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Alexander Bogomolov. RUSSIAN SOFT POWER IN UKRAINE: sources and effects


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Презентація Олександра Богомолова на семінарі Чорноморської миротворчої мережі. Київ червень 2013

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Alexander Bogomolov. RUSSIAN SOFT POWER IN UKRAINE: sources and effects

  1. 1. RUSSIAN SOFT POWER INUKRAINE: sources and effectsSummarize the main plansExplain the long-term course to follow
  2. 2. Power?• “A” getting “B” to do what “A” wants (Robert Dahlet al.)• Rational Persuasion, like stop substance abuse• Manipulative persuasion lying or misleading• Inducement rewards or punishments (bribery)• Power severe punishment: jail, deprivation• Coercion no way out• Physical force – coercion + physical violence
  3. 3. Power?• Steven Lukes’ three faces of power:• Decision-making power• Non-decision –making power (control of theagendas)• Ideological power - making people want thingsthat could be contrary to their interests:women for patriarchal society
  4. 4. soft power cases: visions of futureEUs soft power source lies in its capacity toexpandThe U.S. soft power source lies in itscommitment to support democracy worldwideChina - fast growing political & economic mightThe SU – a dream of a society based onrationality and natural justice
  5. 5. Ukraine’s own three ideas of future• ethnic nationalist – future as the fulfillment ofan independent statehood as historicaspiration of the Ukrainian people;• [liberal] democratic – rights, liberties, goodgovernance• European – a vision of Ukraine as part ofEurope
  6. 6. Ukraine’s Russia-manufactured future– back to the USSRFuture in the past: a persistent reintegration scheme under ahost names:• Economic Union (1993)• Customs Union (1995)• The Eurasian Economic Community (1996 )• Unified Economic Space (2003)• Customs Union (2010)• Russkiy Mir (2007) – Slavic heartlands + Russophonepopulations• Eurasian Union (2011)
  7. 7. Making sense of what Ukraine reallywants: no clue :-(Может, спустя некоторое время – через век – центр опятьвернется сюда, и Киев снова станет центром нашейкультуры. Сегодня этого никто не может знать. Главное –сохранить наше единое цивилизационное пространство,православное пространство, единый русский мирMaybe, after some time, – perhaps, in a century – the center will comeback again here, and Kyiv will again be the center of our culture. Nowno one can know it. The main thing is to preserve our singlecivilizational space, the Orthodox Church space, the single RussianworldYevgenii Guzeev, Russian consul in Lviv
  8. 8. Russia’s entanglement with Ukraine• debate over collective valuescompetition for economic assetspolitical competition between two successorstates
  9. 9. political competition:two contrasting modes authoritarian vs. democraticWestern vs. authentic competing modes of integration with the West junior partners role & assimilating Westernsrules vs. strong claim for global role dealing via influence brokers, selling realistbusiness as usual strategy vs. advancingdemocratic change significance for domestic politics: locallegitimacy dilemma
  10. 10. integration with West… on Russian terms• Доказав, что Россия, будучи одним изгеополитических «центров силы» современногомира, не является при этом его идеологическимполюсом, мы сможем выйти на принципиальноиные формы взаимодействия с Западом, поставивфинальную точку в холодной войне и окончательнооформив политическое завершение ХХ века.Konstantin Kosachov . Foreign Relations Committeeof the State Duma (2010)
  11. 11. NATO expansion problem• NATO-Russia Council Joint Declaration, 20.11.2010: anew phase in cooperation — a true strategicpartnership• RF National Security Strategy til 2020: NATO is not asecurity threat, paradoxically — Ukraines andGeorgias accession are!• Russian rhetoric is directed against NATO and theUnited States, but the newest weaponry routinely goto the Eastern Russia• NATO accession of Ukraine threatens Russiaspolitical primacy (& bargaining capacity) not security
  12. 12. Colliding myths and historic narratives• Kyiv as the mythological cradle of Russianstatehood and religion vs. Hrushevky concept ofUkraine - Rus• Tripartite Russian people – from I. Gizel (1674) tothe Polish uprising of 1863 and through• A tradition of disrespect to Ukrainian nationhoodkey values – language – from Vissarion Belinsky toJoseph Brodsky• Soviet hierarchy of nations (re-unification myth)
  13. 13. Young T. Shevchenko at Karl Briullovs studio(G.Melikhov, 1947, winner of 3rddegree Stalins prize)Cp. Shevchenko asthe great Fatherlyfigure in the Ukrainiannational narrative
  14. 14. shared myths and what sustains themshared historic myths (from the origins of theRussian statehood to the WWII)myth of the great Russian language andculturemodern mass cultureCommon schooling: elite dependence onbest practices, life styles etc.
  15. 15. WWII importance• «За последние 20 лет страны, входившие в СССР,обрели собственные традиции и праздники, ноостался день, который объединяет всех, - 9 мая”“For the past 20 years, countries that were part of theUSSR have acquired their own traditions andholidays, but there remains one day, that had unitedus all — May 9”Zurabov, Russian ambassador to Ukraine
  16. 16. Russias power — Ukraines weekness• the conundrum of the nation-state: either nationwithout state or a state without nation• 2010 + : state against the nation, a case of stalled ifnot aborted nation building• Leadership problem, legitimacy problems
  17. 17. history as a dominant meta-narrative prevalence of identity politics fieldwork data: tendency to read the otherthrough historic narratives formed in thecontext of Russian and Soviet Empire (nationalliberation narrative vs. imperial narrative)
  18. 18. RSP instruments in UkraineTV and other mediaRussian Orthodox ChurchRussian missionsRussian businessRussian political agents inside Ukraine (CPU,political groups and lobbies )Russian intelligence agenciesNew tools: Rossotrunichestvo
  19. 19. RSP and common institutional legacyinstitutional memories and cadre continuity:affinity in decision making cultures,similar corporate cultures, business networksuniformed agencies: camaraderie in arms (e.g.the Day of Chekist), policing methods and inter-agency cooperation (note Leonid Rozvazhaevcase).
  20. 20. business as an area of competing andshared interestsenergy/gas sector,financetelecommunicationssea portsadvertisement and public relationsmedia, particularly TVmass entertainment
  21. 21. Moscow as a global mediator forUkraineGlobal media picture for Ukraine goes throughRussian filters ( INION, etc.) and the otherway round – Ukraine as reflected in the globalmedia is filtered through Russian and Moscow-based mediaUkraines information security concerns showsthat the nation is still encapsulated within itself
  22. 22. Russia vis-à-vis Ukraine in theinternational environmentRussia still the easiest destination & shelterWorld around as shaped by the visa policiesSchengen divide[European perspective issue]--> “Europe doesnt want us”post cold war consensus -> Russia 1stparty inNATO and EC
  23. 23. Ideological dimension: Russkiy MirВерю, что только сплочённый Русский мирможет стать сильным субъектом глобальноймеждународной политики, сильнее всякихполитических альянсов.Patriarch Kirill
  24. 24. RSP regional focusesCrimea and SevastopolOdessaKyivLviv (note 9 May, 2011 rallies of Russiannationalist groups from Crimea)Uzhgorod (Ruthenians)
  25. 25. Political investment scheme: CrimeaLocal assets:• A list of pro-Russian groups including localCommunist Party branch, Russian Community ofCrimea, irredentist Sevastopol Crimea Russia …down to a petty Crimea Tatar opposition group MilliFirqa• Friendly mediaGoals:• effect local & national political agenda;• sustain the image of a pro-Russian region
  26. 26. compatriots go bureaucratic• Coordination Councils of Russian Compatriots• Since 2006, under the Global Coordination Councilof Russian Compatriots (to work out strategies formember groups and fund activities to implementthem) also coordinated by embassies/consulates• Federal Agency for CIS, compatriots abroad, andinternational humanitarian cooperationRossotrudnichestvo (2008)
  27. 27. Rationale• .. Китай воспринимается, как нечто неизменное,поэтому никто не пытается в чем-то разубеждатькитайское руководство. С Китаем сотрудничают,не пытаясь его изменить.• China is perceived as something unchanging,therefore, no one tries to dissuade the Chineseleadership from anything. One cooperates with Chinawithout trying to change it.K. Kosatchev
  28. 28. Rossotrudnichestvo: official RussianSoft Power tool• Two major venues: memorative politics andeducation• Echoing the Orange revolution: St George Ribbonaction + providing traditional institutional supportfor GPW (WWII) habitual rituals on May 9• Actions to commemorate earlier Russian victories –such as 1737 invasion of Crimea• Venue where all strands of Russian nationalismoverlap: 2 Dec 2012, school competition Russia ismy Homeland for the prize of the Night Wolvesbiker club president (Zaldostanov), Sevastopol
  29. 29. re-unification narrative reloadedResearch expedition and conference for youthHistorical and spiritual aspects of the Slavic unity- part of activity plan of Rossotrudnichestvo tocommemorate the 1150-years of the rise of Russianstatehood
  30. 30. ... a sense of destination"Пусть Россия и Украина не будут однимгосударством, но это будет однастрана“Nikita Mikhalkov, film director, reader ofthe Kremlins mind… almost like Arab World?
  31. 31. little tactics and large strategicimpasses• create loyalty dilemmas• => political uncertainties with regards to variousconstituencies, regions etc.• reinforce a political environment in Ukraine thatprioritizes short term gains over long term strategies(environment best suited for Russian elites economicinterests)• undermine Ukraines modern nation buildingeffort
  32. 32. RSP major successesUndermining the national consensus in Ukraine:Perception of PRU rule as some sort of Russianoccupation – language legislation, ‘anti-fascist’themes etc.Manufacturing anti-Ukrainian consensusinternationally: The Ukraine fatigue: a consensuswith Europe on Ukraine as a chaotic state ofambivalent future
  33. 33. RSP vs. Ukrainian sovereigntyUndermines the Legitimacy of any Ukrainian govt.:• traditional (continuity);• charismatic (the Orange leadership);• rational-legal (respect to law, constitution,impersonal legal authority)(Max Weber)
  34. 34. ConclusionsMoscow continues to believe that Ukraine is destined toenter a form of ‘integration’ inspired by the Soviet pastboth parties continue to operate on an unspokenassumption that linguistic borders shape the political ones;privilege irrational resources and gainsconditions unchanged: tactically Moscow may longmaintain a headstart; strategically both parties’ losses aregreater than gainsa more fair game for Ukraine is possible if only itsubstantially redefines the rules and the very culture of thebilateral relationship – for that Ukraine needs a trueleadership and … thinking critically and acting rationally