1. The document discusses a reading by Anthony Giddens called "The Runaway World" about globalization. Giddens argues that globalization is a complex process with economic, political, technological, and cultural dimensions, not just an economic phenomenon. 2. Giddens says we are moving from a world of external risks from tradition/nature to one of manufactured risks from human intervention. This creates more uncertainty. Giddens advocates further democratizing global institutions to gain more control over risks. 3. The document contrasts Giddens' view of reflexive modernization with Ulrich Beck's view, noting they use the term differently and have different views on expert knowledge and the consequences of modern

1. California State University Northridge SOC 370 The Runaway World
Discussion
California State University Northridge SOC 370 The Runaway World DiscussionCalifornia
State University Northridge SOC 370 The Runaway World DiscussionSOC 370 California
State University Northridge The Runaway World DiscussionThe memos need to be
complete in 5 hours with a quote from the attached reading and a brief question or
comment prompted by the quote (two pages maximum). Basically the same thing as a
reading response. Just find a quote and write your thoughts. I need it in 5 HOURS. Basically
Ive attached an article, you just need to read the article, pick 1 quote from it and write 2
pages double spaced about the quote and the textgiddensglobalization.pORDER HERE FOR
ORIGINAL, PLAGIARISM-FREE PAPERSReview: Chasing the ‘Runaway World’: The Politics
of Recent Globalization TheoryReviewed Work(s): Globalization: The Human Consequences
by Zygmunt Bauman; What IsGlobalization? by Ulrich Beck; Runaway World: How
Globalization Is Reshaping Our Livesby Anthony GiddensReview by: Nicholas GaneSource:
Acta Sociologica, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2001), pp. 81-89Published by: Sage Publications, Ltd.Stable
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2001REVIEW ESSAYChasing the ‘Runaway World’: The Politics ofRecent Globalization
TheoryNicholas GaneDepartment of Sociology, City University, London, UKZygmunt
Bauman: Globalization: The HumanConsequences (Cambridge: Polity, 1998).Ulrich Beck:
What Is Globalization? (Cambridge:Polity, 2000).Anthony Giddens: Runaway World: How
Global-ization is Reshaping Our Lives (London: ProfileBooks, 1999).This article is a review
of the recent work ofthree of the most prominent and prolific socialtheorists of today:
Anthony Giddens, UlrichBeck and Zygmunt Bauman. The primary focusof this review will be
the question of globaliza-tion, which has been the subject of recent booksby each of these
thinkers. It will be argued,however, that the positions taken by Giddens,Beck and Bauman

2. on this question can only befully understood against the backdrop of theirrecent political
writings. In view of this, specificattention will be paid to the politics of theirtheories of, and
responses to, globalization. Thearticle will proceed by elucidating the positionsforwarded
by each of these thinkers, beforemoving, in conclusion, to a critical appraisal oftheir
respective works. California State University Northridge SOC 370 The Runaway World
Discussion1. High modernity: the runaway worldRunaway World, which began life as the
1999Reith Lectures, is Giddens’ first book-lengthstudy of globalization. It opens with a
chapteron the nature of global change, in whichGiddens defines his position on globalization
incontrast to two commonly held views. The firstis that forwarded by ‘sceptics’ who doubt
theglobalization process, and who argue that theglobal economy is essentially nothing new,
orthat today trade remains regional rather thantruly world-wide. The second is that of
the‘radicals’, who argue, by contrast, ‘that not onlyis globalization very real, but that its
conse-quences can be felt everywhere’, and beyondthis that ‘The global market-place . .. is
muchmore developed than even in the 1960s and1970s and is indifferent to national
borders’(1999:8). Giddens argues that the radicals arethe closest to being right in this
debate, but thatboth sides are mistaken in treating globalizationas primarily an economic
phenomenon. Inresponse, he offers a different view: ‘Globaliza-tion is political,
technological and cultural, aswell as economic. It has been influenced, aboveall, by
developments in systems of communica-tion, dating back only to the late 1960s(1999:10).
In addition, he argues that it isequally wrong to treat globalization simply asan ‘out there’
phenomenon, as one concerning‘big systems’ (such as the world financial order)which are
far-removed from the individual.Rather, globalization is to be understood alsoas an ‘in here’
phenomenon which influencesthe most intimate and personal aspects of ourlives (see also
Giddens 1994a:95). Giddensproposes, for example, that the transformationof the traditional
family system, coupled withthe drive for greater equality for women, is partof a ‘truly global
revolution in everyday life’, one‘whose consequences are being felt aroundthe world in
spheres from work to politics’(1999:12). And in view of this, he argues thatglobalization is
not to be understood as a single,unilinear process, but as an array of complexprocesses
operating in different directions atonce. First, for example, globalization involvesThis
content downloaded from 130.166.52.128 on Mon, 29 Aug 2016 21:39:05 UTCAll use
subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms82 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 2001 VOLUME 44the ‘pulling
away’ of power and influence fromlocal communities and even nations, and
theestablishment of a new ‘global arena’. Second, it‘not only pulls upwards, but also pushes
down-wards, creating new pressures for local auton-omy’ (1999:13). This movement is
marked bythe revival of local identities and cultures, but isalso accompanied, more
worryingly, by the riseof new nationalisms. Finally, globalization mayIsqueeze sideways’,
and lead to the creation ofnew regional zones either within or across theboundaries of
nation-states (Giddens cites theHong Kong region, northern Italy, Cataloniaand Silicon
Valley as examples). California State University Northridge SOC 370 The Runaway World
DiscussionGiddens develops these arguments throughchapters on risk, tradition and the
family. In thefirst of these, he argues that we are in the processof moving from a traditional
world of externalrisk, in which dangers come ‘from the fixities oftradition or nature’
(1999:26), to one ofmanufactured risk, in which new threats arisefrom our own

3. intervention into nature (globalwarming is the most obvious example). Giddensargues: ‘Our
age is not more dangerous – notmore risky – than those of earlier generations,but the
balance of risks and dangers has shifted.We live in a world where hazards created
byourselves are as, or more, threatening than thosethat come from the outside’ (1999:34).
Thesenew global hazards lend the world a new degreeof uncertainty, for manufactured
risks, such asthose attached to the production of geneticallymodified crops, have no
historical precedent,cannot be calculated in full, and thus remainlargely unknown. Giddens
argues that thismarks the emergence of a new ‘post-traditional’age, in which we are forced
to engage activelywith the knowledge produced by experts, andmake reflexive choices as to
the risks we decide totake and the trust we choose to invest in others.This is a key part of
what Giddens (19 94b) terms‘reflexive modernization’, since individuals andinstitutions
(including the family) are finally setfree from the constraints of tradition (which untilnow
have continued to haunt modernity), andare forced to order and reorder their activities
inthe light of expert knowledge (which is, in turn,reshaped by this very practice). There are
twoaspects of this process which are central toGiddens’ argument regarding
globalization.First, this process is fundamentally unstable, for‘The reflexivity of modernity . .
. does notstabilise the relation between expert knowledgeand knowledge applied in lay
actions. Knowledgeclaimed by expert observers … rejoins itssubject matter, thus . . . altering
it’ (1990:45).Second, while reflexive modernization liberatesus from tradition, tradition
itself does not simplydisappear, rather it becomes a choice not a fate orobligation, meaning,
in turn, that self-identitycan no longer be derived simply from a givenorder, but has to be
‘created and recreated on amore active basis than before’ (Giddens 1999:47). And again,
this process can never becompletely stable, since self-identity is reflexivein nature, and is
shaped by, while in turn alsoshaping, the institutions of modernity (Giddens1991).
California State University Northridge SOC 370 The Runaway World DiscussionGiddens’
response to the uncertainties ofthis new world is political in orientation: ‘Ourrunaway
world doesn’t need less, but moregovernment – and this, only democratic institu-tions can
provide’ (1999:82). This argumentsuggests that greater control of high
(reflexive)modernity can be achieved through furtherdemocratization of the world. In order
for this tohappen, however, Giddens argues that it isnecessary to resolve the ‘paradox of
democracy’,which is, simply put, that the globalization ofdemocracy has been accompanied
by increasingdisillusionment with modern democratic pro-cesses (particularly in the West).
Giddens’answer to this conundrum is to propose ademocratization of democracy itself, a
processwhich is to include the following: the ‘effective’devolution of power, constitutional
reform,greater transparency in political affairs, thefostering of a strong civic culture, and
thepursuit of new transnational or global demo-cratic forms (see 1999:76-81). The
RunawayWorld, disappointingly, offers little indication,however, of how these aims are to
be achieved;for this, one must turn to Giddens’ otherwritings, in particular Beyond Left and
Rightand The Third Way. California State University Northridge SOC 370 The Runaway
World DiscussionThe former of these works is the mostinstructive in this regard, for here
Giddensmakes the case for a new ‘radical’ politics. Thetwist in Giddens’ argument, however,
is that thisnew radicalism is not to be drawn from thetraditional ideologies of the Left, but
fromconservative thought, in particular ‘philosophi-cal conservatism’, which centres on the

4. idea ofliving with imperfection, and forwards ideals ofprotection, conservation and
solidarity. Thereare, he argues, six key aspects of a radicalconservatism, each of which may
be read as aresponse to globalization. First, is the attempt torepair ‘damaged solidarities’.
This rests, Giddensargues, on the reconciliation of autonomy andinterdependence, which
calls in turn for arenewal of personal and collective responsibilityThis content downloaded
from 130.166.52.128 on Mon, 29 Aug 2016 21:39:05 UTCAll use subject to
http://about.jstor.org/termsChasing the ‘Runaway World’ 83for others, and with this the
practical regenera-tion of community (see 1998:79). Second, is arecognition of the
centrality of ‘life politics’. Thismeans, in short, that a reflexive politics oflifestyle or life
choices (what Beck terms ‘sub-politics’, see below) is to be pursued alongsidea reconfigured
emancipatory politics of ‘lifechances’ (which constitutes the traditionalconcern of the Left)
(see Giddens 1991:223-226; 1994b:90-92). Third, is a concern for‘generative politics’, the
aim of which is todefend the public domain through enhance-ment of the autonomy of
individuals and groupsto ‘make things happen’. Fourth, is the pursuitof dialogic democracy.
Giddens argues thatdemocracy is not simply ‘a vehicle for therepresentation of interests’,
but is also ‘a wayof creating a public arena in which contro-versial issues – in principle – can
be resolved,or at least handled, through dialogue ratherthan through pre-established forms
of power’(1994b:16). This emphasis on the creation ofan active public sphere, which is also
central tothe work of Beck and Bauman (see below), isaccompanied by an argument for the
politicalpotentiality of ‘self-help groups’ and socialmovements. Fifth, is a rethinking of the
welfarestate. Giddens addresses this question at lengthin The Third Way, in which he
argues that thewelfare state is essentially undemocratic as itoperates through a ‘top-down’
distribution ofbenefits. His answer to this is to propose a shiftfrom the welfare state to the
‘social investmentstate’; to a system of ‘positive welfare’ based on‘investment in human
capital wherever possi-ble, rather than the direct provision of economicmaintenance’
(1998:117). Finally, Giddensargues that a radical politics must be equippedto confront the
role of violence in all spheres oflife. New forms of fundamentalism (and nation-alism) have
emerged as a response to globaliza-tion, and these forms, by their very nature,are ‘edged
with the possibility of violence’(1999:50). In view of this, he argues, we needto establish a
new cosmopolitan order, onefounded on tolerance and dialogue rather thanexclusion of, or
violence towards, the other, andguided by ‘universal values’ (such as humanrights and the
‘preservation of species’) whichare ‘shared by almost everyone’ (1994b:20).2. Reflexive
modernity: from globalism toglobalityUlrich Beck’s work on globalization, like that
ofAnthony Giddens, is tied to a theory of reflexivemodernization. This said, there are
sharpdifferences between the positions of Beck andGiddens on the subject of
modernization, notleast because they employ the term ‘reflexive’ indifferent ways. For
Giddens, ‘reflexivity’ (Reflex-ivitdt) implies reflection on, or at least knowl-edge of, the
problems and consequences ofmodernization, whereas for Beck it refers to theinability to
know or understand the unintendedconsequences of this process, and implies ‘non-
knowing’ or, better still, unawareness (Nicht-Wissen) (see Beck 1999:109-110). This
distinc-tion is important for it leads to two differentpresentations of the transition from
industrialsociety (the first, linear modernity) to risk society(the second, reflexive
modernity). For Beck, thekey point of this transition is that ‘reflexive’modernization

5. displaces industrial social formsthrough the ‘self-confrontation’ of modernitywith its own
consequences. The result of thisprocess, he argues, is a new situation in whichthe side-
effects of industrial society take centrestage and begin to dominate all areas of
public,political and private debate. This development isintriguing, for not only are the risks
anddangers associated with industrial society trulyglobal in nature, thus demanding
transnationalsolutions, but are rarely understood in theirentirety by either the layperson or
the expert.Here, Beck disagrees with Giddens on two mainpoints: first, he argues, the
transition to‘reflexive’ modernity is not driven by reflectionor intention but is rather
‘unreflected’, ‘auton-omous, undesired and unseen’ (1994:6), andsecond, this transition
undermines the ‘mono-rationality’ (what Weber terms instrumentalrationality
(Zweckrationalitdt)) of expert knowl-edge, leading to a general state of uncertaintyand
unawareness, and to the emergence of newforms of ‘subrationality’. Beck summarizes
thesedifferences as follows: ‘Giddens underestimatesthe pluralization of rationalities and
agents ofknowledge and the key role of known andrepressed types of unawareness, which
consti-tute and establish the discontinuity of “reflex-ive” modernization in the first place’
(1999:130-131). The key point, for Beck, is thatreflexive modernization shatters all notions
ofcontrollability, order and security, and with thisengenders a world that is more ‘runaway’
anduncertain than Giddens suggests. California State University Northridge SOC 370 The
Runaway World DiscussionBeck’s What is Globalization? extends thesearguments regarding
the transition to thesecond (reflexive) modernity. This work centreson a critique of what he
terms ‘globalism’,This content downloaded from 130.166.52.128 on Mon, 29 Aug 2016
21:39:05 UTCAll use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms84 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 2001
VOLUJME 44namely ‘the view that the world marketeliminates or supplants political action
– thatis, the ideology of rule by the world market,the ideology of neoliberalism’ (2000:9).
Beck’scritique of this position is that it treatsglobalization as a monocausal and
economisticprocess, and in doing so reduces its manydimensions – ecological, cultural,
political – toone: economics. The target of this critique isprimarily Immanuel Wallerstein,
whose theoryof the capitalist world-system defines globaliza-tion exclusively ‘in terms of
the institutionaliza-tion of the world market’ (see Beck 2000:33),but Beck is also critical of
other attempts atunderstanding globalization in terms of oneoverriding dimension or logic.
This is a trap,he argues, into which many theorists, includingBauman and Giddens, have
fallen (see below),for they have located ‘the origin and results ofthe globalization dynamic
mainly in one sectorof institutional action’ (2000:31). He claimsthat, for Bauman, this sector
comprises theeconomy of new social inequalities, while theone overriding concern in
Giddens’ work isnever identified; Beck arguing simply that it is a‘common reference point’
for other authors. Thesubstance of Beck’s argument here is clear:globalization is to be
understood as a multi-causal, multi-dimensional process, one drivenby the interplay of a
number of different spheres(‘communications technology, ecology, econom-ics, work
organization, culture and civil societv’(2000:19)) rather than by a single develop-mental
logic. This approach, Beck argues,marks a departure from the discourse ofglobalism, which
advocates a mono-linear con-ception of social change and hence remainsbound to the
conceptual apparatus and mindsetof the first (industrial) modernity. In its place,Beck
proposes a reflexive theory of the global.This, he argues, is to be based upon two

6. mainconcepts: globality, which refers to the collisionof economic, cultural and political
forms in‘world society’, and globalization, which ‘denotesthe processes through which
sovereign nationalstates are criss-crossed and undermined bytransnational actors with
varying prospects ofpower, orientations, identities and networks’(Beck 2000:11 ).
California State University Northridge SOC 370 The Runaway World DiscussionThe crux of
Beck’s argument is thatglobalization presents a fundamental challengeto the foundations of
industrial modernity. Inparticular, it calls into question the ‘methodo-logical nationalism’ of
modern sociology,namely the presupposition ‘that we live and actin the self-enclosed spaces
of national states andtheir respective national societies’ (Beck 2000:20).In response, Beck
claims that it is no longerpossible to treat society as being containedwithin the boundaries
of the nation-state, forglobalization shatters the ‘territorial orthodoxy’of the social and
political, while at the same timeopening new transnational spaces for ‘action,living and
perception’. This, however, does notmean the end of the nation-state itself, butinstead
points to a new dependency betweennational and world society. Beck argues: ‘In theglobal
era, national states do not exist withoutworld societies, and world societies do not
existwithout national states and societies. It is theresulting blockages, breakdowns and
unre-solved questions which give this situation itspolitical charge’ (2000:104). The key
point ofthis statement is that the second, globalmodernity brings into being a new ‘non-
state’world society alongside the already existingworld society of nation-states. This new
society,Beck argues, is made up of transnational actorswho possess specific qualities: ‘they
act acrossborders, even transnationally, and therebyannul the territorial principle of the
nationalstate’; ‘their activity is in many respects moreinclusive, less exclusive, than that of
stateplayers’; ‘they are often more effective thanthe authorities of national states’, and
they‘create their own “‘inclusive sovereignty”, as itwere, by playing off the exclusive
territorialstates against one another’ (2000:103). Andwith this the sociologist and political
theorist ispresented with a significant challenge, namely:how are we to conceptualize this
new realm ofsocial action, and how are we to respond to non-state world society more
generally, which,unlike previous societal forms, exists withouteither institutions or any
discernible order?There is, for Beck, a right and a wrong wayof dealing with this new
situation. The wrongway, he argues, is to reduce globality toglobalism, or, simply put, to
seek resolution toglobal problems through an appeal to theconcepts, institutions and
practices of the firstmodernity. Beck lists ten basic errors associatedwith such practice,
including: the reduction ofglobalization to a single (economic) dimension(see above); the
unconditional support of world-wide free trade; the confusion of economicglobalization
with the internationalization ofthe economy; the subordination of politics toeconomics, and
the pursuit of various forms ofprotectionism (conservative, green and ‘red’)(see 2000:117-
128). Beck, in response to these‘errors’. offers ten alternative ways of addresThis content
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http://about.jstor.org/termsChasing the ‘Runaway World’ 85sing, or at least confronting,
the challenges ofthe second (global, reflexive) modernity(2000:129-155). These take the
form of aseries of proposals for transcending left-/right-wing nostalgia for either the social
or thenational state, and for shifting our attentioninstead to the possibility of transnational
orcosmopolitan democracy. These proposals, whichput the call for a ‘reinvention of politics’

7. (Beck1994; 1997) into practice, include: interna-tional co-operation among nation-states
toforce ‘virtual taxpayers’ to accept their respon-sibility towards social justice; the
formation oftransnational states modelled upon an ideal ofinclusive sovereignty and
protected by interna-tional law; the development of social policywhich encourages the joint
ownership ofcapital; the politicization of consumption; thesupport of ‘niche production’
against the forcesof big capital, and the development of a socialcontract which recognizes
the value of ‘public’or ‘civil’ labour rather than just ‘gainfulemployment’. These proposals,
taken together,constitute Beck’s response to globalization. Insum, they affirm the potential
for democratiza-tion and politicization contained within thetransition to reflexive
modernity, while at thesame time asserting the need for furthermeasures to ensure that
globalization proceeds‘responsibly’, and that a sense of ‘social justice’prevails. Beck here
places great faith in the (self-)empowerment of (global) civil society, and inthe ability of
social movements to tame the anti-social (and perhaps even anti-democratic)tendencies of
global capitalism. It is for preciselythis reason that the restoration of the primacy ofpolitics,
albeit in a ‘reinvented’, subterraneanform, is to be found at the very core of his project(see
Beck 2000:159). California State University Northridge SOC 370 The Runaway World
Discussion3. The resurrection of classZygmunt Bauman adopts a more critical stanceon the
process and discourse of globalization.His work, like that of the two theorists
discussedabove, is tied to the search for a new politics (seeBauman 199.9) but one that is
removed inimportant ways from Giddens’ The Third Wayand Beck’s Reinvention of Politics.
Bauman,rather than pursuing cosmopolitan democracyand affirming the possibilities of a
transnationalstate, argues instead that globalization gives riseto new forms of class
polarization and uncer-tainty (Unsicherheit). In doing so, he focuses onthe costs rather than
benefits of globalization,arguing, in particular, that this process not onlyengenders new
forms of social exclusion butalso the formation of a new hierarchy of socialmobility.
Bauman stresses, above all, thatglobalization has its winners and its losers.The winners are
the new ‘extraterritorial elites’,the ‘absentee landlords’ who exist indepen-dently of
‘territorially confined units of politicaland cultural power’ (199 8a:3). These new eliteshave
the freedom to benefit from flexible or ‘freefloating capital’, from the freedom to move,
andfrom access to new global forms of informationand communication. The losers, by
contrast, are‘the ever more localized’, namely those whoremain bound to their locality and
who sufferfrom the removal of public space from localizedlife. Members of this new
underclass are the firstto feel the bite of downsizing or the relocation ofglobal capital, and,
unlike members of the globalelite, have less freedom to travel or to enjoyunrestricted access
to new virtual technologies.Bauman argues that globalization hence bringsa new social
polarization: ‘What appears asglobalization for some means localization forothers;
signalling a new freedom for some, uponmany others it descends as an uninvited andcruel
fate’ (199 8a:2). California State University Northridge SOC 370 The Runaway World
DiscussionBauman supports this (neo-Marxist) argu-ment by citing statistics which suggest
theemergence of a ‘New Poor’ (see also Bauman1998b) and of a growing gap between
theglobal elites and their local dependants. Draw-ing from a UN Human Development
Report (it isnot clear which one) and an article by VictorKeegan, Bauman informs us that
‘the totalwealth of the top 358 “global billionaires”equals the combined incomes of 2.3

8. billionpoorest people (45 per cent of the world’spopulation)’ (1998a: 70). This social
polariza-tion, however, is not simply confined to differ-ences between ‘developed’ and
‘developing’countries: At the same time, in the USA, byfar the richest country of the world
and thehomeland of the world’s wealthiest people, 16.5per cent of the population live in
poverty; one-fifth of adult men and women can neither readnor write, while 13 per cent
have a lifeexpectancy shorter than 60 years’ (Bauman1999:176). The crux of Bauman’s
argument(which is stated quietly in the work of Beck(1999:6; 2000:152-155) and Giddens
(1998:152; 1999:15-16)) is that globalization accent-uates rather than effaces these
material differ-ences, and offers unlimited opportunities to anelite few while confining
others to localitieswhich cannot be appropriated and domesticatedThis content
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http://about.jstor.org/terms86 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 2001 VOLUME 44by their inhabitants.
Bauman illustrates thispoint by drawing a distinction between thetourist and the vagabond
(see also Postmodernityand Its Discontents (199 7:83-94)); betweenthose who want and
have the means to travel(tourists) and those who have no choice but totravel but are
prevented from doing so. Hisargument is, in sum, that the world is nowstratified according
to our capacity for move-ment, for while members of the ‘extraterritorial’global elite can
choose to live anywhere on theglobe (what Beck terms ‘place polygamy’(2000:72-7)),
others are forced to stay put.And as a result, cities (and perhaps areas of theglobe more
generally) are becoming sites of an‘apartheid a rebours’, for ‘those who can affordit
abandon the filth and squalor of the regionsthat those who cannot afford the move are
stuckto’ (Bauman 1998a:86) (the cities of Chicago,Washington DC, Cleveland and Baltimore
arecited as examples). California State University Northridge SOC 370 The Runaway World
DiscussionBauman’s theory of global/local polariza-tion, however, contains an unexpected
twist:that the new global elites, despite their eco-nomic and political strengths, are never
incomplete control of the globalization processitself, as this process follows its own
chaoticcourse irrespective of human agency. Here,Bauman proffers his own version of the
‘run-away world’: ‘The deepest meaning conveyed bythe idea of globalization is that of the
indeter-minate, unruly and self-propelled character ofworld affairs; the absence of a centre,
of acontrolling desk, of a board of directors, of amanagerial office’ (1998a:59). He supports
thisargument by drawing a distinction betweenuniversalization, by which is meant order-
making on a universal scale, and globalization,which, he claims, is simply another name
forthe ‘new world disorder’, and consists ofunintended and unanticipated global
effectsrather than intended initiatives and under-takings. The point, for Bauman, is that ‘no-
oneseems now to be in control’ of the world (1998a:58), and as a result, we are all forced to
lead ourlives in the shadow of Unsicherheit (uncertainty,insecurity, unsafety). For while the
experience ofglobalization differs according to class position,as local dependants are more
vulnerable to theplay of the capitalist market than are globalelites, members of all classes
are threatened bythe uncontrolled, and perhaps even uncontrol-lable, effects of the
globalization process. This isespecially so in the world of work, where no oneis completely
safe from the forces of globalcapital; from ‘rationalization’, ‘fall in marketdemand’,
‘downsizing’ and the threat of pend-ing unemployment. Indeed, Bauman argues:‘The
message is simple: everyone is potentiallyredundant or replaceable, and so everyone

9. isvulnerable and any social position, howeverelevated and powerful it may seem now, is in
thelonger run precarious; even the privileges arefragile and under threat’ (1999:172).
Thissituation is indicative of a world that is scarred,more generally, by uncertainty and
insecurity.This world, Bauman argues, is characterized bythree main features: ‘insecure
security’ (the factthat job security is disappearing), ‘uncertaincertainty’ (the belief that
more uncertainty liesahead), and ‘unsafe safety’ (the knowledge that,despite national
attempts to reinforce ‘law andorder’, ‘no one’s presence in the world is safe anymore’
(Bauman 1999:31)). These features,taken together, point not only to the emergenceof a
new, global (dis-)order, but to the return offundamental doubt in all spheres of life. In
sum,globalization undermines the assured (self-)confidence of modernity, and is marked by
theemergence of a world in which faith in‘progress’ is replaced by fear of what the
futuremight bring. California State University Northridge SOC 370 The Runaway World
DiscussionOne disappointing aspect of Bauman’sGlobalization is that it rarely, if ever,
considerspossible responses to these consequences ofglobalization. For this, one has to turn
to themore recent In Search of Politics (1999), in whichBauman sets forth his vision of a
new neo-republican politics. In this work, he argues thatglobalization separates out power
(which nowtends to be extraterritorial) from politics (whichtends to remain local), which in
turn leads tothe dissolution of private/public space (theagora). This situation is extremely
worrying,for just as there exists little face-to-face contactbetween those located at different
ends of theglobal class hierarchy, there is now also littlecommunication between the public
and privatespheres; between the ecclesia (originally the siteof politics) and the oikos (the
household).Bauman argues that this is so because theagora, the traditional meeting place of
publicand private interests, has come under attack notonly from totalitarian movements
(which seekto annihilate the private sphere) but throughthe global assault on the power of
the publicsphere, and an accompanying privatization of allspheres of life. Bauman claims
that, despiteappearances. this latter tendency offers us afreedom which is not truly free, for
‘individualliberty can be only a product of collective work’(Bauman 1999:7). In view of this,
he arguesThis content downloaded from 130.166.52.128 on Mon, 29 Aug 2016 21:39:05
UTCAll use subject to http://about.jstor.org/termsChasing the ‘Runaway World’ 87that the
answer to the question of globalfreedom lies in a rebuilding of the agora; of thespace in
which private troubles and publicissues meet. This can only take place, heproposes, through
the search for new limits toprotect public/private space from invasion fromeither side of
the divide; through ‘dismantlingthe limits to citizens’ freedom’ and also through‘self-
limitation’ (see 19 99:4). It is this latter pointthat Bauman seeks to recover, and
which,coupled with his demand for the reconfigura-tion of the agora, defines his search for
a politicswhich can ‘catch up’ with the globalization ofpower. It is never altogether clear,
however, howsuch a rebuilding of public/private space is tohappen in practice (apart from
an argument fora basic income (1999:180-190), a sentimentwhich is shared by Beck
(1999:13) but which isstrangely absent from Giddens’ Third Way(1998), see below. Rather,
Bauman leaves uswith a rather oblique proposal for a newuniversalism, one which is
neither ‘the enemyof difference’ nor requires ‘cultural homogene-ity’ but which promotes
‘the across-the-speciesability to communicate and reach mutualunderstanding. . . ‘
(1999:202). California State University Northridge SOC 370 The Runaway World

10. Discussion4. Concluding remarksThere are a number of important similaritiesbetween the
work of Giddens, Beck and Baumanon the question of globalization. First, eachthinker
presents this process as leading to theemergence of a ‘runaway’ world. Giddens’position is
that high (reflexive) modernity isdefined by ‘post-traditional’ risks and dangerswhich we
have not faced before, and whichcannot be fully predicted or controlled. Thisleads, he
argues, to a world characterized byuncertainty and fundamental doubt, as well asnew
possibilities for reflexive social and politicalaction. Beck and Bauman offer radical
versionsof this same argument. Beck argues, in contrastto Giddens, that the transition to the
second(global) modernity is far removed from humanintention, for the driving force of this
newmodernity is precisely our inability to know; inparticular our inability to predict the
conse-quences of our actions with certainty. Baumantakes this argument one step further,
arguingnot only that no one is in control of theglobalized world (not even the global
elites),but that control of this world is itself unlikely, forglobalization lies ‘beyond the reach
of thedesign-and-action capacity of anybody’s inparticular’ (1998a:60). Our only hope,
heargues, is to reinvigorate private/public space(the agora), and thereby quell the
separation ofglobal power from local politics. California State University Northridge SOC
370 The Runaway World DiscussionSecond, these thinkers are concernedprimarily with the
politics of globalization.Giddens, in spite of his own intention (see1999:14), exhibits an
overriding concern forthe prospects of global forms of life-politics andcosmopolitan
democracy. This emphasis leadshim to neglect other important dimensions ofglobalization.
The economics of this process arediscussed in just a few pages of Runaway World(1999:9-
10), while the technologies of globalforms of communication, which, Giddensclaims, are a
key influence on globalization(1999:10), receive even less attention. Theimportant question
of cultural globalization isalso neglected; Giddens simply argues, in thespace of two
paragraphs, that globalization isnot the same as Westernization for it involves‘reverse
colonization’ – a process whereby ‘non-Western countries influence developments inthe
West’ (1999:16). This argument, however,is left hanging, for Giddens never explains
howthis process works, and in his chapters on risk,tradition, family and democracy, gives
littleindication of the way in which non-Westerncultures continue to exert influence over
theWest. This is a point on which Beck is farstronger (see 2000:42-52), for he offers
anextended argument against what he terms the‘convergence of global culture’ or
‘McDonald-ization’ thesis. His position is, first, that the Westitself has imploded with the end
of the Cold War,and second, that globalization gives rise to new‘glocal’ cultures (local
cultures which exist in aglobal context), thereby engendering culturalmultiplicity rather
than simple homogeneity.These arguments, while a step beyond thoseproffered by Giddens,
are, however, still prob-lematic, for Beck fails to consider the degree towhich (trans-)local
cultures are simply varia-tions of the same, and are distinguished (bothinternally and
externally) by simulated differ-ences rather than by radical alterity. There aretwo
possibilities here which Beck fails to discuss:first, that the West has destroyed all
culturesother to itself while at the same time destroyingitself in the process (which is, in
fact, implied inBeck’s own ‘end of enemies’ argument), andsecond, that the West has
colonized othercultures and recast them in its own image (aprocess based on the reduction
of otherness todifference (see Baudrillard (1993:124-138),and difference to a marketable

11. commodityThis content downloaded from 130.166.52.128 on Mon, 29 Aug 2016 21:39:05
UTCAll use subject to http://about.jstor.org/terms88 ACTA SOCIOLOGICA 2001 VOLUME
44form (see Lyotard (1997:6); Beck (2000:143-147))). That these arguments are not
addressedby Beck, however, comes as little surprise, sincehis work, like that of Giddens, is
concernedprimarily with the ‘politics’ rather than thecultural implications of globalization.
And thisposition is weak in two respects: first, it indicatesa rather traditional conception of
the political,one which shows little understanding of recent‘cultural politics’ (see Nash
2000), and second,its assertion of the ‘primacy of politics’ (Beck2000:159) violates Beck’s
own critique of‘globalism’, for it elevates one dimension ofglobalization over all others. This
is a trap intowhich Bauman’s work on globalization alsofalls, for in typical Marxist fashion it
treatspolitics and culture (which receives little atten-tion) as being structured by economic
forces,which, although more uncertain and unpre-dictable than ever, give rise to new forms
of classpolarization. In this regard, Bauman offers atheory of globalization which is
distinctlyeconomistic, even monocausal, in nature, andwhich, wrongly I believe, downplays
the role ofculture in influencing global social change.A third commonality between these
threetheorists is to be found in their respectiveresponses to globalization, and concerns
theirmutual commitment to social justice and therevitalization of the public sphere. Each
theorist,in short, calls for new ‘inclusive’ forms ofcitizenship in a bid to overcome the
isolationof the ‘new poor’, alongside measures toenhance the potential of a global agora.
Thissaid, the means for realizing these goals differfor each theorist. Giddens, for example,
placesgreat stress on ‘generative’ and ‘life politics’ (seeabove). He proposes that we make
our lives in amore active (reflexive) fashion than ever before,but that we do so in a way that
is alwaysresponsible towards others: ‘no rights withoutresponsibilities’ (1998:65). The
problem withthis argument, which underlies a wider call forthe regeneration of civil society
or community, isthat it burdens the materially disadvantagedwith the duty of pursuing an
active butresponsible life-politics, and at the same timefails to address the structural nature
of (global)social exclusion. In The Third Way, for example,Giddens argues: ‘With expanding
individualismshould come an extension of individual obliga-tions. Unemployment benefits,
for example,should carry the obligation to look actively forwork, and it is up to governments
to ensure thatwelfare systems do not discourage active search’(1998:65). Giddens qualifies
this argument bystating that As an ethical principle, “no rightswithout responsibilities”
must apply not only towelfare recipients, but to everyone’ (1998:65-66), but in practice he
fails to detail theresponsibilities of those not dependent on thewelfare state. Rather, at a
later point in the workhe returns to this subject, and argues that ‘Highunemployment is
linked to generous benefitsthat run on indefinitely. . . ‘, and that, in view ofthis, ‘Benefit
systems should be reformed wherethey induce moral hazard, and a more activerisk-taking
attitude encouraged, wherever pos-sible through incentives, but where necessaryby legal
obligations’ ( 19 9 8:1 2 2). California State University Northridge SOC 370 The Runaway
World DiscussionBeck and Bauman offer a quite differentemphasis. First, they call for
greater responsi-bility on the part of the virtual taxpayers:transnational corporations or
members ofglobal elites who evade the tax-collecting mech-anisms of nation-states. Second,
they argue thata ‘minimum wage or ‘basic income’ is thestarting place for a concrete theory
of socialjustice (see Beck 1999:13; Bauman 1999:180-190). These arguments, which are

12. nowhere tobe found in Giddens’ Third Way or RunawayWorld, balance up the call for
individual andcollective responsibilities, and provide a basis fora more inclusive model of
national or transna-tional citizenship. This is not to say, however,that the positions
forwarded by Beck or Baumanon this subject are unproblematic, for quite theopposite is the
case. The work of Bauman, forexample, contains important insights into the‘human
consequences’ of globalization, but,aside from theoretical arguments for a basicwage and
the revitalization of the agora, offerslittle indication of how social justice is to beachieved in
practice. The work of Beck, bycontrast, suffers from the opposite problem,namely it
identifies concrete ways in whichsocial justice may be pursued at both the localand global
levels, but these suggestions tend tolack theoretical detail and sophistication.
Beck’sargument, for example, for the formation oftransnational states is compressed into a
merefive pages of What is Globalization?, and ispunctuated by long quotations which offer
littleinsight into how these states are to be formed orgoverned, or into nature of the
internationallaw which is to protect them. This is not anisolated problem. In a further
section titled Analliance for civil labour’ (2000:140-142), Beckconsiders the possibility of
forging a new(global) social contract. This section. however,consists of little more than a
collection ofrandom thoughts which are never workedThis content downloaded from
130.166.52.128 on Mon, 29 Aug 2016 21:39:05 UTCAll use subject to
http://about.jstor.org/termsChasing the ‘Runaway World’ 89through, and includes
meaningless statementssuch as ‘Non-monetary sources: Exchange net-works and coupon
systems’ (2000:142).Equally bizarre are his arguments for ‘nicheproduction’ (2000:147-
150) and the market-ing of ‘difference’ (2000:144) as responses toglobalization. These
spring out at the readerwith little justification, and, in the midst of asection entitled ‘What
comes after the Volks-wagen export nation?’ (2000:143-147), readalmost like a guide to
how Germany is tosucceed in the capitalist world market.The positions taken by Giddens,
Beck andBauman on the question of globalization are, forthe reasons stated above,
problematic. Even so, Iwould argue that each of the works underreview deserves close
study, for, unlike manyrival publications, they formulate a sociologicaltheory of
globalization, and in doing so offer achallenge to the presuppositions of classical
andmodern sociology. This challenge is threefold:first, to develop an idea of the social which
is nolonger bounded by a theory of the nation-state;second, to theorize the connection
between thenation-state and the emerging ‘world society’,and finally, to develop new
methods andconcepts for the study of the globalized/globaliz-ing world. Beck argues, quite
rightly, that thesechallenges are to inform all aspects of socio-logical work over the coming
years. Indeed, it isonly through meeting these challenges that a‘global’ sociology may be
developed in its ownright, and a greater understanding of our‘runaway world’ may be
forged. And while theworks of Giddens, Beck and Bauman are not inthemselves entirely
successful in pursuing thesetasks, they offer a valuable introduction to thequestion of
globalization itself, and, moreimportantly, set a new agenda for sociologicaltheory at the
beginning of the twenty-firstcentury. California State University Northridge SOC 370 The
Runaway World DiscussionReferencesBaudrillard, J. 1993. The Transparency of Evil.
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Cambridge:Polity.Bauman, Z. 1998a. Globalization: The Human Consequences.Cambridge:

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University Press.Bauman, Z. 1999. In Search of Politics. Cambridge: Polity.Beck, U. 1992.
Risk Society. London: Sage.Beck, U. 1994. The Reinvention of Politics: Towards a Theory
ofReflexive Modernization. In U. Beck, A. Giddens & S. Lash,Reflexive Modernization.
Cambridge: Polity.Beck, U. 1997. The Reinvention of Politics. Cambridge: Polity.Beck, U.
1998. Democracy Without Enemies. Cambridge: Polity.Beck, U. 1999. World Risk Society.
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The Consequences of Modernity. Cambridge:Polity.Giddens, A. 1991. Modernity and Self-
Identity. Cambridge: Polity.Giddens, A. 1994a. Living in a Post-Traditional Society. In
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1994b. Beyond Left and Right. Cambridge: Polity.Giddens, A. 1998. The Third Way
Cambridge: Polity.Giddens, A. 1999. Runaway World. London: Profile Books.Lyotard, J.-F.
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http://about.jstor.org/terms California State University Northridge SOC 370 The Runaway
World Discussion