How to Understand War Correctly and to Overcome it With Morality & Efficiency: combatreform.org/TRANSFORMATIONUNDERFIRE

1. Building 2D/3D optimized Land
Combat Forces for Decisive
Strategic Maneuver in the 21st
Century
"In war the chief incalculable is the human will, which
manifests itself in resistance, which in turn lies in the
province of tactics. Strategy has not to overcome
resistance, except from nature. Its purpose is to diminish
the possibility of resistance, and it seeks to fulfil this
purpose by exploiting the elements of movement and
surprise."
--Sir Basil H. Liddell-Hart
Air Land
Sea
2002 Lieutenant Michael Sparks IN USAR dynmicpara@aol.com

2. The Two Basic Battles
1. The Battle Against the Earth: Hart’s “Nature”
"We have severly underestimated the Russians, the extent of the country and the
treachery of the climate. This is the revenge of reality."
- German General Heinz Guderian, letter to his wife 1941
Open terrain
Observation Closed terrain
Closed terrain: mobile forces automatically lighter and 3D air transportable linkage; note
world is URBANIZING rapidly
Open terrain: roads, rural areas where we grow food, prairies require GROUND
FORCES TO CONTROL---we must be able to control these areas...requires 2D
optimization
Future Land Forces must FIRST be “powerful against the earth” in terms of mobility,
firepower, survivability, and sustainability--if the earth itself easily smothers their combat
power how can they even begin to think of overwhelming the human enemy?

3. 2. The Battle Against Man
"Natural hazards, however formidable, are inherently less dangerous and less
uncertain than fighting hazards. All conditions are more calculable, all obstacles
more surmountable than those of human resistance".
--Sir Basil H. Liddell-Hart
The Two competing 21st Century War Thought-Forms in the West
VS.
TOFFLERIANS FEHRENBACHIANS

4. 1. Ego-centric Gadgetry trumps of the Tofflerians
Hubris that we have latest gadget that trumps all, computer mentalism
directing firepower to destroy PLATFORMS since without a platform enemy
humans cannot abide in temporal air/sea mediums, man is on a gadget
escalator of human progress (arrogance to exalt human intellect and spend
money on what makes us feel superior)
Favorite example: WWII aircraft carriers with 300 mile range aircraft besting
battleships with 25 mile range guns

5. Naïve Civilian Utopians: reality on a timeline: man on escalator to heaven
3rd Wave: Information
2nd Wave: Mechanical 2002 A.D.
“Scientists”
1st Wave: Agrarian
4000 B.C. “Cavemen”
New replaces old:
Ooops! We still live on
PHYSICAL 1st Wave: Agrarian
planet earth
and grow Throw out the past:
food but timeline 2nd Wave: Mechanical not relevant or respected
hubris says we must
discard this reality
3rd Wave: Information: FIREPOWER TRUMPS ALL!

6. Physicality vs. Earth (that’s “2nd Wave”)
NOT Important! We will mouse-click firepower!
Wheeled Armored Car Defeat on the Battlefield:
Madness: can’t MANEUVER no boots-on-the-ground
x-country, swim, airdrop or fight; infantry decisive, encircling MANEUVER
will suffer bloody WWI stalemates in cities
Afghanistan: Taliban/al Queda
escape by C3D2
SOMALIA
Kosovo: Serb Army unscathed
FCS LAV3STRYKER

7. 2. Tactical-centric Reality trumps of the Fehrenbachians
Must get RESULTS, factors in entire context of reality including gadget vs.
gadget, human factors that men can live on ground if platforms are taken from
them; thus MANEUVER is central to control ground where men live (humility to
focus on what's relevant) since the earth itself is the ultimate "platform" which
undergirds enemy existence/resistance
Favorite example: 1940s German Army with inferior light tanks encircling BEF
in France. Military Combat veteran T.R. Fehrenbach wrote in “This Kind of
War”:
"Americans in 1950 rediscovered something that since Hiroshima they
had forgotten: you may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it,
atomize it, pulverize it, and wipe it clean of life--but if you desire to
defend it, protect it, and keep it for
civilization, you must do this on
the ground the way the Roman
Legions did, by putting your
young men into the mud."

8. Analysis
Air/Sea not natural mediums for man, rely on gadgets to abide there, more
susceptible to gadgetry trumps
Land is where man abides, doesn't need gadgets to abide there, no gadgetry
escalator of human progress, latest gadget doesn't nullify/negate/trump earlier
gadgets, ALL weaponry is relevant and can be lethal; level playing field;
example: can slit throats of unwary sleeping crewmen in multi-million dollar
armored car with computer screen, applying AF/Navy thinking to create a
gadget-centric units that employ counter-gadgetry without physicality versus
the earth is unsound, enemy can refuse to play "arms race" and accept gadget
escalator, all weapons in play at all times
YES!

9. More Problems:
Tofflerian Ego-Gadgeteers think their brand of computer mentalism
firepower trumps all; think battlefield will become giant video game;
Russians call “Surveillance Strike Complex” (SSC) like aircraft carriers
vs battleships at sea; not so on land! Land forces must be able to defeat
entire spectrum of enemy gadgets which requires REALITY centeredness
not expectation that a gadget trump will singularly carry the day.
Land forces must be able to MANEUVER across open and closed terrain
(Battle against the Earth) and be optimized gadget/weapons wise to
prevail while doing so against human (Battle against Man) foes who will
have ALL weaponry types at their disposal, from low to high tech. Low-
tech advantage will require in open terrain low-tech counters, which is
heavier armor protection/firepower. High-tech has not REPLACED low-
tech in land warfare, it has SUPPLANTED it

10. Air/Sea Warfare
High Tech - Low Tech = High Tech Gadget-centric Reality
Land Warfare
High Tech + Low Tech = Complex Tactical-centric Reality
Best Case if Gadgeteers have their way (defined in Reality Context)?
Ego-Gadgeteers create medium weight tracked vehicle FORCE that is 3D air
transportable and terrain agile with C4I SA, BUT IS SUB-OPTIMIZED for combat in
open terrain; too light, will be at disadvantage against human forces with same gadgets
but with heavier platforms with more weight/capability to work with (2D optimization)!
Answer is the have two types of land forces!
2D and 3D Optimized for open and closed
terrain combats against human foes!

11. We will have a good 3D "extraordinary" force but not the complimenting 2D "ordinary"
forces to dominate maneuver in open terrains we must have!
[Sun Tzu's ”tai" and ”chi" force constructs]
“In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed
in order to secure victory. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack - the direct and
the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. The direct
and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle - you never come to an
end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?”
-Sun Tzu
Analogy: WWI British battlecruisers at Jutland getting sunk by heavier German battleship's
gunfire, M4 Medium offensive tanks versus Heavy Tiger/Panther defensive tanks in WWII
Worse case if Gadgeteers have their way (defined in Reality Context)?
Ego-Gadgeteers create medium weight rubber tired wheeled force that is marginally 3D and
NOT terrain agile, but road-bound, is sub-optimized for maneuver in ALL terrains relying
completely on its gadget trump of C4I to direct firepower at a stand-off, with survival mode
infantry security guards to keep low-tech enemies at bay at high cost in blood (keep RPGs
away). Neither 3D or 2D maneuver optimized
Analogy: LAV-III/Stykers IBCTs or FCS "Units of Action" without 3D or agile 2D cross-
country fire & maneuver capability versus low-tech enemy who fights “belt buckle” close,
ambushing these armored cars along roads/trails with low-tech weapons in closed terrain
where stand-off SA cannot be employed

12. ITS 2D/3D MANEUVER AND FIREPOWER:
WAR PHILOSOPHIES WE SHOULD BE STUDYING FOR
21st CENTURY VICTORY THRU 2D/3D OPTIMIZATION--IF WE
WERE OVER THE FIREPOWER VERSUS MANEUVER
CONUNDRUM!
SUN TZU
War is about whose ideas dominate
HART
Defeat the mind of the enemy
VAN CREVALD
4th Generation War is mind warfare
BIBLE
Make enemy your friend
MAN HAS ALWAYS BEEN TECHNOLOGICALLY ADVANCED, BUT
HE’S A KILLER ANGEL; AS TIME GOES ON DANGERS INCREASE

13. Example of imbalanced fire & maneuver-poor force structure
against “Surveillance Strike System”: October 6, 1973.
Egyptian ground forces storm across the Suez Canal and
surprise/overwhelm the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) “Bar-Lev”
forward line of troops (FLOT)
3D Projected
FLOT
2D/3D
2D
2D

14. The Egyptian Army
advanced under a
complete radar-guided,
high-medium-low altitude
surface-to-air missile
“umbrella”, backed up on
the ground by
“hunter/killer” infantry
teams with Rocket
Propelled Grenades
(RPGs) and Sagger 1
Anti-tank Guided Missiles
(ATGMs) to defeat IDF
tank ground maneuver: a
Surveillance Strike
Complex (SSC) in a Major
Theatre of War (MTW)

15. When IDF tanks rushed headlong into Egyptian
Armored formations, they are destroyed by
Sagger ATGMs and RPGs: the invasion
continued
RPGs + ATGMs
= Knocked-out IDF tanks

16. "To defeat Israeli armored counter-attacks in 1973, the
Egyptians employed an average of 55 infantry anti-tank weapons
every 1,000 meters. Their anti-tank positions were mutually
supporting and in depth, using Russian-made RPG-7 armor-
defeating rockets, backed up by Sagger anti-tank guided missiles
(ATGMs), and Soviet tanks and Saggers in a third echelon. By
using the maximum stand-off ranges of all anti-tank weapons
and neutralizing the Israeli Air Force with an effective air
defense umbrella over the main battle area ( MBA), the
Egyptians repulsed attack after attack of Israeli armor."
-- Major Theodore Sendak, U.S. Army Military Review,
September 1979 "The Airborne Anti-Armor Defense"

17. The situation desperate, the IDF
launches fighter-bombers to strafe
and bomb the Egyptian Armored
Columns now just a few miles
away from the capital city of
Israel....
But they are shot down in
horrendous numbers....
Avi Zeira was one of thousands of Israeli Soldiers
who rushed to the front in a frantic call-up of every
able-bodied person in the country:
"I was so angry that we were surprised," Zeira says. "I was
really angry, too, that they had better weapons and we didn't
know about it. I watched as they just shot our planes out of the
sky, leaving us without cover."

18. Then a miracle happened...the Egyptians paused....
...giving the IDF precious time to call up its
reserves and re-organize itself to defeat the enemy
surveillance strike complex; their new tactics:
1. Artillery suppresses enemy
air defense and ATGM
locations
2. Tracked M113 Mobile infantry clears RPG/
ATGM locations
3. Tanks suppress ATGM firing
signatures, dodge missiles

19. 4. USAF emergency airlift begins from CONUS and
USAREUR to replace all lost equipment
5. Ground maneuver regained---with Artillery
suppressing and tanks destroying enemy air defense sites
so the IDF Air Force can fly Close Air Support missions
Egyptian Air Defense
Artilery Site
IDF Centurion
IDF Air/Ground Team
tank killing
ADA

20. IDF recon/covering forces
discover gap in between
Egyptian armies; IDF
ground maneuver forces
under General Sharon
cross Suez Canal and
encircle an entire
Egyptian Army! 3D IDF Paratroops!
Extended
FLOT
2D IDF Armor
Egyptians sue for peace to
prevent annihilation!: Israel
saved

21. Helicopter-borne IDF GENERAL AVRAHAM
Paratroops in ADAN
(TEL AVIV,
extended FLOT 3D 13/5/97.TRANSLATED.)
operations! www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/inter
views/episode-17/adan3.html
“I decided that I would put a
tank brigade in ambush in
the sand dunes; I would
camouflage them with nets
and they would be there to
act against the force coming
from the south. And in the
morning... no, at night, that
night we got Paratroopers,
and they went out into battle
to broaden the passageway to
the bridgehead. They arrived
quite late; they came from
Sharm-al-Sheikh, from a
very far-away front, and they
200 mile 3D Air arrived in helicopters, very
Assault..at night slowly...and we built up a
Paratrooper Battalion, which
entered into a very difficult
battle.

22. THE 2D BREAKOUT
Once across, the tankers overcame local resistance
and some determined Egyptian commando attacks on
their laagers as they reorganized. They then
quickly fanned out into the open desert, crossing the
bridges over the sweet water canals. Here was good
tank country at last, resistance scanty and targets
plentiful. Their first task was to destroy the Egyptian
missile bases to clear the skies for the IAF. During the
day, Adan's and Sharon's tankers destroyed every
missile site within a perimeter reaching some 20
miles along the western bank, breaking havoc among
administrative troops concentrated in the many army
camps in the rear zone of the Egyptian armies
now on the east bank in Sinai. As fast as the Egyptians
threw in reinforcements, they were destroyed by the
roaming Israeli armor. Freed from the threat of the
surface-to-air missiles, the IAF blazed away at
anything that moved, sowing destruction galore.

23. WARNING:
The 1973 war cost Israel 2,378 men, one third of her
air force (102 planes), and more than 800 tanks, a
shockingly high figure for a country the size of
Delaware, with about the same number of people as
Alabama. To comprehend such a loss, a
comparatively high casualty count on the U.S. armed
forces would have resulted in 140,000 dead. As in
previous conflicts, no official record of the Arab
losses was ever released, but again we estimate that
they were higher: about 19,000 dead, more than 350
fighter planes, 1,300 tanks, and 11 ships. Israel won
on the battlefield, but in world opinion it was the
first three days that counted, because it showed that
superior force structure in a well-organized system
coupled with surprise were not Israeli (nor
American) monopolies.

24. Did Israel win? Did the Egyptian SSC work?
Egypt knew that she could not defeat Israel militarily, so
Egypt set out to lose the war in such a fashion as to inflict
maximum casualties on Israel and then win the peace. Egypt
did just that. Egypt halted because Egypt did not want to
over-run its air defense umbrella. As a result of Egypt's
"defeat", the Israeli government fell, Egypt got the entire
Sinai peninsula back and Egypt was able to maneuver the
U.S. into the Camp David talks whereby the U.S. ended up
guaranteeing Egypt's borders with Israel and pledging
massive aid to Egypt. Egypt's casualties would have been
less if Egypt had stuck to her original plan, but Egypt
succumbed to Syria's pleas to launch a limited spoiler attack
to take the pressure off in Syria's losing fight with Israel. The
spoiler attack was launched outside of their air defense
umbrella and was repulsed. The ‘73 war is a perfect example
of the dictum that war is "a continuation of politics by other
means".

25. Nevertheless, this doesn't change the fact that it wasn't the Eqyptian
intention to have Israel cross the Suez and surround their Army. This
gave Israel a fairly strong bargaining position and made it very clear in
the mind of Egyptian leaders that the Israelis could be in Cairo in a matter
of hours. Although all Egyptians are rightfully proud of the initial attack
they don't like to talk about the end result. Let’s not forget that Syria
intended to go all the way to Haifa and Tel Aviv to exterminate the nation
of Israel if possible--a simultaneous two “MTW” type scenario that we
seem today to want to dismiss as an enemy attack option in order to cut
defense budgets. The Israelis fought a two front war of extreme violence,
beginning with surprise attacks on both fronts and ending with both
aggressor countries seeing their capitols in danger. The Egyptian pinning
attack didn't succeed as well as hoped and this is what forced the change
in plans. The limited Egyptian attack outside of the ADA umbrella didn't
cause that umbrella to go away-it remained in place and the Israelis used
combined-arms to crack it.A static defense wouldn’t have changed the
outcome since Israel was planning to attack to decide the issue (as per
their doctrine).
“What ifs” are part of war.

26. IDF Colonel David Eshel writes:
"The Israeli command had anticipated the possibility of a well executed
crossing in their operational concepts. A plan based on the techniques of
Soviet forced river crossing operations was well known to Israeli
intelligence; even a film of such a river crossing maneuver was available
and shown in training. But in actuality, surprise was complete - tactically
as well as technically. The Israelis were neither prepared psychologically
nor militarily to accept the fact that the Egyptian Army was capable of
effectively mounting such an intricate operation.”
The fact that there would not be extensive air support came as a great
shock to the Israeli troops who, lacking the vast artillery forces of their
opponents, had been trained to take air support for granted...
So, although we were not prepared, we attacked with part of our forces on
8th October, just as they arrived, and again that was a mistake because
we did not have the power, and again we suffered great losses. Only later
did we decide to organize first and to switch to an offensive, when we
were prepared to concentrate all our forces.”

27. Lessons Learned for defending MTW aggression:
1. Side that establishes an effective SSC first, lands the
first blows, usually the attacker taking ground
2. He that lands all-encompassing massed/precision strikes
and/or shattering maneuver wins the first battle, which may
be the war--
3. There may be NO RECOVERY to the side receiving
massed, accurate fires if the enemy doesn’t pause (don’t
count on it) and takes ground by maneuver (no territory to
trade for time); U.S. doesn’t have ally with hundreds of
tanks/planes to resupply it if lost in first hours of battle
4. The side receiving SSC fires must be able to absorb,
misdirect and shrug off fires long enough to establish its
own SSC and combining of all joint arms to regain the
initiative through MANEUVER--or lose the war.
5. The key is to asymmetrically attack the enemy’s SSC
boldly at its most critical points to collapse it with
unrelenting ground maneuver to not give the enemy any
time to recover, then pursue to victory: armored, 2D/3D

28. “There is no one to rescue us if we don’t get this right”
--Professor Fred Kagan, U.S. Military Academy on how the U.S. is
in the same super-power dilemma as England was in 1939, except
without a potential rescuer with huge industrial base and time to
re-arm & re-equip her if she fails to prepare for the right pattern of
future war
Israel's big brother (U.S.) made up all IDF combat equipment
losses and then some within a matter of days. We may not have
that backup in a conflict of our own. If we are defeated early on it's
entirely possible that no close airfields will exist for us to use. The
entirely competent Israeli ground forces didn't need any large
train up. They were ready-to-go as soon as they unloaded the
equipment off the planes. We have a terrible time getting ready for
gunnery and NTC deployments. Finally, our complicated
electronic equipment may not be easily adapted to an existing
situation. If the training and infrastructure don't already exist on
the ground, introducing it might make things worse.
ITS TIME FOR THE U.S. ARMY TO RE-INVIGORATE WITH 2D/3D
CAPABLE FORCES NOW USING EXISTING EQUIPMENT!

29. How Air-Mech-Strike 2D/3D maneuver warfare
defeats Surveillance-Strike Complexes
1. AMS Forces can self-deploy to any location in the world to
establish a Forward Line Of Troops despite air/sea anti-
access strategems and even in the presence of SSC fires;
organic ground armored mobility expands options to include
high-altitude delivery offset from enemy SSC, ADA effects
and forces in position = “powerful against the earth”
Two-Tiered airlift system
CONUS ---> ISB
Airlanding pre-loaded 747
cargo aircraft out of enemy
SSC fire range bulk deliver
AMS combat forces QUICKLY
under 96 hours before CONUS/ISB ---> Drop Zone
battle/war is lost; cargo 747s Airdrop USAF t-tail aircraft deliver Forced-Entry
available NOW in large mobile Assault Echelon (AE) forces under armor
numbers at low-cost protection to overcome enemy SSC fires to
establish expanding FLOT; aircraft fly to ISB to
shuttle-airland remainder of AMS Forces (FOE)
into the now secure Assault Landing Zone (AZ)

30. AMS: strategically and tactically agile 2D/3D ground
forces that offer NO easy asymmetric weakness for an
enemy to exploit = “Powerful against man”
Space/Air Cover by
USAF/USN 2D/3D BCTs
CONUS Coast Assault Combat UAVs
Guard/USN
Echelon (AE)
NMD
Border Patrol Follow-On-Echelon Helo SEL
NG (FOE) 3D
APAF Cargo 747s, USAF aircraft, CH-47F
Army helos (in C-5s or self-deploy) airdrop
C-130X
AGS
TSB
shuttle AZ OBJ
airland
TBAMs = Theater Ballistic
Artillery & Missiles Twin 120 mortars
TMAMs = Tactical Mortars, 2D Light Mech
Humraam
Artillery & Missiles
Crusader
Patriot/THAAD
HIMARS/ATACMs
Deep rear Rear Close/Far Deep
8,000 km back to CONUS 250km from enemy TBAMs 50km from TMAMs 300km in enemy rear
All Echelons protected from enemy missile attack

31. 2. AMS 2D optimized forces extend and/or project
from the FLOT to disrupt/suppress/destroy enemy
SSC air defenses to enable 3D decisive maneuver
(encirclements, turning movements) or vise-a-versa
Extended FLOT tactics
3D
3D
2D FLOT
Enables 3D 2D
Force to
advance

32. Projected FLOT tactics
3D
Enables 2D
Projected FLOT Base Force to
of Fire/Maneuver advance
(Mini-SSC)
2D
Main FLOT

33. UAVs/UCAVs
Robust 2D/3D BCTs win in
ANY situation Road Ambushes, C4I verifies
Mines, RPGs, data, CAS
missiles, obstacles,
predictable = DEATH
City
Kills armor in
Tracked BCT Quality infantry
meeting
defeats enemy
x-country infantry engagements
mobile avoids
road threats RSTA verifies
targets hit not
decoys
Wins far 5-50km fight
2D Force Scout dogs
Swims across Wins close 1-5km
rivers/lakes fight 3D Force
blocks,
Mobile Crusader, HIMARS, encircles
EFOGM, Twin 120mm mortar fire
isolates
support KILLS verified targets
severs
enemy

34. Missions of the Urban Combat
Team
• Rapidly Air Deploy Under a Division or Corps HQ as Part of a Joint Force as
the spearhead for MOUT operations
• Prevent, Contain or Stabilize Crises Through Presence and precise Military
Operations in Urban Terrain
• Determine Favorable Outcome of urban Small Scale Contingencies (SSCs)
• Act as the urban Combat Force Guarantor in Security and Support
Operations (SASO) as Part of a U.S. or Multinational Force
• Participate, with Augmentation, in Major Theater Wars (MTWs) insuring
urban areas do not hinder decisive maneuver

35. Can we continue to assault
urban structures using
predictable top-down or
bottom-up tactics?
Helicopter
rooftop
assaults
exposes them
to enemy fires
Slow Ladder
assaults date
back to ancient Foot Infantry exposed
“Stacking” teams at to enemy fires!!!!!
times!
ground-level

36. Solution to 21st Century
Urban combat: Modern Siege Engines;
tracked tanks with combat engineering
means--original purpose of tanks in
the first place in WWI!
General Percy
Hobart’s “Funnies”
with PHYSICAL
MECHANICAL
ADVANTAGE to
directly cope not
impotent, rubber-
tired armored cars
mouse-clicking pleas
for firepower help!

37. MOUT VERTICAL ASSAULT
VEHICLE
Lethality is Not Always Weaponry
it can be MANEUVER
Stealthy Hybrid-Electric
M113A4 used to
transport rifle squad Boom arm delivers
over rubble, debris infantry to
unexpected spot on
buildings
Combat-proven mobility
with RPG resistant
applique armor

38. 3. AMS 2D/3D maneuver forces employ maximum fire &
maneuver to paralyze enemy SSCs as they collapse the
enemy’s centers of gravity with lasting, decisive ground
maneuver, ending the conflict clearly on our favorable terms
“What matters in war is VICTORY, not prolonged
operations, however brilliantly executed”
---Sun Tzu, The Art of War

39. Questions?
LT Michael L. Sparks IN USAR
dynmicpara@aol.com
Book:
www.geocities.com/air_mech_strike/amsbook.htm
Internet:
www.geocities.com/transformationunderfire
www.geocities.com/strategicmaneuver
Airborne!