PEACE	
  PROCESSES	
  COMPARED:	
  
Myanmar	
  &	
  Mindanao	
  	
  
C.	
  Similari@es	
  and	
  contrasts	
  
Similarity	
  #	
  1	
  
•  IdenEty-­‐oriented	
  self-­‐determinaEon	
  struggles,	
  with	
  
religious	
  orientaEon	
  (parEcularly	
  on	
  Mindanao),	
  vis-­‐
à-­‐vis	
  centralising	
  state,	
  ruled	
  from	
  far	
  away	
  and	
  
idenEfied	
  with	
  culturally	
  alien	
  majority	
  ‘other’	
  (state	
  
assimilaEonist	
  agendas).	
  
•  Long-­‐standing	
  armed	
  conflicts	
  complicated	
  by	
  
poliEcal	
  economies	
  (mixtures	
  of	
  ‘grievance’	
  and	
  
‘greed’	
  agendas	
  –	
  on	
  Mindanao?).	
  
Similarity	
  #	
  2	
  
•  Histories	
  of	
  previous,	
  largely	
  unsuccessful	
  ceasefires.	
  
•  Self-­‐reliance	
  of	
  communiEes	
  and	
  armed	
  groups.	
  
•  Elite-­‐driven	
  peace	
  process,	
  with	
  communiEes	
  and	
  
civil	
  society	
  not	
  always	
  feeling	
  properly	
  consulted.	
  	
  
•  Recent	
  posiEve	
  developments	
  led	
  by	
  newly-­‐elected	
  
naEonal	
  Presidents	
  (Benigno	
  Aquino	
  III	
  &	
  U	
  Thein	
  
Sein).	
  
•  Natural	
  resource	
  poliEcs;	
  land	
  issues.	
  
Similarity	
  #	
  3	
  
•  CommuniEes	
  experiencing	
  the	
  benefits	
  of	
  peace:	
  
freedom	
  from	
  fear;	
  rehabilitaEon	
  of	
  communiEes;	
  
freedom	
  of	
  travel;	
  expectaEons	
  of	
  the	
  peace	
  process.	
  	
  
•  What	
  hasn’t	
  changed:	
  conEnued	
  economic	
  problems,	
  
percepEons	
  of	
  discriminaEon	
  on	
  the	
  part	
  of	
  minority	
  
communiEes;	
  prevalence	
  of	
  drugs	
  and	
  lawlessness,	
  
land	
  issues	
  -­‐	
  community	
  concerns.	
  
•  Risks	
  associated	
  with	
  government,	
  naEonal	
  army,	
  
majority	
  community	
  (Filipinos,	
  Burmans)	
  not	
  accepEng	
  
and/or	
  not	
  implemenEng	
  peace	
  agreements.	
  
Similarity	
  #	
  4	
  
•  PosiEons	
  (idenEEes,	
  interests)	
  of	
  those	
  working	
  
with	
  or	
  under	
  the	
  government	
  (c.f.	
  the	
  ‘other	
  
Karen’).	
  
	
  
•  Security	
  Sector	
  Reform/DDR	
  (‘normalisaEon’)	
  -­‐	
  
what	
  are	
  the	
  roles	
  of	
  armed	
  elements	
  
(parEcularly	
  young	
  men),	
  post-­‐ceasefire?	
  
(Possible	
  scenario	
  from	
  other	
  ceasefires	
  in	
  the	
  
Philippines:	
  armed	
  groups	
  become	
  local,	
  semi-­‐
criminal	
  guns-­‐for-­‐hire.)	
  
Similarity	
  #	
  5	
  
•  Challenges	
  of	
  Armed	
  Groups	
  transforming	
  into	
  
viable	
  local	
  governments/administraEons	
  (and	
  
poliEcal	
  parEes?).	
  Risks	
  of	
  poor	
  governance	
  
and	
  corrupEon	
  miEgated	
  somewhat	
  on	
  
Mindanao	
  by	
  disciplined	
  nature	
  of	
  MILF.	
  	
  
Contrast	
  #	
  1	
  
•  Bangsamoro’	
  shared	
  idenEty	
  of	
  all	
  non-­‐Filipino	
  
groups	
  on	
  Mindanao	
  (?);	
  Myanmar’s	
  diverse	
  and	
  
heterogeneous	
  ethnic	
  communiEes.	
  
•  Importance	
  of	
  GRP	
  recognising	
  the	
  Bangsamoro	
  
in	
  principle,	
  as	
  a	
  legiEmate,	
  autonomous	
  poliEcal	
  
enEty;	
  Myanmar	
  government	
  (and	
  Army)	
  has	
  
been	
  reluctant	
  to	
  acknowledge	
  poliEcal	
  
legiEmacy	
  of	
  ethnic	
  (parEcularly	
  armed)	
  actors,	
  
or	
  to	
  grant	
  significant	
  autonomy.	
  
Contrast	
  #	
  2	
  
•  Historically	
  differing	
  poliEcal	
  cultures:	
  GRP	
  openness	
  to	
  
internaEonal	
  engagement.	
  Myanmar	
  military	
  
government	
  autarchy,	
  and	
  ‘xenophobia’	
  (including	
  
towards	
  Muslims).	
  
•  Geographically,	
  where	
  as	
  Mindanao	
  is	
  an	
  island,	
  
Myanmar’s	
  InternaEonal	
  borders	
  have	
  implicaEons	
  for	
  
refugees	
  and	
  regional	
  poliEcs.	
  
•  The	
  two	
  countries	
  have	
  different	
  geo-­‐strategic	
  posiEons	
  
and	
  interests	
  with	
  China,	
  USA,	
  ASEAN,	
  OIC	
  etc.	
  
•  InternaEonal	
  mediaEon	
  in	
  Mindanao	
  peace	
  talks	
  
(InternaEonal	
  Contact	
  Group	
  -­‐	
  novel	
  model,	
  including	
  
states	
  and	
  INGOs).	
  
Contrast	
  #	
  3	
  
•  InternaEonal	
  monitoring	
  on	
  Mindanaon	
  
(InternaEonal	
  Monitoring	
  Group,	
  and	
  Civilian	
  
ProtecEon	
  Component).	
  Limited	
  nature	
  of	
  
internaEonal	
  support	
  to	
  Myanmar	
  peace	
  process.	
  
•  FormaEon	
  of	
  GRP-­‐MILF	
  Peace	
  Panel	
  and	
  TransiEonal	
  
Arrangements	
  (Basic	
  Law,	
  plebiscite,	
  transiEon).	
  
Limited	
  progress	
  in	
  Myanmar	
  peace	
  talks	
  -­‐	
  in	
  relaEon	
  
to	
  autonomy	
  in	
  principle	
  (consEtuEonal	
  change?)	
  or	
  
pracEce	
  (“transiEonal	
  arrangements”).	
  
•  Annex	
  on	
  Revenue	
  GeneraEon	
  and	
  Wealth-­‐sharing.	
  
Contrast	
  #	
  4	
  
•  MILF	
  has	
  large	
  numbers	
  of	
  troops	
  staEoned	
  in	
  close	
  
vicinity	
  to	
  the	
  areas	
  of	
  GRP	
  control,	
  and	
  Philippines	
  
Army	
  bases;	
  LGUs	
  and	
  RP	
  military	
  posiEons	
  across	
  
Bangsamoro,	
  interspersed	
  with	
  MILF	
  [?].	
  Myanmar	
  
‘liberated	
  zones’,	
  and	
  areas	
  of	
  ‘mixed	
  authority’.	
  
•  Impacts	
  of	
  foreign	
  aid	
  …	
  	
  

Peace Processes Compared: Myanmar and Mindanao

  • 1.
    PEACE  PROCESSES  COMPARED:   Myanmar  &  Mindanao     C.  Similari@es  and  contrasts  
  • 2.
    Similarity  #  1   •  IdenEty-­‐oriented  self-­‐determinaEon  struggles,  with   religious  orientaEon  (parEcularly  on  Mindanao),  vis-­‐ à-­‐vis  centralising  state,  ruled  from  far  away  and   idenEfied  with  culturally  alien  majority  ‘other’  (state   assimilaEonist  agendas).   •  Long-­‐standing  armed  conflicts  complicated  by   poliEcal  economies  (mixtures  of  ‘grievance’  and   ‘greed’  agendas  –  on  Mindanao?).  
  • 3.
    Similarity  #  2   •  Histories  of  previous,  largely  unsuccessful  ceasefires.   •  Self-­‐reliance  of  communiEes  and  armed  groups.   •  Elite-­‐driven  peace  process,  with  communiEes  and   civil  society  not  always  feeling  properly  consulted.     •  Recent  posiEve  developments  led  by  newly-­‐elected   naEonal  Presidents  (Benigno  Aquino  III  &  U  Thein   Sein).   •  Natural  resource  poliEcs;  land  issues.  
  • 4.
    Similarity  #  3   •  CommuniEes  experiencing  the  benefits  of  peace:   freedom  from  fear;  rehabilitaEon  of  communiEes;   freedom  of  travel;  expectaEons  of  the  peace  process.     •  What  hasn’t  changed:  conEnued  economic  problems,   percepEons  of  discriminaEon  on  the  part  of  minority   communiEes;  prevalence  of  drugs  and  lawlessness,   land  issues  -­‐  community  concerns.   •  Risks  associated  with  government,  naEonal  army,   majority  community  (Filipinos,  Burmans)  not  accepEng   and/or  not  implemenEng  peace  agreements.  
  • 5.
    Similarity  #  4   •  PosiEons  (idenEEes,  interests)  of  those  working   with  or  under  the  government  (c.f.  the  ‘other   Karen’).     •  Security  Sector  Reform/DDR  (‘normalisaEon’)  -­‐   what  are  the  roles  of  armed  elements   (parEcularly  young  men),  post-­‐ceasefire?   (Possible  scenario  from  other  ceasefires  in  the   Philippines:  armed  groups  become  local,  semi-­‐ criminal  guns-­‐for-­‐hire.)  
  • 6.
    Similarity  #  5   •  Challenges  of  Armed  Groups  transforming  into   viable  local  governments/administraEons  (and   poliEcal  parEes?).  Risks  of  poor  governance   and  corrupEon  miEgated  somewhat  on   Mindanao  by  disciplined  nature  of  MILF.    
  • 7.
    Contrast  #  1   •  Bangsamoro’  shared  idenEty  of  all  non-­‐Filipino   groups  on  Mindanao  (?);  Myanmar’s  diverse  and   heterogeneous  ethnic  communiEes.   •  Importance  of  GRP  recognising  the  Bangsamoro   in  principle,  as  a  legiEmate,  autonomous  poliEcal   enEty;  Myanmar  government  (and  Army)  has   been  reluctant  to  acknowledge  poliEcal   legiEmacy  of  ethnic  (parEcularly  armed)  actors,   or  to  grant  significant  autonomy.  
  • 8.
    Contrast  #  2   •  Historically  differing  poliEcal  cultures:  GRP  openness  to   internaEonal  engagement.  Myanmar  military   government  autarchy,  and  ‘xenophobia’  (including   towards  Muslims).   •  Geographically,  where  as  Mindanao  is  an  island,   Myanmar’s  InternaEonal  borders  have  implicaEons  for   refugees  and  regional  poliEcs.   •  The  two  countries  have  different  geo-­‐strategic  posiEons   and  interests  with  China,  USA,  ASEAN,  OIC  etc.   •  InternaEonal  mediaEon  in  Mindanao  peace  talks   (InternaEonal  Contact  Group  -­‐  novel  model,  including   states  and  INGOs).  
  • 9.
    Contrast  #  3   •  InternaEonal  monitoring  on  Mindanaon   (InternaEonal  Monitoring  Group,  and  Civilian   ProtecEon  Component).  Limited  nature  of   internaEonal  support  to  Myanmar  peace  process.   •  FormaEon  of  GRP-­‐MILF  Peace  Panel  and  TransiEonal   Arrangements  (Basic  Law,  plebiscite,  transiEon).   Limited  progress  in  Myanmar  peace  talks  -­‐  in  relaEon   to  autonomy  in  principle  (consEtuEonal  change?)  or   pracEce  (“transiEonal  arrangements”).   •  Annex  on  Revenue  GeneraEon  and  Wealth-­‐sharing.  
  • 10.
    Contrast  #  4   •  MILF  has  large  numbers  of  troops  staEoned  in  close   vicinity  to  the  areas  of  GRP  control,  and  Philippines   Army  bases;  LGUs  and  RP  military  posiEons  across   Bangsamoro,  interspersed  with  MILF  [?].  Myanmar   ‘liberated  zones’,  and  areas  of  ‘mixed  authority’.   •  Impacts  of  foreign  aid  …