(Moral Theories: Utilitarianism, Deontological Ethics, Virtue Ethics / The Sense of Moral Responsibility in Business) The concept of happiness and its role in moral motivation according to John Stuart Mill.

1. Henry Chinazor Mmeje – University of Vechta – SoSe2021 – S885332
Summer Semester 2021
Pbx047 Principles of Moral Self-Obligation
(Moral Theories: Utilitarianism, Deontological Ethics, Virtue Ethics /
The Sense of Moral Responsibility in Business)
Essay on:
The concept of happiness and its role in moral motivation according to
John Stuart Mill
Teacher: Dr. Anna Szyrwinska-Hörig
Submitted on: 21/08/2021
Author: Henry Chinazor Mmeje
Matriculation Number: s885332
Semester: Summer 2021
Address: Universitattstrasse 9/02, 49733 Vechta, Germany.
Email: Mmejehenryford@gmail.com / Henry.mmeje@mail.uni-vechta.de

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All references to the classical book of Utilitarianism by John Stuart Mill, 1861
The concept of Happiness
The happiness concept, or the utilitarianism, according to John Stuart Mill in 1861 holds that
human activities are directly in extent as they will in general advance happiness, falsely as they
will in general deliver the opposite of satisfaction or the happiness. Pleasure is calculated through
happiness, and without the presence of pain in whatsoever manner; by pleasure deprivation, pain
and, unhappiness. To give a reasonable perspective on the ethical/moral standard set up by the
theory, significantly more needs to be said; specifically, what things it remembers for the thoughts
of pleasure & pain; and how much this has left an open inquiry and research. In any case, these
beneficial clarifications don't influence the theory of human life on which this ethical/moral theory
is based. Specifically, that independence from pain and pleasure, are the sole things needed as
ends; and that every single thing is desirable are alluring either for the happiness inborn in
themselves, or as intends to the advancement of pleasure and pain avoidance.
Presently, such a theory of life energizes in many personalities, and among them in the absolute
generally admirable in feeling and reason, deep rooted hate. To assume that life has (as they
express it) no better quality than happiness; no finer and magnificent object pursuit and want;
they assign as completely mean and stooping. Human beings have potentials more raised than
the other creature cravings like the animals, and when once made aware of them, don't see
anything as satisfaction which does exclude their satisfaction. Indeed, it is very viable with the
concept of utility to perceive the reality, that a few sorts of pleasure are more alluring and more
significant than others. It would be ridiculous that while, in assessing any remaining things,
qualification and quantification are all considered, the assessment of pleasure is expected to rely
solely on quantity.
If I am to explain the contrast of quantities with regards to pleasure, or what ranks one pleasure
more significant than another, simply as a pleasure, aside from its being more prominent in
quantity, there is nevertheless one potential answer. Of two pleasures, in case there be one to
which all or practically all who have insight of both give a chose inclination, regardless of any
sensation of good commitment to lean toward it, that is the more alluring pleasure. By chance one
of the two is, by the individuals who are capably familiar with both, ranked so far over the other
that they choose it, despite the fact that realizing that it will generally be gone to with a more
prominent measure of discontent, and would not leave it for any amount of the other pleasure
which their nature is prepared to do, then humans are vindicated in crediting to the chosen

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All references to the classical book of Utilitarianism by John Stuart Mill, 1861
pleasure a predominance in quality, so far supersede amount as to display it, in examination of
little performance.
Presently it's undeniably true that the individuals who are similarly familiar with, and similarly
prepared to do appreciating and fancying, both, do give a most checked choice to the way of
presence which utilizes their higher capabilities. Scarcely, any human creature would agree to be
changed into any of the lower creatures, for a guarantee of the fullest stipend of a monster's
pleasures; no insightful person would agree to be an imbecile, no educated individual would be a
ignoramus or a blockhead, no individual of conscience and feeling would be childish and the
lowest part of a shield, despite the fact that they ought to be convinced that the imbecile, the
dullard, or the miscreant is preferred happy with his billions over they are with theirs. They would
not leave what they have more than he for the most complete fulfillment of the desires of wants
which they share practically in common with him. On the off chance that they at any point
extravagant they would, it is just in instances of extreme unhappiness, that to escape from it they
would trade their own for practically some other, yet unfortunate in their own eyes. A being of
higher capabilities requires more to make him or her happy and fulfilled, is able likely of more
intense affliction, and unquestionably available to it at more stages, than one of an inferior or
substandard kind; however disregarding these liabilities, he or she can never truly wish to sink
into what he or she feels to be a lower grade of being.
We might give what clarification we please of this reluctance; we might credit it to pride, a name
which is offered unpredictably to the absolute most and to probably the most un-admirable
sensations of which humankind are competent: we might allude it to the love for freedom and
individual autonomy, an appeal to which was with the impassive quite possibly the best means
for its teaching; to the love and quest for power, or then again to the love for happiness, the two
of which do truly go into and add to it: yet its most proper title is a feeling of dignity, which all
people have in one structure or other, and in a few, however in no way, shape or form in definite,
extent to their higher capabilities, and which is so fundamental a part of the happiness of those in
whom it is solid, that nothing which clashes with it very well may be, in any case than quickly, an
object of need to them. Anybody who guesses that this choice takes place at a forfeiture of
happiness; that the prevalent being, in anything like equivalent conditions, isn't happier than the
second class; contradicts the two totally different thoughts, of satisfaction or happiness. It is
undeniable that the being whose limits of satisfaction are low, has the best shot at having them
completely fulfilled; and a profoundly enriched being will consistently feel that any happiness

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All references to the classical book of Utilitarianism by John Stuart Mill, 1861
which he can look for, as the world is comprised, is faulty. Be that as it may, he can figure out
how to bear its faults, in case they are by any means endurable; and they won't make him jealous
the person(s) who is for sure oblivious to the defectives, in any case, simply because he feels not
under any condition the decency to which those faults qualify.
It is smarter to be a person disappointed than a pig fulfilled; preferable to be Aristotle disappointed
over a fool fulfilled. What's more, if the idiot, or the pig, are an alternate assessment, it is on the
grounds that they just know their own side of the inquiry. The other group to the contrast knows
the two sides.
Although, it might be protested, that a lot of people who are fit for the greater pleasures,
periodically, under the impact of enticement, defer them to the lower pleasures. However, this is
very viable with a full enthusiasm for the inborn prevalence of the greater. Humans mostly, from
illness of character, make their political race for the closer satisfaction, however they realize that
it generally will be the less significant; and this no less when the decision is between two real
pleasures, than when it is among real and rational. They seek after arousing guilty pleasures to
the injury of wellbeing, however completely mindful that wellbeing is everyone's benefit.
Also, it can perhaps be additionally protested, that a lot of people who start with young man’s
energy for everything honorable, as they progress in years sink into laziness and self-
centeredness. However, I don't accept that the individuals who go through this exceptionally
normal change, deliberately pick the lower depiction of pleasure in favorite to the greater. I trust
that before they give themselves solely to the one, they have effectively become unequipped for
the other. Humans lose their high desires as they lose their rational preferences, since they have
not time or opportunity for humoring them; and they fiend themselves to second grade pleasures,
not on the grounds that they intentionally lean toward them, but since they are either the only
ones to which they approach, or the ones in particular which they are any more extended fit for
getting a charge out of. It could be addressed whether any individual who has remained similarly
powerless to the two categories of pleasure, ever intentionally and serenely favored the lower;
however many, in all ages, have separated in an inadequate endeavor to merge both.
From this decision of the sole capable evaluators, I capture there can be no attraction. On an
inquiry which is the best merit having of two pleasures, or which of two methods of existence is
the most thankful to the sentiments, aside from its ethical or moral fixtures and from its outcomes,
the evaluation of the individuals who are qualified by information on both, or then again, in the

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event that they vary, that of the larger part among them, should be conceded as last. Additionally,
there needs be the less delay to acknowledge this evaluation regarding the pleasure qualities,
since there could be no other reason to hold on to in the query of quantity. What ways are there
of figuring out which is the most horrible of two pains, or the most extreme of two pleasurable
sensations, aside from the overall testimonial of the individuals who know about both? Neither
pleasure nor pain are similar, and pain is consistently dissimilar with pleasure. What is there to
choose whether a specific pleasure merits buying at the expense of a specific pain, aside from
the experienced people’s sentiments and evaluation?
The concept of everyone’s’ good and moral motivations
As indicated by the concept of happiness, as clarified above, a definitive end, concerning and for
which any remaining things are attractive (regardless of whether we are considering our own great
or that of others), is a living exempted very much far from pain, what's more, as rich as conceivable
in enjoyments and merriments, both in terms of quality and quantity; the experiment of quality,
and the act for estimating it against quantity, being the choice made and felt by the individuals
who in their chances of experience, to which should be added their propensities for hesitance and
self-perception, are ideal outfitted with the method for correlation. This, being, as indicated by the
utilitarian assessment, the finish of human activity, is essentially additionally the norm of
moral/ethical quality; which may in like manner be characterized by the standards and statutes
for human action. The utilitarian moral quality perceives in individuals the power of forfeiting their
own most noteworthy good to the benefit of others. It only declines to agree that sacrifice itself it’s
a good. Any sacrifice which does not increment, or has the potential to increase, the entirety of
happiness and satisfaction, it considers as lavished.
To reiterate, what the challengers or critics of utilitarianism only sometimes have the justice to
recognize, that the happiness which shapes the utilitarian norm of what is conductively right, isn't
the specialist's own happiness, however that of all involved. As between his own satisfaction and
happiness and that of others, utilitarianism expects him to be pretty much as stringently unbiased
as an impartial and kind observer. In the brilliant concept of Jesus Christ of Nazareth, we read
the total spirit of the morals of utility. To treat others as you would like to be treated and also to
show your neighbor the same love that you show yourself, comprise the best flawlessness of
utilitarian ethical/moral quality.

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As the method for making the closest way to deal with this ideal, utility would urge, first, that laws
and social game plans should put the happiness, or (practically speaking it could be known as)
the interest, of each person, as almost as conceivable in concordance with the interest of the
entire; and furthermore, that instruction and assessment, which have so immense a control over
human attribute, ought to so utilize that power as to build up in the psyche of each individual an
insoluble relationship between his own happiness and the benefit of the entire; particularly
between his own happiness and the act of such methods of conducts, good and bad, as respect
for the general happiness advises; so not just he may not be able to imagine the chance of
happiness to himself, reliably with conduct which is against the universal good, yet additionally
that an immediate drive to advance the overall good might be in each individual one of the ongoing
thought processes of actions, and the assumptions associated therewith may fill a huge and
noticeable spot in each person's conscious existence and living. In the event that the, challengers
or critics of the utilitarian moral/ethical quality addressed it to their own personalities in this its,
actual character, I do not know any other proposal moved by some other moral/ethical quality
they might actually assert to be needing to it; what more excellent or more exalted advancements
of human instinct some other moral or ethical framework can be used to promote, or what springs
of activity, not open to the utilitarian, such frameworks depend on for offering impact to their
directives.
The challengers and critics to utilitarianism can't generally be accused of addressing it in a
discreditable manner. Despite what might be expected, those among them who engage anything
like an only thought of its objectivity character, now and then criticize its norm as being excessively
high for humankind. They say it is demanding an excessive amount to necessitate that individuals
will consistently act from the actuation of advancing the overall interests of society. In any case,
this is to mistake the actual importance of a norm of ethics/morality, and puzzle the standard of
activity with its thought process. It is the matter of morals to mention to us what are our obligations,
or by what test we might know them; however no arrangement of morals necessitates that the
sole intention of everything we do will be a feeling of obligation; actually, 99% of every one of our
activities are done from different thought processes, and as it should be done, if the standard of
obligation doesn't criticize them. It is the more unjustifiable to utilitarianism that this specific
misunderstanding ought to be made a ground of issue with it, while utilitarian moralists have gone
past practically all others in asserting that the thought process steers clear of the profound quality
of the activity, however much with the value of the specialist. He who saves an individual animal
from suffocating does what is ethically correct, regardless of whether his thought process be

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obligation, or the expectation of being paid for his difficulty; he who sells out the trust that confides
in him, is blameworthy of a wrongdoing, even if it means to please another friend whom he is
more loyal to or under greater commitments.
We not phenomenally hear the utility creed denounced against as a godless creed. In case it be
important to say anything at all against so simple a presumption, we might say that the inquiry
relies on what thought we have shaped of the ethical or moral person of the Divinity. In case it be
a genuine conviction that God wants, over all things, the happiness of all his creatures on this
earth, and that this was his motivation in their creation, utility isn't just not a godless convention,
but rather more significantly strict than some other. In case it be implied that utilitarianism doesn't
perceive the uncovered will of God as the incomparable law of morality or ethics, I answer, that
an utilitarian who believes and trusts in the ideal wisdom and greatness of God, essentially
accepts that whatever God has figured fit to uncover regarding the matter of morality or ethics,
should satisfy the necessities of utility in a highest level and should serve as a motivation guide
for everyone.
The Validation of the Concept
The creed of the utilitarianism is, that happiness is attractive and desirable at all time, and the
sole things alluring, as an end; any other thing is just being as attractive and desirable as intends
with that in mind. What should be expected of this creed; what conditions is it essential that the
creed ought to satisfy; to make great its claim to be accepted? The sole evidence fit for being
given that an object is apparent, is that individuals really see it. The sole evidence that a sound is
discernible, is that individuals hear it: and many other means of our individual experiences. In like
way, I capture, the sole proof it is feasible to produce that anything is attractive and desirable, is
that individuals do really need it. On the off chance that the end which the utilitarian concept
proposes to itself were not, in theory and practically speaking, recognized to be an end, nothing
might at any point persuade any individual that it was so. No explanation can be given why the
overall happiness is alluring and desirable, then again, actually every individual, as far as he trusts
it to be feasible, needs his own happiness. This, notwithstanding, being a reality, we have not just
all the evidence which the claim concedes to, yet all which it is feasible to require, that happiness
is a virtue: that every individual's happiness is a great to that individual, and the overall happiness,
hence, a virtue to the sum total of all individuals. Happiness has made out its name as one of the
finishes of conduct, and subsequently one of the standards of moral/ethical quality.

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However, it has not, by itself, demonstrated itself to be the only standards. To do that, apparently,
by a similar standard, important to show, that individuals needs happiness and nothing else.
Presently, it is substantial that they do want things which, in like manner, are unequivocally
recognized from happiness. They want, for instance, virtue, and the total absence of vice, and
nothing else than pleasure and zero pain. The craving virtue isn't as widespread, however it is as
credible a reality, as the longing of happiness. And thus, the challengers or critics of the utilitarian
standards consider that they reserve an option to deduce that there are different closures of
human activity other than happiness, and that happiness isn't the norm of approval and
disapproval.
However, does the utilitarian creed reject that individuals need virtue, or retain that virtue isn't a
thing to be needed? On the extremely opposite, It retains that virtue is not to be needed only,
however that it is to be needed impartially, for itself. Anything that might be the assessment of
utilitarian moralists regarding the first conditions by which virtue is estabished virtue; anyway they
might accept (like they always do) that activities and orientations are just virtuous in light of the
fact that they advance another end than virtue; yet this being in all actuality, and it having been
chosen, from contemplations of this portrayal, what is virtue, they not just spot uprightness at the
actual top of the things which are great as intends to a definitive end, yet they likewise perceive
as a mental reality the chance of its being, to the individual, a decent in itself, without looking to
any end past it; and hold, that the brain isn't in a right state, not in a state comparable to Utility,
not in the state generally helpful for the overall happiness, except if it loves virtues in the exact
way; as a thing attractive in itself, despite, in the individual occasion, it ought not produce those
other needed outcomes which it will in general create, and because of which it upholds and sees
as a virtue. This idea isn't, in the littlest amount, a takeoff from the happiness concept. The
elements of happiness are extremely different, and every one of them is attractive in itself, and
not just when considered as expanding a total.
The concept of utility doesn't imply that any given pleasure, like music, for example, or some
random exclusion from pain, for instance health and safety, is to be viewed as intends to a
communal something named happiness, and to be needed on that record. They are desired and
needful in and for themselves; other than being implies, they are a piece of the end. Virtues, as
indicated by the utilitarian creed, isn't normally and initially part of the end, however it is equipped
for turning out to be so; and in the individuals who love it unbiasedly it has become along these
lines, and is needed and loved, not as a way to happiness, but rather as a piece of their happiness.

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To show this farther, we might recollect that virtue isn't the sole thing, initially a method, and which
in case it were not a way to whatever else, would be and stay detached, yet which by relationship
with how it is an affects, comes to be needed for itself, and that too with the most extreme strength.
What, for instance, will we say of the love for cash? There isn't anything initially more alluring
about cash than about any pile of sparkling pieces of pebble stones. Its value is exclusively that
of the things which it will purchase; the longings for different things than itself, which it is a method
for satisfying. However the love for cash isn't just one of the most grounded moving powers of
human existence, yet cash is, as a rule, needed in and for itself; the craving to have it is normally
more hardy than the craving to utilize it, and continues expanding when every one of the cravings
which highlight closes past it, to be reached by it, are dropping off. It might, then, at that point, be
said really, that cash is needed not for an end, but rather as a feature of the end. From being a
way to happiness, it has come to act naturally a central element of the person's idea of happiness
and satisfaction.
As per the utilitarian ideology, virtue is a decent of this depiction. There was no unique desire of
it, or intention to it, save its helpfulness to happiness, and particularly to security from pain.
However, through the affiliation subsequently framed, it could be felt a decent in itself, and needed
as such with as incredible strength as some other decent or good; and with this distinction among
it and the love for cash, power, or fame, that these may, and regularly do, render the individual
harmful to different individuals from the general public to which he has a place, though there isn't
anything which makes him such a lot of a gift to them as the development of the uninvolved love
of ethicalness/morality. Therefore, the utilitarian norm, while it endures and supports those other
acquired needs, up to the extent which they would be more damaging to the overall happiness
than advancing of it, orders and requires the development of the love for virtues up to the best
strength conceivable, as being over everything essential to the overall happiness and satisfaction.
It results from the first contemplations, that there is in all actuality nothing needed with the
exception of happiness or satisfaction. Regardless of what is needed in any case than as a way
to some end past itself, and at last to happiness, is wanted as itself a piece of happiness or
satisfaction, and isn't needed for itself until it has become so. The individuals who need virtue for
the good of its own, want it either in light of the fact that the awareness of it is a happiness, or in
light of the fact that the cognizance of lacking it is a pain, or for the two reasons joined together;
as in truth the happiness and pain only from time to time exist independently, yet quite often
together, a similar individual enjoying pleasure in the amount of virtue achieved, and pain in not

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having achieved more. In the event that one of these gave him the desired or needed pleasure,
and the alternative no pain, he would not cherish or need ethicalness or morality, or would need
it just for different advantages which it may yield to himself or to people whom he really has
concerns towards.
If human instinct is so comprised as to want nothing which isn't either a piece of happiness or a
method for happiness, we can have no other evidence, and we require no other, that these are
the sole things desirable and attractive. Assuming this is the case, happiness is the sole finish of
human activity, and the advancement of it the test by which to decide of all human-conduct; from
whence it essentially follows that it should be the measure of ethical or moral quality, since a
section is involved in the entirety.
Also, presently to choose whether this is actually so; regardless of whether humankind fail to help
itself however that which to them is a pleasure, or of which the non-appearance is a pain; Clearly,
we have arrived at a query between experience and fact, reliant, similar to every comparable
query, upon proof. It must be dictated by rehearsed hesitance and self-perception, helped by
perception of others. I trust that these starting point of proof, unbiasedly counseled, will proclaim
that needing a thing and thinking that its pleasant, hatred for it and considering it painful, are
events altogether indivisible, or rather two parts or pieces of a similar event; in severity of
communication, two distinct methods of naming a similar mental reality: that to consider an object
attractive or desirable or needful (even if it has after-effects), and to consider it lovely, are indeed
the very same thing; and that to need anything, apart from the concept being pleasant or lovely
in terms of ratio, is substantially and conceptually impracticable.
Be that as it may, if this creed be correct, the concept of utility is justified. And if still in doubt,
should now be left to smart thinkers, individuals, audience, researchers and scholars to assess,
appraise or evaluate further.