US Stimson Doctrine: Non-Recognition of Forced Territorial Changes
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The Henry Lewis Stimson Doctrine was a 1932 United States policy of non-recognition of international territorial changes executed by force. It was named after Secretary of State Henry Stimson and announced in response to Japan unilaterally seizing Manchuria from China in 1931. The doctrine held that the US would not acknowledge territorial gains made through military force and remained US policy regarding the Soviet annexation of the Baltic states until they regained independence in 1991. While the doctrine aimed to maintain open access to China, it had little practical impact and failed to deter Japan, which continued its aggression.
![Henry Lewis Stimson Doctrine:
The Stimson Doctrine is a policy of the United States federal
government, enunciated in a note of January 7, 1932, to Japan and
China, of non-recognition of international territorial changes that were
executed by force. Named after Henry L. Stimson, United States
Secretary of State in the Hoover Administration (1929–33), the policy
followed Japan's unilateral seizure of Manchuria in north eastern China
following action by Japanese soldiers at Mukden (now Shenyang), on
September 18, 1931.[2]
The doctrine was also invoked by U.S. Under-
Secretary of State Sumner Welles in a declaration of July 23, 1940, that
announced non-recognition of the Soviet annexation and incorporation
of the three Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania[3]
—and
remained the official U.S. position until the Baltic states regained
independence in 1991.
On January 7, 1932, Secretary Stimson sent identical notes to China
and Japan that incorporated a diplomatic approach used by earlier
secretaries facing crises in the Far East. Later known as the Stimson
Doctrine, or sometimes the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine, the notes read in
part as follows:
Stimson had stated that the United States would not recognize any
changes made in China that would curtail American treaty rights in the
area and that the "open door" must be maintained. The declaration had
few material effects on the Western world, which was burdened by
the Great Depression, and Japan went on to bomb Shanghai.[4]
The doctrine was criticized on the grounds that it did no more than
alienate the Japanese.[6]](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/henrylewisstimsondoctrine1-150311054534-conversion-gate01/85/Henry-lewis-stimson-doctrine-1-320.jpg)
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US Stimson Doctrine: Non-Recognition of Forced Territorial Changes
- 1. Henry Lewis Stimson Doctrine: The Stimson Doctrine is a policy of the United States federal government, enunciated in a note of January 7, 1932, to Japan and China, of non-recognition of international territorial changes that were executed by force. Named after Henry L. Stimson, United States Secretary of State in the Hoover Administration (1929–33), the policy followed Japan's unilateral seizure of Manchuria in north eastern China following action by Japanese soldiers at Mukden (now Shenyang), on September 18, 1931.[2] The doctrine was also invoked by U.S. Under- Secretary of State Sumner Welles in a declaration of July 23, 1940, that announced non-recognition of the Soviet annexation and incorporation of the three Baltic states—Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania[3] —and remained the official U.S. position until the Baltic states regained independence in 1991. On January 7, 1932, Secretary Stimson sent identical notes to China and Japan that incorporated a diplomatic approach used by earlier secretaries facing crises in the Far East. Later known as the Stimson Doctrine, or sometimes the Hoover-Stimson Doctrine, the notes read in part as follows: Stimson had stated that the United States would not recognize any changes made in China that would curtail American treaty rights in the area and that the "open door" must be maintained. The declaration had few material effects on the Western world, which was burdened by the Great Depression, and Japan went on to bomb Shanghai.[4] The doctrine was criticized on the grounds that it did no more than alienate the Japanese.[6]