Israel Studies 24.2 • doi 10.2979israelstudies.24.2.05 52.docx

Israel Studies 24.2 • doi 10.2979/israelstudies.24.2.05 52
Jonathan Schanzer
Terrorism
INTRODUCTION
In 1995, Victor LeVine of Washington University in St. Louis
penned an article in the journal Terrorism and Political
Violence on the
“logomachy” of terrorism.1 A logomachy is a “dispute about or
concerning
words”, and no word has sparked more dispute in recent years
than “ter-
rorism”. The definitional debate has only increased in the years
after the
September 11, 2001 attacks, as the field of terrorism studies has
grown. Yet,
an unanimously agreed-upon, meaningful, and universal
definition of the
act remains elusive.
One element of this debate derives from the question of whether
it
is important to classify terror as coming from above or below.2
This traces
back to a theory articulated in 1964 by Thomas Perry Thornton,
which
states that one must distinguish between enforcement terror
(launched by
those in power) and agitational terror (carried out by those who

aspire to
power).3
The logomachy continues in academia, in the U.S. government,
and
in capitals around the world. Yet, nowhere is the debate over
enforcement
terror and agitational terror more pronounced than in the
Palestinian-Israeli
conflict. The Israeli definition of terrorism, perhaps not
surprisingly, clashes
with that of the terrorist organization Hamas, but also the more
pragmatic
Palestinian Authority. The United States definition tracks with
that of
Israel, which has tipped the balance in Israel’s favor. However,
the debate
is far from settled.
ISR A EL’S DEFINITION OF TER ROR ISM
Israel, a country founded in 1948 against the objection of the
entire Arab
world, has suffered from terrorist attacks since its founding. For
more than
70 years, the Israelis have had to endure this challenge and have
adapted to
Terrorism • 53
the problem on a military and even societal level. Children from
a young
age are sensitized to suspicious packages, the location of the
nearest bomb

shelter, and emergency procedures in the event of a terrorist
attack. The
Jewish state conscripts every able-bodied man and woman into
the Israel
Defense Force, which over the years has evolved to fight
terrorism as much
as traditional military threats. As my colleague Clifford May,
the president
and founder of Foundation for Defense of Democracies, often
says, Israel
is the best place to study the problem of terrorism. “If you want
to study
tornadoes, go to Kansas. If you want to study tropical diseases,
go to Central
Africa. If you want to study terrorism, go to Israel.”
After years of fending off Palestinian terrorist attacks, both at
home
and abroad, the Israelis have pioneered new methods to counter
terrorism,
from advanced drone and urban warfare strategies to high-tech
anti-rocket
and anti-commando tunnel solutions. The Israelis have even
included cyber
in their arsenal of counter-terrorism tools. Yet, the Israeli
definition of ter-
rorism lacks a similar cutting edge.
Israeli law is cumbersome in this regard. It defines a “terrorist
action”
as an action: driven by a political, religious, or ideological
motive; carried
out with the goal of instilling in the public fear or anxiety, or of
forcing
the Israeli government or another government from taking
certain actions;

or an actual act or a real threat to inflict severe harm. Harm is
defined
as impact on: a person’s body or liberty; public security or
health; prop-
erty, including religious sites, burial places, and religious
paraphernalia; or
infrastructure, public systems, or essential services, or the state
economy
or environment.4
Israeli law allows the Minister of Defense to declare an
association as a
“terrorist organization” if it is: perpetrating or intentionally
promoting the
perpetration of terrorist acts; conducting training or providing
guidance for
executing terrorist acts; engaging in a transaction involving a
weapon with
the goal of perpetrating terrorist acts; or assisting or acting with
the goal of
advancing the activities of such a group.5
Thus, Israel has adopted a definition of terrorism that targets
agita-
tional terrorism. This is no surprise, given the terrorist threats
that it faces.
Its challenge, apart from combating terrorism, is fighting those
in the public
domain who seek to legitimize the terrorist groups that attack
the Jewish
state. The definition of terrorism in this context is often another
element
of the debate.

54 • isr a el st udie s, volu me 24 n u mber 2
PA LESTINI A N DEFINITION OF TER ROR ISM6
The Palestinian Authority, the provisional Palestinian
government operating
in the disputed territory of the West Bank, lacks a definition of
terrorism.
This is not entirely surprising, given that the PA is an
institution born of
the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), which first
emerged in the
1960s as a terrorist organization. The core of the PLO, the Fatah
faction, was
similarly founded as a terrorist organization in the 1950s by
Yasser Arafat.
As noted in a Council on Foreign Relations report, “During the
1960s and
1970s, the PLO waged a terrorist war against Israeli targets
around the
world, hijacking aircraft, bombing hotels, restaurants and
military bases,
and targeting for assassination any politician thought to be
conducting
unauthorized contacts with the enemy.”7
The PA emerged in 1994 as a byproduct of an interim peace
agreement
with Israel. While that peace agreement has unraveled, the
governing struc-
ture lives on. It fulfills many of the functions expected of a
state, including
policing and security. Part of that mandate also includes
countering terrorist
organizations. Yet, there are legal challenges associated with
this mandate.

The U.S. Department of State notes that the PA has never
passed
laws that are “specifically tailored to counterterrorism”.8 Still,
PA forces
conducting counterterrorism activities have traditionally done
so based on
a combination of existing laws, including the PLO
Revolutionary Penal
Code of 1979,9 and a set of existing Jordanian penal codes.10
But since
his election in 2005, and especially after the 2006 elections and
civil war
with Hamas in 2007, Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has
governed
almost exclusively by decrees that often target activity vaguely
described as
“harming public security”.11 In fact, in 2007, Abbas effectively
outlawed
terrorist groups by issuing a decree that stated, “armed militias
and military
formations . . . are banned in all their forms.”12
Fighting terrorism by decree is not optimal, however.
Legislation
passed by the Palestinian Authority parliament would carry
greater weight
and authority. However, the Palestinian civil war between the
PLO and
Hamas since 2007 has rendered the parliament defunct for more
than
a decade. With the two most powerful Palestinian factions in a
state of
political gridlock, exacerbated by the fact that the West Bank
and the Gaza
Strip are now territories belonging to two separate Palestinian

regimes,
passing new laws has become impossible. Thus, Abbas’ decrees
provide the
PA security forces with a broad mandate for arresting terror
cells plotting
attacks against both Israel and the PA.
Terrorism • 55
The Palestinian security forces are somewhat surprisingly
effective in
combatting terrorism. This is thanks to a security cooperation
architecture
with Israel created during the Oslo Peace Process, and
commitment from
the United States to support the mission.13 That security
cooperation con-
tinues to this day (although its longevity is now in doubt thanks
to new
American legislation that may defund it), and Palestinian
security forces
continue to target terrorist groups like Hamas and Palestinian
Islamic Jihad,
despite the fact that the government it represents lacks an
official definition
of terrorism.
However, the counterterrorism operations carried out by the PA,
most
of which target terrorist cells belonging to the rival Hamas
faction, do
not often match the rhetoric of the Palestinian leadership.
Admittedly,
Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas has eschewed direct

confrontation
with Israel as a national strategy since ascending to power in
2005, and he
further condemns certain acts of terror.14 So did his
predecessor, Yasser
Arafat, on occasion. Yet, those condemnations have been
qualified and
equivocal. Arafat, for example, was famous for stating that he
and his people
“stand firmly against all kinds of terrorism, whether it is by
states, groups
or individuals.”15 Abbas adopted the same formulation,
condemning “all
forms of terrorism” in response to terrorist attacks against
Israel.16
In short, the Palestinian leadership condemns agitational
terrorism
against Israel, usually under duress, but takes the opportunity to
accuse
Israel of enforcement terrorism, owing largely to Israel’s
continued control
of the disputed Palestinian territories. Saeb Erekat, the longtime
peace
negotiation for the PLO, somewhat famously quipped, “There is
no dif-
ference between the terrorism practiced by the [Islamic State]
group led by
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi and Israel’s terrorism.”17 Or as a
spokesman for the
Fatah party said in response to a terrorist attack in France, “Our
people,
who have endured all forms of state terrorisms at the hand of a
violent for-
eign occupation for decades now, feel the pain of the French
people as they

stand firm in the face of the sinister forces of evil which must
be fought.”18
Such charges attempt to frame as terrorism Israel’s military
control
of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, born of a conflict
instigated by the
Palestinians and the Arab states in 1948. Similarly, they would
seem to
imply that Israeli military responses to ongoing Palestinian
terrorism and
military provocation are terrorism, as well. This interpretation
has gained
resonance among Arab states and a number of like-minded
terrorist groups.
Nevertheless, the notion of Israeli enforcement terrorism has
generally
failed to gain traction.
IN THE ONGOING M A INSTR E A M
DEFINITIONA L DEBATE
Hamas and Terrorism
While the PA seeks to promote a dual definition of terrorism,
the rival
Hamas faction does not bother. Hamas has carried out acts of
terrorism
since its inception in 1987. Tactics originally included
shootings, stabbings,
and crude bombings. During the Second Intifada of 2000–2005,
the group
carried out a string of suicide bombings. In recent years, the

group has
shifted tactics to firing rockets blindly into civilian areas, the
use of com-
mando tunnels to carry out assaults, and more recently, flying
incendiary
devices into Israeli airspace, with the intent to commit arson.
Not surprisingly, the group has neglected to issue a formal legal
defini-
tion of what it constitutes as terrorism, but its 1988 charter
makes it clear
that the group justifies using violence. The charter explicitly
states, “When
an enemy occupies some of the Muslim lands, Jihad [Holy War
in the name
of Islam] becomes obligatory for every Muslim. In the struggle
against the
Jewish occupation of Palestine, the banner of Jihad must be
raised.” In fact,
the charter defines such violence as an obligation: “Fighting the
enemy
becomes the individual obligation of every Muslim man and
woman.”19
In 2007, when the group took over the Gaza Strip by force from
the
Palestinian Authority, it assumed the role of a government—a
role that it
maintains today. Its supporters argue that it is a legitimate
government,
having won elections in 2006, but with the Palestinian
Authority refusing
to acknowledge the results. Its detractors argue that the group’s
decision
to break the impasse a year later with a military putsch in the
Gaza Strip

only reaffirmed the group’s status as a terrorist group.20 For a
decade, the
group has sought to balance between governance in Gaza and
terrorism
against Israel. The result has been a rather miserable existence
for the
people of Gaza, who endure new rounds of violence every few
years.21
In 2017, under duress from some of its own supporters, the
Hamas
leadership released a document that issued new guidance on the
group’s
ideology. Hamas did not intend to replace or supersede its
existing charter,
but rather it attempted to cast the organization in a new light.
The docu-
ment uses the term “resistance” to describe its violence against
the Jewish
state, but it also uses the word jihad again, although some have
tried to
define down this word as merely a “struggle”.
The 2017 document asserts that, “Active resistance and jihad
are the
Palestinian’s legitimate right in their struggle to liberate
Palestine.” It further
Terrorism • 57
states that, “Resisting the occupation with all means and
methods is a
legitimate right guaranteed by divine laws and by international
norms and

laws. At the heart of these lies armed resistance . . .”22
“Legitimate” or “popular” resistance is now a common refrain
among
both Hamas and the PLO. Such resistance includes violent
demonstrations,
stone throwing, and even stabbings. Lately, it has also come to
include flying
incendiary devices that have set fire to Israeli fields. This
definition of ter-
rorism has also rationalized attacks on Israeli settlers living in
the disputed
territories as well as Israeli soldiers, even if they are not
engaging in combat.
JusTified Violence?
The Hamas perspective, often echoed in the statements of other
terrorist
groups like Hezbollah or al-Qaeda, gets at another important
angle of the
logomachy. Can some non-state violence be legitimate?
On 31 May 1986, U.S. President Ronald Reagan devoted an
entire radio
address to this question. In it, he noted, “There are innumerable
groups and
organizations with grievances, some justified, some not. Only a
tiny frac-
tion has been ruthless enough to try to achieve their ends
through vicious
and cowardly acts of violence upon unarmed victims.” Reagan
specifically
debunked the notion that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s
freedom
fighter”. As he stated, “Freedom fighters do not need to
terrorize a popula-

tion into submission. Freedom fighters target the military forces
and the
organized instruments of repression keeping dictatorial regimes
in power.
Freedom fighters struggle to liberate their citizens from
oppression and to
establish a form of government that reflects the will of the
people.”23
Congress passed the Anti-Terrorism Act in 1987, designed to
combat
Palestinian terrorism, noting that it “accounted for 60 percent of
total
international terrorism in 1985,” and that the PLO had “been
implicated
in the murders of dozens of American citizens abroad”. Thus,
Congress
determined that the “PLO and its affiliates are a terrorist
organization and
a threat to the interests of the United States, its allies, and to
international
law and should not benefit from operating in the United
States.”24
The U.S. government’s policy on the more recent iterations of
Palestinian terror groups, such as Hamas, have been remarkably
consistent
with this approach. Indeed, the question of “legitimate
resistance”, at least
in the case of the Palestinians, has not resonated in Washington.
THe War on Terror
As the United States government began to formalize its
approach to
combatting terrorism, the U.S. Department of State began to
issue its

formal list of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs). Among
the first
Palestinian groups to appear on the list were Hamas, Palestine
Islamic Jihad
(PIJ), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), and
PFLP-
General Command (PFLP-GC). The list later grew to include the
Fatah-
affiliated Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB), which was active
during the
second Intifada. In short, the majority of significant terrorist
organizations
targeting Israel were, in turn, targeted by the State
Department.25
In the immediate aftermath of the September 11, 2001 attacks,
the
U.S. Treasury issued its own list, pursuant to Executive Order
13324, in an
effort to combat terrorism finance.26 That list soon expanded to
include a
range of Palestinian terrorist organizations, as well as their
leaders and even
some charities. This became an increasingly important tool for
the Bush
administration in the so-called “War on Terror”.
With the declaration of this war, the U.S. joined the logomachy.
Washington effectively declared war on a tactic, but one that
was ill defined
by the bureaucracy. The U.S., in fact, has at least two official

definitions
of terrorism—perhaps more. One, Title 18 U.S. Code Sec. 2331,
describes
terrorism as something said to (A) Involve violent acts or acts
dangerous
to human life, or (B) Appear to be intended—(i) to intimidate or
coerce
a civilian population; or (ii) to influence the policy of a
government by
intimidation or coercion.27 Another, Title 22 U.S. Code Sec.
2656f (d)2,
describes terrorism as “Premeditated, politically motivated
violence perpe-
trated against noncombatant targets by subnational groups or
clandestine
agents.”28
The U.S. does not explicitly engage in the debate over
agitational and
enforcement terror. It does, however, sanction and deploy other
measures to
isolate rogue states, such as Iran and North Korea, through its
list of State
Sponsors of Terror.29 In the meantime, Washington includes
Palestinian
terror groups on the same lists as some of America’s most
vicious terrorist
enemies, including al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. Indeed,
Washington’s
official policy has been to view terrorist groups in the same
light, no matter
their motivation.
can Terror Groups eVolVe?
Perhaps the last frontier in the definitional debate is whether
groups that

embrace terrorism can effectively evolve into legitimate actors.
As one
Council on Foreign Relations report noted in 2006, “Some
groups widely
shunned as terrorists by the international community have
managed to
beat a well-worn path to negotiations, political legitimacy, and
even sov-
ereign power.”30 The implication is that the terrorism label
need not be
Terrorism • 59
permanent. There is some merit to this argument in some cases,
such as the
African National Congress (ANC), which unequivocally
eschewed violence
and became a wholly nonviolent actor in South Africa’s
political system.
This shift was attributable almost entirely to the personage and
political
philosophy of Nelson Mandela.31
However, such arguments are far more challenging to make on
behalf
of Hamas, or even the PLO. Both groups have evolved in the
sense that
they now serve as political and governing bodies. Yet, both
continue to
either engage in terrorism, as is the case with Hamas, or support
it finan-
cially, as is the case with the PLO.32 The U.S. government has
removed
the PLO’s terror designation, but the U.S. Congress continues to

seek
ways to punish the PLO for engaging in this practice, including
most
recently the Taylor Force Act—named after an American
murdered by a
Palestinian assailant who now receives a stipend from the PLO
while he
sits in an Israeli jail.33
As the United States weighs more stringent counterterrorism
policies,
those adopted by various European governments have muddied
the waters
by trying to distinguish between the military actors and the
politicians in ter-
rorist groups like Hezbollah.34 This is an opening other terror
groups would
like to exploit, even if their structures do not quite mirror this
description.
In the continued battle for legitimacy and justification for their
tactics,
the Palestinian Authority, PLO, and Hamas continue to look for
ways to
divide the West. Among other things, this will include
challenges to the
U.S. definition of terrorism. Thus, the logomachy surrounding
the defini-
tion of terrorism continues, fueled in no small part by the
Palestinian-Israeli
conflict.
Notes
1. Victor T. LeVine, “The Logomachy of Terrorism: On the
Political Uses and

Abuses of Definition,” Terrorism and Political Violence 7.4
(1995): 44. https://www
.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546559508427317
2. Everett L. Wheeler, “Terrorist and Military Theory,”
Terrorism and Political
Violence 3.1 (1991): 8.
3. Thomas Perry Thornton, “Terror as a Weapon of Political
Agitation,”
Internal War: Problems and Approaches (New York, 1964), 72.
4. “Israel: New Comprehensive Counterterrorism Legislation
Adopted,” Library
of Congress: Global Legal Monitor, 15 June 2016.
http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news
/article/israel-new-comprehensive-counterterrorism-legislation-
adopted/
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546559508427
317
https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/09546559508427
317
http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/israel-new-
comprehensive-counterterrorism-legislation-adopted/
http://www.loc.gov/law/foreign-news/article/israel-new-
comprehensive-counterterrorism-legislation-adopted/
5. Ibid.
6. Elements of this section draw from a piece previously
published by the
author. See Jonathan Shanzer and Grant Rumley, “How Do

Palestinians Define
‘Terrorism’?” The Wall Street Journal, 11 September 2017.
https://www.wsj.com
/articles/how-do-palestinians-define-terrorism-1505171406
7. Michael Moran, “Terrorist Groups and Political Legitimacy,”
Council on
Foreign Relations, 16 March 2006.
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/terrorist
-groups-and-political-legitimacy#chapter-title-0-6
8. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and
Countering
Violent Extremism, “Chapter 2. Country Reports: Middle East
and North Africa,”
Country Reports on Terrorism 2016, July 2017.
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt
/2016/272232.htm
9. Asem Khalil, “Formal and Informal Justice in Palestine:
Dealing with the
Legacy of Tribal Law,” La Tribu a L’Heure de la Globalisation
184 (2009): 169–84.
https://journals.openedition.org/etudesrurales/10550
10. Roland Friedrich, Arnold Luethold, and Firas Milhem, eds.,
The
Security Sector Legislation of the Palestinian National
Authority (Geneva Centre
for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2008).
https://www.dcaf.ch
/security-sector-legislation-palestinian-national-authority
11. Jack Khoury, “Palestinian Authority Release Hamas-Linked
Journalists
Arrested for ‘Harming Public Security’,” Ha’aretz, 15 August

2017. https://www
.haaretz.com/middle-east-news/palestinians/palestinian-
authority-releases-journalists
-arrested-for-harming-public-security-1.5442803
12. Palestinian Basic Law, Issued June-July 2007.
http://www.palestinianbasiclaw
.org/presidential-decrees/presidential-decrees-issued-on-june-
july-2007
13. Neri Zilber and Ghaith al-Omari, “Evolution of the
Palestinian Authority
Security Forces,” Washington Institute for Near East Policy, 2
April 2018.
https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-
analysis/view/evolution-of-the
-palestinian-authority-security-forces
14. “Abbas: Second Intifada Was One of Our Worst Mistakes,”
Ha’aretz, 26 May
2010. https://www.haaretz.com/1.5125224
15. “Arafat Announces Elections, Condemns Violence,” PBS
Newshour,
9 September 2002.
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/middle_east-july
-dec02-mideast_09-09
16. “After Bus Bombing, Abbas Says He Rejects ‘All
Terrorism’,” Times of Israel,
19 April 2016. https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-bus-
bombing-abbas-says-he
-rejects-all-terrorism/
17. “Erekat: Israeli ‘Terrorism’ Same as Islamic State,” Times
of Israel, 7 January

2015. http://www.timesofisrael.com/erekat-israeli-terrorism-
same-as-islamic-state
/?fb_comment_id=280432468747263_280451428745367#f1e935
c1d106cf4
18. “Palestinian Leaders Condemn Attack in France, Declare
Support for
French People,” Maan News Agency, 19 July 2016.
https://www.maannews.com
/Content.aspx?id=772249
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-do-palestinians-define-
terrorism-1505171406
https://www.wsj.com/articles/how-do-palestinians-define-
terrorism-1505171406
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/terrorist-groups-and-
political-legitimacy#chapter-title-0-6
political-legitimacy#chapter-title-0-6
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/272232.htm
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2016/272232.htm
https://journals.openedition.org/etudesrurales/10550
https://www.dcaf.ch/security-sector-legislation-palestinian-
national-authority
https://www.dcaf.ch/security-sector-legislation-palestinian-
national-authority
https://www.haaretz.com/middle-east-
news/palestinians/palestinian-authority-releases-journalists-
arrested-for-harming-public-security-1.5442803
http://www.palestinianbasiclaw.org/presidential-

decrees/presidential-decrees-issued-on-june-july-2007
http://www.palestinianbasiclaw.org/presidential-
decrees/presidential-decrees-issued-on-june-july-2007
analysis/view/evolution-of-the-palestinian-authority-security-
forces
analysis/view/evolution-of-the-palestinian-authority-security-
forces
https://www.haaretz.com/1.5125224
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/middle_east-july-dec02-
mideast_09-09
https://www.pbs.org/newshour/politics/middle_east-july-dec02-
mideast_09-09
https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-bus-bombing-abbas-says-
he-rejects-all-terrorism/
https://www.timesofisrael.com/after-bus-bombing-abbas-says-
he-rejects-all-terrorism/
http://www.timesofisrael.com/erekat-israeli-terrorism-same-as-
islamic-
state/?fb_comment_id=280432468747263_280451428745367#f1
e935c1d106cf4
http://www.timesofisrael.com/erekat-israeli-terrorism-same-as-
islamic-
state/?fb_comment_id=280432468747263_280451428745367#f1
e935c1d106cf4
https://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?id=772249
https://www.maannews.com/Content.aspx?id=772249
Terrorism • 61
19. Muhammad Maqdisi, “Charter of the Islamic Resistance
Movement
(Hamas) of Palestine,” Journal of Palestine Studies 22.4 (1993):
122–34. http://www

.jstor.org/stable/2538093
20. For more on the Palestinian internecine conflict, see
Jonathan Schanzer,
Hamas vs Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine (New York, 2008).
21. Jonathan Schanzer, “For Gaza’s Suffering, Blame Hamas,”
New York Post, 16
May 2018. https://nypost.com/2018/05/16/for-gazas-suffering-
blame-hamas/
22. “The Hamas Charter (1988),” Intelligence and Terrorism
Information Center
at the Center for Special Studies, 21 March 2006.
https://www.terrorism-info.org.il
/Data/pdf/PDF_06_032_2.pdf
23. “Radio Address to the Nation on Terrorism,” Ronald Reagan
Presidential
Library and Museum, 31 May 1986.
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sspeeches/53186a
24. “Anti-Terrorism–PLO,” United States Code, Title 22,
Section 5201. https://
law.justia.com/codes/us/2012/title-22/chapter-61/section-5201/
25. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism,
“Foreign Terrorist
Organizations.”
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm
26. Executive Order 13224, “Blocking Property and Prohibiting
Transactions
with Persons Who Commit, Threaten to Commit or Support
Terrorism,” Federal
Register, 24 September, 2001.

https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions
/Documents/13224.pdf
27. “Crimes and Criminal Procedure,” United States Code, 2006
Edition,
Supplement 3, Title 18.
https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/usa/1948/u_s__
code_-_title_18_html/US_Code_Title_18.pdf
28. “Foreign Relations and Intercourse,” United States Code,
2006 Edition,
Supplement 4, Title 22.
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22
29. U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Counterterrorism and
Countering
Violence Extremism, “State Sponsors of Terrorism.” Last
updated 20 November
2017. https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm
30. Michael Moran, “Terrorist Groups and Political
Legitimacy,” Council on
Foreign Relations, 16 March 2006.
https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/terrorist
-groups-and-political-legitimacy
31. Anthony Sampson, Mandela: The Authorized Biography
(New York, 1999).
32. Lahav Harkov, “Palestinian Authority Paid Terrorists Nearly
$350 million
in 2017,” The Jerusalem Post, 9 January 2018.
https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli
-Conflict/Palestinian-Authority-paid-terrorists-nearly-350-
million-in-2017-533227

33. “Congress Passes Taylor Force Act as Part of $1.3 trillion
Budget,” The
Times of Israel, 23 March 2018.
https://www.timesofisrael.com/congress-passes
-taylor-force-act-as-part-of-1-3-trillion-budget-bill/
34. Michael Birnbaum and Ruth Eglash, “EU Designates
Hezbollah’s Military
Wing as a Terrorist Organization,” Washington Post, 22 July
2013. https://www
.washingtonpost.com/world/eu-designates-hezbollahs-military-
wing-as-a
-terrorist-organization/2013/07/22/ffccd872-f2c5-11e2-8464-
57e57af86290_story
.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ce323f266c2e
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538093
http://www.jstor.org/stable/2538093
https://nypost.com/2018/05/16/for-gazas-suffering-blame-
hamas/
https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/pdf/PDF_06_032_2.pdf
https://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/pdf/PDF_06_032_2.pdf
https://www.reaganlibrary.gov/sspeeches/53186a
https://law.justia.com/codes/us/2012/title-22/chapter-
61/section-5201/
https://law.justia.com/codes/us/2012/title-22/chapter-
61/section-5201/
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Documents/13224.pdf
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-
center/sanctions/Documents/13224.pdf
https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/usa/1948/u_s__code_-
_title_18_html/US_Code_Title_18.pdf
https://www.unodc.org/res/cld/document/usa/1948/u_s__code_-
_title_18_html/US_Code_Title_18.pdf

https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/22
https://www.state.gov/j/ct/list/c14151.htm
political-legitimacy
political-legitimacy
https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Palestinian-
Authority-paid-terrorists-nearly-350-million-in-2017-533227
https://www.jpost.com/Arab-Israeli-Conflict/Palestinian-
Authority-paid-terrorists-nearly-350-million-in-2017-533227
https://www.timesofisrael.com/congress-passes-taylor-force-act-
as-part-of-1-3-trillion-budget-bill/
https://www.timesofisrael.com/congress-passes-taylor-force-act-
as-part-of-1-3-trillion-budget-bill/
https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/eu-designates-
hezbollahs-military-wing-as-a-terrorist-
organization/2013/07/22/ffccd872-f2c5-11e2-8464-
57e57af86290_story.html?noredirect=on&utm_term=.ce323f266
c2e
c2e
c2e
c2e

DR. JONATHAN SCHANZER is senior vice president for
research
at the Foundation for Defense of Democracies in Washington,
D.C.
He is a former terrorism finance analyst at the U.S. Department
of the
Treasury. His recent publications include: State of Failure:
Yasser Arafat,
Mahmoud Abbas, and the Unmaking of the Palestinian State
(London,
2013); Hamas vs Fatah: The Struggle for Palestine (London,
2008);
Al-Qaeda’s Armies: Middle East Affiliate Groups and the Next
Generation
of Terror (Washington, D.C., 2004).
Copyright of Israel Studies is the property of Indiana University
Press and its content may not
be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv
without the copyright holder's
express written permission. However, users may print,
download, or email articles for
individual use.

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