The document discusses the development of a new compulsory subject called "Foundations of the Russian State" that will be taught in Russian universities beginning in September 2023. It aims to establish an official state ideology after decades of constitutional bans. The content draws heavily from imperial and Soviet ideologies, promoting Russian sovereignty, conservatism, and patriotism. The introduction of a single coercive state ideology marks Russia's transition from personal authoritarianism under Putin to totalitarianism to preserve the regime after his departure.
Call Girls From Pari Chowk Greater Noida ❤️8448577510 ⊹Best Escorts Service I...
Foundations of the russian state (ENG) (3).pdf
1.
2. From 1 September 2023, a new compulsory subject,
“Foundations of the Russian State”, will be taught in the
first year of all specialisations and forms of education at
Russian universities.
The whole of 2022 was devoted to its development,
despite the constitutional ban on ideology in Russia.
In form and positioning, the “foundations” resemble the
“scientific communism” of the Soviet era, but in content
they are closer to the imperial triad of “orthodoxy,
autocracy, nationality”.
One of the main features of Russia's transition from
personal authoritarianism to totalitarianism is the
emergence of a de facto coercive ideology.
The main goal of this process is to ensure that the
modern Russian regime continues to exist in the “post-
Putin” environment.
5. 3
In Russia, it is the rule, not the exception, to have a state ideology or an officially
proclaimed “national idea”. Since 1991, there has been no official ideology in the
Russian Federation. However, the search for one has continued at the highest
levels, despite an outright ban in Article 13 of the Constitution.
The main source of ideology in Russia today is Vladimir Putin. His person-
al views influence the country's domestic and foreign policy. It can be confi-
dently asserted that the core of the president's worldview, and thus that of the
entire Russian state, is the triad of unlimited sovereignty (indistinguishable from
imperialism), conservatism/traditionalism (with an emphasis on homophobia), and
patriotism (more precisely, loyalty to the state and to him personally).
In recent years, several attempts have been made to formulate an official Russian
ideology. These attempts have circumvented constitutional restrictions: “10 facets
of patriotism”, “Pentabasis” (in two versions), “Four Values” and “Foundations of the
Russian State”, which included previous developments. The “Foundations” will be
introduced as a separate course at Russian universities and in the occupied terri-
tories of Ukraine from 1 September 2023. The subject “Foundations of the Russian
State” (“FRS”) will provide the framework for the study of social sciences and
humanities in the following years (“the only true doctrine”).
The concept of “Foundations” contains the main postulate of the new Russian
ideology of statehood: “Russia is a state and civilisation in its own right”. Russia is
unique in terms of its size, natural resources, cultural diversity, economy and
the challenges it has successfully overcome in the past. The Russian view of the
world is based on the principles of unity in diversity at the national level, the sov-
ereignty at the state level, harmony and cooperation at the society level, love and
responsibility at the family level, and the creation and development at the level
of the individual. The main values of Russian civilisation are stability, mission,
responsibility and fairness.
Two thirds of the principles and values of the “FRS” are borrowed from the im-
perial triad of “orthodoxy, autocracy and nationality”, and a further third from
Soviet communism. The ideal image of Russia and the world outlined in the
“Foundations” includes: a) Russia's global influence on international politics, b) the
traditional and inviolable nature of its internal structure, and c) the pride and
patriotism of the Russian people.
The new Russian ideology can therefore be expressed as a triad: imperialism –
authoritarianism – chauvinism. In the near future, the Russian authorities will
be directed towards strengthening each of these elements. A sign of the Russian
regime's transition from personal authoritarianism to totalitarianism is the in-
troduction of a single state ideology at universities. After Vladimir Putin's death/
departure/removal, ideologically based Soviet-style totalitarianism is the only
way to preserve the current Russian regime.
Overview
7. 5
The ideological monopoly of communism ended with the collapse of the Soviet
Union. Article 13 of the Russian Constitution of 1993 states: “1. There shall be
recognition of ideological diversity in the Russian Federation. 2. No ideology shall be
established as a state ideology or a compulsory ideology”. However, the concept of
the “national idea” has grown in popularity due to the need for a general social
ideological consensus. This concept is almost unknown outside Russia and its
neighbours, although it is related to the nineteenth-century German philosophi-
cal term “Volksgeist” (“national spirit”). It can be argued that the national idea and
state ideology are inextricably linked (although the former seems to be somewhat
broader), since it is problematic to speak of the existence of a political nation of
Russians separate from the state.
In 1996, President Boris Yeltsin announced a competition for a national idea.
However, this initiative was not successful (review of ideas in 1996, critical reviews
in 2004, positive reviews in 2016). “We have an old Russian pastime – the search for a
national idea. It is something like the search for the meaning of life”, said President
Vladimir Putin in 2007. In 2012-2013, a competition was held not to write, but to
create an artistic concept of the national idea. The winning picture was entitled
“Russia – Nevalashka (“untopply”). The land of van'ka-vstan'ka” (a round-bottomed doll),
but it did not gain popularity.
A set of theories and practices of modern Russian government is now called
“Putinism”. Unlike Leninism, however, Putinism is not a separate, self-contained
ideology. It is based on the concepts of the Russian imperial and Soviet eras.
One of the first and most important ideological pillars of Putinism was the
concept of “sovereign democracy”. It was developed in 2005-2006. The key word
here was the first one: according to the political scientist Vladimir Pastukhov,
the absolute intolerance of even a hint of external influence is a matter of com-
plete consensus between the Russian elites and the Russian people. Accordingly,
an enduring value for the Kremlin and most Russians is “sovereignty” as the abil-
ity to take any action regardless of other people's opinions.
In 2019-2023, Putin increasingly used constructions such as “digital sovereignty”,
“full sovereignty”, “technological sovereignty”, “economic and financial sovereignty”,
or “the task of increasing the country's sovereignty is extremely important”, or “if there
is no sovereignty, we will buy everything in the future”. In addition, according to Pu-
tin, “the doctrine of human rights is being used by the West to destroy the sovereignty
of the states”. Propagandists who are close to the administration extend this dis-
course by inventing the “sovereignty of personnel” and so on.
In Russia, there is a similar interpretation of the concept of “independence”. True
independence is inseparable from the ability to be self-sufficient, according to
the Russian elite. This is why very few countries, global or regional hegemons, are
truly independent. The independence of most others is a fiction. It is a manipu-
lative slogan that serves as an instrument of hybrid warfare between real players
on the geopolitical chessboard.
Putin's ideology
8. 6
«Основи російської державності»
From this point of view, Russia is an independent country. Ukraine is not. Hence
Putin sees the Crimea as belonging to Russia, Ukraine as a “fake” country, and
Ukrainians as “one people” with Russians.
At the same time, economist Branko Milanovic draws a direct contrast between
the sovereignty and wealth of countries. He uses the example of the DPRK and
Belgium: “Sovereignty means the freedom to make political and economic decisions with
as few restrictions as possible from other countries. Wealth means having a high level
of income (high GDP per capita). The problem is that they cannot co-exist. Countries
can only get rich by becoming less sovereign, i.e. more globally integrated... Russian
isolationism is a choice for full sovereignty, free from treaties and rules, and free from
the Western ideologies of Marxism and liberalism”.
Finally, Senator Andrei Klishas, one of the co-authors of the Russian consti-
tutional amendments, explicitly states that the ideology of modern Russia is
sovereignty.
Putin's understanding of sovereignty in general, and Ukraine's independence in
particular, is perfectly aligned with the concept of “Kyivan heritage” inherited by
Russian society from imperial times. In this way, Russian “sovereignty” is indis-
tinguishable from Russian imperialism.
On 12 December 2013, in a message to the Federal Assembly, Putin declared him-
self a conservative like Nikolai Berdyaev and said that Russia would be a world
leader in upholding conservative morality. And on 21 October 2021, at a meeting
of the Valdai Club, Putin said that Russia would be guided by the ideology of
conservatism, which had gained in importance in recent years. Putin used four
interchangeable definitions: “smart conservatism”, “sensible conservatism”, “moderate
conservatism” and “optimists' conservatism”.
Traditionalism, or more precisely “traditional values”, is an important, if not the
main, part of Putin's conservatism. The list of traditional values includes human
life, dignity, rights and freedoms, patriotism, service to the motherland, high
moral ideals, a strong family, creative work and the priority of the spiritual over
the material, according to the “Fundamentals of State Policy for the Preservation and
Strengthening of Traditional Russian Spiritual and Moral Values” (2022).
The Ukrainian Institute for the Future has already reviewed the “Concept of the
Humanitarian Policy of the Russian Federation Abroad”, according to which “Russia's
historical experience, rich cultural heritage and spiritual potential have allowed it to
occupy a special place in the world cultural space and have created opportunities for the
successful promotion of traditional Russian spiritual and moral values abroad”. Anoth-
er component of “traditional values” in Russia is state homophobia. This has also
been analysed by the UIF. Since then, the persecution of people with alternative
sexual orientations or gender identities has only intensified: in particular, medi-
cal gender reassignment is effectively banned.
Finally, Putin has put much emphasis on patriotism. In the summer of 2015 he
underlined that patriotism was a sacred duty for Russians, and in October he
called it a “moral guide” for young people. In February 2016, Putin stressed: “We do
not and cannot have any other unifying idea than patriotism... This is the national idea”.
9. 7
He reiterated in May 2020 that the Russian national idea is patriotism, saying
in December 2018 that “patriotism in the best, not sour, sense of the word cannot but
be the basis for strengthening our nation in the broadest and noblest sense of the word”.
“Being a patriot is the essence of the nature and character of the Russian people”, Putin
said in April 2022, calling patriotism one of the key foundations of Russian
statehood and one of the most important values of Russian society. In 2017, a
book entitled “Patriotism is the National Idea of Russia” was published, containing
the president's speeches and articles.
However, as critics have pointed out, Putin's understanding of patriotism differs
from that of the developed world. According to some (2016), this “patriotism is
hysterical, its level is absolutely abnormal. It does not happen in societies that are not at
war”. In order to distract the majority of the population from economic prob-
lems, Putin deliberately maintains this state of affairs. Strengthening patriot-
ism (more precisely, national patriotism) is a way of staying in power. According to
others (2022), patriotism has become a cult for Putin. It can only be practised in
one correct way – by supporting the war and him personally. In this way, as has
often happened in Russian history, patriotism has been transformed from love
of country to love of the state and power.
Thistriadofunlimitedsovereignty(i.e.imperialism)–conservatism/traditionalism
(with an emphasis on homophobia) – patriotism (i.e. loyalty) thus constitutes the ide-
ological basis of Putin personally and also influences the rest of the Russian pop-
ulation. The goals of “catching up with Portugal” in terms of GDP per capita (1999),
“competitiveness” (2004) or “population maintenance” (2011), which were declared as
national ideas, were not part of the final version. And we should not expect any
changes in Putin's ideology, given the results of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine.
11. 9
Despite the constitutional ban, Russia has continued to try to develop and im-
plement a national ideology. For obvious reasons, there has been an intensifi-
cation of these efforts in recent years. On 2 June 2022, for example, the Expert
Institute for Social Research (EISR) held a round table discussion on the topic
“What kind of ideology we need”.
Sergei Mironov, the leader of the party “Fair Russia”, insisted on the need to
abolish the “anti-ideological” article of the Constitution at a meeting of the World
Russian People's Council in October. There was also talk of the abolition of Ar-
ticle 2, which states that a person, his rights and freedoms are the supreme value.
An ultra-conservative model was suggested: faith, family and motherland.
On 4 November, the Speaker of the Federation Council, Valentina Matviyenko,
blogged that “we've already started building our ideology. I am referring, first of all, to
the ideas, provisions and assessments contained in the speeches, reports and articles of the
head of the Russian state, Vladimir Putin”. At the same time, Matviyenko noted that
she was not calling for a national ideology to be created that everyone needed to
follow.
On 31 December, Olga Kovitidi, “senato” of the Crimean occupation authorities,
stressed in an interview that “SVO (special military operation) has revealed a public
demand to develop a common Russian ideology: the ideology of multinational unity
of the Russian Federation”. It is noteworthy that her words in 2017 were almost
exactly the same: “Today there is a public demand in society for a clear and distinct
national idea, a national ideology”. A year earlier, there were rumours that she was
preparing a draft law on ideology.
The search for a “true” state ideology continues, despite the fact that the amor-
phous but comprehensive doctrine of the “rusky mir” (Russian world), despite its
unofficial status, fulfils most of the ideological tasks assigned to it and serves as
a link between the state and Russian Orthodoxy. Several “approaches” to solving
this problem have been made in the last two years alone.
The federal project “Patriotic Education of the Citizens of the Russian Federation”
was launched in 2021. The “Rospatriot Centre”, within the structure of the Feder-
al Agency for Youth Affairs (Rosmolodezh), was entrusted with its implementa-
tion. At the end of the summer of that year, the head of the Centre presented
the results of the project “10 facets of patriotism”. These results were subsequently
published in a separate booklet. They are: education, culture, media, service to
motherland, sport, science, family, history, ecology, volunteerism. The content of
the “facets” and “personality profiles of a patriot” is described in the “Methodological
recommendations” on the foundations of patriotic education, published by the
“Rospatriot Centre” in the autumn of 2002.
Russian ideological
evolution
2022-2023
12. 10
«Основи російської державності»
In October 2022, the conference “Worldview and Social Science Problems. The DNA
of Russia” was held, attended by more than 200 teachers and university leaders
from across the country. The scientific director of the “DNA of Russia” project
is Professor Andrey Polosin of Moscow State University. According to him, the
project's activities will be aimed at both “studying the state of worldview systems”
and “developing and elaborating common ideas about the acceptable parameters of a
worldview system”.
During the conference, the idea of creating a university course on “Foundations of
the Russian State” was discussed. Alexander Kharichev, the head of one of Putin's
administration's departments, said that the future course would consist of three
components: national ideas (which should be “clearly stated and understood”), histor-
ical experience and sociological research. It was expected that 6,000 university
staff would be trained to teach the course by 1 September next year.
On 17 November, an article by Polosin, Kharichev and two other co-authors
entitled “Perception of basic values, factors and structures of Russia's socio-historical
development” was published in the “Journal of Political Studies”. The study described
a five-part model of the Russian value system. The value of “creation” correspond-
ed to the level of the individual, “traditions” to the family level, “harmony” to
the society level, “trust in public institutions” to the state level, and “patriotism” to
the country level. The whole construct was referred to as the “Pentabasis”. The
practical application of the results in “applied research” (i.e. state propaganda) was
explicitly recommended by the authors.
On 29 January Putin instructed the Ministry of Science and Higher Education
to develop and introduce the “Foundations of the Russian state” at universities.
A new article by Polosin and Kharychev on the “DNA of Russia” was published on
8 February. In it, they proposed a different version of the “portrait of the values and
culture of Russia”: “creation for the individual, love for the family, unity for the society,
order for the state and mission for the country”. This time there was no mention of
the term “Pentabasis”. And on 9 February, the EISD held a panel discussion on
“DNA” and the “Foundations”, where Polozin cited “four value constants” inherent
in Russian state throughout all historical periods. The first is “one's own way”, the
second is “messianism, the presence of a super goal”, the third is “super adaptability”
and the fourth is “community”.
Finally, on 22 March, journalists were given a presentation of the “DNA of Russia”
project, which outlined the basics of the course content, and on 21 April, the
Russian Ministry of Education and Science sent the concept of the educational
and methodological complex “Foundations of the Russian State” to the heads of
universities.
15. 13
The introduction states that there is an unacceptable gap between university teaching,
real life and young people's psychological characteristics. The consequences of this gap
“can lead to political destabilisation, escalating social tensions, widening existing and creating
new social cleavages”. A separate course on “FRS” was needed because existing academic
disciplines were not equipped to deal with the problem. Based on “generally accepted val-
ues and norms of behaviour, as well as through the formation of a developed sense of citizenship
and patriotism in students”, it should provide “a systematic and timely response to the current
challenges of the educational and social policy of the Russian state”.
In addition to fostering the above-mentioned sentiments, the course aims to make stu-
dents aware of “the peculiarities of the historical path of the Russian state, the identity of its
political organisation” and to link their “individual dignity and success” with “social progress
and political stability of their motherland”. The objectives and planned outcomes of the
course are in the same vein.
Thus, the course “FRS” justifies “the continuous nature of national history and the multina-
tional civilizational vector of its development” and pride in belonging to “Russian civilisation
and Russian society”, as well as “the value-based nature of traditional institutional decisions
and the special multivariate nature of the relationship between the Russian state and society”,
just as “scientific communism” justified “the historical mission of the working class” and “the
laws, ways, forms and methods of the communist transformation of society”.
The course consists of five sections and is designed for 72 hours in the first semester:
What Russia is (space, people, resources, ideology, symbols, norms and politics);
Russian state and civilisation (historical, geographical, institutional foundations of the
formation of Russian civilisation);
Russian ideology and values of Russian civilisation;
Russian political system (objective presentation of Russian state and public institutions,
their history and main causes of recent social transformations);
Future challenges and development of the country (scenarios of the country's future
development and citizen's role in them).
The first section should be a description of Russia in terms of: a) key characteristics;
b) cultural and economic characteristics of the regions; and c) key challenges and suc-
cesses. The key characteristics of Russia are as follows: “unprecedented territorial size”,
“exceptional natural wealth”, “federal and ethnic diversity”, developed entrepreneurship
(Yandex, Kaspersky, Gazprom, Lukoil, Russian Railways, Aeroflot, Almaz-Antey); “outstanding
structures” (Sayano-Shushenskaya HPP, Lakhta Centre, “Stalinist skyscrapers”, underground).
“Foundations of the
Russian State”:
a brief overview
1
2
3
4
5
16. 14
«Основи російської державності»
This section presents Russia only from a positive perspective, although there are ap-
propriate requirements for lectures and seminars (honesty about ideological orientation,
presentation of local material in a global historical and geographical perspective and vice versa,
expansion of the pantheon of heroes). It does not cover Russia's historical failures or the
activities of Russian villains, although contemporary problems and future challenges
will be discussed further in the course “FRS”.
The second section lists features that characterise a civilised state: “openness, naturalness
of origin and evolution, solidity of values, political clout, long history, possibility of dynamic
adaptation to different conditions of international relations and world politics”, by the way
“each of these elements can and should have relevant political meaning”.
The first lecture has a purely academic purpose. It is intended to introduce students to
the civilizational approach to the historical process and to polemicize with other ap-
proaches. The second, on the other hand, has an ideological function – “the presentation
of national history as a gradual overcoming of fragmentation (not only feudal, but also tribal
in a broader sense) and the transition to an imperial-civilizational project, which later became a
federal-civilizational one”. This is not very different from the classic imperial intellectual
scheme known as “land accumulation”.
There is also a list of the “most important value principles (constants)” of Russian civilisation:
“unity in diversity, sovereignty (power and confidence), harmony and cooperation, love and
responsibility, creation and evolution”. The “civilizational approach”, “conservative thinking”
and “undeservedly ignored or underestimated trends” – communitarianism, solitaries, cos-
mism and Russian religious philosophy are openly postulated as the “ideological basis of
the lecture”. There is thus an undeniable preference for the traditionalist view over the
liberal one.
The third section essentially develops and deepens the previous one. The first lecture
is again theoretical: the students are to be introduced to the categorisation system
(“culture”, “mindset”, “tradition”, “identity”) and to discuss the contemporary Russian view
of the world “through the prism of sound sociological dimensions and political studies”. Al-
though it is appropriate to call for “presenting both the positive as well as the negative
aspects of the contemporary Russian outlook, such as “cultural” as well as “historical
trauma” ... as material for further reflection”, this goal is basically unattainable because of
the absence of a truly independent sociology in Russia. Moreover, it is unlikely that the
real historical traumas can even be properly identified, let alone discussed, under the
current circumstances. A free exchange of views is made impossible by the Kremlin's
current policy of silence and relativization (“not everything is so clear”) of state crimes, as
well as by criminal sanctions for “rehabilitating Nazism” and “discrediting the army”.
The second lecture presents a five-part “systemic model of worldview” (individual, family,
society, state, country). It is linked to the previously announced “constants” of Russian
civilisation. This is where students are taught the “correct worldview”, which the text
calls “mechanisms for solving existing difficulties and problems”. This is no longer based on
the “prism of sociological data”, but on “values”. It also goes on to outline the activities
carried out by the state in the following areas: “the political socialisation of citizens”, “the
politics of symbols and culture”, “the politics of memory and history”, “the politics of nation and
identity”.
The fourth section is devoted to describing the Russian state, giving a “correct historical
overview and presenting the complex nature of Russian political life”.
17. 15
Here, too, the first lecture is intended to be theoretical (“a general excursion into the
categorical and conceptual apparatus”). In reality, however, it immediately turns into an
ideological one. Students are to be introduced to “such important aspects of the Russian
Federation as its federal and republican organisation, democratic principles and the “welfare
state” principle”. The emphasis is on the “incompatibility of “nationalist” concepts with the
existing architecture of the Russian state”.
The second lecture should describe the three Russian presidents politically rather than
personally, but at the same time maintain a “human” line – “this will allow students to
form a less sacralised view of the presidential institution”. The history of parliamentarism
in Russia, its governmental and judicial structures should be mentioned. The concept
of “trial by jury” is mentioned in the text. But it is pointless to expect an explanation of
“telephone law” in modern Russian courts.
The fifth chapter summarises the results and sets the framework for the future. The
first lecture should deal with global issues that are of relevance to Russia: “natural”
(climate change, water and food scarcity), “man-made” (AI, digital inequality) and “political”
(populism, failure of multiculturalism). The article highlights Russia's exceptional role
in overcoming each of them: natural, given its rich resources; man-made, given the
high technologies in which “Russian actors have achieved almost greater success than most
European countries”. And above all, “the civilizational development of Russia has once again
placed it in a potentially much more favourable and promising position in relation to these
negative trends” than the rest of the world.
The second lecture is nothing but pure propaganda. According to it, “the identical values
adopted by the Russian state and people are largely responsible for the different visions of the
future”. And these values are best described by the ideology of the “Foundations of the
Russian State”:
“stability as a key result of previous decades of Russian political system consolidation;
mission as a modern stage of defending national interests and Russian civilisation,
connected with realising Russia's global role as a guarantor of human values and original
development;
responsibility as a necessary stage for the future of the improvement of the civic identity
and political life of the country;
justice as the most important strategic task and value-orientated”.
The concept also announces the creation of a textbook on the “Foundations of the Russian
State” within a year.
19. 17
The process of searching for a state ideology in Russia, which can be tentatively
called “statehood”, is completed with the emergence of the concept of a new aca-
demic subject. It has taken a final form that can be refined in the future, but not
radically changed, after passing through several versions of “facets”, “pentabases”
and “value constants”. At the last moment, the essence of statehood remained
almost the same, although the most odious terms, such as “traditionalism” or
“messianism”, disappeared from the concept.
The new subject will be taught in the first semester of the first year. It will set
the framework for the following years of study in the social sciences and human-
ities. And for those studying other subjects, it is really the only one that will
lay the foundations for how they are going to think about Russian politics. In
other words, it is an attempt at the reincarnation of the idea of the “the only true
doctrine”.
The importance of the course lies in its ability to succinctly reflect the values
shared by the Russian leadership, thereby illustrating the prospects for Russia.
The main postulate of the new Russian state ideology is: “Russia is a separate state
and civilisation”. The concept further states that:
Russia is unique by virtue of the following key features: its size, its natural resources,
its cultural diversity, its economy, and its success in meeting challenges in the past
(noteworthy is that military power is not mentioned as a separate feature);
the principles of unity in diversity, state sovereignty, harmony and cooperation in
society, love and responsibility in the family, and creation and development of the
individual are the basis of the Russian worldview;
stability, mission, responsibility and justice are the main values of Russian
civilisation.
Thus, the Russian state ideology represents a new step in meeting the demands
of the times, but both “feet” are based on the previous ideological platforms – im-
perial and Soviet.
Two-thirds of the new ideology incorporates the imperial triad of “orthodoxy,
autocracy and nationality”. Nationality, under the cloak of conservatism, is con-
tained in the principles of harmony and cooperation (read: community), love and
responsibility (read: traditional values), creation and evolution. Autocracy is open-
ly reflected in the value of stability (read: stability of the regime), responsibility
(read: loyalty) and the principle of sovereignty. Only orthodoxy has its place in
Russia without being formally part of the new ideology.
Transferred from communism to the new ideology were the value of justice and
the principle of unity in diversity. The course “FRS” is also built on the Soviet
methodology of teaching “scientific communism”.
Analysis and conclusions
20. 18
«Основи російської державності»
Instead, the value of mission (read: messianism) has been universal to every Rus-
sian ideology since the 16th century. And patriotism, although not on any list, is
declared to be the goal of the whole course.
Combining these characteristics, principles and values allows us to describe
the ideal Russia as its leaders see it:
Russia has the right to demand a proper place among other world
civilisations, being an independent civilisation. Russia's global mission is
not only the protection of its interests, but also global justice (the right to
development in accordance with non-Western standards, traditional values, etc.).
Russia is organised on the basis of democracy and federalism, but with
the presidency prevailing and without “nationalist concepts”. The Russian
state system is traditional and optimal. Relying on patriotism and the
responsibility of citizens, Russia will defend the stability of the political
regime.
They are proud of their nation and see positive examples from the past and
present. Data from Russian sociology will be used to discuss “cultural” or
“historical traumas”.
If each point is reduced to a single word, a new triad of Russian ideology emerges:
imperialism – authoritarianism – chauvinism. In the near future, the Russian au-
thorities will be directed towards strengthening each of these elements.
After all, a sign of the Russian regime's transition from a state of personal au-
thoritarianism to totalitarianism is the introduction of a single state ideology at
universities, along with other measures such as “Pioneering 2.0” and “Conversations
about the important” at schools.
Creating conditions for the existence of a modern regime after Putin's death/
departure/removal is the main goal of Russia's total ideologization. The question
of his entourage's staying in power (“if not Putin, then who?”) will inevitably arise
as the influence not only of his role as arbiter but also of his personal charisma
comes to an end. Introducing the all-Russian state ideology will make it possible
to justify handing over power to those who symbolise the continuation of Rus-
sia's existing course (“Putin is gone, but the cause is still there”).
1
2
3
