tugas mata kuliah Filsafat dan Sejarah Olahraga

1. MAKALAH
RIVIEW ARTIKEL JOURNAL OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT: IN
ANSWER TO ORWELL: A DEFENCE OF INTERNATIONAL SPORT
Dosen Pengampu :
Dr. Made Pramono, S.S., M.Hum.
Disusun Oleh :
Adi Sanjaya
20060484061
2020 B
UNIVERSITAS NEGERI SURABAYA
FAKULTAS ILMU OLAHRAGA
JURUSAN PENDIDIKAN KESEHATAN DAN REKREASI
TAHUN AKADEMIK 2020
KATA PENGANTAR

2. Assalamualaikum Wr. Wb. Bismillah dengan memanjatkan puji syukur kehadirat Allah
SWT yang telah memberikan rahmat dan hidayah-Nya sehingga saya dapat menyelesaikan
tugas makalah yang berjudul “RIVIEW ARTIKEL JOURNAL OF THE PHILOSOPHY
OF SPORT: IN ANSWER TO ORWELL: A DEFENCE OF INTERNATIONAL
SPORT” ini tepat pada waktunya.
Adapun tujuan dari penulisan dari makalah ini adalah untuk memenuhi tugas pada mata
kuliah Filsafat dan Sejarah Olahraga. Selain itu, makalah ini juga bertujuan untuk menambah
wawasan tentang SEBAGAI JAWABAN UNTUK ORWELL: PEMBELAAN
OLAHRAGA INTERNASIONAL bagi para pembaca dan juga bagi penulis.
Saya mengucapkan terima kasih kepada semua pihak yang telah membagi sebagian
pengetahuannya sehingga saya dapat menyelesaikan makalah ini.
Saya menyadari, makalah yang saya tulis ini masih jauh dari kata sempurna. Oleh karena
itu, kritik dan saran yang membangun akan saya nantikan demi kesempurnaan makalah ini.
Sekian dan terima kasih Wassalamualaikum Wr. Wb.
Gresik, 13 Maret 2021
Adi Sanjaya

3. DAFTAR ISI
KATA PENGANTAR ......................................................................................................ii
DAFTAR ISI.................................................................................................................... iii
ARTIKEL.........................................................................................................................iv
RIVEW ARTIKEL ...........................................................................................................1
BAB I
PENDAHULUAN ............................................................................................................1
BAB II
PEMBAHSAN ..................................................................................................................2
BAB III
PENUTUP.........................................................................................................................3
LINK ONLINE .................................................................................................................3
DAFTAR PUSTAKA .......................................................................................................3

4. Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
ISSN: (Print) (Online) Journal homepage:
https://www.tandfonline.com/loi/rjps20
In answer to Orwell: a defence of international
sport
Brandon Robshaw
To cite this article: Brandon Robshaw (2020): In answer to Orwell: a defence of
international sport, Journal of the Philosophy of Sport, DOI:
10.1080/00948705.2020.1845186
To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2020.1845186
Published online: 11 Nov 2020.
Submit your article to this journal
Article views: 23
View related articles
View Crossmark data
Full Terms & Conditions of access and use can be found at
https://www.tandfonline.com/action/journalInformation?journalCode=rjps2

5. JOURNAL OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT
https://doi.org/10.1080/00948705.2020.1845186
ARTICLE
In answer to Orwell: a defence of international sport Brandon Robshaw
Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences, Open University, Milton Keynes, UK
ABSTRACT
This paper first considers and rebuts George Orwell's case against
international sport. He argues both from general principles and specific
examples that international sporting contests lead to orgies of nationalism
and exacerbate animosities between nations. In response I argue that his
examples are cherry
picked, pathological cases. I then consider the argument of Gleaves and
Llewellyn, which objects to international sport on a) ethical and b) lusory
grounds. Drawing on the work of Iorwerth and Hardman I claim that the
ethical problems are not intrinsic to international sport and can be avoided
or miti
gated; while their lusory argument relies on a single-value definition of elite
sport that can be contested. I conclude that neither Orwell nor Gleaves and
Llewellyn make a successful case against international sport and that it
provides goods that they do not acknowledge.
KEYWORDS International sport; elite sport; nationalism; Patriotism; George
Orwell; J. Gleaves; M. Llewellyn; H. Iorwerth; A. Hardman; David Miller
In the autumn of 1945, the Soviet football team Moscow Dynamo toured Great
Britain playing friendly fixtures against leading British clubs. Only the fixtures
were not so friendly. In an essay ‘The Sporting Spirit’, originally published in
Tribune, George Orwell claimed that the four matches aroused much bad
feeling, leading to crowd trouble and on-pitch violence between players. The
only effect of the tour, he says, ‘will have been to create fresh animosity on
both sides’ (Orwell 2000a, 322). And Orwell argues that this is no accident; it
is, he says, in the nature of the international sport that it leads to ill-will: ‘Even
if one didn’t know from concrete examples (the 1936 Olympics, for instance)
that international sporting contests lead to orgies of hatred, one could deduce
it from general principles’ (2000a, 322).
Much more recently, Gleaves and Llewellyn (2014) have also made a case
against sport between nations (inter-national, with a hyphen, sport as they term
it to distinguish it from non-hyphenated international sport, which is sport
played by teams of mixed nationalities). Their case overlaps with Orwell’s and
indeed they cite him in support, but they also offer additional grounds for
objection. They first provide an ethical argument, that inter
CONTACT Brandon Robshaw b.g.d.robshaw@open.ac.uk
© 2020 IAPS
2 B. ROBSHAW

6. national sport perpetuates power-relations inherited from Western colonial
ism, reaffirms Western cultural hegemony, and also encourages over
generalised and unfair nationalist narratives, fuelling the bad feeling that
Orwell was concerned about. On top of that they offer an objection not
considered at all by Orwell: a lusory argument, that inter-national sport fails to
deliver competition at the very highest levels, because of the quotas for
national entrants necessarily required by contests such as the Olympics or the
football World Cup.
My aim is to rebut both sets of objections and to offer a defence of
international sport while conceding that Orwell and Gleaves and Llewellyn do
point to some problematic features.
Let us start with Orwell. I should begin by saying that his essay is a brilliant
piece of polemic. It is highly enjoyable to read and one finds oneself smiling in
appreciation of his caustic wit. But I disagree very strongly with his con clusion,
which is that international sport is best avoided. But first I should set out the
main points of his critique, which is in two parts. In presenting his case, Orwell
claims that it is supported both by concrete examples and general principles. I
shall take those one by one.
The concrete examples he gives are striking and appear at first to support
his view: as well as the Moscow Dynamos tour and the 1936 Berlin Olympics,
he also cites the ‘Bodyline’ cricket tour of 1932/3, the behaviour of crowds at
boxing matches, especially when the fighters are of different races, and cases
of crowd trouble at football matches in Burma, India and Spain.
He does not maintain that such cases cause nationalistic passions. They
exacerbate them. As he memorably puts it: ‘If you wanted to add to the vast
fund of ill-will existing in the world at this moment, you could hardly do it better
than by a series of football matches between Jews and Arabs, Germans and
Czechs, Indians and British, Russians and Poles, and Italians and Jugoslavs,
each match to be watched by a mixed audience of 100,000 spectators’ (2000a,
324). Some of those matches would still be flashpoints today, and no doubt we
can think of other sporting confrontations that would not be a good idea in
current geopolitical circumstances.
But we should note that these are not normal cases. They are pathological
cases. The Berlin Olympics is notorious precisely because it was an orgy of
nationalism which was not typical of how Olympic Games were and are
normally conducted. Now, of course, international sport like anything else can
go wrong. Sometimes pairings between nations are a recipe for disaster.
Orwell’s international football match between Jews and Arabs watched by a
mixed crowd of 100,000 spectators would not be a recipe for harmony today
any more than it was in 1945. But this does not mean we should give up
international sport; merely that some specific confrontations are best avoided,
and steps can be taken to avoid them by the regulatory bodies concerned. In
the same way, it would usually be a bad idea to invite both
JOURNAL OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT 3
halves of a recently divorced couple to the same party, but this does not
mean we should stop having parties.
What Orwell is doing is cherry-picking his examples. I shall have more to say

7. about cherry-picking. Gleaves and Llewellyn argue that, when trying to assess
by means of concrete examples whether inter-national sport has on balance
good or bad effects, we cannot help but cherry-pick. I shall dispute this.
But let us now deal with Orwell’s argument from general principles, which
goes something like this. Sport is (necessarily) competitive. When questions of
prestige become involved – that is, when one fears that losing will disgrace or
humiliate some power-unit that is larger than the player or team – com
petitiveness leads to ‘the most savage combative instincts’ (2000a, 322), not
merely on the part of the players but on the part of the spectators. This is
evident, he says, even in football matches between schools, but is far more
intense in international matches where tens of thousands of spectators may be
watching, and millions awaiting the results back in the home nations.
Orwell makes a plausible story of it. But is it really a deduction from general
principles? One could put it in the form of a deductive argument to yield the
conclusion ‘All international sport inflames nationalist passions to an
unacceptable degree’, or something of the sort. But to do this one would have
to rely on some sweeping premises, using the word ‘all’, which would be
demonstrably untrue. The fact is that the majority of international sporting
events do not arouse vicious nationalist passions. They arouse rivalry and flag-
waving and one may become emotionally engaged in them for the duration of
the contest, but they do not as a rule to produce or increase lasting animosity.
And to the extent that they do, it is a kind of circumscribed, contextualised
animosity that can be worked off in the next, eagerly anticipated fixture
between the nations. For international sporting contests form part of a
continuing and self contained story. Defeat can always be avenged next time.
And inciden tally, defeat is not always, as Orwell assumes, humiliating: a defeat
can be narrow, valiant, or honourable and can sometimes even feel like a moral
victory.
I conclude therefore that neither Orwell’s concrete examples nor his argu
ment from general principles leads to his conclusion that international sport is
best avoided. Let us now turn to the more considered, philosophical case
made by Gleaves and Llewellyn.
Gleaves and Llewellyn choose not to argue from concrete examples
because, they say, one could find innumerable examples on either side of the
argument: cases where international sport has led to respect and toler ance
and other positive outcomes as well as cases where ‘such competition
reaffirms national, political, religious, racial and ethnic divisions between
countries’ (2014, 7). Since focusing on the consequences of international
4 B. ROBSHAW
sport is ambiguous in this way, it is likely to lead to ‘intellectual cherry picking’
and is, therefore, best avoided.
I do agree that cherry-picking of evidence is always a risk and an intellec tual
failing, but I am not convinced that it is in this case inevitable. To avoid it one
would need to secure an agreement between the proponent and the opponent
of inter-national sport on what measurable outcomes would count as evidence.
It does not seem far-fetched to think they could agree that, say, data on
tourism, trade agreements, consumer habits, diplomatic treaties, state visits

8. and cultural exchanges would be both relevant and measurable. Then one
could see how these variables were affected, over a given period, by sporting
contests between nations. I am not aware that any such study has been done
and it would, no doubt, require a good deal of research, data collection and
sophisticated statistical and analytical techniques but it is not in principle
impossible. Of course, it might turn out that the results of the study were
themselves ambiguous, raising the risk of cherry-picking all over again. But
there is no reason to assume that in advance.
Pending the results of such an empirical investigation, however, let us meet
Gleaves and Llewellyn on their own turf. They make two categorical arguments
against international sport. By ‘categorical’ I mean that they critique not the
consequences of international sport but the features which they regard as
intrinsic to it. The first of these arguments is ethical, the second lusory. I shall
take them one by one.
Their ethical argument focuses first on the post-colonial nature of inter
national sport. Nearly all of the sports practised at international level have
western origins – in many cases, they were developed and codified in mid
Victorian Britain – and were exported as part of colonial rule. Far from being
inclusive, inter-national sport, in Gleaves and Llewellyn’s view, ‘reaffirms old
power dynamics and cultural hegemony, all in the name of “international ism”.
Thus, advocating inter-national sport as a vehicle for spreading sport around
the world shows undesirable biases toward traditional western powers’ (2014,
9).
This is not their main ethical argument and I need not spend very much time
on it. Clearly many aspects of international culture owe their origins to a murky
colonial past – railways, for example. It just does not seem to me to be true
that every time a person catches a train in India they are showing an
undesirable bias towards western powers. Probably the majority of inven tions
or institutions have bloody pasts in one way or another, but they may well have
outgrown their origins to be blameless and beneficial in their new, modern-day
contexts. Besides, it is not intrinsic to inter-national sport that the games or
contests are of western origin.
In any case, Gleaves and Llewellyn make that as a subsidiary point before
moving on to their main ethical objection: that inter-national sport ‘helps craft
narratives about nations and their place in the world’ (2014, 9).
JOURNAL OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT 5
Commentary and discussion focus on national stereotypes such as the ‘indus
trious and organised Germans’, ‘the beautiful and free-flowing Brazilians’, as
well as more derogatory labels like the ‘talented but undisciplined’ Africans
(2014, 9). Moreover, inter-national sport offers endless opportunities for re
hashing stories of old grievances and rivalries, as between Russians and
Poles or English and Argentinians. Inter-national sport thus creates or
cements mythologies about nations’ or races’ capacities and histories.
Gleaves and Llewellyn argue that this is not a dispensable but an inherent
feature of inter national sport: ‘False narratives are not contingent but
fundamental parts of inter-national sport’ (2014, 10).
Let us agree that inauthentic narratives are not a good thing, either in sport

9. or anywhere else. But why are Gleaves and Llewellyn so sure that this is an
intrinsic feature of inter-national sport? It seems to me that narratives are an
intrinsic feature of inter-national sport. That they must be untruthful is
unproven. Most likely they are a mixture of truth, partial truth and falsehood,
and moreover a mixture that changes over time with new experience and
mature reflection: that is, if they are like the narratives that we tell ourselves in
all other areas of life.
Iorwerth and Hardman (2015) also take issue with the simplistic focus that
Gleaves and Llewellyn have on the truth or falsehood of narratives. Inter
national sport, they argue, is rather a forum for debate and discussion about
national cultures. Among the examples they present is the case of Algerian
athlete Hassiba Boulmerka, considered in an earlier paper by WJ Morgan.
Iorwerth and Hardman state that Boulmerka’s ‘decisionnot to abide by Muslim
modesty rules when competing led to significant controversy among a vocal
group of Muslims in Algeria. According to Morgan (1998), the inter-national
athletic community served as the vehicle for meaningful cultural dialogue about
cultural and religious differences, and ultimately about democracy and
freedom’ (Iorwerth and Hardman 2015, 435).
I contend, then, that the most Gleaves and Llewellyn have shown is that
inter-national sport can lead to inauthentic narratives, not that it must do so.
Iorwerth and Hardman are correct to stress that it also provides opportunities
for questioning, challenging and modifying narratives.
What, then, of Gleaves and Llewellyn’s other argument against inter national
sport, the lusory argument? The argument runs like this. What is meaningful
about inter-national sport, what makes it worth competing in and watching, is
the idea that the performances are at an elite level, where talent, training,
tactics and teamwork decide the victors, not luck or privilege. Athletic
excellence alone is rewarded. It is for this reason that winning is so significant.
Inter-national contests, however, do not select entrants on merit alone, but also
on their nationality. In competitions such as the World Cup in football, there are
quotas for each continent. The quota for Africa, for instance, is five nations. It
could be the case that the sixth-best team in
6 B. ROBSHAW
Africa one year is better than some of the European teams (who are allowed
thirteen entrants). And in any case, however one fixes the quotas, each nation
can only enter one team, so some of the top players in the world will be left at
home. Or, to take Gleaves’ and Llewellyn’s own example, at the Olympics each
nation is only allowed three entrants for each individual event. The fourth best
Chinese table-tennis player could actually be the fourth-best in the world. But
he won’t be at the Olympics. Gleaves and Llewellyn on these grounds favour
competitions such as the UEFA Champions League where teams of mixed
nationality compete, and these teams select their players on merit alone – or
at least merit plus availability and affordability.
There is some force to this argument. It is a great pity, for example, that
George Best, one of the most naturally talented players ever to play the game
of football, was never able to showcase his skills at a World Cup because
Northern Ireland never qualified. One might counter that football is a team sport
and if Northern Ireland, even with Best in the team, were not good enough to

10. qualify then they had no right to be at the World Cup. But a global football
tournament organised on a different, non-national basis – a club basis, for
instance – would certainly have featured Best, as well as other highly talented
players from small nations who would not otherwise have been there. And
indeed Best did play in the then-equivalent of the European Champions
League, which is club-based rather than nation-based.
However, this is not a decisive argument against the playing of inter
national sport. Iorwerth and Hardman offer counter-arguments on two fronts:
first, on the general conceptual claim that international sport by its nature
cannot be genuinely elite; and second, on the evaluative claim that athletic
excellence is the only thing that matters.
On the conceptual claim they make two main points: one, despite the
limitations mentioned, inter-national sport does allow the very best athletes or
teams in the world to win events. It may not be so good at deciding who is the
fourth best. But it does offer the chance to see the very best athletes in the
world perform and, because there are qualification requirements, the level of
competition is high. The second point is that the de-nationalised forms of multi-
national sport that Gleaves and Llewellyn favour do little better on this count.
The UEFA Champions League also has quotas. The fifth best team in the
Premier League, who do not qualify, may be superior to a team that qualifies
from a weaker national league. It is hard to see how this problem can be
avoided altogether. Admittedly it can be mitigated. Tennis tournaments such
as Wimbledon, for example, do not have quotas and use a seeding system so
that the top players do not meet too early. Such tournaments are in principle
open to everyone as it is possible to enter by winning pre-tournament
qualification matches: an unknown player could make it deep into the
tournament through talent alone. Nevertheless, it is in the nature of knock-out
competitions that some players could exit earlier
JOURNAL OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT 7
than less-talented rivals. One cannot guarantee that the winner of Match A is a
better player than the loser of Match B, for they have not met. There are of
course round-robin competitions where each player plays every other player.
But these are only realistically possible where small numbers of entrants are
involved. A round-robin system at Wimbledon would mean that each singles
player would have to play 127 matches.
The more fundamental argument against Gleaves and Llewellyn, however,
is the challenge to their claim that the lusory value of elite sport rests entirely
on the pursuit of athletic excellence. Gleaves and Llewellyn argue that elite
sport ‘has certain principles that distinguish it from other forms of sport such as
recreational orcompetitive sport or pedagogical sport designed to teach moral
values’ (2014, 4). The core principle, in their view, is that elite sport values
athletic supremacy over other values; talent is more important than identity.
International sport thus runs counter to the core principle of elite sport, where
national identity is a key factor both in the selection of compet ing teams and
individuals and the spectators’ attitudes towards their perfor mances. Gleaves
and Llewellyn do address the response that competitions such as the Olympic
or Paralympic Games are not solely concerned with elite sport but aim to foster
other, humanistic values too (2014, 5). Their response is that: a) even if this

11. were true of the Olympics and Paralympics, the objec tion still stands for other
inter-national sporting contests; and b) the Olympics and Paralympics do
promote and celebrate elite sport (‘faster, higher, stron
ger’) and therein lies their appeal.
Gleaves and Llewellyn’s argument thus sharply distinguishes elite sport from
all other forms of sport. Elite sport is defined in extremely narrow terms: athletic
excellent alone is to be valued. But this seems a somewhat arbitrary stipulation.
If one simply defines elite sport as excluding all other values besides athletic
excellence, then by definition inter-national sport is not elite, or not fully elite.
But why should one accept that definition? When watching elite sport most
spectators value other qualities too. Even if we take nationality out of the
reckoning, grace, style, aesthetic appeal and a sense of fair play are all valued
qualities in addition to athletic excellence. Knowledge of the history or
biography of teams or individuals may also condition our responses. Gleaves
and Llewellyn’s characterisation of elite sport seems too rarefied, too far
removed from the reasons why sport actually is valued and appreciated.
To separate elite sport from the rest of sport in this way requires an almost
inhuman detachment. In real life, we value sport, at all levels, for a bundle of
reasons. Iorwerth and Hardman cite the work of Kretchmar, whose article
‘Pluralistic Internalism’ (2015) identifies six different models of the way that
sport is played and valued. All the models do include an idea of competition
and excellence, but they also offer additional reasons for valuing sport, such
as opportunity and participation (Model 2) and personal expression and
8 B. ROBSHAW
creativity (Model 5) (see Iorwerth and Hardman 2015, 430). Most relevant for
our purposes here, Kretchmar’s Model 6 includes ‘the role that sport can play
in fuelling communal identity and a sense of belonging and thus an oppor
tunity to participate in something that transcends the individual’ (cited in
Iorwerth and Hardman 2015, 430).
There seems no reason, then, why the lusory value of elite sport should not
comprehend other elements besides athletic excellence. No doubt excellence
forms a larger proportion of its value at the elite level. I am unpersuaded that it
should form 100% of the value.
To conclude: on the ethical side of things, Orwell, and Gleaves and Llewellyn
do point to some potentially troubling effects of inter-national sport, but they
are not peculiar to inter-national sport neither is it impossible to avoid or
mitigate them. Orwell in another of his essays, ‘Notes on Nationalism’, makes
a distinction between patriotism and nationalism. Patriotism, he says, is
‘devotion to a particular place and a particular way of life which one believes
to be the best in the world but has no wish to force on other people’ (2000b,
300). He contrasts this with nationalism which he says means, first, ‘the habit
of assuming that human beings can be classified like insects and whole blocks
of millions or tens of millions of people can be confidently labelled good or bad’
and second ‘identifying oneself with a single nation or other units, placing it
beyond good and evil and recognis ing no other duty than that of advancing its
interests (2000b, 300). For Orwell, then, patriotism is benign, while nationalism
is pernicious. Patriotism in Orwell’s sense seems to equate closely with the

12. idea of liberal nationalism advocated by David Miller, which aims at ‘a world in
which different peoples can pursue their own national projects in a spirit of
friendly rivalry, but in which none attempts to control, exploit or undermine the
others’ (Miller 1995, 189–90).
Orwell makes the assumption in ‘The Sporting Spirit’, on the basis of a few
handpicked examples, that international sport inflames nationalism, rather than
nourishes patriotism. Yet I do not see why it cannot in principle both nourish
patriotism within a nation and help to inculcate the spirit of friendly rivalry
between nations that Miller speaks of. One positive feature of interna tional
sport, which neither Orwell nor Gleaves and Llewellyn acknowledge, is that it
offers a working model of how universal rules can be impartially applied and
generally respected; which seems a very useful model for the international
community.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
JOURNAL OF THE PHILOSOPHY OF SPORT 9
References
Gleaves, J., and M. Llewellyn. 2014. “Ethics, Nationalism, and the Imagined
Community: The Case against Inter-National Sport.” Journal of the Philosophy
of Sport 41 (1): 1–19. doi:10.1080/00948705.2013.785427.
Iorwerth, H., and A. Hardman. 2015. “The Case for Inter-national Sport: A Reply
to Gleaves and Llewellyn.” Journal of the Philosophy of Sport 42 (3): 425–441.
doi:10.1080/00948705.2015.1036876.
Miller, D. 1995. On Nationality. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Morgan, W. J., 1998, 'Multinational Sport and Literary Practices and Their
Communities: The Moral Salience of Cultural Narratives.' In Ethics and Sport,
edited by M. Macnamee and S.J. Parry, 184–284. London: FN Spon.
Orwell, G. 2000a. “Notes on Nationalism.” In Essays, 321–324. London:
Penguin Modern Classics.
Orwell, G. 2000b. “The Sporting Spirit.” In Essays, 300–317. London: Penguin
Modern Classics.

14. 1
RIVIEW ARTIKEL
Judul In answer to Orwell: a defence of international sport
Pengarang Brandon Robshaw
Nama Jurnal Journal of the Philosophy of Sport
Volume, Tahun
Issue, Halaman
Volume 48, 2021 - Issue 1, 1-9
BAB I
PENDAHULUAN
1.1 Latar belakang
Pada musim gugur tahun 1945, tim sepak bola Soviet Moscow Dynamo melakukan tur ke
Inggris Raya untuk memainkan pertandingan persahabatan melawan klub-klub Inggris
terkemuka. Hanya perlengkapannya yang tidak begitu ramah. Dalam sebuah esai 'The
Sporting Spirit', yang awalnya diterbitkan di Tribune, George Orwell mengklaim bahwa
keempat pertandingan itu menimbulkan banyak perasaan tidak enak, yang menyebabkan
masalah penonton dan kekerasan di lapangan antar pemain. Satu-satunya efek tur, katanya,
'akan menciptakan permusuhan baru di kedua sisi' (Orwell 2000a, 322). Dan Orwell
berpendapat bahwa ini bukanlah kebetulan; Ini, katanya, dalam sifat olahraga internasional
yang mengarah pada niat buruk: 'Bahkan jika seseorang tidak tahu dari contoh konkret
(Olimpiade 1936, misalnya) bahwa kontes olahraga internasional mengarah pada pesta pora
kebencian, seseorang dapat menyimpulkannya dari prinsip-prinsip umum '(2000a, 322).
1.2 Rumusan Masalah
Bagaimana Brandon Robshaw mempertimbangkan dan membantah kasus George Orwell
terhadap olahraga internasional?
1.3 Manfaat
Mengetahui bagaimana Brandon Robshaw mempertimbangkan dan membantah kasus
George Orwell terhadap olahraga internasional.

15. 2
BAB II
PEMBAHASAN
Baru-baru ini, Gleaves dan Llewellyn (2014) juga mengajukan kasus melawan olahraga
antar negara (antar-nasional, dengan tanda hubung, olahraga yang mereka sebut untuk
membedakannya dari olahraga internasional tanpa tanda hubung, yaitu olahraga yang
dimainkan oleh tim-tim dari kebangsaan campuran). Kasus mereka tumpang tindih dengan
Orwell dan memang mereka mengutipnya untuk mendukung, tetapi mereka juga menawarkan
alasan tambahan untuk keberatan.
Tujuan Brandon Robshaw adalah untuk membantah kedua set keberatan dan menawarkan
pembelaan olahraga internasional sambil mengakui bahwa Orwell dan Gleaves dan Llewellyn
memang menunjukkan beberapa fitur yang bermasalah.
Oleh karena itu, Brandon Robshaw menyimpulkan bahwa baik contoh konkret Orwell
maupun argumennya dari prinsip-prinsip umum mengarah pada kesimpulannya bahwa
olahraga internasional sebaiknya dihindari. Sekarang mari kita beralih ke kasus filosofis yang
lebih dipertimbangkan yang dibuat oleh Gleaves dan Llewellyn.
Gleaves dan Llewellyn memilih untuk tidak berdebat dari contoh konkret karena, kata
mereka, orang dapat menemukan contoh yang tak terhitung banyaknya di kedua sisi
argumen: kasus di mana olahraga internasional telah mengarah pada rasa hormat dan
toleransi dan hasil positif lainnya serta kasus di mana 'persaingan seperti itu menegaskan
kembali perpecahan nasional, politik, agama, ras dan etnis antar negara '(2014, 7). Karena
berfokus pada konsekuensi internasional olahragabersifat ambigu dalam hal ini, kemungkinan
besar akan mengarah pada 'pemetikan ceri intelektual' dan, oleh karena itu, sebaiknya
dihindari.

16. 3
BAB III
PENUTUPAN
3.1 Kesimpulan
Untuk menyimpulkan: di sisi etika, Orwell, dan Gleaves dan Llewellyn memang
menunjukkan beberapa efek yang berpotensi mengganggu dari olahraga antar-nasional, tetapi
mereka tidak khas dalam olahraga antar-nasional juga tidak mungkin untuk menghindari atau
menguranginya.
3.2 Saran
Sesuai dengan apa yang disampaikan oleh Brandon Robshaw bahwa seharusnya argument
dari Orwell, dan Gleaves dan Llewellyn harus memiliki difinisi yang yang tidak bisa
dinganggu gugat. Saran yang bisa disampaikan untuk penulis riview ini adalah banyak-
banyak membaca dan menggali informasi terkait apa yang sedang diriview.
LINK
DAFTAR PUSTAKA
Robshaw B 2020. In answer to Orwell: a defence of international sport. Journal of the
Philosophy of Sport. 48. 1-9