UASSC Update by Industry Co-Chair

AAUS
RPAS in Australian Skies 2017 Conference
June 2017
CASA UASSC
INDUSTRY CO-CHAIR UPDATE
DR TERRY MARTIN

Acceptable Design
Regulated Specific
RiskAssessment
Methodology
Traffic Density
Certification
Status
Population
Comms &
Surveillance
Coverage
CrewTraining
Airspace
Category
Operation
Criticality
Benchmarking (EU, US)
Airspace
Management
Policy
Human Factors
CNPC
Detect & Avoid
Risk Management
sUAS & Low Level
UAVOps
Ops near
Aerodromes
Security
EmergingTech
National
Operational
Priorities
CONOPS
Unique
Sector
Requirements
Common
Requirements
ALL CONOPS
Roadmap
Development Scoping
Terms of Reference
Goals
Scope
Objectives
Bounds & Limits
Assumption
Baselining
CASA Processes
Approval
Benchmark
Available
Manpower
Risk Management
Knowledge Gaps
Safety Obligations
Trial Appetite
KEY OUTPUTS
• Separation Confidence
• Position Reporting: RAIM like assurance
• Navigation Performance
• Compatibility with Airspace Class Requirements
• Confidence platform can reliably maintain flight
Trials
Evidence
Requirements
Skills
Trial Sites
Teaming
Safety
Expectations
Trial
Methodologies
Feedback
Expectation

Copyright:Terrence Martin
UASSC Roadmap Update
Risk Assessment Methodology
• Expanded Operations critically reliant on Risk Process
developed
• Likely adoption of JARUS SORA
• SAWG exploring its merits, shortfalls,
• Developing interim solutions, supplemented by general
lessons developed at Nova: Shadow, Heron, etc
• Close Follow, Hybrid or go it Alone
• More Later
Risk Assessment
RiskAssessment
Methodology
Traffic Density
Certification
Status
Population
Comms &
Surveillance
Coverage
CrewTraining
Airspace
Category
Operation
Criticality

Objectives
• Identify the Priority sectors, and benefits for RPAS
Operations in Australia
• Set of CONOPS developed & provided to forum for
review
Objectives: CONOPS Coverage
National
Operational
Priorities
CONOPS
Agriculture:
• Broad Area PrecisionAgriculture,
• Pest &Weed Detection,
Disaster & Emergency Services
• SAR (Maritime)
• Tropical Cyclone with Cells onWings
• CBRN
• Small Scale Urban SAR
Cells onWings (COWS) & UTM
Conservation
Mining/Hard Rock/Pit/Open Cut
Logistics
• Package Delivery
• Long Range Freight
Training
• BVLOS
• VLOS/EVLOS
Roadmap
Development Scoping
Terms of Reference
Goals
Scope
Objectives
Bounds & Limits
Assumption

Objectives
• Identify the Priority sectors, and benefits for RPAS
Operations in Australia (Includes CONOPs
development) .
• Set of CONOPS developed & provided to forum for
review
Objectives: CONOPS Coverage
National
Operational
Priorities
CONOPS
Agriculture:
• Broad Area PrecisionAgriculture,
• Pest &Weed Detection,
• SAR (Maritime)
• Tropical Cyclone with Cells onWings
• CBRN
Cells onWings (COWS) & UTM
Conservation
Logistics
Training
• BVLOS
• VLOS/EVLOS
Roadmap
Development Scoping
Terms of Reference
Goals
Scope
Objectives
Bounds & Limits
Assumption
KEY ELEMENT of BENCHMARKING IS ADOPTION of JARUS SORA
CONOPS DEVELOPMENT CRITICAL for SORA EFFORTS
MORE LATER

Baselining
CASA Processes
Approval
Benchmark
Available
Manpower
Risk Management
Knowledge Gaps
Safety Obligations
Trial Appetite
Objectives
• Baseline Australia’s RPAS regulatory environment
• Benchmark against International Standards
Roadmap
Development Scoping
Terms of Reference
Goals
Scope
Objectives
Bounds & Limits
Assumption
Baselining CASA Processes
Airspace
Management
Policy
Human Factors
CNPC
Detect & Avoid
Risk Management
sUAS & Low Level
UAVOps
Ops near
Aerodromes
Security
EmergingTech

Baselining
CASA Processes
Approval
Benchmark
Available
Manpower
Risk Management
Knowledge Gaps
Safety Obligations
Trial Appetite
Objectives
• Baseline Australia’s RPAS regulatory environment
• Benchmark against International Standards
Roadmap
Development Scoping
Terms of Reference
Goals
Scope
Objectives
Bounds & Limits
Assumption
Baselining CASA Processes
Airspace
Management
Policy
Human Factors
CNPC
Detect & Avoid
Risk Management
sUAS & Low Level
UAVOps
Ops near
Aerodromes
Security
EmergingTech
WHY?
• Community is uncertain what the current
approval BVLOS baseline is!
• Don’t need to reinvent the wheel, &
harmonisation
• Vague understanding of the regulatory
and capability gaps that are preventing
progress of range of BVLOS Operations

14 Key R&D Activities:
• EVLOS/VLOS
• 1.RPAS activities awareness for security
• 2. Operations in Urban Areas
• 3. Human Factors
• IFR/VFR
• 4. Visual Detectability solutions
• 5. DAA
• 6. Comms C2 Datalink
• 7. Airspace & Airport Access
• 8 Contingency
• BVLOS
• 9. DAA
• 11 Airspace & Airport Access
• 12. Security
• 13 Human Factors: BVLOS & IFR/VFR
• 14 Best Practice Demonstration
Europe: Technology and Operational Gaps
GAPS LINKED
TO
ACTION
&
MILESTONES
Operational & Technology
gaps:
1. Integration into ATM and Airspace
environments
2. Surface operations incl. take-off and
landing
3. Operational contingency procedures
and systems
4. Data communication links incl.
spectrum issues
5. Detect & Avoid systems and
operational procedures
6. Security issues
7. Verification and Validation Methods

14 Key R&D Activities:
• EVLOS/VLOS
• 1.RPAS activities awareness for security
• 2. Operations in Urban Areas
• 3. Human Factors
• IFR/VFR
• 4. Visual Detectability solutions
• 5. DAA
• 7. Airspace & Airport Access
• 8 Contingency
• BVLOS
• 9. DAA
• 11 Airspace & Airport Access
• 12. Security
• 13 Human Factors: BVLOS & IFR/VFR
• 14 Best Practice Demonstration
Europe: Technology and Operational Gaps
GAPS LINKED
TO
ACTION
&
MILESTONES
Operational & Technology
gaps:
1. Integration into ATM and Airspace
environments
2. Surface operations incl. take-off and
landing
3. Operational contingency procedures
and systems
4. Data communication links incl.
spectrum issues
5. Detect & Avoid systems and
operational procedures
6. Security issues
7. Verification and Validation Methods
So are we going to reinvent the wheel on all of these?
Do we even have the capacity?
Where should we Close Follow?

Trials
Evidence
Requirements
Skills
Trial Sites
Teaming
Safety
Expectations
Trial
Methodologies
Feedback
Expectation
Site Attributes:
• Location, Proximity to Critical Infrastructure/CBD/Aerodromes
• Politics, funding, investment
• Instrumentation?
• Airspace Class, Surveillance, Population,VHF Coverage, IFR/VFR Routes,
Terrain,
• Feedback of Information/Data to CASA
Roadmap Development: Trials

Identify key gaps & opportunities
• Reg Procedures -> CASA or Airservices
• Technical Specification Development :
• DAA, CNPC -> Regulatory Bodies
• Platform Integrity Requirements forOperations
• Evidence requirements for Risk: traffic, population
• Technology Shortfalls -> Industry (perhaps supported by Govt funding)
• “Quick win” opportunities for commencing operations,
Key Outputs

Tough Choices
[1] “Roadmap for the integration of civil RPAS into the European Aviation System”, EASA June 2013
[2] US Dept. Transport, ‘Integration of CivilUnmannedAircraftSystems (UAS) in the National AirspaceSystem (NAS) Roadmap, ’
CNPC DAA/SAA
Performance Specifications including path loss, link
margins, attennas, lost link declaration times
Performance specifications considering Detection
performance, FAR, tracking rates, encounter dynamics &
platform manuevreability, human response times, …..
Spectrum allocations GBSAA & ABSAA possibilities
Security Relationship with C2
• European1 RPAS & US DOT “NAS Integration” 2 roadmaps clearly highly the critical role
that DAA, CNPC & ATM will play in safe integration of RPAS into the NAS, particularly for
expanded operations,
• JARUS, RTCA, EUROCAE, ICAO, EASA & FAA have various working groups conducting
research into these topics to identify technical & procedural uncertainty, and produce
necessary procs and specification .
• Issues currently under review:
• Indigenous effort (money & time) dedicated to this area is limited.
• Our Capacity (Skills, Knowledge, Experience) is what???

Tough Choices
Options for CASA & Australian Industry on CNPC, DAA, ATM …(Risk???):
1. Do nothing,
2. CASA:
• Work with international NAAs to develop regulatory and technological solutions for UAS integration into NAS.
• Work independently from the international community on Australian specific solutions for UAS integration into
NAS.
3. Industry provides bigger contribution to be part of the solution, working closely with CASA
4. A combination of above.
Have we consciously decided to “close-follow”, or have we defaulted to
it because its easy?
What is the implications of doing so?

• Identity key gaps/issues/challenges/opportunities which must be addressed to commence priority operations
• Isolate Degrees of Freedom:
• Where we can act, or where must we wait.
• Who needs to be involved in that decision?
Key Outputs

Taking into consideration Indigenous Capacity (CASA and Industry) :
• Identity key gaps/issues/challenges which must be addressed,
• Isolate Degrees of Freedom:
With known gaps, degrees of freedom, and areas of uncertainty
• Establish trial priorities, prioritised sequencing for their conduct and
necessary resourcing, partners
• Provide recommendations and proposed schedules for CASA in
regulatory development priorities CASR Part 101/102, MOS and ACs
Key Outputs

• Gap Analysis, Benchmark, Baseline
• Risk Assessment:
• SORA: more from Mike Roberts
• Airworthiness : Initial and Continuing
• Detect & Avoid: more from BrandonWilliams
• Control & Non-Payload Communications (CNPC)
• Airspace Integration: More from Brandon Suaraz
• Training: more from Dan Minton
• Test Ranges &Trials
• Security & Privacy
• Operations
• EmergingTechnologies
Remainder of Presentation

JARUS
Specific Operations Risk
Assessment
(SORA)

JARUS SORA
Future RPAS Framework
Certified Specific Open
Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS Toys
European Approach
Australian Draft Framework
Regulated Specific Open
Standard Restricted Specific Small RPAS Very small RPAS
Low
Risk
Operations
Medium
Risk
Operations
High
Risk
Operations

CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited
Over population etc
Controlled Airspace
BVLOS
IFR Conditions
Above 400 feet AGL
Within 3 NM of Aerodrome
JARUS SORA
Regulation for Specific Category
Regulated Specific

CONOPS Consideration Standard Restricted Specific Limited
Over population etc
Controlled Airspace
BVLOS
IFR Conditions
Above 400 feet AGL
Within 3 NM of Aerodrome
JARUS SORA
Regulation for Specific Category
Regulated Specific
Work to be done
• What Equipment
• What Restrictions
• What Procedures
• WhatTraining
• How is RISK Assessed?

SORA INPUT
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS Description
• Remote Crew
SAIL Evaluation
Ground
Risk
Class
Air Risk
Class
Lethality
SAIL Verdict
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SORA OUTPUT
Lowest SAIL I- low intrinsic risk,
Highest, SAIL VI - high intrinsic risks
SAIL determines objectives to be met and
the level of robustness
JARUS SORA
High Level Overview
JARUS has flagged that the release of an updated draft in July 2017.
A pictorial overview of the SORA Process can be found here:
https://www.slideshare.net/terrymartin2805826/overview-of-the-jarus-specific-operations-risk-assessment-process

SORA OUTPUT
SORA INPUT
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS Description
• Remote Crew
SAIL Evaluation
Ground
Risk
Class
Air Risk
Class
Lethality
SAIL Verdict
me.
me.
me.
me.
me.
Training
Barriers
Design
& Prod
Barriers
Ops
Barriers
Maint
Barriers
Risk Management
JARUS SORA

SORA OUTPUT
SORA INPUT
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS Description
• Remote Crew
SAIL Evaluation
Ground
Risk
Class
Air Risk
Class
Lethality
SAIL Verdict
me.
me.
me.
me.
me.
Training
Barriers
Design
& Prod
Barriers
Ops
Barriers
Maint
Barriers
Risk Management
JARUS SORA
SAIL Drives the Robustness of the barriers
• Level of Integrity (How tough is the standard)
• Level of Assurance
• Who checks and what their credentials are
• Evidence required

JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Threat Barriers
UAS out
Of
Control
Technical Issues
with UAS
Aircraft on
Collision Course
Human Error
Datalink
Deterioration
Adverse
Operating
Conditions
Deteriorating of
External
Systems
Operational procedures are
defined, validated and adhered
to
The remote crew is trained to
identify critical environmental
conditions and to avoid them
Environmental conditions for safe
operations defined, measurable
and adhered to
UAS designed and qualified for
adverse environmental
conditions (e.g. adequate
sensors, DO-160 qualification)
UAS is designed to
automatically manage
datalink deterioration
situations
Datalink performance
established and
verified (e.g. datalink
budget)
Procedures and
limitations are in-
place and adhered
to
Datalink systems and infrastructure
is manufactured to adequate
standards appropriate to the
operation
Datalink systems and
infrastructure is designed to
adequate standards
appropriate to the operation
Datalink systems and
infrastructure is installed and
maintained to adequate standards
appropriate to the operation
Procs are in place to handle
deterioration of external
systems supporting RPAS Operations
UAS is designed to manage deterioration of
externals
systems supporting RPAS Operations
Operational procedures are
defined, validated and
adhered to
Remote crew trained and
current and able to control
the abnormal situation
The UAS is detectable by
other airspace users
UAS is equipped with
functionality to maintain
safe separation
Operational
procedures are
defined, validated
and adhered to
Remote crew trained
and current and able to
control the abnormal
situation
Multi crew
coordination
Adequate resting
times are defined
and followed
Safe recovery
from Human
Error
A Human Factors evaluation
has been performed and the
HMI found appropriate for
the mission
Automatic protection of
critical flight functions
(e.g. envelope
protection)
The operator
is competent
and/or
proven
UAS
manufactured by
competent and/or
proven entity
UAS
maintained by
competent
and/or proven
entity
UAS developed
to authority
recognized
design
standards
Inspection of
the UAS
(product
inspection)
Operational
procedures are
defined,
validated and
adhered to
UAS is designed
considering
system safety and
reliability
Remote crew trained
and current and able
to control the
abnormal situation
Safe recovery
from technical
issue
Threats
Overview: Specific Threat Barriers identified for SORA Process

JARUS SORA and SAIL Assessment
Harm Barriers
UAS out
Of
Control
HAZARD
Fatalities to 3rd
Parties on Ground
Fatalities to 3rd
Parties in the Air
Damage to
Critical Infrastructure
HARM
Two Types of Harm Barriers
• Reduce Effect of Hazard with respect to relevant harm
• Reduce the likelihood the hazard will cause harm
Contingency
Procedures are
defined,
validated &
adhered to
Crew Training
is adequate to
cope with
Situation
Containment
in place and
effective
Contingency
Procedures
are defined,
validated &
adhered to
Contingency
Procedures are
defined,
validated &
adhered to
Crew Training is
adequate to
cope with the
situation
UAS Design
Features
mitigate the
severity of
MAC
UAS equipped
with capability
to Avoid
Collision
Design features
that aid visibility
and or detection
by other aircraft
Crew
Training is
adequate to
cope with the
situation
Containment
in place and
effective
(tether, geo-
fencing, etc.)
UAS equipped
with obstacle
Avoidance
capability
Effects of
Ground Impact
Reduced
Allowed Operation
Profile takes critical
infrastructure into
consideration
Effects of
Ground Impact
are reduced

SORA INPUT
Concept of Ops
Information on:
• Operator
• Intended Ops
• UAS Description
• Remote Crew
SAIL Evaluation
Ground
Risk
Class
Air Risk
Class
Lethality
SAIL Verdict
SORA OUTPUT
JARUS SORA
CONOPS & the Roadmap

CONOPS
Guidelines for System & Operation Information for a CONOPS
Organisation Operations
Training
RPAS
Airframe
Performance
Flight
Controls
Propulsion
Sensors
Payloads
RPA
Geo
Fence
Navigation
Autopilot
RPS
FCS
DAA
Payloads
Control
Details &
Architecture
Loss
Degradation
Safety
Features
C2 Link GSE
Training
Barriers
Maintenances
Crew Details
Safety Normal Ops
Strategy
AbnormalOps
Accidents &
Incidents
SOPs
Maint of Currency
FSTDs
Training Program
InitialTRG & Quals

CONOPS
SAWG: Finding our Priority GAPS

CONOPS
SAWG: Finding our Priority GAPS
SORACONOPS Considerations
Agriculture:
• Broad Area Precision
Agriculture,
• Pest & Weed Detection,
• SAR (Maritime)
• Tropical Cyclone with Cells
on Wings
• CBRN
• Cells on Wings (COWS) &
UTM
Conservation
Logistics
Training
• BVLOS
• VLOS/EVLOS
RPASAWG CONOPS
Unique
CONOP Gaps
Common
Gaps ALL
CONOPS
SORA
BLACKBOX
Barrier Robustness
Airworthiness
Operations
Training
Procedures
me.
me.
me.
me.
me.
GAPS in
• Technical Specifications, or Solutions
• ATC or CASA Procedures & processes
• Low Hanging Fruit

Airworthiness
SORA Elements dedicated to Airworthiness
Barriers in the SORA that have initial or continuing airworthiness implications shown in Orange

Airworthiness
JARUS WG-3 Draft Proposal: Operator Approval
Desired CONOPs
SAIL
Required Barriers for CONOPS
Operational
Approval
NOTE: Intrinsic SAIL 5
Manufacturing Standards ?
SORA
Robustness
• Level of Integrity: ADS
• Assurance:Who & Evidence

Airworthiness
JARUS WG-3
• OL-TC provides manufacturers with
flexibility to produce RPAS for specific
CONOPS, without the need to
incorporate systems to mitigate risks
that are not present within that
CONOPS
Manufacturer
FullTC
• CS-LURS,
• CS-LUAS
Operationally
LimitedTC
For Eg.
Agricultural
Application
SORA
Required Barriers for CONOPS
Robustness
• Level of Integrity:Tailored ADS
• Assurance:Who & Evidence

Training
• Training Plays a significant Role in Preventing Undesired Consequences
• Operating, Design, Maintenance

SORA Training Distilled?
• Competence
• Operator
• Maintainer
• Manufacturer
• Crew
• Technical issues
• Abnormal & emergencies
• Deteriorating Systems
• Operational & Contingency
Procedure& limitations
• In place, validated & adhered to
across all threat & harm lines

Training Objectives
1. Ensure training is designed in such a sequence that a person can ‘continue’
or ‘build on’ a previously attained qualification, much like the manned world
(in line with part 61).
2. International licencing recognition
3. Address industry needs for todays operations (low hanging fruit)
4. Tiered flight training organisations (more accessible for industry)
5. Tiered licencing and ratings
6. Training for others: ATC, Maintenance, GroundCrew

Training Objectives
Suggested Categories
• Basic RePL
• Night Operations
• EVLOS
• CRP Rating: add to business…supports owning a business
• Controlled Airspace Rating
• Instructor Rating
• BVLOS Rating
• SpecificType Ratings and orTypeTraining

Training Category Suggestions
Suggested Categories
• Basic RePL
• Night Operations
• EVLOS
• CRP Rating: add to business…supports owning a business
• Controlled Airspace Rating
• Instructor Rating
• BVLOS Rating
• SpecificType Ratings and orTypeTraining

Draft Observations
Observations
• Duration, skill of instructors, should organisation be an RTO
• Should CASA set curriculum or other organisations
• Should the training rigour scale with CONOPS, risk & SAIL

Detect & Avoid
• Focused on UA requiring approval to fly in airspace
normally frequented by commercial transport aircraft
• Facilitates transition to Class A or special use airspace,
traversing Class D, E & G
• Requires Equipment supporting both Cooperative &
uncooperative DAA
RTCA Phase 1 MOPS

Detect & Avoid
Encounter Set: Understanding the Risk
DetectEncounters
Own-ship
Data
Tracker
Alerting
Guidance
Display Pilot
Aircraft
Model

Detect & Avoid
SC-228 MOPS Development
Alert
Pilot
Detect
Intruder
Determine
Resolution
15 s
Negotiate
ATC
Clearance
10 s 30.0 s
maneuver
to
remain
well clear
(Aircraft Performance
???
35.0 s
DAAWell Clear
Radar Declaration Range
RDR and RCS to be established for:
• Small (< 100kts),
• Medium (<130 kts)
• Large Aircraft (< 170 kts)

DAA Performance Assessment
RTCA SC 228 SAA Requirements
220 Degrees
30 Degrees
Day, Night, Bright Light, & any
weather

SC-228
• Detection:
• Range RDR: 8 NM +
• Must establish intruder track before 4000 ft (RCPR) 99% of time
• Must establish tracks for 95% of intruders starting at RDR
• No more than 20 seconds to establish track once in FoR
• Probability FalseTracks: 1 false track per hour
• Within FoR, with Slant range out to 8 NM or RDR of Large Intruder
• Range Accuracy: 50 feet
• Range Rate Accuracy: 8 feet/second
• Azimuth Angle Error: 0.5 Degrees
• Elevation Angle Error: 0.5 Degrees
Key Radar MOPS Specifications

Detect and Avoid
RTCA SC 228 DAA MOPS
• MOPS not applicable to sUAS: Must be > 55lb
• Radar presents significant SWaP for sUAS
• Bottom Line: requirements only achievable by “High End” of
town
• Yet , sUAS represent the overwhelming, and increasingVOLUME
of UAV wanting to operate BVLOS

SC-228
• Range RDR: 8 NM +
• Range Accuracy: 50 feet
• Range Rate Accuracy: 8 feet/second
• Azimuth Angle Error: 0.5 Degrees
• Elevation Angle Error: 0.5 Degrees
• Probability FalseTracks: 1 false track per hour
• Within FoR, with Slant range out to 8 NM or RDR of Large Intruder
• Detection:
• Must establish intruder track before 4000 ft (RCPR) 99% of time
• Must establish tracks for 95% of intruders starting at RDR
• No more than 20 seconds to establish track once in FoR
Key Radar MOPS Specifications
How long before a specification is written for sUAS?
How would the technical expectations vary?
So what considerations will be used to make Risk Assessment, with
no SPECs currently in PLAY ?
Who MAKES the CALL, DOTHEY HAVETHE SKILLS?

Detect and Avoid
Radar: Echodyne Negative Index Materials MESA
Echodyne owned by Microsoft
Flagged specifications include
• FOV was up to 120° x 80
• Detected small UAVs out to 750m
• Detect small Aircraft out to 3km
• 4D data cube of radar returns
accurately depicting ground
vegetation, barbed wire fences &
other stationary obstacles,
• MESA-DAA will be available to
commercial customers in early
2017

Detect and Avoid
Visual Spectrum Camera
IMPERX Bobcat 2.0 B6620
• Sensor: 16 Mpixel, CCD
• Resolution: 6576 x 4384
• Pixel pitch: 5.5 micrometres
• Power: 1.5 A, 12 VDC
• 10 m Wingspan: falls subpixel at 36km
with 20 mm lens and 100 degrees FOV
• Weight: 250g
Source: http://www.imperx.com/ccd-cameras/b6620

Detect and Avoid
Sensors: Laser Range Finding
DLEM diode laser rangefinder
• Ranges up to 5 kilometers.
• weight between 38 an 170 grams,
• Minimal power ??
• Defence not keen on being painted with LASER
https://www.jenoptik.com/products/defense-and-security/laser-rangefinders/oem-modules-system-integration/dlem

Detection Performance with Background Clutter
Contrast Against
Background
Clutter
Against Ground Clutter

Detect & AVoid
Mil-Hard 1.3 MP High Resolution InGaAs SWIR Camera: GA1280
Source: https://www.photonicsonline.com/doc/mil-hard-mp-high-resolution-ingaas-swir-camera-ga-j-0001
• Pixels: 1280 x 1024 pixel
• Pixel pitch: 15 um
• Weight: 125 grams
• Power:
• Angular Resolution = 0.08 with 10 mm lens (88 FOV)
• MOPS Radar only requires 0.5 degrees,
• But Cessna sub-pixel is 2.6 km
• Could move to 20mm lens and scan like Kestrel…
• Could you team it with miniature LRF??

Detect and Avoid
FLIR Neutrino MWIR
• Pixels: 640 x 512
• Pixel pitch: 15 um
• Weight: 450 grams
• Power: 5 watts

BETTER INTRINSIC ARC
Determinations
Quantitative Methods

Detect & Avoid Alternates
• SORA Process Intrinsic ARC employs crude metrics forTraffic Density
Step 2B- Intrinsic Air Risk Class
Traffic Density ( Examples) Air Risk Class
Very Low ( above FL600, below highest Building) 1
Low (Below 500 ft or within 400 ft from Infrastructure) 2/3 *
Medium (Away from Major FL and Airways) 4/5 *
High ( In Major FL & on airways, aerodrome traffic Patterns 6
Very High 7
• DAA Systems are barriers, driven by this requirement
• What if we could better represent Intrinsic ARC: spatially & temporally

This research was conducted by QUT as part of an Advance Queensland Fellowship held by Aaron McFadyen and
supported by Queensland State Government Department of Science, InformationTechnology and Innovation (DSITI) &
Thales Australia.The air traffic data was provided by Airservices Australia under aTailored Data Supply Agreement.

Moving Ahead
Nova Systems Risk Model
Hazard
Central Event
BarrierThreat
Barrier Effectiveness
Rating
Barrier Category
Consequence
Barrier Degradation (or
Escalation) Factor

Common Applicant CONOPS
Information on:
• Operator
• IntendedOps
• UAS Description
• Remote Crew
Updated SORA Blackbox
Hazard
Central Event
BarrierThreat
Rating
Barrier Category
Consequence
Escalation) Factor
Background Models & Process
to be Updated by Risk
Specialists
Joe Public
ApplicationTemplates
Hello WorldI am paddingfor
this document.I hope
nobody can read this during
the presentation.That would
embarrassme.Cananyone
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wryly if you can, but please
don’t embarrassme.
SAIL I
SAILVSAIL IV
SAILIIISAIL I
SAILV
Moving Ahead
End State
CASA Assessor
Templates
SAIL I
SAILVSAIL IV
SAILIIISAIL I
SAILV
Submission
Priority
Templates
for National
Priority
CONOPSSuite of Indigenous
CONOPS
me.
me.
me.
me.
me.
SORA Framework
NOVA Model
Rare or Unseen CONOPS
Reviewed by a Specialist
Assessment
Result
Assessment
Result
CASA HAZLOG

Common Applicant CONOPS
Information on:
• Operator
• IntendedOps
• UAS Description
• Remote Crew
Updated SORA Blackbox
Hazard
Central Event
BarrierThreat
Rating
Barrier Category
Consequence
Escalation) Factor
Background Models & Process
to be Updated by Risk
Specialists
Joe Public
ApplicationTemplates
SAIL I
SAILVSAIL IV
SAILIIISAIL I
SAILV
Moving Ahead
End State
CASA Assessor
Templates
SAIL I
SAILVSAIL IV
SAILIIISAIL I
SAILV
Submission
Priority
Templates
for National
Priority
CONOPSSuite of Indigenous
CONOPS
me.
me.
me.
me.
me.
SORA Framework
NOVA Model
Rare or Unseen CONOPS
Reviewed by a Specialist
• Safe & Commensurate with Risk
• Repeatable
• Transparent
• Harmonised Internationally yetAhead
of the Game
Assessment
Result
Assessment
Result
CASA HAZLOG

Availability and Continuity
CNS and Safe Separation
• Performance established and
verified (i.e link budgets)
• Procedures & limits in place
• Eg Lost Link procedures
• Declaration times
• filters
• Datalink system and
infrastructure has a design
standard and is manufactured
appropriate for operation & is
maintained…

Availability and Continuity

Indigenous Capacity: Lost Link Decision Times
Taxi, Takeoff and Landing. Within 5nm of runway and below 10kft.
• Lost C2 Link Decision time = 2 seconds.
• Short time required because risk may increase rapidly and the pilot may
not have time to intervene for a RPA with a low automation level.
• A Lost C2 Link must be declared quickly;
More automatic operation required by RPA if these times cant be achieved
2 NM 3 NM
400ft AGL
100ft AGL
0 NM
500ft
600ft AGL RPAS
How Long would it take for RPAS to Communicate Lost
Link to ATC???

Indigenous Capacity: Lost Link Decision Times
Departure and Arrival. RPA within 30nm of runway and below 18kft.
• RLOS at this longer range
• Lost C2 Link Decision time = 10seconds.
• Equivalent to the ATC RCP for terminal areas.
Enroute. RPA greater than 30nm from runway and below 60kft.
• Use BRLOS (terrestrial network)
• 10 seconds Lost C2 Link Decision time (non-satellite)
• 30 seconds when satellite C2 Link, e.g. when significantly further way
than 30nm.

CNS, ATM and Emerging Requirements for RPAS
ICAO Air Navigation Plan and ATM Concept
Communication
Navigation
Surveillance
AirTraffic
Management
Required Comms
Performance
Performance Based Comms &
Surveillance
Required Surveillance
Performance
Required Navigation
Performance
Performance Based
Navigation

Determining appropriate prescribed separation minima is complex. Key
parameters impacting achievement of predeterminedTLS for a given traffic density
are:
• a) aircraft navigation performance;
• b) ground and airborne communications performance;
• c) surveillance performance.
These performance capabilities are used to determine:
• airspace design (separation minima/route spacing/sectorization),
• instrument procedures and
• air traffic control intervention capability.
• An increase or decrease in any single parameter may result in a corresponding
increase or decrease in some or all of the other parameters.
Separation (ICAO 9689)

That’s all Great But…
• Many RPA systems are not RNP compliant
• Have different CNPC setups, , latency and transaction times
• Therefore the Intervention times are different.
1. For ATC: (Flight Levels, heading, track change etc) at any point
2. For Pilot: when directed and when alerted about track deviation
Should the separation distances change:
•For MALE/HALE Operations
•For UTM?
RNP and Aircraft Separation

BVLOS RPAS Trials
Trial Participants
RPAS Operators UTM ProvidersTrial Management

CNPC
UTM & LTE Coverage
Source: LTETower Signal data generated by Stephen Dade at Nova Systems using STK

CNPC
Altitude
Source: LTETower Signal data generated by Stephen Dade at Nova Systems using STK
• What will the altitude limitations be using LTE
• Availability, Continuity, Integrity
• How will this be substantiated

Required Communication Performance
CNPC and RCP Requirements for RPAS
CNPC
2
UA
GRS
GRS
CNPC
1
GRS
GRS
GRS
UA
UA
GRS
UA
UA
Public Network
GCS GCS
GCS
GCS
GCS
VPN
VPN
Handover
to Standalone
Inter Network
Handover
Intra Network
Handover
Handover
to
SATCOM
Handover
Between Standalones
Derived with Permission from Hee Wook Kim, ETRI Korea, RTCA SC-228:
Gateway
Gateway

Australia is moving from RNAV to RNP expectations for aircraft.
From May 2016, will move to the following navigation specifications:
• Oceanic routes - RNP 4 where capable, otherwise RNAV 10 (RNP 10)
• Continental Routes: RNP 2
• Terminal instrument flight procedures - RNP 1
• Non-precision approach operations - RNP APCH
Required Navigation Performance (RNP)

Performance Based Comms & Surveillance
RNP considering COMMS and RPAS
ALERT
Track
Correction
after Alert
Track
Deviation
RNP
Containment
RNP expects you to:
• accurately know your position,
• monitor it and be alerted if you deviate,
• Act to correct it in a timely manner if you
do deviate, and
• communicate with relevant people (ATC
& other pilots), so they can respond.
• Also factors in ATC intervention time.
• Separation distances are predicated on
these assumptions

In order to obtain RNP approval, an operator must meet both operational
requirements as well as aircraft airworthiness:
Operational Requirements
• Flight crew training and operating procedures for the navigation systems to be used
must be described by the operator in a syllabus of training and an aide-memoir
• Methods of control for flight crew training, operational procedures and database
management must be identified in the operations manual.
• Navigation error reporting procedures
RNP Compliance: Operational Requirements

Required Navigation Performance
• Statement inType Certificate, or SupplementalType Certificate (STC), and
Aircraft Flight Manual
• Continuing Airworthiness: aircraft and RNP system maintenance; and
• Validity and continuing integrity of the airborne navigation database,
• A FMS alone cannot be certified for RNP operations
RNP Compliance-Airworthiness

Airworthiness Requirements:
• RNP Performance captured usingTotal System Error (TSE) computed as sum
of the following:
• Navigation System Error (NSE):
• FlightTechnical Error (FTE):
• Path Definition Error (PDE).
• Rapid improvements in GNSS mean the NSE is very small,
• Under PBN, focus is on ensuring flown path is both accurate & maintained
via alerting & monitoring…and now FTE is the area of biggest scrutiny

Airworthiness Requirements:
• RNP Performance captured usingTotal System Error (TSE) computed as sum
of the following:
• Navigation System Error (NSE):
• FlightTechnical Error (FTE):
• Path Definition Error (PDE).
• Rapid improvements in GNSS mean the NSE is very small,
• For RNP/PBN focus is on ensuring ensuring path definition is accurate &
maintained via alerting & monitoring…FTE is the area of biggest scrutiny
Will current/future generation MALE/HALE meet these standards
Are they appropriate?

Performance Based Comms
& Surveillance

Required Comms Performance
Factors Affecting Separation & Route Spacing
PBN
Navigation
NAVAID
Infrastructure
Performance Based
Concept
Navigation
Specification
Navigation Application
Source: Derived from ICAO Performance Based Navigation Manual, Doc 9613
If the Navigation Specification cannot be met, …..

Required Comms Performance
Factors Affecting Separation & Route Spacing
Intervention
PBN
Exposure to RiskNavigation
NAVAID
Infrastructure
Communication
ATC Procs &Tools
Surveillance
Performance Based
Concept
Traffic
Density
Operational
ErrorNavigation
Specification
Navigation Application
Source: Derived from ICAO Performance Based Navigation Manual, Doc 9613
Route
Configuration
WHAT is the impact on separation distances. Needed to understand:
• Exposure : See earlier work from Aaron McFadyen on data driven methods
• Intervention: Comms and Surveillance

ICAO 9869- PBC&S Manual -- 2016
RNP 10
Network
ATS Unit
Applicable Airspace
• Airspace characteristics
• Tech Dependencies
• Other considerations
State Application to Airspace ie
Local Safety Assessment
Prescribe specs for communication &
Surveillance supportingATM Operations in
applicable airspace
• ANSP requirements
• Aircraft Operator Requirements
• PBC&S Monitoring
RSP 180
Specification
RCP 240
ATM Operation (X)
Standards & procs for Comms, Nav and
Surveillance identifying appropriate
RCP/RSP Specification
It may be to possible to
achieve separation distances
commensurate with RNP 2
even if the aircraft is not RNP
compliant
provided the RCP/RSP
environment supports it,

ICAO 9869- PBC&S Manual -- 2016
CAVEAT:
• PBC&S isVERY NEW
• RPAS RCP (RLP) still in development (Eg RTCA 228), JARUS
• Limited attention paid to RSP, RNP, PBS&S inter-relationships, BUT RPAS
differences may warrant attention.

Separation Distance for RNP/RCP/RSP
Source: RTCA DO-350: End to End RCP (CPDLC) & RCTP [Continental,
Oceanic and Remote
For aircraft, climbing, cruising or descending on the same track, the following
separation minima may be used…
Separation
Minima
RNP
Specification
RCP
Specification
RSP
Specification
Max ADS-C
periodic reporting
interval
50 NM
(93 km)
10 240 180 27 minutes
50 NM
(93km)
4 240 180 32 minutes
30 NM
(55km)
4 240 180 14 minutes

Separation Distance for RNP/RCP/RSP
Source: RTCA DO-350: End to End RCP (CPDLC) & RCTP [Continental,
Oceanic and Remote
For aircraft, climbing, cruising or descending on the same track, the following
separation minima may be used…
Separation
Minima
RNP
Specification
RCP
Specification
RSP
Specification
Max ADS-C
periodic reporting
interval
50 NM
(93 km)
10 240 180 27 minutes
50 NM
(93km)
4 240 180 32 minutes
30 NM
(55km)
4 240 180 14 minutes
• Is the Concept of PBN and PBC&S scalable for UTM
• What will be the separation distances for UTM
• What happens if the network latency impacts on the position certainty
and UTM intervention time?

Separation Assurance & RSP
Source: PBC&S Doc 9869
RSP requires availability, continuity, integrity etc but an
important aspect is “”RSP delivery time”.
• The value for the RSP data delivery time is based on the time when the
surveillance data delivery is considered overdue.
• Again: reliant on a comms link…
• For separation assurance, the RSP data delivery can be determined by
collision risk modelling.
• Collision risk modelling considers the RSP delivery times in the
surveillance data delivery and controller intervention buffer supporting
separation assurance.

Air Traffic Modelling
1 - Analytical and Simulated Models
Separation < 1nm Separation < 500ft
Manned Aircraft Unmanned Aircraft
This research was conducted by QUT as part of an Advance Queensland Fellowship held by Aaron McFadyen and supported by Queensland State
Government Department of Science, InformationTechnology and Innovation (DSITI) &Thales Australia.The air traffic data was provided by
Airservices Australia under aTailored Data Supply Agreement.

But the CNPC Latency &Transaction times are different for RPAS!
1. What does the CNPC network topology look like.
2. Intervention times:
1. For ATC: (FL, heading, track change etc) at any point
2. For Pilot: when directed and when alerted about track deviation
Should the separation distances change?
RNP and Aircraft Separation

Manned Network Topology: CPDLC
ATC
Composes
&
Sends Message
ATC
Receives
Response &
Understands
RCP Parameters
• TransactionTime
• Availability
• Continuity
• Integrity

Copyright:Terrence Martin Source: Derived from RTCA DO-350
C2 Link Required Communication Performance: DO 350
ATSU
encodes
Message
& sends
to CSP
CSP
transmits
ATSU
Message
to Aircraft
Aircraft
decodes
Message
and gives to
flight crew
Crew
reads and
responds
to ATC eg
wilco
Aircraft
System
encodes
response &
transmits to
CSP
CSP sends
response
message
to ATSU
ATC
Compose
Message
ATSU
decodes
response
and gives
to ATC
ATC reads
response
RCP Specification: TransactionTime + Availability, Integrity, Continuity
Initiator
Performance
Responder
Performance
𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑃
𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑈 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑃
Initiator
Performance
𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑃 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑈
𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡

Required Link Performance
RELAY CNPC via RPA
ATC
Composes
&
Sends Message
ATSU
RP
Receives
Response &
Understands
Comms Link

Expanding RTCA SC-228 Required Link performance
ATSU
encodes
Message
& sends
to CSP
CSP
transmit
s ATSU
Message
to
Aircraft
Aircraft
decodes
Message and
gives to flight
crew
Crew
reads and
responds
to ATC eg
wilco
Aircraft
System
encodes
response &
transmits to
CSP
CSP sends
response
message
to ATSU
ATC
Compose
Message
ATSU
decodes
response
and gives
to ATC
ATC reads
response
Initiator
Performance
Responder
Performance𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑃𝐴
𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑈
𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑃
Initiator
Performance
𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑃 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐺𝐶𝑆 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑃𝐴 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑃 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐺𝐶𝑆

RELAY CNPC via RPA
ATC
Composes
&
Sends Message
ATSU
RP
Receives
Response &
Understands
Comms Link
Or ATC-RP Comms link could be direct
Will this be transparent to ATC.
Not currently ATC Surveillance Compliant

Expanding RTCA SC-228 Required Link performance
ATSU
encodes
Message
& sends
to CSP
CSP
transmit
s ATSU
Message
to
Aircraft
Aircraft
decodes
Message and
gives to flight
crew
Crew
reads and
responds
to ATC eg
wilco
Aircraft
System
encodes
response &
transmits to
CSP
CSP sends
response
message
to ATSU
ATC
Compose
Message
ATSU
decodes
response
and gives
to ATC
ATC reads
response
Initiator
Performance
Responder
Performance𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑃𝐴
𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑇𝑆𝑈
𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑃
Initiator
Performance
𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐴𝑖𝑟𝑐𝑟𝑎𝑓𝑡
𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑃 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐺𝐶𝑆 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝑅𝑃𝐴 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐶𝑆𝑃 𝑅𝐶𝑇𝑃𝐺𝐶𝑆
Not currently being examined in
RTCA SC-228.
How is PBNAlerting and Response
catered for?

RELAY CNPC via RPA
ATC
Composes
&
Sends Message
Command Link
ATSU
RP
Receives
Response &
Understands

Required “Link” Performance
Unmanned Network Topology: RELAY COMMS
ATC
Composes
&
Sends Message
Telemetry
Link
ATSU
RP
Receives
Response &
Understands

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