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The Context and Impacts of the Canterbury Earthquake Sequence of 2010-2011 - Kelvin Berryman
1. The context and impacts of the
Canterbury earthquake sequence of 2010-2011
Kelvin Berryman
Director, New Zealand Natural Hazards Research Platform
Christchurch 12.51 pm
22 Feb, 2011
William B. Joyner Memorial Lecture 2013
Natural Hazards Research Science
GNS Platform
2. In this presentation some discussion of:
•regional tectonic setting & earthquake sequence
•ground motions & the built environment
•social and economic impacts
•successes and failures
•lessons for Canterbury, NZ and internationally
Natural Hazards Research Platform
GNS Science
3. As well:
•the Tuesday workshop (presentations on EERI website),
John Hare (performance of built environment), John Hamilton (EM and the Response
phase in Christchurch), and David Johnston (societal impacts)
•Mary Comerio discussing Christchurch recovery & policy
•Art Frankel covering aspects of Christchurch ground motions
•Literature already – NZJGG, SRL, Bull NZ Soc EQ Eng
•Reports of the Royal Commission of Enquiry
(http://canterbury.royalcommission.govt.nz/)
•Writing for public consumption, eg. Red Zone
Free e-book by Jordan Kelly
(http://www.bidstrategist.com/freeresources)
•Data from GeoNet and related sites
(http://info.geonet.org.nz/display/appdata/Applications+and+Data)
•Many conference presentations – AGU, SCEC, SSA
•Reports by EERI, TLCEE, GEER, NZ agencies
Natural Hazards Research Platform
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4. A few preliminary comments
•Impacts and consequences of the Canterbury earthquakes
needs to be understood in terms of its rarity.
•There were clearly some failures (management of natural hazard
risk, inaction on earthquake prone building policy & poor risk
communication) but there were also many successes.
•Decisions about changed policy and procedures need to keep the
rarity of the February 2011 event in mind, otherwise some overly
conservative actions may result.
•Making a difference - absorbing lessons learned as a memorial to the
185 persons that lost their lives in the February 22nd earthquake –
requires ongoing cooperation between engineers, scientists, policy
makers, the business community, insurance and politicians. It is at best
a work in progress in New Zealand and there is a danger we may slip
back into past behaviours and silos.
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6. New Zealand tectonic
and bathymetric Raukumara
setting Peninsula
CVR/TVZ
Oblique subduction of
Pacific plate beneath
North Island along
North Island
Hikurangi Trough
Dextral Fault Belt
ea i
at ng
u
P l ura
Oceanic plateau Marlborough
k
Hi
material on Hikurangi strike-slip
Plateau
Chatham Rise
Continental
convergence in central
South Island
Southern
Oblique subduction Alps
beneath Fiordland Fiordland
Image from NIWA
National Institute of Water and Atmospheric Research Ltd
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7. Regional
Fault
Patterns
Barnes et al, 2011
Jongens et al,
2012
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8. An update on the
Canterbury earthquake sequence
•The regional context
•The continuing aftershocks: their frequency and strength
•Why was there so much damage to the Canterbury region in
Feb 2011 and subsequently
•Earthquake forecast probabilities – what do they mean
Natural Hazards Research Platform
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9. 2010 model
NZ National
Seismic
Hazard Model
Hazard in Canterbury is
moderate by NZ
standards – EQ shaking
level for design code
~ 0.3 g PGA
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11. February and June fault slip inversions from GPS data
– can also be compared with seismology and InSar
Interpretation by Beaven et al., GNS
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12. Magnitude Magnitude vs Time ( up to February 2013 )
generally felt
often not felt
incomplete detection
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14. Features of the earthquake sequence in the NZ context
A large (for NZ) natural hazard event in a small economy
•10% of NZ’s 4.5 million people directly impacted
•Total loss estimates c. $35b NZD – about 8-10% GDP
•NZ’s economy about the same size as Munich-Re or IBM annual revenue
Events such as this have the possibility of irreparably damaging the economy
of small or developing nations
Regional economy is strong (based on agriculture)
•Port, airport, road and rail networks had very little downtime
•95% of businesses are still operating albeit with downturn in tourism, education,
and hospitality
•Some migration away from Canterbury especially initially, now about 9,000
persons, but 30,000 new workers needed for rebuild – communities remained
largely intact
•Early government support for local business continuity and workforce
A city cannot operate in isolation from its hinterland. Supply chains and
infrastructure are critical. “Shelter in place” was a feature and is a key
tipping-point in regional economic resilience
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15. The Impacts - Ground Motion (10% in 50 yr code level = 0.3 g)
4 Sept 2010 26 Dec 2010
22 Feb 2011 13 June 2011
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16. Comparison of four CBD records
against code requirements
22 Feb 2011
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17. Residential Building Damage Map
Building Damage Ratio
(Repair cost estimate / replacement
cost)
0% (no building damage)
0% - 20%
20% - 40%
40% - 60%
60% - 80%
80% - 100%
100% (rebuild because it is
uneconomic to repair the
building)
Building damage after the 22 February 2011 event
Natural Hazards Research Platform
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20. A couple of perspectives ………………….
1.The Sept 2010 Darfield earthquake was a near design level event in the city
•Damage wasn’t too bad except for unreinforced masonry (as expected)
•Services were restored reasonably quickly (24 hrs for electricity, a few
days in most places for water & waste water, dramatic liquefaction and
lateral spread damage in some of eastern Christchurch (future red zone)
2. The Feb 2011 event was near to a 2500 yr return period event for the city
•Damage was largely as would be expected
•Most engineered structures performed quite well
•Infrastructure was badly damaged, especially in future red zones & TC 2 & 3
•The people and the city did very well, considering, but there is now an
expectation in some quarters to have little or no damage in extreme events
•Was performance good enough for an extreme event? What are acceptable
levels of safety and economic resilience – red zoning implies unacceptable,
what about repairability and functionality in extreme events
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21. 6.5 Ka New Zealand Historical Atlas 1997
7 Ka
5 Ka
8 Ka 3 Ka
2 Ka
1 Ka
Why is liquefaction such an
issue in eastern Christchurch?
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22. Crust Thinning – Simplified Example
SeptemberEarthquake
February Earthquake
Liquefaction Material ofStructures
Reconsolidation Soil
Ground Settlement, Settlement & &Removed Sinking into
Ground Liquefaction Liquefaction
Ground
Pre-September Level Slide courtesy
Pre-February
Level
Non-liquefying Crust
Ground Water Level
Liquefying
Soil
Slide courtesy of Sjoerd van Ballegooy (Tonkin & Taylor) & EQC
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24. Rockfall Hazard
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25. Extensive
Demolition –
Christchurch
CBD 2 years on
Christchurch CBD
Feb 2011
Christchurch CBD
Nov 2012
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26. Residential Claims - Unprecedented Scale
data courtesy Hugh Cowan, Earthquake Commission
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27. Insurance Perspectives - Recent major earthquake events
USD billion (at 2011 prices)
Event Date Country Economic Economic losses Insured Insurance
Losses as %GDP Losses Industry
Contribution
11 March 11 Japan up to 300 up to 5.4% 35 up to 17%
27 Feb 11 Chile 30 18.6% 8 27%
22 Feb 11 NZ 15 10% 12 80%
12 Jan 10 Haiti 8 121% 0.1 1%
04 Sept 10 NZ 6 5.3% 5 81%
06 April 09 Italy 4 0.2% 0.5 14%
23 Oct 11 Turkey 0.75 0.1% 0.03
4%
04 April 10 Mexico 0.95 0.09% 0.2 21%
Source: Swiss Re sigma catastrophe database
NZ presents the highest ratio of insured to economic losses. Residential earthquake
insurance virtually mandatory through the EQ Commission, so insurance plays a
much greater role in reconstruction efforts than in other examples
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28. Looking Forward
•revised seismic coefficient in building code – 0.22 to 0.3
•forecasting future events from time varying model
•land zoning
•Improved foundations
•repair and rebuild
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29. Time-Varying Earthquake Hazard Forecast
• Used to inform update of building
codes
• Accounts for different earthquake
clustering scales
• Combines four different models
• Used to estimate probabilities of
ground shaking Likelihood of another M6 event
currently about 30% of the
estimate immediately pre
• Short-term clustering model – Feb 22 2011
STEP - Days to Year(s)
• Medium-term clustering model
– EEPAS - Years to decades
• Long-term average model –
PPE - Average earthquake rate
since 1960
• NSHM fault model - Longest-
term mostly time-independent
Yearly number of earthquakes greater than M 5 from
four models
Gerstenberger, Rhoades, et al, GNS
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30. Reducing Future Risk – The Residential Red Zone
Residential Red Zone – as at 24 Sep 2012
• in total 190,000 homes have been zoned
• 7,861 properties in flatland
•c. 600 properties in Port Hills
•c. 4% of total homes
•Value c. NZD 3-4 billion
•Flatland zoning due to likely
future land damage
•Port Hills zoning due to future
life risk
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32. What do Residential land zones mean?
TC1 - future liquefaction unlikely
• No change, ie NZS3604 still applies. But use
mesh in slabs
TC2 – minor to moderate damage from future
liquefaction possible
• Lightweight walls/roof and suspended ground
floor, to allow use of NZS3604 as above, OR
• Enhanced concrete floor slabs
TC3 – moderate to significant damage from
future liquefaction possible
• Specific design required
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33. Resilience and insurability of Central Christchurch
• Seismic outlook is well understood
• Ground is good to build on
• Building costs are similar across NZ, even with
the upgraded Building Code
• Building damage potential well understood
• New city buildings will have much improved
damage profile
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37. Major lessons emerging
1. Land use planning controls to limit exposure to known liquefaction
susceptibility were not enacted – failure to deflect development pressure
and failure by science to spell-out likely impacts or consequences.
2. Failure to find a solution to known earthquake prone building risk –
this is largely a URM and older concrete inventory, not the
two multistory buildings that collapsed. The built environment
generally performed as expected or better than expected under
extreme ground motions.
3. Poor communication of what building codes and rapid building
inspections mean, and in risk communication. Engineers and scientists
should talk to the public in terms of possible impacts, not “safe”, and not
earthquake magnitudes.
4. High stress drop, extremely energetic earthquakes with higher than
expected vertical accelerations may be a characteristic of some low
strain rate parts of NZ – implications for hazard and code requirements
5. Code is for life safety but a cities future depends on functionality – how
to achieve this in the code or city planning process ?
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38. Rebuilding – challenges, impediments and opportunities
• Getting people back into homes, businesses, and feeling secure
- claim settlement !!!!
• Building standards (life risk + serviceability?)
• Insurability
• Investment capital
• Technical considerations
(short term EQ risk, liquefaction)
• The biggest build NZ will ever do
(we hope) – a major urban renewal project
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39. Many, many acknowledgments……………
The science response to the Canterbury earthquakes has involved
major contributions from many professionals from many institutions, including:
GNS Science, University of Canterbury, New Zealand’s geotechnical &
structural engineering capacity, Auckland University, Victoria University,
and international collaborators from USA, Japan, Canada and elsewhere.
The science has contributed to policy, regulation and risk management in
collaboration with:
Civil Defence, CERA, Christchurch City Council and adjacent local
government authorities, Environment Canterbury, central government
departments (social development, education, justice, treasury, building &
housing), government Ministers, the insurance industry, and the business
community.
And to the Joyner Awards Committee for the honour of speaking to you today
Natural Hazards Research Platform
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Editor's Notes
This is the 2002 hazard model for 500 year return period PGA on class C (average ground). Christchurch is about 0.3 g, comparable with Nelson or New Plymouth and more than Dunedin, Hamilton, and Auckland
Nothing beats a picture and to try and explain that concept. The potential is there for all of that to liquefy because it’s all sand, above the ground water table and below the ground water table. But it’s only the sand below the ground water table that has the ability to liquefy, above the ground water table it doesn’t. After September we had some shaking, or during September we had some shaking, those underlying soils liquefied and the upper crust didn’t, and for a large number of properties in Canterbury there may have been some liquefaction at depth but there was no sand ejection to the ground surface, no ground surface subsidence, no effect and no observed land damage and no one put in a claim. But for properties where the sand did start to come out or come out by the road, subsidence occurred, undulations occurred to the land and these houses started to get some ground deformation related damage, so superimposed over the top of shaking damage. A few days after the earthquake the land had reconsolidated to its original strength and that sand was left out on the road, removed by volunteers and so we now find ourselves at a new level and it was this new level that was surveyed across Canterbury. After February much more intense shaking so probably more of the soil layer liquefying, I’m showing a diagram here which is just a single layer but in reality there’s a whole lot of different layers of soil and more of that profile liquefying, but because now there was a thinner crust, because of previous subsidence is now getting a lot more sand coming up to the ground surface, causing a lot more undulations and distress to the house, but also because this crust is thinner the houses are now starting to punch through and tilt and get a lot more deformation related damaged because this crust is less able to support the house than it was previously. And in that simple analogy would be walking on a sheet of ice on a lake when the ice is thick and it’s quite safe to walk on it and the ice can support your weight. When that ice gets thinner you have the chance of breaking through because it’s less able to support your weight and it’s the same analogy here with the crust being able to support the house and so as it gets thinner we’re starting to see surface punching failure. Once again after February the soil reconsolidated, regained it’s strength and so there is no land damage at depth, there’s only been a consequential affect at the ground surface and this property is now more vulnerable to the liquefaction hazard next time around as a result of a thinner crust. So if you would rebuild at that level with exactly the same construction technique as before, the house now would perform a lot worse if you had an identical sequence of events coming across than you would have in September and that is as a result of ground surface subsidence.