Bhopal Gas Tragedy

DISASTER MITIGATION AND MANAGEMENT
CASE STUDY
BHOPAL GAS TRAGEDY- THE NIGHT OF DEATH
Submitted By: Anjali Dubey(01308142019)

The pre - event phase
• The process that led to leakage

• How many got affected
with disaster
The event phase

08:
PREVENTING
“NEW
BHOPALS”

❑ AIM:
• To study about the tragic incident happened in Bhopal and how it impacted People and also to
evaluate the level of preparedness, response, mitigation techniques adopted and thus provide
needed recommendations for future strategies.
❑ OBJECTIVES:
• To know the actual reason behind this tragedy.
• To know who was basically responsible for Bhopal gas tragedy.
• To know what actions had been taken by the government for the
victims and as well as against the culprit.
• To study of Immediate Effect of Bhopal Disaster.
a) THE GAS CLOUD c) ACUTE EFFECT
b) RELEASE THEORIES d) HYDROGEN CYANIDE DEBATE
• To study of Long term Effect of Bhopal Disaster.
a) LONG TERM HEALTH EFFECTS d) ENVIRONMENTAL
b) HEATH CARE e) ECONOMIC REHABILITATION
c) OCCUPATION AND HABITATION REHABILITATION
• To study of Effected areas/places due to Disaster in Bhopal.
• Also see the aftermath of the incident.

WHAT IS DISASTER?
It is a catastrophic situation in which the normal pattern of life or eco-system has been disrupted and
extra-ordinary emergency interventions are required to save and preserve lives and or the environment.
According to the United Nations, disaster is- “The Occurrence Of Sudden Or Major Misfortune Which
Disrupts The Basic Fabric And Normal Functioning Of The Society Or Community”
This reports covers CHEMICAL DISASTER(man-made disaster)
CHEMICAL DISASTERS
A chemical accident is the unintentional release of one or more hazardous substances which could harm
human health or the environment. Chemical hazards are systems where chemical accidents could occur
under certain circumstances. Such events include fires, explosions, leakages or releases of toxic or
hazardous materials that can cause people illness, injury, disability or death.
Chemical disasters may arise in number of ways
o Process and safety systems failures
i. Human errors
ii. Technical errors
iii. Management errors
o Induced effect of natural calamities
o Accidents during the transportation
o Hazardous waste processing/ disposal
o Terrorist attack

Impacts of Chemical Disaster
Major Consequences:
• Loss of life/injuries
• Impact on livestock
• Damage to Flora/ Fauna
• Environmental Impact (air, soil, water)
• Financial losses to industry.

Major Industrial Disasters in India
Bombay Docks Explosion
April 14, 1944
Freighter SS Fort Stikine caught fire and
resulted in two massive blasts in the Victoria
Dock of Bombay. Nearly 800 people died
and some 80,000 were left homeless.
Chasnala Mining Disaster
December 27, 1975
A huge explosion rocked the Chasnala Colliery
in Dhanbad killing 372 miners. The explosion is
supposed to have caused by sparks from
equipment igniting a pocket of flammable
methane gas.
Union Carbide Gas Tragedy
December 2-3, 1984
Nearly 5295 people died and
5,27,894 were affected after
being exposed to some 40 tonnes of
methyl isocyanate gas leaked from a
pesticide plant owned by the US
multinational, Union Carbide Corp, in
Bhopal.
Korba Chimney Collapse
September 23, 2009
45 people died when a chimney under
construction at a power plant at the Bharat
Aluminium Company (Balco) collapsed in
Korba in Chhattisgarh.
Jaipur Oil Depot Fire
October 29, 2009
An oil fire at IOC depot’s giant tank in the
Sitapura Industrial Area on the outskirts of
Jaipur killed 12 people and injured at least
130. The blaze continued for more than a
week.
Mayapuri Radiolgical Accident
2010
A big radiation scare hit the national capita
when one person was killed and 8 others
hospitalized at AIIMS after exposure to
radioactive substances at the Mayapuri scrap
yard in West Delhi.
Visakhapatnam HPCL Refinery Blast
August 23, 2013
23 people were killed on when a blast
caused due to sparks originating from
welding after a heavy build-up of
hydrocarbons in a pipeline, led to the
collapse of the cooling

Major Industrial Disasters in India
Nagaram GAIL Pipeline Explosion
June, 2014
18 people were killed and 40 injured
when a massive fire broke out after a
blast in the GAIL underground gas
pipeline in the coastal village of
Nagaram in Andhra Pradesh. Bhilai Steel Plant Gas Leak
2014
Six people were killed and over 40 injured
due to a leakage in methane gas
pipeline at a water pump house in the
Bhilai Steel Plant in Durg district in
Chattisgarh.
Tughlakabad Gas Leak
2017
As many as 200 school students of the
Rani Jhansi School for Girls were
admitted to the hospital after chemical
gas leakage from a container truck at
the customs area of Tughlakabad depot
in South Delhi.
Kanpur Ammonia Gas Leak
March 15, 2017
Five people were killed and 9 others
injured when ammonia leaked from the
gas chamber of a cold storage facility at
Shivrajpur in Kanpur district of Uttar
Pradesh.
Belur Chlorine Gas Leak
May, 2017
More than 10 people fell sick and were
rushed to the hospital following a chlorine gas
leak at a water treatment plant at
Gandehalli in Belur in South Karnataka.
Bhilai Steel Plant Pipeline Blast
2018
An explosion in a gas pipeline connected to the
coke oven section of the Steel Plant in Bhilai,
Chhatisgarh, operated by SAIL, resulted in the
death of 9 people and injured

❑ ABOUT
• Bhopal is the capital city of the Indian state of Madhya Pradesh and the
administrative headquarters of both Bhopal district and Bhopal division.
• It is known as the City of Lakes for its various natural and artificial lakes and for
being one of the greenest cities in India.
• It is the 16th largest city in India and 131st in the world, Founded by Raja Bhoj.
• After formation of Madhya Pradesh, the state capital Bhopal was a part of
the Sehore district.
• It was bifurcated in 1972 and a new district Bhopal was formed.
• One of the 21 Fastest Growing Cities in India. Bhopal is the 20th largest urban
agglomeration in India.
• It is 744 km south of New-Delhi and 779 km northwest of Mumbai.
Map Source: Bhopal Master Plan 1991
BHOPAL
METROPOLIS CAPITAL
❑ LOCATION

Municipal land
areas: 28717
Hectares
Average elevation
of 422 meters(1401
ft.)
Is just north of the
upper limit the
vindhya mountain
ranges. Located on
the Malwa plateau
Latitude: 23
degrees 16 minute
North
Longitude: 77
degrees 36 minute
East
The major hills in Bhopal comprise of
Idgah Hills and Shyamala Hills in the
northern region and Arera Hills in the
central region
Geography and Natural Resources
.
• City's geography has in it two lakes namely upper lake and
lower lake.
• The catchment area of the Upper Lake is 361 km² while that
of the Lower Lake is 9.6 km².
• The Upper Lake drains into the Kolar River.
• The Van Vihar National Park is a national park situated
besides the Upper Lake.

CONNECTIVITY • The NH12 and NH86 intersect
each other at Bhopal
connecting Jaipur, Jabalpur,
Raisen and Dewas.
• Bhopal is a transit point to travel
between Indore, Hoshangabad,
Sehore, Raisen , Kolar, Vidisha
and Sanchi.
• Roads could not be developed
due to topographical
configurations and site conditions
are:
1. Road from village Chunabhatti to
Bhadbhada
2. Road from Asha Niketan to the
proposed Ring Road along Bhopal-
Itarsi Railway line.
• 10% annum growth in vehicular
traffic over the last decade, of
which 80% are 2 wheelers Walk
44%
MIC Plant

❑ BACKGROUND STUDY OF DISASTER:
1970s
Late 1970s and early 1980s Competition forces
“backward integration”.
MMIC manufactured at Bhopal site.
• Drought causes drop in market demand
for Sevin–safety and maintenance lax
• Plant conformed to much laxer standards
than sister plant US.
Indian Government invites UCC to set up Sevin
plant-
• Plant built in Bhopal at central location and
transport infrastructure.
• Indian Government has 22% stake in UCIL
(UCC’s India Subsidiary).
• Plant initially approved for formulation only
(built in area zoned forelight industrial use).
Late 1970s and early 1980

• Medical Officer
brought into notice
the hazard posed
by the factory
• Jan 1982, 24 persons
affected by
Phosgene
• Feb 1982 – 18
persons affected by
MIC leak
EVENTS PRIOR TO TRAGEDY
Plant Operator
Killed By Gas
Leak(Phosgene)
Dec
1981
• Reported leaks of
phosgene MIC and
chloroform
• Ruptures in
pipework and
sealed joints
• Poor adjustment of
certain devices
where excessive
pressure could lead
to water entering
the circuits
May 1982 Report
by Americans
on UCC plant
May
1982
• 200 skilled workers
asked to resign
• Only 1 person in
control room
• June 1984- 30 ton
refrigeration cooling
the MIC system was
shutdown
• Oct 1984- Vent Gas
Scrubber was
turned off, Flare was
extinguished
All energy
concentrated
on cost cutting
1983
onw-
ards

CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS LEADING TO INCIDENT
Inside Union Carbide Outside the company
• 1100: Bhopal established
• Until 1860: undeveloped
• 1860-1945: community dependent on agriculture for
tax revenue
1934: UCIL • 1947: independence
• 1950: population 70,000
1950s: UCIL expands into chemicals • 1956: Bhopal becomes state capital
• 1965: government pesticide market
1969: Agri Products Division • Booming pesticides market
• Mid 1970s: heavy competition
1978: licensed to make MIC
1981: MIC plant • 1980-1982: bad weather
1981-1984: cut-backs • 1984: population 850,000; lack of infrastructure
1982: safety defects (OSS)
1984: Oct. tank loses pressure; Nov. second tank loses pressure; 2 Dec. 11 p.m.: pipe washing; 3 Dec. 1 a.m.: accident
occurred

i. The alarms of MIC tank had not worked since past four years
ii. Only single manual back-up system as compared to USA where four-stage system was used
iii. The flare tower and the vent gas scrubber had been out of service for five months before the disaster
due to which flare tower could only hold a quarter of the gas that leaked during the incidence
iv. The refrigeration system was idle and the MIC was kept at 20 degrees Celsius, not the 4.5 degrees as
suggested by the manual
v. Due to absence of slip-bound plates, the water leaked into the MIC tanks from pipes being cleaned ,
Faulty valves were not installed by the operators
vi. The MIC tank pressure gauge was not functioning properly for roughly a week before the accident.
vii. On the night shift, no maintenance supervisor was in place to record instrument readings.
UCC Approach – Key Problems
The process that led to leakage

The Systems that failed were
Series of failures leading to The Bhopal Gas Tragedy
1
2
4
3
5

• Occurrence: 3rd December 1984.
• Place of occurrence: Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India.
• Company: Union Carbide Corporation. Chemical: Methyl
Isocyanate (40 tons)
• People Affected: >500,000
• People Died: ~40,000
• Scale: Amongst the worst Industrial Disasters of its time.
ABOUT THE TRAGEDY

How many were affected?
• 36 wards were marked as being “gas affected”,
with an estimated population in 1984 of 520,000.
• Of these 520,000 exposed people, 200,000 were
below 15 years of age and 3,000 were pregnant
women.
• On the basis of the mortality figures, which became
available immediately after the gas
Leakage, these areas
were classified as being
severely (two wards with
32,000 inhabitants),
Moderately (five wards
with 72,000 inhabitants)
and mildly affected (29
wards with 416,000
Inhabitants)
• However, there are many doubts concerning the
accuracy of these figures. The area covered
by the cloud was probably much larger than first
estimated. In 1989, when decisions about
interim relief were taken, all 56 wards in Bhopal
were considered to be affected: two severely,
five highly and 47 generally affected.

How many died?
• The first official death toll figure was 1,408. Later it rose
to 2,259, including 541 children and 318 women.
• In 1991, 3,928 deaths had been certified.
• Kulling and Lorin make this estimate: 500 persons died
• EVEN THIS IS PROBABLY AN UNDERESTIMATE:
❖ Registration at the hospitals was cut off when an upper limit or top number was reached.
❖ As soon as a patient was declared dead, it was common for his/her relatives to vanish with the
body, before registration was possible. At Hamidia Hospital, it was estimated that 500 to 1,000
bodies were taken away without registration.
❖ Bodies collected on the streets by the police were dumped in the Narmada River without being
registered.
❖ Shrouds for Hindu and Muslim death services were distributed.
❖ Those who fled Bhopal and died in other places were not registered.
❖ In March 1985, there were still thousands of people registered as missing.
before they got any medical treatment. Of the 6,000 who got treatment for serious symptoms, 2,000
died within the first week.
• According to Report(ICFTU,1998), those who died within hours of the tragedy numbered 2,500, and
within months 3,100 more persons died.

• Other estimations vary between 10,000 and 20,000.
• Sambhavna estimates 8,000 deaths during the first weeks, and another 8,000 since then.
• During the first 48 hours, the death rate in some of the worst affected areas has been estimated to
20/1,000. During December 1984, it was 24/1,000, compared to the national average of 1/1,000.
• The worst affected age-group was children below 5 years age, with a death rate of 33/1,000.
• Around 800 buffaloes and 3,000–4,000 other larger domestic animals died or had to be put to death
Dead cattles being carried away for disposal

• The initial effects of exposure were coughing, vomiting, severe eye
irritation and feeling of suffocation.
• The acute symptoms were burning in the respiratory tract and eyes,
blepharospasm, breathlessness, stomach pains and vomiting.
• The causes of deaths were choking, reflexogenic circulatory
collapse and pulmonary
• Findings during autopsies revealed changes not only in the lungs
but also cerebral oedema, tubular necrosis of the kidneys, fatty
degeneration of the liver and necrotizing enteritis.
• The stillbirth rate increased by up to 300% and neonatal mortality rate by 200 %.
• Birth defects among children born to affected women. There were several other effects such as
respiratory difficulties, immune and neurological disorders, cardiac failure secondary to lung injury and
female reproductive difficulties.
• The number of people affected is more than 520,000. The Tragedy killed 4000 immediately, 10000
within 72 hours and more than 25000 have died since then. All leaves yellowed and fell off within 72
hours.
HEALTH EFFECTS:

Bhopal Disaster Data from a Study Conducted:
0 20 40 60 80 100
Respiratory
Eye
Gastrointestinal
Neuromuscular
Gynaecological
SYMPTOMS
Among residents within 2Km of factory of exposure
percentage of people with symptoms.
HEALTH EFFECTS:

Mental health
• The gas leak severely damaged the mental health of local people.
• The ICMR reported that 10-12% of patients who visited clinics had “psychological symptoms”.
• According to data from 10 satellite government clinics in moderately and severely affected areas,
22% of 855 patients had psychiatric problems.
• Women’s mental health was particularly affected, as was that of children.
• A government study found that exposed children suffered from bed-wetting, stubbornness, irritability
and fearfulness.
• A survey conducted 10 years after the leak found that 36% of those interviewed reported nightmares,
65% anxiety, 24% depression, and 64% difficulty in decision making/lack of concentration.
HEALTH EFFECTS:

In 1986, Dr CR Krishna Murti, who was the president of the commission that investigated the accident,
visited Stockholm. He stated that 30,000–40,000 persons had persistent disabilities. He recognized the
following categories:
1. Those who were so seriously disabled that they cannot work. They often experienced difficulties
in walking or cycling because of bad co-ordination.
2. Those who had some persistent dysfunction in the airways and suffered from chronic pulmonary
insufficiency, but still manage to work.
3. Those who seem well, but who have a strongly decreased resistance to infections, especially in
the lungs and airways.
HEALTH EFFECTS:

Entrenchment of Poverty:
• The economic and social consequences of the gas leak were therefore largely borne by those with the
least resources.
• According to a Medico Friend Circle survey from 1985, soon after the gas leak, 65% of working people
in the severely exposed area faced a drop in income ranging from 20% to 100%.
• Five years later, 90% of those who had worked before the leak reported a reduced capacity to work.
• According to a survey of workers conducted by the Fact Finding Mission on Bhopal (FFM Bhopal),
o 35% of male workers and 25% of female workers became unemployed after the leak.
o No less than 81% of male workers who changed jobs earned less.
o The 456 workers in the FFM Bhopal survey suffered chronic cough (81%); weakened eyesight
(67%); and breathlessness and weakness (34%). Due to these issues their financial condition is
also getting affected.
• It is clear that the gas leak radically Altered the social fabric and economics of
everyday life, and entrenched existing Poverty and social disempowerment.
• According to ICMR studies, 68-86% of the population in the severely affected
area belonged to a “very depressed socio-economic class”. More than 70% of
those living in severely affected areas were found to be living in poor quality
houses.

• As a result of the gas leak, seventy-five percent of Bhopal citizens are unable to work for more than a
few hours at a time.
• Only 6.8% of the population can work for any longer than that.
• Unemployment and its effect on Bhopal's economy
a) "supply vs. demand" the demand is very low, driving the suppliers out of business, therefore
lowering the supply too.
b) Many people have become money lenders in the city, and some charge up to 20% interest.
About 5% of the population has gained employment by the government's efforts.
Source: http://library.thinkquest.org/01473/Economic%20Effects.htm
Long Duration Short Duration
Percentage of people engaged in Long term and Short term
duration of work
Entrenchment of Poverty:

Vulnerable Group: Women & Children
CHILDREN
• Children and the elderly proved most vulnerable in the wake of the disaster.
• Children under the age of 10, died in large numbers.
• Children also exhibited signs of trauma and psychiatric problems related to their medical problems
and social disruption.
• The few studies available on the effects of the Bhopal gas disaster on children are mostly observational
in nature. News reports suggest that children continue to be the most adversely affected by the
disaster.
• The long-term effects of gas exposure on children are still being uncovered.
• A recent study on the effects of exposure to MIC toxic fumes on the physical growth pattern of
adolescents found significant decreases in most measurements in boys, but not girls. The effects were
most significant in boys that were exposed in the womb, possibly as a result of the sex-specific effects of
the MIC degradation product trimethylamine.

Vulnerable Group: Women & Children
WOMEN
• Women widowed as a result of the disaster have found themselves in a particularly precarious situation.
• Being gas-affected carries with it social stigma, and activists working with survivors’ organizations say
that young women who are known to be gas exposed often face difficulties in getting married. This is
attributed primarily to possible difficulties with child bearing and the potential financial liability that
chronic ill-health entails. Research completed in 1996 indicated that the proportion of women not
married between the ages of 15 and 29 was 19% in severely exposed areas compared with 6% in
mildly exposed areas.
• Married women exposed to the gas face difficulties because of their inability to work and possible
difficulties with child bearing or increased financial liability because of illness and many of these
affected women have abandoned by their families.
Yogita (Second from Right) has not been able to find a groom due to her
siblings being affected by the aftereffects of the Bhopal Gas Tragedy.

Effects of Methyle Isocynate Gas on Environment
• Due to the Toxic gas after the disaster within a few days tree in the
vicinity became barren and 2000 bloated animal carcasses had to
be disposed off.
• The water, air and food become polluted in that area.
• The impact of the plant on human rights is not confined to the gas leak.
• Since the plant opened in 1970, it has been a source of environmental pollution. Even today the
contaminated site continues to pollute the groundwater, the sole source of water for those around the
plant, with toxins.
• The Bhopal plant began manufacturing the pesticide Sevin in September 1977, using imported MIC. By
February 1980, the plant was manufacturing MIC on site, as well as the pesticide Aldicarb (marketed as
Temik), phosgene and monomethylamine, both used to make MIC.64 All operations ceased in
December 1984 after the gas leak.
POLLUTION

S.No Chemical Amount Use in factory Nature of original pollution
1 Methylene Chloride 100 MT Solvent Air
2 Methanol 50 MT Solvent Air
3 Ortho-idichlorobenzene 500 MT Solvent Air, Water, Soil
4 Carbon tetrachloride 500 MT Solvent Air
5 Chloroform 300 MT Solvent Air
6 Tri methylamine 50 MT Catalyst Air
7 Chloro benzyl chloride 10 MT Ingredient Air, Water, Soil
8 Mono chloro toluene 10 MT Ingredient Air, Water, Soil
9 Toluene 20 MT Ingredient Air, Water, Soil
10 Aldicarb 2 MT Product Air, Water, Soil
11 Carbaryl 50 MT Product Air, Water, Soil
12 Benzene Hexachloride 5 MT Ingredient Air, Water, Soil
13 Mercury 1 MT Water, Soil
14 Mono methyl amine 25 MT Ingredient Air
15 Chlorine 20 MT Ingredient Air
16 Phosgene 5 MT Ingredient Air
17 Hydro chloric acid 50 MT Ingredient Air, Soil
18 Chloro sulphonic acid 50 MT Ingredient Air, Soil
19 Alpha Naphthol * 50 MT Ingredient Air, Soil
20 Napthalin 50 MT Ingredient Air
21 Chemical waste Tar 50 MT Waste Water, Soil
22 Methyl Isocyanate 5 MT Ingredient Air, Water, Soil
POLLUTION: Environment (Chemicals Dumped by Union Carbide in Bhopal)

S.No Completely Damaged Partially Damaged Undamaged
1 Methi (fenugreek) Alfalfa Mint
2 Radish Mustard Cuscuta
3 Spinach Cabbage Parthenium
4 Brinjal Cauliflower Wild rice
5 Tomato Water hyacinth Bougainvillea
6 Chenopodium Marigold Moringa
7 Castor Coriander Jamun
8 Datura Rose Banana
9 Jasmine Bottlegourd Mango
10 Calotropis Wild spinach
11 Lantana Lemon
12 Ber Guava
13 Neem
List of Flaura damaged by MIC
Source: Indian Council of Agricultural Research
S.No Area (sq.m.) around the vegetation near MIC plant Intensity of damage
1 3.5 Severely affected
2 5 Badly affected
3 6 Moderately affected
4 10.5 Mildly affected
A vegetation damaged contour prepared
Source: Central Board for the Prevention and Control of Water Pollution

WASTE ABANDONMENT
• 350 metric tonnes of toxic waste
• Groundwater and soil contaminated with heavy metals
and carcinogenic chemicals
i. Dicholorbenzene,
ii. Hexachlorobutadiene,
iii. Tricholoroethane
iv. Mercury, lead, cadmium
• Poisoning drinking water sources in 16 communities:
effecting 25,000 people
i. Hexachlorobutadiene : potent kidney toxin a possible
human carcinogen.
ii. Trichloroethene: impairs foetal development
The solar evaporation pond
Factory’s chemical waste
POLLUTION

Toxic Materials in Soil and Water
CHEMICAL AMOUNT
Benzene, oxybis 7, 890
Dichlorobenzenes 87,500
Polynuclear Aromatic Hydrocarbons 2,340
Phthalates 9,940
Trichlorobenzenes 9,410
Trimethyl Trianzintrione 24,470
1-Napthalenol 59,090
Units in parts per billion (ppb)
• Lead, Nickel, Copper, Chromium, Hexachlorocyclohexane and chlorobenzenes were also found in soil
samples.
• Mercury was found to be between 20,000 to 6,000,000 times the standard level in soil.

Groundwater at the accident site a
drinking water supply for 15
communities remains contaminated,
according to a report released.
Researchers collected groundwater
samples from 20 locations and sent
them to a lab in Delhi, India and
Switzerland.
Swiss lab results show chloroform
concentrations as many as 3.5 times
higher than drinking-water guidelines
from the World Health Organization and
U.S. EPA, and carbon tetrachloride at
up to 2,400 times higher than the
guidelines.
Source: S. Goodman, “Poisoned Water Haunts Bhopal
25 Years after Chemical Accident,” Scientific
American, 01-Dec-2009.
Groundwater contamination
Source: “Living
Dead,” India
Environment Portal.

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW FRAMEWORK
• The disaster in Bhopal was and remains a human tragedy and a tragedy for human rights. By using the
human rights framework to examine what happened, we can see what obligations under international
law have been breached and what protective standards failed.
• Acts and omissions related to the disaster at Bhopal violated the civil and political rights of the victims
as well as their economic, social and cultural rights.
• Human rights responsibilities extend beyond states. Since 1948 the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
has provided a common standard of achievement which means that every individual and every organ
of society bears responsibility for the universal and effective recognition and observance of the rights
and freedoms it sets out.
• Since the Bhopal disaster, this responsibility as it applies to businesses has been further elaborated by the
UN Working Group on the Working Methods and Activities of Transnational Corporations. In 2003 the UN
Norms on the responsibilities of transnational corporations and other business enterprises with regard to
human rights (UN Norms) were adopted by the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights and transferred for discussion to the UN Commission on Human Rights. The preamble to
the UN Norms notes that
“transnational corporations and other business enterprises, their officers and persons working for
them are also obligated to respect generally recognized responsibilities and norms contained in
United Nations treaties and other international instruments.”

HUMAN RIGHTS LAW FRAMEWORK
Violated rights
1. Right to life
2. Right to the highest attainable standard of health
3. Right to a remedy
4. Right to an adequate standard of living
5. Right to freedom from discrimination
6. Right to a safe environment
• After the Bhopal tragedy, the Permanent Peoples’ Tribunal in Bhopal in 1992 concluded that
fundamental human rights had been grossly violated in terms of a series of articles in the various
international declarations concerned with human rights.
• National governments have signed those declarations and many try seriously to follow them. Thus it is
possible to file a suit with the International Tribunal for Human Rights in the Hague.

ACCOUNTABILITY OF UNION CARBIDE & INDIAN GOVERNMENT
Land Use Planning in Bhopal: It’s consequences
• After the independence of India in 1947, Bhopal
became the state capital of Madhya Pradesh. The
city started attracting new industries and government
institutions and this growth continued throughout
1960s.
• From 50,000 people as a base in the mid-50s, the city
grew to 102,000 in 1961 up to 670,000 in 1981.
• However, the rapid growth of Bhopal was not
supported by adequate basic services or urban
infrastructures and the situation led to haphazard
urbanization. Nearly 20% of the total population lived
in the slum colonies within 5 km of the pesticide plant.
Due to lack of development restrictions in place,
many of these colonies encroached up to the site
boundaries of the plant. Some of these experienced
the direct influence of the gas leak.

• In the Bhopal Development Plan, the new municipal limits were given and a zone 15 miles away from
the city limits was prescribed for hazardous industry. The factory was then situated in area allocated
under general industry land use. The local authorities wanted the factory shifted as by now there was a
huge informal urban agglomeration around the factory. The request was turned down by the State
Government.
Land use planning in Bhopal: It’s consequences

• The plant was located
adjacent to residential
areas and was within two-
three kilometers from the
Bhopal Railway Station bus
stand(violation of planning
law of that period i.e. No
industrial unit can be
planned within the 2 km. of
radius).
• With the help of State
Government, UCIL was
given license to
manufacture MIC in the
existing premises.

• One of the key reasons for the high number of fatalities in Bhopal accident was the lack of land use
restrictions, resulting in the co-existence of densely populated residential areas in close proximity to a
highly hazardous industry.
• While land under amenities increased, there was a noticeable shortage of health facilities and doctors
for a city which had a large chemical factory and therefore, was constantly at health risk. At the time
of the mishap, there were 1800 hospital beds and 300 doctors. (Shrivastava,1996)
Usually, the city expands towards the source of employment, a factor as seen in most of the city models.
Figure: Land Use in Bhopal (1961) (Town and
Country Planning Department, 1975)
Figure Land Use in Bhopal (1973) (Town and Country
Planning Department,
1975)

• Following the disaster in Bhopal, many national governments and intergovernmental organizations
recognized the need for land use planning to restrict and control the use of land in the vicinity of
hazardous installations. Nonetheless, no significant improvement has been made in India so far to
incorporate ‘risk assessment’ into land use planning decisions.
• Despite all of these applied changes in other countries, 30 years after the Bhopal accident, India is still
far behind due to deficiencies in legislation and the lack of guidelines.
• In India, certain regulations including the Section 41A of Factories Act11, the Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA)2 Notification12 ; the Zoning Atlas for Siting of Industries by Central Pollution Control
Board (CPCB)13 deal with the safe siting of hazardous industries. However, these legal provisions do not
provide any specific criteria or mechanism which can guide land use planning decisions.

Institute, West Virginia, USA Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh, India
Emergency plan An elaborate four-stage emergency plan to deal
with toxic releases, fires, etc, including a general
public alert linked to community police, river and
rail traffic and local radio stations. Various
emergency broadcast systems in place to alert
and disseminate appropriate information to the
public.
No system to inform public authorities or the
people living adjacent to the plant. No
emergency plan shared with communities living
adjacent to the plant; no system to disseminate
information regarding emergency to the public
with the exception of a loud siren.
Maintenance
programme
A maintenance programme to determine and
evaluate replacement frequency for valves and
instrumentation and alarm systems. Weekly review
of safety valves and reviews and maintenance
recorded extensively.
No evidence of an effective instrument
maintenance programme. Safety valve testing
programme largely ineffective and no proper
records maintained of reviews of instruments,
valves and alarm systems, etc.
Lab analysis A lab analysis of MIC was conducted to test
quality and check for contamination prior to
storage, processing or distribution.
No lab analysis of quality was undertaken. MIC
stored for long periods without testing for
contamination.
Training Extensive employee training programme to ensure
high level of training and information among all
employees of normal and emergency
procedures.
Operators put in charge without sufficient
training.
Protective equipment Extensive provision of appropriate personal
protective equipment to employees including
protective clothing, air respirators, etc.
Personal protective gear and breathing air
equipment not easily accessible, inadequate
and of poor quality.
Safety Measures in UCC Plants - the USA and India

• The country needed pesticides to protect her agricultural production .
• MIC is used to produce pesticides that control insects which would in turn, help increase
production of food as a part of India’s GREEN REVOLUTION.
• Initially, India imported the MIC from the United States.
• In an attempt to achieve industrial self-sufficiency, India invited Union Carbide to set up a
plant in the state of Madhya Pradesh to produce methyl isocyanate.
• To the people of the city of Bhopal, Union Carbide was a highly respected , technically
advanced Western company.
• This coupled with political power and scientific expertise worked together to change the
people’s perception of what was dangerous and more importantly what was safe.
Government and People’s Support For Plant :

❑ The Settlement
• Steps to realize the right to a remedy for individuals who are victims of human rights violations should
include, according to guidelines currently being considered by the UN Commission on Human Rights,
a) access to justice,
b) Reparation for harm suffered (including restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, satisfaction and
guarantees of non-repetition), and
c) access to factual information concerning the violations.
• Despite outstanding claims by victims, on 14 February 1989, while UCC was appealing against a High
Court ruling that it should pay Rs.250 crores (approximately US$157 million at the prevailing rate) as
interim relief, the Supreme Court announced a court-endorsed settlement between UCC and the
government of India. This settlement was negotiated without the participation of the victims, despite the
fact that an application on behalf of the victims had explicitly asked the Court to involve victims in any
negotiations around a settlement.
• The Supreme Court issued an order which specified that UCC and UCIL were to pay US$470 million in
compensation the Union of India as claimant and for the benefit of all victims of the Bhopal Gas Disaster
under the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Registration and Processing of Claims) Scheme, 1985, and notas
fines, penalties or punitive damages” - The settlement bestowed sweeping civil and criminal immunity on
UCC and UCIL, eliminating their legal liability.
DISASTER MITIGATION & MANAGEMENT TECHNIQUE

• Three months after the gas leak, the Bhopal Gas Leak Disaster (Processing of Claims) Act, 1985 (Claims
Act) was enacted in parliament. The legislation gave the government the right” to represent and act on
behalf of victims in any litigation in India or elsewhere. - The Claims Act deprived victims of their right to
pursue individual court claims against UCC for damages or personal injury due to the gas leak.
• The Claims Act, which forced the victims to accept the government as their advocate, as well as the
Supreme Court-endorsed settlement of 1989, show how executive action to overcome judicial
complexity has had the consequence of securing corporate impunity rather than corporate
accountability. The complexities of the legal system led to a denial of the right of the victims to access
justice.
❑ Compensation: ‘treating the victims like culprits’:
• The US$470 million settlement was far less than most estimates of the damage at the time. In its
amended case before the Bhopal district court in January 1988, the government maintained that the
claims connected to the leak would exceed US$3 billion. A year later, it settled for less than one sixth of
that amount. An intervention filed on behalf of the victims before the supreme court claimed that
rs.1,000 crores (around US$628 million) were needed as interim relief alone. the entire settlement only
amounted to rs.750 crores (around US$470 million) at the time.

• The 2003 annual report of the Madhya Pradesh Gas Relief and Rehabilitation Department reveals that by
October 2003, compensation had been awarded in 15,248 cases of death and at least 554,895 cases of
injury or disability – more than five times the numbers of dead, injured and disabled used by the
Supreme Court to calculate the settlement.
• The survivors faced numerous problems relating to the amount of compensation. The sums paid were
inadequate, no interest was paid on delayed payments, and compensation remained unpaid.
Problems in the process included: denial of the individual’s right to claim damages; corruption; victims
forced to choose between settling or facing litigation; denial of appropriate appeal mechanisms; denial
of legal aid; and long delays and huge bureaucracy.
❑ The Compensation Mechanism:
• The May 1989 order of the Supreme Court setting out the settlement stated: individual claimant shall be
entitled to claim particular quantum ofcompensation even if his case is found to fall within any of the
broadcategories.”- This meant that victims were denied their individual right toprove the extent of
individual damages suffered and claim appropriate compensation.
• Average awards were far smaller than originally envisioned. This indicates the arbitrary nature of the
awards. In at least five wards the average compensation was equal to the minimum, while in six wards it
was actually less than the minimum. In cases where the victim had died, the average compensation
given by 1995 was Rs.73,638 far less than the minimum Rs.100,000 stipulated by the Supreme Court.

- An October 2002 survey in one severely affected ward revealed that 91% of the 1,481 claimants
had received only the minimum compensation.
❑ Failure to register claims
• A study by the Bhopal Group for Information and Action of three gas-affected localities concluded
that-
a) The claims of 42.4% of the residents had not been registered.
b) In one severely affected locality, nearly one sixth of the claims were not registered.
c) The single largest omission comprised at least 15,000 gas-affected victims who were
under 18 at the time of registration of claims.
d) Not until august 1992 did the supreme court order that minors had a legal
entitlement to be registered.
e) Children born to gas-affected parents have continued to be excluded, despite the
supreme court recognizing the entitlement of “later born children who might
manifest congenital or pre-natal mic afflictions”.

❑ Rehabilitation of victims
• In the days after the disaster, the state government of Madhya Pradesh organized a relief effort that
involved virtually every arm of government including the army.
• The government of Madhya Pradesh had a seven-year action plan (1984-85 to 1990-91). In this period it
spent Rs.164.3 crores (about US$35.8 million) on the medical, social and economic rehabilitation of the
affected population.
• A subsequent five-year rehabilitation action plan, costing Rs.258 crores (about US$56.2 million), covered
the period 1990-95.
• Central government provided 75% of the costs, with the rest coming from the state government.
a) Medical rehabilitation:
The government’s medical rehabilitation programme consisted of offering free care to the gas-
exposed population in existing government hospitals, building new ones, and conducting
research on the effects of gas exposure on the population.
b) Special Industrial Area and industrial training:
As part of the rehabilitation action plan, 152 work-sheds were built in a Special Industrial Area to
generate employment in small- and medium-scale industries. Construction of the sheds was
completed in 1991. Of the 152 sheds, 55 were allotted to private entrepreneurs, 52 were occupied
by the Rapid Action Force(a special division of the police) and the remainder lie vacant.

c) Vocational training for women:
Beginning in 1985, the state government set up 50 training/production centres in different localities
for women gas victims to train them in trades such as sewing, hosiery embroidery and stationery
manufacture.
Women trainees were offered a stipend of Rs.150 per month.
Within four years, all but two of the centres had been closed. The two are known as “the stationery
centre” and about 90 women work there. The “stitching centres”, where 2,300 gas-affected
women were employed, were closed down by the government in 1992.
d) Social rehabilitation:
The colony of 2,486 houses that the state government built for the gas victims, especially for
widows, is a picture of neglect with poor access roads, open drains and gutters, overflowing sewers
and piles of garbage and rubbish.
The Madhya Pradesh government admitted in August 2004 that the colony “is in bad shape and
developmental (drainage and sanitation, pipe water facilities) and maintenance works are
urgently needed… in order to improve the quality of life of victims.”

❑ Orphans abandoned by the state
o At least 28 children were orphaned in the immediate aftermath of the gas leak. Twenty years later
many of them were still waiting for the state to fulfil its promises to them.
o The orphans were supposed to be under the care of the Department of Women and Child
Development of the Madhya Pradesh government.
o The poverty of the orphans of Bhopal is aggravated by the amount that they still have to spend on
medical treatment.
o “The government set up such a huge gas relief department and mechanism but they did not think it
fit to employ us orphans. “- Sadanand recalls (one of the orphan)

❑ INDIA
• Laws:
a) The Environment Protection Act was enacted in 1986: The act defines the environment and
authorizes the central government to take all such measures as it deems necessary or expedient for
the purposes of protecting and improving the quality of the environment and preventing,
controlling and abating environmental pollution.
b) The Factories Act: It was amended to include the list of hazardous industries and the provision to
locate an industry. The Central and State Pollution Control Board laid down comprehensive
industrial standards for the control of effluents and emissions.
c) The Public Liability Insurance Act, 1991: it is another act with an aim to provide immediate relief to
the victims affected by accidents while handling hazardous substances and for matters connected
therewith.
d) Hazardous Wastes (Management, Handling and Transboundary Movement) Rules, 2008, it is
provided for means of safe storage and disposal of “hazardous waste”.
e) National Green Tribunal Act, 2010: Provides for the establishment of a Tribunal for disposal of cases
related to environmental protection and conservation of forests.
STEPS TAKEN AFTER DISASTER (MITIGATION
TECHNIQUES)

• The Disaster Management Institute
The Disaster Management Institute in Bhopal (DMI) was established in 1987, after the
Bhopal Gas Disaster, by the Government of Madhya Pradesh (79). It is the only institute of its kind in
India. The aims are to provide training in Disaster Management, to carry out research oriented studies
concerning causes and effects of disasters, their prevention and mitigation by management, to
collect information concerning hazards and disasters, and to offer consultant services to industries
and others.
• Non-governmental organizations
a) NGOs in India have found it necessary to co-operate in networks that together cover a large area
with broad competence.
b) The Other Media and the Delhi Science Forum together with the survivors’ organizations are
responsible for keeping the criminal cases alive.
c) The Bhopal Group for Information and Action (BGIA) supports local survivors’ organizations and
keeps in touch with an international network.
d) The Sambhavna Trust not only provides health care, but also different kinds of support to survivors
and other documentation.

❑ THE INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY
• International labour organisations
a) The ILO was founded in 1919, in the wake of a destructive war, to pursue a vision based on the
premise that universal, lasting peace can be established only if it is based on social justice.
b) The main aims of the ILO are to promote rights at work, encourage decent employment
opportunities, enhance social protection and strengthen dialogue on work-related issues.
c) The unique tripartite structure of the ILO gives an equal voice to workers, employers and
governments to ensure that the views of the social partners are closely reflected in labour
standards and in shaping policies and programmes.
• Inter-state organisations
Inter-state organisations have also drawn up declarations and conventions
a) The “Bhopal Resolution” of the European Parliament calls upon European firms to maintain levels
of safety abroad that are comparable to those in place in their home operations.
b) In the OECD Guidelines on Multinational Enterprises, the member states agree to regulate their
multinationals doing business abroad, to ensure that their operations “are in harmony with
national policies of the countries in which they operate”.
c) The OECD Code on Accidents Involving Hazardous Substances emphasises the imperative of
providing citizens with full information and enhancing their role in the decision-making process.
d) The proposed UN International Code of Conduct on the Transfer of Technology articulates the
responsibilities of the contracting parties.

1. Eloor-Edyar area, Cochin, Kerala: Sits over 200,000
tonnes of highly hazardous chemicals, pesticides
waste
2. Ranipet chromium contaminated area, Tamil Nadu:
About 220,000 tonnes of chromium waste piles, of 2-
4 metres high, cover 3 hectares
3. Ratlam Industrial area, Ratlam, Madhya Pradesh:
Contaminated with effluents from pharma industry,
manufacturing H-Acid
4. Chromium contaminated area, Sundargarh, Odisha: 50,000 tonnes of chromium waste
dumped in open land
5. Talcher chromium contaminated area, Talcher, Odisha: 60,000 tonnes of waste from
closed chrome salt manufacturing unit dumped in the open
Bhopal-like disasters in the making
Hazardous waste contaminated sites identified
by the Central Pollution Control Board

6. Ganjam mercury contaminated area, Ganjam, Odisha: Over 50,000 tonnes of mercury
waste from closed caustic soda plants at different locations
7. Juhi-Baburaiya-Rakhi-Mandi, Kanpur, Uttar Pradesh: about 2 hectares of soil
contaminated with roughly 10,000 tonnes of hexavalent chromium within densely
populated settlement; owners not known
8. Rania, Kanpur Dehat, Uttar Pradesh: About 45,000 tonnes of hexavalent chromium
waste pile up on 200 hectares of private land
9. Nibra Village, West Bengal: 4,440 tonnes of chromium waste dumped; owners not
known
10. Persistent Organic Pollutants contaminated area, Lucknow: Indian Pesticide Ltd
generated 36,432 tonnes of hexachlorocyclohexane (HCH) waste
Bhopal-like disasters in the making

WHAT COULD HAD BEEN DONE TO AVOID THE DISASTER
• Supervisor could have been placed on night shifts and the readings and feedback of the
Equipment could have been taken for every one hour.
• There should have been 4 stage back up system (union carbide plant of USA) instead of a
one manual back up system.
• At regular intervals proper maintenance and servicing of Flare towers, pressure valves, gas
scrubbers must have be made.
• Strict regulations and methods must have been used according to the manual.
• Proper pressure gauges should have been used.

• Local governments clearly cannot allow industrial facilities to be situated within urban
areas, regardless of the evolution of land use over time.
• Industry and government need to bring proper financial support to local communities so
they can provide medical and other necessary services to reduce morbidity, mortality
and material loss in the case of industrial accidents.
• Existing public health infrastructure needs to be taken into account when hazardous
industries choose sites for manufacturing plants.
• Legislation and regulation needs to evolve in active consultation with all stakeholders
laying emphasis on emerging requirements, and increasing standards with appropriate
emphasis on actual functioning of safety mechanisms and inculcation of an active safety
culture.
• Multinationals, by virtue of their global purpose, organization, and resources, should be
treated as single, monolithic agents, rather than as a network of discrete, non-
interdependent units.
CONCLUSION & RECCOMENDATIONS

o The most important prerequisite for accident prevention is the top manangement commitment to safety.
o Accident prevention needs not to be treated as an expensive add-on facility but it has to be an integral
part of management and organizational objectives.
o A major implication of the Bhopal accident is that, at the project formulation phase itself, hazard
assessment has to be carried out. The safety levels that are to be adopted in any hazardous facility have
to be determined in terms of population at risk.
o When hazardous facilities are to be built in developing countries, the levels of safety to be achieved
must be higher and not lower than that planned for developed countries, since, in developing countries
scenario’s are bit different,
a) Operators may not be very skilled;
b) The population around industrial facilities is likely to be higher;
c) 0 emergency management procedures are likely to be slow because of the difficulty in quickly
communicating and transporting and;
d) Hazard management practices are not institutionalized.
e) Hazard management costs are likely to be lower if hazard assessment is carried out along with
decision for locating the project; determining storage requirements; safety equipment investments;
and man power and skill requirements.

• Another step needed for institutionalizing hazard assessment is to internalize the likely damage costs,
through a proper insurance system (Kleindorfer and Junreuther 1986).
• Hazardous facilities have to pay insurance charges commensurate with the risk they pose.
• There has to be an international agreement on risk compensation for hazardous facilities (Ott 1985).
This will force them to improve the safety in those facilities.
• Regulatory agencies can press for this reform since it will reduce the administrative cost of
regulations and make sure that safety is not neglected.
HAZARD ASSESSMENT HAS TO BE A PART OF THE PROJECT APPRAISAL SYSTEM
FOR HAZARDOUS FACILITIES OR FACILITIES WITH LOW PROBABILITY-HIGH
CONSEQUENCE ACCIDENTS.

Bhopal Gas Tragedy

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