CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Yemeni political actors met in Aden and called for the establishment of an alternative capital to Sana’a in either Aden or Taiz, both former capitals, on February 15. There appears to be growing support for an alternative government or regional autonomy throughout Yemen. Sana’a-based politicians reached an agreement to form a new transitional council composed of underrepresented groups, but could not agree on a way forward for Yemen’s executive branch. 2. Iranian Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei reinforced the concept of Iran’s “Economy of Resistance” in a February 18 speech as a reaction to the West’s continued economic pressure on Iran. Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani added that the resistance economy did not imply Iran would close itself off from the global economy. 3. Al Shabaab claimed credit for the bombing of a hotel in Somalia’s capital, Mogadishu, that killed and injured dozens of people, including Somali government officials, on February 20. Al Shabaab has lost control of some of its strongholds in Somalia, but still maintains its capability to conduct asymmetric attacks.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
February 24, 2015

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
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1. Yemeni southern political actors called for the establishment of an alternative capital.
2. Iranian officials reinforced the concept of Iran’s “Resistance Economy” in speeches as a
reaction to sanctions from the West.
3. Al Shabaab bombed a hotel frequented by military and government officials.
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3. ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda may be looking to compete with the Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS) by encouraging low-level attacks by its
followers in the West. Al Shabaab recently called for supporters to target shopping centers in the West, copying from its 2013
Westgate Mall attack in Kenya. Despite competition with ISIS, the al Qaeda network will continue to direct resources to the
Iraq-Syria front to support the Sunni populations there.
U.S. prosecutors cited a letter recovered in the May 2011 Abbottabad raid against Osama bin Laden as evidence in the trial of
alleged al Qaeda operative Abid Naseer. Naseer reportedly pledged allegiance to bin Laden and described his plans to bomb a
shopping center in England in 2009 through an intermediary.
South Africa issued a warning citing 11 designated individuals who might use the country as an operational base. The
suspected have ties to al Qaeda or ISIS.
Outlook: Al Qaeda seeks to reassert its relevance in the global jihadist movement and will try to influence the decision-making
of foreign fighters in the Iraq-Syria conflict.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
The Pakistani military (PakMil) continues to target Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) militants in ground operations and air strikes
in tribal and urban areas of Pakistan. The TTP’s leadership is under significant pressure as U.S. and Pakistani airstrikes target
TTP leaders on both sides of the Afghanistan and Pakistan border. Despite increased counter-terrorism efforts by PakMil, there
has been a notable increase in suicide bombings claimed by TTP and its affiliates.
Outlook: PakMil operations, drone strikes continue in North/South Waziristan, Khyber/Orakzai Agencies, and across Afghan
border. Al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) continues media operations and may launch additional spectacular attacks,
possibly in conjunction with TTP.
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AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
UN Special Envoy to Yemen Jamal Benomar announced that Yemen’s political parties agreed to create a transitional council as
part of a new bicameral legislature that will include Yemen’s parliament on February 20. The transitional council will give greater
representation to the South, women, and youth leaders. Separately, the Awalek tribes in Shabwah announced the creation of a
3,000-strong force to defend the governorate from outside militias on February 19. The tribes created the force in response to
recent al Houthi gains in southern al Bayda.
Outlook: Despite the political agreement in Sana’a, Yemen’s political actors outside the capital will continue to push for
autonomy from the central government.
Security
Continued al Houthi control of the capital Sana’a continues to fuel unrest in Yemen’s eastern and southern governorates.
Popular committees reportedly loyal to President Abdu Rabbu Mansour Hadi’s brother fought with Special Security Forces
(SSF) led by a pro-Houthi commander on February 16 in Aden. Al Houthi militants engaged in heavy fighting with local tribes in
southern al Bayda in the districts surrounding al Bayda city from February 14-16. Mediation ended the conflicts and granted the
al Houthis permission to search for AQAP influence in the districts.
Outlook: Continued al Houthi expansion south and control of the central government will meet with resistance from local
forces.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
Ansar al Sharia militants destroyed buildings at the 19th Infantry Brigade base in Shabwah on February 19. Ansar al Sharia
gave a warning the previous day and evacuated the area around the camp before demolishing buildings. The planning and lack
of conflict around the event indicates possible cooperation between Ansar al Sharia and tribal forces in Shabwah.
Outlook: AQAP will continue to depict itself as a foil to al Houthi influence across Yemen with the hope that it will continue to
gain support from tribal forces.
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YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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YEMENGULF OF ADEN
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1) 14-16 FEB: Al
Houthi militants
clashed with local
tribesmen in al Zahir,
al Bayda.
2) 16-20 FEB: Special
Security Forces (SSF)
fought with popular
committees led by
former President
Hadi’s brother,
Nasser Mansour, in
Aden.
3) 16 FEB: Al Houthi
militants clashed with
local tribesmen in al
Ramdah, Ibb.
4) 15 FEB: Ansar al
Sharia militants
attacked a military
base in Ataq city,
Shabwah.
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6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Unrest in Galgudud region between the Somali government and Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ) ended in a ceasefire. A
mediation committee announced that the Somali Federal Government and Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a (ASWJ) had agreed to a
ceasefire on February 17. A dispute over representation in government between the two had resulted in fighting over the town
of Guriel, Galgudud region on February 10 and 12.
Outlook: A second outbreak of fighting between the Somali forces and ASWJ militants should the current ceasefire break down
may allow al Shabaab to regain ground in the region.
Security
Al Shabaab may be expanding its operations in the Horn of Africa. Tanzanian security forces engaged unknown gunmen in
Tanga region in northern Tanzania on February 15. The gunmen escaped, but it is feared that they were al Shabaab militants.
An airstrike targeting al Shabaab was carried out near Marka, Lower Shabelle region on February 16. It is not clear who
conducted the strike.
Outlook: If the gunmen in Tanzania were al Shabaab, it could indicate the group’s ability to operate throughout the region
despite its losses in Somalia.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab continued its targeting assassinations of Somalia officials. Al Shabaab killed a Somali government official in
Mogadishu on February 15 and killed four more in a drive by shooting on February 16. Despite increased security in the capital,
al Shabaab also carried out an attack on a hotel in the city involving a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED), a
suicide bomber, and gunmen on February 20. The hotel was popular among Somali government officials.
Outlook: Al Shabaab is still capable of carrying out complex and high profile attacks in Mogadishu and will continue to do so.
As the group loses more territory, it may use asymmetrical tactics to carry out attacks.
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
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7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
1)15, 16 FEB: Al
Shabaab killed
government officials
in Mogadishu.
2) 15 FEB: Tanzanian
security forces
engaged suspected al
Shabaab militants in
Tanga region,
northern Tanzania.
3) 16 FEB: Airstrike
targeted al Shabaab
near Marka, Lower
Shabelle region.
4) 20 FEB: Al Shabaab
carried out complex
attack on hotel in
Mogadishu.
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
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HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
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8. ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
Algeria continued its counter-smuggling operations against AQIM near Algeria’s southern border. Meanwhile, AQIM released a
statement supporting the attack by the Uqba ibn Nafaa Brigade as “revenge” against the Tunisian National Guard for the death
of five women during a security operation in October 2014.
Outlook: Unrest in Libya will continue to contribute to AQIM’s overall ability to carry out smuggling operations in the Sahel.
AQIM may seek to support Ansar al Din and associated movements in Mali and will likely continue its relationships with Ansar
al Sharia in Libya and Tunisia.
Ansar al Sharia (Libya, Tunisia)
Uqba ibn Nafaa Brigade militants attacked a Tunisian National Guard checkpoint in the Kasserine region, near the Algerian
border, killing four soldiers. In response to the attack, Tunisian security forces protested in multiple regions for three days their
lack of equipment and called for the enactment of stricter counter-terrorism laws. In Libya, Ansar al Sharia and allied militants
continued to lose ground to Libyan military and Operation Dignity forces in Benghazi.
Outlook: Activity targeting Tunisian security forces will likely increase, particularly in the Kasserine region. Unrest in Libya will
continue to fuel unrest throughout North Africa and the Sahel.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
The fifth round of Inter-Malian peace talks are currently underway in Algiers with the Malian government and various rebel
separatist groups participating. The peace talks so far have not produced much progress. Meanwhile, Tuareg and Arab
separatist groups attempted to take over the town of Tabankort in northern Mali from pro-government forces.
Outlook: As the peace talks continue to progress, it is unlikely that the Malian government, pro-government forces, and rebel
separatist groups will be able to compromise and reach a lasting peace agreement. Moreover, the weak Malian government will
be unable to restore order in the North as pro-government forces and rebel separatists continue to clash.
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MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

9. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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1) 17 FEB: Twenty
Uqba ibn Nafaa
Brigade militants
attacked a Tunisian
National Guard
checkpoint in
Kasserine, killing four
soldiers. Two days
later, Tunisian
security forces
clashed with
unidentified militants
in the same area.
2) 17-19 FEB: Libyan
military forces
advanced against
Ansar al Sharia and
allied militants in
western and central
Benghazi.
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10. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
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SAHELWEST AFRICA
2
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1) 14 FEB: Gunmen
attacked an army
base in the Mopti
region, killing two
Malian soldiers.
2) 15 FEB: A suicide
bomber detonated
explosives at the
entrance of a
MINUSMA camp near
the town of
Tabankort, wounding
at least seven people.

11. ASSESSMENT:
Economy
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s speech on February 18 did not indicate a declining threat
perception; rather it reinforced his call for countermeasures against the West’s intent to continue to place
economic pressure on Iran. There is an inextricable link between Khamenei’s concerns about immediate
sanctions relief and his Resistance Economy strategy. Resistance, however, does not mean the regime is
opposed to seeking economic opportunity. Parliament Speaker Ali Larijani underscored the flexibility of this
strategy: “resistance economy does not mean the doors of the country close…”
Outlook: The Supreme Leader will continue to support the administration’s efforts to gain economic relief;
however his manifest pessimism will mask latent fears of a collapsing economy and domestic unrest.
Nuclear Talks
The Supreme Leader’s remarks about the nuclear talks did not reveal any shift in his support for
negotiations. Khamenei, nevertheless, remains pessimistic about the prospects of reaching a
comprehensive and implementable deal with the P5+1. Khamenei said that, even if Iran agrees on the
nuclear issue, the U.S. will not lift sanctions because it hates the Islamic Revolution and the Iranian nation.
Outlook: Khamenei’s support for a final nuclear agreement is predicated on the immediate removal of
sanctions.
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IRAN

12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
1214 FEB – 20 FEB 2015
16 FEB: The Supreme Leader’s Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati and Parliament Speaker Ali
Larijani met with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi to promote enhanced Tehran-Beijing relations.
17 FEB: President Rouhani announced the regime’s plan to restructure its space program, placing the
Aerospace Industries Organization and its related research center under the control of the Ministry of
Communications and Information Technology.
17 FEB: A new manned spacecraft prototype was unveiled, scheduled to be launched into orbit next year.
18 FEB: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei delivered a speech on the state of the economy and blamed
the West for Iran’s economic problems. Khamenei warned that Iran “can and will” sanction the West if
bullying continues.
18 FEB: Iran and Iraq sign 10 bilateral cooperation agreements and MOUs.
18 FEB: Foreign Ministry Spokeswoman Marzieh Afkham reiterated Tehran’s position of preserving a unified
government in Yemen.
19 FEB: Senior Parliamentarian Alaeddin Boroujerdi accused Bahrain of supplying cash and arms to a
terrorist network that was disbanded on February 5 and February 11 in Sistan va Baluchistan province.
20 FEB: Iran and the U.S. started direct nuclear negotiations in Geneva.
20 FEB: Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif stated that the EU’s decision to place the National Iranian
Tanker Company back on its sanctions list did not violate the Joint Plan of Action nuclear agreement.
20 FEB: Permanent Representative to the IAEA Reza Najafi said that the agency’s latest report verifies Iran’s
transparent nuclear program.

13. ACRONYMS
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Atomic Energy Agency of Iran (AEOI)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)
Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State (IS)
Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
North Waziristan (NWA)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
South Waziristan (SWA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

14. CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT ANALYSTS
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Alexis Knutsen
al Qaeda analyst
alexis.knutsen@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project,
visit www.criticalthreats.org.
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