we address the trouble of selective jamming attacks in wireless networks. In these assaults, the adversary is energetic best for a brief period of time, selectively concentrated on messages of excessive significance. We illustrate the benefits of selective jamming in phrases of network performance degradation and adversary effort with the aid of offering case research. A selective assault on TCP and one on routing. We show that selective jamming attacks can be launched with the aid of performing actual-time packet classification at the physical layer. To mitigate these attacks, we develop 3 schemes that prevent actual-time packet class via combining cryptographic primitives with physical-layer attributes. We analyze the security of our strategies and examine their computational and communication overhead.

1. Hiding Message from Hacker Using Novel
Network Techniques
R.Subhulakshmi, MCA.,M.Phil*1
R.Priyanga ,M.Sc(CS)#2
Abstract-.In this s work, we address the trouble of
selective jamming attacks in wireless networks. In these
assaults, the adversary is energetic best for a brief
period of time, selectively concentrated on messages of
excessive significance. We illustrate the benefits of
selective jamming in phrases of network performance
degradation and adversary effort with the aid of
offering case research. A selective assault on TCP and
one on routing. We show that selective jamming attacks
can be launched with the aid of performing actual-time
packet classification at the physical layer. To mitigate
these attacks, we develop 3 schemes that prevent actual-
time packet class via combining cryptographic
primitives with physical-layer attributes. We analyze
the security of our strategies and examine their
computational and communication overhead.
Keyword—Selective Jamming, Denial-of-
Service, Wireless Network s, Packet Classification,
CPHS (Cryptography Puzzle Hiding Scheme).
I.INTRODUCTION
The open nature of the wireless medium leaves it
vulnerable to intentional interference attacks, typically
referred to as jamming. The timing channel is a
logical communication channel in which information
is encoded in the timing between events. Recently, the
use of the timing channel has been proposed as a
countermeasure to reactive jamming attacks
performed by an energy- constrained malicious node.
In fact, while a jammer is able to disrupt the
information contained in the attacked packets, timing
information cannot be jammed, and therefore, timing
channels can be exploited to deliver information to the
receiver even on a jammed channel. Since the nodes
under attack and the jammer have conflicting
interests, their interactions can be modeled by means
of game theory. Accordingly, in this paper, a game-
theoretic model of the interactions between nodes
exploiting the timing channel to achieve resilience to
jamming attacks and a jammer is derived and
analyzed. More specifically, the Nash equilibrium is
studied in terms of existence, uniqueness, and
convergence under best response dynamics.
Furthermore, the case in which the communication
nodes set their strategy and the jammer reacts
accordingly is modeled and analyzed as a Stackelberg
game, by considering both perfect and imperfect
knowledge of the jammer’s utility function. Extensive
numerical results are presented, showing the impact of
network parameters on the system
performance[9][10][11][15].
II.NETWORK TECHNIQUES
Networks can be private or public. Private
networks require the user to obtain permission to gain
access. Typically, this is granted either manually by a
network administrator or obtained directly by the user
via a password or with other credentials. Public
networks like the internet do not restrict access.
Network devices including switches and routers use a
variety of protocols and algorithms to exchange
information and to transport data to its
intended endpoint.
Every endpoint (sometimes called a host) in a
network has a unique identifier, often an IP address or
a Media Access Control address, that is used to
indicate the source or destination of the transmission.
Endpoints can include servers, personal computers,
phones and many types of network hardware.
Wired and wireless technologies Networks may use
a mix of wired and wireless technologies. Network
devices communicate through a wired or wireless
transmission medium. In wired networks, this may
consist of optical fiber, coaxial cable or copper wires
in the form of a twisted pair. Wireless network
pathways include computer networks that use wireless
data connections for connecting endpoints. These
endpoints include broadcast radio, cellular radio,
microwave and satellite [6][7][8].
Two very common types of networks include:
 Local Area Network (LAN)
 Wide Area Network (WAN)

2. 1.3.1 LOCAL AREA NETWORK
A Local Area Network (LAN) is a network
that is confined to a relatively small area. It is
generally limited to a geographic area such as a
writing lab, school, or building.
Computers connected to a network are
broadly categorized as servers or workstations.
Servers are generally not used by humans directly, but
rather run continuously to provide "services" to the
other computers (and their human users) on the
network. Services provided can include printing and
faxing, software hosting, file storage and sharing,
messaging, data storage and retrieval, complete access
control (security) for the network's resources, and
many others[17][18][19][20].
1.3.2 WIDE AREA NETWORK
Wide Area Networks (WANs) connect
networks in larger geographic areas, such as Florida,
the United States, or the world. Dedicated
transoceanic cabling or satellite uplinks may be used
to connect this type of global network.
Using a WAN, schools in Florida can
communicate with places like Tokyo in a matter of
seconds, without paying enormous phone bills. Two
users a half-world apart with workstations
equipped.[12][13].
III. METHODOLOGY
 Sending The Source To Destination
Figure 1. Sending Data to Destination Node Diagram
 Retrieving The File
Figure 2. Receiving Data and Retrieving the File
Diagram
IV. PROPOSED METHOD
In the simplest form of jamming, the adversary
interferes with the reception of messages by
transmitting a continuous jamming signal, or several
short jamming pulses. Typically, jamming attacks
have been considered under an external threat model,
in which the jammer is not part of the network.
 Network Unit
 Real Time Packet Classification
 Selective Jamming Module
 Strong Hiding Commitment Scheme (SHCS)
 Cryptographic Puzzle Hiding Scheme
(CPHS).
 Network Unit
We address the problem of preventing the
jamming node from classifying m in real time, thus
mitigating J’s ability to perform selective jamming.
The network consists of a collection of nodes
connected via wireless links. Nodes may
communicate directly if they are within
communication range, or indirectly via multiple hops.
Nodes communicate both in uncast mode and
broadcast mode. Communications can be either
unencrypted or encrypted. For encrypted broadcast
Source
Select the File
to Send
Channel Encoding
& Interleaving
Send Packet
Destination
De-Interleaving the
Data
Channel
Decoding
Show Packets

3. communications, symmetric keys are shared among
all intended receivers. These keys are established
using pre shared pair wise keys or asymmetric
cryptography.
 Real Time Packet Classification
Consider the generic communication system
depicted. At the PHY layer, a packet m is encoded,
interleaved, and modulated before it is transmitted
over the wireless channel. At the receiver, the signal is
demodulated, de interleaved, and decoded, to recover
the original packet m. Moreover, even if the
encryption key of a hiding scheme were to remain
secret, the static portions of a transmitted packet could
potentially lead to packet classification. This is
because for computationally-efficient encryption
methods such as block encryption, the encryption of a
prefix plaintext with the same key yields a static
cipher text prefix. Hence, an adversary who is aware
of the underlying protocol specifics (structure of the
frame) can use the static cipher text portions of a
transmitted packet to classify it.
 Selective Jamming Component
The impact of selective jamming attacks on the
network performance. Implement selective jamming
attacks in two multi-hop wireless network scenarios.
In the first scenario, the attacker targeted a TCP
connection established over a multi-hop wireless
route. In the second scenario, the jammer targeted
network-layer control messages transmitted during the
route establishment process selective jamming would
be the encryption of transmitted packets (including
headers) with a static key
.
Figure 3. Selective Jamming Diagram
 Strong Hiding Commitment Scheme (Shcs)
Propose a strong hiding commitment scheme
(SHCS), which is based on symmetric cryptography.
Our main motivation is to satisfy the strong hiding
property while keeping the computation and
communication overhead to a minimum. The
computation overhead of SHCS is one symmetric
encryption at the sender and one symmetric
decryption at the receiver. Because the header
information is permuted as a trailer and encrypted, all
However, in wireless protocols such as 802.11, the
complete packet is received at the MAC layer before
it is decided if the packet must be discarded or be
further processed.
Figure. 4. Processing at the hiding sublayer.
 Cryptographic Puzzle Hiding Scheme
(CPHS)
Propose a solution based on All -Or- Nothing
Transformations (AONT) that introduces a modest
communication and computation overhead. Such
transformations were originally proposed by Rivest to
slow down brute force attacks against block
encryption algorithms. An AONT serves as a publicly
known and completely invertible pre-processing step
to a plaintext before it is passed to an ordinary block
encryption algorithm. Present a packet hiding scheme
based on cryptographic puzzles. The main idea behind
such puzzles is to force the recipient of a puzzle
execute a pre-defined set of computations before he is
able to extract a secret of interest. The time required
for obtaining the solution of a puzzle depends on its
hardness and the computational ability of the solver.
The advantage of the puzzle based scheme is that its
security does not rely on the PHY layer parameters.
However, it has higher computation and
communication overhead.
Fe
ld
1
Fi
el
d
2
Field
3
Fi
el
d
n
Random
Payload
m
} } } } }
. .
.
. .
.
. .
.
. .
.
. .
. . . .
π1(
m) . . .
. .
.
. .
.
Figure. 5. Application of permutation π1 on packet m.

4. VI.EXPERIMENTAL RESULT
Figure 6. Run the Source Page File
Figure 7 .Run The Destination File
Figure 8.Encoding the Selecting File
Figure 9. Interleaving the Selecting File
Figure 10.Choose the Destination Node
Figure 11.Receving the Selecting File

5. V. CONCLUSION
In previous research methodologies to detect
jamming attacks are illustrated it is also shown that it
is possible to identify which kind of jamming attack
is ongoing by looking at the signal strength and other
relevant network parameters. Such as bit and packet
error. We model the interactions between a jammer
and a target node as a jamming .We have suggested a
cryptography puzzle hiding scheme techniques of the
transactions within a jammer and interaction node
that a use a timing pathway to develop flexibility to
jamming attacks. We evaluated the impact of
selective jamming attacks on network protocols such
as TCP and routing. Our finding show that a selective
jammer can significantly impact performance with
very low effort. We developed our scheme combine
transform a selective jammer to a random one by
preventing real-time packet classification. Our
scheme combine cryptographic primitives such as
commitment schemes, cryptographic puzzles, and all-
or-nothing transformation (ANOTs) with physical
layer characteristics. We analyzed the security of our
schemes and qualified their computational and
communication overhead
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