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AWC-DL Student: Jeffrey S. Hoffmann, c: 202-253-5136 or jhoffma6@gmail.com
Prior to beginning the formal response, I would like to address my firm “real world” disagreement with
selected comments from this OpEd. First, the French are not coordinating well with their allies in
combination with “no one wants to die for the Arab League, the United Nations (UN) or some temporary
coalition of the willing.” May 29, 2011 marked, yet, another anniversary for the International Day of UN
Peacekeepers, which, the Peace & Security Committee of the UN Association – National Capital Area
(UNA-NCA) hosted French Under Secretary General (USG) Alain Le Roy for the UN Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) in Washington D.C. In addition to the Henry L. Stimson Center
Chairman’s Forum and other activities that can be reviewed at (www.unanca.org), more related to the
second question, highlighting the interagency process, force planning, and Congress, USG Le Roy also
conducted visits with the Department of State and the White House National Security Council (NSC),
concluding with a reception on Capital Hill hosted by an interest group called the Better World Campaign
and Congressman Russ Carnahan. The U.S. and USG Le Roy collaboratively reviewed and assessed the
current situation in Sudan (post referendum election and remaining conflict/threats in the North/South
border area of Abyei). Discussion of strategy also focused on the future of Libya, quote from USG Le
Roy,
“That was one of my purposes to come this morning and to discuss with a member of the NSC, is
their views on the future of Libya, the role for the UN and UN Peacekeeping or of UN involvement,
what for the African Union, what for NATO, and we have in the UN to be prepared for any
situation, so we make contingency planning. If we have to monitor this fire, we must be ready to
be able to bring the money to us as soon as possible. But we have to see. That’s permanently. We
do. We discuss with the key member states on those involved in a specific conflict to see how the
division of labor between them and us, so we keep doing that all the time, but at the same time,
each time is different. Each case is different. The Libyan case, I think has no precedence. So we
invent every day, but the key point is to be constant discussion, dialogue with the key member
states interested in this specific conflict.”1
Second, the UN International Day of UN Peacekeepers also recognizes/honors those who have lost their
lives while serving on a UN mission under UN operational control known as the Dag Hammarskjöld
medal. Since the first UN mission established in 1948, an estimated seventy (70) American citizens
(military and civilian) have been unfortunate recipients of the posthumous award fighting on behalf of and
for the UN; the Blue Helmet veterans of the world.2
Best stated by former secretary of state Henry Kissinger, “Tranquility is not the natural state of the world;
peace and security are not the law of nature.”3
The authors of Kissinger’s quote led them to believe there
is a need to focus on threats and security, there is a sense of distrust, and a perceived need for carefully
managing the balance of power (Ibid, pg 92).
However, let’s step back and review the “balance of power.” Today, what many leaders, decision, and
policy makers fail to understand is our current environment; it’s not pre-1989 Cold War. The state and
non-state threats are much more volatile and unpredictable with growing and empowered rogue
state/developing country decisions impacting the scope and shape of the 21st Century environment.
Additionally, there are new superpowers emerging, perhaps not in the traditional sense, but in areas of the
economy, regional coalitions such as the European Union (EU), control of natural resources like water or
grazing rights, and simply because it is strategic for a country to appear they are an influential “key
member” state in the scheme of global relations recovery or what Langenheim describes as coercive
democracy, which we’ll discuss later in this essay.4

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For an example, only one year ago, the Libyan Arab Jamahiriya was commended by several countries
under the UN Human Rights Council (HRC 16/15) for their successes in developing effective policy and
other “rule of law” instruments towards the protection of human rights and their role on the Council. One
particular excerpt from the Syrian Arab Republic praised Libya for its serious commitment to and
interaction with the HRC and its mechanisms.”5
What happened over the course of one year in Libya; a country since suspended from HRC membership
by the UN General Assembly and in a tumultuous turmoil with a growing humanitarian crisis, which
another interest group, Amnesty International, can validate the astonishing statistics of human rights
abuses in Libya.
Events during 1995-2005 would show that Dr. Francis Fukuyama’s, The End of History and the Last Man,
had underestimated the enduring appeal of Islam across the Middle East and adjoining regions including
North Africa. Islam’s resistance to modern Western ideas hardened the cultural and religious
impediments to the spread of liberal democracy into those regions.6
In fact, it appears Robert Kaplan
predicted correctly stating in many places, Islam is becoming a vehicle for expressing anger and violence
rather than tolerance and peace. He specifically focused on young Islamic fundamentalists turning to
militant violence and predicted political, social, and religious upheaval in Egypt that would leave it with a
fundamental Islamic government.7
While at present, the control of Egypt appears to be under military rule, Kaplan’s predictions may not be
entirely accurate, but to further assess Libya, we need to look at the political environment well prior to the
1995 events referenced by “Seeing the Elephant” essay. For most of the history, the people of Libya have
been subjected to varying degrees of foreign control, primarily from Mediterranean Empires. The Arabs
conquered Libya in the 7th
century along with the adoption of Islam and the Arabic language and culture.
In the mid-16th
century, the Ottoman Turks claimed the country until Italy invaded and colonized Libya in
1911. After World War II, British and French forces occupied the Libyan territory until a UN resolution
granted it an independent nation on December 24, 1951 under rule of King Idris I.8
When applying the power transition theory9
to assess Libya as a state threat, Libya was in a very limited
“stage of potential power” until 1959 when significant oil reserves were discovered elevating it from one
of the world’s poorest countries to great wealth. The King Idris I monarchy ruled until 1969 when a
military coup led by Colonel Muammar al-Qadhafi proclaimed the new Libyan Arab Republic headed by
the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC). At this point, Libya had entered the, “stage of transitional
growth in power,” which included the implementation of several regime goals reflecting a combination of
Islamic codes, socialism, and radical Arab nationalism. The RCC pledged to take an active role in the
plight of Palestinians, promote Arab unity, and encourage domestic policies based on social justice, non-
exploitation, and an equitable distribution of wealth (CountryWatch, pg 8).
With the growth in wealth due to further industrialization of the country and petroleum sale profits,
Qadhafi became a more unpredictable threat. One primary example; an early objective of the new Libyan
government was to withdrawal all foreign military installations from the country. In the 1970’s all British
and U.S. facilities were closed and alongside the Libyan government had ordered the expulsion of Italian
and Jewish residents. By 1971, libraries and cultural centers operated by foreign governments were
closed, as well. By 1994, the general population of Libya was affected, in fact, as part of Qadhafi’s
country re-organization plan; he created the General People’s Congress (GPC), which replaced the RCC
(CountryWatch).

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Furthermore, and viewed as a greater state threat to the West, the 1980’s became very competitive for
Libya. Following a failed coup d’etat in May 1984, Libya began to imprison, interrogate, and execute
thousands of its own internal opponents and increase the rise of more radical elements inside the Libyan
power hierarchy. Libya also began to support terrorist activities, which led to U.S. and UN economic
sanctions as an instrument policy that prevented Libya from entering the final “stage of power maturity.”
With no timeline set for the end of sanctions, which reflects similarities of the third variant of coercive
democracy, the concept of “escalation dominance” was practiced; multinational investment was
withdrawn, Libya was added to the U.S. terror sponsor country list and, in fact, attacked with an air strike
by U.S. military forces in 1986 (CountryWatch and Langenheim, pg 160 AWC Book 1).
To revive its reputation as a terror-sponsoring country that leveraged the practice of a “carrot and stick”
approach, UN sanctions were lifted in September 2003 after Libya accepted responsibility for the
Lockerbie airline bombing. This policy tool could be viewed as the fourth variant of coercive democracy,
which offers positive incentive in exchange for compliance to reduce the threat (Langenheim). In
December 2003, Libya had also announced it had agreed to reveal and end its programs to develop
weapons of mass destruction and to renounce terrorism. Libya began to make significant strides in
normalizing relations with Western nations and with the UN as one-month Chair of the UN Security
Council and member of the HRC. Libya had appeared to have once again entered the “stage of
transitional growth in power.” This was proven successful until, of course, the protests in February 2011
that are now determined to ensure Qadhafi does not return to power and the Libyan regime is transformed
indefinitely.
I initially provided an introductory example and summary of the second part of this essay question; how
the interagency process works and can be effective with respect to the UN Department of Peacekeeping
Operations office, which also included participants from the U.S. Military Observer Group (USMOG) to
the UN. When analyzing the several factors in relation to the Middle East, I strongly agree with
Zbingniew Brzenzinski who states,
“They are, in brief, generally critical of Israel’s policy and, thus, could be labeled as being in some
respects anti-Israel. But an anti-Israel bias is not the same as anti-Semitism.”10
I personally believe this is the core of the problems we face in the Middle East. With respect to Libya,
one of Col Qadhafi’s primary goals of his regime was to take an active role in the plight of the
Palestinians. As a former liaison in the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program with Israeli test pilots, it does
not require much convincing, in this particular case, a lobby effort such as the “Israel Lobby,” while
effective, its impacts are selfish only to Israel and Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and not beneficial to U.S.
policy. Quote again in response to Brzenzinski, “If the Palestinians had spent the last 40 years treating
Israelis as they have been treated, American Jews would be outraged and would rightly demand that the
U.S. use its power to stop it.”11
The New York Times (NYT) article authored by David Brooks addressed several questions: Is the
coalition trying to depose Col Qadhafi? Are coalition forces trying to halt Qadhafi’s advances to weaken
his government? Would the coalition allow Qadhafi to win so long as he didn’t massacre more civilians?
Is it trying to create a partitioned Libya and we there to help the democratic tide across the region?
Brooks first suggests multilateral efforts are marked by opaque decision-making and strategic vagueness.
Using Libya as the country of evaluation, this is true. Other foreign interests in Libya wholly revolve
around Libya’s oil resources. However, the U.S. viewed this country as a threat on several occasions with
some positive incentive and the CoutryWatch political risk index for Libya is 4 out of 10 possible points

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categorized as unstable and unpredictable.12
If the elimination of Col Qadhafi equates to easier access to
their oil, I would say, yes, the coalition forces are trying to depose and halt Qadhafi’s advances to weaken
the regime and no, the coalition would not allow Qadhafi to win.
When reviewing U.S. policy on Libya and the Middle East, the 2010 National Security Strategy (NSS)
states, “we have an array of enduring interests, longstanding commitments and new opportunities for
broadening and deepening relationships in the greater Middle East. This includes maintaining a strong
partnership with Israel while supporting Israel’s lasting integration into the region. The U.S. also will
continue to develop our key security relationships in the region with such Arab states as with Egypt,
Jordan, and Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries - partnerships that enable
our militaries and defense systems to work together more effectively.”
The 2010 NSS, which impacts the U.S. government processes including intelligence requirements does
not highlight Libya, but frankly, in addition to the U.S., there is or should say were, perhaps only a couple
of Western European/European Union (EU) member countries (France and Italy) concerned about Libya
as a potential partner. The 2007 French arms agreement valued at $405 million for anti-tank missiles and
radio communications systems was an example of this economic interest (CountryWatch). In comparison,
since 1979, a bordering country to Libya, Egypt has received an est. $60 billion in military and economic
assistance overall with about $34 billion in the form of foreign military financing (FMF) grants and loans
from the U.S.13
However, given the current situation in Egypt, these same weapon systems were used to
deter the protestors who led the effort to encourage a more democratic system in their country. I think
that is the risk associated with armaments cooperation and security assistance as an instrument of foreign
policy; tools such as FMF can be used against our strategic interests.
Since the February 2011 events, stated in a recent Arab Times article, the GCC and EU support the
Libyan “no-fly-zone” and stressed that Libyan leader Muammar Gaddafi’s “regime has lost its legitimacy
and expressed support to the Transitional National Council as a legitimate interlocutor representing the
aspirations of the Libyan people.”14
To address a second point in the NYT article, “multilateral efforts obsess about the diplomatic process
and ignore the realities on the ground.” While this may be true and the article does make a valid point
with reference to leadership decision-making and how the view of a UN resolution may be interpreted in
different ways. Two quotes from a Foreign Policy excerpt conclude the following about leadership
(earlier ref, Hagen, pg 91 and 95, AWC Study Guide, Book 2):
- In a bipolar international system that characterized the Cold War, such a rationale might have seemed
reasonable. But today there is little consensus on the nature of the “new world order” and more room
for interpretation, innovation, misunderstanding, and miscommunication.
- Practitioners find it difficult to use academic approaches that “assume that all state actors are alike and
can be expected to behave in the same way in given situations. Instead, policymakers prefer to work
with “actor specific models that grasp the different internal structures and behavioral patters of each
state and leader with which they must deal. It is in this area “think tanks” specialize and can offer
credible solutions like the recent March 2011 publication released from the Center for Strategic and
International Studies titled, “Libya as a Multilateral Moment.” (Author: Mark Quarterman). Full
article can be viewed at: http://csis.org/publication/libya-multilateral-moment
The quotes above provide an answer to the NYT article referencing failed multilateral efforts in Kosovo,
Rwanda, and Iraq; different leadership, political-military affair dynamics, socio-economic environment,
and foreign policy goals not able to fit into one multilateral strategic approach.

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But the NYT article does question a topic or target (depending on the analytical environment); the
question of, “who are the rebels supporting?” After reviewing Jane’s Sentinel Security Assessment on
Libya, the only perceived non-state actor threat identified is the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG),
which pledged allegiance to the Al-Qadea Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), primarily based
in Algeria. Stated in Jane’s, “The Gadhafi regime has had problems with Islamist militants dating back
to the 1980s when a number of extremist groups emerged in the country. A series of clashes between
security forces and Islamic militants, mainly from the LIFG that was established in 1990 by a group of
veterans of the Afghan jihad, occurred around Benghazi in 1996 and 1997.” 15
Is this coincidence or if not, could raise a greater threat than Qadhafi, which Jane’s also suggests the
emergence of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb has raised fears that Libyan extremists will forge links
with other regional militants in the future, although as yet there is little evidence to suggest that AQIM
holds any attraction for Libyan youth. Meanwhile, NATO continues to orchestrate attacks and civil war
escalates. Alongside, foreign policy and strategy shapes itself around a commonality of goals mostly
driven by the UN Security Council resolution that will more than likely lead to the fall of Col Qadhafi
with a new chapter for Libya to include unknown leadership and goals to maintain and/or re-define its
sovereign position in the Med and North Africa.
1
Le Roy, Alain Under-Secretary General, UN DPKO Department Head, Henry L. Stimson Center Chairman’s Forum with Ambassador
Lincoln Bloomfield, Jr., Transcript (pg 16), www.stimson.org. May 24, 2011. Bio of USG Le Roy, prior to the DPKO, he served as
Conseiller Maître à la Cour des comptes and as Ambassador in charge of the Union for the Mediterranean Initiative
(www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/about/dpko/chief.shtml).
2
UN DPKO. www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/resources/statistics/fatalities.shtml
3
Hagen, Joe D. and Hermann, Margaret G., “International Decision Making: Leadership Matters,” pg 92 (AWC Study Guide, Book 2) –
reprinted with permission from Foreign Policy, No. 110 (Spring 1998), 124-137.
4
Langenheim, William S., “Give Peace a Chance: First, Try Coercive Diplomacy,” Naval War College Review 55, no 4,
(Autumn 2002), AWC Study Guide, Book 1, pg 188-190.
5
Kuntz, Tom, Libya’s Late, Great Rights Record,” New York Times, March 5, 2011. Website:
www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/weekinreview/06libya.html
6
Binnendijk, Hans and Kugler, Richard L., “Seeing the Elephant: The U.S. Role in Global Security,” December 2006 (AWC Study Guide,
Book 1, pg 10), reprinted.
7
Ibid, “Robert Kaplan: Global Anarchy and Violence, pg 23-25. Excerpt from his text, The Coming Anarchy: Shattering
Dreams of the Post Cold War, book traced the roots of ethnic violence in the Balkans to centries-old struggles among the
Orthodox, Christian, and Muslim religions.
8
Coleman, Denise Youngblood, CountryWatch Review: Libya, CountryWatch, Inc., ISBN 1-60423-715-9, 2011 Edition.
Website: www.countrywatch.com
9
A.F.K. Organski, “The Power Transition,” World Politics, 1958 (AWC Study Guide, Book 1, pg 53-56). Reprint.
10
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, “A Dangerous Exemption: Why Should the Israel Lobby be Immune from Criticism?” Foreign Policy,
No. 155, July-August 2006 (AWC Study Guide, Book 2, pg 359).
11
Mearsheimer, John and Walt, Stephen, “Mearsheimer and Walt Respond,” Foreign Policy, No. 155, July-August 2006
(AWC Study Guide, Book 2, pg 362).
12
Political Risk evaluated from the following factors: political stability, political representation, democratic accountability,
freedom of expression, security and crime, risk of conflict, human development, jurisprudence and regulatory transparency,
economic risk, and corruption. www.countrywatch.com (Libya 2011 Report).
13
Christoff, Joseph A., Security Assistance: State and DoD Need to Assess How the Foreign Military Financing Program for
Egypt Achieves U.S. Foreign Policy and Security Goals, Report to the Committee on International Relations, House of
Representatives, GAO-06-437, April 2006 (AWC Study Guide, Book 2, pg 20).
14
“GCC, EU back Libya Rebel Council,” Arab Times, Abu Dhabi, April 20, 2011. www.arabtimesonline.com
15
Jane's Sentinel Security Assessment - North Africa (Libya), 18-May-2010. www.janes.com