![[~] whois -h
tweedge
▪ Founder of
dnstrace.pro
▪ Third year RIT CSEC
student and BSides
regular
▪ Runs Snort on own
network
▪ Guacamole aficionado
▪ Dungeons and Dragons]()
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BSides Rochester 2018: Chris Partridge: Turning Domain Data Into Domain Intelligence
- 2. [~] whois -h tweedge ▪ Founder of dnstrace.pro ▪ Third year RIT CSEC student and BSides regular ▪ Runs Snort on own network ▪ Guacamole aficionado ▪ Dungeons and Dragons
- 3. Contents 1.Quick Refresher on DNS 2.The Reactive Threat Intelligence Problem 3.Scraping and Ingesting DNS Data at Scale 4.Anomalies, Analysis and General Findings
- 6. DNS Basics https://www.facebook.c om/login/ ▪ The protocol: https:// ▪ The page: /login/ ▪ FQDN: www.facebook.com ▫ TLD: com Registrable domain:
- 7. What Can it Tell You? A IPv4 address AAAA IPv6 address ANY all records CNAME canonical name MX mailserver NS nameserver TXT text And more...
- 8. How Does it Work? DNS is a hierarchical system. Y o u Yo ur DN S Root DNS .com DNS Facebo ok DNS
- 11. Reactive Security != Great Security ▪ Consider 100% file- signature-based antimalware ▫ Easy to circumvent ▫ Difficult/costly to maintain ▫ Slow to adapt ▪ Better than nothing? ¯_( ツ )_/¯
- 12. “ An IP address earns a negative reputation when Symantec detects suspicious activity, such
- 13. “ An IP address earns a negative reputation when Symantec detects suspicious activity, such
- 14. “ ...If the IP addresses change frequently, and if the site has an IP address that was hosting
- 15. “ ...If the IP addresses change frequently, and if the site has an IP address that was hosting
- 16. ▪ Domain safety heuristics are available ▫ How recent the registration was ▫ Frequent address changes ▫ Popularity estimates It’s a Start
- 18. Relational Learning “To predict unforseen or future relationships between entities based on past observations.”
- 20. Relational Threat Intelligence Doma in X Resolves to certain IPsResolves to certain other domains Was registered by _ registrar Has certain text records ... some other characteristic s ...
- 22. What Would We Need? ▪ Huge quantities of parsed domain data ▫ Some collect this passively; we won’t ▫ Difficult to acquire aggressively ▪ As much threat intelligence as possible
- 25. Acquiring TLDs http://data.iana.org/TL D/tlds-alpha-by- domain.txt Stats: ▪ 1543 TLDs ▪ Available by HTTP ▪ Also by FTP ▪ Wow
- 26. Acquiring Domains ▪ Buy access to curated zone files ▫ ~$300/year ( ° °)╯ □ ╯ ︵ ┻━┻ ▪ Request access to zone files from registrars ▫ ICANN’s CZDS is a good start
- 27. Discovering Domains & Subdomains Out of Scope ▪ Brute force ▪ Website crawling ▪ Search engines & passive In Scope ▪ Probabilis tic lookups ▪ Reverse DNS ▪ Using DNSSEC: NSEC and
- 29. Website Crawling ▪ Find and follow links ▪ Complex and resource intensive if the entire document is rendered for each page ▪ Requires a webserver to be running
- 30. Search Engines & Passive DNS ▪ Great for real-life engagements, exposes nothing about your recon to a target ▪ Depends on external services Recommended software:
- 31. Probabilistic Lookups ▪ Use a list of known FQDNs and parse out the most common subdomains ▪ Combine with anything you know about the target (eg. wordlists) to increase
- 33. Reverse DNS ▪ Useful for IPv4 (dense), less useful for IPv6 (sparse) ▪ Often results in ISP- assigned FQDNs ▪ ...hrm.
- 34. DNSSEC ▪ A set of security extensions for DNS ▪ Provides: ▫ Origin authentication ▫ Data integrity ▫ Denial of existence
- 36. NSEC Walks ▪ How does denial of existence work with DNSSEC? ▫ NS returns NSEC response: “next secure record” Generally: examp le.com api ww w User requests “test” NS returns
- 38. 1624 IN NSEC www.example.com. A NS SOA TXT AAAA RRSIG NSEC DNSKEY
- 40. NSEC3 Walks ▪ Privacy improvements in 2008 to DNSSEC, creating NSEC3 records by hashing adjacent valid records Generally: examp le.com api ww w User requests “test” NS returns NSEC3 record stating: “There is nothing between ‘71f64b...’ and ‘724611...’”
- 44. DNSSEC, NSEC, NSEC3 Recap ▪ If a target has DNSSEC enabled it’s absolutely worth investigating an NSEC(3) walk ▪ NSEC scales well, NSEC3 does not (on CPU) ▪ NSEC5 on the way
- 45. Zone Transfers (AXFR Query) ▪ Ask the nameserver politely for all its zone data ▪ Between 1/7 and 1/10 nameservers allow AXFR ▪ Requires little effort for possibly large payout
- 46. North Korea DNS Leak Found by mandatoryprogrammer/ TLDR Sept. 2016, 28 domains: airkoryo.com.kp, cooks.org.kp, friend.com.kp, gnu.rep.kp, kass.org.kp, kcna.kp, kiyctc.com.kp, knic.com.kp, koredufund.org.kp, korelcfund.org.kp,
- 49. Resolving the Domain Space ▪ The DIY solution 1.Try an AXFR (if applicable) 2.Try an ANY query 3.Iterate through desired query types ▪ Thread and geographically distribute
- 50. Make Use of Open Domain Data Rapid7 Sonar ▪ SSL, Forward DNS, and Reverse DNS = great ▪ Approx. 2.3 billion data points per week in FDNS ▪ Permits non-malicious noncommercial use
- 51. Storing Everything ▪ Decompose everything ▪ Use scalable database engines ▫ Current setup: Percona 5.6 with TokuDB ▪ Compression works wonders ▪ Indexes are your
- 54. Domain Errors ▪ a104-100-169- 118.depl1521945933 ▪ sxevz.www.ae01521990 153 ▪ dc-wpprod-f5 ▪ nic.llc ▪ mac.sport
- 55. LLC Isn’t a TLD? Sport? ▪ IANA says yes: ▪ Mozilla’s Public Suffix List says no:
- 56. Here We Go!
- 57. Invalid Types ▪ a104-100-169- 118.depl1521945933 Type: ec2-52-39- 231 ..., reply: a ▪ dc-wpprod-f5 Type: canam.ws, reply: a
- 58. IPv4 / DNS A
- 59. IPv6 vs IPv4
- 60. CNAME Mistakes ▪ http://exmail.qq.com/ login ▪ ms28789472.msv1.inval id ▪ 6ca0fe83df737a7b1a6 003830fc47008 ▪ www.tuolongledcom ▪ fdfddfdf.343sdfd.fddd
- 61. MX and NS Errors
- 63. Adding Threat Intelligence ▪ Ingest as many lists as possible ▫ Phishing feeds of URLs ▫ Domain reputation feeds ▫ IP reputation feeds ▫ BOGONs ▪ Considering heuristics
- 64. Tuning Threat Intelligence ▪ Threat intel source reputation ▪ Threat type and severity ▪ User bias based on threat category
- 73. Limitations ▪ Data is far from complete at the moment ▪ Threat intelligence sources are good, not great ▫ Response time to emerging threats is slow
- 74. Limitations
- 75. Future Improvements ▪ Talk to a lawyer ▪ Scale out, cover more geographic areas, increase query throughput ▫ You can help! ▪ Implement distributed NSEC walking, AXFRs
- 76. The Endgame ▪ Make dnstrace a proactive tool for geeks ▫ Generate firewall configurations ▫ Generate DNS blocklists ▪ Make dnstrace a proactive tool for
- 79. This is the Last Slide- Thank you so much for coming to my talk! Keep in touch via ... Email chris@partridge.tech LinkedIn /in/tweedge/ GitHub? @tweedge
Editor's Notes
- No questions section at the end re: not an expert. I’m on the mailing list, but this is a discussion, not a lecture.
- I know, nobody really likes DNS. me neither.
- Strip away request data to get at the parts of a domain
- DNS hierarchy - a given NS only knows about itself and its delegates. None are obligated to expose information that isn’t being requested. Replace text-heavy slide with diagram
- With the talk about the basics over - what does security in the DNS space look like?
- When was this from? What does it mean?
- ouch
- Getting better? When/where/who?
- Even Talos is making reactive decisions, but this time supplemented with proactive heuristics
- Reasonable heuristics can help protect people - ok, great. It’s a start. But we don’t have that many heuristics to work with. What about a dynamic address so Bob can access his nextcloud at home?
- Requires complex, relational structureAllows for link-based clusteringLower dimensionality and high similarity tend to make systems more effective
- Too many characteristics to prove effective for clustering - though specific characteristics and sets of characteristics are classifiable, thus, heuristics
- Finite set of characteristics, strong structure of both nodes and characteristics.
- We could give it a go
- TLDs are easy. TLD holders want you to know that their TLD exists for marketing reasons, technical reasons (parsing), etc
- Generally for enumerating domains people buy access to zone files
- I’ll make recommendations for discovering out of scope things, and demo discovering in-scope things
- Absolutely not. Good lawyer can make it sound like a DoS attack. Especially bad at scale. Read: DDoS.
- Limits search to web-only domains, out of scope for the intended function of DNS. Useful in other situations. Lots of options.
- Good for limited IRL engagements, can’t perform this at scale due to blacklisting
- Can be used with certain limitations at scale. Example assumes randomized brute force search of strlen<=6 at 50% completion using only alpha charset - numbers, dashes, etc. would greatly expand search space
- We can usually tell the ISP by AS allocations anyway, but whatever
- Implements several new records types including dnskey, rrsig, nsec... dnssec-secured responses can be verified to be signed by the NS, valid, and to prevent an ISP just intercepting/nulling dns responses there is authenticated denial of existence.
- Denial of existence you say... how does that work?
- Replies with an NSEC record. There is not a standard for NSEC records beyond “the next record signed by the nameserver” but this typically means (in most implementations) the next record that exists/returns data.
- hmmmmmmmm
- There you have it, example.com replies with the next valid domain. So we can enumerate.
- But example.com is too small. Let’s enumerate the DNS footprint of something bigger... say, PayPal. 689 queries. That’s an 80-char wide window, longest subdomain I saw was ~30 chars, so 7 * 10^55 is a good estimate of the 50% brute force space. ONE SEPT-EN-DEC-ILLION TIMES as many queries.
- People realized the former was a bad idea and came up with NSEC3, the big change being hashed subdomain results
- You can see we get gibberish back - no easy walks to be found here. But that’s not to say they’re not possible - you can collect a list of those hashes and then feed them into a cracking software
- Here’s an NSEC3 walk of the .pro TLD - in several seconds we crack 11% of domains using hashcat on a Xeon L5640 CPU with a very bad mask. With a last-gen GPU cracking system and a better mask or wordlist, we could push much higher coverage with little extra investment
- Cloudflare’s “DNSSEC done right.” NSEC doesn’t have to be the next existing domain - just has to be the next signed record. So CF generates garbage records to prevent a walk.
- Four our project we’d need to create failure cases. NSEC5 prevents enumeration - it’s available but not really used right now
- Should not be enabled for production environments. 1/7 numbers from dns arc, marjorie @ ic3. 1/10 is approx. lower bound what I’ve seen so far. Reveals activity beyond reasonable doubt to any DNS admin checking the logs though.
- Demo axfr - lots of content. We don’t just get a list of valid domains/subdomains - we get query types and responses too. neat!
- We now have a lot of ways of acquiring FQDNs - but we’ve only scratched the surface of resolving that domain space
- AXFR first - very little effort to enumerate an entire zone, try it against any registrable domain. Failing that, ANY (since we want all the data). Some service providers are refusing ANY, generally due to complexity and DoS amp. Re: cloudflare. Failing that, iterate through most-wanted types (A, AAAA, CNAME, MX, NS, etc.). We thread heavily and maintain 20 nodes in 6 countries and 3 continents.
- Really no reason not to if you’re doing this at the scale we are noncomercially. More scans = more granular data = better maps.
- Decompose for faster querying. Much worse performance and utility to select where “10.%” to find everything in the 10.0.0.0/8 space. Useful to have everything that can be an integer represented as an integer, and even FQDNs parsed out into subsections
- Not that we have the data we need, let’s start playing with it.
- Filing an issue
- Hmmmmmm
- 0.1% of addresses went to private or loopback addresses - doesn’t seem like much until you consider that’s about 1.2 million addresses. Here’s the breakdown. An additional 0.01% of addresses resolve to 1.1.1.1, so APNIC was right to lend that address to Cloudflare.
- Protocol doesn’t belong here, .invalid???, a series of CNAMEs with the same hash-like value, simple errors, keyboard smash????
- Localhost is not, in fact, a valid MX or NS record
- Phishing: eg openphish, domain reputation: eg spamhaus, IP rep: eg everything in firehol, BOGONs from team cymru
- Assign trust ratings based on common criteria to all threat intelligence lists. User bias is a multiplier so they can quickly zero out things not relevant to them (eg. if they don’t mind ads, or want to access a certain cove of ragged sailors)
- A map of a hosting provider, beget.tech
- I wouldn’t trust that adobe update, would you?
- Heroku, 000webhost
- Harder decisions - some things will get caught, so we need to find ways to minimize false positives - eg. integrating heuristics for false positive reduction
- AWS but limited
- GitHub but limited
- Considering making some visualizations for estimating our current coverage
- Lots of querying power in few areas
- Could show map of where we have nodes
- This is the end goal - not to just have an investigative tool but a utility that can help people be secure at a domain level with a level of precision and proactivity that has not been executed before.