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Hash and Mac Algorithms
Contents
Hash Functions
Secure Hash Algorithm
HMAC
Hash Functions
Hash functions
 Takes an input message M
 Produces an output hash value, H(M), for the message M.
M
Hash function
H(M)
Hash Functions
Hash functions
 partitions it into L fixed-size blocks of b bits each
M
b bits b bits b bits b bits → L blocks × b bits
H(M)
Hash function
 If necessary, the final block is padded to b bits
 Modify the length of M to L blocks × b bits
→ L blocks × b bits
→ M + padding
M
b bits b bits b bits b bits
H(M)
M Padding
Hash function
Hash Functions
Compression function, f
 Hash algorithm involves repeated use of compression
function, f
 takes an n-bit input from previous step and a b-bit input from
message.
 produces an n- bit output.
Hash Functions
…
Hash functions
IV or CV0 Initial value for 1st compression
CVi Output of the ith compression
CVL The final hash value, H(M)
n Length of hash code
Yi ith input block from message M
b Length of input block
Hash Functions
Secure Hash Algorithm
SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm)
 developed by NIST and published as FIPS 180 in 1993
 NIST, National Institute of Standards and Technology
 FIPS, a federal information processing standard
 revised version FIPS 180-1 was issued in 1995
 referred to as SHA-1 that produces 160 bit hash value.
 FIPS 180-2 in 2002 defined 3 versions of SHA
 SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 for 256, 384 and 512 bits hash.
Secure Hash Algorithm
 SHA-1 is based on the hash function MD4.
 SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512
 have the same underlying structure as SHA-1
 also use the same types of modular arithmetic and logical binary
operation as SHA-1
 Comparison of 4 version of SHA
Secure Hash Algorithm
SHA-512 Logic
 Input : a maximum length of less than < 2128
bits
 Output : a 512-bit message digest
Secure Hash Algorithm
5 Steps
 Step 1: Append padding bits
 Step 2: Append length
 Step 3: Initialize hash buffer
 Step 4: Process message in 1024-bit(128-word) blocks
 Step 5: Output
Secure Hash Algorithm
 Step 1: Append padding bits
 The message is padded so that its length is congruent to 896 mod
1024, [ length ≡ 896 mod 1024 ]
 Padding is always added, even if the length of message is satisfied.
 If the length of message is 896 bits, padding is 1024 bits,
because 1920(=896 + 1024) mod 1024 = 448.
 thus, 1 ≤ padding bits ≤ 1024
 The padding consists of a single 1-bit followed by the necessary
number of 0-bits, (100…0)
1. append padding
2. append length
3. Initialize hash buffer
4. Process message
5. Output
1024 × (N-1) + 896 bits
Secure Hash Algorithm
 Step 2: Append length
 A block of 128 bit is appended to the message
 contains the length of the original message (before padding)
 After 2 steps, the length of message is a multiple of 1024
 The expanded message is a sequence of 1024 bit block M1, …, MN
1. append padding
2. append length
3. Initialize hash buffer
4. Process message
5. Output
Secure Hash Algorithm
 Step 3 : Initialize hash buffer
 Secure hash algorithm use a 512-bit buffer.
 holding the intermediate and final result of the hash function.
 Eight 64-bit registers (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) are used.
 IV( Initial vector ) of eight 64-bit registers in hexadecimal value.
 These words were obtained by taking the first 64bits of the fractional
parts of the square roots of the first 80 prime numbers.
1. append padding
2. append length
3. Initialize hash buffer
4. Process message
5. Output
a = 6A09 E667 F3BC
C908
e = 510E 527F ADE6
82D1
b = BB67 AE85 84CA
A73B
f = 9B05 688C 2B3E
6C1F
c = 3C6E F372 FE94
F82B
g = 1F83 D9AB FB41
BD6B
Secure Hash Algorithm
 Step 4 : Process message in 1024-bit (128-word) blocks.
 The main function of the algorithm is module F in the below picture.
 The module F is the compression function.
 Mi is the ith input block of expanded message.
 Hi is the intermediate hash result and HN is the final result.
 The operation ( + ) is word-by word addition mod 264.
1. append padding
2. append length
3. Initialize MD buffer
4. Process message
5. Output
Secure Hash Algorithm
The module F consists of 80
rounds for 1 block, Mi
 Let t-th round call round t
 where 0 ≤ t ≤ 79
Round t takes as an input
 the contents of 512bit buffer,
abcdefg
 a 64-bit value, Wt
 an additive constant, Kt
Round t updates
 the contents of buffer for the t +1
round
Secure Hash Algorithm
 Wt, a 64-bit value
 A part of message block Mi is used at round t.
 These values derived from the current 1024-bit block, Mi
 Detail explain how to generate will be later.
 Kt , an additive constant
 An integer number is added at round t.
 These words represent the first 64-bits of fractional parts of the cube
roots of the first 80 prime number.
 Kt provides a “randomized” set of 64-bit patterns
 which eliminate any regularities in the input data.
Secure Hash Algorithm
After 80th rounds, the contents
of the buffer is added to the
input to the first round (Hi-1) to
produce (Hi).
 The addition is done independently
 for each 8 words with each of the
corresponding words in Hi-1
 using addition modulo 264
Secure Hash Algorithm
 Step 5 : Output
 After all N 1024 bits blocks have been processed, the output
form the Nth stage is the 512-bit message digest.
 Summary of SHA-512
H0 = IV
Hi = SUM64(Hi-1, abcdefghi)
MD = HN
 N = number of blocks in the expanded message
 SUM64 = Addition modulo 264
performed separately on each word of
the pair of inputs
1. append padding
2. append length
3. Initialize MD buffer
4. Process message
5. Output
Secure Hash Algorithm
SHA-512 round function
 Detail at the logic in each of the 80 steps of the processing
of on 512-bit block.
 Each round is defined by the following set of equation :
 T1 and T2 will be shown in the next slide.
a = T1+T2 e = d + T1
b = a f = e
c = b g = f
d = c h = g
Secure Hash Algorithm
),,()(
)(),,(
512
02
512
11
cbaMajaT
KWegfeChhT tt
+=
++++=
∑
∑
64
2moduloaddition
constantadditive64bita
blockinput1024bitcurrentthefromderived64bit worda
bitsbyargument64bittheofshiftrightcircular)(ROTR
)(ROTR)(ROTR)(ROTR)(
)(ROTR)(ROTR)(ROTR)(
)AND()AND()AND(
)ANDNOT()AND(),,(
790number;step
411814512
1
393428512
0
=+
=
=
=
⊕⊕=
⊕⊕=
⊕⊕=
⊕=
≤≤=
∑
∑
t
t
n
K
W
nxx
eeee
aaaa
cbcabaMaj
gefegfeCh
tt
Secure Hash Algorithm
a = T1+T2 e = d + T1
b = a f = e
c = b g = f
d = c h = g
),,(
)(
)(
),,(
512
02
512
1
1
cbaMaj
aT
KW
e
gfeCh
hT
tt
+
=
++
+
+
=
∑
∑
T2
T1
Secure Hash Algorithm
Wt , a 64-bit value
 Wt are derived from the 1024-bit message.
 The first 16 values of Wtare taken directly from the 16
words of the current block.
Secure Hash Algorithm
 The remaining values are defined as follows.
hton the rigby zeroes
nxx
xxxx
xxxx
WWWWW
n
ttttt
paddingwith
bitsbyargumentbit-64theofshiftleft)(SHR
)(SHR)(ROTR)(ROTR)(
)(SHR)(ROTR)(ROTR)(
where
)()(
66119512
1
781512
0
2
512
1715
512
016
=
⊕⊕=
⊕⊕=
+++= −−−−
σ
σ
σσ
Secure Hash Algorithm
Creation of Wt
)()( 2
512
1715
512
016 −−−− +++= ttttt WWWWW σσ
)()() 14
512
1111
512
0016 WWWWWEx σσ +++=
HMAC
MAC (A message authentication code)
 defined FIPS SUB 113
 The most common approach to construct a MAC
 Recently, there has been increased interest in developing a
MAC.
 The motivation
1. cryptographic hash function, MD5 and SHA-1, generally execute
faster in software than symmetric block cipher such as DES.
2. Library code for cryptographic hash functions is widely available.
HMAC
 A hash function such as SHA
 not designed for use as a MAC
 cannot be used directly for that purpose because it does not rely on
the secret key.
 There have been a number of proposals
 for the incorporation of a secret key into an existing hash algorithm
 HMAC[BELL96a] is most supported.
 issued RFC 2104 and as a NIST(FIPS 198).
 as the mandatory-to-implement MAC for IP security
 used in other Internet protocol such as SSL.
HMAC
HMAC Design Objectives on RFC 2104 list
 To use, without modification, available hash functions. In particular,
hash functions that perform well in software and code is freely and
widely available.
 To allow for easy replaceability of the embedded hash function in
case faster or more secure hash function are found or required.
 To preserve the original performance of the hash function without
incurring a significant degradation.
 To use and handle key in a simple way.
 To have a well understood cryptographic analysis of the strength of
the authentication mechanism based on reasonable assumption about
the embedded hash function.
HMAC
HMAC structure
 IV = initial value input to hash function
 M = message input to HMAC
 K = secret key recommended length is
≥ n;
 if key length is greater than b; the key is input
to the hash function to produce an n-bit key.
 ipad = 00110110 repeated b/8 times
 opad = 01011100 repeated b/8 times
HMAC
HMAC structure
 Hash = embedded hash function
( MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160)
 Yi= ith block of M, 0 ≤ i ≤ (L-1)
 K+
= K padded with 0 on left so that the
result is b bits in length
 L = number of blocks in M
 b = number of bits in a block
 n = length of hash code produced by H
HMAC
HMAC Algorithm
1. Append zero to the left end of K to
create a b-bit string K+

if K is of length 160 bits and b = 512, K
will be appended with 44 zero bytes 0×00.

K+
= K padded with 0 on left so that the
result is b bits in length
2. XOR K+
with ipad to produce the b-bit
block Si

ipad = 00110110
3. Append M to Si
HMAC
4. Apply H to the stream generated in
step 3.
5. XOR K+
with opad to produce the b-bit
block So.

opad = 01011100
4. Append the hash result from step 4 to
So.
5. Apply H to the stream generated in
step 6 and output result.
HMAC
HMAC should execute in
approximately the same time as
the embedded hash function
 for a long message.
 HMAC adds 3 executions of the hash
compression function.
A more efficient implement is
possible by precomputing
))opad(,IV(f
))ipad(,IV(f
⊕
⊕
+
+
K
K
HMAC
 These quantities only need to computed initially and every
time the key exchange.
 The precomputed quantities substitute for the initial value.
 Only one additional instance of the compression function is
added to the processing.
))opad(,IV(f
))ipad(,IV(f
⊕
⊕
+
+
K
K
HMAC
Security of HMAC
 The security of any MAC function based on an embedded
hash function depends in some way on the cryptographic
strength of the underlying hash function.
 The appeal of HMAC is that its designers have been able to
prove an exact relationship between the strength of the
embedded hash function and the strength of HMAC
HMAC
 The security of HMAC is expressed in terms of the
probability of successful forgery with
 a given amount of time spent by the forger
 a given number of message-MAC pairs created with the same key.
 For a given level of effort (time, message-MAC pairs) on
messages generated by a legitimate user and seen by the
attacker, the probability successful attack on HMAC is
equivalent to one of following attacks.
HMAC
 The probability successful attack on HMAC
1. The attacker is able to compute an output of the
compression function even with an IV that is random,
secret, and unknown to the attacker.
2. The attacker finds collisions in the hash function even
when IV is random and secret.
HMAC
 In the 1st attack, compression function as equivalent to the
hash function.
 For this attack, the IV of the hash function is replaced by a secret,
random value of n bits.
 An attack requires either
 A brute-force attack on the key, a level of effort on the order of 2n
 A birthday attack, a special case of 2nd attack.
HMAC
 In the 2nd attack, the attack is looking for 2 messages M
and M’ that produce H(M)=H(M’)
 A birthday attack requires a level of effort of 2n/2
for a hash length of n
 MD5, 264
, looks feasible in today, so MD5 is unsuitable for HMAC?
 The answer is no.
 To attack MD5, attackers know the hash algorithm and IV, so they can
generate the hash code for any message
 In HMAC, attackers don’t know K, so they can’t generate the hash code.
 So, to attack HMAC, attackers must observe a sequence of messages.
 For a hash code of 128 bits, this requires 264
observed blocks with using
the same key.
 On a 1-Gbps, it takes 150,000 years to get a satisfied stream.
 Thus, if speed is concern, MD5 is fully acceptable to use rather than
SHA-1 as the embedded hash function for HMAC.

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Hash mac algorithms

  • 1. Hash and Mac Algorithms
  • 3. Hash Functions Hash functions  Takes an input message M  Produces an output hash value, H(M), for the message M. M Hash function H(M)
  • 4. Hash Functions Hash functions  partitions it into L fixed-size blocks of b bits each M b bits b bits b bits b bits → L blocks × b bits H(M) Hash function
  • 5.  If necessary, the final block is padded to b bits  Modify the length of M to L blocks × b bits → L blocks × b bits → M + padding M b bits b bits b bits b bits H(M) M Padding Hash function Hash Functions
  • 6. Compression function, f  Hash algorithm involves repeated use of compression function, f  takes an n-bit input from previous step and a b-bit input from message.  produces an n- bit output. Hash Functions
  • 7. … Hash functions IV or CV0 Initial value for 1st compression CVi Output of the ith compression CVL The final hash value, H(M) n Length of hash code Yi ith input block from message M b Length of input block Hash Functions
  • 8. Secure Hash Algorithm SHA (Secure Hash Algorithm)  developed by NIST and published as FIPS 180 in 1993  NIST, National Institute of Standards and Technology  FIPS, a federal information processing standard  revised version FIPS 180-1 was issued in 1995  referred to as SHA-1 that produces 160 bit hash value.  FIPS 180-2 in 2002 defined 3 versions of SHA  SHA-256, SHA-384 and SHA-512 for 256, 384 and 512 bits hash.
  • 9. Secure Hash Algorithm  SHA-1 is based on the hash function MD4.  SHA-256, SHA-384, SHA-512  have the same underlying structure as SHA-1  also use the same types of modular arithmetic and logical binary operation as SHA-1  Comparison of 4 version of SHA
  • 10. Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-512 Logic  Input : a maximum length of less than < 2128 bits  Output : a 512-bit message digest
  • 11. Secure Hash Algorithm 5 Steps  Step 1: Append padding bits  Step 2: Append length  Step 3: Initialize hash buffer  Step 4: Process message in 1024-bit(128-word) blocks  Step 5: Output
  • 12. Secure Hash Algorithm  Step 1: Append padding bits  The message is padded so that its length is congruent to 896 mod 1024, [ length ≡ 896 mod 1024 ]  Padding is always added, even if the length of message is satisfied.  If the length of message is 896 bits, padding is 1024 bits, because 1920(=896 + 1024) mod 1024 = 448.  thus, 1 ≤ padding bits ≤ 1024  The padding consists of a single 1-bit followed by the necessary number of 0-bits, (100…0) 1. append padding 2. append length 3. Initialize hash buffer 4. Process message 5. Output 1024 × (N-1) + 896 bits
  • 13. Secure Hash Algorithm  Step 2: Append length  A block of 128 bit is appended to the message  contains the length of the original message (before padding)  After 2 steps, the length of message is a multiple of 1024  The expanded message is a sequence of 1024 bit block M1, …, MN 1. append padding 2. append length 3. Initialize hash buffer 4. Process message 5. Output
  • 14. Secure Hash Algorithm  Step 3 : Initialize hash buffer  Secure hash algorithm use a 512-bit buffer.  holding the intermediate and final result of the hash function.  Eight 64-bit registers (a, b, c, d, e, f, g, h) are used.  IV( Initial vector ) of eight 64-bit registers in hexadecimal value.  These words were obtained by taking the first 64bits of the fractional parts of the square roots of the first 80 prime numbers. 1. append padding 2. append length 3. Initialize hash buffer 4. Process message 5. Output a = 6A09 E667 F3BC C908 e = 510E 527F ADE6 82D1 b = BB67 AE85 84CA A73B f = 9B05 688C 2B3E 6C1F c = 3C6E F372 FE94 F82B g = 1F83 D9AB FB41 BD6B
  • 15. Secure Hash Algorithm  Step 4 : Process message in 1024-bit (128-word) blocks.  The main function of the algorithm is module F in the below picture.  The module F is the compression function.  Mi is the ith input block of expanded message.  Hi is the intermediate hash result and HN is the final result.  The operation ( + ) is word-by word addition mod 264. 1. append padding 2. append length 3. Initialize MD buffer 4. Process message 5. Output
  • 16. Secure Hash Algorithm The module F consists of 80 rounds for 1 block, Mi  Let t-th round call round t  where 0 ≤ t ≤ 79 Round t takes as an input  the contents of 512bit buffer, abcdefg  a 64-bit value, Wt  an additive constant, Kt Round t updates  the contents of buffer for the t +1 round
  • 17. Secure Hash Algorithm  Wt, a 64-bit value  A part of message block Mi is used at round t.  These values derived from the current 1024-bit block, Mi  Detail explain how to generate will be later.  Kt , an additive constant  An integer number is added at round t.  These words represent the first 64-bits of fractional parts of the cube roots of the first 80 prime number.  Kt provides a “randomized” set of 64-bit patterns  which eliminate any regularities in the input data.
  • 18. Secure Hash Algorithm After 80th rounds, the contents of the buffer is added to the input to the first round (Hi-1) to produce (Hi).  The addition is done independently  for each 8 words with each of the corresponding words in Hi-1  using addition modulo 264
  • 19. Secure Hash Algorithm  Step 5 : Output  After all N 1024 bits blocks have been processed, the output form the Nth stage is the 512-bit message digest.  Summary of SHA-512 H0 = IV Hi = SUM64(Hi-1, abcdefghi) MD = HN  N = number of blocks in the expanded message  SUM64 = Addition modulo 264 performed separately on each word of the pair of inputs 1. append padding 2. append length 3. Initialize MD buffer 4. Process message 5. Output
  • 20. Secure Hash Algorithm SHA-512 round function  Detail at the logic in each of the 80 steps of the processing of on 512-bit block.  Each round is defined by the following set of equation :  T1 and T2 will be shown in the next slide. a = T1+T2 e = d + T1 b = a f = e c = b g = f d = c h = g
  • 21. Secure Hash Algorithm ),,()( )(),,( 512 02 512 11 cbaMajaT KWegfeChhT tt += ++++= ∑ ∑ 64 2moduloaddition constantadditive64bita blockinput1024bitcurrentthefromderived64bit worda bitsbyargument64bittheofshiftrightcircular)(ROTR )(ROTR)(ROTR)(ROTR)( )(ROTR)(ROTR)(ROTR)( )AND()AND()AND( )ANDNOT()AND(),,( 790number;step 411814512 1 393428512 0 =+ = = = ⊕⊕= ⊕⊕= ⊕⊕= ⊕= ≤≤= ∑ ∑ t t n K W nxx eeee aaaa cbcabaMaj gefegfeCh tt
  • 22. Secure Hash Algorithm a = T1+T2 e = d + T1 b = a f = e c = b g = f d = c h = g ),,( )( )( ),,( 512 02 512 1 1 cbaMaj aT KW e gfeCh hT tt + = ++ + + = ∑ ∑ T2 T1
  • 23. Secure Hash Algorithm Wt , a 64-bit value  Wt are derived from the 1024-bit message.  The first 16 values of Wtare taken directly from the 16 words of the current block.
  • 24. Secure Hash Algorithm  The remaining values are defined as follows. hton the rigby zeroes nxx xxxx xxxx WWWWW n ttttt paddingwith bitsbyargumentbit-64theofshiftleft)(SHR )(SHR)(ROTR)(ROTR)( )(SHR)(ROTR)(ROTR)( where )()( 66119512 1 781512 0 2 512 1715 512 016 = ⊕⊕= ⊕⊕= +++= −−−− σ σ σσ
  • 25. Secure Hash Algorithm Creation of Wt )()( 2 512 1715 512 016 −−−− +++= ttttt WWWWW σσ )()() 14 512 1111 512 0016 WWWWWEx σσ +++=
  • 26. HMAC MAC (A message authentication code)  defined FIPS SUB 113  The most common approach to construct a MAC  Recently, there has been increased interest in developing a MAC.  The motivation 1. cryptographic hash function, MD5 and SHA-1, generally execute faster in software than symmetric block cipher such as DES. 2. Library code for cryptographic hash functions is widely available.
  • 27. HMAC  A hash function such as SHA  not designed for use as a MAC  cannot be used directly for that purpose because it does not rely on the secret key.  There have been a number of proposals  for the incorporation of a secret key into an existing hash algorithm  HMAC[BELL96a] is most supported.  issued RFC 2104 and as a NIST(FIPS 198).  as the mandatory-to-implement MAC for IP security  used in other Internet protocol such as SSL.
  • 28. HMAC HMAC Design Objectives on RFC 2104 list  To use, without modification, available hash functions. In particular, hash functions that perform well in software and code is freely and widely available.  To allow for easy replaceability of the embedded hash function in case faster or more secure hash function are found or required.  To preserve the original performance of the hash function without incurring a significant degradation.  To use and handle key in a simple way.  To have a well understood cryptographic analysis of the strength of the authentication mechanism based on reasonable assumption about the embedded hash function.
  • 29. HMAC HMAC structure  IV = initial value input to hash function  M = message input to HMAC  K = secret key recommended length is ≥ n;  if key length is greater than b; the key is input to the hash function to produce an n-bit key.  ipad = 00110110 repeated b/8 times  opad = 01011100 repeated b/8 times
  • 30. HMAC HMAC structure  Hash = embedded hash function ( MD5, SHA-1, RIPEMD-160)  Yi= ith block of M, 0 ≤ i ≤ (L-1)  K+ = K padded with 0 on left so that the result is b bits in length  L = number of blocks in M  b = number of bits in a block  n = length of hash code produced by H
  • 31. HMAC HMAC Algorithm 1. Append zero to the left end of K to create a b-bit string K+  if K is of length 160 bits and b = 512, K will be appended with 44 zero bytes 0×00.  K+ = K padded with 0 on left so that the result is b bits in length 2. XOR K+ with ipad to produce the b-bit block Si  ipad = 00110110 3. Append M to Si
  • 32. HMAC 4. Apply H to the stream generated in step 3. 5. XOR K+ with opad to produce the b-bit block So.  opad = 01011100 4. Append the hash result from step 4 to So. 5. Apply H to the stream generated in step 6 and output result.
  • 33. HMAC HMAC should execute in approximately the same time as the embedded hash function  for a long message.  HMAC adds 3 executions of the hash compression function. A more efficient implement is possible by precomputing ))opad(,IV(f ))ipad(,IV(f ⊕ ⊕ + + K K
  • 34. HMAC  These quantities only need to computed initially and every time the key exchange.  The precomputed quantities substitute for the initial value.  Only one additional instance of the compression function is added to the processing. ))opad(,IV(f ))ipad(,IV(f ⊕ ⊕ + + K K
  • 35. HMAC Security of HMAC  The security of any MAC function based on an embedded hash function depends in some way on the cryptographic strength of the underlying hash function.  The appeal of HMAC is that its designers have been able to prove an exact relationship between the strength of the embedded hash function and the strength of HMAC
  • 36. HMAC  The security of HMAC is expressed in terms of the probability of successful forgery with  a given amount of time spent by the forger  a given number of message-MAC pairs created with the same key.  For a given level of effort (time, message-MAC pairs) on messages generated by a legitimate user and seen by the attacker, the probability successful attack on HMAC is equivalent to one of following attacks.
  • 37. HMAC  The probability successful attack on HMAC 1. The attacker is able to compute an output of the compression function even with an IV that is random, secret, and unknown to the attacker. 2. The attacker finds collisions in the hash function even when IV is random and secret.
  • 38. HMAC  In the 1st attack, compression function as equivalent to the hash function.  For this attack, the IV of the hash function is replaced by a secret, random value of n bits.  An attack requires either  A brute-force attack on the key, a level of effort on the order of 2n  A birthday attack, a special case of 2nd attack.
  • 39. HMAC  In the 2nd attack, the attack is looking for 2 messages M and M’ that produce H(M)=H(M’)  A birthday attack requires a level of effort of 2n/2 for a hash length of n  MD5, 264 , looks feasible in today, so MD5 is unsuitable for HMAC?  The answer is no.  To attack MD5, attackers know the hash algorithm and IV, so they can generate the hash code for any message  In HMAC, attackers don’t know K, so they can’t generate the hash code.  So, to attack HMAC, attackers must observe a sequence of messages.  For a hash code of 128 bits, this requires 264 observed blocks with using the same key.  On a 1-Gbps, it takes 150,000 years to get a satisfied stream.  Thus, if speed is concern, MD5 is fully acceptable to use rather than SHA-1 as the embedded hash function for HMAC.