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Hands-On Ethical
Hacking and
Network Defense

3rd Edition
Chapter 9
Embedded Operating Systems: The Hidden
Threat
Last modified 1-11-17
Objectives
• After reading this chapter and completing the
exercises, you will be able to:
– Explain what embedded operating systems are and
where they’re used
– Describe Windows IoT (Internet of Things) and other
embedded operating systems
– Identify vulnerabilities of embedded operating systems
and best practices for protecting them
Introduction to Embedded Operating Systems
Introduction to Embedded Operating
Systems
• Embedded system
– Any computer system that isn’t a general-purpose PC
or server
• GPSs and ATMs
• Electronic consumer and industrial items
• Embedded operating system (OS)
– Small program developed for embedded systems
• Stripped-down version of OS commonly used on
general-purpose computers
• Designed to be small and efficient
Introduction to Embedded Operating
Systems (cont’d.)
• Real-time operating system (RTOS)
– Typically used in devices such as programmable
thermostats, appliance controls, and spacecraft
• Corporate buildings
– May have many embedded systems
• Firewalls, switches, routers, Web-filtering appliances,
network attached storage devices, etc.
• Embedded systems
– Are in all networks
– Perform essential functions
• Route network traffic; block suspicious packets
Windows and Other Embedded
Operating Systems
• Recycling common code and reusing technologies
– Sound software engineering practices
– Also introduce common points of failure
• Viruses, worms, Trojans, and other attack vectors
• Windows and Linux vulnerabilities
– Might also exist in embedded version
• Windows CE
– Some source code is available to the public
• Code sharing is not common
• Microsoft believed it would increase adoptions
• Image from http://intelligentsystem.com/wp-content/uploads/
2015/06/Windows-10-IoT.png
Other Proprietary Embedded OSs
• VxWorks
– Widely used embedded OS
• Developed by Wind River Systems
– Used in spacecraft
– Designed to run efficiently on minimal hardware
Figure 9-3 Creating an embedded OS image in VxWorks Workbench
Other Proprietary Embedded OSs
(cont’d.)
• Green Hill Software embedded OSs
– F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
– Multiple independent levels of security/safety (MILS)
• OS certified to run multiple levels of classification
– Embedded OS code
• Used in printers, routers, switches, etc.
• QNX Software Systems QNX
– Commercial RTOS
• Used in Cisco’s ultra-high-availability routers and
Logitech universal remotes
Other Proprietary Embedded OSs
(cont’d.)
• Real-Time Executive for Multiprocessor Systems
(RTEMS)
– Open-source embedded OS
– Used in space systems
• Supports processors designed to operate in space
• Using multiple embedded OSs
– Increases attack surface
Figure 9-4 Monolithic kernel versus microkernel OSs
*Nix Embedded OSs
• Embedded Linux
– Monolithic OS
• Used in industrial, medical, and consumer items
– Can be tailored for devices with limited memory or
hard drive capacity
– Supports widest variety of hardware
– Allows adding features
• Dynamic kernel modules
*Nix Embedded OSs (cont’d.)
• Real Time Linux (RTLinux)
– OS microkernel extension
– Turns “regular” Linux into an RTOS
• Suitable for embedded applications requiring a
guaranteed response in a predictable manner
• Linux OpenWrt * dd-wrt
– Embedded Linux OS
– Used in Linksys WRT54G wireless router
• Found in home offices and small businesses
• Links Ch 9t, 9u
Figure 9-5 Monitoring bandwidth use with dd-wrt
16
17
Vulnerabilities of Embedded OSs
PsyBot
• Links Ch 9e, 9f
Windows Mobile Vulnerabilities
Vulnerabilities of Embedded OS's
• Impact of attacks have become more serious
– Embedded OSs are no exception
• Easiest way to profit from hacking
– Attack devices that store and dispense cash (e.g.,
ATMs)
• Involves use of card skimmers or stealing the
machines
Embedded OSs Are Everywhere
• Embedded systems with Y2K software flaw
– Billions located everywhere
• Today
– Many more embedded devices
• Under attack from hackers and terrorists
• Attackers want to further financial or political causes
– Addressing security early in design phase is essential
Embedded OSs Are Networked
• Advantages of connecting to a network
– Efficiency and economy
– Ability to manage and share services
• Keeps human resources and expertise minimal
• Reduces costs
• Any device added to a network infrastructure
– Increases potential for security problems
Embedded OSs Are Difficult to Patch
• General-purpose desktop OSs
– Simple to patch
• Wait for vulnerability to be identified
• Download and install patch
• Embedded OSs
– Must continue operating regardless of threat
– Lack familiar interfaces
– Buffer overflow attacks might be successful
• Few updates released to correct vulnerabilities
• Manufacturers typically prefer system upgrades
Embedded OSs Are Difficult to Patch
(cont’d.)
• Open-source software
– Cost of developing and patching shared by open-source
community
• Patching Linux kernel
– Estimated at tens of billions of dollars
• Total cost of developing and patching it, in programmer
hours
– Offers flexibility and support
• Large; has many code portions
• Fixing a vulnerability
– Weigh cost of fixing against importance of information the
embedded system controls
Hacking Pacemakers
• Link Ch 9g
Embedded OSs Are in Networking
Devices
• Networking devices
– Usually have software and hardware designed to
transmit information across networks
• General-purpose computers
– Originally performed routing and switching
• High-speed networks now use specialized hardware
and embedded OSs
• Attacks that compromise a router
– Can give complete access to network resources
• Attackers follow usual methods of footprinting,
scanning, and enumerating the target
Embedded OSs Are in Networking
Devices (cont’d.)
• Authentication bypass vulnerability
– Common vulnerability of routers
– Specially crafted URL bypasses normal
authentication mechanism
• Router Hacking Contest
– Link Ch 8h
• After bypassing authentication
– Attackers can launch other network attacks
• Use access gained through compromised router
• "...if your browser’s user agent string is
“xmlset_roodkcableoj28840ybtide” (no
quotes), you can access the web
interface without any authentication and
view/change the device settings..."
• Link Ch 9s
Embedded OSs Are in Network
Peripherals
• Common peripheral devices:
– Printers, scanners, copiers, and fax devices
• Multifunction devices (MFDs)
– Perform more than one function
• Rarely scanned for vulnerabilities or configured for
security
– Have embedded OSs with sensitive information
• Information susceptible to theft and modification
• Attackers may use malware or insert malicious links
• Social-engineering techniques may be used to gain
access
Hacking into a Printer
• Taking control of a printer gives you
– Access to stored print jobs
– You can use the printer as a gateway into a secure
LAN
• See link Ch 9i
– You could also alter the messages the printer
produces to send malicious links to desktops
Figure 9-6 Setting up custom links on a Dell networked printer
Figure 9-7 Modified firmware being uploaded to a networked printer
Supervisory Control and Data
Acquisition Systems
• Used for equipment monitoring in large industries
(e.g., public works and utilities)
– Anywhere automation is critical
• May have many embedded systems as components
– Vulnerable through data fed in and out or embedded
OSs
• Systems controlling critical infrastructure
– Usually separated from Internet by “air gap”
• Maybe NOT! New info 2 slides ahead!
Project AURORA
• In a 2007 security test, a simulated cyber attack on
a diesel generator destroyed it
– Link Ch 9j
Stuxnet
• Infected Siemens Programmable Logic Controller
cards in nuclear power plants
• Suspected to be a targeted military attack against
one Iranian nuclear plant
• Very sophisticated attack, using four 0-day exploits
• Infected thousands of Iranian systems
• Iran may have executed nuclear staff over this
– Links Ch 9k – 9m
SCADA Vulnerabilities and the Air
Gap
Not in book
∗ Link Ch 6b in CNIT 122
44
SCADA Vulnerabilities
Dell DRAC Video
∗ Link Ch 9q
∗ Using
SHODAN
∗ Link 

Ch 9r
46
81 Vulnerable DRAC systems
∗ Later articles claim that many other systems are
vulnerable, including passenger jets
∗ Links Ch 6d, 6e in CNIT 122
47
Even Worse
∗ Link Ch 6f in CNIT 122
48
DHS Response
Cell Phones, Smartphones, and PDAs
• Conversations over traditional phones
– Considered protected
• Tapping used to require a lot of time, expensive
equipment, and a warrant
– Many have the same security expectations of cell
phones, smartphones, and PDAs
• PDAs have additional vulnerabilities associated with
PDA applications and services
• Smartphones combine functions; have even more
vulnerabilities
Cell Phones, Smartphones, and PDAs
(cont’d.)
• Cell phone vulnerabilities
– Attackers listening to your phone calls
– Using the phone as a microphone
– “Cloning” the phone to make long-distance calls
– Get useful information for computer or network
access
• Steal trade or national security secrets
• Java-based phone viruses
Cell Phone Rootkit
• Link Ch 9l
Rootkits
• Modify OS parts or install themselves as kernel
modules, drivers, libraries, and applications
– Exist for Windows and *nix OSs
• Rootkit-detection tools and antivirus software
– Detect rootkits and prevent installation
• More difficult if OS has already been compromised
• Rootkits can monitor OS for anti-rootkit tools and
neutralize them
• Biggest threat
– Infects firmware
Rootkits (cont’d.)
• Trusted Platform Module (TPM)
– Defense against low-level rootkits
• Ensures OS hasn't been subverted or corrupted
• ISO standard ISO/IEC 11889
• Link Ch 9o
• Firmware rootkits
– Hard to detect
• Code for firmware often isn't checked for corruption
• Insider hacking
– Harder to detect
• Malicious code hidden in flash memory
Rootkits (cont’d.)
• Systems compromised before purchased
– May function like normal
– Must flash (rewrite) BIOS, wipe hard drive, and
reload OS
• Expensive and time consuming
• LoJack for Laptops
– Laptop theft-recovery service
– Some design-level vulnerabilities rootkits can exploit
• Infection residing in computer’s BIOS
• Call-home mechanism
UEFI Secure Boot
• Link Ch 9o
Best Practices for Protecting Embedded OSs
Best Practices for Protecting
Embedded OSs
• Identify all embedded systems in an organization
• Prioritize systems or functions that depend on them
• Follow least privileges principle for access
• Use data transport encryption
• Configure embedded systems securely
• Use cryptographic measures
• Install patches and updates
• Restrict network access and reduce attack surface
• Upgrade or replace systems that can’t be fixed or pose
unacceptable risks

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Ch 9: Embedded Operating Systems: The Hidden Threat

  • 1. Hands-On Ethical Hacking and Network Defense
 3rd Edition Chapter 9 Embedded Operating Systems: The Hidden Threat Last modified 1-11-17
  • 2. Objectives • After reading this chapter and completing the exercises, you will be able to: – Explain what embedded operating systems are and where they’re used – Describe Windows IoT (Internet of Things) and other embedded operating systems – Identify vulnerabilities of embedded operating systems and best practices for protecting them
  • 3. Introduction to Embedded Operating Systems
  • 4. Introduction to Embedded Operating Systems • Embedded system – Any computer system that isn’t a general-purpose PC or server • GPSs and ATMs • Electronic consumer and industrial items • Embedded operating system (OS) – Small program developed for embedded systems • Stripped-down version of OS commonly used on general-purpose computers • Designed to be small and efficient
  • 5. Introduction to Embedded Operating Systems (cont’d.) • Real-time operating system (RTOS) – Typically used in devices such as programmable thermostats, appliance controls, and spacecraft • Corporate buildings – May have many embedded systems • Firewalls, switches, routers, Web-filtering appliances, network attached storage devices, etc. • Embedded systems – Are in all networks – Perform essential functions • Route network traffic; block suspicious packets
  • 6. Windows and Other Embedded Operating Systems • Recycling common code and reusing technologies – Sound software engineering practices – Also introduce common points of failure • Viruses, worms, Trojans, and other attack vectors • Windows and Linux vulnerabilities – Might also exist in embedded version • Windows CE – Some source code is available to the public • Code sharing is not common • Microsoft believed it would increase adoptions
  • 7. • Image from http://intelligentsystem.com/wp-content/uploads/ 2015/06/Windows-10-IoT.png
  • 8. Other Proprietary Embedded OSs • VxWorks – Widely used embedded OS • Developed by Wind River Systems – Used in spacecraft – Designed to run efficiently on minimal hardware
  • 9. Figure 9-3 Creating an embedded OS image in VxWorks Workbench
  • 10. Other Proprietary Embedded OSs (cont’d.) • Green Hill Software embedded OSs – F-35 Joint Strike Fighter – Multiple independent levels of security/safety (MILS) • OS certified to run multiple levels of classification – Embedded OS code • Used in printers, routers, switches, etc. • QNX Software Systems QNX – Commercial RTOS • Used in Cisco’s ultra-high-availability routers and Logitech universal remotes
  • 11. Other Proprietary Embedded OSs (cont’d.) • Real-Time Executive for Multiprocessor Systems (RTEMS) – Open-source embedded OS – Used in space systems • Supports processors designed to operate in space • Using multiple embedded OSs – Increases attack surface
  • 12. Figure 9-4 Monolithic kernel versus microkernel OSs
  • 13. *Nix Embedded OSs • Embedded Linux – Monolithic OS • Used in industrial, medical, and consumer items – Can be tailored for devices with limited memory or hard drive capacity – Supports widest variety of hardware – Allows adding features • Dynamic kernel modules
  • 14. *Nix Embedded OSs (cont’d.) • Real Time Linux (RTLinux) – OS microkernel extension – Turns “regular” Linux into an RTOS • Suitable for embedded applications requiring a guaranteed response in a predictable manner • Linux OpenWrt * dd-wrt – Embedded Linux OS – Used in Linksys WRT54G wireless router • Found in home offices and small businesses • Links Ch 9t, 9u
  • 15. Figure 9-5 Monitoring bandwidth use with dd-wrt
  • 16. 16
  • 17. 17
  • 21. Vulnerabilities of Embedded OS's • Impact of attacks have become more serious – Embedded OSs are no exception • Easiest way to profit from hacking – Attack devices that store and dispense cash (e.g., ATMs) • Involves use of card skimmers or stealing the machines
  • 22. Embedded OSs Are Everywhere • Embedded systems with Y2K software flaw – Billions located everywhere • Today – Many more embedded devices • Under attack from hackers and terrorists • Attackers want to further financial or political causes – Addressing security early in design phase is essential
  • 23. Embedded OSs Are Networked • Advantages of connecting to a network – Efficiency and economy – Ability to manage and share services • Keeps human resources and expertise minimal • Reduces costs • Any device added to a network infrastructure – Increases potential for security problems
  • 24. Embedded OSs Are Difficult to Patch • General-purpose desktop OSs – Simple to patch • Wait for vulnerability to be identified • Download and install patch • Embedded OSs – Must continue operating regardless of threat – Lack familiar interfaces – Buffer overflow attacks might be successful • Few updates released to correct vulnerabilities • Manufacturers typically prefer system upgrades
  • 25. Embedded OSs Are Difficult to Patch (cont’d.) • Open-source software – Cost of developing and patching shared by open-source community • Patching Linux kernel – Estimated at tens of billions of dollars • Total cost of developing and patching it, in programmer hours – Offers flexibility and support • Large; has many code portions • Fixing a vulnerability – Weigh cost of fixing against importance of information the embedded system controls
  • 27. Embedded OSs Are in Networking Devices • Networking devices – Usually have software and hardware designed to transmit information across networks • General-purpose computers – Originally performed routing and switching • High-speed networks now use specialized hardware and embedded OSs • Attacks that compromise a router – Can give complete access to network resources • Attackers follow usual methods of footprinting, scanning, and enumerating the target
  • 28. Embedded OSs Are in Networking Devices (cont’d.) • Authentication bypass vulnerability – Common vulnerability of routers – Specially crafted URL bypasses normal authentication mechanism • Router Hacking Contest – Link Ch 8h • After bypassing authentication – Attackers can launch other network attacks • Use access gained through compromised router
  • 29. • "...if your browser’s user agent string is “xmlset_roodkcableoj28840ybtide” (no quotes), you can access the web interface without any authentication and view/change the device settings..." • Link Ch 9s
  • 30. Embedded OSs Are in Network Peripherals • Common peripheral devices: – Printers, scanners, copiers, and fax devices • Multifunction devices (MFDs) – Perform more than one function • Rarely scanned for vulnerabilities or configured for security – Have embedded OSs with sensitive information • Information susceptible to theft and modification • Attackers may use malware or insert malicious links • Social-engineering techniques may be used to gain access
  • 31. Hacking into a Printer • Taking control of a printer gives you – Access to stored print jobs – You can use the printer as a gateway into a secure LAN • See link Ch 9i – You could also alter the messages the printer produces to send malicious links to desktops
  • 32. Figure 9-6 Setting up custom links on a Dell networked printer
  • 33. Figure 9-7 Modified firmware being uploaded to a networked printer
  • 34. Supervisory Control and Data Acquisition Systems • Used for equipment monitoring in large industries (e.g., public works and utilities) – Anywhere automation is critical • May have many embedded systems as components – Vulnerable through data fed in and out or embedded OSs • Systems controlling critical infrastructure – Usually separated from Internet by “air gap” • Maybe NOT! New info 2 slides ahead!
  • 35. Project AURORA • In a 2007 security test, a simulated cyber attack on a diesel generator destroyed it – Link Ch 9j
  • 36. Stuxnet • Infected Siemens Programmable Logic Controller cards in nuclear power plants • Suspected to be a targeted military attack against one Iranian nuclear plant • Very sophisticated attack, using four 0-day exploits • Infected thousands of Iranian systems • Iran may have executed nuclear staff over this – Links Ch 9k – 9m
  • 37. SCADA Vulnerabilities and the Air Gap Not in book
  • 38. ∗ Link Ch 6b in CNIT 122 44 SCADA Vulnerabilities
  • 39. Dell DRAC Video ∗ Link Ch 9q
  • 40. ∗ Using SHODAN ∗ Link 
 Ch 9r 46 81 Vulnerable DRAC systems
  • 41. ∗ Later articles claim that many other systems are vulnerable, including passenger jets ∗ Links Ch 6d, 6e in CNIT 122 47 Even Worse
  • 42. ∗ Link Ch 6f in CNIT 122 48 DHS Response
  • 43. Cell Phones, Smartphones, and PDAs • Conversations over traditional phones – Considered protected • Tapping used to require a lot of time, expensive equipment, and a warrant – Many have the same security expectations of cell phones, smartphones, and PDAs • PDAs have additional vulnerabilities associated with PDA applications and services • Smartphones combine functions; have even more vulnerabilities
  • 44. Cell Phones, Smartphones, and PDAs (cont’d.) • Cell phone vulnerabilities – Attackers listening to your phone calls – Using the phone as a microphone – “Cloning” the phone to make long-distance calls – Get useful information for computer or network access • Steal trade or national security secrets • Java-based phone viruses
  • 46. Rootkits • Modify OS parts or install themselves as kernel modules, drivers, libraries, and applications – Exist for Windows and *nix OSs • Rootkit-detection tools and antivirus software – Detect rootkits and prevent installation • More difficult if OS has already been compromised • Rootkits can monitor OS for anti-rootkit tools and neutralize them • Biggest threat – Infects firmware
  • 47. Rootkits (cont’d.) • Trusted Platform Module (TPM) – Defense against low-level rootkits • Ensures OS hasn't been subverted or corrupted • ISO standard ISO/IEC 11889 • Link Ch 9o • Firmware rootkits – Hard to detect • Code for firmware often isn't checked for corruption • Insider hacking – Harder to detect • Malicious code hidden in flash memory
  • 48. Rootkits (cont’d.) • Systems compromised before purchased – May function like normal – Must flash (rewrite) BIOS, wipe hard drive, and reload OS • Expensive and time consuming • LoJack for Laptops – Laptop theft-recovery service – Some design-level vulnerabilities rootkits can exploit • Infection residing in computer’s BIOS • Call-home mechanism
  • 49. UEFI Secure Boot • Link Ch 9o
  • 50. Best Practices for Protecting Embedded OSs
  • 51. Best Practices for Protecting Embedded OSs • Identify all embedded systems in an organization • Prioritize systems or functions that depend on them • Follow least privileges principle for access • Use data transport encryption • Configure embedded systems securely • Use cryptographic measures • Install patches and updates • Restrict network access and reduce attack surface • Upgrade or replace systems that can’t be fixed or pose unacceptable risks