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Virtualization Based Security
(“VBS”)
Strengths and Weaknesses
Quick Bio
• Anthony DiDonato CEO/Principal Architect for Critical Design
Associates Inc.
• 20+ years of experience in information technology
• Twitter: @Anthony_D_CDA
• Website: https://criticaldesign.net
• LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/anthony-didonato-
40b411142/
20+ Years of “Breaking Stuff”… and learning
Agenda
• Demonstrate malware attacks and protection
• Discuss Detection vs. Isolation and Containment
• Discuss Virtualization Based Security (The Why, How, and What)
• Review and demonstrate currently available solutions
• Discuss the Pros and Cons of VBS
Kick Off Demo: Sacrificial VM!
• Olympic Destroyer without VBS
• “Effectively a targeted attack using a wiper”
• Available on the internet for reverse engineering purposes
• A ”hopefully” suitable sacrifice for the demo gods!
• Olympic Destroyer with VBS
• WannaCry/Ransomware with VBS
• Still works today!
A word about AV,NGAV and Whitelisting…
• Relies upon detection… which typically fails over time!
• Typically requires incident response
• Typically requires a patient zero
• Prone to mis-configuration and exceptions
• Administrative overhead
• SIEM/IR overhead
• Many false positives
• Numerous documented and proven evasion tactics
Isolation and Containment
• Uses trust and detection but does not rely upon it
• Leverages hypervisor technology to create isolated and protected
memory and processes/threads
• Creates a higher level of trusted computing by:
• Protecting MBR, DMA, and Kernel
• Protecting Secrets and the host
• Treating all externally created, signed content as “Untrusted”
What is Virtualization Based Security (“VBS”)?
• Hardware enforced isolation and containment
• Using a hypervisor to create a secure and isolated region of memory
from the host operating system.
• References:
• https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/windowsitpro/2016/06/29/step-change-
in-security-with-modern-devices-and-architecture/
• Major players:
• Microsoft
• Bromium
• *Honorable mention: QubesOs
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/windowsitpro/2016/06/29/step-change-in-security-with-modern-
devices-and-architecture/
Driver Loaded=Injected
https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/windowsitpro/2016/06/29/step-change-in-security-with-modern-
devices-and-architecture/
VTL1VTL0
Driver Loaded or
Injected
VSM=Virtual Secure Mode
SECUREKERNEL.EXENTOSKRNL.EXE
https://blogs.windows.com/msedgedev/2016/09/27/application-guard-microsoft-edge/
VIRTUALIZATION BASED SECURITY WINDOWS 10 APPLICATION GUARD
VTL1VTL0
Demo: Procdump LSASS.EXE, LSAISO.EXE
• Procdump lsass.exe
• Procdump lsaiso.exe
BIOS/UEFI
NTDLL.DLL
API CALLS
NTOSKRNL.EXE
WINDOWS EXPLORER
USER
MODE
KERNEL
MODE
Is Admin?
Get System
Load Library/Driver
Dump Memory Get Secrets/Creds
Send to Attacker
Establish Persistence
Hardware
Apps
Move Laterally
USER MODE
KERNEL MODE
Isolated
USER MODE
Secure
KERNEL MODE
Hypervisor
VM1 VM2
Hypervisor
VBS Enabled Host OS
Process
0
Process
1
Page Table Process 1
GPA: 666 0x666888
Page Table Process 0
GPA: 666 0x666888
SLAT SLAT
Intel VT-d/EPT
Process
0
Page Table Process 1
SPA:666 0x666888
Demo: Credential Guard and Mimikatz
• Demonstrate obtaining cleartext passwords with WDCG enabled.
• Mimikatz Custom SSP (Security Support Provider, Circa 2014)
• Added to memory (fileless)
• Runas Admin
• privilege::debug
• misc::memssp
• Close
 VBS (Hyper-V)
Applications 
© Bromium - 2016
WindowsDefender
ApplicationGuard
forEdge
Windows 10 Kernel 
What does Microsoft VBS ”buy” you?
Requirements
• Windows 10 1607 or Later
• Windows Edge
• Enterprise or Education
• UEFI
• TPM
Protection
• Credential Protection
• Driver Signing Protection
• Protected Boot/Secrets
• Protected Processes (limited)
What does it lack? Windows 10 with WDAG, WDCG
• Lacking
• Support for Windows 7, 8.x
• Support for Adobe, Office, Other Content
• Leverages Trusted/Untrusted model (Human Errors)
• Support for Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer
• Total protection of credentials
• Protection from fileless malware attacks (WMI, Powershell, Macros,etc...)
© Bromium - 2015
New Micro-VM
per ‘user task’
Windows
Host
Microvisor
Boot
(Windows 7, 8 upgrade)
Protected
Isolated
• OS
• Network
• Intranet
• SaaS Sites
• Applications
• Files
• Credentials
• Websites
• Attachments
• USB / shares
• Untrusted networks
• Vulnerable Applications
© Bromium - 201523
Boot
(Windows 7, 8 upgrade)
WindowsDefender
ApplicationGuard
forEdge Protection
Monitoring
Monitoring
Self-
remediation
3
Fed to SOC for
real-time analytics
& hunting
2
© Bromium - 2016
Complete record
of execution state
(diffs, pcaps, files)
1
 VBS (Hyper-V)
Applications 
Windows 10 Kernel 
• Protection against Pass-the-hash
attacks
• Kernel code integrity checks
• WDAG isolates Edge
 Protection & self-remediation for
• Network-based attacks
• File or data loss
• Key-loggers & screen scrapers
• Ransomware
• Persistent APTs
• Pass-the-hash attacks
• All malicious execution
 Tamper-proof real-time monitoring
(EDR) of isolated tasks and the
Windows desktop
®
Windows 7, 8

Virtualization Based Security with Windows 10 VBS and Bromium
Demo: Bromium vs. Malware
• Automatic Containment
• Automatic Isolation
• Multiple Browser and Application Support
• Automatic Incident Response
• Automatic Remediation
What’s missing (currently)?
• Knowledge and awareness
• Trusted resident content (already infected)
• Existing persistence (APT)
• Mis-Configuration/Exceptions
• Ever evolving evasion techniques and exploits
Questions?

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BSides Rochester 2018: Anthony DiDonato: Virtualization Based Security

  • 2. Quick Bio • Anthony DiDonato CEO/Principal Architect for Critical Design Associates Inc. • 20+ years of experience in information technology • Twitter: @Anthony_D_CDA • Website: https://criticaldesign.net • LinkedIn: https://www.linkedin.com/in/anthony-didonato- 40b411142/
  • 3. 20+ Years of “Breaking Stuff”… and learning
  • 4. Agenda • Demonstrate malware attacks and protection • Discuss Detection vs. Isolation and Containment • Discuss Virtualization Based Security (The Why, How, and What) • Review and demonstrate currently available solutions • Discuss the Pros and Cons of VBS
  • 5. Kick Off Demo: Sacrificial VM! • Olympic Destroyer without VBS • “Effectively a targeted attack using a wiper” • Available on the internet for reverse engineering purposes • A ”hopefully” suitable sacrifice for the demo gods! • Olympic Destroyer with VBS • WannaCry/Ransomware with VBS • Still works today!
  • 6. A word about AV,NGAV and Whitelisting… • Relies upon detection… which typically fails over time! • Typically requires incident response • Typically requires a patient zero • Prone to mis-configuration and exceptions • Administrative overhead • SIEM/IR overhead • Many false positives • Numerous documented and proven evasion tactics
  • 7. Isolation and Containment • Uses trust and detection but does not rely upon it • Leverages hypervisor technology to create isolated and protected memory and processes/threads • Creates a higher level of trusted computing by: • Protecting MBR, DMA, and Kernel • Protecting Secrets and the host • Treating all externally created, signed content as “Untrusted”
  • 8.
  • 9. What is Virtualization Based Security (“VBS”)? • Hardware enforced isolation and containment • Using a hypervisor to create a secure and isolated region of memory from the host operating system. • References: • https://blogs.technet.microsoft.com/windowsitpro/2016/06/29/step-change- in-security-with-modern-devices-and-architecture/ • Major players: • Microsoft • Bromium • *Honorable mention: QubesOs
  • 13. Demo: Procdump LSASS.EXE, LSAISO.EXE • Procdump lsass.exe • Procdump lsaiso.exe
  • 14. BIOS/UEFI NTDLL.DLL API CALLS NTOSKRNL.EXE WINDOWS EXPLORER USER MODE KERNEL MODE Is Admin? Get System Load Library/Driver Dump Memory Get Secrets/Creds Send to Attacker Establish Persistence Hardware Apps Move Laterally
  • 15. USER MODE KERNEL MODE Isolated USER MODE Secure KERNEL MODE Hypervisor
  • 16. VM1 VM2 Hypervisor VBS Enabled Host OS Process 0 Process 1 Page Table Process 1 GPA: 666 0x666888 Page Table Process 0 GPA: 666 0x666888 SLAT SLAT Intel VT-d/EPT Process 0 Page Table Process 1 SPA:666 0x666888
  • 17. Demo: Credential Guard and Mimikatz • Demonstrate obtaining cleartext passwords with WDCG enabled. • Mimikatz Custom SSP (Security Support Provider, Circa 2014) • Added to memory (fileless) • Runas Admin • privilege::debug • misc::memssp • Close
  • 18.  VBS (Hyper-V) Applications  © Bromium - 2016 WindowsDefender ApplicationGuard forEdge Windows 10 Kernel 
  • 19. What does Microsoft VBS ”buy” you? Requirements • Windows 10 1607 or Later • Windows Edge • Enterprise or Education • UEFI • TPM Protection • Credential Protection • Driver Signing Protection • Protected Boot/Secrets • Protected Processes (limited)
  • 20. What does it lack? Windows 10 with WDAG, WDCG • Lacking • Support for Windows 7, 8.x • Support for Adobe, Office, Other Content • Leverages Trusted/Untrusted model (Human Errors) • Support for Chrome, Firefox, Internet Explorer • Total protection of credentials • Protection from fileless malware attacks (WMI, Powershell, Macros,etc...)
  • 21.
  • 22. © Bromium - 2015 New Micro-VM per ‘user task’ Windows Host Microvisor Boot (Windows 7, 8 upgrade)
  • 23. Protected Isolated • OS • Network • Intranet • SaaS Sites • Applications • Files • Credentials • Websites • Attachments • USB / shares • Untrusted networks • Vulnerable Applications © Bromium - 201523 Boot (Windows 7, 8 upgrade)
  • 24. WindowsDefender ApplicationGuard forEdge Protection Monitoring Monitoring Self- remediation 3 Fed to SOC for real-time analytics & hunting 2 © Bromium - 2016 Complete record of execution state (diffs, pcaps, files) 1  VBS (Hyper-V) Applications  Windows 10 Kernel 
  • 25. • Protection against Pass-the-hash attacks • Kernel code integrity checks • WDAG isolates Edge  Protection & self-remediation for • Network-based attacks • File or data loss • Key-loggers & screen scrapers • Ransomware • Persistent APTs • Pass-the-hash attacks • All malicious execution  Tamper-proof real-time monitoring (EDR) of isolated tasks and the Windows desktop ® Windows 7, 8  Virtualization Based Security with Windows 10 VBS and Bromium
  • 26. Demo: Bromium vs. Malware • Automatic Containment • Automatic Isolation • Multiple Browser and Application Support • Automatic Incident Response • Automatic Remediation
  • 27. What’s missing (currently)? • Knowledge and awareness • Trusted resident content (already infected) • Existing persistence (APT) • Mis-Configuration/Exceptions • Ever evolving evasion techniques and exploits

Editor's Notes

  1. JPMC
  2. JPMC