Bhopal Gas Tragedy - 1984. The presentation is about the disasters happened in Bhopal on 2nd and 3rd December in 1984, in which more than 4,000 were dead instantly and 5,00,000 were affected. It also shows the procrastination of the company and negligence of the Factory workers, which caused this tragic incident.

1. BHOPAL GAS TRADEGY
2nd and 3rd December, 1984
(The worst industrial accident in the history of the Industrial world Up to 4,000 dead, 500,000 affected.)
Name: - Alset Utkarsh Sanjay
Roll No.: - 16PE00 2
Subject: - Disaster Management
Guided By –
Prof. Vikas V. Kulkarni

2. 1) Introduction
2) Accident Overview
3) Plant View
4) Plant, Process and Product Description
5) Containment Description
6) Containment Description (MIC Storage Tank)
7) Tank Safety Features
8) Tank Exothermic Reaction
9) Several circumstantial evidence points to the total breakdown
10) Contribution to Negligence
11) Accident Description
12) In-operative Safety Features
13) Effects after Disaster
14) Aftermath of the Tragedy
15) Rehabilitation
16) Support of Government to Culprits
17) Conclusion
18) Actual footage of the Bhopal gas tragedy !
Bhopal Disaster
CONTENTS

3. INTRODUCTION
 UCC (Union Carbide Corporation ) in association with local government had
set up plant for pesticides.
 Pesticides includes the storage of deadly MIC (methyl isocyanide).
 On 3rd December, 1984, an accident occurred in storage tank E610 containing
MIC, which leaked directly in the atmosphere.
 Many people and livestock were dead
 Warren Anderson , then CEO of UCC, was still registered under Indian court,
but, US was not handing him over to India (till he was alive).
Bhopal Disaster

4. Bhopal Disaster
ACCIDENT OVERVIEW
 A pesticide plant in India produced the compound Methyl Isocyanide (MIC)
as an intermediate product in the process.
 MIC is an extremely toxic and unstable substance and even in very small
quantities is fatal.
 Large quantities of the MIC were stored in steel tank. The tank had many
safety features to maintain the product in a safe and stable form.
 Economic pressures meant, that most of these features were abandoned to
save money.
 Water, inadvertently entered the storage tank and caused an exothermic,
runaway reaction to occur.
 The MIC boiled up and MIC vapour was expelled through the bursting disc
vent.
 The scrubber and flare stack were not operating. So, the MIC vapour was
discharged directly to atmosphere.
 The wind carried it as a plume over the adjacent city of Bhopal where the
victims were living.

6. Bhopal Disaster
PLANT VIEW

7. Bhopal Disaster
PLANT VIEW
Picture illustrates proximity of plant to residential urban neighbourhood.

8. Bhopal Disaster
PLANT VIEW
Picture shows the plant as it is today.

9. Bhopal Disaster
PLANT & PROCESS DESCRIPTION
•The Union Carbide plant at Bhopal produced the product called ‘Sevin’ an
insecticide for spraying on crops.
•The capacity of the plant was 5,000 tons of Sevin per annum. It commenced
full production in 1980.
•The factory was located, at the northern end of the town of Bhopal which
was relatively less populated area.
•Over the years, unplanned urban growth and densely populated suburbs were
allowed to be built at the southern edge of the factory.
Note:- The prevailing wind was from the North.

10. Bhopal Disaster
PROCESS DESCRIPTION
 There were five main process areas on site:-
1. Carbon Monoxide Production
 Carbon plus Oxygen to Carbon Monoxide
2. Phosgene Manufacturing Plant
 Carbon Monoxide plus Chlorine to Phosgene
3. Methyl Isocyanate Plant
 Phosgene plus Methyl Amine to MIC
4. Alpha Napthol Plant
5. Sevin Plant
 MIC plus Alpha Napthol to Sevin
 MIC was produced by reacting
Phosgene with Methyl Amine
and separating out the MIC by
Distillation Process.
 The liquid MIC was then
pumped in storage tanks.

11. Bhopal Disaster
PROCESS DESCRIPTION

12. Bhopal Disaster
PRODUCT DESCRIPTION
 Although, only MIC and Phosgene were implicated in the disaster,
the plant was characterized by the production and storage of a large
number of very dangerous compounds.
O C N CH3
O H
OH
Alpha Napthol
‘Sevin’
1 - Naphthyl - N - Methyl - Carbamate

13. Bhopal Disaster
PRODUCT DESCRIPTION
H C N
H
H
H
H
Methyl Amine
O C
Cl
Cl
Phosgene
H C O C N
H
H
Methyl Iso Cyanate

14. Bhopal Disaster
Plant Production Process
Methylamine => (1) Reacts with Phosgene; (2) Producing Methyl Isocyanate;
(3) which reacts with 1 – naphthanol; (4) to yield carbaryl;
(5) Sevin = C12 H11 NO2

15. Bhopal Disaster
PRODUCT DESCRIPTION
1) Methyl Isocyanate (MIC) CH3NCO
 Molecular Weight M = 57
 Boiling Point at atmospheric pressure is 39 C
 It is a Colorless, Highly Volatile Liquid at room temperatures with
a Vapor twice as dense as air.
 MIC is a Toxic gas attacking the Skin, Eyes, Respiratory Systems
and Internal Organs. It is more lethal than Chlorine or Phosgene.
 MIC is both Volatile and Unstable at higher temperatures and can
breakdown exothermically to give out large amounts of heat. For
safe handling, it must be maintained at about 0 C

16. Bhopal Disaster
PRODUCT DESCRIPTION
2) Chlorine (Cl2)
 Molecular Weight M = 71
 Boiling point at atmospheric pressure −34.04 °C
 It is a Greenish yellow gas at room temperatures with vapor
2.5 times as dense as air.
 It is a Toxic gas, that attacks the lungs and other soft tissue like
tendons, ligaments, fascia, skin, fibrous tissues, fats, and synovial
membranes (which are connective tissue), and muscles, nerves and
blood vessels (which are not connective tissue).

17. Bhopal Disaster
PRODUCT DESCRIPTION
3) Phosgene (Carbonyl Chloride) COCl2
 Molecular Weight M = 99
 Boiling point at atmospheric pressure 8.3 °C
 It is a Volatile Liquid or Colorless Gas at room temperatures with vapor
3.5 times as dense as air.
 It is a toxic gas that attacks the lungs and other soft tissue.
Note:- both Chlorine and Phosgene were used extensively
in WW1 as Poisonous gases.

18. Bhopal Disaster
PRODUCT DESCRIPTION
4) Carbon Monoxide (CO)
 Molecular Weight M = 28
 It is a Colorless, Odorless, Non - Irritating, Permanent gas, slightly
less dense than air.
 It is Moderately Toxic and kills by interfering with the blood oxygen
transport mechanism.

19. Bhopal Disaster
CONTAINMENT DESCRIPTION
 There were three identical MIC storage vessels all built from
stainless steel. The tanks were mounded in earth and the mound
covered with concrete. The disaster had its origin in one of these,
Tank 610.
 The tank was horizontal, cylindrical in orientation with a diameter,
D of 2.43 m and length, L of 13 m. Approximate Nominal Volume,
V
 Actual capacity would have been less than this taking into account
internal fittings, etc.; possibly 55 m3.
32
60
4
mLDV 


20. Bhopal Disaster
CONTAINMENT DESCRIPTION (MIC Storage Tank)

21. Bhopal Disaster
MIC STORAGE TANK
Picture shows the tank as it is today.

22. Bhopal Disaster
MIC STORAGE TANK
Picture shows a section of the tank after the incident in an upturned
position.

23. Bhopal Disaster
TANK SAFETY FEATURES
 A Nitrogen line was connected to the tank to transfer the product by inert
pressurization of the headspace.
 This could also be used to maintain a positive pressure inside the tank and
thus prevent the ingress of unwanted liquids.
 The tank was fitted with a pressure relief valve and rupture disc.
 The vent line from the valve exhausted into a scrubbing tower filled with
caustic soda (NaOH).
 This would neutralize the MIC to form Sodium Isocyanate.
 Any residual gas from the scrubber was sent to a 30 m tall flare stack
where it would be burned off.

24. Bhopal Disaster
TANK SAFETY FEATURES
 There was an external coiled jacket on the vessel through which coolant
(Freon / chloroform) was re-circulated.
 This was to keep the vessel contents at 0 C and thus prevent any adverse
exothermic reactions occurring.
 Tanks were not to be filled above the 50 % mark, so that in the event of
dangerous chemical reactions occurring, solvents could be pumped-in, to
quench the reactions.
 The operating philosophy was that, the tanks should only hold the
minimum amount of MIC necessary for Sevin production; they were not
to be used for stockpiling.

25. Bhopal Disaster
TANK EXOTHERMIC REACTION
 Tank E610 contained 42 tons of MIC.
 Exothermic chemical reactions between the water and MIC began in the
tank.
 Gases including Methyl Amine, Carbon Dioxide, Phosgene and others
were amongst the products of these reactions and they pressurized in the
vessel.
 Corrosion of the tank walls, would also have been intensified and the
released iron may have catalyzed further runaway reactions.
 The pressure rose from the normal storage pressure of 0.1427 kg/cm2, up to
2.039 kg/cm2 and then onto 3.569 kg/cm2 and beyond.
 The temperature rose from ambient (20 C) up to 60 C and beyond.
 The MIC liquid in the tank began to boil vigorously and MIC vapor, under
pressure traveled up the pipes leading from the tank.
 A small leak of MIC developed at a valve, in one of the lines.
 The tank began to rumble and creak (चरमराहट) in its concrete casing.

26. Bhopal Disaster
TANK EXOTHERMIC REACTION
 The main safety valve blew at a pressure in excess of 3.569 kg/cm2
and a jet of MIC traveled-up the scrubbing tower and escaped out
the top.
 The tank itself expanded with the heat, burst the concrete casing and
was ejected upwards to topple over.
 A second pipe then ruptured releasing a second geyser of MIC.

29. Bhopal Disaster
 The plant has two main safety devices:
1) Scrubber, which neutralize the gas with caustic soda and
2) Flare tower, where the gas can be burnt-off.
 Both the safety devices failed to operate on that particular day.
i. The Refrigeration Units for the storage tanks containing MIC gas were
out of order for several months.
ii. The Water Jet had failed to reach at the top of the 120 foot stack from
which MIC gas was gushing out.
iii. The poisonous gas was stored in the tanks for more than two months,
violating the safety rules.
iv. The factory turned on the public siren about an Hour after the gas
started releasing into the atmosphere.
v. The plant was located in densely populated area of old Bhopal.
Several circumstantial evidence points to the total breakdown

30. Bhopal Disaster
 UCIL didn’t maintained safety rules.......
 A pipe leaked? They Didn't replace it.
 MIC workers needed more training.
 The MIC tank alarms had not worked for four years.
 The flare tower and the vent gas scrubber had been out of service for five months
before the disaster.
 To reduce energy costs, the refrigeration system was idle.
 The MIC was kept at 20 Degree Celsius, not the 4.5 Degrees advised by the manual.
CONTRIBUTION TO NEGLIGENCE

31. Bhopal Disaster
 The Steam boiler, intended to clean the pipes, was out of action for
unknown reasons.
 Carbon steel valves were used at the factory, even though they corrode when
exposed to acid.
 According to the operators, the MIC tank pressure gauges had been
malfunctioning for roughly a week.
 Union Carbide Corporation (UCC), admitted in their own investigation
report that most of the safety systems were not functioning on the night of
December 3, 1984.
 UCIL didn’t maintained safety rules.......
CONTRIBUTION TO NEGLIGENCE

32. Bhopal Disaster
ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION
1) Pipe Cleaning Procedure
 As part of routine procedures, the pipes leading from the MIC distillation column
to the storage tanks were regularly flushed with pressurized water.
 MIC and any associated products can be quite corrosive and could form corrosion
deposits in the pipe.
 These deposits would contaminate the MIC in the tanks and could initiate
unwanted reactions.
 During cleaning, valves in the product lines should be closed and a blank or
slip-blind placed in the valves, leads to the storage tank to prevent contamination.
 However the valves, although closed, were not sealing properly because of
corrosion and the maintenance crew forgot about the blank.
 It appears that about 1000 kg of water plus metal debris entered tank E610.
 Assuming all the previously described safety features were operative, this should
not have been a catastrophic occurrence.

33. Bhopal Disaster
ACCIDENT DESCRIPTION
 Schematic view of pipe washing procedure indicating location of the
relevant valves and pipe blank.

34. Bhopal Disaster
IN-OPERATIVE SAFETY FEATURES
 The plant had been operating at a loss for the previous year due to
lower than expected demand for the product.
 The plant was not running continuously, but intermittently.
 A cost cutting program of work had been implemented.
 The refrigeration system had been turned-off about six months
previously, to save on operating costs which was the prime
protection system.
 The caustic scrubbing tower was inoperative and the flare had been
partly dismantled.
 Valves on the Nitrogen line were defective due to unsatisfactory
maintenance.
 Lax operating routines meant that tanks were allowed to be filled
above the 50 % mark.

35. Bhopal Disaster
Dead bodies of victims of that
massacre
 It is estimated that total deaths are
about 20,000 up to 20 years after
disaster.
 It is estimated 1,00,000 to 2,00,000
people have permanent injuries.
 Reported symptoms are eye
problems, respiratory difficulties,
immune and neurological disorders,
cardiac failure secondary to lung injury,
birth defects among children born to
affected women.
EFFECTS AFTER DISASTER

66. Bhopal Disaster
 Medical staff were unprepared for the
thousands of casualties.
 Doctors and hospitals were not informed of
proper treatment methods for MIC gas
inhalation.
 They were told to simply give cough medicine
and eye drops to their patients.
 The gases immediately caused visible damage
to the trees. Within a few days, all the leaves
fell off.
 2,000 bloated animal carcasses had to be
disposed of.
 "Operation Faith": On December 16, the
tanks E611 and E612 were emptied of the
remaining MIC.
 This led to a second mass evacuation from
Bhopal.
AFTERMATH OF THE TRAGEDY

67. Bhopal Disaster
 Immediate relief was decided two days after the tragedy.
 Relief measures commenced in 1985, when food was distributed for a short
period and ration cards were distributed.
 Widow pension rate of Rs. 200 per month (later Rs. 750 per month) was
provided.
 One-time ex-gratia payment of Rs. 1,500 to families with monthly income
Rs. 500/- or less was decided.
 2,486 flats in 2 and 4 story buildings were constructed in the "Widows
colony" outside Bhopal.
 The water did not reach the upper floors.
 It was not possible to keep cattle. Infrastructure like buses, schools, etc.
were missing for at least a decade.
REHABILITATION

68.  Indian government closed plant to outsiders and failed in making the data public.
 The Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) were forbidden to
publish their data on health effects until after 1994.
 The Indian Government and Union Carbide Corporation (UCC) deny permanent
injuries caused by MIC.
 UCIL (Union Carbide India Ltd.) paid a token of $ 470 million even though
asked a total compensation of $3.3billion. But the government said nothing.
 The government sent safely Mr. Anderson the CEO of UCIL at the time of
massacre, to US.
 Civil and criminal cases are still pending in United States District Court,
Manhattan, New York City borough, US and the District Court of Bhopal,
involving UCC, UCIL employees, and Warren Anderson.
SUPPORT OF GOVERNMENT TO CULPRITS
Bhopal Disaster

69. Bhopal Disaster
CONCLUSIONS
 There were a number of clear contributory factors that caused this
disaster.
1) Factory Siting
 A plant producing a variety of very dangerous compounds was sited:-
a) too close to a residential area
b) on the wrong side with respect to the prevailing wind.
2) Large Product Inventory
 Total storage capacity of MIC was in excess of 150 m3. When dealing
with such toxic products, the amount at hand should always be
minimized.

70. Bhopal Disaster
CONCLUSIONS
3) Abandonment of Safeguards
 Economic problems and the resultant pressure to save money lead to the
shutting down of vital safety systems.
 If the factory was uneconomic it would have proved a more sensible
option to shut it down.
4) Medical Unpreparedness
 Not enough information on the toxicity of the factory’s products and lack
of knowledge of treatment in the local hospitals.
 The factory should have been much more pro-active in leasing with the
municipal authorities in preparing an emergency evacuation plan.

71. Actual footage of the Bhopal gas tragedy !