1. Spread by
Sahana V
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2. Several bacterial, viral agents and toxins-
pose public health risk- bioterrorist attack1
14th century- siege of ukraine2
Fort Pitt, Ohio river valley3
Anthrax- 1979, Soviet Union
Anthrax, botulinum and aflatoxin- 1995,
Iraq
1. Bioterriorism: from threat to reality.Atlas RM Annu Rev Microbiol. 2002; 56():167-85.
2. Biological warfare. A historical perspective.Christopher GW, Cieslak TJ, Pavlin JA, Eitzen EM Jr.
JAMA. 1997 Aug 6; 278(5):412-7.
3. Wheelis M. Biological warfare before 1914. In: Moon JE van Courtland., editor. Biological and
toxin weapons: Research, development, and use from the middle ages to 1945. Vol. 1.
Stockholm, Sweden: Stockholm International Peace Research Institute; 1991. pp. 8–34.
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3. 4. Why should we be concerned about biological warfare?. Richard Danzig et al,. JAMA, Vol
278,No,5,pp. 431-432
Factors
Easy
delivery
Low
visibility,
high
potency
Recipes –
available
on
internet
Extremely
Low-
technology
methods
concealment,
transportatio
n
,disseminatio
n easy
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5. J Pharm Bioallied Sci. 2010 Jul-Sep; 2(3): 179–188.

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6. 6
Types of
pathogen
Antipersonnel
Anti-animal
Anti-material
Anti-plant
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7. 7
Pathogen
Contagious
Lethal
Mass killing
Non-lethal
Economic
Disruption
Non-
contagious
Lethal
Area Denial
Non-lethal
Incapacitation
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8. Disease Pathogen Abused
Anthrax Bacillus antracis (B) First World War
Second World War
Soviet Union, 1979
Japan, 1995
USA, 2001
Botulism Clostridium botulinum (T) –
Plague Yersinia pestis (B) Fourteenth-century
Europe
Second World War
Smallpox Variola major (V) Eighteenth-century N.
America
Tularemia Francisella tularensis (B) Second World War
6. The history of biological warfare. EMBO Rep. 2003 June; 4(Suppl 1): S47–S52
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9. Agent
Infective
Dose
(Aerosol)
Incubation
Period
Diagnostic
Assay
Chemotherap
y
Anthrax
8,000-50,000
spores
1-5 d Ag- ELISA
Ciproflaxin
Doxycycline
Penicillin
Plaque
100-500
organisms
2-3 d Ag-ELISA
Chlorampheni
col
Q-fever
1-10
organisms
10-40 d ELISA Tetracycline
Small pox
Assumed low
10-100 org
7-17 d
ELISA,PCR,
Virus isolation
Cidofovir
7. Clinical Recognition and management of patients exposed to biological warfare agents. JAMA,
Vol,278,No5.1997.pp.399-411 4/20/2015
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10. • A release of 50 kg agent in an area with population 5
million
• Anthrax
 250,000 cases -100,000 deaths
 Plague
 150,000 cases -36,000 deaths
 Tularemia
 250,000 cases -19,000 deaths
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12.  Gram-positive,
 Endospore-forming,
rod-shaped
 width of 1–1.2µm and
a length of 3–5µm
 Only obligate species
on Bacillus
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6. The history of biological warfare. EMBO Rep. 2003 June; 4(Suppl 1): S47–S52

13.  Cell binding protein-
Protective Antigen(PA)
 Enzymes
• Edema Factor (EF)
• Lethal Factor (LF)
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14. 14
• 95% of all cases globally
• Incubation: 3-5 days (up to 12 days)
• Spores enter skin through open wound or abrasion
Large skin ulcer created
• Fever and malaise  5% - 20% mortality
• Untreated – septicemia and death.
Cutaneous
• Severe gastroenteritis
• Incubation: 2-5 days after consumption of
undercooked, contaminated meat
• Case fatality rate: 25-75%
Gastrointestinal
• Incubation: 1-7 days
• Phase 1: Nonspecific - Mild fever, malaise
• Phase 2: Severe respiratory distress Cyanosis,
death in 24-36 hours
• Case fatality: 75-90% (untreated)
Inhalational
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15. 15
Worst-case scenario
(Office of Technology
Assessment)
• 50 kg of spores
 Urban area of 5 million
 250,000 cases of
anthrax
 100,000 deaths
• 100 kg of spores
 Upwind of Wash D.C.
 130,000 to 3 million
deaths
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16. 16
Vaccine – available but effectiveness
unproven in humans (only monkeys)
• 5-35% experience systemic side effects
• No long-term side effects proven
• Six shots plus annual booster required
Penicillin
• Has been the drug of choice
• Some strains resistant to penicillin
Ciprofloxacin
• Chosen as treatment of choice in 2001
• No strains known to be resistant
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17. Clostridium
botulinum-
Anaerobic bacteria
Neurotoxins – A to
G
Incubation: 24 to 36
hrs
0.001 pg/kg of body
weight
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19.  Vaccine :
• Every case of Foodborne botulism is treated as a
public health emergency. If antitoxin is needed, it can
be quickly delivered to a physician anywhere in the
country.
• Skin should be tested for hypersensitivity before
equine antitoxin is given.
 Mortality :
• Botulism can result in death due to respiratory failure.
• In the last 50 years, patients who die from botulism
have dropped from 50% to 8%.
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20. Extreme neuro-specificity: BoNTs are
being exploited in the treatment of a
myriad of neuromuscular disorders and for
the removal of facial wrinkles (BOTOX).
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23. Techniques
Binary
Biological
Weapons
Designer
Genes
Gene
Therapy
8. Genetically Engineered Bioweapons: A New Breed of Weapons for Modern Warfare. Mackenzie
Foley .Applied Sciences, Winter 2013 / March 10, 2013 4/20/2015
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24.  The unfortunate fact
remain that humans
are often the most
sensitive or the only
detectors of the
biological attack.9
9. Department of the Army, Navy and the Air Force NATO Handbook on the medical aspects of NBC
Defensive operations,1996.
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25.  Not only human sample
 Powdery material, air/water samples
 Sample preparation- hours to days
 Sample collection, handling, transportation
and preparation- vital
 Conventional culture procedures- some virus
or bacteria
• Minimum: 3-7 to 15 days
• Skilled manpower
• No real time
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26. Detection in
the field with
limited or no
instruments
Accurate
Rapid
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27. • Natural prevalence of the disease
• Becton Dickinson (USA) , Vitek (BioMe’rieux)
and Microlog (USA)
• Pure culture and trained manpower 
Biochemical test
based assays
• Luciferin- luciferase interaction
• Quality control- bacterial contamination
• ATP contamination from non-microbial source

• Non-specific 
• First line defence 
Bioluminescence
based detection
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28. 10. Immunoassay of infectious agents.Andreotti PE, Ludwig GV, Peruski AH, Tuite JJ, Morse SS, Peruski LF
Jr Biotechniques. 2003 Oct; 35(4):850-9.
11. A review of molecular recognition technologies for detection of biological threat agents.Iqbal SS, Mayo
MW, Bruno JG, Bronk BV, Batt CA, Chambers JP Biosens Bioelectron. 2000; 15(11-12):549-78.
• ELISA based
• Quality of antigen or antibody11
• Different substrate label i.e, fluroscent,
chemiluminescent and different platforms
like ELISA plate, Visual dot and lateral
flow format
• Only one agent at a time 
Antigen-
Antibody10
• Q-PCR assays-probes for all the agents
• Software: Monitors the progress and presence
detected online on a monitor
• Data transferred over long distance
• Variation with nucleic acids, availability of
starting material
• Inhibitory substances, specificity and
sensitivity of primers, probes and enzymes
used 
Nucleic
acid
based
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29. DRDE, Gwalior-
• Toxicology and biochemical pharmacology
• nanotechnology-based sensors
• unmanned robot-operated aerial and ground
vehicles fitted with NBC detection sensors
HSADL, Bhopal-
• animal diseases such as avian influenza, Nipah
virus infection, rabbit haemorrhagic fever, and
swine flu.
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