Presented by Mahendra , Hall of Fame Global Speaker & AIM Expert in 3rd Asean Refining & Petrochemical Forum 3017 Conference on " How MIQA can ensure the process safety of ageing petroleum industries which requires top driven proactive reliability culture , in-house technical expertise & operational discipline"
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MIQA, An Ultimate Element of PSM Implementation
1.
2. MIQA, An Ultimate Element of PSM
Implementation
AIM of process Safety Management
PSM Objectives
What’s MIQA , An Ultimate Element of PSM
Why Reliability of Static Equipment Important ?
Real Root Causes of Poor Reliability of Static Equipment
Global Scenario of Static Equipment
:”Wake up Call” to Operators of Ageing Petroleum Industries
MIQA in Ageing Assets : A Global Challenging Problem
Way forward to MIQA in Ageing Plants
Why MIQA (AIM/RBI) fail and how to get success
3. AIM of Process Safety Management
Develop plant’s systems & procedures to
prevent unwanted releases of spills &
emissions, which may ignite and cause
disaster of toxic impacts, local fires, or
explosions in plants - affecting people,
nearby Communities , Environment &
Image of Company
4. Flixoborogh, 1 June 1974
Additional facility built in 1972 for the
production of Cyclohexanone
•Used to produce Caprolactum intermediate
for the manufacture of nylon
• Section 25A involved oxidation of
cyclohexane at 8.8 Barg / 155°C
• The reaction was carried out in six liquid
phase reactors
•Each reactor was set 14” lower than the
previous to allow the liquid to flow under
gravity through the reaction train.
• March 27th 1974, a crack developed in
reactor number 5. The maintenance engineer
recommended shutdown for 3 weeks for
repair
Flixoborogh, 1 June 1974
5.
6.
7. Proactive identification, evaluation and
mitigation of chemical releases that could
occur as a result of failures of processes,
procedures or equipment.
Proactive control of the consequences of
catastrophic releases of highly hazardous
chemicals from a process.
PSM Objectives :
8. Out of 14 PSM Elements, MIQA is Ultimate for Process Safety
9.
10. MIQA shall ensures 360⁰ Integrity
of equipment starts from inception of
its Design , Construction, Startups,
Commissioning , Operation, Turnaround
till Decommissioning, to prevent out of
containment of hazardous liquid & gases
from its pressure boundary
11. Pressure Vessels and Storage tanks
Piping systems including all components
Relief & Vent systems and associated devices
Safety Instrumented Systems (SISs) and Emergency
Shutdown (ESD) systems - Process control systems -
Controls system including monitoring devices and
sensors, critical alarms and interlocks.
Rotary equipment
Electrical equipment
Equipment Under MIQA
12. Identification and documentation of PSM critical equipment
MIQA Implementer Team
PSM critical equipment review
Quality Assurance of New Equipment
Maintenance, Inspection And Testing of Equipment
Repairs and Changes
Maintenance Procedures /schedule
Maintenance training
Quality Control of Maintenance, Repair and Operation (MRO) Materials and Spares
Reliability Engineering
Predictive Maintenance Program
Documentation
MIQA PROCEDURE
13.
14. Ageing is the main cause of poor reliability of Static Assets
18. What’s Ageing & What are Aged Equipment ?
Ageing is not by no. of years equipment passed
but by its present condition
Aged Asset that outlived its useful life and may
include the equipment still functional but
expensive to operate/maintain, still works but
breakdown frequently disrupting operation or
equipment that broken and it is too expensive to
repair
Ageing Assets, a serious concern in petroleum industries for its sustenance
19. Broadly due to
poor design/construction and
In-service corrosion/ metallurgical
degradation due to poor
maintenance / mal-operation
Leading to Over ageing & premature
failure in catastrophic manner
20. Causes of Design Deficiencies
No consideration of Geographical features & types
of crude processing while setting up refinery
Poor knowledge & experience of designer for
selecting material, its degradation & protection
Poor knowledge of NDT technologies, its selection
and practicality
Economical Metallurgy due to limited budget
22. Metallurgy Mismatch
P9 material in place of P91 resulted catastrophe just
after commissioning
Carbon steel in place of Alloy steels
SS 304H in Place of SS 304L & vice versa
SA 516 Gr70 in place of SA 516 Gr60 in NACE & Caustic
Service
Ordinary Brass in place of Ar stabilized Admiralty Brass
SS 304 piping in place of SS 321
23. Heat Treatment Condition
No Stabilization Treatment of Stabilized Grade SS 347 &
321 after welding leading to Chloride & Polythionic SCC.
No PWHT of CS equipment after welding in caustic,
Amine, LPG, sodium carbonate & hydrogen Service causing
catastrophe due to SCC
Failure of Admiralty brass U tube bundle in lube oil cooler
due to no solution annealing of tubes after bending
Use of SA191 Grade B7 studs in place of Grade B7M in
NACE H2S service
24. Dimension & Geometry/ Slope
Thinning of Elbow at Crown portion
Undersize fillet welding in place of
Full Penetration welds
Out of roundness & Verticality in
Storage tanks
25. Poor Workmanship During Construction
Welding by helpers / unqualified personnel
Short Bolting
Reverse Slope of pipelines causing inefficient
drainage
Gas Cutting in place of Drilling for holes
Box up Equipment with foreign materials
Gas / Grinding Cutting of SS in place of Plasma
26. Construction Lapses
Poor workmanship & Nonstandard procedures
Mismatch in Filler Wire.
Improper baking of electrode / no or improper purging
Metallurgy mix up.
Non compliance of welding Procedure & repetitive repairs
Manipulation in NDT & PWHT.
Box up of Equipment With Foreign Materials
No Dewatering & Dry up after Hydro Testing
Poor Insulation: Aluminium clad on high temperature ASS lines.
Poor Refractory Application & Dry out
27. Construction Lapses
Poor workmanship & Nonstandard procedures
Poor application of coating & lining
No Passivation & long idling without Preservation
Use of Poor Quality water in hydro testing
No PWHT ( Stabilization) in SS 321/347
No SR of CS equipment in Amine, Caustic, LPG, H₂ service
No RT after PWHT
RT interpretation noncompliance with design need
PWHT cycle problem in P91 & P92 dissimilar material.
Poor control of welding parameters in Duplex & P91/P92.
Lack of experience /poor qualification of QA/QC inspectors
28. Poor Start-Up & Commissioning Damages
Maximum damage in the life of a plant occurs
at start up Due to over run of operating
parameter and the remnant effect of this
damage may affect the design life significantly.
A step by step procedure if followed strictly
can give a safe and risk free plant start up & in-
turn smooth operation , longer run-length &
expected safer design life in future.
29. Post Commissioning Mal-Operation- No IOW
Poor Control of Operating Parameters
Long idling without proper preservation
Inefficacy of dosing system for corrosion control.
Running equipment beyond design parameters: No IOW
Processing High TAN crude with low metallurgy
Processing High NAN Crude with inadequate Metallurgy
Running the equipment in leaky condition
30. Frequent Steam & Power Failures
Thermal fatigue, Thermal Shocks Causing metallurgical
degradation due to thermo-mechanical Stress in High
Temperature Equipment.
Accelerate corrosion due to stoppage of pumps causing
condensation of acidic gases in overhead circuit leading
to dew point corrosion at each event.
Starvation of water in PG boilers leading to creep
failure .
31. Capacity Utilization Beyond Design
Refiners running the plant as high as 120% to 140%
of its design just for greed of getting production or
breaking the previous bench mark records of
production causing high velocities of streams & high
temperature leading to erosion corrosion, fatigue &
creep damages.
Change of crude (Opportunity crude) without
metallurgy up-gradation due to international market
drive & availability leading to faster rate of corrosion.
32. Frequent change of Inspectors
Poor inspection recommendation
Poor documentation.
Lack of proactive skill & confidence In
Decision Making
All above lead to confusion & chaos in
turn poor reliability.
33. No Company Owned Standards & Practices
Nonstandard norms & practices of Inspection &
Maintenance result
Repetitive failure
More Maintenance & Inspection cost
Poor Reliability of Equipment
No in-house talent & expertise development
More dependency & panic at time of resigning
Confusion, chaos & delay in jobs
34.
35. Impact of Ageing on MIQA
Increased Unpredictable Failures & catastrophes
More Unsafe situation & fatal
Pressure from Regulators
More repair & more maintenance cost
Poor run length & On-stream Service factor
Need more Inspection with Advance NDT & Heavy
Replacement for Life Extension.
36. As per the current industry climate, pipelines
may cost up to $ 3 million per km to replace
for prolonging the lifetime of infrastructure and
avoiding preventable damage is extremely
valuable to operators.
Ageing Pipelines & Replacement Cost
4 million KM Ageing Pipelines replacement in USA
shall cost $12000 billion which can break the
backbone of most developed economy of world
37. With the safety of personnel being a top
priority across the entire global industry,
operators must ensure they have robust
monitoring and inspection regimes, corrosion
monitoring techniques, risk assessments and
active maintenance programs in place to
safeguard against risk.
Life Extension of Ageing Assets
38. Continued operation of ageing assets,
through RLA & Life Extension Plans
Creating opportunities to lower costs and
increased profits for sustenance, but
need wisdom & expertize.
As the industry seeks to increase the economic life
of assets, many will remain in operation longer
than anticipated. Some oil and gas assets have
39. Current condition assessment
Life extension evaluation and GAP analysis
Technical qualification for life extension
Obsolescence preparedness
Life extension costs and plans
Five-step approach for Life Extension
40. Assess history & present status
Detect symptoms of ageing
Examine options: e.g. continued service, re-rating, repair, scrapping
Use risk-based approach to identify critical systems and equipment
Life extension evaluation and GAP analysis
Determine modifications required
Perform technical qualification to operate structures & equipment
beyond original design life
Obsolescence preparedness
Elongated term cost prediction
What we do in Life Extension?
41. AIMS outline the ability of an asset to perform its
required function effectively and efficiently
whilst protecting health, safety & environment
and the means of ensuring that the people,
systems, processes, and resources that deliver
integrity are in place, in use and will perform
when required over the whole lifecycle of the
asset
What’s AIM
42. An Integrity Management System should address the
quality at every stage of the asset life cycle, from the
design of new facilities to maintenance management to
decommissioning. Inspections, auditing/assurance and
overall quality processes are just some of the tools
designed to make an AIMS effective
The AIMS should also endeavor to maintain the asset in a
fit-for-service condition while extending its remaining life
in the most reliable, safe, and cost-effective manner. The
AIM programs (in the US) attempt to meet API-580, API-
581, and PAS 55 requirements, as applicable.
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46. MIQA in Ageing Assets : A global Challenge
Ageing Assets : Predict, control , Monitor & Mitigate Complex Corrosion & Metallurgical Degradation
47. MIQA in Ageing Assets : A Global Challenge for PSM
Management of Ageing Assets: Need Top driven Reliability
Culture & In-house Team Expertise
Proactive Detection, Dynamic Risk Analysis and Timely Action for avoiding Catastrophes
50. Corrosion is Cancerous disease to Industries
Specially Oil & Gas which can kill the total
economy of a company or country.
Are you aware of this fact ?
Replacement of Ageing Assets can break the
backbone of even most developed World
economy and life enhancement is the only
option to sustain.
51.
52. MIQA in Ageing Assets & Cost Reduction
Arbitrary Cost Reduction : Increasing Risk of Replacing the Facility for sustenance
53. MIQA in Ageing Asset & Cost Reduction
Arbitrarily cutting skilled head counts
Increasing Risk to sustenance due to Poor Monitoring & Maintenance
54. MIQA in Ageing Assets :A Global Challenge for PSM
Way forward to Reliability of Ageing Assets
55. MIQA in Ageing Assets & Cost Reduction
Reducing Inspection Budget Arbitrarily : Increasing Risk to Sustenance
56. Risk Assessment Through RBI & FFS Technologies for
achieving Reliability of static assets, is the key to
survival for Ageing Petroleum Industries
Both Technologies are Complementary, Stands alone
separately but meet together in Crisis
MIQA & Management of Ageing Assets
World over, No break through yet for both RBI/FFS due to
lack of expertise , high complexity and poor culture
57.
58. A New Way to Use RBI - The Long Play
While RBI will continue to be used in the short term to defer
inspections, its real power lies in its ability to create a long
term plan. Have you thought about using it for the long term?
the term "RBI it away" as in completing an RBI assessment to
make an overdue inspection disappear. These people are very
short sighted in their views of RBI's capabilities. RBI is a
powerful equipment life-cycle tool that can predict damage out
into the future, and the API codes allow you to take full
advantage of this technology.
59.
60.
61. Ageing Assets : A threat to sustenance , Environment & Human Life
MIQA in Ageing Assets : A Global Challenge for PSM
62. MIQA in Ageing Assets : A Global Challenge for PSM
Way Forward to Reliability: Life Time Integrated Integrity of Entire Plant
79. MIQA in Ageing Assets : A Global Challenge for
PSMGood Asset Integrity Management balances Design Integrity , Operating Integrity and Technical
Integrity in the most cost effective and productive way starting from plant design to end of life
80.
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90. MIQA , most important Element of Process Safety Management and is ultimate to
prevent Out of containment of hydrocarbon or toxic liquid and gases avoiding fire ,
explosion and catastrophes by ensuring the mechanical integrity of assets at every
stage starting from inception of design to start up during construction and then
commissioning to and then during operation , break downs , turn around till
decommissioning.
Global statistic of petroleum industries estimated 80 % static assets consisting mainly
pipelines, plant piping, pressure vessels and safety valves in refineries and
petrochemicals are aged either due to expiry or due to poor condition. These assets
are still productive but having lot of uncertainty for reliability and frequently failing
resulting catastrophes and explosion. Replacement of these assets is not feasible due
to high cost & time constraint. Life enhancement is the only option . MIQA needs top
driven proactive reliability culture , In-house technical expertize and operational
discipline along with time and funding.
Conclusion
Editor's Notes
Management or stake holders can not wait until an incident occurs to take action
We must be PROACTIVE
Data to ensure MIQA : know it & prove it
What is the exact corrosion condition of plant
Where the plant is in poor condition and mitigation action plans made and implemented
Where the plant is in good condition and the action plans made to maintain it as such
On 06Aug2012, explosion & fire took place due to Ф8” just upstream of bend rupture in LGO side stream of crude distillation of Chevron Richmond refinery in USA. Analysis of ruptured component indicated low silicon carbon steel material and failed due to high temperature sulphur corrosion (erosion corrosion phenomenon) which is localised damage mostly prevalent in the location of turbulence and high velocity region causing uniform thinning over a large area. Silicon content is an important parameter to prevent HTSC in carbon steel since silicon content if lower than 0.1% corrosion rate soot up exponentially. HTSC failures tend to involve rupture resulting large leaks rather than pinhole leak. Historical data revealed no thickness data recorded on this component in their RBI plans . This component was never replaced since its commissioning in seventies when there was no control over silicon content in CS. After USTM & silicon many other components were found having the silicon content lesser than 0.1%.
This incident due to several fatalities , production loss and damage to plant and image/reputation of company has given big jolt to chevron. After that Chevron has developed new construction guidelines stating piping installed in high temperature and high sulphur service shall be constructed with 9 chrome steel. This incident has brought the revolution in material selection world over to “ use inherently safer material and robust design instead economical” to avoid failures and catastrophes. Hence let’s say “ Reliable is safe ! Safe is profitable”
On 2nd Apr 2010 six fatalities with explosion / fire due to catastrophic rupture of CS heat exchanger shell in NHT . In the fire zone there are six exchanger in two rows of three exchanger each in series. (Naphtha+hydrogen) feed tube side enter into heater at 550 ᴼF & 630 Psig. After heating at 625ᴼF, this feed enter into reactor for removing impurities from naphtha. The O/L feed of reactor passes shell side of exchanger A & D for cooling at 630ᴼF- 710ᴼF at 590 psig. After A & B, the effluent passes into B & E and then A & F for further cooling and finally effluent come out at 270ᴼF from exchanger C & F . Shell longitudinal joint rupture took place in exchanger E and in exchanger B circumferential joint was found cracked.
Cause of rupture is due to long term hydrogen exposure of CS shell beyond the HTHA limit of Nelson curve of CS due to chockage of tube preventing heat flow from shell to tube in exchanger E & B. Investigation revealed there was no TI points on these exchangers.
This incident brought the revolution in selection of material for resistant to HTHA and modified the Nelson curve & API RP 941 mentioning CS in high temperature can be used if the temperature is lesser than 400ᴼF & hydrogen Pressure is lesser than 50 psig. API 571 damage mechanisms recommend to use inherently safer material as 300 series as well as 5 Cr, 9 Cr & 12 Cr alloys or stabilized grades special Cr-Ni steel as in reformer.
This incidents has brought the revolution to use inherently safer material instead using economical carbon steel and given big impact world over to modify the existing plant. Again Let’s say “ Reliable is Safe ! Safe is profitable
On 16 Apr2001, big fire took place subsequent to vapour cloud formation due to rupture of 90 deg elbow over head circuit of saturate gas plant. Cause of leak is the erosion corrosion aggravated after the provision of BFW injection point in the upstream of elbow. After few years of commissioning, refinery was facing the shell side chockage problem in condenser in O/H circuit due to which throughput was affected and frequent plant shutdown for cleaning the exchanger. To mitigate this problem, refinery has planned the modification by providing intermittent BFW water injection point just upstream of the elbow to wash the deposit on stream. After few years of operation , on 16 apr2001 elbow in down stream just after the injection point was suddenly ruptured and hydrocarbon vapours develop the cloud on the top of column and subsequently big fire took place. Many equipment in SGP and adjacent unit were badly damaged.
Cause of failure: wrong location of injection point which is causing erosion – corrosion due to water droplets and corrosives in vapour in presence of turbulence and impact force of water droplets favouring ideal condition for erosion corrosion to take place.
Poor inspection & RBI monitoring
No MOC approval done before going for modification in overhead lines.
This incident has created lot of awareness about the susceptibility of injection points, mixing points, dead legs, dead ends and dosing point to corrosion . Lot of case study and mechanisms along with preventive measures articles published in NACE after this incident.
On 16Feb2016, LPG fire at Valero – PDA unit MCKEE REFINERY took place due to sudden leak from ruptured elbow. The control station connected to the PDA extractor column was not in use for last 15 years and was isolated by closing two gate valves and one control valve but it remains connected to propane pump. Water settling out of a propane leaked through 10” gate valve and accumulated in the low point elbow. During cold weather, water in the elbow was frozen and due to increase in volume, it exerted stresses on the elbow wall at subzero temperature making the material brittle. During the summer season the ice got melted and lot of propane released after the rupture of elbow in brittle mode and resulted fire. Later this fire spread in other areas and resulted multiple fire in entire plant. Four people injured and shutdown of the plant extended.
This is the burning examples of damages due to cold leg formation.
Crevice Corrosion of piping at support location is the biggest problems of ageing pipelines. Due to lack of access these pipeline could not be protected from corrosion externally by coating in their entire life. These pipelines are badly corroded on the support location . Frequent failure and catastrophes are taking place in these piping . Correction is time taking and difficult and require shutdown of the plant in many cases and expensive.
Avoid the stitch weld and crevices in modified support system of piping.
Phase wise correction/replacement of these piping segments
CUI is a silent killer & big constraint for reliability of ageing assets more chronic problem in coastal area. API RP 583 describe how to protect and design piping and equipment to prevent and monitor CUI. Ingress of water and its stagnation should be avoided to prevent CUI. Thermo-graphy is used to detect the damaged insulation remotely in insulated piping and equipment and does not require access. Neutron back scatter technique is used to detect usceptible locations where water ingress / stagnation is taking place within insulation. LRUT can detect the CUI damages remotely by removing the insulation locally. Profile radiography & real time tangential RT can detect the CUI but require access to location.CUI can be controlled during the design of equipment itself by avoiding water ingress / water retention on the structural and nozzle attachment locations of equipment and piping and workmanship during the application of insulation and cladding / sealing material .
PG&E pipe explosion in San Bruno took place on 09 Sep 2010 due to rupture of natural gas U/G pipelines. 38 houses burnt and more than eight people killed in this mishap. PG&E fined 1.6 billion dollars which is the highest penalty in the history of USA.
Cause of failure: This line was constructed in nineteen fifties and corrosion because of ageing along with over pressurization is the main cause of failure which resulted thinning and ductile mode of failure in 6 o’clock position of pipe. Demand of natural gas increased due to increasing population . To meet this demand pipelines was over pressurized. However as seen in the photograph all girth weld remain intact during the rupture.
Further investigation revealed: lapses in hydro-test & history data found missing and some places not matching.
This incident had created lot of awareness about the safety of gas pipeline, among operators , regulators and public / politics. However still the trend of pipelines in USA is increasing and it is a big matter of concern how to improve the reliability of these ageing assets causing frequent catastrophes affecting the environment & human safety.
AIM / RBI is the combined responsibility of each and every department including HR, Finance, Commercial & Contractual manpower. Hence everyone shall be aware and trained about reliability and what is their role in that.
Reliability has to start from inception of thought to have facility. Reliability is important start from conceptual design (feed data), detailed engineering, procurement, construction and start up till commissioning at every step but design stage it is easier and without expense. Hence during design stage the reliability shall be given special emphasis.
RBI shall not be done during operation & turn around but it must be done during design and construction stage otherwise it becomes unreliable. Material spec. & quality lapses are to be monitored & controlled at every steps in the entire life cycle of assets from its design to final decommissioning . if not done will result into in born sick plant & AIM/ RBI becomes herculean task.
Integrity operating window design to control the operating parameters for maintaining the integrity of equipment and improving the run length and availability of plant.