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IntroductiontoCryptology
6.3-InformationTheoretic
MACs
Federico Pintore
Mathematical Institute, University of Oxford (UK)
Michaelmas term 2020
Information Theoretic MACs
2/10
So far, we have considered computational security for MACs.
Does there exist a MAC that is secure even in the
presence of unbounded adversaries?
Information Theoretic MACs
2/10
So far, we have considered computational security for MACs.
Does there exist a MAC that is secure even in the
presence of unbounded adversaries?
The probability of guessing a valid tag is at least 1/2|t|
(where |t| is the tag length).
Information theoretic MACs: success probability cannot be
better than 1/2|t|
.
Achievable provided that the number of messages that can
be authenticated is bounded.
Information Theoretic MACs
3/10
Basic case: only one message can be authenticated.
Information Theoretic MACs
3/10
Basic case: only one message can be authenticated.
One-time Message Authentication Experiment Mac1−unforg
A,S
Challenger Ch Adversary A
k ← KeyGen
One query m0
to Mack
t0
= Mack(m0
) is sent
Outputs a forgery (m, t)
Information Theoretic MACs
3/10
Basic case: only one message can be authenticated.
One-time Message Authentication Experiment Mac1−unforg
A,S
Challenger Ch Adversary A
k ← KeyGen
One query m0
to Mack
t0
= Mack(m0
) is sent
Outputs a forgery (m, t)
A wins the game, i.e. Mac1−unforg
A,S = 1, if:
Verifyk(m, t) = 1;
m 6= m0
.
Information Theoretic MACs
4/10
Definition
A message authentication code S is one-time -secure if, for
every adversary A (including unbounded ones), it holds that
Pr(Mac1−time
A,S = 1) ≤ .
Information Theoretic MACs
5/10
To construct information theoretic MACs, strongly universal
functions1
can be used.
1
Also called pairwise-independent functions
Information Theoretic MACs
5/10
To construct information theoretic MACs, strongly universal
functions1
can be used.
Definition
A keyed function h : K × M → T , where h(k, m) := hk(m), is
strongly universal if, for all m 6= m0
and t, t0
∈ T , it holds
Pr(hk(m) = t ∧ hk(m0
) = t0
) = 1/|T |2
where the probability is taken over uniform choice of k ∈ K.
1
Also called pairwise-independent functions
An Information Theoretic MAC
6/10
Let h : K × M → T be a strongly universal function. Define a
MAC
S = (KeyGen, Mac, Verify)
with message space M as follows:
k ← KeyGen : outputs a uniform element k from K.
t ← Mac(k, m): outputs the tag hk(m).
1/0 ← Verify(k, m, t): outputs 1 if m ∈ M and t == hk(m),
0 otherwise (canonical verification).
An Information Theoretic MAC
6/10
Let h : K × M → T be a strongly universal function. Define a
MAC
S = (KeyGen, Mac, Verify)
with message space M as follows:
k ← KeyGen : outputs a uniform element k from K.
t ← Mac(k, m): outputs the tag hk(m).
1/0 ← Verify(k, m, t): outputs 1 if m ∈ M and t == hk(m),
0 otherwise (canonical verification).
Theorem
The message authentication code S is one-time 1/|T |-secure.
An Example of Strongly Universal Function
7/10
Example
Consider Zp for a prime p. Let:
M = T = Zp, and
K = Zp × Zp.
Define the keyed function h : K × M → T as
ha,b(m) = a · m + b mod p.
An Example of Strongly Universal Function
7/10
Example
Consider Zp for a prime p. Let:
M = T = Zp, and
K = Zp × Zp.
Define the keyed function h : K × M → T as
ha,b(m) = a · m + b mod p.
Theorem
For any prime p, the function h is strongly universal.
Limitations of Information Theoretic MACs
8/10
Theorem
If S is a one-time 2−n
-secure message authentication code with
constant size keys, then
|k| ≥ 2n.
Limitations of Information Theoretic MACs
8/10
Theorem
If S is a one-time 2−n
-secure message authentication code with
constant size keys, then
|k| ≥ 2n.
Theorem
If S is a `-time 2−n
-secure message authentication code with
constant size keys, then |k| ≥ (` + 1)n.
Limitations of Information Theoretic MACs
8/10
Theorem
If S is a one-time 2−n
-secure message authentication code with
constant size keys, then
|k| ≥ 2n.
Theorem
If S is a `-time 2−n
-secure message authentication code with
constant size keys, then |k| ≥ (` + 1)n.
Corollary
If the key-length of a given MAC is bounded, then it is not
information-theoretic secure when authenticating an
unbounded number of messages.
Further Reading I
9/10
N.J. Al Fardan and K.G. Paterson.
Lucky thirteen: Breaking the TLS and DTLS record
protocols.
In Security and Privacy (SP), 2013 IEEE Symposium on,
pages 526–540, May 2013.
J Lawrence Carter and Mark N Wegman.
Universal classes of hash functions.
In Proceedings of the ninth annual ACM symposium on
Theory of computing, pages 106–112. ACM, 1977.
Jean Paul Degabriele and Kenneth G Paterson.
On the (in) security of IPsec in MAC-then-Encrypt
configurations.
In Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer
and communications security, pages 493–504. ACM, 2010.
Further Reading II
10/10
Ted Krovetz and Phillip Rogaway.
The software performance of authenticated-encryption
modes.
In Fast Software Encryption, pages 306–327. Springer, 2011.
Douglas R. Stinson.
Universal hashing and authentication codes.
Designs, Codes and Cryptography, 4(3):369–380, 1994.

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Crypto - Chunk 6.3.pdf

  • 2. Information Theoretic MACs 2/10 So far, we have considered computational security for MACs. Does there exist a MAC that is secure even in the presence of unbounded adversaries?
  • 3. Information Theoretic MACs 2/10 So far, we have considered computational security for MACs. Does there exist a MAC that is secure even in the presence of unbounded adversaries? The probability of guessing a valid tag is at least 1/2|t| (where |t| is the tag length). Information theoretic MACs: success probability cannot be better than 1/2|t| . Achievable provided that the number of messages that can be authenticated is bounded.
  • 4. Information Theoretic MACs 3/10 Basic case: only one message can be authenticated.
  • 5. Information Theoretic MACs 3/10 Basic case: only one message can be authenticated. One-time Message Authentication Experiment Mac1−unforg A,S Challenger Ch Adversary A k ← KeyGen One query m0 to Mack t0 = Mack(m0 ) is sent Outputs a forgery (m, t)
  • 6. Information Theoretic MACs 3/10 Basic case: only one message can be authenticated. One-time Message Authentication Experiment Mac1−unforg A,S Challenger Ch Adversary A k ← KeyGen One query m0 to Mack t0 = Mack(m0 ) is sent Outputs a forgery (m, t) A wins the game, i.e. Mac1−unforg A,S = 1, if: Verifyk(m, t) = 1; m 6= m0 .
  • 7. Information Theoretic MACs 4/10 Definition A message authentication code S is one-time -secure if, for every adversary A (including unbounded ones), it holds that Pr(Mac1−time A,S = 1) ≤ .
  • 8. Information Theoretic MACs 5/10 To construct information theoretic MACs, strongly universal functions1 can be used. 1 Also called pairwise-independent functions
  • 9. Information Theoretic MACs 5/10 To construct information theoretic MACs, strongly universal functions1 can be used. Definition A keyed function h : K × M → T , where h(k, m) := hk(m), is strongly universal if, for all m 6= m0 and t, t0 ∈ T , it holds Pr(hk(m) = t ∧ hk(m0 ) = t0 ) = 1/|T |2 where the probability is taken over uniform choice of k ∈ K. 1 Also called pairwise-independent functions
  • 10. An Information Theoretic MAC 6/10 Let h : K × M → T be a strongly universal function. Define a MAC S = (KeyGen, Mac, Verify) with message space M as follows: k ← KeyGen : outputs a uniform element k from K. t ← Mac(k, m): outputs the tag hk(m). 1/0 ← Verify(k, m, t): outputs 1 if m ∈ M and t == hk(m), 0 otherwise (canonical verification).
  • 11. An Information Theoretic MAC 6/10 Let h : K × M → T be a strongly universal function. Define a MAC S = (KeyGen, Mac, Verify) with message space M as follows: k ← KeyGen : outputs a uniform element k from K. t ← Mac(k, m): outputs the tag hk(m). 1/0 ← Verify(k, m, t): outputs 1 if m ∈ M and t == hk(m), 0 otherwise (canonical verification). Theorem The message authentication code S is one-time 1/|T |-secure.
  • 12. An Example of Strongly Universal Function 7/10 Example Consider Zp for a prime p. Let: M = T = Zp, and K = Zp × Zp. Define the keyed function h : K × M → T as ha,b(m) = a · m + b mod p.
  • 13. An Example of Strongly Universal Function 7/10 Example Consider Zp for a prime p. Let: M = T = Zp, and K = Zp × Zp. Define the keyed function h : K × M → T as ha,b(m) = a · m + b mod p. Theorem For any prime p, the function h is strongly universal.
  • 14. Limitations of Information Theoretic MACs 8/10 Theorem If S is a one-time 2−n -secure message authentication code with constant size keys, then |k| ≥ 2n.
  • 15. Limitations of Information Theoretic MACs 8/10 Theorem If S is a one-time 2−n -secure message authentication code with constant size keys, then |k| ≥ 2n. Theorem If S is a `-time 2−n -secure message authentication code with constant size keys, then |k| ≥ (` + 1)n.
  • 16. Limitations of Information Theoretic MACs 8/10 Theorem If S is a one-time 2−n -secure message authentication code with constant size keys, then |k| ≥ 2n. Theorem If S is a `-time 2−n -secure message authentication code with constant size keys, then |k| ≥ (` + 1)n. Corollary If the key-length of a given MAC is bounded, then it is not information-theoretic secure when authenticating an unbounded number of messages.
  • 17. Further Reading I 9/10 N.J. Al Fardan and K.G. Paterson. Lucky thirteen: Breaking the TLS and DTLS record protocols. In Security and Privacy (SP), 2013 IEEE Symposium on, pages 526–540, May 2013. J Lawrence Carter and Mark N Wegman. Universal classes of hash functions. In Proceedings of the ninth annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing, pages 106–112. ACM, 1977. Jean Paul Degabriele and Kenneth G Paterson. On the (in) security of IPsec in MAC-then-Encrypt configurations. In Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security, pages 493–504. ACM, 2010.
  • 18. Further Reading II 10/10 Ted Krovetz and Phillip Rogaway. The software performance of authenticated-encryption modes. In Fast Software Encryption, pages 306–327. Springer, 2011. Douglas R. Stinson. Universal hashing and authentication codes. Designs, Codes and Cryptography, 4(3):369–380, 1994.