The document discusses why pressurized exits used in buildings may not be suitable for transportation tunnels. In buildings, pressurized exits are used to protect the exit path from smoke in the event of a fire by acting as a barrier. However, tunnels do not have the same compartmentalization as buildings. Instead, tunnel ventilation systems are designed to control smoke spread. Applying the high pressures needed to pressurize tunnel exits could result in door opening forces that are too strong. Such pressurized exit systems in tunnels may also be complex and may not function as intended. It is better to understand how tunnel smoke control systems work and focus on measures that provide real safety benefits.
Why Pressurized Tunnel Exits May Not Improve Safety
1. WHY PRESSURIZED EXITS FOR
TRANSPORTATION TUNNELS
MAY NOT MAKE SENSE
Kenneth J. Harris, Bob Melvin
WSP | Parsons Brinckerhoff
California, USA
E-mail: harris@pbworld.com
3. BASIS OF PRESSURIZED EXITS
3
Protect building occupants.
Smoke control
Door opening forces
Incident floor fire
Egress to point of safety
Pressure differential bounding constraints
Pressure Force
NFPA 101 87.5 pa (0.35 in. wc) 133 N (30 lbf)
Design range 12.5-25 pa (0.05-0.10 in. wc.) 19-38 N (4-8 lbf)
4. ROAD AND RAIL TUNNEL SMOKE CONTROL DESIGN
4
Confined spaces
Space smoke control
Point of safety
Location exterior to facility OR
Protected space
Tenable environment-permits self-rescue or survival
Smoke control in the tunnel
5. ROAD AND RAIL TUNNEL SMOKE CONTROL DESIGN
5
Longitudinal ventilation
Upstream protection and tenable environment
Prevention of backlayering
Pressure Force
NFPA 101 87.5 pa (0.35 in. wc) 133 N (30 lbf)
Design range 12.5-25 pa (0.05-0.10 in. wc.) 19-38 N (4-8 lbf)
NFPA 130 & 502 146 pa (0.58 in. wc.) 222 N (50 lbf)
Design range 125-375 pa (0.5-1.5 in. wc.) 190-570 N (43-129 lbf)
6. BUILDING SMOKE CONTROL
6
Complications in building smoke control
Stack effect
Stairwell pressurization
Elevator pressurization
Combined systems
Seasonal extremes
7. BUILDING SMOKE CONTROL DESIGN
7
NFPA 92, Standard for
Smoke Control Systems
Fstruc/Fbldg Door
opening force (N)
Fr Residual force to
overcome any door closer
and friction (N)
Figure 1. Exit door arrangement.
(1)
(2)
13. DISCUSSION
13
Code and Standard requirements
Exit path
Buildings. Protecting exit path from the incident area.
Tunnels. The exit path is protected by the tunnel ventilation system.
Door opening force
Buildings. Pressures necessary to control smoke result in low door opening
forces.
Tunnels. Pressure necessary to control smoke result in high door opening forces.
Tunnels. Controls necessary for flow and pressure make systems complex.
14. SUMMARY
14
Requirements for pressurized exits derive from building industry.
Barrier separation
Common exit path and its protection from incident space
Tunnels have no occupancy barriers
Ventilation system control smoke spread in incident space.
Proposed systems have higher door opening forces
Proposed systems are more complex and may not work as intended.
By understanding how tunnel smoke control systems work, resources can be
focused on measures that provide real benefit.
Editor's Notes
Many jurisdictions require a pressurized emergency exit for road and rail tunnels. This derives from the building environment where emergency exits and stairwells are pressurized to keep smoke from the incident floor out of the exit. However the specific circumstances of road and rail tunnels are quite different from buildings and what seems like a good idea may not even work, be likely to fail even if it could work and cause a significant obstruction to exiting, the exact opposite of its intent.
Pressurized exits are used in buildings to protect evacuating occupants. The maximum door opening force allowed for buildings based on NFPA 101, the Life Safety Code, is 133 N (30 lb). The required differential pressures in buildings are generally in the range of 12.5 to 25 pa (0.05 to 0.10 in. wc) with a maximum limit of 87.5 pa (0.35 in. wc) for door opening limitations. Pressurized exits are one component of the building fire life-safety design. Building fire design is generally based on the premise that the fire originates on a single floor (incident floor) and mitigations, suppression and containment, are used to confine the fire to that floor. Egress is provided to allow building occupants to evacuate to a point of safety. Pressurization is used to keep egress paths clear of smoke by creating a higher pressure zone in the egress preventing flow of smoke from the incident floor to the egress path. The range of pressure differential is bounded on the low side of that necessary to overcome a smoke pressure and on the high side by the necessary force to be able to open a closed door.
Road and rail tunnels are confined spaces where smoke cannot flow out of the space. Some form of ventilation is usually employed to control the smoke flow in the tunnel and allow occupants to move to either a tenable environment or point of safety. A point of safety is defined as either a location exterior to the facility or a protected space. Protection can be a combination of rated barriers and/or ventilation. A tenable environment is defined as one that permits the self-rescue or survival of occupants. The most common form of smoke control is longitudinal that creates an upstream clear area.
In order to accomplish this, sufficient air velocity must be provided to overcome the buoyant forces of the fire plume. This requirement is often referred to as prevention of backlayering and keeps the upstream area clear of smoke and a tenable environment. In contrast, the downstream area is contaminated with smoke and hot gases and untenable. The air flows necessary to create this condition often result in tunnel pressures of 125 pa (0.5 in. wc) and can often rise to 375 pa (1.5 in. wc) if large air flows are required in special sections such as crossovers. These pressures are much higher than seen in the building environment and exceed those door-opening force limitations. The standards for both road and rail tunnels limit maximum door-opening force to 222 N (50 lbf), substantially higher than the 133 N (30 lbf.) allowed in buildings.
While building smoke control is often used as an example of how beneficial these systems are, there are often complications in more complex and tall buildings. Ferreira (1) describes four particular scenarios that can lead to building smoke control not behaving as expected.
Stack effect. For tall buildings, pressures in vertical stairwells and shafts can change dramatically simply because of seasonal temperatures. These changes can cause pressures to exceed door opening forces.
Stairwell pressurization. Compensating for high pressures can require barometric dampers, pressure sensors and variable speed drives (VSD) for motors resulting in increased complexity both in commissioning and maintenance.
Elevator pressurization. Additional pressure limits are placed on elevators to ensure door-opening is not inhibited by pressure differential.
Combined systems. Combinations of elevators, stairs and other areas can create very complex systems, which may not work as desired when needed.
Finally, specific attention is called to test and commission for all conditions that may occur. This would at a minimum include seasonal extremes.
The requirements and details for building smoke control design is given in NFPA 92, Standard for Smoke Control Systems. Building smoke control designs are generally characterized in Figure 1. The space is generally figured to have a slight positive pressure, 13 to 25 pa, in order to prevent ingress of outside air. When an incident occurs, a pressurization system is started that provides sufficient flow to keep a positive pressure differential (13 pa) in the exit so that smoke cannot migrate into it. The maximum airflow is usually based on a number of doors being open. This is at least one incident and exit door for a total of two. Depending on the circumstances, more may be required. Another bounding consideration is the door opening force. This is primarily a function of door area and differential pressure. Figure 1 describes the forces and moments on a door in this situation.
Equation 1 gives the force required to open the door.
Variable Description
Fstruc/Fbldg Door opening force (N)
Fr Residual force to overcome any door closer and friction (N)
W Door width (m)
H Door height (m)
A Door area (m2)
dP Pressure differential across the door (Pa)
d Distance from doorknob to side of door (mm)
Equation 2 solves for the differential pressure across the door for a building location.
Using a door of 0.9 m (35 in.) wide by 2.1 m (82 in.) high with handle 75 mm (3 in.) from the edge, and door opening force of 133 N, the maximum differential pressure to keep door opening forces within allowed limits is 130 Pa (0.52 in. wc.). Given the flow and pressure requirements some form of control is necessary to balance these.
Figure 2 shows a common approach where pressure differential is used to control a variable speed drive. Another approach is to use a pressure relief damper to vent excess pressure to the outside.
Tunnel smoke control is characterized by two primary strategies, longitudinal and extraction. Both of these seek to minimize or remove smoke from the immediate incident area. In longitudinal ventilation, the smoke is pushed downstream by a velocity pressure greater than the smoke buoyant pressure as shown in Figure 3.
In extraction, the smoke is removed by a flow rate greater than the smoke generation rate as shown in Figure 4.
A tunnel pressurized egress system must operate against the pressures occurring in the tunnel and still allow door operation. This requires very complex control of flows and pressures. A general description of tunnel egress pressurization system requirements and operation will first be given.
Tunnel egress pressurization systems are generally perceived to be similar to those in buildings and are characterized in Figure 1.
Equation 3 is similar to Equation 2 except the higher allowed door-opening forces also allow higher pressure differentials in the tunnel. In this case the tunnel door opening force of 220 N allows a differential pressure of 215 Pa (0.865 in. wc).
Control can be provided by either a VFD, controlled by pressure differential transmitters or pressure relief damper. Sometimes both of these are used together, which can create some issues when they are compensating for each other. Of more fundamental concern is that tunnel ventilation systems can create positive or negative pressure conditions inside the tunnel. The positive pressure condition conforms to general perception of exits requiring supply air to keep smoke out. It should be noted the pressures are significantly higher which can lead to control complications. The negative pressure condition would require removing air from the system to control exit pressure, i.e. an exhaust fan, which is generally not the practice. Complicating matters is that either condition could exist, depending on the tunnel ventilation mode selected.
In addition, the pressure differential between the egress exit and the external pressure at that location must also be considered. This is most usually an ambient pressure condition. This location may also be an access point for responders, so both tunnel and ambient location doors may be open at the same time.
In an attempt to quantify the description of the issue, some conditional expressions will be developed. Equation 4 defines the door-opening force pressure limit requirement. The sum of exit pressure plus the tunnel pressure must be less than or equal to the maximum allowed door opening pressure for tunnels.
Equation 5 defines the tunnel pressure control requirement. The minimum allowed pressure differential to prevent smoke ingress from tunnel to the exit is 12 Pa.
Equation 6 defines the external or ambient pressure control requirement. The differential between exit pressure and ambient external pressure must be less than or equal to the maximum allowed door opening pressure for tunnels.
Equation 7 defines the external ambient pressure as atmospheric.
Following conventional practice, exits are positively pressurized since the fire is assumed to be in the tunnel. For a zone where the tunnel is positively pressurized, the exit pressure must be greater than the tunnel pressure, but not so great as to exceed door opening force at the surface exit. For positive tunnel pressure, the governing boundary equations can be consolidated into a maximum exit pressure for tunnels. Equation 8 defines this upper bound of exit pressure and that it must be less than the tunnel pressure plus the positive pressure necessary to keep smoke out.
This gives a maximum pressure of 203 Pa (0.815 in. wc.) that can occur in the tunnel. Pressure exceeding this will result in a door-opening force at the surface exit that exceeds Standard limits.
For negative tunnel pressure, the governing boundary equations can be consolidated into a minimum exit pressure for tunnels. Equation 9 defines this lower bound of exit pressure and that it must be less than the surface exit pressure minus the maximum allowed door opening pressure.
This gives a minimum pressure of -215 Pa (-0.863 in. wc.). Because exits are positively pressurized, they will always be higher than tunnel pressure. Therefore, pressure lower than this will again result in a door opening force at the surface exit that exceeds Standard limits.
A common misperception is that tunnels are like horizontal buildings. From a smoke control standpoint this is not accurate. Buildings as shown in Figure 2 can be characterized as multiple chambers stacked on top of each other with barriers between each of the chambers. These barriers significantly limit smoke spread between the chambers. A key aspect of building smoke control is to confine the fire to the incident chamber (floor) and allow occupants to escape to a protected exit. This exit is protected in two ways, one by separation and second by pressurization to keep smoke from migrating from the incident floor into it. The assumption here is that the exit path is at risk of being contaminated by the smoke products and that it must be protected from this intrusion. This contamination is seen as occurring in the egress path, which must be protected.
Tunnels are fundamentally different. First of all, there are no barriered chambers. The entire facility is open without separation. This lack of separation has led to reliance on ventilation for smoke control. This means that smoke is controlled around the fire such that egress path(s) are maintained in the tunnel itself. Unlike buildings smoke does not intrude into the egress path. Two principle methods of smoke control are used in tunnels, longitudinal and extraction. Both rely on creating smoke-free zones away from the fire incident.
In recognition of this fact, emergency exits are typically spaced around 762 meters (2500 feet) apart, significantly farther than that found in buildings. This further recognizes the reality that once occupants have left the fire incident area, they are protected from smoke by the tunnel ventilation system and that pressurized exits are not necessary.
Longitudinal Ventilation
Longitudinal ventilation seeks to create a smoke-free zone behind the fire incident and move the smoke downstream of the incident. Occupants then evacuate upstream. In order to accomplish this, a longitudinal airstream is created with sufficient velocity force to overcome the fire buoyant forces. The velocity necessary to accomplish this is called the critical velocity. Figure 5 shows this. The whole premise of this strategy is that occupants move to the clear area. The downstream area is smoke-filled, but occupants are not in this area. Thus any exits in this area are not being used as exits. In other words, smoke control is provided in the tunnel, not the exit. Therefore, pressurized exits are not necessary for smoke control because there is no smoke where the exits would be used.
Extraction Ventilation
Extraction ventilation works similarly to longitudinal except that the smoke is extracted into a separate duct and tunnel lengths both upstream and downstream of the fire incident are clear. Occupants can evacuate in both directions. Any exits in the tunnel can be used. Similar to longitudinal, smoke control is provided in the tunnel, not the exit. Again, pressurized exits are not necessary for smoke control because there is no smoke where the exits would be used.
Many codes and standards require pressurized exits for tunnels. The premise is that these will provide smoke control for occupants evacuating a fire incident in the tunnel, similar to that function performed in buildings. For buildings there is some justification in that smoke from an incident floor can intrude into the exit path, jeopardizing the safe passage of the building occupants. For tunnels, however, the smoke control system in the tunnel is specifically designed to create tenable zones away from the fire incident where smoke cannot intrude. Or to put it another way, the tunnel smoke control system inherently protects the exits from contamination, so no internal protection is necessary.
There are additional complications with pressurized exits for tunnels that make their implementation problematic. Building codes typically require pressure differentials that limit door opening forces to 133N (30 lbf.). Tunnel Standards allow a door opening force of 220 N (50 lbf.), primarily recognizing the higher pressure differentials that are necessary for tunnel ventilation. While these higher forces will work for many tunnel configurations, primarily single track ones, pressures in special sections such as cross-overs, storage tracks, etc. can be much higher because of higher flow rates necessary to handle smoke control requirements in these areas. Also, many agencies require that the design airflow rates be provided with the most critical fan out of service. When all fans are operating, pressures can again get high and exceed the door-opening force pressures.
While some pressure control practices are used to modulate system pressure within the exit stair, there are limits in the allowable pressure range between the tunnel and ambient that are often exceeded primarily by the tunnel smoke control system. In other words, even with a pressure control system, the door operating forces will exceed Standard requirements. These pressure control systems are complex and costly to maintain. That money could be better spent on the components that make a real difference to safety.
Fundamentally, buildings use barrier zoning as a primary means of smoke containment and exit pressurization is only used to protect the exit during evacuation while the barrier to the exit is open. In contrast, tunnels have no barriers and tunnel ventilation is used to control smoke flow. Exits are inherently protected by the tunnel ventilation system, so no additional protection of exits is required.
In contrast, tunnels have no occupancy barriers
Requirements for pressurized exits derive from the building industry, where fires are separated by barriers and a common exit path is used to allow occupants from the incident space to exit the building. This exit path is protected by a pressurization system that prevents the smoke from the incident space from migrating into the protected evacuation path.
In contrast, tunnels have no occupancy barriers and ventilation systems rather than barriers are used to control smoke spread in the incident space. The exit path is away from the fire in one or two directions and this path is protected by the tunnel ventilation system. There is no need for pressurizing portions of the exit path with separate systems and doing so can create very complex systems that may not even work as intended in an incident.
In the misguided belief that these systems were necessary, many designs have been produced that do not work, result in excessive door opening forces, or require excessive maintenance to keep operational. The barriers that are the primary means of smoke control in buildings do not exist in tunnels. In contrast, the tunnel ventilation system is the primary means of smoke control in tunnels and exits only need to provide a path to a point of safety. Exits are not a boundary to the incident area.
By not having to maintain a fundamentally flawed system, tunnel operators can focus their resources on measures that provide real benefit rather than measures that don’t.