EDSP 370Essay on Intellectual Disabiities InstructionsTh.docx

EDSP 370
Essay on Intellectual Disabiities Instructions
The focus of this course is on students with intellectual
disabilities. It is important that you gain a good understanding
of the full range of characteristics identified as intellectual
disabilities. This essay will demonstrate your understanding of
the characteristics and the implications for education for each
of the subcategories of intellectual disabilities.
In the essay you will define each of the subtypes of intellectual
disability and identify the characteristics to include cognitive
processing, academic skills, and social skills. The description of
the subtypes is to be followed by a one page reflection stating
your personal philosophy on how individuals with intellectual
disabilities should be viewed/treated, including how this is
guided by faith and including Biblical references. Your paper
should include a title page, the essay with at least 3 citations, a
reflection page with Biblical references, and a reference page.
The paper, citations and references should be in APA format,
double-spaced, with 12-point font and 1” margins. You may use
headings to organize your essay. The length of the essay should
be at least two pages and the reflection should be at least one
page in addition to the title page and reference page.
Page 1 of 1
11

Chapter 2: The Interest of the SS in the
Monumental Building Economy
As Albert Speer has written, the SS never efficiently maximized
its use of forced labor
even after 1942 when forced-labor operations were made a key
part of centralized
government wartime economic policy.1 But such a retrospective
assessment misrepresents
a crucial point: while SS economic managers and on-site camp
administrations never
efficiently used their forced-labor population, this population
nevertheless was coerced
into functioning productively. The SS did not temper the
punitive and brutal goal of the
camps in suppressing supposed enemies of the Party and state in
order to address the
individual needs of the forced-laborer to make him more
efficient. Rather, it was through
the day-to-day oppression of individual prisoners that the
productive goals of SS
administrators came together with the punitive initiatives of the
on-site camp personnel.
But for what end were productivity and punishment combined?
From the founding
of major forced-labor operations in 1938 until their
reorientation to the armaments industry
in 1942–3, the predominant answer to this question is: to
provide materials for the
monumental building economy. The building economy in
general was one of the most
dynamic sectors of growth in National Socialist Germany.
Monumental projects favored
by Hitler provided a high-profile symbolic focus to
contemporary discussions concerning

the strength of the German economy. As one of Hitler’s major
peacetime initiatives, the
reconstruction of specific cities on a massive scale and with
particular aesthetic materials
(above all, stone) helped revive particular segments of the
building economy, a revival that
was thoroughly integrated with the broader policies of the state.
Hence, an analysis of the
involvement of SS companies in the production of building
materials for individual
monumental projects necessitates a triangulation of political,
economic and architectural
conditions. The effectiveness of the SS in linking its control
over larger concentration
camp populations, the productive output of these populations
and the need for specific
building materials can be critically assessed as material
conditions for this moment in the
political history of art. How these sometimes complementary,
sometimes conflicting
conditions developed is the subject of this chapter on the SS
interest in the Nazi monumental
building economy.
Jaskot, Paul B.. The Architecture of Oppression : The SS,
Forced Labor and the Nazi Monumental Building Economy,
Routledge, 1999.
ProQuest Ebook Central,
http://ebookcentral.proquest.com/lib/sciarc-
ebooks/detail.action?docID=165458.
Created from sciarc-ebooks on 2018-09-18 10:30:43.
C
op
yr

ig
ht
©
1
99
9.
R
ou
tle
dg
e.
A
ll
rig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.
12

The Architecture of Oppression
A history of the German Earth and Stone Works (DEST), the
largest SS economic
concern, affirms the connection of forced labor to state and
Party architecture. DEST was
set up in April 1938 to oversee the economic exploitation of
concentration camp forced
labor in the production of bricks and quarrying of stone.
Through an institutional history,
DEST’s development as an important influence on the
reorganization of the camps after
1936 comes most clearly into focus with its expansion in the
early war years. DEST
economic activity stepped up in this period due to increased
numbers of prisoners from
the occupied territories and SS attempts to wield more power in
the National Socialist
political hierarchy. KL Flossenbürg and KL Mauthausen, the
first and largest stone-
quarry concentration camps respectively, were used to assert SS
authority both by
producing stone for specific projects and by punishing various
peoples designated as
enemies of the state. By orienting DEST’s production to the
monumental architectural
projects of Hitler and Speer, the SS competed in the expanding
market for building
materials and in the volatile political spheres of the Party and
state.
Crucial to the development of the building materials enterprises
in the concentration
camps was the advantage DEST administrators took of
developing political and economic
conditions in the late 1930s and during the war. Oswald Pohl’s

SS economic managers
worked opportunistically to secure any leverage that extended
the SS’s economic or
political sphere of influence and to fight of encroachments on
their authority from other
administrations.2 For it was only by taking advantage of
changing conditions that the
long-term goals of ensuring the permanence of concentration
camps could be pursued.
The permanence of the institutions would guarantee, by
extension, the endurance of the
SS itself as a political and economic force in National Socialist
Germany. Simply put, SS
policy for the labor camps remained somewhat flexible in order
to adapt to changing
circumstances and to use its increasing political authority most
effectively.
After 1936, the SS set up the concentration camps to punish
physically those
deemed ideologically or politically threatening to the state and,
in the process, to build up
a stable position within the German peacetime economy. The
production of building
materials in these camps was an attempt by the SS to make a
brutally inefficient operation
economically viable. Concerns for the individual laborer were
rarely addressed in this
period whereas the potential productivity of the entire inmate
population was of greatest
interest to DEST’s managers. Only through increasing
production rates at camps such as
Flossenbürg and Mauthausen could the decimation of the labor
force continue to be
justified in economic terms. The shrewd decision of Himmler
and his advisors to target

early on the privileged state and Party architectural projects as a
potential market allowed
for the focus on productivity late into the war. While other
industries were forced to
curtail their production or turn their enterprises over to
armaments tasks, the SS retained
its building materials industry through both its undiminished
political authority and its
economic orientation towards architectural policy. That this
occurred at the expense of
thousands of lives in the forced-labor camps is also part of the
architectural history of
National Socialist Germany.
Routledge, 1999.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
©
1
99
9.
R

ou
tle
dg
e.
A
ll
rig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.
13
Chapter 2: The Monumental Building Economy
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE SS AND THE
CONCENTRATION CAMP SYSTEM
The choice of the building economy was not a predictable one
for SS administrators;
further, the use of forced labor for productive economic ends
was of course neither an
initial goal of the SS nor an impetus for the founding of the

concentration camps. Rather,
the interest in persecuting perceived enemies of the Party was
only adapted to economic
purposes after changes in the organization and administration of
the camps as well as the
development of the monumental building economy. The rise of
forced labor as a driving
force for the formulation of specific oppressive policies
depended on key aspects of these
early changes in the management of the camps.
A brief overview of the initial years of the concentration camp
system indicates
which developments would condition the introduction of
DEST’s forced-labor operations.
When the National Socialist government came to power in 1933,
the three main Party-
controlled policing forces of the Gestapo, the SS and the SA all
opened temporary
concentration camps to incarcerate individuals opposed or
threatening to the NSDAP.
These camps allowed the Party to avoid the potentially hostile
government response that
would have resulted had Party members resorted to the state’s
established judicial and
penal system. In the early stages of the concentration camps, the
prisoners held there
were almost exclusively political enemies from the German
Communist Party or Social
Democrats and union officials. Some felons were also put in the
camps, though the
politicals made up the vast majority of prisoners. The turn
towards the secret police, the
SS and the SA to crush the strongest elements of political
opposition established early on
the authoritarian character of the National Socialist state.3

German policing institutions, whether controlled by the state or
by various Party
groups, competed with one another for primacy in these years.
By 1933, the SS had
evolved from a small cadre of guards who protected Hitler in
his appearances at public
meetings in the Weimar Republic to become a formidable
counter-balance to the SA. The
year 1934 proved to be crucial for the SS in its pursuit of
increased political authority in
National Socialist Germany. In April, Hermann Göring made
Himmler head of the powerful
Gestapo in Prussia, and, after the purging of the SA in June of
that year, Hitler elevated
the SS to the status of an independent Party institution. As a
result of these orders, the SS
achieved total control over the concentration camps, securing
the foundation of the eventual
integration of the SS into the German state as the dominant
policing force.4
When the SS took over the concentration camp system in 1934,
the main camps
were Columbiahaus, Dachau, Ersterwegen, Fuhlsbüttel,
Lichtenburg, Oranienburg and
Sachsenburg. Many of these camps were nothing more than
warehouses acquired for the
purpose of having detention centers separate from the German
police. But Dachau became
a model for subsequent larger concentration camps because of
its construction as an
independent complex outside of a major urban area and its
centralized administration.
Dachau had early on been established as the training center for
guards (the Death’s Head

Squads [SS Totenkopfverbände]) under the leadership of
Theodor Eicke. Himmler
appointed Eicke in July 1934 to head the office of the Inspector
of Concentration Camps
Routledge, 1999.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
©
1
99
9.
R
ou
tle
dg
e.
A
ll

rig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.
14
and SS Guard Units (Inspekteur der Konzentrationslager und
SS-Wachverbände [Inspekteur
der KL]). In this role, he was responsible for preparing the
guards and commandants and
overseeing the administrative organization of the camps.
Through the Inspekteur der KL
and the Death’s Head Squads, SS on-site camp personnel were
trained in a quasi-military
environment that emphasized the ideological goals of camp
punishment separate from
considerations of administrative efficiency. Eicke, because of
his influence in setting up
Dachau, would be crucial for providing the model for further
concentration camp
development after 1936.5
Work at the camps was rarely systematically organized before

1936. Dachau formed
the exception to this rule. In this camp, Eicke introduced
cultivation and peat collecting in
the moor by summer 1933, while also in that year various labor
details were set up to
provide for the general maintenance of the camp. At this stage
of development, work
served the purpose of making the camp as self-sustaining as
possible. The SS also
occasionally contracted out some small groups of prisoners to
private firms. The labor
details within the camp were headed by Kapos, that is, prisoners
(usually drawn from the
criminal population) who oversaw the work groups. Kapos
retained their position as long
as the labor details remained productive. If not, they were
replaced or disciplined.6
Unrelated to the concentration camps, the SS also began early
on to acquire private
businesses which legitimated the ideological goals of the SS and
promoted its independent
position in the state. In December 1934, the SS purchased its
first firm, the Nordland-
Verlag, responsible for publishing SS tracts and other texts. A
porcelain manufacturer,
Porzellan-Manufaktur Allach, was also taken over by the SS in
1936 and used private
labor for its concern near Dachau (though some prison labor
was used later in the 1930s).
Allach was one of Himmler’s favorite projects and produced
various figurines (soldiers,
animals, etc.) to compete in the small but profitable German
porcelain market. Throughout
its history, the SS acquired a wide range of enterprises
including works that produced

mineral water, clothing, flower pots and other goods.7
Enterprises that relied on private
labor, however, were not the focus of SS economic activity after
the reorganization of the
camp system and the beginning of the production of building
materials.
The increase in the size of the SS administration and its interest
in private economic
activity resulted in the organization of a new office in June
1935. Administratively part of
Himmler’s Personal Staff, the SS Administrative Office (SS-
Verwaltungsamt) was created
to deal with all budgetary considerations, economic enterprises,
construction tasks, housing,
clothing and other daily necessities of the SS. Himmler gave the
leadership of this office to
Oswald Pohl, who entered the SS in February 1934. Up until
this time, Pohl had served
as a naval officer and administrator. His political convictions
were clear, however, as he
had joined the NSDAP early on in 1926. With the development
and extension of the
Verwaltungsamt through the 1930s, Pohl began his quick rise to
become one of the most
powerful men in the SS (after Himmler and Heydrich).8
By 1935, the concentration camp system was organized and
centralized in the SS
offices in Berlin. Pohl had established control over a separate
economic and administrative
Routledge, 1999.

C
op
yr
ig
ht
©
1
99
9.
R
ou
tle
dg
e.
A
ll
rig
ht
s
re
se
rv

ed
.
15
office for the potential exploitation of forced labor beyond the
self-sustaining needs of the
camps, and the SS as a policing institution was rapidly
expanding its influence in Germany.
In 1936, Hitler appointed Himmler as head of the German police
force (controlled by the
Ministry of the Interior) thus centralizing the state and Party
policing apparatus. In the
same year, the concentration camp system was reorganized on
the Dachau model. The SS
was clearly marked as an integral part of the National Socialist
state. The question is, then,
why did the SS specifically decide to use the output of forced
labor for the monumental
state and Party building projects, a decision that would affect
both the enactment of
economic goals and the consolidation of policing authority
through the concentration
camps?
THE GERMAN BUILDING ECONOMY, 1933–8
The centralization of the SS administration and the
systematization of the concentration
camps happened simultaneously with but separate from the
resurgence of the German

building economy. The German economy in general began
sluggishly but significantly to
pull out of its 1929 crash in the fall of 1932, months before
Hitler came to power. In the
initial recovery, however, unemployment remained high, and
National Socialist candidates
made the issue central to their campaign promises and criticism
of the Weimar Republic.
Employment had significant political import because by 1932–3
only two out of every
five people with a job in 1929 were still working. This ratio was
even higher in some
geographic areas of Germany with strong building industries. In
the southern state of
Bavaria, for example, rural crises and a disenchantment with the
parliamentary democratic
system proved influential in turning citizens to vote for the
NSDAP in the 1932 elections
(with support at just over 37 per cent in July 1932). But
economic distress and
unemployment became crucial factors as well for voters
rejecting the republican political
parties. As the largest sector of the Bavarian industrial
economy, the building trades
suffered from the Depression at even higher rates than many
other comparable industries;
according to the 1933 census, 39 per cent of building trade
workers were unemployed.9 A
crucial campaign issue, the unemployment situation provided
fodder for NSDAP leaders
in general, and for propaganda aimed specifically at sectors of
the building economy.
As a major concern of the new NSDAP regime, the
unemployment situation and
stimulation of production formed the core of economic policy as

they had in the previous
republican governments. From 1933 to 1936, work-creation
schemes and the stimulation
of trade were astonishingly successful in aiding the recovery of
the German economy.
But, as Richard Overy points out, this was less a result of
instigating any particularly new
kind of “fascist” economic policy as it was due to Hitler’s
decision to stimulate growth
through directed government spending with the “linkage effects
it produced and the
stimulus it offered to particular areas of private business.”10
Such a policy was undertaken
by any number of different political systems, from democratic
to fascist. As with other
regimes, Hitler also promoted the construction industry as a
central component of this
Routledge, 1999.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
©
1

99
9.
R
ou
tle
dg
e.
A
ll
rig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.
16
directed spending effort. In this regard, while no one sector of
the economy was sufficient
on its own for causing the recovery, construction grew at a
much higher rate than the

economy as a whole. As of 1932, RM 2 billion were invested in
construction; by 1936,
that number had multiplied to RM 9 billion with a concomitant
employment of 2 million
workers. The bulk of this construction was in new housing and
road construction
(particularly the Autobahn), but industrial and commercial
construction as well as a few
high-profile public buildings made a significant contribution to
the overall economic effect.
Government expenditure in the construction industry not only
had the desired economic
impact of stimulating businesses related to and reliant on
building activity but also helped
achieve the political goal of marking the NSDAP as the party
that had brought Germany
back from the economic brink.11
Through such means as work creation and directed state
investment, the employment
situation was eventually stabilized by 1936. At that time, the
reverse problem arose of an
increasing demand on the available labor pool. Public works
projects (particularly the
Autobahn and building construction) and the growing
importance of armaments production
as a percentage of total economic output strained the labor
market even further.12 NSDAP
National Treasurer (Reichsschatzmeister) Franz Xaver Schwarz
pointed out the continuing
problem in a memorandum of 1939: “The lack of manpower,
especially in the building
economy, demands a planned use of the available manpower.”13
The competition for labor
in these years had considerable influence on decisions
concerning state and Party

construction projects and there was infighting over labor
allocation between government
administrations pursuing individual and institutional interests.
The emphasis on labor-
intensive industries such as construction solved the
unemployment situation but created
other problems for the productivity of the German economy.14
The worker shortage
became a primary condition that affected the SS mobilization of
forced labor in the
concentration camps.
In addition to tight labor markets, the intensification of
production in certain sectors
of the economy led to shortages of key materials. By 1936, as
preparations for war began
to dominate state economic policy, attempts were made to
correct these problems through
the centralization of the distribution of material resources as
well as the work force
through Hermann Göring’s Office of the Four Year Plan. In
April 1936, Hitler appointed
Göring to organize the economy and put all available state and
Party institutions at his
disposal. This resulted in Göring’s Four Year Plan (announced
at the Party Rally in
September 1936) which promoted a rapid militarization of
industry. The centralization of
the allocation of workers and materials– the key to the plan’s
success–also increased the
influence of the large private conglomerates involved in the
military and economic drive.
Though the German economy continued to operate under
competitive market conditions,
the conjunction of increased political control over the economy
and the interests of the

larger conglomerates tended towards a highly managed
economic system, distinct from
that of democratic industrial states and socialist economies.15
This tendency helped a
politically powerful institution like the SS to pursue its
economic goals.
Routledge, 1999.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
©
1
99
9.
R
ou
tle
dg
e.

A
ll
rig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.
17
The same process of centralization affected the building
industry, most intensely
by the reduction of its access to iron and cement as well as the
stricter control of labor
markets. In addition to the implicit effect that the allocation of
materials and labor for
military industries had on supplies of each for other trades, the
building industry became
an institutionalized part of the Four Year Plan when Göring on
9 December 1938 named
Fritz Todt as the General Plenipotentiary for the Regulation of
the Building Economy
(Generalbevollmächtigter für die Regelung der Bauwirtschaft
[GBBau]). Todt, who had
previously organized the building of the West Wall (a series of

bunkers and defenses on
the western border of Germany), became responsible for the
construction of all necessary
military projects, important armaments factory sites, canals,
Autobahn, railroads and
housing estates for workers in Four Year Plan firms. The
GBBau also secured materials
and workers for those concerns determined crucial to national
defense. Finally, Todt’s
administration was meant to manage the construction of the
designated monumental
building projects in Berlin, Nuremberg and Munich. Though
Speer saw to it that Todt was
never able to bring the control of the city rebuilding projects
under his jurisdiction, Todt’s
grip on the iron market and worker allocation in particular made
the GBBau central to
monumental building schemes in Germany.16
As a high-profile segment of the building economy, monumental
Party and state
construction prospered from the initial impetus to direct
government spending towards
building; yet after 1936, such construction was also restricted
by the crisis in labor
markets and limitations on materials. Hence, aesthetic choices
combined with political
economic policies. This situation can be elucidated by looking
at the stone industry, stone
being the key aesthetic material promoted by Hitler and his
architects. Paul Ludwig
Troost’s House of German Art (Haus der deutschen Kunst
[Figure 1]) in Munich, Hitler’s
first major commission after he came to power in 1933, relied
on vast quantities of
German limestone for its façade, a material Hitler had chosen

himself. Hitler also influenced
Werner March’s use of stone instead of steel and glass in his re-
working of the initial
design for the Olympic Stadium (1936 [Figure 2]) in Berlin. In
these cases as in others,
Hitler’s belief in the permanence of stone and its connection
(unlike modernist structures)
to a craft tradition which he associated with powerful political
regimes and a “German”
style obviously influenced aesthetic choices made by state and
Party architects. Though
many types of buildings and materials were used throughout the
National Socialist period,
the high-profile projects of the Party and state remained
exclusively stone buildings with
modified neo-classical forms.17
Moreover, the most important projects were constructed almost
in their entirety
from granite, limestone and marble. In Nuremberg and in
Berlin, Hitler ’s direct
approval via Speer was required for major designs, and they
both consistently
favored granite or limestone façades with marble interiors or
detailing, as was the
case with Speer’s New Reich Chancellery. These preferences
for stone led to a
Routledge, 1999.

C
op
yr
ig
ht
©
1
99
9.
R
ou
tle
dg
e.
A
ll
rig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.

18
strong revival of the quarrying industry up to the outbreak of
war in 1939, but only for
specific types of stone. For example, in a letter of April 1937
from the Labor Ministry to
the NSDAP administration for Koblenz-Trier, the local basalt
industry was cited as one
area of stone production where conditions were becoming worse
because of a lack of
government contracts.18 The building materials market, when it
came to stone, depended
on aesthetic decisions made by Party and state leaders who, in
turn, took their cues from
Hitler and his architect Speer.
Figure 1
PAUL LUDWIG TROOST, HOUSE OF
GERMAN ART, MUNICH, 1933–7
Source: G. Troost, Bauen im neuen
Reich, 1938
Figure 2
WERNER MARCH, OLYMPIC
STADIUM, BERLIN, 1936
Source: G. Troost, Bauen im neuen
Reich, 1938
Routledge, 1999.

ed
.
19
But in spite of exceptions, the stone industry prospered with the
broader state
economic policies. By 1936, industry specialists had already
noted a significant increase
in the production of marble, granite and limestone as a result of
state-directed funding.
Further, one critic noted that the reliance on foreign stone
imports had been greatly
reduced in favor of a renewed emphasis on production within
Germany itself (autarky
being one of Hitler’s key nationalist policies).19 Such optimism
was tempered only after
1936 when even architectural-quality stone had to be registered
with the state to monitor
its production, and the work force came under the same pressure
as in other industries in
the German economy. Particularly of concern was where the
new generation of laborers
was going to come from, i.e. the apprentices for stone masonry,
quarrying work and
construction.20 The conclusion that we can reach from this
situation is that the increase in
the political management of the economy resulting from
Göring’s Four Year Plan
significantly affected seemingly non-military industries that
nevertheless also relied on

labor-intensive work and the use of specific materials. Clearly,
by the late 1930s, the
stone industry and architects working on monumental projects
were feeling just such an
effect.
All in all, then, when the SS set up its economic concerns, the
building industry was
subject to political manipulation by state and Party institutions
greatly stressed by the
huge demands of rearmament and architectural policy. Gradual
centralization of the industry
allowed for the protection of fewer and fewer projects and for a
concentration on those
enterprises deemed absolutely crucial to the state. Further, the
pressure on employment
markets left the private economy and state projects eager for
ways to maximize the
output of a limited labor force. A building economy faced with
restrictions on its workers
and the kinds of materials available for construction as well as
expanding in all sectors
provided an opportunity for an institution like the SS that
unilaterally controlled people
in its camps. It indicated a potential choice for SS economic
administrators newly concerned
after 1936 with directing the abuse of those people to the
broader German economy.
SS CONCENTRATION CAMPS AND THE FORMATION OF
DEST
Demands placed on the German economy due to the Four Year
Plan came about just as the
SS had consolidated its power over the entire police force of
Germany and was reorganizing

the concentration camp system. When Hitler appointed Himmler
to head the German
police in June 1936, Theodor Eicke had already been working
for two years on planning
the construction of large institutions throughout the Reich based
on the model of KL
Dachau. These plans for consolidation and expansion were fully
implemented after
Himmler’s appointment. By August 1936, the camps at
Oranienburg, Fuhlsbüttel,
Esterwegen and Columbiahaus had been consolidated into the
facility at KL Sachsenhausen
just outside of Berlin. A year later, the SS closed down
Sachsenburg and moved its
prisoners to the new camp at KL Buchenwald near Weimar.
Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen
Routledge, 1999.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
©
1
99

9.
R
ou
tle
dg
e.
A
ll
rig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.
20
were modeled after Dachau in their administrative structure and
their capacity to hold up
to 8,000 prisoners each. The other remaining camp, KL
Lichtenburg, had been reserved
exclusively for women since the summer of 1937.21

The extension of the camps and choice of sites indicate that
Himmler’s goal was not
simply to set up an effective penal system but to establish the
long-term viability of the
camps as political and economic tools of the SS. Inmate
populations in 1934 and 1935 had
been steadily decreasing as the initial political prisoners
arrested after January 1933 were
released. Planning for larger camps depended in 1936–7 on a
view of their permanent
importance to the state as well as on the potential prison
populations determined from
ideological criteria. Economically, Sachsenhausen and
Buchenwald were chosen for their
proximity not only to population centers (Prussia,
Saxony/Thuringia), but also to clay
deposits suitable for brick making. Early on, the SS oriented
these camps to their potential
production of materials for the building industry. In the case of
Buchenwald, for example,
the location near Weimar was suggested by the Thuringian
Geological Provincial Examination
office (Thüringische Geologische Landesuntersuchung) because
of the availability of clay
deposits. It was only after this suggestion that Eicke and Pohl
made a visit to the site in
May 1937 and approved the location of a camp here.22 In 1937,
these economic plans
remained vague in terms of how they were to be implemented;
nevertheless, the interest
in the economic use of forced labor for the building economy
influenced this extension of
the concentration camp system.
For Eicke, and seemingly for Himmler as well, the founding of

Buchenwald and
Sachsenhausen was first and foremost a manifestation of the
political gains achieved by
the SS in 1935–6. Economic goals remained secondary (and
Pohl remained in the
background) while the SS consolidated its power to regulate
German society through
policing institutions. Himmler had fought off the Justice and
Interior Ministries’ attempts
to establish authority over the concentration camps and had
received Hitler’s approval to
make the camps permanent institutions. Finally, the extension
of arrest categories after
1936 enhanced the necessity for the KL by drastically
increasing the numbers of inmates.
The largest extension of categories occurred only after Himmler
gained control of the
police and reorganized the camps in 1936. Through a series of
orders and laws from 1937–
8, the SS began defining and arresting occupational criminals,
so-called asocials (beggars,
Sinti and Roma [Zigeuner], vagrants, prostitutes, alcoholics and
others), homosexuals and
Jehovah’s Witnesses. Himmler based these extra-juridical
arrests on the Law for the
Protection of the People and State (Gesetz zum Schutzvon Volk
und Staat) of February
1933. First enacted to legitimize the arrest of large numbers of
Communists after the
burning of the Reichstag, the SS used this law to lay its hands
on all people who were seen
as destructive to the Party or state. The exact categorization of
those arrested was left up
to the local police and Gestapo officials. With Hitler’s approval
in hand, the SS had gained
not only an established control over policing institutions but

also had increased its ability
Routledge, 1999.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
©
1
99
9.
R
ou
tle
dg
e.
A
ll
rig
ht

s
re
se
rv
ed
.
21
to punish and incarcerate greater numbers of people cast as
political or ideological enemies.23
Through such means, the SS legitimated once again the need for
the concentration camp
system which it unilaterally controlled.
The political authority won by the SS allowed for the pursuit of
other interests that
would contribute to the consolidation of the concentration
camps as integral institutions
in the German state. By 1937, Himmler, through his
administrator Pohl, began to place
increasing emphasis on securing the permanence of the camps
by adapting them to a
comprehensive economic program. It was already clear to
Himmler that larger camps
would be needed in times of war, but a growing emphasis on
economic enterprises would
give the SS a reason to expand the camps in peacetime as well.

Though the intent to exploit
penal labor was part of the organization of the camps from the
very beginning, it was only
in 1937–8 that the SS addressed the economic potential of
forced labor as a key means of
guaranteeing its role in a peacetime Germany. After regulations
concerning who could be
taken into custody were broadened, the SS could and did
actively target prisoners who
met its economic needs. The opening of KL Buchenwald, for
example, was aided by a
direct order in June 1938 from Reinhard Heydrich, chief of the
SS-Reich Central Security
Office (Reichssicherheitshauptamt [RSHA]), to the effect that
every local police district
arrest at least 200 male so-called asocials who also were
considered ready and able to
work. Through such measures, Buchenwald’s population rose
from an initial 2,295 inmates
in August 1937 to 7,776 one year later.24 Prepared as they were
to select prisoners based
on political, ideological and economic criteria, the SS could
attempt to maximize its
economic potential. This policy was also clearly in line with the
need to extend the
productivity of all labor as defined by the state’s economic
goals and those of Göring’s
Four Year Plan.25
Extending the function of the camps to include grander schemes
of developing an
economic empire occurred first with the brickworks established
at Buchenwald and
Sachsenhausen in 1938. It was in 1937–8, again a time when
severe labor and material
shortages were common, that the SS began seriously to orient

forced-labor operations to
the building materials market. At first, SS brickworks were
linked only to the necessities
of the Four Year Plan. For example, Hellmuth Gommlich
(Minister of the Interior in
Thuringia) wrote in a letter of 24 April 1937: “The camp
inmates should be occupied,
within the framework of the Four Year Plan, with the
production of bricks.”26 Yet by the
time construction began on the brickworks in 1938, the SS had
turned to the more exclusive
and increasingly powerful patronage of Speer by linking the
quarries and some of the
brickworks to Speer’s needs as head of the Inspector General of
Building for the Reich
Capital Berlin (Generalbauinspektor für die Reichshauptstadt
Berlin [GBI]).
The decision to focus the majority of forced-labor operations on
the production of
large-scale brickworks and stone quarries came at the initial
meeting of Speer, Himmler
and Hitler, that occurred after Buchenwald opened in July 1937
but before Pohl’s trip to
Flossenbürg and Mauthausen in March 1938.27 With the support
of Speer and Hitler, the
use of the prisoners to make bricks and to quarry stone became
institutionalized in the
Routledge, 1999.

22
founding of DEST on 29 April 1938. The business was
officially registered on 10 June
1938 under the management of SS-Obersturmbannführer Arthur
Ahrens (who in September
1938 appointed SS-Standartenführer Walter Salpeter as deputy
manager). Two agents
(procurators) were also named, SS-Hauptsturmführer Hans
Mummenthey and SS-
Untersturmführer Hans Clemens Tietjen. On paper, the business
always had a double
organization. DEST personnel administered the concern as a
private enterprise but, as SS
members, they were also politically responsible to the SS-
Verwaltungsamt under Pohl,
although at this stage Pohl played little more than an overseeing
role in the firm.28
The goals of DEST were spelled out in the corporate resolution
(Gesellschaftsvertrag): (1) the opening of stone quarries and
quarrying of natural stone;29
(2) the production of bricks; (3) street building (later dropped
as a potential assignment);
and (4) the running or acquiring of other enterprises related to
quarrying or brick making.
These goals were set up not only to “re-educate” the inmates of
the concentration camps
but also, in the process of punishment, to serve the massive
demands of the German

construction industry. Mummenthey, in a report on the
organization of the administration
of DEST in July 1940, stated the goal succinctly: “In the
general interest, its [DEST’s]
task primarily consists in employing the labor power of the
concentration camp prisoners
for the job of the production of building materials.”30
But such a company was of dubious legality as it involved a
Party institution
getting involved with the private economy, a point that had been
ignored with the small-
scale operations prior to 1937–8 but now became of crucial
importance to the NSDAP
Treasurer Schwarz as the SS expanded into national building
materials markets. The
German state had such a restriction on economic activity
precisely because, among other
reasons, a political institution was perceived to have an unfair
advantage and, hence, must
be banned from investing in the private market. SS
administrators avoided this criticism
by using the loophole that their concerns were not, like private
businesses, engaged in
maximization of profit but rather served the dual political goals
of punishing or “reforming”
inmates through labor as well as providing needed materials for
the monumental building
projects prioritized by Hitler. Specifically, Speer’s plans for
Berlin (Figure 3) were
continuously cited by the SS in its reports and contracts as a
justification for the unlawful
entry of a Party institution into private business. For example,
in a memorandum of 15
June 1938 sent to Schwarz from his staff, Pohl is quoted as
defending the legality and

purpose of the brickworks at Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen.
Pohl declared that the SS
entry into the brick-making business was justified in two ways:
(1) to keep the inmates
busy, especially as the recent annexation of Austria had greatly
contributed to the number
of prisoners; and (2) to supply Speer with building materials for
the “Führerbauten,” as
the output of the German brick-making industry could meet only
18 per cent of Speer’s
need of 2 billion bricks a year.31 The memorandum indicates
how the SS justified its
economic operations by pointing to Speer’s special needs as
well as casting its enterprise
in terms of the political function of managing the prison
population. With this cultural and
political legitimization, no mention need be made of legal
debates.
Routledge, 1999.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
©

1
99
9.
R
ou
tle
dg
e.
A
ll
rig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.
23
Administratively, DEST was organized at first under Pohl’s SS-
Verwaltungsamt. However,
with the rapid expansion of the economic enterprises, this office

quickly developed into
the SS-Central Administration and Economic Office (Hauptamt
Verwaltung und Wirtschaft
[SS-HAVW]), established 20 April 1939 on the organizational
model of Heydrich’s RSHA.
Unlike the SS-Verwaltungsamt, which only had jurisdiction
within the SS itself, a Hauptamt
had a dual status as a Party position (e.g. overseeing the
administrative organization of the
Figure 3
ALBERT SPEER, MODEL OF THE
NORTH–SOUTH AXIS, BERLIN,
c. 1940
Source: Ullstein Bilderdienst
Routledge, 1999.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
©
1
99

9.
R
ou
tle
dg
e.
A
ll
rig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.
24
SS and its concerns) and a position within the Ministry of the
Interior (e.g. administering
finances of the state for the formation of an SS army and the
KL). The HAVW had three
divisions corresponding to Pohl’s areas of authority: legal,
economic and a department for

the inspection of all SS administrations and concerns. The
economic division oversaw the
bureaus that managed the SS-controlled businesses. Eight of
these bureaus existed by
1940, covering the building materials firms in the Reich and
occupied territory, the porcelain
works, the mineral water works and the other SS concerns.32
DEST itself made up Amt W
III A/1 in the economic division.
This reorganization came also as Pohl was professionalizing the
managerial staff of
the SS economic division especially in the face of bungled
operations in the first year of
DEST.33 Although he was a brickworks owner before he came
to the SS, Ahrens proved to
be a disaster as a leader of DEST, and in 1939 Pohl replaced
him with Salpeter, a man who
came to the job prepared with administrative and financial
management experience. Salpeter,
assisted by Mummenthey, directly administered the enterprise.
Amt W III A/1 was
further broken down into the two main divisions of the
brickworks under the leadership
of Erduin Schondorff, and the granite works under Heinz
Schwarz, both of whom were
technical professionals in their fields. The administrative
breakdown indicates the way
the SS rationalized management of production and centralized
the direction of the enterprises
in its economic administration. While ideologically committed
to the punishment of inmates,
Pohl’s economic administrators also focused on ways of
increasing the output of DEST
by concentrating on the economic organization of the
operations.34

Although set up in April 1938, DEST lacked significant funding
for development in
the concentration camps until a major contract was signed with
the GBI on 1 July 1938.
This was to be the first of many contracts, large and small, that
the SS made and attempted
to make with the GBI, establishing a predominantly
architectural orientation to DEST’s
economic concerns. The GBI agreed to extend RM 9.5 million
in credit to DEST in 1938
in exchange for deliveries of at least 120 million bricks
annually over a ten-year period
from the brickworks at KL Sachsenhausen. So clearly connected
was the enterprise to
state architectural policy that Speer even took credit for
suggesting the construction of a
brickworks for Berlin when funding became an issue with the
Economic Ministry after
the initial contract was signed. (Notably, Speer repeatedly
emphasized in his post-war
work that SS economic aspirations were entirely motivated by
administrators within the
SS. He avoided in his writing all mention of GBI initiatives
with the SS.)35 The delivery of
bricks was to begin by October 1938. However, due to problems
that immediately beset
production at Sachsenhausen, the GBI had paid less than RM 6
million of its promised
support. In a renegotiated contract signed by Speer, Pohl,
Salpeter and Mummenthey on
27 August 1940, the terms of the original agreement were
somewhat altered. The GBI
promised to pay DEST RM 10 million (minus what had already
been paid) on annual
deliveries of 100 million core bricks and 20 million façade

bricks. This new contract came
at a time when the confidence in victory during the war reached
its peak and the viability
of the KL firms had to be reasserted after the failure of the new
brick-making technology
Routledge, 1999.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
©
1
99
9.
R
ou
tle
dg
e.
A

ll
rig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.
25
at Sachsenhausen. Whereas the original contract simply listed
the terms of agreement, the
later contract specifically linked the public interests of the SS
and state architectural
policy: the brickworks at Sachsenhausen was set up to “occupy”
the prisoners of the KL
and, simultaneously, to “help out” with the great pressures
placed on the building materials
industry by the rebuilding of Berlin.36
The GBI was the first and largest single patron of DEST during
its entire history as
a provider of building materials. Beginning with base payments
in 1938 for pre-approved
brick orders and additional payments through 1941 totaling over
RM 9 million, no other

customer was so crucial to DEST’s success. Though credit funds
were received from other
sources including the Reichsbank, the GBI retained its role as
the predominant architectural
client through its payments to the SS.37 Financing the
enterprises at the camps rested
largely on the advantage taken by the SS of the GBI’s need for
an ever larger share of the
building materials market in Germany.
Bank credits and advances from the GBI allowed the SS to build
and develop its
ventures from 1938 to the beginning of the war in September
1939. Construction had
begun on the brickworks at KL Sachsenhausen and Buchenwald
by the summer of 1938
and the initial quarries at KL Flossenbürg and Mauthausen were
either leased or acquired
by this time. The 1938 annual report shows a loss, but in 1939
the operating budget
jumped and a small profit of RM 135,850 was achieved. These
initially optimistic figures
were compromised by the mistakes made at KL Sachsenhausen,
but nevertheless reflect
the growth of the concerns. Payments were also received in
these years for relatively
small orders from (among others) the Reichsautobahn and the
“Buildings at Adolf Hitler
Platz” Association in Weimar. Both of these orders were for
stone, the brickworks not yet
being operational, and indicate the relative success of the
granite works in this period
(profit of over RM 390,000) in relation to the brickworks (loss
of more than RM 390,000).38
Thus, by the time the war began, four of the six concentration

camps were producing or
being readied to produce building materials, some of which
were already making their way
to the monumental building projects of the Party and state. The
SS attempt to obtain a
major share of the building materials industry in Germany was
well under way before
September 1939 due to consistent financial backing and the
increased authority to arrest
extended categories of people. With Speer’s GBI and the
centralized organization of the
seemingly unlimited forced labor, these concentration camps
were filled and the inmates
put to work.
DEST AND THE MONUMENTAL BUILDING ECONOMY
DURING THE WAR
The outbreak of war in September 1939 did little to dampen the
development of DEST
and the pursuit by the SS of a share in the German building
economy. Not only did the SS
expect the war to end quickly, but it had been exempted from
turning over its economic
operations to armaments industries. Hence, DEST extended its
operations, acquired new
quarry sites and brick-making facilities and directed its
production to specific monumental
Routledge, 1999.

26
projects. Punishing prisoners through the development of the
forced-labor camps continued
at a rapid pace.
Three periods of economic activity can be distinguished, which
correspond to state
architectural policy, economic conditions and military
circumstances. First, the quarries
and brickworks went through a phase of accelerated expansion
geared to the production of
architectural materials (1939–42). Second, DEST, in its
attempts to be flexible in the face
of military setbacks, extended only particular works based on
the shrinking number of
architectural projects (1942–3). Finally, DEST redirected labor
and resources towards the
armaments industry economy, though it still had access to the
occasional commission for
architectural materials (1943–4). With its authority extended
through greater policing
powers gained during the war, the SS took advantage of the
crucial importance of
architectural policy to the state and adapted to the economic
crises and priorities inherent
in a wartime market economy.39
With the intent to achieve Nazi ideological and military goals,
the war led to further
political management of the private economy. The regulation of

wages, costs of basic
materials, etc., became central factors for the military economy.
But the difference between
pre- and post-1939 was significant; not only were certain
production costs fixed but the
state also implemented increasingly stringent measures in terms
of the prioritization of
“useful” projects. That is to say, a clear hierarchy was
established based on determining
the necessity of the project to the war effort and, from the
business side, the effectiveness
of the firm at carrying through the project. A firm’s ability to
compete was based less on
competitive pricing and more on productivity. In such a
situation, the larger firms–
particularly the cartels–were favored as they had the means to
maximize productivity
with their expansive use of resources and mobilization of
labor.40
The building economy was no different. In the optimistic war
years before 1942,
articles in the architectural trade journal of Der Deutsche
Baumeister emphasized the need
of architects to become more knowledgeable about the use of
diverse building materials,
the availability of building materials and the relation between
the building economy and
the war effort. But as most materials were already regulated by
the GBBau, the variable
of greatest concern to the building economy was the labor force.
Already within the first
war year, the state encouraged architects and construction
professionals to maximize
labor output at all costs. While the curtailment of peacetime
building projects during the

war (excepting after June 1940 Hitler’s favored projects for
Berlin, Nuremberg, Munich,
Linz and Hamburg) led to some relief from the worker shortage
in other areas of the
building economy, construction was seriously threatened by the
loss of skilled and unskilled
workers to the military. Replacements needed to be found, and
state officials discussed
publicly the use of more foreign civilian labor from occupied
territories and the use of
prisoners of war. In article after article, professionals
emphasized the quantity and quality
of the labor force as the most pressing need in the war economy
and, up to 1942, for the
presumed post-war needs of the monumental building projects
which seemed to be only
a battle victory or two away. Thus, in the early war years, the
efficient use of regulated
Routledge, 1999.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
©

1
99
9.
R
ou
tle
dg
e.
A
ll
rig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.
27
materials as well as the expansion and maximization of labor
productivity dominated the
concerns of the state and its architects. At least up until the

clear military setbacks on the
Eastern Front, such concerns were used to urge architects and
construction managers to
prioritize their efforts in order to pursue the goals both of the
wartime building economy
and Hitler’s favored architectural projects.41
Such an emphasis on productivity and specific monumental
projects proved useful
for DEST administrators in their efforts to expand their
economic operations. In contrast
to other industries that were immediately affected by
restrictions due to the war, SS
ventures were negatively influenced more by the failure of the
new brick-making process
implemented at the KL Sachsenhausen facility (named
Oranienburg I) than by external
factors. This brickworks’ technological failure resulted in the
need to rebuild the facility
and became the basis for the formulation of SS economic
strategy in 1939–40. For example,
in July 1940, Pohl decided on the advice of Salpeter and Hans
Hohberg to collect the
majority of SS firms in a holding company called the German
Economic Concerns (Deutsche
Wirtschaftsbetriebe GmbH [DWB]). The immediate purpose of
the organization was to
offset DEST’s losses at Oranienburg I with the collective profits
from other SS firms. The
reorganization allowed the SS to reduce taxes on the individual
profit-making concerns.
Hohberg more generally introduced modern accounting
techniques and other practices
gained from his pre-SS knowledge of management and
administration.42 Thus, the SS
rationalized its enterprises in 1940, becoming more efficient by

using business practices
of private industry (like the holding company) to cut costs and
raise levels of production.
This rationalization helped the development of DEST, though it
faced a loss based
on the performance of the brickworks. The operating budget
gained in relation to the
previous year, and monthly production at Mauthausen and
Flossenbürg slowly increased.
Both of these camps began to show a profit well above the
proceeds of the brickworks.
The GBI agreed to pay an additional RM 5 million in credit
towards DEST’s operating
budget, RM 1 million of which was designated for the granite
works in May 1940. Further
payments were agreed upon for the brickworks in a new contract
of August 1940 between
the GBI and DEST. The augmentation of funds, and small but
growing profit in the granite
works, contributed to the general optimism among the officials
of DEST in this first war
year, leading Himmler in October 1940 to order an increase in
production. At the end of
the budget year, Salpeter stated that the leadership of DEST had
operated on the assumption
that the war would end victoriously by late fall 1940 and be
followed by an unimaginable
rise in the need for building materials. DEST attempted to
position its firms to take
advantage of this need.43
As the GBI financing indicates, much of the development costs
of DEST and the
promise of its continued success during the war was linked to
the brickworks and their

potential capacity to provide a stable basis of productive
activity for the peacetime years
to come. Aside from the Oranienburg work at Sachsenhausen
and the Berlstedt work at
Buchenwald, the SS had also acquired a brickworks near
Hamburg in 1938 that led to the
planned development and creation of KL Neuengamme in 1940.
Two other brickworks
Routledge, 1999.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
©
1
99
9.
R
ou
tle
dg

e.
A
ll
rig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.
28
within the Reich were purchased in the first years of the war
near KL Stutthof (Danzig)
and Prambachkirchen near Linz. Prambachkirchen, however, did
not use prison labor and
quickly focused its production on armaments tasks.44
Hitler furthered the SS expansion into the brick industry when
he appointed Himmler
to the post of Reich Commissioner for the Consolidation of
German Nationhood
(Reichskommissar für die Festigung Deutschen Volkstums) in
December 1939. In this
position, Himmler was given exclusive authority over all

brickworks in the occupied
territories that were not owned or controlled by German citizens
or by people of German
descent. Salpeter administered the takeover of these properties
through the new concern
of the East German Brickworks (Ostdeutsche Ziegeleibetriebs
GmbH). By May 1940,
the works included those at Bielitz, Kalisch, Posen, Zichenau
and the ghetto at Lodz
(Litzmannstadt). Though not centered around concentration
camps, the eastern brickworks
nevertheless often had brutal labor conditions and extreme
production schedules carried
out by Polish civilians or Jewish forced labor. The SS planned
to use these brickworks
particularly to establish building brigades later in the war for its
own construction projects
in the occupied territory. As in 1935–6, the increased political
authority of the SS was
followed by grander schemes for economic development.45
Bricks were important to the German building industry because
of the restrictions
placed particularly on iron first by Göring’s Four Year Plan and
then the material needs of
the war economy. Ideologically, the construction of brick
buildings was often associated
with local architectural projects (such as those in Hamburg) or
with particular “German”
academic traditions (most notably, that of Schinkel). However,
SS production never
centered on high-quality bricks necessary for façade work
except at KL Neuengamme,
where the clay deposits were particularly good. Though aspiring
to tap the market for
façade bricks, the SS quickly reconciled itself to producing

bricks in most of the works
that would mainly serve as structural material.46
Whereas the brickworks provided the impetus for the SS’s
entrance into the building
materials industry, the stone quarries were more specifically
aligned with particular building
projects. As a result, they had a greater rate of success in
meeting DEST’s economic goals.
In addition to Mauthausen and Flossenbürg, KL Natzweiler and
KL Gross-Rosen were
also set up around quarry systems in 1940. A quarry at Marburg
was acquired by DEST
in 1942, though it employed only civilians. DEST, under the
guidance of Speer’s
administration, also set up a stone-processing center
(Oranienburg II) in 1941 near KL
Sachsenhausen. Oranienburg II used prisoners to cut stone in
preparation for the
monumental building projects in Berlin. The SS created similar
stone-mason programs for
inmates at Flossenbürg, Gross-Rosen and Natzweiler.47
Himmler and Pohl’s decision to
erect a system of quarries connected to concentration camp
labor was quite practical in
relation to the overwhelming importance of stone to the
monumental buildings in National
Socialist Germany. It also corresponded to the general
conditions of the early-war building
economy in which Hitler continued to privilege his high-profile
projects.
Routledge, 1999.

ed
.
29
It is thus hardly surprising that DEST quarries were sited on
high-quality granite
deposits. The SS specifically targeted the monumental
representational building sites,
acquiring contracts for (among others) the German Stadium in
Nuremberg and the Soldiers’
Hall in Berlin. Speer also advised DEST managers in choosing
sites based on the type of
granite for Natzweiler and Gross-Rosen, and possibly for
Flossenbürg and Mauthausen
as well. The focus of quarrying efforts on Hitler and Speer’s
major projects also provided
a reason for justifying further developmental funds for DEST,
funds which could be
related only to the potential output of the brickworks. From
1938 to 1943, the total
turnover of the granite works was at least double that of the
brick producers.48 Though
bricks were always a crucial component of the production plans,
DEST’s quarries were
connected more consistently with specific monumental state and
Party projects. This
optimism concerning the productivity of the quarries and the
expansion of DEST’s
concerns coincided with enlarged camp populations resulting
from the extension of Gestapo

and police authority to arrest individuals for reasons of
“internal state security during the
war.”49 The political function of the camps coincided with the
economic adaptation of
DEST enterprises to the military situation and the wartime
building economy’s focus on
labor and productivity.
Nevertheless, the simultaneous expansion of DEST enterprises
and centralization
of administration at the beginning of the war did not go
unchallenged. In 1940, the Finance
Ministry confronted Pohl with the need to raise SS payments to
the state for support of
prisoners engaged in laboring for SS concerns. This issue was
central to the ability of the
SS to use almost all of its revenue for development rather than
for the welfare of the
laborers. Discussion of this issue took place at a meeting
between the SS and the Finance
Ministry on 20 October 1940. Until this time, SS payments to
the state of RM 0.30 per
inmate per day were meant as a means of funding the upkeep of
the inmates and institutions.
Finance Ministry representatives compared SS payments to the
RM 3.00–4.50 per
prisoner per day paid by the judicial prison system in an attempt
to convince the SS that
it, too, had to raise its support. They also noted that prisoners
hired out to armaments
firms and private businesses netted the Waffen-SS RM 5.00–
6.00 per day. This amount
went directly into funds controlled by Pohl. Though the Finance
Ministry wanted to limit
SS revenue and force it to abide by restrictions like the judicial
penal institutions, the

meeting produced only a promise to take the matter up in the
1941 budget year.50 That the
issue was raised at all, however, indicates the kind of
administrative maneuvering typical
of the National Socialist government which, in this case,
attempted to limit the growing
economic power of the SS–in vain, as it turned out.
In addition to the administrative and technical challenges faced
by the SS in 1940,
Germany’s failure to defeat the British air force in the fall
indicated that the war would
continue for some time. Yet, throughout 1941, DEST persisted
in expanding its economic
activities in order to position itself more strongly in the market
for building materials. As
long as the military successes (especially in France and at the
beginning of the Soviet
campaign in 1941) were more frequent than defeats, building
professionals could still talk
Routledge, 1999.
C
op
yr
ig
ht

©
1
99
9.
R
ou
tle
dg
e.
A
ll
rig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.
30
about the demands of the monumental building projects, and SS

economic administrators
remained optimistic about the extension of their empire. In a
report from the HAVW early
in 1941, goals continued to be set confidently, not only in
relation to the development of
the enterprises but also to the German building market as a
whole. DEST meant to
increase production of stone in the granite works by 30 per cent,
securing a 12.5 per cent
share of the German granite industry, the largest of any firm.
The stone-processing center
of Oranienburg II and the quarry at Natzweiler were also
scheduled to open this year. The
HAVW set goals for the brickworks as well: Oranienburg I at
Sachsenhausen was to be
brought up to half its total production capacity, Buchenwald’s
output was to increase
qualitatively and quantitatively and Neuengamme was to be
completed.51 DEST requested
funding for these developments from the Deutsche
Golddiskontbank through the
Reichsbank, receiving an RM 8 million credit in May 1941.52
Production increased noticeably, though not at the rate
projected by the HAVW.
Mauthausen doubled its rate while Flossenbürg remained
relatively even. Gross-Rosen
continued to develop but slowly, and the brickworks still had
technical problems though
they were producing. DEST, on the basis of sales and
development, resumed talks with
the GBI for further stone contracts. At this stage, as Salpeter
wrote to Mummenthey, top
priority was given to making the concerns ready to take
advantage of the rush on the
building materials market expected as soon as the war ended.53

The loss for the year
totaled over RM 3.3 million as the costs for rebuilding
Sachsenhausen were absorbed,
while turnover reached above RM 2.1 million, once again
mostly from the granite works.54
The SS could continue production in 1941 based on the function
of the forced-labor
camps as oppressive institutions and on Hitler’s decision to
favor certain sectors of the
monumental building economy. Yet economic exceptions
granted to DEST because of the
political function of the concentration camps once again came
up as an issue in the
administrative struggle over tax regulations with the Stone and
Earth Economic Division
(Wirtschaftsgruppe Steine und Erde) in the Reich Economic
Professional Organization
(Reichswirtschaftskammer). In January and February 1941,
Schondorff, for DEST, wrote
to the Economic Professional Organizations that DEST should
be freed from paying any
export-extraction duties on its products. Schondorff justified
this position by stating that
DEST represented no competitive threat to private concerns.
Prisoners produced bad
quality work and the costs such as watch personnel were
significantly higher than those
in the private sector. Furthermore, DEST should be freed from
paying the duties because
judicial prisons were not required to pay taxes on goods
produced.55 Whereas previously
DEST administrators had drawn a distinction between the
concentration camps and
prisons of the judicial system (as with prison laborer support
payments), now they were

relating the two and playing down all notions of income. The
flexibility to redefine the
enterprises was meant here as before to establish SS control
over the largest share of
development income available through the manipulation of its
labor camps.
The Reich Economic Professional Organization ultimately
rejected DEST’s request,
claiming that DEST was too big and would disrupt the
competition in the market whatever
Routledge, 1999.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
©
1
99
9.
R
ou

tle
dg
e.
A
ll
rig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.
31
the claims to the opposite might be. As a registered private
concern, DEST had to follow
the rules set up by the Ministry of Economics for other members
of the organization.
However, as a compromise, a flat-rate payment on earned
revenue was suggested for
DEST similar to that paid by the air transport industry.56 But
even with this compromise,
the Economic Professional Organization showed itself to be
fully aware of DEST’s potential

to achieve the aims that Himmler himself had envisioned: a
substantial share in the
building materials market.
DEST’s expansion and its consistent struggles with other
administrations led in
September 1941 to the reorganization and further rationalization
of the HAVW. All concerns
of the SS were placed in Amt W, the granite quarries and
brickworks being assigned Amt
W I under Salpeter assisted by Mummenthey. (Salpeter had been
called up for war duty,
so Mummenthey continued as the actual leader.) These changes
were short-lived but
important for the final manifestation of the SS economic
administration in the form of the
SS Economic and Administrative Central Office (Wirtschafts-
und Verwaltungshauptamt
[WVHA]), founded in February 1942. The WVHA united the
administrations of the SS
Central Budget and Building Office (Hauptamt Haushalt und
Bauten [HAHuB]) and the
HAVW, forming one organizational entity for all administrative
and economic concerns.
Such a reorganization corresponded to the unprecedented plans
for SS control over
expansion and settlement in the east as well as the growing
pressures for mass mobilization
placed on the German war economy, particularly by the
armaments industries. The
reorganization was further a result of SS administrators still
being optimistic about a
potential post-war building market and plans proposed for their
own massive institutional
building needs in the post-war German order. With the rise in
requests for forced labor

from armaments industries as well as the expansion of SS
enterprises, Pohl could now
place the administration of these tasks under a prioritized and
rationalized economic
policy.57
This reorganization proved successful for increasing the ability
of the SS to adapt to
wartime economic conditions and simultaneously to extend its
economic operations.
Since Speer turned away from architecture after his appointment
in February 1942 as
Minister of Armaments and Munitions Production and head of
the GBBau, he delegated
most of his architectural duties to his staff.58 The important
market planned for SS
building materials–especially the state projects of Berlin,
Nuremberg and Linz–appeared
to be losing support from those planning the wartime economy.
Hence, Pohl’s rationalization
extended his ability to act in all areas of the SS use of forced
labor and became crucial as the
priority given to architectural policy crumbled in the face of
mounting difficulties posed
by the war. DEST was still an important component but only
one of the myriad and
expansive goals set by the WVHA.
In 1942 some monumental building project managers were still
ordering materials
and the perceived need for stone and bricks in the potential
post-war building economy
provided enough impetus for the continued development of
DEST concerns. During
1942, the SS consolidated its hold on properties that it had
previously leased or

s
re
se
rv
ed
.
32
administered and took over the management of several new
concerns. Stutthof, a camp
outside of Danzig, was made an independent KL in April 1942
and two brickworks were
purchased there and nearby at Hopehill. Stutthof concentrated
on brick production, while
Hopehill also produced roofing tiles and ceramic pipes. The
gravel works at Auschwitz,
administered by DEST since 1940, was bought outright in
March 1942. DEST also
acquired the private quarries at Marburg in February 1942,
though they were never fully
developed. Thus, 1942 continued to be a year of expansion and
consolidation for the
building materials concerns of the SS.59
DEST had a total turnover in 1942 of over RM 9.1 million,
almost 7 million of
which came from the production at the granite works alone. Still
troubled by the
reconstruction of the brickworks at KL Sachsenhausen, the

holding company of the DWB
absorbed over RM 1 million in losses. Negotiations were begun
for setting prisoners to
work on armaments production–at Oranienburg II, recycling of
cable and machine parts;
for Flossenbürg a Messerschmitt works; and Mauthausen
inmates were put at the disposal
of Steyr-Daimler Puch AG. However, this did not affect DEST
enterprises. Their
production remained focused on building materials, and above
all stone. The SS maintained
its building materials market orientation even to the point of
displaying the various
stones, brick and ceramic products at an industry trade fair in
October 1942.60 Though
most accounts of the KL system describe this year as marking a
shift towards armaments
production, the reorganization and expansion of SS enterprises
indicates a consistent
effort to maintain the DEST building material operations
throughout 1942 even while the
WVHA was shifting its organizational focus to armaments tasks
under the impetus of
Speer’s ministry.61
It was only in 1943 that the SS succeeded in changing the focus
of production from
building materials to armaments. Even then, however, DEST
still attempted at every turn
to expand and develop its building materials concerns. That the
SS simultaneously promoted
both armaments work and its own building materials firms this
late in the war is indicated
by a DEST audit report:
Actually, an analysis of the profit results shows that returns for

1943 and 1944, for
the most part, stem from the armaments production taken on by
DEST in 1943.
But there is likewise no doubt that the profit situation also has
improved beyond the
scope of the armaments business; for not only the works in
which important
military products were made but also the works that have kept
to their peacetime
production [e.g. granite quarries] show a favorable development
of returns.62
Even though 1943 proved to be a year of restructuring for the
entire forced-labor industry,
the SS continued to hold on to a belief in the eventual
usefulness of DEST building
materials enterprises for architectural products.63
The change in emphasis from the production of building
materials to armaments
work came quickly but with uneven results in the various DEST
enterprises. By the
beginning of 1943 half of the planned new work at KL
Neuengamme was finished and
Routledge, 1999.

.
33
operating, raising the output from 4.3 million bricks in 1942 to
15.2 million in 1943.
Notably, the majority of these bricks were of a very high
quality, suitable more for the
planned rebuilding of Hamburg than simply for the repair of
bomb-damaged structures. It
was not until the first air raids in Hamburg began in summer
1943 that the bricks from KL
Neuengamme were used for reconstruction efforts. Up to that
point, they had been saved
for the eventual end of the war and continuation of the city’s
redesign. Orders continued
to be filled at KL Mauthausen, KL Flossenbürg and KL
Natzweiler as well. Though by
this time private quarries (unlike brickworks) were not
consistently protected as a war-
important industry, DEST quarries received and maintained
exceptional status to continue
their work throughout 1943. While 33 per cent of Flossenbürg’s
c. 8,000 prisoners
(including Soviets) were working for Messerschmitt by
September 1943, 1,000 prisoners
continued to quarry stone even in early 1944.64
By 1943, the issue of payment to the state to support forced
laborers was again
brought up and settled in an attempt to improve the output of
what no longer appeared to

be an unlimited inmate population. Though populations grew
rapidly from c. 60,000 in all
KL in 1942 to over 300,000 by the end of 1943, increased
pressure was put on the camps
by both top SS officials and external administrations
(particularly Speer’s ministry, as
well as the Plenipotentiary for Labor Allocation headed by Fritz
Sauckel) to make forced
labor more productive. Pohl, through an order of 30 December
1942, implemented a new
payment support scale that ranged from the standard RM 0.30
per day to RM 2.50 per
day depending on the classification of the prisoner. The order
sought to obviate problems
similar to those brought up by the Ministry of Finance in 1940:
the appearance on the
part of the SS of having excessive advantage over private firms,
and disturbances of the
market caused by its undercutting prices. This order changed
the overall cost of support
for prisoners in many of the camps. As many prisoners who
lived through the experience
attest, some advantages did accrue directly to them as a result
(including allowing them to
acquire small quantities of tobacco or receive extra food rations
for heavy labor and
armaments work in camp canteens) but these supposed
advantages were sometimes
fictitious or irregular at best. Yet, for the majority, their labor
did change from the murderous
production of building materials to the relatively more valued
armaments tasks.65
Although little expansion took place during 1943 in the capacity
of the DEST
works to direct output towards the monumental state and Party

projects, fewer cutbacks
in this area were made than the historical literature suggests.
While in 1943 much of the
remainder of concentration camp labor was turned towards
armaments production, the
DEST works still produced their highest turnover yet with
almost RM 9 million coming
from the granite quarries alone. Revenues for DEST also
remained high for the first half of
1944, totaling c. RM 6.6 million.66 However, by 1944, the
development of DEST’s
building materials business was almost entirely stopped. The
quarries filled only a few
orders and had been idle for the most part, while the brickworks
continued producing for
air-raid shelters and for the eventual rebuilding of bomb-
destroyed cities. Whereas a large
clay deposit was purchased in summer 1944 at Zehlendorf for
brick production at KL
Routledge, 1999.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
©

1
99
9.
R
ou
tle
dg
e.
A
ll
rig
ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.
34
Sachsenhausen, an attempt to buy a quarry previously leased by
DEST for KL Flossenbürg

was put of until the end of the war.67
Yet even the total mobilization of DEST and the other KL
concerns for the war
economy was short-lived, as the organization of the camps came
under increased pressure
with the advance of the Soviets on the Eastern Front. By
January 1945, KL Stutthof had
been evacuated as had other eastern camps, sending thousands
of prisoners on a murderous
march west to camps like Flossenbürg and Mauthausen or
leaving them to die along the
road.68 The orientation of DEST economic enterprises at the
concentration camps to the
architectural projects of the Party and state could not compete
with the total mobilization
of the German economy by 1943. As a producer of building
materials, DEST quickly
faded away, for the military defeats eroded its basis of support
in state contracts for the
monumental building economy.
What is evident from this institutional overview of DEST is that
the SS interest in
the production of building materials was subject to the political
pressures on the building
economy beginning as early as 1936 and extending into the
crucial war years. As an
important economic sector of pre-war and wartime Germany, the
building economy itself
was integrated into the developing political economy of the
state. But as long as this
political economy could be adapted and expanded to include the
variable needs of
monumental state architectural projects, the pre-war
development of DEST around high-

quality granite concerns and brickworks could continue.
Further, these concerns could be
extended during the war due to the increased control of new
numbers of forced laborers
sent to the concentration camps as a result of military
operations. Only in 1942–3 did
DEST administrators reluctantly give up this politically
determined advantage of controlling
the largest labor force of any building materials concern in the
German economy. However,
just as the wartime setbacks undermined Hitler and Speer’s
pursuit of architectural
construction so too did these wartime conditions promote a
further militarization of the
German economy including that of the building industry. The
results of this institutional
development would prove crucial for the day-to-day life of the
prisoners in the key
forced-labor camps geared to the production of building
materials for DEST.
PRODUCTIVITY AND PUNISHMENT AT THE DEST STONE
QUARRIES
Having analyzed the development of DEST in relation to
monumental architectural policy
and the militarized economy, the question remains as to how
these developments were
affected by the punitive policies implemented in the camps
themselves. Because the
granite quarry concentration camps were more dependent than
the brickworks on the
monumental Party and state projects, an analysis of the two
major DEST quarry camps–
KL Flossenbürg and KL Mauthausen– indicates most clearly
how the economic goals of

the SS amounted to an architectural policy. It also indicates the
extremely variable results
Routledge, 1999.
C
op
yr
ig
ht
©
1
99
9.
R
ou
tle
dg
e.
A
ll
rig

ht
s
re
se
rv
ed
.
35
of those economic goals. Once the first stages of camp
construction and development
were completed, both quarry systems became active in
producing stone for local and state
needs. From 1938 to at least mid-1943, the majority of forced
labor performed by the
prisoners was devoted to the production of building materials
for DEST. Because of the
increased flow of prisoners to the camp, the SS was least
concerned about the conditions
of laborers in this period. Thus, the number of work-related
injuries and deaths in the
forced-labor concentration camps remained high while DEST
pursued its interests in the
building materials economy. Output rather than maximization of
labor potential remained
the primary criteria for the abuse of labor. The productivity of
that labor was won not at
the expense but as a result of the camp’s main function of

punishing the inmates. The
political practice of policing the prisoners was significantly
influenced by the economic
policy of productivity.69
KL Flossenbürg and KL Mauthausen (Figures 4, 5) were the
fifth and sixth
concentration camps set up in National Socialist Germany, after
Dachau, Buchenwald,
Sachsenhausen and (at that time) Lichtenburg. On 24 March
1938, Eicke, Pohl and the
building engineer Hubert Karl (SS-Verwaltungsamt) visited the
land around Flossenbürg
and then Mauthausen. The group decided in favor of both sites
for the formation of new
concentration camps, above all because of the available granite.
In the case of Mauthausen,
an additional justification for its location near Linz was the
purported need to employ the
expected number of new prisoners resulting from the annexation
of Austria on 12 March
1938. By 30 March 1938, the Gauleiter for Oberdonau, August
Eigruber, triumphantly
spoke of the honor Austria had received in being allocated its
own concentration camp in
a speech picked up by the international press.70
KL Flossenbürg originally included three leased quarries with a
fourth acquired
in 1941, all near the camp itself. The total planned output was
12,000 cbm (cubic
meters) of stone a year, 90 per cent of which was to be
architectural quality stone
while only 10 per cent was to be for street building material.
The stone consisted of
coarse-grained blue-gray and gray-yellow granite of an average

grade. KL Mauthausen
was made up of three quarries, all acquired or leased in 1938:
Wienergraben immediately
outside of the camp complex and leased from the city of
Vienna; Kastenhof, also a
leased quarry but several kilometers from the camp; and Gusen,
the land of which was
partly leased and partly purchased from the local quarry firm
Poschacher and also far
from the camp. The granite was blue-gray, fine-grained and of a
higher quality than
that of Flossenbürg, though only 42,000 cbm of the planned
output of 290,000 cbm
a year was suitable for high-profile architectural projects.71
Since the quarrying industry
by definition was heavily reliant on labor-intensive work,
achieving such fantastic
production goals for both camps would require the effective
organization of thousands
o f i n m a t e s . T h a t t h e p o l i t i c a l f u n c t i o n o f
t h e c a m p w o u l d , o n t h e o n e
Routledge, 1999.
C
op
yr
ig

hand, hinder economic effectiveness (through a focus on
physical and arbitrary punishment)
while, on the other, guarantee control over a large productive
labor force did not at the time
appear to DEST administrators as a contradiction.
Hitler’s and Speer’s aesthetics and the massiveness of the
ceremonial building projects
secured the market for Flossenbürg and Mauthausen granite and
its production in quantity.
Granite and stone in general had been favored by Hitler even as
early as Mein Kampf (1925).
In his book, Hitler contrasted the worthy endurance of stone
monuments of the past with the
plaster and temporary tenements and department stores “of a
few Jews” in the Weimar
Republic. German architects and architectural administrators
had argued long before Hitler for
the ideological significance of stone, even if what, exactly,
stone architecture signified was
disputed. Hitler’s favored projects posed no less of a
contradiction in that stone buildings
Figure 4
WATCH TOWER AT KL
FLOSSENBÜRG, c. 1940 (present
condition)
Source: Author
Routledge, 1999.

37
could be discussed simultaneously in terms of an imagined
reference to Greek society
(and, hence, Aryan racist roots) or to Roman precedents
(emphasizing a comparison of
the contemporary German “empire” with those of the past). But
whatever the ideological
significance, the importance of certain kinds of stone remained
a dominant feature of
Hitler’s aesthetic commitments and, by extension, a key
symbolic component of the
German building economy. Because the aesthetic preferences of
Hitler and Speer determined
the materials chosen for the building projects of the “Führer
Städte,” the blue-gray granite
at each DEST quarry could easily serve these projects. This
aesthetic also guided the
further purchase of quarries at KL Gross-Rosen and KL
Natzweiler.72
But the organization and institutional socialization of camp
personnel, from the
commandant to the guards, worked against the efficient
production of stone to fulfill the
aesthetic choices of state and Party architecture. Particularly
apparent was the contradiction
between the economic goals set out by the trained management
personnel of DEST’s
central office and the emphasis placed on punishment by
commandants and guards who

had worked their way through the ranks of the Death’s Head
Squad under Eicke’s Dachau
model. From the beginning, Dachau was known for its random
physical abuse of prisoners,
a characteristic that was common to concentration camps during
their entire period of
existence. In the camps, Himmler took care that the
punishments would be controlled by
SS personnel, away from the interference of the Justice Ministry
but also outside of the
control of DEST. At Dachau, Eicke early on instituted a
standard hierarchy of punishment
and an organization of the camp administration that remained
relatively constant until the
end of the war and de-emphasized an efficient use of forced
labor. The use of forced labor
was subject to the approval of the commandant, though the
camp administration as a
whole remained under the authority of the central SS office in
Berlin.73
The hierarchy of the camp administration indicated the potential
means by which
the prisoners would be punished and also made productive.
Those who determined the
Figure 5
SOUTHWEST FAÇADE OF KL
MAUTHAUSEN, c. 1942 (present
condition)
Source: Author
Routledge, 1999.

ed
.
38
lives of the prisoners were organized in the five departments of
the inner administration.
First was the Kommandantur, including the commandant who
was responsible for both
the guards and the overall camp administration. After the
organization of the WVHA in
early 1942, commandants were also meant to manage the
economic enterprises at the
camps. At both Mauthausen and Flossenbürg, however,
management of the works remained
mostly under the control of the DEST administrators even after
1942. The second
department of the camp was the Political Division controlled by
the Gestapo and
responsible for the registration of new prisoners and any release
of so-called reformed
inmates. The camp administration made up another division
(including the camp building
engineer) and the camp doctor formed a fourth division.74
The fifth section, the Protective Custody Camp Leader
(Schutzhaftlagerführer),
supervised the economic function of the camps. The
Schutzhaftlagerführer had the most
immediate and direct control over each prisoner’s life and was
therefore central to the

effectiveness of the forced labor in the camps. Because of the
size of the camps, more than
one person frequently led this division. The
Schutzhaftlagerführer oversaw the work
assignments as well as the Block leaders and the Commando
leaders, who were responsible
for the prisoner Kapos. Kapos were directly chosen from the
prisoners and held
accountable for the inmates under their control. Till 1943,
Kapos were invariably German
criminals used by the SS to ensure that most day-to-day
punishments would be conducted
by the inmates themselves. The orders from the central offices
of DEST in Berlin went
directly to the Schutzhaftlagerführer, then were carried out in
the quarries through the
work assignments. This process allowed for much abuse of the
system, as the
Schutzhaftlagerführer was rarely held responsible for any deaths
or injuries to the prisoners
on the job as long as the assigned task was done.75 This
division of the camp thus
embodied the dual goal of the organization of forced labor for
economic production and
the oppression of the prisoners. While the emphasis on
punishment denied the efficient
maximization of labor it did not preclude the possibility of
productive forced labor used
to achieve DEST’s economic goals. In this sense, work and the
destruction of prisoners
were related goals of DEST managers and on-site SS personnel.
But how did this organizational emphasis on production and
punishment work in
practice at Flossenbürg and Mauthausen? Of the two camps,
Flossenbürg opened first at

the end of April or early May 1938. The initial Commandant
was SS-Sturmbannführer
Jakob Weiseborn, who committed suicide in January 1939 and
was replaced by SS-
Obersturmführer Karl Künstler. Künstler, a career soldier,
directed the camp from May
1939 to August 1942 in its most active period of development
and success in granite
production. However, after a drunken brawl in April 1942, he
was strongly censured by
Pohl and Himmler at which point he entered the Waffen-SS
division Prinz Eugen to fight
at the front. He was replaced in September 1942 by the
Commandant from Natzweiler,
SS-Sturmbannführer Egon Zill. Zill proved ineffectual in his
duties, however, and was
replaced in April 1943 by Max Koegel who had been trained,
like many, at Dachau. The
Schutzhaftlagerführer, SS-Hauptsturmführer Hans Aumeier, also
came from Dachau and
Routledge, 1999.
C
op
yr
ig
ht

in the same role at the end
of 1941. He was replaced by SS-Hauptsturmführer Karl Fritzsch
who held the post till
March 1944. The work leader for the DEST quarries was SS-
Mann Max Schubert, who
was replaced in January 1942 by SS-Obersturmführer Alois
Schubert.76 The socialization
of these men was varied, from rural to urban, lower class to
middle class, and reflected the
general heterogeneity of the SS. However diverse their
backgrounds, though, the
administration of Flossenbürg provided them with an
opportunity to achieve their personal,
political or ideological goals by punishing inmates and making
them productive.77
At the end of April 1938, the first prisoners arrived from
Buchenwald and were
used to build the camp and prepare the stone quarries. Prisoners
were sent from Dachau
between May and July, from Buchenwald between August and
November, and from
Sachsenhausen in late November, bringing the total to 1,500
inmates by the end of 1939.
The initial work led by Schubert at the stone quarries was heavy
labor with primitive
tools, since the modernization of methods did not occur until
1940–1. The clearing of the
camp site itself and the construction of necessary buildings for
the prisoners also occupied
much of the initial stage of forced labor. By the end of 1939,
enough of the quarries had
been cleared for stone orders to begin.78
At Mauthausen, the SS administration was changed less often
and the quarries

EDSP 370Essay on Intellectual Disabiities InstructionsTh.docx

EDSP 370Essay on Intellectual Disabiities InstructionsTh.docx

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to EDSP 370Essay on Intellectual Disabiities InstructionsTh.docx

Similar to EDSP 370Essay on Intellectual Disabiities InstructionsTh.docx (20)

More from tidwellveronique

More from tidwellveronique (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

EDSP 370Essay on Intellectual Disabiities InstructionsTh.docx