualcomm Inc. Internet.org was intended to bring
more people online by rolling out networks, developing projects
and mobilizing the industry and
government. Services — including social networks, messaging,
food information and weather information
that would eventually bring in revenue for carriers and Internet
companies — would be provided.
Zuckerberg was convinced that growth of the Internet.org
initiative would not be affected by concerns
about data security and government intervention.20
Facebook was becoming aware of increased competition from
Google, Microsoft and Twitter and from
mobile companies, smaller Internet companies and traditional
online and media businesses. Competitive
pressure was growing from regional social networks including
“Cyworld in Korea, Mixi in Japan,
Google-owned Orkut in Brazil and India, and vKontakte in
Russia.”21 These companies offered a variety
of Internet products, services, content, online advertising
offerings and various other products that could
compete with specific Facebook features. According to a
Facebook representative:
Certain competitors, including Google, could use strong or
dominant positions in one or more
markets to gain competitive advantage against us in areas where
we operate, including: by
integrating competing social networking platforms or features
into products they control, such as
search engines, web browsers, or mobile device operating

systems; by making acquisitions; or by
making access to Facebook more difficult. As a result, our
competitors may acquire and engage
users at the expense of the growth or engagement of our user
base, which may negatively affect
our business and financial results.22
ABOUT WHATSAPP
WhatsApp, a mobile messaging application, was started on
February 24, 2009, by Jan Koum and Brian
Action, both former Yahoo engineers.”23 They devised a simple
process of connecting mobile users.
According to Koum:
We were the first guys to do it; we were actually the first
mover. Everybody else came in and
tried to copy us, but they were not successful. We were global
from day one. We focused on
translations, [adding] Italian, German, Spanish [and] Russian
into the applications from day one
because we understood that it is the power of communication,
which people want to communicate
with people in other countries.We hired really smart people; our
first set of engineers was
extremely talented and allowed us to build a foundation that
enabled us to build everything on top
of it.24
In June 2009, Koum responded to Apple’s launch of push
notifications with updates in WhatsApp.
WhatsApp 2.0 was released with a messaging component and

the number of active users suddenly
swelled to 250,000. In October 2009, five ex-Yahoo employees
invested $250,000 in seed funding. Chris
Peiffer, an old friend of Koum, was hired to make the
Blackberry version of WhatsApp. To delay the fast
growth, WhatsApp was switched from a “free to paid service,
the primary cost being sending verification
texts to users.”25 In December 2009, WhatsApp was updated so
that photos could be sent through
iPhones. By early 2011, WhatsApp was ranked among the top
20 applications in the U.S. App Store.
A
ut
ho
riz
ed
fo
r
us
e
on
ly
in
th
e
co
ur

er
s
is
a
c
op
yr
ig
ht
v
io
la
tio
n.
Page 4 9B14M107
Following months of negotiation with partner Sequoia Capital,
the founders agreed to take $8 million
from Sequoia to top their seed fund. By February 2013,
WhatsApp’s user base had increased to
approximately 200 million active users. After valuing
WhatsApp at $1.5 billion, Sequoia invested another
$50 million. Following a security glitch in May 2011,
WhatsApp released a new version of the messenger
application for iPhones. WhatsApp faced another controversy on
January 6, 2012, when a hacker pointed

out a security problem in the application by publishing a
website that made it possible to change the status
of an arbitrary WhatsApp user as long as the phone number was
known. WhatsApp had to devise a
solution to the problem by putting an IP-address check on the
currently logged-in sessions. On January
13, 2012, with no reason being disclosed, WhatsApp was
removed from the iOS App Store and later
added back after four days. WhatsApp updates were also under
scrutiny from security researchers when
they noticed, in May 2012, that WhatsApp messages were no
longer sent as plaintext. On August 15,
2012, the WhatsApp support staff claimed that the messages
were encrypted in the latest version of the
WhatsApp software for iOS and Android (but not BlackBerry,
Windows Phone, and Symbian), without
specifying the implemented cryptographic method.26
In January 2014, WhatsApp had 50 employees, with more than
30 of them being engineers. Although the
company had its headquarters in the California city of Mountain
View, Russia was the centre for most of
its engineering work.27 Despite its modest size, WhatsApp was
already handling an average of 19 billion
messages per day, including about 600 million photos.
WhatsApp’s messaging volumes surpassed that of
traditional texts sent through the networks of cellphone carriers.
While SMS generated about $100 billion
in annual revenue, WhatsApp had an annual charge of just $1
after letting users use the application free
for the first year.28 According to a Nielson report, three out of
every four smartphone users used a chat
application. In India,WhatsApp led the pack of the most popular
applications with a 76 per cent reach;
Facebook was in fifth place with a 52 per cent reach, and
Chinese app WeChat was in 10th place, with a

22 per cent reach.29
WhatsApp’s audience of 450 million users had expanded at a
pace faster than that of Facebook,
reportedly adding one million users every day. It was estimated
that WhatsApp would reach a figure of
one billion users by 2015. More than 70 per cent of its users
returned to the application on a daily basis —
levels of engagement unheard of in Internet circles.30 The
messaging application offered services very
similar to Facebook: group chats, photo sharing, status updates,
shared links and audio files. However,
while Facebook faced the challenge of user attrition primarily
due to privacy-related concerns, WhatsApp
messages were private between the sender and receiver.31 Yet
WhatsApp still faced various security and
privacy concerns from governments and telecommunication
authorities — including the Canadian and
Dutch governments and the Communications and Technology
Commission of Saudi Arabia. The primary
concern was that users had to upload their mobile phone’s entire
address book to WhatsApp servers in
order to discover who was available via WhatsApp.32
Although on the surface WhatsApp and Facebook appeared to
hold divergent views on certain subjects,
Koum and Zuckerberg shared a vision of connecting the world
to the Internet, delivering development
benefits and, in the longer term, achieving profits too. Unlike
Facebook, however, WhatsApp’s revenue
business model was based on texting; it displayed no ads.33
Exilway Global, the world’s biggest emerging
markets private equity fund, valued WhatsApp at $11 billion in
November 2013. Twitter, which
possessed more than 500 million active users globally, was
valued at slightly less than $20 billion.34

When asked by a reporter about competition from messaging
applications such as Line, KakaoTalk, Viber
and WeChat, Koum replied that he had no fear someone would
build a better message/photo-sharing
platform and make WhatsApp irrelevant. According to Koum,
WhatsApp’s competitive advantage was
based on its product: “We have always had people copy us. It is
not shocking — if anything it is
A
ut
ho
riz
ed
fo
r
us
e
on
ly
in
th
e
co
ur
se
In

te
gr
at
ed
B
us
. P
ol
ic
y
&
S
tr
at
eg
y
at
K
en
t S
ta
te
U
ni

ve
rs
ity
ta
ug
ht
b
y
M
. J
am
es
S
m
as
f
ro
m
A
ug
2
8,
2
01

7
to
D
ec
1
2,
2
01
7.
U
se
o
ut
si
de
th
es
e
pa
ra
m
et
er
s

is
a
c
op
yr
ig
ht
v
io
la
tio
n.
http://www.livemint.com/Search/Link/Keyword/WeChat
Page 5 9B14M107
flattering. But what is important for us is to continue to get our
product right. I spend more time worrying
about ourselves, [and] that we are doing the right thing.”35
While promoting games and rushing to build platforms was the
focus of its competitors, WhatsApp
remained devoted to a clean, fast communication service that
worked flawlessly (see Exhibit 10). By
using the Internet as its communications backbone, WhatsApp
had completely transformed personal
communications, which were previously dominated by the

world’s largest wireless carriers.36
THE DEAL
It took the market and the technology industry by surprise when
Zuckerberg announced Facebook’s
decision to acquire WhatsApp for a staggering price of $19
billion on February 19, 2014 — the latter’s
revenues were estimated to be just $20 million for 2013. The
founders and employees of WhatsApp were
given $4 billion in cash, $12 billion in shares and $3 billion in
restricted stock units. The restricted stock
units that employees had been given were to stay with the
company until 2018.37 The sum represented
more than Facebook had ever paid for a company.38 Facebook
had spent 35 per cent of its cash on hand
on the deal.39 The merger agreement provided Facebook to pay
WhatsApp a fee of $1 billion in cash, in
the event of failure to obtain regulatory approvals.40
Although Zuckerberg and Koum had known each other for
years, the Facebook-WhatsApp deal was
worked out in eleven days. Aligning for the Internet.org project
had given them the idea of combining
their companies. Facebook’s deal to pay $19 billion for
WhatsApp closely followed the $900 million
purchase of another messaging service, Viber, by Japanese
Internet giant Rakuten. A $3 billion offer from
Facebook had been turned down by California-based messaging
firm SnapChat.41
According to Benedict Evans, a former cellphone analyst who
was then a partner with the venture capital
firm Andreessen Horowitz, “This is a ‘go big or go home’
moment for Facebook.”42 Facebook’s social

network of 1.2 billion active users would be united with
WhatsApp’s 450 million users. According to
Zuckerberg:
I just think that by itself it is worth more than $19 billion . . . I
could be wrong. This could be the
one service that gets to a billion people and ends up not being
that valuable. [But] I do not think I
am [wrong]. . . . Other Android messaging applications such as
KakaoTalk, Vine and WeChat
were already bringing in $2 to $3 a person with pretty early
efforts. . . . That shows that if we can
do a pretty good job of helping WhatsApp to grow then this is
just going to be a huge business….
In partnership with Facebook, WhatsApp can focus on
connecting one, two, three billion people
over the next however long that is going to take.43
WhatsApp was placed at the same value as Gap Inc. but more
than half the market value of Twitter Inc., a
microblogging service. According to Koum, he felt flattered to
be invited onto the board of Facebook by
Zuckerberg:
[We] probably did not expect success to this level. The size of
the deal shows how important
communication is in today’s world. Communication is at the
very core of our society. That is
what makes us human. We talked about this as a partnership and
not as an acquisition. WhatsApp
will continue to remain independent. There are no changes
planned to the product. Nothing really
changes from the user point of view. [S]o when we were talking

about this deal, we were not as
interested in terms of the numbers but as a partnership between
two great companies who share
the same vision. . . . Mark really understands that for WhatsApp
to be successful it really needs to
stay independent.44
A
ut
ho
riz
ed
fo
r
us
e
on
ly
in
th
e
co
ur
se
In
te
gr

at
ed
B
us
. P
ol
ic
y
&
S
tr
at
eg
y
at
K
en
t S
ta
te
U
ni
ve
rs

ity
ta
ug
ht
b
y
M
. J
am
es
S
m
as
f
ro
m
A
ug
2
8,
2
01
7
to

D
ec
1
2,
2
01
7.
U
se
o
ut
si
de
th
es
e
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
is
a

c
op
yr
ig
ht
v
io
la
tio
n.
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/product
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/topic/Android
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/definition/product
Page 6 9B14M107
According to Zuckerberg, if Facebook had not acquired
WhatsApp, the latter would have been under
increased pressure to eventually focus more on revenue models
and monetization over the near term
rather than on the company’s continued growth.45
REACTIONS AFTER ANNOUNCEMENT OF THE DEAL
Analysts felt that many more such deals would follow. The
industry had realized that messaging had
become the most sought after application as it enabled mobile

phone users around the globe to be
dependent on their local carriers to communicate freely
worldwide.46 Declan Lonergan, analyst at Yankee
group, said, “Facebook’s valuation of WhatsApp is shockingly
high, but so too is the risk of being left
behind as these apps become dominant platforms for
communication, media distribution, social
engagement and advertising.”47 Analysts at research firm Trefis
reported, “‘[M]obile messaging is here to
stay, even though the growth in social networking industry
might slow down.’ WhatsApp filled an
important gap in Facebook’s portfolio.”48 Employees at
Facebook said they had a moment of envy when
they thought about the enormous payout WhatsApp employees
would get. Others said it made them
reconsider their jobs. They were, nevertheless, of the opinion
that the deal was a long term win.49
Facebook’s shares fell as much as 3.4 per cent in early trading
after announcement of the deal, thereby
reducing the company’s market capitalization by billions;
however, by end of the trading day the shares
had bounced back, erasing earlier losses (see Exhibits 11 and
12).50
It was feared the deal would shake the bigger market for mobile
communications with voice calls, images
and video, similar to what YouTube did to the online video
industry in 2006, after being bought out by
Google.51 The industry was rife with reports that Google had
also been in active discussion to buy out
WhatsApp with a bid of $10 billion.52 Other reports alleged
that Google was willing to top Facebook’s
$19 billion offer. Google’s chief executive officer (CEO), Larry
Page, had even assured Koum that
Google would allow WhatsApp to operate independently and
compete with Facebook.53

All focus in the industry was on start-ups that had invented a
service and circulated it around the world,
especially in places such as Asia. Some of the services included
China-based WeChat, Japan’s Line and
South Korea’s KakaoTalk, which were all gradually turning
their attention to global markets. The
messaging services, through the use of Internet or IP
communications, could help users bypass telecom
carriers and their fees for SMS — a global market worth tens of
billions of dollars.54
In India, the Facebook-WhatsApp deal faced hurdles. The deal
was at risk of coming under detailed
scrutiny by the country’s fair trade regulator, the Competition
Commission of India (CCI), as both players
had significant presence in India. All mergers and acquisition
deals involving companies having an Indian
presence had to be approved by CCI, which had the mandate to
prevent unfair trade practices in the
market place.55
On the other hand, a United States-based privacy group had
asked the Federal Trade Commission (FTC)
to review and, if required, block the Facebook-WhatsApp deal
in order to guard the privacy of more than
450 million users who had installed the application on their
phones. The Electronic Privacy Information
Centre (EPIC), in its complaint to the FTC on March 6, 2014,
had said that Facebook regularly collected
all data on its users, which exposed WhatsApp users to privacy
risks. WhatsApp had built a user base by
committing not to collect user data for advertising revenue.
Conversely, Facebook routinely made use of
user information for advertising purposes and had made it clear
that it intended to incorporate data of

WhatsApp users into the user profiling business model, thus
violating users’understanding of exposure to
online advertising. According to EPIC, “WhatsApp users could
not reasonably have anticipated that by
selecting a pro-privacy messaging service, they would subject
their data to Facebook’s data collection
practices.”56
A
ut
ho
riz
ed
fo
r
us
e
on
ly
in
th
e
co
ur
se
In
te

gr
at
ed
B
us
. P
ol
ic
y
&
S
tr
at
eg
y
at
K
en
t S
ta
te
U
ni
ve

rs
ity
ta
ug
ht
b
y
M
. J
am
es
S
m
as
f
ro
m
A
ug
2
8,
2
01
7

to
D
ec
1
2,
2
01
7.
U
se
o
ut
si
de
th
es
e
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
is

a
c
op
yr
ig
ht
v
io
la
tio
n.
Page 7 9B14M107
This controversy had users worried about their privacy. As one
user tweeted, “I guess it is time to move
on and uninstall WhatsApp now that Facebook is buying it. I do
not like the idea of one company
controlling social media and online chat apps, it feels like Big
Brother is watching me.”57 Zuckerberg
clarified on the issue of privacy and claimed that WhatsApp did
not store messages and other content
shared by users on the instant messaging service.58
Additionally, on February 22, 2014, WhatsApp suffered an
outage for more than three hours that
frustrated users just days after the acquisition. Server issues
were reported to be the problem. Some users

took to other forms of social media, including blogs and
Twitter, to report the outage and vent frustration.
Twitter buzzed with messages that it was part of Facebook’s
conspiracy to shut down WhatsApp and
divert users to Facebook Chat.59
WHATSAPP’S ASPIRATIONS
To be on par with key competitor Viber, WhatsApp planned to
launch free voice calls by mid-year.
According to Koum, “We are driven by the mission that people
should be able to stay in touch anywhere
and affordably. Our goal is to be on every mobile phone in the
world.”60
Koum also stressed that his company had no plans to add
advertising or marketing to the service and that
its staff of 55 was unlikely to grow much.61 Their emphasis
would be to ensure that voice calls worked
just as well. According to him, “I understand that there are
bandwidth constraints and network constraints,
but we will take the same approach to voice [calls] that we took
to [messaging] five years ago, which is
focus on quality, simplicity [and] performance so that it is the
world standard for voice just as messaging
is the world standard.”62 Mobile phone operators were
beginning to feel threatened by WhatsApp’s plans
to diversify into voice calls. They feared that the success of any
such voice services over the Internet
could severely dent voice revenue, which still accounted for the
majority of overall revenue for telecom
service providers. However, in one CEO’s opinion, voice
services over the Internet would face enormous
challenges in connectivity: “If [WhatsApp’s] overall revenue
stream shifts to [the Internet], the

connectivity part of that equation is at risk, and without
connectivity, you can just forget everything on
the IP space. . . . This arena is only just [starting] to be debated.
So how it will play out remains to be
seen.”63
The decision to enter voice services would also put WhatsApp
in competition with telecom operators
globally. According to market researcher Ovum, telecom
operators were worried as text messaging was a
$120 billion business for them.64 Koum, however, had other
plans. He sought to cast himself as a partner
to telecom operators and not simply a competitor. He planned to
launch a WhatsApp branded mobile
service in Germany in partnership with KPN’s E-Plus. As he
said, “We are working with carriers in
established markets to bring value to end users.”65
FUTURE OUTLOOK
Zuckerberg defended his decision to spend a huge sum of money
on WhatsApp. Although he was
optimistic that WhatsApp was worth more than the amount paid,
he was apprehensive that he might have
overestimated WhatsApp’s growth trajectory.66 By allowing
WhatsApp to function independently, would
he be able to recover the money he had committed to paying for
it? How would he monetize on
WhatsApp’s users if he let WhatsApp continue with the same
business model? Koum was satisfied with
the deal and found it rewarding but his focus was still to
improve and grow WhatsApp’s reach in various
critical markets.67 Would WhatsApp be allowed to function
independently? Under the new management,
what were the future prospects of the company?

A
ut
ho
riz
ed
fo
r
us
e
on
ly
in
th
e
co
ur
se
In
te
gr
at
ed
B
us

. P
ol
ic
y
&
S
tr
at
eg
y
at
K
en
t S
ta
te
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
ta
ug
ht

b
y
M
. J
am
es
S
m
as
f
ro
m
A
ug
2
8,
2
01
7
to
D
ec
1
2,

2
01
7.
U
se
o
ut
si
de
th
es
e
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
is
a
c
op
yr
ig

ht
v
io
la
tio
n.
Page 8 9B14M107
EXHIBIT 1: TOTAL SUBSCRIBERS (IN BILLIONS)
Source: AT Kearney, “The Mobile Economy 2013”,
www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/760890
/The_Mobile_Economy_2013.pdf, February 27, 2014.
EXHIBIT 2: AVERAGE REVENUE PER SUBSCRIBER BY
REGION (US$ PER MONTH)
2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Africa 18.6 15.8 16.2 15.4 14.8
Asia Pacific 15.8 13.7 14.7 13.5 14.3
Latin America 26.7 24.0 24.9 23.9 24.1
Middle East 24.7 27.3 27.6 26.5 26.7

Europe 53.5 51.1 50.6 47.1 44.1
North America 62.0 61.9 62.8 63.4 64.8
Others 19.4 13.7 13.4 13.0 12.5
EXHIBIT 3: AVERAGE GLOBAL CONNECTION SPEED
(MKBPS)
A
ut
ho
riz
ed
fo
r
us
e
on

ly
in
th
e
co
ur
se
In
te
gr
at
ed
B
us
. P
ol
ic
y
&
S
tr
at
eg
y

at
K
en
t S
ta
te
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
ta
ug
ht
b
y
M
. J
am
es
S
m
as
f

ro
m
A
ug
2
8,
2
01
7
to
D
ec
1
2,
2
01
7.
U
se
o
ut
si
de
th

es
e
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
is
a
c
op
yr
ig
ht
v
io
la
tio
n.
Page 9 9B14M107

EXHIBIT 4: MOBILE NETWORK OPERATORS REVENUES
(US$ BILLION)
EXHIBIT 5: EXPLOSION OF MOBILE SUBSCRIBER
Source: A T Kearney, “The Mobile Economy 2013”,
A
ut
ho
riz
ed
fo
r
us
e
on

es
e
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
is
a
c
op
yr
ig
ht
v
io
la
tio
n.
Page 10 9B14M107

EXHIBIT 6: GLOBAL AVERAGE REVENUE PER DATA
SERVICES AND SOCIAL MEDIA ($/MONTH)
EXHIBIT 7: PORTABLE DEVICES CONSUMERS MOST
WANT TO PURCHASE (DEVEPOLED
MARKETS) – IN %
EXHIBIT 8: FACEBOOK’S ADVERTISING AVERAGE
REVENUR PER USER68
Note: These figures include the advertising revenues for the
first three quarters of 2013.
Source: John Koetsier, “Facebook Grows Per-user Revenue in
Every Single Global Territory”,
http://venturebeat.com/2013/10/30/facebook-grows-per-user-

revenue-in-every-single-global-territory/, accessed February
27, 2014.
A
ut
ho
riz
ed
fo
r
us
e
on
ly
in
th
e
co
ur
se
In
te
gr
at
ed

B
us
. P
ol
ic
y
&
S
tr
at
eg
y
at
K
en
t S
ta
te
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
ta

ug
ht
b
y
M
. J
am
es
S
m
as
f
ro
m
A
ug
2
8,
2
01
7
to
D
ec

1
2,
2
01
7.
U
se
o
ut
si
de
th
es
e
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
is
a
c
op

yr
ig
ht
v
io
la
tio
n.
Page 11 9B14M107
EXHIBIT 9: FACEBOOK FINANCIALS
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Sales/Revenue 777M 1.97B 3.71B 5.09B 7.87B
Sales Growth - 154.05% 87.99% 37.13% 54.69%
Cost of Goods Sold (COGS) incl. D&A 223M 493M 860M
1.36B 1.9B
COGS excluding D&A 145M 354M 537M 715M 892M
Depreciation & Amortization Expense 78M 139M 323M 649M
1.01B
Depreciation 76M 130M 303M 571M 866M
Amortization of Intangibles 2M 9M 20M 78M 145M
COGS Growth - 121.08% 74.44% 58.60% 39.52%
Gross Income 554M 1.48B 2.85B 3.73B 5.97B
Gross Income Growth - 167.33% 92.51% 30.66% 60.24%
Gross Profit Margin - - - - 75.83%
SG&A Expense 292M 449M 1.1B 3.19B 3.05B

Research & Development 87M 144M 388M 1.4B 1.42B
Other SG&A 205M 305M 707M 1.79B 1.63B
SGA Growth - 53.77% 143.88% 191.05% -4.36%
Other Operating Expense 0 0 0 0 0
Unusual Expense 0 0 0 0 117M
EBIT after Unusual Expense 0 0 0 0 (117M)
Non Operating Income/Expense 2M (2M) (19M) (7M) (13M)
Non-Operating Interest Income - - - 14M 19M
Equity in Affiliates (Pretax) 0 0 0 0 0
Interest Expense 10M 22M 42M 51M 56M
Interest Expense Growth - 120.00% 90.91% 21.43% 9.80%
Gross Interest Expense 10M 22M 42M 51M 56M
Interest Capitalized 0 0 0 - -
Pretax Income 254M 1.01B 1.7B 494M 2.75B
Pretax Income Growth - 296.85% 68.15% -70.86% 457.49%
Pretax Margin - - - - 34.98%
Income Tax 25M 402M 695M 441M 1.25B
Income Tax - Current Domestic 97M 382M 724M 604M 1.22B
Income Tax - Current Foreign 1M 1M 8M 22M 68M
Income Tax - Deferred Domestic (73M) 19M (37M) (178M)
(35M)
Income Tax - Deferred Foreign 0 0 0 (7M) (2M)
Income Tax Credits 0 0 0 0 0
Equity in Affiliates 0 0 0 0 0
Other After Tax Income (Expense) (107M) (234M) (332M)
(21M) (9M)
Consolidated Net Income 122M 372M 668M 32M 1.49B
Minority Interest Expense 0 0 0 0 0
Net Income 122M 372M 668M 32M 1.49B
Net Income Growth - 204.92% 79.57% -95.21% 4,559.38%
Net Margin Growth - - - - 18.94%
Net Income After Extraordinaries 122M 372M 668M 32M 1.49B
Preferred Dividends 0 0 0 0 0
Net Income Available to Common 122M 372M 668M 32M
1.49B
EPS (Basic) 0.06 0.17 0.31 0.02 0.62

EPS (Basic) Growth - 204.73% 79.54% -93.60% 3,000.00%
Basic Shares Outstanding 2.14B 2.14B 2.14B 2.01B 2.42B
EPS (Diluted) 0.06 0.17 0.31 0.01 0.60
EPS (Diluted) Growth - 204.73% 79.54% -96.80% 5,900.00%
Diluted Shares Outstanding 2.14B 2.14B 2.14B 2.17B 2.52B
EBITDA 340M 1.17B 2.08B 1.19B 3.93B
EBITDA Growth - 244.41% 77.54% -42.91% 231.26%
EBITDA Margin - - - - 49.95%
A
ut
ho
riz
ed
fo
r
us
e
on
ly
in
th
e
co
ur
se
In

is
a
c
op
yr
ig
ht
v
io
la
tio
n.
Page 12 9B14M107
EXHIBIT 9 (CONTINUED)
Assets
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
Cash & Short Term Investments 633M 1.79B 11.36B 9.63B
11.45B
Cash Only 633M - 8.97B 1.51B 1.04B
Short-Term Investments - - 2.4B 8.11B 10.41B
Cash & Short Term Investments Growth - 181.99% 536.58% -
15.29% 18.94%

Cash & ST Investments / Total Assets 57.08% 59.70% 82.42%
63.74% 63.98%
Total Accounts Receivable - 373M 547M 1.17B 1.16B
Accounts Receivables, Net - 373M 547M 719M 1.11B
Accounts Receivables, Gross - 384M 564M 741M 1.15B
Bad Debt/Doubtful Accounts - (11M) (17M) (22M) (38M)
Other Receivables - 0 0 451M 51M
Accounts Receivable Growth - - 46.65% 113.89% -0.85%
Accounts Receivable Turnover - 5.29 6.78 4.35 6.79
Inventories - 0 0 0 0
Finished Goods - 0 0 0 0
Work in Progress - 0 0 0 0
Raw Materials - 0 0 0 0
Progress Payments & Other - 0 0 0 0
Other Current Assets - 88M 149M 471M 461M
Miscellaneous Current Assets - 88M 149M 471M 461M
Total Current Assets - 2.25B 12.06B 11.27B 13.07B
Net Property, Plant & Equipment 148M 574M 1.48B 2.39B
2.88B
Property, Plant & Equipment - Gross - 820M 1.93B 3.27B 4.14B
Buildings - 0 355M 594M 1.07B
Land & Improvements - 29M 34M 36M 45M
Computer Software and Equipment - 61M 73M 93M 95M
Other Property, Plant & Equipment - 58M 120M 194M 203M
Accumulated Depreciation - 246M 450M 882M 1.26B
Total Investments and Advances - 0 0 0 0
Other Long-Term Investments - 0 0 0 0
Long-Term Note Receivable - 0 0 0 0
Intangible Assets - 96M 162M 1.39B 1.72B
Net Goodwill - 37M 82M 587M 839M
Net Other Intangibles - 59M 80M 801M 883M
Other Assets 961M 74M 90M 57M 221M
Tangible Other Assets - 74M 90M 57M 221M
Total Assets 1.11B 2.99B 13.79B 15.1B 17.9B
Assets - Total - Growth - 169.61% 361.07% 9.55% 18.49%

A
ut
ho
riz
ed
fo
r
us
e
on
ly
in
th
e
co
ur
se
In
te
gr
at
ed
B

us
. P
ol
ic
y
&
S
tr
at
eg
y
at
K
en
t S
ta
te
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
ta
ug

ht
b
y
M
. J
am
es
S
m
as
f
ro
m
A
ug
2
8,
2
01
7
to
D
ec
1

2,
2
01
7.
U
se
o
ut
si
de
th
es
e
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
is
a
c
op
yr

ig
ht
v
io
la
tio
n.
Page 13 9B14M107
EXHIBIT 9 (CONTINUED)
Liabilities & Shareholders Equity
2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
ST Debt & Current Portion LT Debt - 106M 279M 365M 239M
Short Term Debt - 0 0 0 0
Current Portion of Long Term Debt - 106M 279M 365M 239M
Accounts Payable - 104M 234M 65M 268M
Accounts Payable Growth - - 125.00% -72.22% 312.31%
Income Tax Payable - - - - -
Other Current Liabilities - 179M 386M 622M 593M
Dividends Payable - 0 0 - -
Accrued Payroll - - - 146M 196M
Miscellaneous Current Liabilities - 179M 386M 476M 397M
Total Current Liabilities - 389M 899M 1.05B 1.1B
Long-Term Debt - 367M 398M 1.99B 237M

Long-Term Debt excl. Capitalized Leases - 250M 0 1.5B 0
Non-Convertible Debt - 250M 0 1.5B 0
Convertible Debt - 0 0 0 0
Capitalized Lease Obligations - 117M 398M 491M 237M
Provision for Risks & Charges - - 60M 100M -
Deferred Taxes - - - 0 0
Deferred Taxes - Credit - - - - -
Deferred Taxes - Debit - - - 0 0
Other Liabilities 241M 72M 75M 205M 1.09B
Other Liabilities (excl. Deferred Income) 241M 72M 75M 205M
1.09B
Deferred Income - 0 0 - -
Total Liabilities 241M 828M 1.43B 3.35B 2.43B
Non-Equity Reserves - 0 0 0 0
Total Liabilities / Total Assets 21.73% 27.69% 10.39% 22.17%
13.55%
Preferred Stock (Carrying Value) - 0 0 0 0
Redeemable Preferred Stock - 0 0 0 -
Non-Redeemable Preferred Stock - 0 0 0 -
Common Equity (Total) 868M 2.16B 12.35B 11.76B 15.47B
Common Stock Par/Carry Value - - - 0 0
Retained Earnings - - 1.17B 1.66B 3.16B
ESOP Debt Guarantee - - 0 0 0
Cumulative Translation Adjustment/Unrealized
For. Exch. Gain - - (7M) - -
Unrealized Gain/Loss Marketable Securities - - 0 0 0
Revaluation Reserves - - 0 0 0
Treasury Stock - - 0 0 0
Common Equity / Total Assets 78.27% 72.31% 89.61% 77.83%
86.45%
Total Shareholders' Equity 868M 2.16B 12.35B 11.76B 15.47B
Total Shareholders' Equity / Total Assets 78.27% 72.31%
89.61% 77.83% 86.45%
Accumulated Minority Interest - 0 0 0 0
Total Equity 868M 2.16B 12.35B 11.76B 15.47B

Liabilities & Shareholders' Equity 1.11B 2.99B 13.79B 15.1B
17.9B
Source:
www.marketwatch.com/investing/stock/fb/financials,accessed
April 3, 2014. Au
th
or
iz
ed
fo
r
us
e
on
ly
in
th
e
co
ur
se
In
te

a
c
op
yr
ig
ht
v
io
la
tio
n.
Page 14 9B14M107
EXHIBIT 10: WHATSAPP’S COMPETITORS
Line
According to analysts, the earning potential for Line, Japan’s
most popular messaging application,
remained underappreciated. It had the biggest revenue
opportunity from a games/advertising perspective
because its home base of Japan was the largest mobile games
market in the world and 85 per cent of its
user base was outside Japan, which could be monetized by the
application. According to Reuters, Line
had brought in around $335 million in revenue in 2013, and it

was estimated that by 2017, it would
generate $2.2 billion. Line was continuously expanding its
services, offered next to its core messaging
service, to utilities, radio, ecommerce (C2C, B2C), calls and
sponsored accounts (such as on Twitter).69 It
had witnessed a 48 per cent growth in its user base.70 As
reported in October 2013, the estimated value
of Line could be put at anywhere from $8 to $10 billion.71
KakaoTalk
The revenues of telecom operators had taken a hit in recent
years with South Korea's KakaoTalk offering
a free alternative to text messaging. KakaoTalk provided free
call and text messaging services. Users
could also share diverse content and information, from photos,
videos, voice messages, and URL links to
contact information. Both one-on-one and group chats were
available over wifi or 3G, and there were no
limits to the number of friends who could join in group chat.72
There was a gaming feature that allowed
one to buy physical gifts within the application and have them
sent to friends, a feature Facebook tried in
2013 that had failed.73
It had 133 million registered users and was prepping a $2
billion IPO backed by Morgan Stanley and
Samsung Securities. Whereas WhatsApp dominated many
Western countries, the founder of KakaoTalk
was targeting the rest of the world, with Indonesia being the
current battleground. As in October 2013, the
estimated value of the company was around $1.5 billion to $2
billion.74
According to the CEO Sirgoo Lee, “We are going different

directions from WhatsApp. If you want a pure
messaging service, WhatsApp is for you. There is more to offer
than just texting, such as games and
mobile commerce.”75
WeChat
Wechat, a mobile text and voice messaging application
developed by Tencent in China, was available on
different platforms including Android, iPhone, Blackberry,
Windows Phone, Symbian and OSX, and
supported different languages.76 The combined monthly active
users of WeChat and Weixin (the version
available in China) had reached 355 million as of end 2013, an
increase of 121 per cent year-on-year and
up 6 per cent quarter-on-quarter. Although WeChat dominated
in China, it was intensifying efforts to
attract overseas users. It had doubled its international footprint
to 100 million users in three months in
2013, and early in 2014, it had passed 100 million downloads on
GooglePlay internationally. Parent firm
Tencent had plans of supporting a broader portfolio of
associated applications spanning activities such as
games, entertainment, information and utilities. It planned to
leverage Official Accounts and Weixcin
Payment to explore online-to-offline and mobile e-commerce
opportunities in China. In 2014, the
company’s focus was on ramping up its online video services.77
The estimated value of WeChat was $30
billion or $95 per user.78
Source: Created by author.

ht
v
io
la
tio
n.
http://weixin.qq.com/
Page 15 9B14M107
EXHIBIT 11: FACEBOOK SHARE PRICE (IN US$)
Source: www.google.com/finance/historical?Q=NASDAQ:FB.
EXHIBIT 12: FACEBOOK – VOLUME OF SHARES TRADED
(IN MILLION $)
Source: www.google.com/finance/historical?Q=NASDAQ:FB.
A
ut

ho
riz
ed
fo
r
us
e
on
ly
in
th
e
co
ur
se
In
te
gr
at
ed
B
us
. P
ol

ic
y
&
S
tr
at
eg
y
at
K
en
t S
ta
te
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
ta
ug
ht
b
y

M
. J
am
es
S
m
as
f
ro
m
A
ug
2
8,
2
01
7
to
D
ec
1
2,
2
01

7.
U
se
o
ut
si
de
th
es
e
pa
ra
m
et
er
s
is
a
c
op
yr
ig
ht
v

io
la
tio
n.
Page 16 9B14M107
ENDNOTES
1 The case has been written on the basis of published sources
only. Consequently, the interpretation and perspectives
presented in this case are not necessarily those of Facebook or
WhatsApp.
2 Mark. Prigg, “How To Celebrate Facebook Style: Mark
Zuckerberg And WhatsApp Founder Jan Koum Celebrate
$19billion
Deal With Psy In Barcelona,” February 25, 2014,
www.dailymail.co.uk/sciencetech/article-2567663/How-
celebrate-
Facebook-style-Mark-Zuckerberg-whatsapp-founder-Jan-Koum-
party-Psy.html, accessed April 7, 2014.
3 Barbara. Ortutay, “Zuckerberg Takes Long View With
WhatsApp, Internet,” February 24, 2014,
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/zuckerberg-talks-whatsapp-
internet-access-all, accessed February 27, 2014.
4 Prigg, op. cit.
5 Romit Guha, “We Want A Billion Indians On WhatsApp, Says
Cofounder Jan Koum,” February 26, 2014
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/opinion/interviews/we-
want-a-billion-indians-on-whatsapp-says-co-founder-jan-
koum/articleshow/31009771.cms?curpg=2, accessed February

26, 2014.
6 Deloitte, The State Of The Global Mobile Consumers, 2013,
www.deloitte.com/content/dam/Deloitte/global/Documents/Tech
nology-Media-Telecommunications/dttl_TMT-
GMCS_January%202014.pdf, accessed April 7, 2014.
7 All figures in US$, unless otherwise indicated.
8 AT Kearney, The Mobile Economy 2013,
www.atkearney.com/documents/10192/760890/The_Mobile_Eco
nomy_2013.pdf,
accessed April 7, 2014.
9 Neil. Hughes, “Mobile App Use Surged 115% in 2013,
Messaging and Social Apps Saw Most Growth,” February 13,
2014,
http://appleinsider.com/articles/14/01/13/app-use-surged-115-
in-2013-messaging-social-apps-saw-most-growth, accessed
March 24, 2014.
10 “WhatsApp Deal Shows Stunning Growth Of Messaging
Apps,” February 24, 2014.
www.ndtv.com/article/world/whatsapp-
deal-shows-stunning-growth-of-messaging-apps-487239,
accessed February 27, 2014.
11 Ansuya Harjani, “Just How Big Will the Messaging App
Industry Get,” March 9, 2014, www.cnbc.com/id/101474726,
accessed March 24, 2014.
12 Ibid
13 Return on Equity by Sector,
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/New_Home_Page/datafile
/roe.html, accessed April 9,
2014.
14 “Exilway Private Equity Estimates WhatsApp Valuation at
US$11 billion, Intends to Pick Stake,” November 13, 2013,
http://finance.yahoo.com/news/exhilway-private-equity-
estimates-whatsapp-130300090.html, accessed March 28, 2014.
15 Leslie. D. Monte, “With WhatsApp Facebook Gets a
Younger Mobile Face in India,” February 20, 2014,
www.livemint.com/Companies/D6PFnundapshHqz8lTvI5L/With

-whatsapp-Facebook-gets-younger-mobile-face-in-India.html,
16 “MWC2014: WhatsApp’s Worth Is More Than $19 Billion,
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg Says,”
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-
news/internet/MWC2014-whatsapps-worth-is-more-than-19-
billion-Facebook-
CEO-Mark-Zuckerberg-says/articleshow/30962384.cms,
17 Cornelius. Rahn, “Mark Zuckerberg Says WhatsApp Worth
More Than $19 Billion, February 25 2014,
www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-02-24/zuckerberg-seeks-
phone-partners-in-quest-to-connect-billions.html, accessed
February 27, 2014.
18 Facebook Inc., http://csimarket.com/stocks/FB-Return-on-
Equity-ROE.html, accessed April 16, 2013.
19 Rahn, op. cit.
20 Ibid.
21 Chloe. Albanesius, “Facebook Names Google, Twitter,
Microsoft as Major Rivals, February 2, 2012,
www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2399738,00.asp, accessed
April 11, 2014.
22 Brian. Womack, “Facebook Cites Google+ with Mobile Shift
Among Potential Risks,” February 8, 2012,
www.businessweek.com/news/2012-02-08/facebook-cites-
google-with-mobile-shift-among-potential-risks.html, accessed
April 11, 2014.
23 Amit. Chowdhury, “WhatsApp Hits 500 Million Users,”
April 22, 2014,
www.forbes.com/sites/amitchowdhry/2014/04/22/whatsapp-hits-
500-million-users/, accessed February 27, 2014.
24 Guha, op. cit.
25 Pam Olson, “Exclusive: The Rags-to-Riches Tale of how Jan
Koum built WhatsApp into Facebook’s New $19 billion
baby”. February 19, 2014,
www.forbes.com/sites/parmyolson/2014/02/19/exclusive-inside-

story-how-jan-koum-built-
whatsapp-into-facebooks-new-19-billion-baby/, accessed
February 27, 2014.
26 Ibid.
27 “10 Things to Know AboutWhatsApp and Its Future with
Facebook,” February 20, 2014,
www.hindustantimes.com/technology/socialmedia-updates/10-
things-you-should-know-about-whatsapp/article1-
1186201.aspx, accessed February 27, 2014.
28 Michael Liedtke. “Does WhatsApp Deal Show Facebook
What’s Up”, February 20, 2014, http://news.yahoo.com/does-
whatsapp-deal-show-facebook-knows-39-222513541--
finance.html, accessed February 27, 2014.
29 “With WhatsApp Facebook Gets a Younger Mobile Face in
India,” http://iimtallinone.blogspot.in/2014/02/with-whatsapp-
facebook-gets-younger.html, accessed March 24, 2014.
30 Ibid.
A
ut
ho
riz
ed
fo
r
us
e
on
ly
in

th
e
co
ur
se
In
te
gr
at
ed
B
us
. P
ol
ic
y
&
S
tr
at
eg
y
at
K

en
t S
ta
te
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
ta
ug
ht
b
y
M
. J
am
es
S
m
as
f
ro
m

A
ug
2
8,
2
01
7
to
D
ec
1
2,
2
01
7.
U
se
o
ut
si
de
th
es
e

pa
ra
m
et
er
s
is
a
c
op
yr
ig
ht
v
io
la
tio
n.
Page 17 9B14M107
31 Sharad. Raghavan, “WhatsApp Deal: Facebook’s Future Lies
in Investing in R&D,” February 24, 2014,

http://articles.economictimes.indiatimes.com/2014-02-
24/news/47635885_1_whatsapp-criticism-facebook-messaging-
app,
32 WhatsApp, op. cit.
33 Guha, op. cit.
US$11 billion, Intends to Pick Stake,” op. cit.
35 Jim. Goetz, “Four Numbers that Explain Why Facebook
Acquired WhatsApp,”
http://sequoiacapital.tumblr.com/post/77211282835/four-
numbers-that-explain-why-facebook-acquired, accessed
February
27, 2014.
36 Ibid.
37 Julliane. Pepitone, “Mark Zuckerberg: $19 Billion for
WhatsApp is Cheap,” February 25, 2014,
www.nbcnews.com/tech/social-media/mark-zuckerberg-19-
billion-whatsapp-cheap-n37401, accessed February 27, 2014.
38 Raghavan, op. cit.
39 Mark. Isaac, “Don’t Expect Facebook’s WhatsApp to Make
Any Real Money for Years,” February 24, 2014,
http://recode.net/2014/02/24/dont-expect-facebooks-whatsapp-
to-make-any-real-money-for-years/, accessed February 27,
2014
40 “10 Things to Know About WhatsApp and Its Future with
Facebook”, op. cit.
41 “WhatsApp Deal Shows Stunning Growth of Messaging
Apps,” op. cit.
42 Liedtke, op. cit.
43 “MWC2014: WhatsApp’s Worth Is More than $19 Billion,
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg Says,” op. cit.
44 Ibid.
45 Isaac, op. cit.
Apps,” op. cit.

47 Ibid.
48 Ibid.
49 Jillian D’Onfro, “Here’s How Facebook Employees Really
Feel About the WhatsApp Acquisition”, February, 24, 2014,
www.businessinsider.com/facebook-employees-whatsapp-
acquisition-2014-2, accessed February 27, 2014.
50 Dominic. Rushe, “WhatsApp: Facebook Stock Slides Then
Recovers AfterNews of $19 Billion Deal,” February 21, 2014,
www.theguardian.com/business/2014/feb/20/facebook-
whatsapp-shares-stock-fall-acquisition-reaction, accessed March
28,
2014.
Apps,” op. cit.
52 Gaurav Choudhary, “A Bold Move, A Calculated Risk:
Facebook, WhatsApp and Game Theory,” February 26,
2014,www.hindustantimes.com/business-news/a-bold-move-a-
calculated-risk-facebook-whatsapp-and-game-theory/article1-
1188219.aspx, accessed February 27, 2014.
53 “Google Was Ready to Pay More than $19 Billion for
WhatsApp: Report,” February 21, 2014,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-
news/internet/Google-was-ready-to-pay-morethan-19-billion-
for-whatsapp-
Report/articleshow/30781810.cms, accessed February 27, 2014.
Apps,” op. cit.
55 Jawed Anwer, “FB-WhatsApp Deal May Come under Lens,”
Times of India, March 10, 2014.
56 Alexei Oreskovic, “Privacy Groups Ask Regulators to Halt
Facebook’s $19 Billion WhatsApp Deal,” March 6, 2014,
www.reuters.com/article/2014/03/06/facebook-whatsapp-
idUSL1N0M328A20140306, accessed February 27, 2014.
57 Anwer, “FB-WhatsApp Deal May Come under Lens,” op. cit.
58 Jawed Anwer, “Ahead of WhatsApp-Facebook Deal
Approval, Concerns over Privacy of Users,” March 9, 2014,

http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/Ahead-of-
whatsapp-Facebook-deal-approval-concerns-over-privacy-of-
users/articleshow/31747910.cms, accessed April 9, 2014.
59 “WhatsApp Services Restored after Brief Outage,” February
23, 2014, http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-
news/internet/whatsapp-service-restored-after-brief-
outage/articleshow/30879704.cms, accessed February 27, 2014.
60 “WhatsApp First New Feature Under Facebook: Voice
Calls,” February 24, 2014,
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/tech/tech-news/software-
services/whatsapps-first-new-feature-under-Facebook-Voice-
calls/articleshow/30951210.cms, accessed February 27, 2014.
61 Prigg, op. cit.
62 Guha, op. cit.
63 “WhatsApp in Voice a Threat for Telecom Operators:
Telenor CEO John Fredrik Baksaas,” February 26, 2014,
http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/news-by-
industry/telecom/whatsapp-in-voice-a-threat-for-telecom-
operators-
telenor-ceo-jon-fredrik-baksaas/articleshow/31008686.cms,
64 “WhatsApp First New Feature Under Facebook: Voice
Calls,” op. cit.
65 Ibid.
66 “MWC2014: WhatsApp’s Worth Is More than $19 Billion,
Facebook CEO Mark Zuckerberg Says,” op. cit.
67 Guha, op. cit.
68 “Facebook Grows Per User Revenue in Every Single Global
Territory,” http://venturebeat.com/2013/10/30/facebook-
grows-per-user-revenue-in-every-single-global-territory/,
69 Ansuya Harjani, “Just How Big Will the Messaging App
Industry Get?” March 9, 2014,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/101474726,accessed March 24, 2014.

ht
v
io
la
tio
n.
Page 18 9B14M107
US$11 Billion, Intends to Pick Stake,” op. cit.
71 “How Will Facebook’s $19 Billion WhatsApp Deal Affect
the Mobile Messaging Market?” February 20, 2014,
www.redherring.com/finance/how-will-facebooks-19bn-
whatsapp-deal-affect-the-mobile-messaging-market/, accessed
April
9, 2014.
72 Jon Russell, “Korean Messaging App KakaoTalk’s Games
Platform Grossed $311 million in H1 2013”,
http://thenextweb.com/asia/2013/07/16/korean-messaging-app-
kakao-talks-games-platform-grossed-311-million-in-h1-
2013/, accessed March 24, 2014.
73 S. Kovach, “WhatsApp Rival CEO: It’s Just a Messaging
App and We Can Offer So Much,” March 3, 2014,
www.businessinsider.com.au/kakao-talk-2014-3, accessed
March 24, 2104.
74 A. Acuna and I. Kwon, “What is KakaoTalk’s Business
Model,” October 6, 2013, http://ultralab.co/what-is-kakaotalks-
business-model/, accessed April 9, 2014.
75 Kovach, op. cit.

76 Mittal Mandalia, “We Chat Announces Native Mac Client,
Windows Version May Follow Soon”,
www.techienews.co.uk/977156/wechat-announces-native-mac-
client-windows-version-may-follow-soon/, accessed March
26, 2014.
77 “WhatsApp Rival WeChat is Narrowing the Gap as It Passes
355 Million Monthly Active Users,”
http://thenextweb.com/apps/2014/03/19/whatsapp-rival-wechat-
is-narrowing-the-gap-as-it-passes-355-million-monthly-
active-users/#!Bq2ym, accessed March 26, 2014.
78 “How Will Facebook’s $19 Billion WhatsApp Deal Affect
the Mobile Messaging Market?” op. cit.
A
ut
ho
riz
ed
fo
r
us
e
on
ly
in
th
e
co

ur
se
In
te
gr
at
ed
B
us
. P
ol
ic
y
&
S
tr
at
eg
y
at
K
en
t S
ta

te
U
ni
ve
rs
ity
ta
ug
ht
b
y
M
. J
am
es
S
m
as
f
ro
m
A
ug
2

8,
2
01
7
to
D
ec
1
2,
2
01
7.
U
se
o
ut
si
de
th
es
e
pa
ra
m

et
er
s
is
a
c
op
yr
ig
ht
v
io
la
tio
n.
Essay Two: Summary and Researched Response
to a TED Talk of Your Choosing
What to Do:
Writing academically involves summarizing other peoples’
ideas, characterizing those ideas faithfully, and responding to
those ideas—often by using research. For this essay, write a
summary and researched response to a TED Talk of your

choosing.
What is a “strong response”?
A “strong response” is a developed, thorough, extended
response that has a main controlling idea. In the words of the
authors of The Allyn and Bacon Guide to Writing, when you
write a strong response to a source, you should “speak back to
[the] author from your own critical thinking, personal
experience, values, and, perhaps, further reading or research”
and feel open to “write a response in which you are free to
consider the author’s rhetorical strategies, your own agreement
or disagreement with the author’s ideas, and your personal
response to the text” (118).
Because TED Talks have quite a range in topics and because
there are many ways to respond to each TED Talk, you may not
know right away what you want to “say back” to a particular
TED Talk. Indeed, you may discover and develop your response
through research and drafting.
Tip #1: Highlight
Whatever it is you choose to “say back” to the TED Talk, strive
to give your response focus—a main controlling idea that has a
purpose. It may help to know that you don’t need to respond to
every point an author makes. You may choose to “highlight” the
points that relate most to your focus.
Tip #2: Rely on Detail-Rich Paraphrase and Summary:
Make substantial use of the source or sources you’re responding
to. Offering a single sentence of quoted material and not
engaging any of the author’s other ideas often is not enough.
Rely on detail-rich paraphrase and summary more than quoting.
They offer a much deeper, more informative portrayal of a

source than solitary quotes do.
That said, I also urge you to use quotes. Quotes may be used to
invite other authors into your conversation to “say” things
they’ve articulated especially well. Quotes may also help you
convey to your reader the style or flavor of a source you’re
writing about.
Tip #3: Perhaps Research the Speaker:
Who is the speaker, and what is their relevant experience? That
said, still keep your response idea-focused.
Tip #4: In-text Citations for Time-Based Media Sources:
MLA citation requires special in-text citations for sources that
allow you to track the time that elapses—think of YouTube
videos and how they have a timeline at the bottom. To see how
to make these in-text citations, please see this page at Purdue
OWL and scroll down to the section “Time-based media
sources”: https://owl.english.purdue.edu/owl/resource/747/02/
What is the research requirement?
Use research to broaden your understanding, illustrate your
points for your reader, and support your claims. Use at least 5
credible sources, including the following: at least 1 credible
internet source, at least 1 credible book or ebook, and at least 1
relevant scholarly journal article. Any other relevant sources
(news items, interviews you conduct, videos, etc.) may be used,
too.
Who is your audience for this essay?
In The Curious Researcher, Bruce Ballenger recommends
“writing across” rather than “writing up” (19). By “writing

across,” Ballenger means writing to your peers—your
classmates, who are in your “discourse community” (i.e. your
ENGL 101 class).
During this project, you’ll be discussing your ideas with your
classmates, sharing your writing with them, and receiving and
implementing their feedback.
As Ballenger points out, “you’re trying to make your topic
relevant and interesting to people who share in your own
‘discourse’ community. As you advance in college, that
community will become more specialized and so will your
writing” (19). As you may have noticed when we were
introducing ourselves in class, we’re a pretty varied group,
coming from a variety of places and having a variety of
interests. We’re also all here, a part of the UW-Stout
community!
Minimum Word Count: 1000 words. The works cited page
doesn’t count towards the word count.
Value: 100 points Formatting: The document should be
formatted according to MLA guidelines. Essays formatted
incorrectly will be docked up to 5 points.
How Your Essay Will Be Graded:
Your essay will graded on how well it meets these challenges:
· Elaborating a thoughtful, thorough response to the TED Talk
you have chosen
· Integrating your research into your writing in a way that crafts
a conversation or argument
· Utilizing at least the required minimum of sources (5 sources
total, at least 1 news item, 1 internet source, and 1 scholarly
journal article)
· Summarizing what sources say accurately and in detail

· Quoting and paraphrasing effectively and correctly
· Employing correct citation and formatting (MLA style)
· Writing in a style that meets the needs of the audience and that
contains a minimal amount of distracting errors
Due Dates:
First Draft: Due in your group’s thread in the Discussion Forum
by the time your small group’s conference begins. These
conferences will be held during our usual class time on
Tuesday, Oct. 17th, and Thursday, Oct. 19th. 10 pts.

ENGL 101 Fall 2017 Double-Entry Journal Guide

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to ENGL 101 Fall 2017 Double-Entry Journal Guide

Similar to ENGL 101 Fall 2017 Double-Entry Journal Guide (20)

More from SALU18

More from SALU18 (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

ENGL 101 Fall 2017 Double-Entry Journal Guide