Bhopal Gas Tragedy

Arkadeep Dey (CSE2015/030)
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1. Place of occurrence
It occurred on the night of 2–3 December 1984 at the Union Carbide India Limited
(UCIL) pesticide plant in Bhopal, Madhya Pradesh.

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2. People involved for the disaster
According to the District Court of Bhopal Warren Anderson(UCC CEO at the time of
the disaster )and seven ex-employees, including the former UCIL chairman were involved
for that disaster.Civil and criminal cases were filed against those people in the District
Court of Bhopal. An eighth former employee was also involved, but died before the
judgement was passed.
3. Description of the victims
Estimates vary on the death toll. The official immediate death toll was 2,259.
The government of Madhya Pradesh confirmed a total of 3,787 deaths related to the
gas release. A government affidavit in 2006 stated that the leak caused 558,125
injuries, including 38,478 temporary partial injuries and approximately 3,900 severely
and permanently disabling injuries. Others estimate that 8,000 died within two weeks,
and another 8,000 or more have since died from gas-related diseases.
The effects of exposure were coughing, severe eye irritation and a feeling of
suffocation, burning in the respiratory tract, blepharospasm, breathlessness, and
stomach pains and vomiting. People awakened by these symptoms fled away from the
plant. Those who ran inhaled more than those who had a vehicle to ride. Owing to their
height, children and other people of shorter stature inhaled higher concentrations.
Bhopalgas disaster girl, the burialof one iconic victim of the gas leak (4 December 1984)

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4. Impact on environment
The Bhopal gas leak caused extensive damage to the environment surrounding the
Union Carbide factory. The impacts were both immediate and long-term. Due to
improper clean up in the area, Bhopal residents are still affected by the negative
consequences of the gas leak.
Immediate Effects
In the days following the gas leak, the leaves on the trees near the factory
yellowed and fell off the branches. Around 2,000 animals, mostly livestock such as
goats and buffalo, were killed by the gas leak. The Indian government prohibited
fishing in the area for fear that the rivers and lakes were polluted. The food supply
in Bhopal became scarce due to suppliers' fears of food safety. Nearby crop
growth was also affected by the leak. According to authorities, 36 wards in the
region were considered to be “gas affected.” These 36 wards contained a
population of some 520,000 people.
Long-Term Effects
Since the Bhopal gas leak, there have been persistent environmental problems
due to improper clean up. Past attempts to decontaminate the environment in and
around Bhopal were incomplete. The clean-up responsibilities shifted from Union
Carbide Industries to the Madhya Pradesh government in 1998. Since this time,
money and accountability for the leak have become a problem. As a result,
drinking water contamination has become a major issue.

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Water Contamination
Bhopal's underground water supply is polluted with toxic chemicals such as heavy
metals and persistent organic pollutants. The contamination is not only due to the
Bhopal gas leak, but also to Union Carbide's practices prior to the leak. The
improper treatment of chemicals has contributed to the water pollution. As a result
of the contamination, the water in Bhopal is unsafe for drinking.
Greenpeace Research Laboratories conducted water sample testing in 1999 and
determined the levels of contaminants in Bhopal's water supply. This map shows
the sites chosen for testing (red circles). The wind in this area blows to the North
and to the East, which is why the particular sites were chosen. Greenpeace
believed these areas would have the highest contamination levels from chemicals
being carried by the wind.
Greenpeace Research Laboratories found volatile organic compounds in Bhopal's
drinking water supply. The level of trichloroethene was 50 times higher than the
EPA safety limits. Trichloroethene can impair foetal development. The list of
volatile organic compounds found included:
 Chlorinated benzenes
 Chlorinated ethane
 Chloroform
 Carbon tetrachloride
 Trichloroethene
In addition to VOC's, Greenpeace Research Laboratories also found elevated levels
of heavy metals in the water. The heavy metals detected included:
 Mercury
 Chromium
 Copper
 Nickel
 Lead
Heavy metals bio accumulate in both aquatic and terrestrial organisms and are
toxic to humans. One water sample found mercury to be 12% of the overall
weight of the sample.
Other chemicals found in the water were toxic organ chlorides such as:
 Chlorinated ethane
 Chlorinated hexanes
 DDT
 Hexachlorobutadiene
Hexachlorobutadiene is a potent kidney toxin and is under review as a possible
human carcinogen.

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These chemicals persist in the drinking water supply because the water was never
fully decontaminated. Although the water is labelled unfit for drinking, Bhopal
residents still consume the contaminated water.
Soil Contamination
In addition to water testing, Greenpeace Research Laboratories also performed soil
testing to check for contamination. They tested several sites near the Union
Carbide plant. Greenpeace found the metal levels in the soil similar to
uncontaminated soil. The only metal with high concentrations was copper, which
can naturally vary in nature and was unlikely due to the gas leak. The researchers
concluded that the activities at the Union Carbide plant including the gas leak did
not contaminate the surrounding soil.
Lasting Impact
Activist groups have urged Dow Chemicals (the current owner of the Union
Carbide plant) to clean up the environment surrounding Bhopal. These groups
have urged the local government to request that Dow Chemicals pay for the clean-
up. Although a legal settlement resulted in the Madhya Pradesh government
having jurisdiction over the clean-up, activist groups believe Dow Chemicals must
still be held accountable. Due to a lack of money and no one taking responsibility,
the efforts to clean up the environment came to a halt. The impact of this decision
is that until the drinking water is decontaminated, the residents of Bhopal will
continue to be exposed to the toxic chemicals.
5. Major issues involved [reaction of Government & Company] &
justice
Judicial Precedent
 Progress in reforming liability law: Soon after the disaster, Indian courts
ruled that liability in the case of a disaster is commensurate with a
company's assets and not merely with the amount of damage caused.
 Use of interim damage awards: The disaster marked the first time that the
Indian government had made interim damage awards. A positive
development for sure, but given the problems associated with relief
payments in this case, this was not exactly earth shattering.
 Strengthened & expanded class action rights: For the first time in its history,
the Indian government invoked Parens patriae, which meant that they acted
on behalf of the citizens as a plaintiff for a class action lawsuit.

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6. Failure of safety measures
 A Nitrogen line was connected to the tank to transfer the product by inert pressurization of the
headspace.
 The tank was filled with a pressure relief value and rupture disc.The vent line from the valve
exhausted into a scrubbing tower filled with caustic soda (NaOH).This would neutralize the mic
to form sodium isocyanate .Any residual gas from the scrubber was sent to a 30m tall flare
stack where it would be burned off.
 There was an external coiled jacket on the vessel through which coolant (Freon/chloroform)
was to keep the vessel contain at 0®C and thus prevent any adverse exothermic reactions
occurring.
 Tanks were not to be filled above 50% marks so that in the event of dangerous chemical
reaction occurring, solvents could be pumped in to quench the reactions.
7. Details of Act involved
Apart from the civil proceedings, criminal proceedings were also initiated before the Chief
Judicial Magistrate in Bhopal. The case was instituted in the year 1987. Since the clause in the
settlement order which quashed the criminal proceedings was held invalid and unjustifiable, the
criminal proceedings initiated could continue. The judgement was delivered only on June 7, 2010,
26 years after the disaster. Theproceedings wereinitiated under Section 304 A, and Sections 336,
337, and 338 read with Section 35 of the Indian Penal Code. Section 304 A deals with causing
death by negligence. Sections 336, 337 and Section 338 deal with the offences of endangering life
and personal safety of others. This is read along with Section 35 which deals with the aspect of
common intention.
8. Act passed after that tragedy
Legislation Passed
The disaster triggered a number of new, far-reaching programs aimed at
creating a strong oversight structure for mitigating industrial risk in India.
 Environment Protection Act (1986): The Act was an umbrella law aimed
at enabling a more holistic approach to risk management and remedying
shortcomings in current environmental standards. The Act strengthened
inspections standards, controlled hazardous substances, encouraged
reporting of violations, and required more personal responsibility from
corporations. Created under the Act was the Ministry of Environment and
Forests, which administers and enforces environmental laws.
 Factories (Amendment) Act (1987): This Act amended and strengthened
an existing law by providing additional safeguards in the use and storage of
hazardous substances. It also mandated worker safety training. It

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represented a very positive step towards creating a safer working
environment for India's working class.
 Air (Amendment) Act (1987): Required every industry to get
governmental consent to release pollutants.
 Hazardous Waste Rules (1989): Basically allowed government to
“authorize” companies as to what they could pollute with.
 Public Liability Insurance Act (1991): Required every business owner to
carry insurance to cover death, injury, or damage resulting from a disaster.
The Act pertained less with the workers than with the neighbours, who had
previously been unprotected. However, the extent of liability and how it was
to be covered were unclear. It also failed address growth in settlements near
a given plant or distinguish between highly- and less-hazardous materials.
9. Synopsis of the case
On December 3 1984, more than 40 tons of methyl isocyanate gas leaked from a
pesticide plant in Bhopal, India, immediately killing at least 3,800 people and causing significant
morbidity and premature death for many thousands more. The company involved in what
became the worst industrial accident in history immediately tried to dissociate itself from legal
responsibility. Eventually it reached a settlement with the Indian Government through
mediation of that country's Supreme Court and accepted moral responsibility. It paid $470
million in compensation, a relatively small amount of based on significant underestimations of
the long-term health consequences of exposure and the number of people exposed. The
disaster indicated a need for enforceable international standards for environmental safety,
preventative strategies to avoid similar accidents and industrial disaster preparedness.
Since the disaster, India has experienced rapid industrialization. While some positive changes in
government policy and behavior of a few industries have taken place, major threats to the
environment from rapid and poorly regulated industrial growth remain. Widespread
environmental degradation with significant adverse human health consequences continues to
occur throughout India.
December 2004 marked the twentieth anniversary of the massive toxic gas leak from Union
Carbide Corporation's chemical plant in Bhopal in the state of Madhya Pradesh, India that killed
more than 3,800 people. This review examines the health effects of exposure to the disaster,
the legal response, the lessons learned and whether or not these are put into practice in India
in terms of industrial development, environmental management and public health.
10. Case history
In this case, the prosecution argued that the whole disaster was a result of running a
defectively designed plant with a number of operational defects without any reasonable care.
The prosecution submitted the findings by the Council of Scientific and IndustrialResearch
(CSIR) to substantiate their contentions. The team of scientists from the CSIR noticed that MIC
was stored in largetanks instead of stainless steel drums. The flare tower and the vent gas
scrubber had been out of service for five months before the disaster. The gas scrubber

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therefore did not treat escaping gases with sodium hydroxide (caustic soda), which might have
brought the concentration down to a safe level. To reduce energy costs, the refrigeration
system, designed to inhibit the volatilization of MIC, had been left idle. Slip-blind plates that
would have prevented water from pipes being cleaned from leaking into the MIC tanks through
faulty valves were not installed. Carbon steel valves were used at the factory, even though they
corrode when exposed to acid. On the night of the disaster, a leaking carbon steel valve was
found, allowing water to enter the MIC tanks. The pipe was not repaired because it was
believed it would take too much time and be too expensive. Thus, insufficient caution in design
choice of material and other alarming instruments, inadequate control on systems of storage
and on quality of stored materials and as well as lack of necessary facilities for quick effective
disposal of material are the main reasons which lead to the incident. All these show that the
business was carried out with reckless indifference to the public. The Companyauthorities had
the knowledge and the properties of how dangerous a gas is MIC and still carried on the
activities with gross negligence, recklessness and utter disregard to the public. The element of
criminality is introduced by the accused having run the risk of doing such an act with
recklessness and indifference to the consequences. The UCC being a company dealing with a
substance like MIC, it owes a duty of care to the public. The activities of the enterprise falls far
below the standards required and therefore, the prosecution argued that it amounted to gross
negligence.
For all these contentions, the UCC came up with several defences. Firstly, they argued that the
reports by the CSIR cannot be admitted as evidence. It was that CSIR was merely a fact finding
body and that it was constituted for a very limited purpose. Therefore, it was argued that its
contents could not be taken as proof. Secondly, it was contended that the Company had
obtained all licenses and approvals from the Government for carrying out the business under
the Designed Transfer Agreement & Technical Service Agreement. All other permits required
were also duly obtained and hence the UCC argued that they carried out their business in a
completely authorised manner with the permission being obtained by the Government of India
itself. Moreover, it was submitted that none of the Company officials had any criminal intention
to cause any harm to any member of the public. The Company refused to admit any kind of
negligence on its part and further argued that the officials were in no way involved with the day
to day activities of the business and therefore they cannot be held responsible for any
negligence on the part of the workers. It was further argued that the accused officials were not
even present in the occasion where the disaster took place. All these were based on the
principle that vicarious liability is not applicable under criminal law and therefore the directors
cannot be held liable for the negligence of the workers.
The UCC also denied all allegations that the UCIL plant in India was not properly designed. It
further submitted that the MIC plantat Bhopal was designed in the same pattern as that of the
MIC plant in Verginia, USA. But it is important to note that The Government of India was never
permitted to visit the plant at Vergina. Also, no brochure or any other documentary evidence
demonstrating the similarity between the two plants at Verginia and Bhopal was produced
before the court by the UCC to support its contentions.

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The Judgment:- But all of these contentions were rejected and all the accused were found
guilty and were subjected to imprisonment and were also liable to fine. But these orders could
not be enforced as some of the accused did not appear in the Court. Mr. Warren Anderson,
who was the chairman of the UCC at the time the disaster took place, is still absconding and all
requests for his extradition still remain unsuccessful as the U.S Government rejected it.
Legal Issues: One of the main issues which the Bhopal Gas tragedy raises is the issue of
absolute liability. This issue was elaborately discussed in the case of M.C Mehta v Union of
India. The principle of absolute liability states that when an enterpriseis engaged in hazardous
or inherently dangerous industry and if any harm results in account of such activity then the
enterprise is absolutely liable to compensate for such harm and that it should be no answer to
the enterprise to say that it had taken all reasonable care and that the harm occurred without
any negligence on its part. In such industries, the principle of safe design would be that one
does not guard merely against the most predictable, routine type of accidents. Rather one tries
to anticipate the worst that could happen, even if it is highly unlikely, and not only guard
against it, but prepare to contain it and make sure that there is no way for that even to take
place.
This is the principle of absolute liability and liability can be fixed even if there is no negligence
on part of the accused. In the case of absolute liability, even the defences available under strict
liability would not apply. Thus, even if the accident is some freak incident, liability would still be
fixed. In such a case, it would be no good defence to argue that the direct or the proximate
cause of the accident or the causa causan of the accident was not the carrying of such
hazardous activity, but it actually is an Act of God or that it is due to some third party
intervention. Even if the Company had taken extreme precautions to ensure that such events
do not take place, responsibility would still be fixed on them. This principle of absolute liability
in India evolved primarily because of the awakening that the Bhopal Gas Disaster and the
Oleum Gas Leak case gave.
The Bhopal Gas Tragedy is also in a way responsible for the passing of the Public Liability
Insurance Act, 1991 which provides for compulsory insurance of any unit or factory undertaking
a hazardous activity.
Apart from all of this, the tragedy has recently been much discussed in the light of the Nuclear
Liability Bill. This bill has a lot of controversial provisions which aim at capping the total liability
in case of a nuclear accident. The bill also prohibits the victims from suing the suppliers directly
and allows them to recover only from the operators. The bill also lays a cap on the amount that
an operator can recover from the suppliers.
In the light of the events that followed Bhopal, it is clear that there is a need for a proper
mechanism of compensation and it is important that any kind of cap on liability should be
removed as it would be unconstitutional.

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11. Settlements
1985 – 1988: Government provides relief & aid, pursues legal case
1989: Union Carbide agrees to $470 million compensation settlement
1991: Relief payments started, however only residents in specific “gas affected
areas” of the city were eligible to receive
compensation
Gas Affected Areas: Compensating only specific
“gas affected areas” politicized the process, with
some advocates calling for more wards to be
included.
A complication with ward-wide payments in
Bhopal was that between the 1984 disaster and
the beginning of payments in 1991, the city's
population more than doubled. This meant that
new residents who for some reason decided to
move into a “gas affected area” were eligible for
compensation.
 This is both good and bad.
 Because the gas exposure is presumed to have
contaminated the soil and water, even new
Bhopal residents are likely being exposed to
contaminants and could benefit from sharing in the settlement.
 However, payments to these new residents have the effect of shrinking an
already small compensation pool,
leaving some victims with unpaid medical bills or relatives of the dead
undercompensated.
Union Carbide contributed about $100 million (90% of it in stock) to fund
relief & prevention efforts. The major contribution was $90 million for
hospital catering to heart, lung, and eye problems. Other contributions
included $5 million to the Indian Red Cross, $4.6 million for interim aid, and
$2 million for a vocational training center in Bhopal—which has since been
closed.
12. Ethical issues involved
 Poor quality and lack of many instruments, safety Poor quality and lack of many instruments,
safety equipment and reduced operation of critical equipment and reduced operation of critical
systems systems
Only parts of Bhopal
were considered
"affected" by the
gas leak

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o Flare Tower, VGS, Water Sprays, MIC refrigerator, Tank Flare Tower, VGS, Water Sprays,
MIC refrigerator, Tank 610.
 The local community was never given any The local community was never given any
information about MIC and other chemicals. information about MIC and other chemicals
 Gross negligence by the Government of India Gross negligence by the Government of India and
UC.
 3 separate safety audits. No actions made.
 Cared more about saving money.
 Coffee breaks were more important.
 First official meeting took place 40 hours after the disaster.
 Workers were never informed of the dangers of Workers were never informed of the dangers
of MIC as well as other chemicals.
o Gained information the hard way.
13. Social aspect of tragedy
Before analyzing the legal and environmental aspects of the tragedy, it is important to
note the problems in establishing a factory in an industrializing country. India, by far, still a poor
nation in 1984 is an ancient culture, with its evolved set of norms and traditions. Worst of all is
the caste system; in which majority of people belong to the group of lower castes and
untouchables. The untouchables are the most downtrodden of them all. Since the factory
started in Bhopal, people belonging to such communities began migrating from villages
towards the factory and began squatting in adjoining land, doing small businesses and working
in odd jobs or as servants in the employee’s houses. These areas developed as shantytowns
and were the first affected during the tragedy. The delay in reactions to the tragedy may have
been contributed by the fact that the majority of the victims were people from these
communities. The class actions in Supreme Court representing the victims were also affected
due to this factor. Union Carbide India Limited could hire the best of lawyers. How could the
poor, uneducated people afford the best? Also even the distribution of compensation was
affected by the rampant corruption in the Indian bureaucracy. Even the Rs. 10,000 (250$) set
aside for the victims families were not properly disbursed. Even the decision of agreeing to the
470million $ settlement by the Government of India, acting as victims representative, was not
made by prior consultation with the victims. Dominic Lapierre in his book Five Past Midnight in
Bhopal (2002) gives an account of a New York lawyer promising 100 million rupees to the
meeting of victims, most of them who earned Rs. 300 (less than 20$), quote them as jubilant.
After many years while researching for the book, he encounters the same couple, who had not
received much compensation, and asking for “at least an apology from Union Carbide.” The
unique social system of India and its ramifications contributed to the toughness of the relief
and rehabilitation operations. The problems were exasperated with the change of Western and
Eastern methods of thinking, work ethics and lifestyles. There was a lack of co-ordination from
the parts of Union Carbide officials in India and Danbury (where the global HQ of Union Carbide
was located) in handling of operational details of the plant, handling of its maintenance and

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security. This is especially important 6 because there was an accusation of sabotage of the
valve by a disgruntled employee, but the details were never proven.
14. Economic Aspects of the Tragedy
According to various value-event studies published after the tragedy (Salinger, 1992; Marcus et. al.,
1991), the abnormal return of the Union Carbide stock increased after the lag of just a month. This lag
might not have contributed by the catastrophe, but previous events prior to the tragedy such as profits
for the corporation dropping and several takeover bids (Salinger, 1992), for example a failed takeover
bid by GAF. The increase in the stock prices was explained as a result of restructuring and
recapitalization of the company before the sell-off. According to a study published in Journal of
Management Science (Marcus et. al. 1991), stock prices respond positively to defensive activities by
the management, rather than accommodative moves by managers towards the victims. This explains
how managers while trying to deflect lawsuits suppress their personal human reactions towards
tragedy and try to deny all responsibility (Marcus et. al., 1991). This may serve to answer the question
where the Union Carbide officials accused sabotage by a disgruntled employee or attack by a “Sikh
terrorist”. By accommodative signals, as the settlement of 470$ million, the shareholders see this
action as an acceptance of responsibility to the tragedy and the acceptance of problems within the
company and the stock reacts in a negative way (Marcus et. al. 1991), but they could not reject their
null hypothesis (H0: When a company is involved in an accident, its investors will react more positively
to defensive signals than to accommodative signals). The Dow chemical company successfully took
over Union Carbide in February 6th 2001, after that Union Carbide became a wholly-owned subsidiary.
Dow owned all the stock of Union Carbide, but UC remained a separate entity. Thereafter Dow claimed
that the stockholders and the Union Carbide did not have any responsibility in the tragedy
(www.bhopal.com/position.htm). The details about this statement are explained in the next section in
depth .

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16. Conclusion
The tragedy of Bhopal continues to be a warning sign at once ignored and heeded. Bhopal and its
aftermath were a warning that the path to industrialization, for developing countries in general and India
in particular, is fraught with human, environmental and economic perils. Some moves by the Indian
government, including the formation of the MoEF, have served to offer some protection of the public's
health from the harmful practices of local and multinational heavy industry and grassroots organizations
that have also played a part in opposing rampant development. The Indian economy is growing at a
tremendous rate but at significant cost in environmental health and public safety as large and small
companies throughout the subcontinent continue to pollute. Far more remains to be done for public
health in the context of industrialization to show that the lessons of the countless thousands dead in
Bhopal have truly been heeded.

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17. Bibliography
1. https://en.wikipedia.org
2. http://enhs.umn.edu
3. http://www.slideshare.net
4. http://www.legalservicesindia.com
5. http://www.cas.mcmaster.ca

Bhopal Gas Tragedy

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