For this assignment there are going to be 4 Discussion Posts. Fo.docx

For this assignment there are going to be 4 Discussion Posts.
For your first post this week, define, summarize, analyze, and
evaluate the main ideas in the videos about Morozov and
Shirky. Discuss their dystopian and utopian ideas about how
the Internet can either strengthen dictatorships or empower civil
society and democracy in cyberspace.
In your second post, use Morozov’s and Shirky’s ideas to
discuss and evaluate Min Jiang’s essay. Does it take a
dystopian or utopian view of the Internet and social media in
China? Offer evidence from the article to support your point of
view.
For your third and fourth posts, summarize, analyze, and
evaluate the main ideas in the articles by Svensson and by Shi
and Yang. Do these authors take a dystopian or a utopian view
of the Internet and social media in China? Support your point
of view with evidence from these articles e.g., quotations,
examples, etc.
· Resources:
deLisle, Jacques, Avery Goldstein, and Guobin Yang, eds., The
Internet, Social Media, and a Changing China. This title is
available as an E-book on the Utica College Library homepage.
Read all the following sections and chapters, listed below:
Introduction: “The Internet, Social Media, and a Changing
China, “ by
Jacques deLisle, Avery Goldstein, and Guobin Yang, pp. 1-9;
p.16: read only the third paragraph that begins “Third, the latest
waves….or in other online forums.” This paragraph relates to
something Shirky discusses in his first video on China’s social
media; and read Dynamism and Complexity: Ongoing Change,
New Challenges, and Regime Responses, pp. 26-27.
Ch. 1: “The Co-Evolution of the Internet, (Un-) Civil Society,
and Authoritarianism in China” by Min Jiang, pp. 28-48.

Ch. 2: “Connectivity, Engagement, and Witnessing on China’s
Weibo,” by Marina Svensson, pp. 49-70.
Ch. 3: “New Media Empowerment and State-Society Relations
in China,” by Zhengzhi Shi and Guobin Yang, pp. 71-85.
Pei, Minxin. China’s Trapped Transition: The Limits of
Developmental Autocracy. Cambridge, Mass., Harvard
University Press, 2008. Conclusion, pp. 205-218.
· Required Videos (total time appx. 87 min.) Use the close
caption system for the Morozov videos if you have difficulty
understanding them. Note: this system does not translate
Russian, Chinese, German, and French into English, but
Morozov summarizes those speakers comments.
Evgeny Morozov: How The Internet Strengthens Dictatorships,
TED Talk, (min. 11:51).
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=-hFk6FDrZBc
Documentary, Evgeny Morozov: The End of Cyper-Utopia
(49:16 min.) Ai Weiwei is the artist/dissident/blogger who
appears in this video around 16:00 min., riding in a car. Also
toward the beginning off the video, Morozov mentions “illiberal
adaptation,” discussed by Minxin Pei in the first few pages of
Ch. 2, “Democratizing China?”
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=oSmTmg1GkrY
Pen America: China’s Social Media Censorship Creates

Dilemma for Writers (Clay Shirky), (10:17 min.)
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=vLJS9qxTgHQ
How Social Media Can Make History—Clay Shirky, TED-ED
Talk, 15:48 min.
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ASZJE15E0SY
Discussion Post Sample:
The "Panopticon Effect" is a method used by the government of
China to keep citizens in check at all times possible. In her
book, MacKinnon describes the Panopticon Effect as a way to "
give prisoners credible proof that they are under surveillance
some of the time, though not all of the time. If they have no
way of knowing exactly when they are being watched, they end
up having to assume they are under surveillance all the time."
(MacKinnon,2012, p80). Based on Bentham's design, she also
argues that " When people are unaware of being monitored, at
least some of the time, without clear information about exactly
how and when the surveillance is taking place, against whom,
and according to what specific criteria, people will choose to
avoid trouble and modify their behavior in ways that are often
subtle and even subconscious."(MacKinnon,2012, p80).

China's practice of the Panopticon Effect is in use as a daily
routine. Citizens are constantly being monitored by face and
object recognition cameras and technologies that allow
government officials to acquire data and compare the data
acquired against the information on a database. Facial
recognition is measured by "identifying all of the faces in a
given image. For each face, the algorithm measures out key data
points like the distance between the eyes or the color of the skin
and then use those measurements to create a template that can
be compared against other faces in a database." (Wall Street
Journal, 2017). Not only are the Chinese monitored by cameras,
but also by the daily applications they use on their electronic
devices (discussed in the last paragraph).
Everywhere in China there are checkpoints in which each
citizen's id card is revised. In the video "Life Inside China's
Total Surveillance State", the journalist from the Wall Street
Journal makes emphasis on how strict is life for the Chinese due
to the constant surveillance implemented by the government.
Some of the aspects touched on the video included the fact that
if a citizen wants to buy a weapon, the weapon is then "tied to
the buyer's identification card" (Wall Street Journal, 2017).
This enforces security and allows for faster profiling of
criminals during or after the commission of crimes, however,
for innocent people this seems very unnecessary. The
implementation of surveillance goes above and beyond and
allows the government to manipulate the citizens like puppets,
and use them as a way to test new technologies.
In China, almost every citizen makes use of the "WeChat"
application, which not only does it offer social network
features, but also is used to "pay utility bills, pay for food, rent
items, take a taxi, buy tickets for events, such as movie tickets,
and even rent hotel rooms and book flights." (China
Uncensored, 2017). This application offers facial recognition as
well as an addition to the features mentioned above. The
drawback to this application is that the government has full

access to everyone's information within the WeChat databases.
The government has the ability to listen to conversations over
the phone due to its ability to activate microphones, as well as
being capable of tracking the user's location and activities.
Basically, the users have to live with the fact that they are being
watched from the moment they sign up to use the app.
References:
MacKinnon, R. (2012). Consent of the Networked: The
Worldwide Struggle for Internet. New York, NY: Basic Books.
Wall Street Journal. (2017, June 27). Next-Level Surveillance:
China Embraces Facial Recognition. Retrieved March 27, 2018,
from https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Fq1SEqNT-7c
China Uncensored (2017, August 23) WeChat: The App That's
Always Watching You . Retrieved March 27, 2018, from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DMHwVU-8BHM
Wall Street Journal (2017, December 20). Life Inside China's
Total Surveillance State. Retrieved March 27, 2018, from
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=OQ5LnY21Hg
Week 1 Assignment: Opinion Paper
Below is the assessment of your written paper assignment.
Written Assignment
Grading Form
Content (70%)
Points Earned: 7 / 7
· All key elements of the assignment are covered in a
substantive way. Major points are stated clearly & supported by
specific details, examples, or analysis.

· Provided substantive definitions for terms
· Consider what you have learned about the schools of thought
and theories. In your opinion, which is the best way to mitigate
crime, using the justice system or social control?
· Met word count of 350 – 700 words
Comments:
Good job!
You addressed the key elements of the assignment.
Both approaches (criminal justice system and informal social
controls) are needed to help mitigate crime and juvenile
delinquency.
You were over the word count. It is a skill to take large
amounts of information and present it in a clear, concise, and
articulate manner.
Organization (15%)
Points Earned: 1 / 1.5
· The tone is appropriate to the content and assignment.
· The introduction provides a sufficient background on the topic
and previews major points.
· Paragraph transitions are present, logical, and maintain the
flow throughout the paper.
· The conclusion is logical and reviews the major points.
Comments:
Good job with the tone!
Good job but you need help with the structure.
You need an introduction.
You need to improve the conclusion.

Be creative with the terms. Do not just provide the assignment
instructions for each. For example, you do not need “List and
define…”
Good job using sectional headings and/or transitional sentences
as you move from one topic to another.
Mechanics (15%)
Points Earned: 1 / 1.5
· The paper—including tables and graphs, headings, title page,
and reference page— is consistent with APA formatting
guidelines and meets course-level requirements.
· Intellectual property is recognized with in-text citations and a
reference page.
· Rules of spelling, grammar, usage, and punctuation are
followed.
· Sentences are complete, clear, concise, and varied.
Comments:
Good job but you need help with APA.
Your in-text citations were good. But you need to use more in-
text citations. Placement is also important. You should not
put a citation in the middle of a paragraph and assume the
reader will relate the citation to all the information in the
paragraph.
Your reference page was good.
Total Point Earned: 9 / 10
Comments: Good job! Your content was good. But you need
help with structure and APA. Please use our Center for
Writing Excellence for assistance. Keep trying to improve. I
know you can do it. Let me know if you have any questions.

Conclusion
BY FOCUSING on the critical weaknesses of the Chinese
political sys-
tem in general, and on many of the hidden costs of China's
transition
from communism in particular, this book attempts to show the
limits of
a developmental autocracy. Despite its awe-inspiring economic
growth
and progress, a set of self-destructive dynamics is weakening
China's
most vital political institutions-the state and the ruling party.
Lagging
behind the country's rapid economic modernization, China's
closed
political system is increasingly becoming an anachronism. At
present,
it is incapable of facilitating the representation of China's
complex and
diverse social interests or mediating the conflict between an
authoritar-

ian state and a liberalizing society.
The breakdown of the mechanisms of political accountability
has led
to pervasive corruption and collusion among the ruling elites,
while
the loss of confidence in the regime's own future has motivated
its
insiders to engage in unrestrained predation. The inevitable
deterio-
ration of governance that has resulted from these institutional
failings
has undermined the state's capacity, heightened social tensions,
and cast
into doubt the sustainability of the progress that China has
achieved
since the late 1970s. Even China's gradualist economic reform
strategy,
which has received almost universal endorsement for its
flexibility and
efficacy, is centered on the CCP's goal of political survival, and
not the
development of a true market economy. The economic costs of
ensur-

ing the CCP's political monopoly through policies of rent
protection,
though hidden, are real, substantial, and growing.
206
Co
py
ri
gh
t
@
20
06
.
Ha
rv
ar
d
Un
iv
er
si
ty
P
re
ss
.
Al
l
ri
gh
ts
r

es
er
ve
d.
M
ay
n
ot
b
e
re
pr
od
uc
ed
i
n
an
y
fo
rm
w
it
ho
ut
p
er
mi
ss
io
n
fr
om
t
he
p

ub
li
sh
er
,
ex
ce
pt
f
ai
r
us
es
p
er
mi
tt
ed
u
nd
er
U
.S
.
or
a
pp
li
ca
bl
e
co
py
ri
gh
t

la
w.
EBSCO : eBook Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 4/9/2018
11:53 AM via UTICA COLLEGE
AN: 282477 ; Pei, Minxin.; China’s Trapped Transition
Account: s8331415.main.ehost
Conclusion 207
By critically examining the understated social and political
costs of
China's neoauthoritarian development strategy, this book also
tries to
question three ideas that have retained their allure despite
mounting
skepticism about their validity.
The first idea is that economic progress is the key determinant
of po-
litical liberalization. While it is true that economic growth and
mod-
ernization can create favorable conditions for the emergence of
liberal
political regimes, China's slow movement toward political
openness in
spite of twenty-five years of rapid economic growth suggests

that the
choices of its ruling elites are the real determinants of
democratiza-
tion. In fact, if anything, rapid short-term economic growth may
have a
perversely negative impact on democratization because it
provides all
the incentives for the ruling elites not to seek political
liberalization.
The second idea is that the gradualist reform strategy works
better
than the so-called big-bang approach. Of course, the big-bang
ap-
proach has failed miserably in Russia and several other former
Soviet
bloc countries, but the achievement of China's gradualist
strategy has
been greatly overstated. More important, as Chapter 3 shows,
the grad-
ualist strategy is ultimately unsustainable because of the
dynamics of
rent dissipation and the mounting costs of inefficiency incurred
by
path-dependent partial reforms.

The third idea is that of the efficacious neoauthoritarian
develop-
mental state. Despite the examples of successful
neoauthoritarian de-
velopmental states in East Asia, the political logic and
institutional
determinants of autocracy-patronage dictated by regime
survival, the
political monopoly of the authoritarian regime, and ineffective
moni-
toring and policing of the state's agents in the absence of the
rule of
law, civil liberties, and political opposition-are more likely to
create a
predatory state than a developmental one.
This book also underscores the centrality of politics in general,
and
the control of political power in particular, in setting the course
of eco-
nomic and regime transitions. As the analysis of the political
consider-
ations behind the Chinese leaders' policies on political and
economic

reforms shows, the most critical determinant of their strategies
is
whether they will strengthen or endanger their political
survival. To
the extent that the overall effects of the chosen strategies
increase the
chances of their political survival, the ruling elites can be
flexible in
tactical terms, allowing partial reforms to boost the short-term
vigor of
Co
py
ri
gh
t
@
20
06
.
Ha
rv
ar
d
Un
iv
er
si
ty
P
re
ss

.
Al
l
ri
gh
ts
r
es
er
ve
d.
M
ay
n
ot
b
e
re
pr
od
uc
ed
i
n
an
y
fo
rm
w
it
ho
ut
p
er
mi

ss
io
n
fr
om
t
he
p
ub
li
sh
er
,
ex
ce
pt
f
ai
r
us
es
p
er
mi
tt
ed
u
nd
er
U
.S
.
or
a
pp
li

ca
bl
e
co
py
ri
gh
t
la
w.
208 Conclusion
the political and economic systems. But such tactical flexibility
and ad-
justment have strict limits and must not blind us to the
fundamental in-
compatibility between a monopolistic ruling party's
determination to
perpetuate its power and a society's collective desire for a more
auton-
omous and rule-based economic and political order. Having
seized po-
litical power through the barrel of a gun, a formerly

revolutionary
party, such as the CCP, will unlikely seek its own demise
through volun-
tary reform.
However, a developmental autocracy's overriding goal of self-
perpetuation is ultimately imperiled by the self-destructive
dynamics
found in nearly all autocracies: low political accountability,
unrespon-
siveness, collusion, and corruption. In most cases, an autocratic
regime's
collective interests are grossly misaligned with the individual
interests
of its agents. Acting rationally, self-interested agents seek to
maximize
their own gains, especially during a transitional period when
changes in
the rules of the game create abundant opportunities for self-
enrichment.
The economic and political costs incurred by these agents in
their self-
dealing are inevitably borne by both the autocratic regime-
which suf-

fers, as a result, from low legitimacy, weak authority, and
organizational
corruption-and society-which pays in the form of deteriorating
gov-
ernance and economic performance. Thus, it is inconceivable
that a
developmental autocracy can retain its vigor for long. On the
contrary,
the self-destructive dynamics embedded in a developmental
autocracy
will most likely lead to a gradual buildup of systemic risks
within the au-
tocratic regime and progressively sap its strength. That is why,
except in
a very small number of cases, most self-styled developmental
autocra-
cies eventually fail.
Given China's impressive growth performance, one may
question
the pessimistic logic behind the main thesis of this study. If the
Chinese
political system is so dysfunctional, why has the country
maintained
such rapid economic growth since the late 1970s? There are

several ex-
planations for this apparent paradox of bad governance and
good
growth. First, the pathologies of a trapped transition became
more se-
rious and visible in the 1990s, after the neoauthoritarian
development
strategy had gained dominance within the CCP and the liberal
forces,
both within the party and in society, were marginalized after
Tiananmen.
To the extent that deterioration in governance has a lagging
effect on
economic performance (for example, the deleterious effects of
under-
Co
py
ri
gh
t
@
20
06
.
Ha
rv
ar
d

Un
iv
er
si
ty
P
re
ss
.
Al
l
ri
gh
ts
r
es
er
ve
d.
M
ay
n
ot
b
e
re
pr
od
uc
ed
i
n
an
y
fo

rm
w
it
ho
ut
p
er
mi
ss
io
n
fr
om
t
he
p
ub
li
sh
er
,
ex
ce
pt
f
ai
r
us
es
p
er
mi
tt
ed
u
nd

er
U
.S
.
or
a
pp
li
ca
bl
e
co
py
ri
gh
t
la
w.
Conclusion 209
investment in human capital and public health usually do not
become
visible until one or two generations later), it is possible that the
path-
ologies of a trapped transition will have a material impact on
macro-

economic performance in future years.
Second, in the short term, the growth rate can be pumped up by
high savings and, hence, investment rates and massive shifts of
popula-
tion from agriculture to industry, the two major factors behind
China's
rapid growth in recent years. In the Chinese case, with a
national sav-
ings rate of 40 percent and an annual flow of $40 billion to $50
billion
in foreign direct investment since the late 1990s (about 3-4
percent of
GDP), high investment rates can propel growth even though the
eco-
nomic system remains relatively inefficient.
Third, it is important to look at the quality of growth because
the fo-
cus on growth rate alone tends to ignore the hidden costs and
the low
quality of growth. In other words, growth rates may
inaccurately reflect
or, indeed, can seriously misrepresent a society's welfare gains.
For ex-

ample, if high growth is achieved at the expense of rising
inequality,
underinvestment in human capital, damage to the environment,
and
pervasive official corruption, such growth must be considered
low qual-
ity. In China's case, high growth rates have been accompanied
by all
these symptoms of low-quality growth. The massive
accumulation of bad
loans in the Chinese banking system due to government-directed
credit
must also be considered another symptom of low-quality
growth, or a
cause of artificially high growth because such wasted
investments have
been counted as economic output.
Finally, the effects of bad governance on China's economic
perfor-
mance may already be visible. By international comparison,
China is
growing too slowly, as Martin Wolf argued. Given its size, its
low starting

base, and its high savings rate and high investments, China
ought to
have grown much faster than the 6.1 percent annual rate
recorded be-
tween 1978 and 2003. 1 A most likely explanation for China's
not living
up to its economic potential is the institutional weakness of the
politi-
cal system. Of course, identifying weak institutions as causes of
poor
performance gives one reasons for both optimism and
pessimism.
Should China manage to reform these institutions, its economic
per-
formance will undoubtedly improve. But if it fails to do so, then
its growth
rate will probably stagnate or even decline, especially when
macroeco-
nomic conditions become less favorable. In fact, China
experienced
Co
py
ri
gh
t
@

20
06
.
Ha
rv
ar
d
Un
iv
er
si
ty
P
re
ss
.
Al
l
ri
gh
ts
r
es
er
ve
d.
M
ay
n
ot
b
e
re
pr
od

uc
ed
i
n
an
y
fo
rm
w
it
ho
ut
p
er
mi
ss
io
n
fr
om
t
he
p
ub
li
sh
er
,
ex
ce
pt
f
ai
r
us
es

p
er
mi
tt
ed
u
nd
er
U
.S
.
or
a
pp
li
ca
bl
e
co
py
ri
gh
t
la
w.
210 Conclusion
such an episode of slow growth in 1998-2000. Research by

Thomas
Rawski shows that, contrary to official Chinese data, the
Chinese econ-
omy barely grew during this period. 2
Getting Out of a Trapped Transition
This study raises another important question: how can a partial
reform
equilibrium end? Put metaphorically, how can a country such as
China
get out of the transition trap? To the extent that a trapped
transition
will eventually create conditions that force the ruling elites to
make
fundamental choices, there are three possible scenarios or ways
out. By
and large, these choices are similar to those faced by political
leaders
trapped in an unsatisfactory and unsustainable status quo-as was
the
case following the end of the Cultural Revolution.
First, given the self-destructive dynamics of a trapped
transition, a
neoauthoritarian regime will soon exhaust its economic and
political

vitality. With deteriorating economic performance and
increasingly ris-
ing social tensions, China's ruling elites will be forced to
choose be-
tween maintaining a deteriorating status quo and taking the
risks of
more radical reforms to restore political accountability and curb
decen-
tralized predation. If they opt for reform, they will most likely
mobilize
new political groups to overcome the resistance of the
beneficiaries of
a trapped transition and help break the old partial reform
equilibrium.
As the experience of the former Soviet Union demonstrates,
however,
mobilizing societal forces to pressure a discredited regime to
change
can inadvertently unleash an antiregime revolution. Such "run-
away re-
form," or the "de Tocqueville paradox," poses great risks to
potential
reformers. 3 Once the previously excluded groups are fully
mobilized,

reformers will lose their ability to control the agenda and the
goals of
these newly empowered groups. Therefore, a country can get
out of a
trapped transition without experiencing social convulsion only
if re-
formers can maintain full control of the renewed reform
process. As
Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe Schmitter showed, such an
out-
come is most likely only when reformers gain the cooperation of
the
moderate members of the societal opposition. 4
Second, one of the alternatives to getting out of a trapped
transition
through renewed reforms is a regime collapse. The logic of rent
dissipa-
tion and decentralized predation means that the institutional
degener-
ation of a developmental autocracy will progressively spread,
resulting
Co
py
ri

gh
t
@
20
06
.
Ha
rv
ar
d
Un
iv
er
si
ty
P
re
ss
.
Al
l
ri
gh
ts
r
es
er
ve
d.
M
ay
n
ot
b
e

re
pr
od
uc
ed
i
n
an
y
fo
rm
w
it
ho
ut
p
er
mi
ss
io
n
fr
om
t
he
p
ub
li
sh
er
,
ex
ce
pt
f
ai

r
us
es
p
er
mi
tt
ed
u
nd
er
U
.S
.
or
a
pp
li
ca
bl
e
co
py
ri
gh
t
la
w.

Conclusion 211
in deteriorating performance of the authoritarian regime,
especially in
terms of economic growth. Facing declining political legitimacy
and
prospects of social turmoil, ruling elites with available exit
options will
most likely take them, particularly during a crisis when the
regime's
own survival is imperiled. Under such circumstances, we can
expect
the political equivalent of a bank run-a panicked rush for the
exit by
the regime's insiders who no longer have the will or the
incentive to
defend the regime. Unfortunately, the collapse of a
developmental
autocracy under crisis conditions may break the partial reform
equilib-
rium, but is no guarantee of a return to a stable liberal political
order,
as shown by the difficulties experienced by Russia after the
Soviet col-
lapse and by Indonesia after the demise of the Suharto regime.

Third, for a large and diverse country such as China, it is often
diffi-
cult to build a strong enough new reform coalition at the
national level.
But regional and local reform coalitions can be formed with a
combi-
nation of the initiatives of forward-looking local elites and
pressure
from societal forces. Although the devolution of power has led
to the
decentralization of predation, two developments can potentially
gen-
erate more positive dynamics for reform. Devolution of power
will, in
some cases, result in greater political accountability for local
elites. More
important, devolution of power in China's context has
encouraged in-
terregional competition for capital, labor, and markets. Local
account-
ability and interregional competition mayjointly motivate local
elites and
civil society groups to experiment with new institutional
reforms that

can address the ills of a trapped transition at the local level. It
is worth
noting that, in the 1990s, the most innovative governance
reform attempts,
such as the township-level elections and refining village
elections, were
"middle-up" initiatives-risk-taking ideas implemented by
progressive
local officials to remedy local problems. If more jurisdictions
take the
middle-up route, at least some of the social and political ills
caused by
a trapped transition can be ameliorated at the local level. In the
end,
local initiatives will probably encourage governance divergence
across
China, as some areas manage to get out of a trapped transition
through
reform and others continue to stagnate or even deteriorate
further.
Implications for the International Community
One must not rule out the possibility that a country such as
China can be

stuck in a trapped transition for an extended period. It is
conceivable
Co
py
ri
gh
t
@
20
06
.
Ha
rv
ar
d
Un
iv
er
si
ty
P
re
ss
.
Al
l
ri
gh
ts
r
es
er
ve
d.

M
ay
n
ot
b
e
re
pr
od
uc
ed
i
n
an
y
fo
rm
w
it
ho
ut
p
er
mi
ss
io
n
fr
om
t
he
p
ub
li
sh
er

,
ex
ce
pt
f
ai
r
us
es
p
er
mi
tt
ed
u
nd
er
U
.S
.
or
a
pp
li
ca
bl
e
co
py
ri
gh
t
la
w.

212 Conclusion
that a developmen tal autocracy can continue to use the same
mix of re-
pression, co-optation, and adaptation to maintain an elite-based
ruling
coalition for decades. Deteriorating governance and economic
perfor-
mance may be the necessary-but not sufficient-conditions for
the
emergence of a fatal crisis. A combination of tactical
adaptation, im-
provisation, luck, and mass apathy may allow the ruling elites
to stay in
power even as the country is mired in misrule.
The likelihood that China's transition to a market economy and
open society has stalled has serious implications for policy. For
Chinese
leaders, a transition process trapped in a partial reform
equilibrium

endangers their ambitious goal of becoming a full-fledged
global
power. The combination of flawed economic and political
institutions
creates market distortions, inefficient uses of resources, and
opportu-
nities for massive systemic corruption. The rapid economic
develop-
ment China was able to achieve in the first twenty-five years of
its
transition will unlikely be sustained. Instead of becoming a
global eco-
nomic power, China may enter a prolonged period of stagnation.
In addition, the risks of domestic instability will likely increase,
both
as a result of the social frustrations caused by poor economic
perfor-
mance and the political dissatisfaction against an authoritarian,
exclu-
sionary, corrupt, and ineffective regime. Given the difficulties
and costs
associated with forming viable coherent opposition groups
capable of
opposing and offering a credible alternative to the CCP, it is

difficult to
imagine that the CCP behemoth can be dethroned by an
organized
coalition from below. Absent a deep and wide fracture that
shatters the
CCP from within, the collapse of the CCP may be a low-
probability
event. Thus, the unavailability of a credible alternative and the
slim pos-
sibility of a regime implosion suggest that political stagnation
would ac-
company economic stagnation, with further erosion of state
capacity,
the decline of the CCP's legitimacy, and increases in
lawlessness, cor-
ruption, and social disorder. Ultimately, such stagnation will
progres-
sively increase the risks of regime collapse or state failure, as
the strains
accumulate in the dysfunctional political and economic systems.
For the international community, a China trapped in prolonged
eco-
nomic and political stagnation poses a set of challenges few
have contem-

plated seriously. Since the 1990s, China's rapid economic
ascendance
has changed the West's assessment of its capabilities and
prospects.
Projecting China's future growth on the basis of its stellar
development
Co
py
ri
gh
t
@
20
06
.
Ha
rv
ar
d
Un
iv
er
si
ty
P
re
ss
.
Al
l
ri

gh
ts
r
es
er
ve
d.
M
ay
n
ot
b
e
re
pr
od
uc
ed
i
n
an
y
fo
rm
w
it
ho
ut
p
er
mi
ss
io
n
fr
om

t
he
p
ub
li
sh
er
,
ex
ce
pt
f
ai
r
us
es
p
er
mi
tt
ed
u
nd
er
U
.S
.
or
a
pp
li
ca
bl
e
co
py

ri
gh
t
la
w.
Conclusion 213
record in the recent past, the Western business community
views China
as an unprecedented commercial opportunity and a strategic
market.
Although China may be a difficult place to do business, Western
busi-
nesses have learned how to manage and live with the risks
inherent in
that nation's political and economic environments. But if the
implica-
tions of this study are borne out, the lofty expectations of
Western busi-
nesses are most likely to be disappointed. China may be one of
the

biggest economies of the world, but the high rates of growth
and gen-
eration of wealth projected by Western businesses will unlikely
materi-
alize. At the very least, the conclusions drawn from this study
should
make these businesses reassess their China strategy and adjust
the risk
premium they demand in return for their investments.
At the geopolitical level, the prospect of a rising China that
could
challenge the existing world order in general, and the
preeminence of
the United States in particular, has dominated the debate on the
West's
policy toward China since the mid-1990s. 5 Security analysts
are preoc-
cupied with China's potential military capabilities and
intentions. Even
though the China debate has spawned two conflicting policy
approaches,
often labeled "containment" and "engagement," the fundamental
prem-
ise underlying these two opposing approaches is similar.

Advocates of
engagement and containment both assume China's rise as a
given, and
their differing policy prescriptions focus on projected Chinese
strength,
rather than its weakness. To be sure, China's weaknesses
sometimes
cause concerns in the West. But on such occasions, relatively
rare in the
1990s when the Chinese economy boomed, analysis of China's
problems
tends to be extremely pessimistic, often with predictions of an
immi-
nent collapse of the Chinese political order and economy.6
Should China's rise fizzle, as this book suggests is highly likely
if no
fundamental political reforms are implemented, both the
containers
and engagers will be disappointed. For the hard-nosed realists
ob-
sessed with the potential threat from a China with peer-
competitor ca-
pabilities, a China stuck in its incomplete transition means a
much

weaker China incapable of mounting a real challenge for global
pre-
eminence. In practical terms, the careful construction of a
strategic bal-
ance of power designed to counter China's rising influence, as
pursued
by the George W. Bush administration through its efforts to
recruit
Japan and India into a potential anti-China security alliance,
may turn
out to be unnecessary. Needless to say, the tens of billions of
dollars in
Co
py
ri
gh
t
@
20
06
.
Ha
rv
ar
d
Un
iv
er
si

ty
P
re
ss
.
Al
l
ri
gh
ts
r
es
er
ve
d.
M
ay
n
ot
b
e
re
pr
od
uc
ed
i
n
an
y
fo
rm
w
it
ho

ut
p
er
mi
ss
io
n
fr
om
t
he
p
ub
li
sh
er
,
ex
ce
pt
f
ai
r
us
es
p
er
mi
tt
ed
u
nd
er
U
.S
.

or
a
pp
li
ca
bl
e
co
py
ri
gh
t
la
w.
214 Conclusion
military spending justified as a response to China's rIsIng
military
threat will be wasted. Without China as a peer competitor,
Washing-
ton's strategic thinkers will have to look elsewhere for new
threats.
But liberal engagers will also have a harder time reconciling
their ex-

pectations that economic progress will bring democratization
with the
hard reality that the Chinese experience has consistently defied
such
expectations. With progress toward a genuine open society
frustrat-
ingly slow in China, Western liberals may find it increasingly
difficult to
maintain their optimism about China's future as a candidate for
de-
mocratization. In policy terms, the intellectual case for
engagement
with China that has been made will rest on even more shaky
ground.
The international community should take another look at China
and
start preparing, at least intellectually, for the unpleasant
prospect that
China may not only fail to fully realize its potential, but also
descend in to
long-term stagnation. Such a reassessment of China's future
should pro-
duce a new and more realistic framework in analyzing China's
ongoing

transformation and addressing the real challenges it brings.
Instead of
viewing China as the new superpower of the twenty-first
century, the in-
ternational community may want to see it as an underperforming
giant
that has failed to seize a historic opportunity for making a
fundamental
break with its authoritarian past and paid a heavy price for it.
In all likelihood, a China trapped in partial reforms would
resemble,
in several crucial respects, an incapacitated state. Unlike a
completely
failed state, an incapacitated state retains nominal national
sovereignty,
territorial integrity, and central government authority. Its ruling
elites,
through the monopoly of political power, remain unchallenged.
How-
ever, in an incapacitated state, the government's comprehensive
capa-
bility of governing is feeble, even though it may retain a limited
ability
to enforce its will and rule selectively, mostly under

circumstances
where such demonstration of state power affirms, at the
symbolic level,
the existence of a centralized political authority. Thus, over a
wide
range of issues deemed of critical interest to the international
commu-
nity-such as environmental protection, nonproliferation, antinar-
cotics, migration, control of the spread of HIV/AIDS, and
poverty
alleviation-an incapacitated state would be unable to honor its
com-
mitments or perform its governing functions effectively. The
interna-
tional community would likely find threats and problems posed
by
incapacitated states ultimately more frustrating and difficult to
address
Co
py
ri
gh
t
@
20
06

.
Ha
rv
ar
d
Un
iv
er
si
ty
P
re
ss
.
Al
l
ri
gh
ts
r
es
er
ve
d.
M
ay
n
ot
b
e
re
pr
od
uc
ed

i
n
an
y
fo
rm
w
it
ho
ut
p
er
mi
ss
io
n
fr
om
t
he
p
ub
li
sh
er
,
ex
ce
pt
f
ai
r
us
es
p
er

mi
tt
ed
u
nd
er
U
.S
.
or
a
pp
li
ca
bl
e
co
py
ri
gh
t
la
w.
Conclusion 215
because traditional approaches to foreign policy contain few
effective

prescriptions to treat state incapacitation. Given China's huge
size and
its role in global security and the international economy, the
challenge
posed by an incapacitated state in China would simply
overwhelm the
international community's ability (even if we assume
willingness) to pro-
vide meaningful assistance. The spillover effects from China's
internal
woes and weaknesses would not only affect the interests of
many nations,
but also would make China's problems those of the entire
international
community.
Few may have viewed China's prospects through such dark
lenses.
But one ignores the self-destructive logic of predatory
authoritarianism
at his own peril.
Co
py
ri
gh
t

@
20
06
.
Ha
rv
ar
d
Un
iv
er
si
ty
P
re
ss
.
Al
l
ri
gh
ts
r
es
er
ve
d.
M
ay
n
ot
b
e
re
pr

od
uc
ed
i
n
an
y
fo
rm
w
it
ho
ut
p
er
mi
ss
io
n
fr
om
t
he
p
ub
li
sh
er
,
ex
ce
pt
f
ai
r
us

es
p
er
mi
tt
ed
u
nd
er
U
.S
.
or
a
pp
li
ca
bl
e
co
py
ri
gh
t
la
w.
Co
py

ri
gh
t
@
20
06
.
Ha
rv
ar
d
Un
iv
er
si
ty
P
re
ss
.
Al
l
ri
gh
ts
r
es
er
ve
d.
M
ay
n
ot
b

e
re
pr
od
uc
ed
i
n
an
y
fo
rm
w
it
ho
ut
p
er
mi
ss
io
n
fr
om
t
he
p
ub
li
sh
er
,
ex
ce
pt
f

ai
r
us
es
p
er
mi
tt
ed
u
nd
er
U
.S
.
or
a
pp
li
ca
bl
e
co
py
ri
gh
t
la
w.

Appendix
Notes
Acknowledgments
Index
Co
py
ri
gh
t
@
20
06
.
Ha
rv
ar
d
Un
iv
er
si
ty
P
re
ss
.
Al
l
ri
gh

ts
r
es
er
ve
d.
M
ay
n
ot
b
e
re
pr
od
uc
ed
i
n
an
y
fo
rm
w
it
ho
ut
p
er
mi
ss
io
n
fr
om
t

he
p
ub
li
sh
er
,
ex
ce
pt
f
ai
r
us
es
p
er
mi
tt
ed
u
nd
er
U
.S
.
or
a
pp
li
ca
bl
e
co
py
ri

gh
t
la
w.
Co
py
ri
gh
t
@
20
06
.
Ha
rv
ar
d
Un
iv
er
si
ty
P
re
ss
.
Al

l
ri
gh
ts
r
es
er
ve
d.
M
ay
n
ot
b
e
re
pr
od
uc
ed
i
n
an
y
fo
rm
w
it
ho
ut
p
er
mi
ss
io
n

fr
om
t
he
p
ub
li
sh
er
,
ex
ce
pt
f
ai
r
us
es
p
er
mi
tt
ed
u
nd
er
U
.S
.
or
a
pp
li
ca
bl
e

co
py
ri
gh
t
la
w.
University of Pennsylvania Press
Chapter Title: The Coevolution of the Internet, (Un)Civil
Society, and Authoritarianism in
China
Chapter Author(s): Min Jiang
Book Title: The Internet, Social Media, and a Changing China
Book Editor(s): Jacques deLisle, Avery Goldstein, Guobin Yang
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press. (2016)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1b3t8nr.4
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,
researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information

technology and tools to increase productivity and
facilitate new forms of scholarship. For more information about
JSTOR, please contact [email protected]
Your use of the JSTOR archive indicates your acceptance of the
Terms & Conditions of Use, available at
http://about.jstor.org/terms
University of Pennsylvania Press is collaborating with JSTOR
to digitize, preserve and
extend access to The Internet, Social Media, and a Changing
China
This content downloaded from 72.237.4.114 on Mon, 09 Apr
2018 15:50:21 UTC
All use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms
C H A P T E R 1
The Coevolution of the Internet, (Un)Civil
Society, and Authoritarianism in China
Min Jiang
Th is chapter extends Guobin Yang’s 2003 seminal article on
the coevolution
of the Internet and civil society in China.1 It argues the Internet
has facili-
tated, on the one hand, the coevolution of Chinese civic spaces
and authori-
tarian control, and, on the other, the coevolution of civic

activities and uncivil
interactions. Th e Internet has not only helped amplify civic
discourses and
group formations; it has also augmented the infl uence of
uncivil exchanges
online, leading to a greater degree of fragmentation and
cynicism of public
opinion. Although social media platforms such as the Twitter-
like Sina Weibo
can serve as a critical space for expressing and channeling
public opinion,
they are unlikely to be the ultimate game changer.
In charting the new terrain of China’s online civic spaces, the
chapter
focuses on four aspects: (1) real- time activism; (2) online po
liti cal jamming;
(3) weibo celebrities; and (4) the rise of an “uncivil society”
online. I explore
conditions and instances of “real- time” activism; the use of
cultural jamming
and “serious parody” for po liti cal activism; the role of weibo
celebrities in fos-
tering plurality and fragmentation; and the uncivil ideological
discourse
exchanges that have led to public brawls in the street and pop u
lar rejection
of “public intellectuals.” In contrast, to curb the po liti cal
consequences of new
forms of mediated activism, the control regime has implemented
a variety
of new mea sures besides fi ltering and employment of pro-
government com-
mentators to forestall or pacify collective actions, including real
name regis-
tration policy and anti- rumor campaigns.

2018 15:50:21 UTC
The Coevolution of the Internet 29
Th e chapter argues positive development of online public
spaces in China
relies as much on institutional politics to eff ectively channel
public opinion
as it does on identity politics and progressive changes in
subjectivity through
everyday life interactions. While the Internet mediates such
negotiations and
is increasingly indispensable to the parties involved, it does not
determine
their outcomes. Th e contextualized use of the Internet and new
media, shaped
by the social, cultural, and po liti cal protocols surrounding
such technologies,
ultimately does.
Context
Th e massive diff usion of the Internet and the rise of China as a
world power
are two prominent stories of our time. In 1994, China connected
to the World
Wide Web. By mid-1998, Chinese Internet users reached 1
million. Today,
China is the second largest economy in the world and home to
632 million
Internet users, 275 million microbloggers, 527 million Internet

mobile phone
users, and such Internet giants as Alibaba, Baidu, Tencent, and
Sina.2 Th e rapid
development of the Chinese Internet is grounded in the
transformation of
China itself from a third- world country to a manufacturing and
industrial
power house aft er the Chinese Communist Party traded Mao for
markets and
gradually opened its closed doors to the outside world in the
late 1970s.
Th e Chinese government’s embracing of the Internet presents a
paradox
and has attracted heated public debate over the po liti cal
consequences of the
widespread adoption of the Internet in an authoritarian society.
President
Reagan famously remarked: “Th e Goliath of totalitarianism
will be brought
down by the David of the microchip.”3 Yet defying such
prevailing techno-
utopian predictions that the Internet sides with freedom and
undermines au-
tocratic rulers, Beijing has so far managed to weave and guard
an expanding
fi ltered web. Besides employing various means of censorship,4
more impor-
tant, the regime has built and promoted state legitimacy through
economy,
nationalism, ideology, culture, and governance to ensure the
compliance, if
not allegiance, of its population.5
Th is is not to say that Chinese authorities do not fear the diff
usion of the

Internet in China or its po liti cal implications. In fact, Party
mouthpiece and
People’s Daily Online’s editor in chief once remarked: “What
would it look
like if everybody went into politics? . . . China has more than
100 million In-
ternet users. If they were all free to speak their minds, we
would have a very
2018 15:50:21 UTC
30 Min Jiang
serious situation.” 6 With more than 600 million of the Chinese
population
online now, control of po liti cal discourse is by no means a
cakewalk. As Guo-
bin Yang demonstrated in his nuanced account of digital
activism in China,
the Chinese state’s regulation of the Internet has consistently
run against an
impressive degree of grassroots challenges fueled by public
discontent dur-
ing China’s tumultuous economic, social, and cultural
transformations.7
Th e evolution of the Internet in China in the last two de cades
has wit-
nessed the simultaneous growth of authoritarianism and
grassroots activ-
ism fueled by contention and participation. Dubbed oft en by
pop u lar press

as a “cat- and- mouse” game, the coevolution of digital activism
and authori-
tarianism does not pronounce immediate winners or losers.
However, it has
become increasingly clear that the Internet is not necessarily an
insur-
mountable threat to capable illiberal regimes. So far the Chinese
govern-
ment has managed to promote the Internet as a means for
socioeconomic
development while successfully minimizing its po liti cal
impact. Overall,
despite limited po liti cal freedoms, people’s freedoms in other
realms have
expanded with improved living standards and opportunities.
China’s on-
line activism is thus embedded in a much larger media ecol ogy
and social
pro cess, where the po liti cal impact of the Internet is mediated
through a
complex mix of social, economic, po liti cal, and institutional
circumstances.8
Unlike the dictators toppled during the Arab Spring— Ben Ali
failed
to control the communication networks in Tunisia, where
protestors used the
Internet effectively to or ga nize civil disobedience; Mubarak
unplugged
the Internet in Egypt and drove protestors to the street—
Chinese authorities
have walked a fi ne line balancing Internet growth and its
attendant po liti cal
consequences. Its “networked authoritarianism” or
“authoritarian deliberation”
resorts less to brute force but allows for a considerable degree

of give- and- take
between the state and emergent civil forces.9 Moreover, China’s
expanding
economy, the state’s anticorruption promises, its emphasis on
governance,
and its appeal to Chinese nationalism and civilization have
fostered an im-
plicit state- society pact, a grand bargain of sorts, that the po
liti cal status quo— a
one- party system monopolized by a small group of elites with
the assurance
of reasonable per for mance, social stability, and continued
economic growth—
shall remain unchallenged. In the realm of new media, such an
arrange-
ment has translated into a form of “informational
authoritarianism” that
combines capitalism, authoritarianism, and Confucianism to
institute state
regulation, as well as widespread self- censorship among
Internet ser vice/
content providers and users.10
2018 15:50:21 UTC
While much of the previous literature tends to focus on
grassroots
empowerment,11 or disempowerment,12 this chapter argues for
a dialectic
coevolution of the state and an emerging Chinese civil society

mediated via
the Internet. Th e grassroots empowerment narrative focuses on
the Inter-
net’s decentralized structure, low cost, greater access to
information/ideas,
communication speed, user interactivity, connectivity across
space, online
dissent, or ga ni za tion, and mobilization. On the other hand,
the disempow-
erment thesis emphasizes state control of Internet infrastructure,
prohibi-
tion of po liti cally sensitive content, regulation of ICP/ISP,
state surveillance
of netizens, and rampant self- censorship, as well as
commercialization,
entertainment, slacktivism, and distraction away from critical
social issues
and real changes.
Does the widespread adoption of social media in China alter the
balance
of power between the state and the emerging civil society? In
what ways
does it contribute to citizen empowerment? How have
authorities adjusted
to contain public opinion? Taking the perspective of a
coevolution of the
Internet, (un)civil society, and authoritarianism in China, in
what follows,
I discuss the most recent development of the Chinese Internet
and new
media, particularly the rise and fall of Sina Weibo (China’s
Twitter) since
August 2009.
Online Activism and (Un)Civil Society

As many Chinese are now connected via mobile social
networks, digital ac-
tivism has acquired new characteristics. I highlight in the
following: (1) real-
time activism, (2) online po liti cal jamming, (3) weibo
celebrities, and (4) the
rise of an uncivil society online.
Real- Time Activism
Th e arrival of mobile microblogging and photo sharing makes
possible the
instantaneous broadcast of an unfolding event over the Internet
and social
networks. With deeper integration of the mobile web into
people’s everyday
life, a new genre of media activism— real- time activism— has
emerged as Chi-
nese netizens start to document and amplify anything they fi nd
provocative,
scandalous, and intriguing in real time. Some accidentally
become national
2018 15:50:21 UTC
32 Min Jiang
or international news and even lead to policy change as they tap
into wide-
spread public sentiment and deep- seated social problems.

Speaking at a public lecture at Peking University in June 2010,
propaganda
offi cial Li Baozhu proudly announced: “With a wave of my
hand, tens of mil-
lions of posts about the Deng Yujiao incident were all
deleted.”13 Th e comment,
accompanied by live pictures, was quickly circulated on
Chinese microblog-
ging before being taken down by commercial portals soon aft
erward.
One of the most prominent cases of real- time activism concerns
the
Wenzhou train collision. On July 23, 2011, two high- speed
trains crashed
into each other at 8:34 p.m. near Wenzhou, a coastal city in
southeast China,
causing four cars to fall out of a sixty- foot- tall viaduct and
resulting in forty
deaths. Four minutes aft er the accident, a Sina Weibo user
posted the fi rst
tweet about the accident. Nine minutes later, a desperate plea
for help was
posted on Sina Weibo, retweeted more than one hundred
thousand times
(later censored): “A cry for help! Train D301 has been derailed
not far from
Wenzhou station. Children are crying up and down the carriage.
No staff
member has come out! Hurry up and save us!” Two hours aft
erward, the fi rst
tweet about rescue relief was sent from the scene and
government appeal for
blood donations was put on Sina Weibo. Later, a user’s tweets
from the blood
donation clinic were reposted more than one hundred thousand

times.14
At a time of crisis when offi cial media are absent or barred
from report-
ing, social media users become de facto reporters on the scene,
giving ac-
counts in real time. Weibo is oft en chosen in China to break
such news not
only because of its speed or con ve nience but also because of
its connected-
ness and publicness. Deeply embedded in users’ social
relationships and
everyday life and used by many professional reporters, weibo
was highly
conducive to the spread of critical news and information before
stricter reg-
ulations were imposed by authorities later to rein in public
opinion and
spread “positive energy.”15 A week aft er the accident, more
than 10 million
comments about the crash had been posted on Sina Weibo,
nearly all of them
angry, questioning authorities’ rescue eff orts, the hasty burial
of evidence,
and the truth behind the accident.16
Few social media users are activists, yet oft en by accident their
fi rsthand
accounts, when widely circulated, form the basis of truth and
public dis-
course. Within twenty- four hours aft er the accident, video
clips of authori-
ties burying a train carriage spread like wildfi re online.17
People believed they
were “burying the truth.” Aft er offi cial media announced the
end of rescue

eff orts merely eight hours aft er the crash, the survival of
“miracle girl,” two-
2018 15:50:21 UTC
year- old Yiyi, whose parents died in the crash, further fueled
online fury.18
In response to reporters’ charge that the Ministry of Railways
was trying
to thwart investigation, the ministry spokesman haplessly
commented:
“Whether or not you believe it, I believe it,” which immediately
took fl ight as
an Internet meme. Even offi cial media turned up the heat on
the ministry. State
tele vi sion CCTV anchor Qiu Qiming veered from his script
and asked on air:
“Can we drink a glass of milk that is safe? Can we stay in an
apartment that
will not fall apart? Can we travel roads in our cities that will
not collapse?”19
Th e hastily constructed railways under Minister “Great Leap
Liu,” as an
offi cial report later revealed, were plagued with safety
hazards due to infe-
rior engineering, poor management, and systemic corruption. Th
e minister
was sacked for embezzling millions of dollars from public
projects. Conse-

quently, the world’s largest and fastest railway, Harmony
Express, one of
China’s proudest modern achievements, has come to represent
recklessness
and fraud.20 In this case, real- time activism, in the form of
civic journalism
and public criticism, played a crucial role in helping uncover
the truth by
keeping the pressure on the government. Media of all kinds—
old and new,
grassroots and offi cial— participated in exposing the iconic
failure of govern-
ment per for mance that in large mea sure violated the grand
bargain of mod-
ern Chinese politics that allows the Party to “reign unchallenged
as long as
it is reasonably competent.”21 However, weibo’s connectedness
and public-
ness, as the chapter will later explain, have come under
increasing state scru-
tiny as the government propaganda apparatus begins to pressure
commercial
operators to fi lter around the clock and silence infl uential
users online.
Online Po liti cal Jamming
Not only can activism in the social media age occur in real
time; its style has
also taken a more playful turn to evade censors and reach larger
publics. On-
line po liti cal jamming— the use of digital media and pop u lar
culture to dis-
seminate dissenting images and viewpoints, disrupt stultifying
mainstream
po liti cal discourses, and expose social injustices— borrows

from “cultural
jamming” practices that target and subvert mainstream
corporate culture
and ideologies.22 Like cultural jams, online po liti cal jamming
challenges
dominant po liti cal discourses by producing and distributing
counter-
hegemonic messages via new media: logos are reconfi gured,
images Photo-
shopped, pop u lar fi lms clips remixed, and pop culture
references appropriated
2018 15:50:21 UTC
34 Min Jiang
and distributed via digital networks.23 Not only are such
practices rooted in
parody as a powerful tool of po liti cal re sis tance worldwide
throughout hu-
man history, to which China is not an exception; they have
acquired new
genres, features, and potency in Chinese cyberspace, creating an
alternative
carnivalesque world of freedom and laughter where the rich and
powerful
are ridiculed and subverted.24
Similar to its Western counterparts, online po liti cal jamming
in China
has spread acerbic critique of contemporary Chinese politics
cloaked in

frisky artistic forms and helped energize acts of social and po
liti cal activ-
ism. For instance, Chen Guangcheng, a famous Chinese human
rights
activist and self- taught blind lawyer, is internationally
recognized for or ga-
niz ing a landmark class- action lawsuit against authorities’
abuses in family-
planning practices in Linyi, Shandong. Aft er serving four years
in prison, he
was released in 2010 and was under house arrest until his
remarkable escape
to the U.S. embassy in Beijing in April 2012. To protest against
the brutal
treatment of Chen, his supporters made stickers, the size of a
booklet cover,
featuring a stylized graphic of Chen’s face with his signature
sunglasses (see
fi gure 1.1), modeled aft er the logo of KFC, a well- known U.S.
fast- food chain
in China. “Pearl Her,” a Chen supporter, reportedly had four
thousand of
these stickers produced and asked fellow supporters to put them
on their
cars. A Google Maps page was also set up for a “FREE CGC
Car Sticker
Club” where supporters who had put the sticker on their cars
could register
their approximate locations. She remarked: “dissidents have
traditionally
been quite confrontational with the government. . . . But we
should learn
how to express ourselves and protest in an orderly way, to use
art and enter-
tainment more freely. It is like Occupy Wall Street.”25

Another FREE CGC’s participatory act is the Dark Glasses
Portrait
campaign (see fi gure 1.2). To support Chen, an anonymous
Chinese artist,
“Crazy Cab,” began to solicit and curate digital photos of
netizens wearing
the blind activist’s signature sunglasses in 2012. Viewed in
isolation, each
photo did not trip censors. When aggregated, however, these
photos evolved
into a powerful and continuous picture wall, reminding people
of the hoodie-
wearing campaign for Trayvon Martin in the United States and
the hijab
“Be a Man” photo drive showing solidarity for the Ira nian
Green Movement.26
As an act of guerrilla activism, the campaign was designed to
avoid censor-
ship, as authorities cannot possibly round up everyone wearing
sunglasses.27
Such acts of “serious parody” are examples of Chinese activists’
appro-
priation of cultural jam techniques for digital po liti cal
activism.28 Cultural
2018 15:50:21 UTC
or po liti cal jamming, Cammerts explains, draws inspirations
from art move-

ments of Dadaism, Surrealism, Fluxus, and Situationism.29 It
borrows from
Dadaism the idea of assigning diff erent meanings to objects,
exemplifi ed in
the art work of Marcel Duchamp, who famously dubbed a urinal
art and
named it Fountain. Likewise, the “FREE CGC” sticker recoded
the ready- made
KFC logo with disruptive meanings. In addition, cultural
jamming adopts
the optical illusion practice of Surrealism, cleverly designed to
confuse the
viewer. Th e “FREE CGC” sticker clearly baffl ed the Chinese
police, who did
not notice them. “And if they ask what Free CGC means, we say
it is free KFC,”
says an activist.30 Moreover, po liti cal jamming follows
Fluxus’s principle of
integrating social action in the fl ux of everyday life, blending
art and social
Figure 1.1. Source (original
source unknown): http://
newnation . sg / tag / obama
- fried - chicken/ (New
Nation, a Singapore- based
online publication, has
granted the author permis-
sion to reuse the image for
this chapter).
Figure 1.2. Source (screenshot): http:// ichenguangcheng .
blogspot . com / . Site creator
has chosen to remain anonymous.

2018 15:50:21 UTC
http://newnation.sg/tag/obama-fried-chicken/
http://ichenguangcheng.blogspot.com/
36 Min Jiang
critique into a form of counter- artistic movement. In the “FREE
CGC” case,
not only did activists produce and distribute stickers online;
more important,
participants integrated activism into both material (for example,
a car) and
immaterial (for example, performing) aspects of their daily life.
Lastly,
po liti cal jamming is détournement, or rerouting, in the
Situationist sense.
By hijacking the original artwork, détournement, like the
“FREE CGC”
sticker, situates new po liti cal messages in existing consumerist
culture and
public spaces, both online and offl ine.
Th is new type of “art as po liti cal act” in the Chinese activism
scene owes
a debt to famed Chinese artist- activist Ai Weiwei. A student of
Duchamp,
Ai views art not as something detached from society or
transcending so-
called ordinary people but part of everyday life and
experiences. “If artists
betray the social conscience and the basic principles of being

human, where
does art stand then?” Ai asks.31 A provocateur who dares to
pose nude to con-
demn the Party and give the middle fi nger to iconic buildings
around the
world, including the Tiananmen and the White House, Ai also
led notable
eff orts that combined art and digital activism. Between 2008
and 2009, he
investigated student casualties due to the collapse of “tofu-
dreg” (shoddy)
school buildings in the aft ermath of the Sichuan earthquake. A
list of 5,385
names was collected, for which he was severely beaten. To
mourn the dead
and shame authorities who refused to release students’ names,
the list was
printed on white paper, each name read aloud and recorded by
strangers who
volunteered to participate in digital art making.32 In both cases,
social me-
dia facilitated the diff usion of po liti cal jamming to larger
publics and helped
coordinate large- scale per for mances in a participatory
manner. However, the
impact of po liti cal jamming is not impossible to control if the
state resorts
to more forceful means to suppress activists and diff use poorly
coordinated
actions.
Weibo Celebrities
Besides real- time activism and po liti cal jamming, the role of
weibo celebri-
ties in China’s emerging civil society is worth noting. By

introducing distinct
identities, information, and worldviews, weibo celebrities tend
to foster plural-
ity and fragmentation simultaneously. Here, weibo celebrities
refers to users
on Chinese microblogging platforms with large numbers of
followers.
Known as “Big Vs,” their accounts are usually verifi ed,
designated with a V.
2018 15:50:21 UTC
In January 2015, all top ten Sina Weibo celebrities had more
than 40 million
fans. Among them, “Weibo King,” actor Chen Kun, had more
than 73 million.
“Weibo Queen,” Yao Chen, had 72 million. While many of these
celebrities
are entertainers, others, such as Kai-fu Lee, ex- CEO of Google
China, also
have more than 50 million followers.33 Copying its celebrity-
driven business
approach from blogging to microblogging, Sina Corporation has
actively
cultivated its “stars” and a celebrity culture from sports,
entertainment, and
media to real estate, science, and technology to drive online
discussion, traf-
fi c, and ultimately profi t. Although Sina Weibo’s user base has
witnessed

a signifi cant loss to Tencent’s WeChat, a group- chat social
media platform,
Weibo remains as China’s “public forum,” central to the
publicness of Chinese
social media.
Weibo celebrities, a new breed of opinion leaders in the social
media age,
hold considerable sway in China’s public opinion space.
Compared with the
80- million- member Chinese Communist Party, weibo
celebrities’ fans are for-
midable both in numbers and loyalty. As many offi cial media
are not held
in high esteem in China, weibo celebrities with their expertise,
charisma, and
authority are an important source of alternative news,
information, and opin-
ions to millions. Although opinion leaders and public opinion
formation
are certainly not new in China,34 or elsewhere,35 weibo has
arguably altered
in no small mea sure Chinese microbloggers’ access to news and
information,
their relation to one another and social elites, public opinion
formation, and
even online activism mechanisms.
Th e public campaign against child traffi cking “Take a Photo,
Save a
Child” is one such example. It was started in 2011 on Sina
Weibo by Profes-
sor Yu Jianrong, a weibo celebrity known for his support for
social justice
issues. Soon, a microblog site was launched for people to post
photos of

child beggars in the hope to re unite parents with their
kidnapped children.
More than 175,000 people joined the eff ort and posted more
than twenty-
fi ve hundred photographs. Supported by ultra- weibo
celebrities like Yao
Chen and Kai-fu Lee and sanctioned by the state, the campaign
garnered
a great deal of attention. It also made weibo celebrities out of
grassroots
advocates such as Deng Fei, a journalist from Phoenix Weekly,
and Charles
Xue, a Chinese American angel investor. Although only a few
children
were successfully identifi ed and re united with their families
as a result of
this campaign, the charitable eff ort raised widespread social
awareness and
solicited long- term commitment from Jet Li’s One Foundation
and legislative
support.36
2018 15:50:21 UTC
38 Min Jiang
Weibo celebrities’ contribution to such charity causes and
similar
episodes of civic activism have benefi ted from weibo’s
functionalities and
sociality and weibo celebrities’ infl uence. Although these
celebrities’ po-

liti cal impact is under the constant surveillance of commercial
operators
and authorities, their posts oft en blur the boundaries between
self- media and
public media, private lives and public issues. In his exuberantly
optimistic
book, Weibo Changes Everything, Kai-fu Lee compares weibo
users with ten
thousand fans with magazine own ers, those with one hundred
thousand
fans to regional newspaper publishers, and those with 1 million
or even 10
million followers to having the infl uence of national papers and
national TV
stations. Celebrity posts are no longer self- talk but public
talk.37
Oft en critical of social ills, top weibo celebrities, such as real
estate ty-
coons Ren Zhiqiang and Pan Shiyi, IT elite CEO Kai-fu Lee,
and economists
Mao Yushi and Lang Xianping, exert considerable infl uence.
Th ese public
fi gures use weibo not only as a PR tool to cultivate their
personal image but
also as a means to express their views and infl uence the public.
Moreover,
the separation between private lives and public issues has
become increas-
ingly artifi cial and fl uid for weibo celebrities. For instance,
research fi nds
that between October and November 2011, one- fi ft h of
“Weibo Queen” Yao
Chen’s posts concerned public issues rather than topics about
entertainment
or herself.38 Her revelation of her distant relatives’ experience

of forced de-
mo li tion put the social issue at the front and center of her
followers’ minds.
Another weibo celebrity’s, Luo Yonghao’s, public smashing of
Siemens’s
faulty refrigerators and CCTV anchor Zhang Quanling’s post
about erro-
neous ads on Baidu also put these companies in the public
spotlight, chan-
neling personal frustrations and driving public discourse.39
The Uncivil Society Online
However, like previous web technological changes, weibo’s
impact on Chi-
na’s emergent civil society and activism is highly mixed. Not
all weibo ce-
lebrities are civil in their discourse or online behavior. Besides
individuals
and groups conducive to the expansion of open discussion and
growth of an
emergent civil society, more radical and extreme personalities
and groups
have thrived as well. Th e coexistence of groups of
diametrically opposed
ideologies has led to considerable slanging matches, online
verbal abuse,
and even public brawls in the street. In addition, “50 cents,” or
paid pro-
2018 15:50:21 UTC

government online commentators reportedly reaching 2
million,40 have
fl ooded weibo and other pop u lar online spaces, breeding
substantial confu-
sion and discursive frictions.41 As a result, public discourses
and opinions
formed in such online spaces are not necessarily coherent or
always pro-
ductive, and they have grown more fragmentary, polarized,
theatrical, and
cynical over time, culminating in the phenomenal pop u lar
rejection of
“public intellectuals.”
For instance, Kong Qingdong, a professor of Chinese at Peking
Univer-
sity and a descendant of Confucius, is a highly controversial
weibo celebrity.
On January 24, 2012, during an interview on Chinese news site
v1.cn, he
openly cursed Hong Kong residents as dogs of the British
Empire: “As far as
I know, many Hong Kong people don’t regard themselves as
Chinese. Th ose
kinds of people are used to being the dogs of British
colonialists— they are
dogs, not humans.” 42 Refusing to apologize for it, he defended
his remarks as
“free speech.” 43 On the Chinese Internet, Kong, Zhang
Hongliang, Sima Nan,
and Wu Fatian are popularly referred to as the “New Four Arch
Evils” in
China.44 Appealing to pop u lism, nationalism, Maoism, and
even the Cultural

Revolution, these Far Left fi gures known for their ultra-
nationalistic, anti-
West, anticapitalist stance amassed a considerable following
online for their
defense of “the people” against “the elite.” 45
Social media not only amplifi ed the voices of such extremists
and fueled
fragmentation and polarization but, perhaps more important,
helped disman-
tle the “public intellectual” in China. In a most theatrical
fashion in 2012,
the high- profi le weibo debate between Han Han and Fang
Zhouzi and the
physical brawl started on weibo between Wu Fatian and Zhou
Yan enveloped
Chinese netizens in deep cynicism. “Public intellectual,” defi
ned in contem-
porary China by infl uential metropolitan paper Southern
Daily’s supplement
Southern People Weekly as “knowledgeable, progressive and
critical individ-
uals who actively engage in public aff airs,” has become a label
to be shunned
like a plague by online celebrities.46
Before the arrival of weibo, Han Han was already a literary star
and pub-
lic fi gure. His blogs were read by tens of millions and in Time
magazine’s 2010
“Time 100” poll, Han Han, at twenty- seven, came in second.47
For many, es-
pecially Chinese youth, Han Han is the ultimate nonconformist:
a high school
literary competition winner and dropout, a pop u lar blogger, a
best- selling

author, a singer, and most recently a professional racecar driver.
An out-
spoken critic against China’s establishment with snarky wit,
Han Han is the
unoffi cial rebel voice of his generation.48 Fang Zhouzi’s fl
ame war with Han
2018 15:50:21 UTC
40 Min Jiang
Han started in mid- January 2012. Following Han Han’s three
controversial
po liti cal posts on revolution, democracy, and freedom, blogger
Mai Tian
accused Han Han of being the front man of a team of
ghostwriters and
promoters. Aft er Mai Tian withdrew his accusation as a result
of counter-
evidence, Fang picked up the crusade and engaged Han Han in a
war of words
over the authenticity of Han’s work.49 Fang Zhouzi is known in
China as a
fraud buster, having brought down most prominently Tang Jun,
former pres-
ident of MSN China, for lying about his PhD degree. Th eir
wrangle, broad-
cast live from Sina Weibo, polarized not only China’s literary,
media, and
intellectual circles, who split into a “Han camp” and a “Fang
camp”; it most
tragically alienated millions of weibo users disappointed by the

malicious lan-
guage and behavior of the so- called public intellectuals online.
Both camps
used the same derogatory labels— “50 Cents” and “residual
toxin of the
Cultural Revolution”—to condemn each other. Although their
debate fi zzled
because of lack of evidence off ered by either side, the
spectacle they cre-
ated in China’s public life cast deep skepticism on both public
fi gures and
Chinese intellectuals in general.50
However, the most dramatic uncivil dispute is the physical fi
ght between
Wu Fatian and Zhou Yan, started and arranged over weibo and
known as
“Weibo Brawl.” Wu Danhong, or “Wu Fatian” online, was an
assistant pro-
fessor at Beijing University of Po liti cal Science and Law
whose staunch de-
fense of the Party had earned him the “Advanced 50 Cents”
badge.51 On July
3, 2012, Wu posted a tweet on Sina Weibo supporting the
construction of a
questionable metal refi nery plant in Shifang, Sichuan Province,
that had
sparked local protests and been halted. His remarks infuriated
Zhou Yan, a
Sichuan TV reporter empathetic to the protest. An exchange of
insults quickly
escalated to a fi ght appointment at Beijing Chaoyang Park on
July 6, 2012,
that drew onlookers online and offl ine. Videos of the
encounter circulated
widely aft erward, including footage of Ai Weiwei trying to

attack Wu, a trans-
gression some said they were willing to forgive because it was
Wu Fatian.52
Yet the public was not so forgiving of the ways “public
intellectuals,” espe-
cially the well- educated democracy- loving liberals, behaved at
the scene. Th e
transition from verbal abuse to physical attack on Wu Fatian
shocked and
disappointed many sympathetic to liberal views in China,
prompting some
to remark that the brawl smeared the image of liberals and in eff
ect made
more room for those opposing liberal and demo cratic views in
China.53
Following these high- profi le incidents, “public intellectual”
has turned
into a widely accepted pejorative in China. Not only is the
hooliganization
2018 15:50:21 UTC
of public intellectuals a tragic turn of China’s emerging civil
society, it also
casts serious doubt on the conducive role that the Internet is
thought to have
played in the development of China’s emergent civil society.
Instead, through
social media, paid commentators, and self- seeking

personalities, abrasive
exchanges between ideological factions have propelled the
Chinese online
space to be more fragmentary, polarized, theatrical, and cynical
over time.
Control Regime in Action
To respond to new forms of digital activism and curb the po liti
cal con-
sequences of social media, China’s control regime has
implemented various
new mea sures besides fi ltering and hiring pro- state
commentators to fore-
stall collective actions. Two are highlighted here: (1) real name
registration
policy and (2) anti- rumor campaigns.
Real Name Registration Policy
Th e rapid growth of the weibo user base from nil to 278 million
in three years
worried authorities.54 During its ascendance, Chinese weibo
has witnessed
many explosive exposures of corrupt offi cials, government
unaccountability,
and social injustices, thriving as the cyber epicenter of China’s
sociopo liti cal
lives. Weibo’s aff ordances and deep integration into China’s
public life are
regulatory nightmares. To curtail public rage on weibo, Beijing
Municipal
Provisions for Microblog Development and Management
(Microblog Provi-
sions hereaft er) was promulgated on December 16, 2011,
targeting more than

a dozen microblog ser vice providers headquartered in Beijing,
especially Sina
Weibo.55 Such provisions required weibo operators to
implement real name
registration by March 16, 2012.
Ostensibly promoted by the state to tame online rumors and
safeguard
a healthy online environment, the policy is seen as an offi cial
tactic to curb
public discourse, targeting each microblogger.56 Specifi cally,
users are ex-
pected to register their IDs with weibo as mandated by the state.
Following
the principle “front stage voluntary, backstage real name,”
microbloggers
can use pseudo user names, but they are asked to register their
real identi-
ties backstage with weibo operators, linked to their national ID
cards, mobile
phone numbers, or other identifi cations. Weibo businesses
maintain their
2018 15:50:21 UTC
42 Min Jiang
servers do not retain user ID information, but users’ national ID
card in-
formation will be compared against public security’s database
to verify user
identity. Unregistered users can view microblogs but cannot

post or pass
along any.57 By March 2012, Sina reportedly had verifi ed 60
percent of its
users.58 In December 2012, the policy was passed as law in the
National Peo-
ple’s Congress.59 Th e State Council expected major portal
websites to verify
user identity by June 2014, although, to date it is not clear how
many users
have registered with their real identities.60
Specifi cally, Article 8 of the Microblog Provisions requires
microblog-
ging ser vice providers (MSPs) to “build a comprehensive
system of con-
tent evaluation and monitor the production, reproduction,
publication,
and distribution of microblog information.” 61 Article 9
stipulates: “Any
or ga ni za tion or individual . . . must register with real name.
Th e use of fake
or stolen ID cards, business registration information, or or ga ni
za tion code
is forbidden. Websites that off er microblog ser vice should
ensure the truth-
fulness of user registration information.” Additionally, Article 5
eff ectively
legalizes censorship by commercial intermediaries. In December
2012, the
real name registration policy was endorsed by the National
People’s Con-
gress Decision on Strengthening Internet Information
Protection, which
requires all ISPs to collect users’ real names when providing
Internet con-
nection, analog phones, mobile phones, or information

publishing.62
Th ese top- down mandates triggered a heated debate among
weibo
operators and users. Tencent CEO, Ma Huateng, publicly
opposed the policy,
arguing that it poses a great threat to user privacy and security
and places
an unreasonable burden on ISPs. Ma’s sentiments were echoed
by Chen
Tong, Sina’s editor in chief, who argued back in 2005 that the
indiscriminate
adoption of real name policy was unlikely to deter slander or
other illegal
activities.63 However, unable to resist state pressures, Sina, for
instance,
reportedly hired more than a thousand people to manually
monitor and
delete weibo posts around the clock besides using computational
fi ltering
and encouraging weibo users to fl ag abusive users.64
Regulators brushed aside public concerns for privacy and rights
to expres-
sion, stressing instead reducing “pornography, rumors, slander,
fake identi-
ties that threaten network security and social stability.” 65
Downplaying the
policy’s chilling eff ects, China Central Tele vi sion (CCTV)
deleted its own
news on the bankruptcy of South Korea’s real name registration
policy.66 State
media also actively promoted stories that gave citizens the false
impression

2018 15:50:21 UTC
that such a policy was prevalent elsewhere in the world. Li
Yizhong, the for-
mer minister of industry and information, publicly stated:
“Internet real name
registration, according to our research, is adopted by most
countries.” 67 While
“real name” sites like Facebook are pop u lar around the world,
they are not
mandated by the state or connected to users’ national IDs. Li’s
comments
were fl atly rejected by some. One user remarked: “Th ere are
many such
‘mosts.’ Most countries have competitive elections. Most
countries’ offi cials
publish their property rec ords. Most countries’ highways are
free. Most coun-
tries don’t limit the mobility of their residents through Hukou
system. Most
countries have press freedom.” 68 Authorities’ impulse to
control information
fl ow and public opinion through the real name registration
policy is not new,
but the speed and extent to which the policy has been pushed
through with-
out strong public opposition is alarming.
Anti- Rumor Campaigns
Th e rollout of real name registration policy may be considered

part of
Chinese authorities’ much larger campaign to regulate speech
online. Besides
encouraging weibo users to self- censor through legislation, the
latest anti-
rumor campaign also employs judicial decisions and extralegal
tactics to
achieve the state’s regulatory goals, targeting in par tic u lar
weibo celebrities,
or “Big Vs.”
In September 2013, China’s highest court handed down a
judicial deci-
sion, announcing stiff penalties for posting rumors that get
shared fi ve hun-
dred times or seen fi ve thousand times.69 A convicted off ense
could carry a
three- year jail sentence, a ruling deemed by many as setting a
dangerous pre-
ce dent for free speech despite reported cases of fabricated
rumors for money
and infl uence. Th e fi rst person to run afoul of the law was an
outspoken
sixteen- year- old, Yang Hui, who questioned the local police
investigation of
a suicide case in Gansu Province. Th e police’s evidence, he
argued, was highly
inadequate. His accusation quickly went viral. But it turns out
Yang’s
“rumor” was right. Th e police’s case eventually collapsed, and
the local police
chief was suspended. Yang was released. China Daily, however,
calls the
incident “an accident.”70 In a fundamentally fl awed legal
system, “rumor” is
oft en used as a means of social protest and proves to have an

unusual degree of
truth and accuracy in China.71 Instead of increasing
government transparency
2018 15:50:21 UTC
44 Min Jiang
and responsiveness, the state’s demonization of “rumor”
produces a chill-
ing eff ect on the public’s ability to know, to question, and to
act.
Th e most prominent cases of state rumor campaigns were
orchestrated
via offi cial Chinese media. One targeted a vocal Chinese
American weibo
celebrity and investor Charles Xue and another New Express
reporter Chen
Yongzhou. Known as “Xue Manzi” on the Chinese Internet, Xue
became fa-
mous for championing several charity causes, including the
2011 campaign
against child traffi cking and his initiative to ask netizens to
pitch projects over
weibo for which he provided angel investment. By the time he
was arrested
for prostitution solicitation on August 23, 2013, he had more
than 12 million
weibo followers. It was widely speculated that Xue’s criticism
of social and
police issues prompted the detention. In early August, Xue was

among a
group of “Big Vs” invited to meet with the head of the State
Internet Infor-
mation Offi ce (SIIO), who urged the group to be more
constructive in their
online postings. It seems offi cials did not deem his per for
mance adequate.
Paraded on state tele vi sion CCTV, Xue appeared rueful in jail
clothes and
confessed his wrongdoing. Even Hu Xijin, editor in chief of
Party paper Global
Times, commented on Sina Weibo (later removed): “Using
sexual scandal, tax
evasion and so on to take down po liti cal foes is a hidden rule
common among
governments worldwide.”72 By making an example of Xue, the
state shamed
a few “Big Vs” and intimidated others.
Equally gripping is the Chen Yongzhou incident. Chen was
detained in
Guangzhou by Changsha police on October 18, 2013, for
allegedly defaming
Changsha- based, state- owned Zoomlion Heavy Industry
Science & Technol-
ogy, China’s second- largest heavy equipment maker. On
October 23 and 24,
New Express printed extra- large- font headlines calling for
Chen’s release, a
move seen as an unpre ce dented call for press freedom. On
October 26, Chen
appeared in a nine- minute national TV broadcast confessing to
fi ling stories
in exchange for payment from an outside company. Th e story
exploded on
Chinese social media with many expressing sympathy for Chen

and dis-
approving of police and CCTV’s abuse of power. Although
journalism fraud
and bribing is a real issue, people noted the following:
Changsha police ar-
rived in Guangzhou in Zoomlion’s car; the state- owned
company is well
connected with local and national authorities; Chen is known
for diligent
fact- checking and journalist ethics; the CCTV story did not
name the third
party bribing Chen but obtained and aired Chen’s confessions
prior to court
trial.73 Th e truth may never be known, but the “killing the
monkey to scare
2018 15:50:21 UTC
the chicken” tactic is unlikely to be eff ective in eradicating
rumors or
people’s challenges to authorities in China in the long run.
Refl ections on the (Un)Civil Society
Th e chapter argues that in the social media era, the coevolution
of the Inter-
net, civil society, and authoritarianism has produced a mixed
impact on
China’s sociopo liti cal lives. A few new trends of China’s
Internet and online

activism are surveyed in the chapter, including real- time
activism, online
po liti cal jamming, weibo celebrities, and the rise of an uncivil
online society.
Th e state’s containment of public opinion on Chinese social
media via legal
and extralegal means, such as the real name registration policy
and anti-
rumor campaigns, are also discussed. In addition, the amplifi
cation of both
civil and uncivil tendencies on the Chinese Internet has
engendered a greater
degree of fragmentation, polarization, and cynicism among
Chinese netizens
for which previous literature on Chinese online civic spaces has
not ade-
quately accounted.
“Uncivil society” is highlighted here to draw attention to the
diffi culty of
creating and sustaining civil society, particularly in the Chinese
context.
Previously, three schools of thought dominated the
understanding of civil
society: civil society as associational life; civil society as the
good society re-
sulting from free association; and civil society as the public
sphere where
citizens engage in discussions over public issues and arrive at
consensus.74
Th ese three related views of civil society point to the necessity
to build
voluntary associations based on tolerance and cooperation, eff
ective insti-
tutions that produce good government, and the capacity to
deliberate demo-

cratically. Implicit in these dominant views of civil society are
positive
assumptions about human nature, consensus formation, and
institution
building, views that have been critiqued by many for being
incapable of
recognizing the “agonistic pluralism” world in which we live.75
By remov-
ing power considerations and basing deliberation purely on
rationality and
morality, Habermas’s construction of the public sphere and civil
society,
though desirable, is seen as far too idealistic, detached from
reality.76
Applying the concept of civil society to China encounters
additional
challenges. While Mouff e’s departure from “public sphere” and
introduction
of “agonistic pluralism” recognize social confl icts with
productive potentials,
2018 15:50:21 UTC
46 Min Jiang
this agonism still rests on an “adhesion to the ethico- political
principles of
democracy” that is feeble if not absent in China.77 With limited
protection
for individual rights and arbitrary practice of the rule of law,
Chinese poli-

tics is dominated by struggles between elite factions at the very
top;78 con-
fl icts between diff erent social, economic, and ideological
strata; and multiple
confrontations between the state and the citizenry.79
Ultimately, authori-
tarian order and opaque operations of power pose fundamental
threats to
China’s emerging civil society.80
“Uncivil society online” is used here to capture the extreme
incivility of
online exchanges between individuals and groups over public
issues, which
not only fail to produce solutions to problems but also
accentuate group
identities and widen the ideological chasms between them. Th is
notion
underscores the following: (1) the plentitude of disrespect
between inter-
locutors, (2) schisms between groups in ideology and values,
and (3) inad-
equate mechanisms to channel online exchanges to build eff
ective civic
institutions. One may reasonably argue that “uncivil society” is
not a China-
specifi c phenomenon. Th e crisis in democracy experienced in
many West-
ern societies today— systemic corruption, widespread po liti cal
apathy, and
failed governance—is also accompanied by an “uncivil” turn in
civic life;
however, China’s “uncivil society” is embedded in its own
unique historical,
economic, and sociopo liti cal contexts.81

Further, a conceptualization of civil society as purely
oppositional to
the state is limiting. On the one hand, it tends to equate “civil
society” with
“po liti cal society,” and, on the other, it downplays the
heterogeneous groups
inhabiting the “civil society” space and becomes increasingly
inadequate to
capture the complex dynamics on the ground.82 As a much
larger and diverse
Chinese population, rather than a small group of liberal elites,
has come to
adopt the Internet, the implicit assumption of a liberal subject
demanding
social justice, media freedom, and po liti cal reforms online
may be limited.
A rising cacophony nowadays stems not only from contentions
between the
state and grassroots oppositions but also between various
factions of “civil
society” groups, including po liti cally conservative, chauvinist,
nationalistic,
and apathetic subjects and businesses.83
While civil society is commonly associated with the third space,
distinct
from the private sphere, government, and business as a
groundswell for ac-
tivism against authorities, in reality the variety of individuals
and groups
making up “civil society” and the interactions between them are
oft en far
too complex to be reduced to a linear formula of “civil society =
public

2018 15:50:21 UTC
sphere = NGOs = empowerment.”84 On the darker side, civil
society can
include the Mafi a and terrorists.85 In less extreme forms,
members of civil so-
ciety can include po liti cal opportunists, nationalist ideologues,
and reaction-
aries. Moreover, civil society’s conceptual in de pen dence from
the state and
commercial interest oft en fails to translate straightforwardly in
practice. Far
from it, civil society groups such as human rights organizations
in authoritar-
ian countries and anticapitalist associations are oft en the
targets of state
and corporate co- optation.86 Conversely, ideologue factions
and trade as-
sociations too can seek to infl uence po liti cal and fi nancial
authorities.
Th e problematization of “civil society” thus invites a more
critical and
nuanced reading and analysis of China’s emergent civil society
and its en-
gagement with the Internet and social media. Previously, for
instance, Le and
Yang noted that the various strains of China’s online sociopo
liti cal discourses
can be grouped into fi ve major ideological orientations: Far
Left , moderate

left , neutral, moderate right, Far Right.87 Netizens’ attitudes
toward a unifi ed
Chinese nation, Chinese government’s policies, traditional
Chinese culture,
and Western po liti cal/economic systems oft en guide their
choices of online
groups, discourses, and interactions with others online. A 2013
mainland
China national online survey conducted by Ma and Zhang
reveals that among
Chinese netizens, “rightists” (those who favor rule of law,
protection of personal
rights and freedoms, and market economy) constitute
38.7 percent; “left ists”
(those who strongly support nationalism and oppose Western po
liti cal and eco-
nomic systems) make up only 6.2 percent; while the majority
are centrists at
55.1 percent. Zhang’s national survey published in 2012,
however, fi nds left ists
constitute 38.1 percent of Chinese citizens, rightists 8 percent,
and centrists
51.5 percent.88 Due to the surveys’ inherent research
limitations (for example,
the representativeness of survey participants), the opposing
statistics they of-
fered failed to produce conclusive evidence of the ideological
makeup of Chi-
nese citizens. However, it seems the identifi cation of such
ideological groupings
and their potential consensus could be a productive route to
understanding
the changing Chinese civic spaces besides various forms of
social stratifi ca-
tion along class, gender, race, generational, and rural- urban
fault lines.

Conclusion
Although social media platforms such as Sina Weibo provide
technological
aff ordances for instantaneous communication and endless
possibilities of
2018 15:50:21 UTC
48 Min Jiang
group formation, their capacity for civic empowerment is
mediated through
many factors, including grassroots demands and or ga ni za tion,
state inter-
vention, and Internet ser vice providers’ policies and practices,
as well as the
civic groups’ interactions with one another. Social media can
serve as a crit-
ical space for expressing and channeling public opinion in
China, but they
are unlikely to be the ultimate game changer. Th e ability of the
Internet to
transform social and po liti cal realities increasingly needs to
suffi ciently ac-
count for the eff ect of divergent cyber subjectivities and a
wider range of so-
cial, economic, and po liti cal factors beyond merely
considering the Internet’s
technological impact on the state or the grass roots in general.

Such a transition would require a more sophisticated framework
to dis-
sect the heterogeneous components that make up China’s online
civic spaces
today without losing sight of the power the authoritarian state
can assert over
the society or the power of individuals to expand their spheres
of infl uences.
It also means to take into account both civil and uncivil
elements of China’s
emergent civil society and their appropriation of new media for
identity for-
mation and collective mobilization. Previous work has examined
in- depth
Internet use by diverse civic groups: dissidents, working class,
nationalists,
activists, environmentalists, urban youth, and young migrant
women.89 Each
of the subgroups carries distinct yet mixed attitudes toward and
demands
for the state, the market, and other social strata. Together, they
oft en render
the emergent Chinese civil society “praetorian,” swirling in
extensive and
sometimes very intensive po liti cal participation without being
channeled
eff ectively through formal institutions.90
Positive development of public spaces and power relations in
China re-
lies as much on institutional politics to eff ectively channel
public opinion as
it does on identity politics and progressive changes in
subjectivity through
everyday life interactions. While the Internet mediates such
negotiations and

is increasingly indispensable to the parties involved, it does not
determine
their outcomes. Th e contextualized use of the Internet and new
media, shaped
by the social, cultural, and po liti cal protocols surrounding
such technologies,
ultimately does.
2018 15:50:21 UTC
University of Pennsylvania Press
Chapter Title: New Media Empowerment and State-Society
Relations in China
Chapter Author(s): Zengzhi Shi and Guobin Yang
Book Title: The Internet, Social Media, and a Changing China
Book Editor(s): Jacques deLisle, Avery Goldstein, Guobin Yang
Published by: University of Pennsylvania Press. (2016)
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/j.ctt1b3t8nr.6
JSTOR is a not-for-profit service that helps scholars,
researchers, and students discover, use, and build upon a wide
range of content in a trusted digital archive. We use information
technology and tools to increase productivity and

For this assignment there are going to be 4 Discussion Posts. Fo.docx

For this assignment there are going to be 4 Discussion Posts. Fo.docx

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to For this assignment there are going to be 4 Discussion Posts. Fo.docx

Similar to For this assignment there are going to be 4 Discussion Posts. Fo.docx (20)

More from AKHIL969626

More from AKHIL969626 (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

For this assignment there are going to be 4 Discussion Posts. Fo.docx