Understand War: Fehrenbach vs Tofflers v1.0


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How to Understand War Correctly and to Overcome it With Morality & Efficiency: combatreform.org/TRANSFORMATIONUNDERFIRE

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Understand War: Fehrenbach vs Tofflers v1.0

  1. 1. Building 2D/3D optimized Land Combat Forces for Decisive Strategic Maneuver in the 21st Century "In war the chief incalculable is the human will, which manifests itself in resistance, which in turn lies in the province of tactics. Strategy has not to overcome resistance, except from nature. Its purpose is to diminish the possibility of resistance, and it seeks to fulfil this purpose by exploiting the elements of movement and surprise." --Sir Basil H. Liddell-Hart Air Land Sea2002 Lieutenant Michael Sparks IN USAR dynmicpara@aol.com
  2. 2. The Two Basic Battles1. The Battle Against the Earth: Hart’s “Nature” "We have severly underestimated the Russians, the extent of the country and the treachery of the climate. This is the revenge of reality." - German General Heinz Guderian, letter to his wife 1941 Open terrainObservation Closed terrainClosed terrain: mobile forces automatically lighter and 3D air transportable linkage; noteworld is URBANIZING rapidlyOpen terrain: roads, rural areas where we grow food, prairies require GROUNDFORCES TO CONTROL---we must be able to control these areas...requires 2DoptimizationFuture Land Forces must FIRST be “powerful against the earth” in terms of mobility,firepower, survivability, and sustainability--if the earth itself easily smothers their combatpower how can they even begin to think of overwhelming the human enemy?
  3. 3. 2. The Battle Against Man"Natural hazards, however formidable, are inherently less dangerous and lessuncertain than fighting hazards. All conditions are more calculable, all obstaclesmore surmountable than those of human resistance".--Sir Basil H. Liddell-Hart The Two competing 21st Century War Thought-Forms in the West VS. TOFFLERIANS FEHRENBACHIANS
  4. 4. 1. Ego-centric Gadgetry trumps of the ToffleriansHubris that we have latest gadget that trumps all, computer mentalismdirecting firepower to destroy PLATFORMS since without a platform enemyhumans cannot abide in temporal air/sea mediums, man is on a gadgetescalator of human progress (arrogance to exalt human intellect and spendmoney on what makes us feel superior)Favorite example: WWII aircraft carriers with 300 mile range aircraft bestingbattleships with 25 mile range guns
  5. 5. Naïve Civilian Utopians: reality on a timeline: man on escalator to heaven 3rd Wave: Information 2nd Wave: Mechanical 2002 A.D. “Scientists” 1st Wave: Agrarian 4000 B.C. “Cavemen” New replaces old:Ooops! We still live onPHYSICAL 1st Wave: Agrarianplanet earthand grow Throw out the past:food but timeline 2nd Wave: Mechanical not relevant or respectedhubris says we mustdiscard this reality 3rd Wave: Information: FIREPOWER TRUMPS ALL!
  6. 6. Physicality vs. Earth (that’s “2nd Wave”) NOT Important! We will mouse-click firepower!Wheeled Armored Car Defeat on the Battlefield:Madness: can’t MANEUVER no boots-on-the-groundx-country, swim, airdrop or fight; infantry decisive, encircling MANEUVERwill suffer bloody WWI stalemates in cities Afghanistan: Taliban/al Queda escape by C3D2 SOMALIA Kosovo: Serb Army unscathed FCS LAV3STRYKER
  7. 7. 2. Tactical-centric Reality trumps of the FehrenbachiansMust get RESULTS, factors in entire context of reality including gadget vs.gadget, human factors that men can live on ground if platforms are taken fromthem; thus MANEUVER is central to control ground where men live (humility tofocus on whats relevant) since the earth itself is the ultimate "platform" whichundergirds enemy existence/resistanceFavorite example: 1940s German Army with inferior light tanks encircling BEFin France. Military Combat veteran T.R. Fehrenbach wrote in “This Kind ofWar”:"Americans in 1950 rediscovered something that since Hiroshima theyhad forgotten: you may fly over a land forever; you may bomb it,atomize it, pulverize it, and wipe it clean of life--but if you desire todefend it, protect it, and keep it forcivilization, you must do this onthe ground the way the RomanLegions did, by putting youryoung men into the mud."
  8. 8. AnalysisAir/Sea not natural mediums for man, rely on gadgets to abide there, moresusceptible to gadgetry trumpsLand is where man abides, doesnt need gadgets to abide there, no gadgetryescalator of human progress, latest gadget doesnt nullify/negate/trump earliergadgets, ALL weaponry is relevant and can be lethal; level playing field;example: can slit throats of unwary sleeping crewmen in multi-million dollararmored car with computer screen, applying AF/Navy thinking to create agadget-centric units that employ counter-gadgetry without physicality versusthe earth is unsound, enemy can refuse to play "arms race" and accept gadgetescalator, all weapons in play at all times YES!
  9. 9. More Problems:Tofflerian Ego-Gadgeteers think their brand of computer mentalismfirepower trumps all; think battlefield will become giant video game;Russians call “Surveillance Strike Complex” (SSC) like aircraft carriersvs battleships at sea; not so on land! Land forces must be able to defeatentire spectrum of enemy gadgets which requires REALITY centerednessnot expectation that a gadget trump will singularly carry the day.Land forces must be able to MANEUVER across open and closed terrain(Battle against the Earth) and be optimized gadget/weapons wise toprevail while doing so against human (Battle against Man) foes who willhave ALL weaponry types at their disposal, from low to high tech. Low-tech advantage will require in open terrain low-tech counters, which isheavier armor protection/firepower. High-tech has not REPLACED low-tech in land warfare, it has SUPPLANTED it
  10. 10. Air/Sea WarfareHigh Tech - Low Tech = High Tech Gadget-centric RealityLand WarfareHigh Tech + Low Tech = Complex Tactical-centric RealityBest Case if Gadgeteers have their way (defined in Reality Context)?Ego-Gadgeteers create medium weight tracked vehicle FORCE that is 3D airtransportable and terrain agile with C4I SA, BUT IS SUB-OPTIMIZED for combat inopen terrain; too light, will be at disadvantage against human forces with same gadgetsbut with heavier platforms with more weight/capability to work with (2D optimization)! Answer is the have two types of land forces! 2D and 3D Optimized for open and closed terrain combats against human foes!
  11. 11. We will have a good 3D "extraordinary" force but not the complimenting 2D "ordinary"forces to dominate maneuver in open terrains we must have![Sun Tzus ”tai" and ”chi" force constructs]“In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory. In battle, there are not more than two methods of attack - the direct and the indirect; yet these two in combination give rise to an endless series of maneuvers. The direct and the indirect lead on to each other in turn. It is like moving in a circle - you never come to an end. Who can exhaust the possibilities of their combination?” -Sun TzuAnalogy: WWI British battlecruisers at Jutland getting sunk by heavier German battleshipsgunfire, M4 Medium offensive tanks versus Heavy Tiger/Panther defensive tanks in WWIIWorse case if Gadgeteers have their way (defined in Reality Context)?Ego-Gadgeteers create medium weight rubber tired wheeled force that is marginally 3D andNOT terrain agile, but road-bound, is sub-optimized for maneuver in ALL terrains relyingcompletely on its gadget trump of C4I to direct firepower at a stand-off, with survival modeinfantry security guards to keep low-tech enemies at bay at high cost in blood (keep RPGsaway). Neither 3D or 2D maneuver optimizedAnalogy: LAV-III/Stykers IBCTs or FCS "Units of Action" without 3D or agile 2D cross-country fire & maneuver capability versus low-tech enemy who fights “belt buckle” close,ambushing these armored cars along roads/trails with low-tech weapons in closed terrainwhere stand-off SA cannot be employed
  13. 13. Example of imbalanced fire & maneuver-poor force structure against “Surveillance Strike System”: October 6, 1973. Egyptian ground forces storm across the Suez Canal andsurprise/overwhelm the Israeli Defense Force (IDF) “Bar-Lev” forward line of troops (FLOT) 3D Projected FLOT 2D/3D 2D 2D
  14. 14. The Egyptian Armyadvanced under acomplete radar-guided,high-medium-low altitudesurface-to-air missile“umbrella”, backed up onthe ground by“hunter/killer” infantryteams with RocketPropelled Grenades(RPGs) and Sagger 1Anti-tank Guided Missiles(ATGMs) to defeat IDFtank ground maneuver: aSurveillance StrikeComplex (SSC) in a MajorTheatre of War (MTW)
  15. 15. When IDF tanks rushed headlong into Egyptian Armored formations, they are destroyed by Sagger ATGMs and RPGs: the invasion continuedRPGs + ATGMs= Knocked-out IDF tanks
  16. 16. "To defeat Israeli armored counter-attacks in 1973, theEgyptians employed an average of 55 infantry anti-tank weaponsevery 1,000 meters. Their anti-tank positions were mutuallysupporting and in depth, using Russian-made RPG-7 armor-defeating rockets, backed up by Sagger anti-tank guided missiles(ATGMs), and Soviet tanks and Saggers in a third echelon. Byusing the maximum stand-off ranges of all anti-tank weaponsand neutralizing the Israeli Air Force with an effective airdefense umbrella over the main battle area ( MBA), theEgyptians repulsed attack after attack of Israeli armor." -- Major Theodore Sendak, U.S. Army Military Review, September 1979 "The Airborne Anti-Armor Defense"
  17. 17. The situation desperate, the IDF launches fighter-bombers to strafe and bomb the Egyptian Armored Columns now just a few miles away from the capital city of Israel....But they are shot down inhorrendous numbers.... Avi Zeira was one of thousands of Israeli Soldiers who rushed to the front in a frantic call-up of every able-bodied person in the country: "I was so angry that we were surprised," Zeira says. "I was really angry, too, that they had better weapons and we didnt know about it. I watched as they just shot our planes out of the sky, leaving us without cover."
  18. 18. Then a miracle happened...the Egyptians paused.... ...giving the IDF precious time to call up its reserves and re-organize itself to defeat the enemy surveillance strike complex; their new tactics:1. Artillery suppresses enemyair defense and ATGMlocations 2. Tracked M113 Mobile infantry clears RPG/ ATGM locations 3. Tanks suppress ATGM firing signatures, dodge missiles
  19. 19. 4. USAF emergency airlift begins from CONUS andUSAREUR to replace all lost equipment5. Ground maneuver regained---with Artillerysuppressing and tanks destroying enemy air defense sitesso the IDF Air Force can fly Close Air Support missions Egyptian Air Defense Artilery Site IDF Centurion IDF Air/Ground Team tank killing ADA
  20. 20. IDF recon/covering forcesdiscover gap in betweenEgyptian armies; IDFground maneuver forcesunder General Sharoncross Suez Canal andencircle an entireEgyptian Army! 3D IDF Paratroops! Extended FLOT 2D IDF ArmorEgyptians sue for peace toprevent annihilation!: Israel saved
  21. 21. Helicopter-borne IDF GENERAL AVRAHAM Paratroops in ADAN (TEL AVIV, extended FLOT 3D 13/5/97.TRANSLATED.) operations! www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/inter views/episode-17/adan3.html “I decided that I would put a tank brigade in ambush in the sand dunes; I would camouflage them with nets and they would be there to act against the force coming from the south. And in the morning... no, at night, that night we got Paratroopers, and they went out into battle to broaden the passageway to the bridgehead. They arrived quite late; they came from Sharm-al-Sheikh, from a very far-away front, and they200 mile 3D Air arrived in helicopters, veryAssault..at night slowly...and we built up a Paratrooper Battalion, which entered into a very difficult battle.
  22. 22. THE 2D BREAKOUTOnce across, the tankers overcame local resistanceand some determined Egyptian commando attacks ontheir laagers as they reorganized. They thenquickly fanned out into the open desert, crossing thebridges over the sweet water canals. Here was goodtank country at last, resistance scanty and targetsplentiful. Their first task was to destroy the Egyptianmissile bases to clear the skies for the IAF. During theday, Adans and Sharons tankers destroyed everymissile site within a perimeter reaching some 20miles along the western bank, breaking havoc amongadministrative troops concentrated in the many armycamps in the rear zone of the Egyptian armiesnow on the east bank in Sinai. As fast as the Egyptiansthrew in reinforcements, they were destroyed by theroaming Israeli armor. Freed from the threat of thesurface-to-air missiles, the IAF blazed away atanything that moved, sowing destruction galore.
  23. 23. WARNING:The 1973 war cost Israel 2,378 men, one third of herair force (102 planes), and more than 800 tanks, ashockingly high figure for a country the size ofDelaware, with about the same number of people asAlabama. To comprehend such a loss, acomparatively high casualty count on the U.S. armedforces would have resulted in 140,000 dead. As inprevious conflicts, no official record of the Arablosses was ever released, but again we estimate thatthey were higher: about 19,000 dead, more than 350fighter planes, 1,300 tanks, and 11 ships. Israel wonon the battlefield, but in world opinion it was thefirst three days that counted, because it showed thatsuperior force structure in a well-organized systemcoupled with surprise were not Israeli (norAmerican) monopolies.
  24. 24. Did Israel win? Did the Egyptian SSC work?Egypt knew that she could not defeat Israel militarily, soEgypt set out to lose the war in such a fashion as to inflictmaximum casualties on Israel and then win the peace. Egyptdid just that. Egypt halted because Egypt did not want toover-run its air defense umbrella. As a result of Egypts"defeat", the Israeli government fell, Egypt got the entireSinai peninsula back and Egypt was able to maneuver theU.S. into the Camp David talks whereby the U.S. ended upguaranteeing Egypts borders with Israel and pledgingmassive aid to Egypt. Egypts casualties would have beenless if Egypt had stuck to her original plan, but Egyptsuccumbed to Syrias pleas to launch a limited spoiler attackto take the pressure off in Syrias losing fight with Israel. Thespoiler attack was launched outside of their air defenseumbrella and was repulsed. The ‘73 war is a perfect exampleof the dictum that war is "a continuation of politics by othermeans".
  25. 25. Nevertheless, this doesnt change the fact that it wasnt the Eqyptianintention to have Israel cross the Suez and surround their Army. Thisgave Israel a fairly strong bargaining position and made it very clear inthe mind of Egyptian leaders that the Israelis could be in Cairo in a matterof hours. Although all Egyptians are rightfully proud of the initial attackthey dont like to talk about the end result. Let’s not forget that Syriaintended to go all the way to Haifa and Tel Aviv to exterminate the nationof Israel if possible--a simultaneous two “MTW” type scenario that weseem today to want to dismiss as an enemy attack option in order to cutdefense budgets. The Israelis fought a two front war of extreme violence,beginning with surprise attacks on both fronts and ending with bothaggressor countries seeing their capitols in danger. The Egyptian pinningattack didnt succeed as well as hoped and this is what forced the changein plans. The limited Egyptian attack outside of the ADA umbrella didntcause that umbrella to go away-it remained in place and the Israelis usedcombined-arms to crack it.A static defense wouldn’t have changed theoutcome since Israel was planning to attack to decide the issue (as pertheir doctrine).“What ifs” are part of war.
  26. 26. IDF Colonel David Eshel writes:"The Israeli command had anticipated the possibility of a well executedcrossing in their operational concepts. A plan based on the techniques ofSoviet forced river crossing operations was well known to Israeliintelligence; even a film of such a river crossing maneuver was availableand shown in training. But in actuality, surprise was complete - tacticallyas well as technically. The Israelis were neither prepared psychologicallynor militarily to accept the fact that the Egyptian Army was capable ofeffectively mounting such an intricate operation.”The fact that there would not be extensive air support came as a greatshock to the Israeli troops who, lacking the vast artillery forces of theiropponents, had been trained to take air support for granted...So, although we were not prepared, we attacked with part of our forces on8th October, just as they arrived, and again that was a mistake becausewe did not have the power, and again we suffered great losses. Only laterdid we decide to organize first and to switch to an offensive, when wewere prepared to concentrate all our forces.”
  27. 27. Lessons Learned for defending MTW aggression:1. Side that establishes an effective SSC first, lands thefirst blows, usually the attacker taking ground2. He that lands all-encompassing massed/precision strikesand/or shattering maneuver wins the first battle, which maybe the war--3. There may be NO RECOVERY to the side receivingmassed, accurate fires if the enemy doesn’t pause (don’tcount on it) and takes ground by maneuver (no territory totrade for time); U.S. doesn’t have ally with hundreds oftanks/planes to resupply it if lost in first hours of battle4. The side receiving SSC fires must be able to absorb,misdirect and shrug off fires long enough to establish itsown SSC and combining of all joint arms to regain theinitiative through MANEUVER--or lose the war.5. The key is to asymmetrically attack the enemy’s SSCboldly at its most critical points to collapse it withunrelenting ground maneuver to not give the enemy anytime to recover, then pursue to victory: armored, 2D/3D
  28. 28. “There is no one to rescue us if we don’t get this right” --Professor Fred Kagan, U.S. Military Academy on how the U.S. is in the same super-power dilemma as England was in 1939, except without a potential rescuer with huge industrial base and time to re-arm & re-equip her if she fails to prepare for the right pattern of future warIsraels big brother (U.S.) made up all IDF combat equipmentlosses and then some within a matter of days. We may not havethat backup in a conflict of our own. If we are defeated early on itsentirely possible that no close airfields will exist for us to use. Theentirely competent Israeli ground forces didnt need any largetrain up. They were ready-to-go as soon as they unloaded theequipment off the planes. We have a terrible time getting ready forgunnery and NTC deployments. Finally, our complicatedelectronic equipment may not be easily adapted to an existingsituation. If the training and infrastructure dont already exist onthe ground, introducing it might make things worse.ITS TIME FOR THE U.S. ARMY TO RE-INVIGORATE WITH 2D/3DCAPABLE FORCES NOW USING EXISTING EQUIPMENT!
  29. 29. How Air-Mech-Strike 2D/3D maneuver warfare defeats Surveillance-Strike Complexes1. AMS Forces can self-deploy to any location in the world toestablish a Forward Line Of Troops despite air/sea anti-access strategems and even in the presence of SSC fires;organic ground armored mobility expands options to includehigh-altitude delivery offset from enemy SSC, ADA effectsand forces in position = “powerful against the earth” Two-Tiered airlift system CONUS ---> ISB Airlanding pre-loaded 747 cargo aircraft out of enemy SSC fire range bulk deliver AMS combat forces QUICKLY under 96 hours before CONUS/ISB ---> Drop Zone battle/war is lost; cargo 747s Airdrop USAF t-tail aircraft deliver Forced-Entry available NOW in large mobile Assault Echelon (AE) forces under armor numbers at low-cost protection to overcome enemy SSC fires to establish expanding FLOT; aircraft fly to ISB to shuttle-airland remainder of AMS Forces (FOE) into the now secure Assault Landing Zone (AZ)
  30. 30. AMS: strategically and tactically agile 2D/3D ground forces that offer NO easy asymmetric weakness for an enemy to exploit = “Powerful against man” Space/Air Cover by USAF/USN 2D/3D BCTs CONUS Coast Assault Combat UAVs Guard/USN Echelon (AE) NMD Border Patrol Follow-On-Echelon Helo SEL NG (FOE) 3D APAF Cargo 747s, USAF aircraft, CH-47F Army helos (in C-5s or self-deploy) airdrop C-130X AGS TSB shuttle AZ OBJ airlandTBAMs = Theater BallisticArtillery & Missiles Twin 120 mortarsTMAMs = Tactical Mortars, 2D Light Mech HumraamArtillery & Missiles Crusader Patriot/THAAD HIMARS/ATACMs Deep rear Rear Close/Far Deep 8,000 km back to CONUS 250km from enemy TBAMs 50km from TMAMs 300km in enemy rear All Echelons protected from enemy missile attack
  31. 31. 2. AMS 2D optimized forces extend and/or projectfrom the FLOT to disrupt/suppress/destroy enemySSC air defenses to enable 3D decisive maneuver(encirclements, turning movements) or vise-a-versa Extended FLOT tactics 3D 3D 2D FLOT Enables 3D 2D Force to advance
  32. 32. Projected FLOT tactics 3D Enables 2D Projected FLOT Base Force to of Fire/Maneuver advance (Mini-SSC) 2DMain FLOT
  33. 33. UAVs/UCAVsRobust 2D/3D BCTs win inANY situation Road Ambushes, C4I verifies Mines, RPGs, data, CAS missiles, obstacles, predictable = DEATH City Kills armor in Tracked BCT Quality infantry meeting defeats enemy x-country infantry engagements mobile avoids road threats RSTA verifies targets hit not decoys Wins far 5-50km fight 2D Force Scout dogs Swims across Wins close 1-5km rivers/lakes fight 3D Force blocks, Mobile Crusader, HIMARS, encircles EFOGM, Twin 120mm mortar fire isolates support KILLS verified targets severs enemy
  34. 34. Missions of the Urban Combat Team• Rapidly Air Deploy Under a Division or Corps HQ as Part of a Joint Force as the spearhead for MOUT operations• Prevent, Contain or Stabilize Crises Through Presence and precise Military Operations in Urban Terrain• Determine Favorable Outcome of urban Small Scale Contingencies (SSCs)• Act as the urban Combat Force Guarantor in Security and Support Operations (SASO) as Part of a U.S. or Multinational Force• Participate, with Augmentation, in Major Theater Wars (MTWs) insuring urban areas do not hinder decisive maneuver
  35. 35. Can we continue to assault urban structures using predictable top-down or bottom-up tactics? Helicopter rooftop assaults exposes them to enemy firesSlow Ladderassaults dateback to ancient Foot Infantry exposed “Stacking” teams at to enemy fires!!!!!times! ground-level
  36. 36. Solution to 21st Century Urban combat: Modern Siege Engines; tracked tanks with combat engineering means--original purpose of tanks in the first place in WWI!General PercyHobart’s “Funnies”with PHYSICALMECHANICALADVANTAGE todirectly cope notimpotent, rubber-tired armored carsmouse-clicking pleasfor firepower help!
  37. 37. MOUT VERTICAL ASSAULT VEHICLE Lethality is Not Always Weaponry it can be MANEUVERStealthy Hybrid-ElectricM113A4 used totransport rifle squad Boom arm deliversover rubble, debris infantry to unexpected spot on buildings Combat-proven mobility with RPG resistant applique armor
  38. 38. 3. AMS 2D/3D maneuver forces employ maximum fire &maneuver to paralyze enemy SSCs as they collapse theenemy’s centers of gravity with lasting, decisive groundmaneuver, ending the conflict clearly on our favorable terms “What matters in war is VICTORY, not prolonged operations, however brilliantly executed” ---Sun Tzu, The Art of War
  39. 39. Questions?LT Michael L. Sparks IN USARdynmicpara@aol.comBook:www.geocities.com/air_mech_strike/amsbook.htmInternet:www.geocities.com/transformationunderfirewww.geocities.com/strategicmaneuver Airborne!