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Jillian Bellah
POLS 309-900
14 December 2010
1
How Divided Can We Stand?
INTRODUCTION
How many branches of government does it take to stop or hinder the effective flow of
policy modifications and implementation? Anyone who has taken middle school U.S. history is
familiar with the United States’ three branches of government: the executive, legislative, and
judiciary. However, anyone who watches the news or C-SPAN is equally (if not more) familiar
with the “gridlock” associated with it. Other countries that have less separated governments
may not face such a slowdown in their efforts to implement and change various policies. If this
is so, what implications could be derived? Therefore it could be possible that countries with a
more centralized form of government, or a government with less separation of powers, could
implement and modify its policies much more quickly than, for instance, a country like the
United States, which was founded on the principle of “checks and balances” (a.k.a. separation
of powers).
The implications of this study could have effects in various responsibilities of
government life. For instance, if a certain form of government—e.g. centralized vs.
decentralized—may be able to be more flexible with its policies, then it may be a system worth
imitating. It could provide as a blueprint to the most efficient form government, whether it
would mean adding on more agencies or branches, or streamlining the bureaucracy currently in
place. Also, if two countries were in conflict with each other and the “enemy’s” form of
government was known, then each country would be able to estimate how quickly its foe could
make or change its policies. This could provide for a huge defensive advantage if a country
could accurately estimate how quickly it must act to beat the opposition to the “punch”.
Jillian Bellah
POLS 309-900
14 December 2010
2
In an attempt to discover if there is any link between “Rule of Law” and “Steering
Capability”, the variables that will be used in this quest were taken from “The Quality of
Government Dataset Codebook” that was issued May 27, 2010. . In short, Rule of Law
represents the degree of how separated the powers are in each country, and Steering
Capability represents how quickly a country’s government can reevaluate and change their
priorities and policies.
LITERATURE REVIEW
The featured question is “how does the Rule of Law affect a country’s Steering
Capability”. In other words, does the extent to which exists a separation of power have any
sort of effect on how effective a government’s implemented policies are?
In my research, I did not encounter articles that addressed this question directly. There
have been many interorganizational studies and implementation studies, but none of them
have queried if the separation of powers and its effect on implementing and changing policies
may be related in some way. Susan M. Barrett wrote a brief article on the history of
implementation studies and decided that up until the publication of the article there have been
only two approaches scholars have taken to examine how governments implement and modify
its own policies1
. Barrett asserts that there have been “top-down” and “bottom-up”
implementation studies2
.
“The top-down model is reflected in traditional structures of governance and
public sector organization, emphasizing the separation of politics and
administration and co-ordination and control through authority and hierarchy”.
1
Barrett, Susan M. 2004. “Implementation Studies: Time for a Revival? Personal Reflections on 20 Years of
Implementation Studies”. Public Administration 82 (June): 249-62.
2
ibid
Jillian Bellah
POLS 309-900
14 December 2010
3
“The bottom-up ‘camp’ was associated with those espousing a micro political
view of intra- and inter-organizational [behavior], and included a range of
models, some emphasizing consensus building, influence and exchange
processes…and others emphasizing conflict and the exercise of power…in the
policy-action relationship”.
3
Through her models, Susan Barrett attempts to explain the gridlock in policy through
the managerial styles of different governments. Ms. Barrett gives her opinion at the end of her
article stating that she agrees with the “Structuration Theory developed by Giddens”3
, which is
“structures or rules of the fame determine the status quo of power relations”. The quote
Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr. and Robert S. Montjoy of Auburn University wrote an article
describing their theoretical perspective on interorganizational policy implementation4
. In brief,
this article reviews the different forms of interdependence—pooled, sequential, and
reciprocal—and how it relates to policy implementation5
. Their hypothesis was “in the absence
of authority or resources we would expect little action on the part of an agency unless the
program happens to be consistent with the goals and world view of the dominant coalition.
The effect of inaction by one or more agencies will vary with the type of interdependence
involved”6
. At the end of their study they found no significant relationships but that “it might
be worthwhile for policy makers to devote attention in the policy formulation stage to the
profitability of the proposed exchanges for key actors”7
.
THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS
3
ibid
4
Montjoy, Robert. S. and Laurence J. OToole, Jr. 1984. “Interorganizational Policy Implementation: A Theoretical
Perspective”. Public Administration Review 44 (November/December): 491-503.
5
ibid
6
ibid
7
ibid
Jillian Bellah
POLS 309-900
14 December 2010
4
Although the previous studies have examined various other factors of what could be
affecting implementations and formulation of policies in different states and/or countries—
such as how difficult it is for a country to gather consensus on its proposed policies—it has been
the study of how separation of powers could play into how well a country’s government’s
leadership can implement and change its policies has been overlooked by many scholars.
When more people become involved, the more difficult it becomes to make a decision,
especially those which affect thousands, if not millions, of people. The more separated, or
fragmented, a government becomes by adding different branches or agencies, then the more
people that become involved. When more people are added to the decision making process,
then it adds to the number of people that need to agree on a policy, which complicates the
process considerably. A dictatorship, basically, has only one “branch”, or on key person or
“arm” that makes all the decisions for its citizens. A government is the decision maker for
policies that are implemented or modified for its respective country. Simply put, we should
expect that the more complex or separated a government it then there should be less “output”
of policies and policy changes. Conversely, a dictatorship, a more centralized form of
government, then it should be expected that implementation and modifications of policies
should happen more quickly. Therefore, if decision making becomes more difficult when more
people become involved in the decision making process, and if more separated governments
have more people involved, then it follows that a government with more separation of powers,
or a higher Rule of Law, will be less capable to make the decisions to implement and modify
policies quickly, or have less Steering Capability.
Jillian Bellah
POLS 309-900
14 December 2010
5
It should be expected that the “Steering Capability” and “Rule of Law” will be negatively
related, which would mean that as a country’s “Rule of Law” increases, or has more branches in
its government that are more separated, then “Steering Capability” will decrease. In summary,
a more separated government would mean that it will be harder for governments to react and
be flexible with its own respective policies.
Additional predictors that could have a possible effect on the outcome are Consensus
Building, Stability of Democratic Institutions, and Stateness. Consensus Building is the measure
of the extent to which policy makers agree on various issues, such as economic policies or long
term goals. Stability of Democratic Institutions is defined as “to what extent the democratic
institutions, including the administrative and judicial systems, are capable of performing, and
the extent to which the democratic institutions are accepted or supported by the relevant
actors.” Finally, Stateness concerns how well a state can use force, how many citizens accept
their government as legitimate, and the extent of how well the basic administration structures
are established. All three of these predictors have been studied by scholars in their quest to
explain the most efficient way to put policies into operation.
DATA AND METHODS
Rule of Law is defined as the extent to which a “working separation of powers exists”
and an “independent judiciary exists”. Rule of Law also measures the extent to which “there
are legal or political penalties for officeholders who abuse their positions” and “civil liberties
are guaranteed and protected”. For this variable a 0 represents no separation of powers or
independent judiciary, while a 10 represents an extremely separated government with many
“check-and-balances” in place. Steering Capability is measured by the extent to which the
Jillian Bellah
POLS 309-900
14 December 2010
6
“political leadership sets and maintains strategic priorities”, “how effective the government is
in implementing reform policy”, “how flexible and innovative the political leadership is” and “if
the political leadership learns from past errors”. A 0 for Steering Capability translates into a
government not being effective, and a 10 meaning the government is very effective.
Three additional predictors were added: Consensus Building, Stability of Democratic
Institutions, and Stateness. They are all measured on a 0 to 10 scale also. A 0 for Consensus
Building means there is practically no agreement between the political actors, and a 10
represents perfect agreement. The lowest score for Stability of Democratic Institutions means
that the democratic institution is incapable of performing well, while a high score means that
the government is performing very smoothly and is supported and accepted by almost all of the
relevant actors in the system. When Stateness is given a score of 0, the country does not have
good use of force and many citizens do not accept the government as legitimate, and a score of
10 is just the opposite.
The data chosen to test the above hypothesis came from a survey in 2007, The Quality
of Government Dataset. The information was collected by the University of Gothenberg. Since
Steering Capability, Rule of Law, Consensus Building, Stability of Democratic Institutions, and
Stateness are all measured on a continuous, or an interval scale, the best method for examining
the interaction will be a multivariate regression.
RESULTS
Before going into the multivariate regression, I thought it would be helpful to examine
the bivariate regression for Rule of Law and Steering Capability to get a better idea of what to
look for or expect. Table 1 below shows the numerical findings of this analysis.
Jillian Bellah
POLS 309-900
14 December 2010
7
Table 1: Rule of Law vs. Steering Capability
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P
Constant 0.53255 0.23369 0.0245 *
Rule of Law 0.84576 0.04089 <2e-16 ***
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’
Residual standard error: 0.9881
117 degrees of freedom
Adjusted R-squared: 0.7834
This bivariate regression shows a positive significant relationship between Rule of Law
and Steering Capability. A unit increase in Rule of Law we would expect to translate into
roughly a .846 unit increase in Steering Capability. The greater the extent that there is a
working separation of powers in a government, then the easier it is for that government to set,
implement, and modify policies. Figure 1 offers a visual representation of the above bivariate
regression.
Jillian Bellah
POLS 309-900
14 December 2010
8
Figure 1
Already my hypothesis may not be correct because I predicted the opposite effect; or,
the more separation of powers that exists then the more difficult it would be to execute and
change policies. Also, according to the above regression, about 78.34 percent of the variation
in Steering Capability can be explained by Rule of Law.
Jillian Bellah
POLS 309-900
14 December 2010
9
Next, I added in the additional predictors to see if they would have any significant affect
that could change the above findings. Table 2 below shows the results from the multivariate
regression with the added predictors of Consensus Building, Stability, and Stateness.
Table 2: Multiple Linear Regression for Steering Capability
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P
Constant -0.28214 0.35882 0.433
Rule of Law 0.17005 0.11003 0.125
Consensus Building 0.61623 0.10475 4.11e-08 ***
Stability 0.06387 0.06484 0.327
Stateness 0.09905 0.05865 0.094
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’
Residual standard error: 0.8337
114 degrees of freedom
Adjusted R-squared: 0.8458
Looking at this table the findings from the previous bivariate regression seem to be for
naught. Table 2 shows Rule of Law as not being significant anymore as it relates to Steering
Capability along with Stability and Stateness. The only significant factor from the multivariate
regression that could have an effect on a country’s Steering Capability is Consensus Building.
Since the coefficient of Consensus Building is about .616, it can be expected that a single unit
increase in Consensus Building would be associated with an approximate .616 increase in
Steering Capability.
Jillian Bellah
POLS 309-900
14 December 2010
10
Figure 2
Figure 2 above is a graphical representation of Consensus Building and how it relates to
Steering Capability. Simply put, as it becomes easier for a country’s policy makers to come to
agreement on proposed new policies or policy changes, then the easier it becomes for that
country implement and modify such policies. Referring back to Table 2, the adjusted R2
is
.8458. This means that about 84.58 percent of the variation in Steering Capability can be
explained by Rule of Law, Consensus Building, Stability, and Stateness. Again, my hypothesis is
Jillian Bellah
POLS 309-900
14 December 2010
11
not supported here. Instead of finding some sort of relationship opposite to what I proposed,
there was no significant relationship to be found at all according to the multivariate regression.
How could something that was found to be significant in the bivariate regression
analysis not be found significant again once other predictors are added to the mix? It could be
possible that Rule of Law affects Consensus Building which has been discovered to have a
positive relationship with Steering Capability. Is Consensus Building a confounding variable that
is related to Rule of Law and Steering Capability? To test this, I ran a bivariate regression to see
if Rule of Law has any affect on Consensus Building. Table 3 below shows my results.
Table 3: Rule of Law vs. Consensus Building
Variable Coefficient Standard Error P
Constant 0.68298 0.18625 0.000371 ***
Rule of Law 0.88712 0.03259 < 2e-16 ***
Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’
Residual standard error: 0.7875
117 degrees of freedom
Adjusted R-squared: 0.8625
This table shows a very significant positive relationship between how divided a country’s
government is and how easy it is for that country to come to an agreement on proposed
policies. As a country’s government working separation of powers increases then it should be
easier for that country to come to agreements on policies. This bivariate regression also shows
an R2
value of .8625; so, about 86.25 percent of the variation of Consensus Building can be
explained by Rule of Law. For a pictorial representation of this relationship, you may refer to
Figure 3 below.
Jillian Bellah
POLS 309-900
14 December 2010
12
Figure 3
CONCLUSION
Finding out how effectively governments can implement and change policies will always
be a puzzle that, hopefully, can be changed one day. How separated a government is set up
was the missing piece I thought I had found in order to put the whole picture together. If a
government is more separated, then it should take longer for that government to execute and
Jillian Bellah
POLS 309-900
14 December 2010
13
modify policies because of all the extra people and channels the proposed policies would have
to travel to. In terms of Rule of Law and Steering Capability, as Rule of Law increases, then
Steering Capability should decrease.
First, a bivariate regression with Rule of Law and Steering Capability was preformed.
This analysis showed that there was a significant positive relationship between Rule of law and
Steering Capability. According to Table 1 and Figure 1, as a working separation of powers
increases (Rule of Law), then the extent to which that government can implement and modify
policies also increases. Basically, that means that the more separation there is, then the easier
it becomes for decision makers to execute and change policies. This is the opposite effect I had
expected. This may be because a government with a working separation of government is able
to collaborate and come up with the best solutions to any issue that arises. As opposed to a
dictatorship, which really has no working separation of powers has to think about all of the
options himself or herself which may take longer for him or her to go through the whole
thought processes.
Next, a few other predictors were added to the analysis to see if the affects of Rule of
Law would change any. Consensus Building, how well a country’s decision makers can come to
an agreement, Stability of Democratic Institutions, how well a government performs and how
accepted its leaders are, and Stateness, how well a country can use force and the extent to
which its citizens view the country as legitimate were added to the mix in a multivariate
regression. I didn’t think that these new predictors would change my hypothesis in any way.
As you can see from Table 2, I was wrong. Rule of Law lost its significance that it had in the
Jillian Bellah
POLS 309-900
14 December 2010
14
previous bivariate analysis. Stability of Democratic Institutions and Stateness weren’t
significant either. The only factor that was found to have any meaning in this analysis was
Consensus Building. From Figure 2, you could tell that the easier it becomes for decision
makers to come to an agreement on proposed policies and policy changes, and then it also
becomes easier for that government to implement and modify those polices. This makes sense
because it seems much easier to get things done if people agree. However, there is no measure
of how good these policies are. For instance, in the Bay of Pigs incident, consensus was high
and the proposed policy or plan of action was agreed upon swiftly, but it has later been
regarded as an awful mistake. A further study could be done to examine this phenomenon
further.
It would make sense though because a dictator only has to build consensus with himself
or herself should find getting to an agreement to be much easier than a government with three
branches and two divisions in one of those branches. The latter scenario would mean that the
proposed policy would have to go through the hands of hundreds of people thus taking more
time. To take a further look at this, I did a bivariate regression between Rule of Law and
Consensus Building with the thought that as a working separation of powers increases then the
ability of decision makers to come to an agreement should decrease because of all the extra
channels and hoops that need to be jumped through. As you can see from Table 3 and Figure 3,
I was wrong again.
It would appear from the results of my analyses that as a working separation of powers
(Rule of Law) increases then the ability for decision makers to come to agreement on a variety
Jillian Bellah
POLS 309-900
14 December 2010
15
of issues (Consensus Building) also increase. This is the opposite affect I thought would happen.
In the end, it may have been found that Consensus Building was a link that connects both Rule
of Law and Steering Capability. Further study needs to be done to see just how much
Consensus Building affects the world of policy making. Also, a new measure needs to be found
to determine how good a policy or policy change is because if Consensus Building allows
countries to implement and modify policies quickly and effectively, but these are bad policies,
then it would follow that some “devil’s advocates” need to be thrown into the discussion of
proposed policies to make sure that bad choices are not made.

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  • 1. Jillian Bellah POLS 309-900 14 December 2010 1 How Divided Can We Stand? INTRODUCTION How many branches of government does it take to stop or hinder the effective flow of policy modifications and implementation? Anyone who has taken middle school U.S. history is familiar with the United States’ three branches of government: the executive, legislative, and judiciary. However, anyone who watches the news or C-SPAN is equally (if not more) familiar with the “gridlock” associated with it. Other countries that have less separated governments may not face such a slowdown in their efforts to implement and change various policies. If this is so, what implications could be derived? Therefore it could be possible that countries with a more centralized form of government, or a government with less separation of powers, could implement and modify its policies much more quickly than, for instance, a country like the United States, which was founded on the principle of “checks and balances” (a.k.a. separation of powers). The implications of this study could have effects in various responsibilities of government life. For instance, if a certain form of government—e.g. centralized vs. decentralized—may be able to be more flexible with its policies, then it may be a system worth imitating. It could provide as a blueprint to the most efficient form government, whether it would mean adding on more agencies or branches, or streamlining the bureaucracy currently in place. Also, if two countries were in conflict with each other and the “enemy’s” form of government was known, then each country would be able to estimate how quickly its foe could make or change its policies. This could provide for a huge defensive advantage if a country could accurately estimate how quickly it must act to beat the opposition to the “punch”.
  • 2. Jillian Bellah POLS 309-900 14 December 2010 2 In an attempt to discover if there is any link between “Rule of Law” and “Steering Capability”, the variables that will be used in this quest were taken from “The Quality of Government Dataset Codebook” that was issued May 27, 2010. . In short, Rule of Law represents the degree of how separated the powers are in each country, and Steering Capability represents how quickly a country’s government can reevaluate and change their priorities and policies. LITERATURE REVIEW The featured question is “how does the Rule of Law affect a country’s Steering Capability”. In other words, does the extent to which exists a separation of power have any sort of effect on how effective a government’s implemented policies are? In my research, I did not encounter articles that addressed this question directly. There have been many interorganizational studies and implementation studies, but none of them have queried if the separation of powers and its effect on implementing and changing policies may be related in some way. Susan M. Barrett wrote a brief article on the history of implementation studies and decided that up until the publication of the article there have been only two approaches scholars have taken to examine how governments implement and modify its own policies1 . Barrett asserts that there have been “top-down” and “bottom-up” implementation studies2 . “The top-down model is reflected in traditional structures of governance and public sector organization, emphasizing the separation of politics and administration and co-ordination and control through authority and hierarchy”. 1 Barrett, Susan M. 2004. “Implementation Studies: Time for a Revival? Personal Reflections on 20 Years of Implementation Studies”. Public Administration 82 (June): 249-62. 2 ibid
  • 3. Jillian Bellah POLS 309-900 14 December 2010 3 “The bottom-up ‘camp’ was associated with those espousing a micro political view of intra- and inter-organizational [behavior], and included a range of models, some emphasizing consensus building, influence and exchange processes…and others emphasizing conflict and the exercise of power…in the policy-action relationship”. 3 Through her models, Susan Barrett attempts to explain the gridlock in policy through the managerial styles of different governments. Ms. Barrett gives her opinion at the end of her article stating that she agrees with the “Structuration Theory developed by Giddens”3 , which is “structures or rules of the fame determine the status quo of power relations”. The quote Laurence J. O’Toole, Jr. and Robert S. Montjoy of Auburn University wrote an article describing their theoretical perspective on interorganizational policy implementation4 . In brief, this article reviews the different forms of interdependence—pooled, sequential, and reciprocal—and how it relates to policy implementation5 . Their hypothesis was “in the absence of authority or resources we would expect little action on the part of an agency unless the program happens to be consistent with the goals and world view of the dominant coalition. The effect of inaction by one or more agencies will vary with the type of interdependence involved”6 . At the end of their study they found no significant relationships but that “it might be worthwhile for policy makers to devote attention in the policy formulation stage to the profitability of the proposed exchanges for key actors”7 . THEORY AND HYPOTHESIS 3 ibid 4 Montjoy, Robert. S. and Laurence J. OToole, Jr. 1984. “Interorganizational Policy Implementation: A Theoretical Perspective”. Public Administration Review 44 (November/December): 491-503. 5 ibid 6 ibid 7 ibid
  • 4. Jillian Bellah POLS 309-900 14 December 2010 4 Although the previous studies have examined various other factors of what could be affecting implementations and formulation of policies in different states and/or countries— such as how difficult it is for a country to gather consensus on its proposed policies—it has been the study of how separation of powers could play into how well a country’s government’s leadership can implement and change its policies has been overlooked by many scholars. When more people become involved, the more difficult it becomes to make a decision, especially those which affect thousands, if not millions, of people. The more separated, or fragmented, a government becomes by adding different branches or agencies, then the more people that become involved. When more people are added to the decision making process, then it adds to the number of people that need to agree on a policy, which complicates the process considerably. A dictatorship, basically, has only one “branch”, or on key person or “arm” that makes all the decisions for its citizens. A government is the decision maker for policies that are implemented or modified for its respective country. Simply put, we should expect that the more complex or separated a government it then there should be less “output” of policies and policy changes. Conversely, a dictatorship, a more centralized form of government, then it should be expected that implementation and modifications of policies should happen more quickly. Therefore, if decision making becomes more difficult when more people become involved in the decision making process, and if more separated governments have more people involved, then it follows that a government with more separation of powers, or a higher Rule of Law, will be less capable to make the decisions to implement and modify policies quickly, or have less Steering Capability.
  • 5. Jillian Bellah POLS 309-900 14 December 2010 5 It should be expected that the “Steering Capability” and “Rule of Law” will be negatively related, which would mean that as a country’s “Rule of Law” increases, or has more branches in its government that are more separated, then “Steering Capability” will decrease. In summary, a more separated government would mean that it will be harder for governments to react and be flexible with its own respective policies. Additional predictors that could have a possible effect on the outcome are Consensus Building, Stability of Democratic Institutions, and Stateness. Consensus Building is the measure of the extent to which policy makers agree on various issues, such as economic policies or long term goals. Stability of Democratic Institutions is defined as “to what extent the democratic institutions, including the administrative and judicial systems, are capable of performing, and the extent to which the democratic institutions are accepted or supported by the relevant actors.” Finally, Stateness concerns how well a state can use force, how many citizens accept their government as legitimate, and the extent of how well the basic administration structures are established. All three of these predictors have been studied by scholars in their quest to explain the most efficient way to put policies into operation. DATA AND METHODS Rule of Law is defined as the extent to which a “working separation of powers exists” and an “independent judiciary exists”. Rule of Law also measures the extent to which “there are legal or political penalties for officeholders who abuse their positions” and “civil liberties are guaranteed and protected”. For this variable a 0 represents no separation of powers or independent judiciary, while a 10 represents an extremely separated government with many “check-and-balances” in place. Steering Capability is measured by the extent to which the
  • 6. Jillian Bellah POLS 309-900 14 December 2010 6 “political leadership sets and maintains strategic priorities”, “how effective the government is in implementing reform policy”, “how flexible and innovative the political leadership is” and “if the political leadership learns from past errors”. A 0 for Steering Capability translates into a government not being effective, and a 10 meaning the government is very effective. Three additional predictors were added: Consensus Building, Stability of Democratic Institutions, and Stateness. They are all measured on a 0 to 10 scale also. A 0 for Consensus Building means there is practically no agreement between the political actors, and a 10 represents perfect agreement. The lowest score for Stability of Democratic Institutions means that the democratic institution is incapable of performing well, while a high score means that the government is performing very smoothly and is supported and accepted by almost all of the relevant actors in the system. When Stateness is given a score of 0, the country does not have good use of force and many citizens do not accept the government as legitimate, and a score of 10 is just the opposite. The data chosen to test the above hypothesis came from a survey in 2007, The Quality of Government Dataset. The information was collected by the University of Gothenberg. Since Steering Capability, Rule of Law, Consensus Building, Stability of Democratic Institutions, and Stateness are all measured on a continuous, or an interval scale, the best method for examining the interaction will be a multivariate regression. RESULTS Before going into the multivariate regression, I thought it would be helpful to examine the bivariate regression for Rule of Law and Steering Capability to get a better idea of what to look for or expect. Table 1 below shows the numerical findings of this analysis.
  • 7. Jillian Bellah POLS 309-900 14 December 2010 7 Table 1: Rule of Law vs. Steering Capability Variable Coefficient Standard Error P Constant 0.53255 0.23369 0.0245 * Rule of Law 0.84576 0.04089 <2e-16 *** Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ Residual standard error: 0.9881 117 degrees of freedom Adjusted R-squared: 0.7834 This bivariate regression shows a positive significant relationship between Rule of Law and Steering Capability. A unit increase in Rule of Law we would expect to translate into roughly a .846 unit increase in Steering Capability. The greater the extent that there is a working separation of powers in a government, then the easier it is for that government to set, implement, and modify policies. Figure 1 offers a visual representation of the above bivariate regression.
  • 8. Jillian Bellah POLS 309-900 14 December 2010 8 Figure 1 Already my hypothesis may not be correct because I predicted the opposite effect; or, the more separation of powers that exists then the more difficult it would be to execute and change policies. Also, according to the above regression, about 78.34 percent of the variation in Steering Capability can be explained by Rule of Law.
  • 9. Jillian Bellah POLS 309-900 14 December 2010 9 Next, I added in the additional predictors to see if they would have any significant affect that could change the above findings. Table 2 below shows the results from the multivariate regression with the added predictors of Consensus Building, Stability, and Stateness. Table 2: Multiple Linear Regression for Steering Capability Variable Coefficient Standard Error P Constant -0.28214 0.35882 0.433 Rule of Law 0.17005 0.11003 0.125 Consensus Building 0.61623 0.10475 4.11e-08 *** Stability 0.06387 0.06484 0.327 Stateness 0.09905 0.05865 0.094 Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ Residual standard error: 0.8337 114 degrees of freedom Adjusted R-squared: 0.8458 Looking at this table the findings from the previous bivariate regression seem to be for naught. Table 2 shows Rule of Law as not being significant anymore as it relates to Steering Capability along with Stability and Stateness. The only significant factor from the multivariate regression that could have an effect on a country’s Steering Capability is Consensus Building. Since the coefficient of Consensus Building is about .616, it can be expected that a single unit increase in Consensus Building would be associated with an approximate .616 increase in Steering Capability.
  • 10. Jillian Bellah POLS 309-900 14 December 2010 10 Figure 2 Figure 2 above is a graphical representation of Consensus Building and how it relates to Steering Capability. Simply put, as it becomes easier for a country’s policy makers to come to agreement on proposed new policies or policy changes, then the easier it becomes for that country implement and modify such policies. Referring back to Table 2, the adjusted R2 is .8458. This means that about 84.58 percent of the variation in Steering Capability can be explained by Rule of Law, Consensus Building, Stability, and Stateness. Again, my hypothesis is
  • 11. Jillian Bellah POLS 309-900 14 December 2010 11 not supported here. Instead of finding some sort of relationship opposite to what I proposed, there was no significant relationship to be found at all according to the multivariate regression. How could something that was found to be significant in the bivariate regression analysis not be found significant again once other predictors are added to the mix? It could be possible that Rule of Law affects Consensus Building which has been discovered to have a positive relationship with Steering Capability. Is Consensus Building a confounding variable that is related to Rule of Law and Steering Capability? To test this, I ran a bivariate regression to see if Rule of Law has any affect on Consensus Building. Table 3 below shows my results. Table 3: Rule of Law vs. Consensus Building Variable Coefficient Standard Error P Constant 0.68298 0.18625 0.000371 *** Rule of Law 0.88712 0.03259 < 2e-16 *** Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ Residual standard error: 0.7875 117 degrees of freedom Adjusted R-squared: 0.8625 This table shows a very significant positive relationship between how divided a country’s government is and how easy it is for that country to come to an agreement on proposed policies. As a country’s government working separation of powers increases then it should be easier for that country to come to agreements on policies. This bivariate regression also shows an R2 value of .8625; so, about 86.25 percent of the variation of Consensus Building can be explained by Rule of Law. For a pictorial representation of this relationship, you may refer to Figure 3 below.
  • 12. Jillian Bellah POLS 309-900 14 December 2010 12 Figure 3 CONCLUSION Finding out how effectively governments can implement and change policies will always be a puzzle that, hopefully, can be changed one day. How separated a government is set up was the missing piece I thought I had found in order to put the whole picture together. If a government is more separated, then it should take longer for that government to execute and
  • 13. Jillian Bellah POLS 309-900 14 December 2010 13 modify policies because of all the extra people and channels the proposed policies would have to travel to. In terms of Rule of Law and Steering Capability, as Rule of Law increases, then Steering Capability should decrease. First, a bivariate regression with Rule of Law and Steering Capability was preformed. This analysis showed that there was a significant positive relationship between Rule of law and Steering Capability. According to Table 1 and Figure 1, as a working separation of powers increases (Rule of Law), then the extent to which that government can implement and modify policies also increases. Basically, that means that the more separation there is, then the easier it becomes for decision makers to execute and change policies. This is the opposite effect I had expected. This may be because a government with a working separation of government is able to collaborate and come up with the best solutions to any issue that arises. As opposed to a dictatorship, which really has no working separation of powers has to think about all of the options himself or herself which may take longer for him or her to go through the whole thought processes. Next, a few other predictors were added to the analysis to see if the affects of Rule of Law would change any. Consensus Building, how well a country’s decision makers can come to an agreement, Stability of Democratic Institutions, how well a government performs and how accepted its leaders are, and Stateness, how well a country can use force and the extent to which its citizens view the country as legitimate were added to the mix in a multivariate regression. I didn’t think that these new predictors would change my hypothesis in any way. As you can see from Table 2, I was wrong. Rule of Law lost its significance that it had in the
  • 14. Jillian Bellah POLS 309-900 14 December 2010 14 previous bivariate analysis. Stability of Democratic Institutions and Stateness weren’t significant either. The only factor that was found to have any meaning in this analysis was Consensus Building. From Figure 2, you could tell that the easier it becomes for decision makers to come to an agreement on proposed policies and policy changes, and then it also becomes easier for that government to implement and modify those polices. This makes sense because it seems much easier to get things done if people agree. However, there is no measure of how good these policies are. For instance, in the Bay of Pigs incident, consensus was high and the proposed policy or plan of action was agreed upon swiftly, but it has later been regarded as an awful mistake. A further study could be done to examine this phenomenon further. It would make sense though because a dictator only has to build consensus with himself or herself should find getting to an agreement to be much easier than a government with three branches and two divisions in one of those branches. The latter scenario would mean that the proposed policy would have to go through the hands of hundreds of people thus taking more time. To take a further look at this, I did a bivariate regression between Rule of Law and Consensus Building with the thought that as a working separation of powers increases then the ability of decision makers to come to an agreement should decrease because of all the extra channels and hoops that need to be jumped through. As you can see from Table 3 and Figure 3, I was wrong again. It would appear from the results of my analyses that as a working separation of powers (Rule of Law) increases then the ability for decision makers to come to agreement on a variety
  • 15. Jillian Bellah POLS 309-900 14 December 2010 15 of issues (Consensus Building) also increase. This is the opposite affect I thought would happen. In the end, it may have been found that Consensus Building was a link that connects both Rule of Law and Steering Capability. Further study needs to be done to see just how much Consensus Building affects the world of policy making. Also, a new measure needs to be found to determine how good a policy or policy change is because if Consensus Building allows countries to implement and modify policies quickly and effectively, but these are bad policies, then it would follow that some “devil’s advocates” need to be thrown into the discussion of proposed policies to make sure that bad choices are not made.