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Safety KPI
Safety KPI –
– what for?
what for?
Learnings from the attempt to build a
Learnings from the attempt to build a
Learnings from the attempt to build a
Learnings from the attempt to build a
meaningful Safety Management Cockpit
meaningful Safety Management Cockpit
René Aebersold, Deputy Chief Safety Officer skyguide
Table of Contents
Why measure safety ?
What to measure?
How to measure ?
1
2
3
2
How to measure ?
What to do with the measured data?
Conclusions
3
4
5
Why measure safety?
› To prove how good we are…. Hooray!
› Because others do it, too…
› To punish.
1
3
› To punish.
› For the money (to get a bonus).
› To compare with others.
› To identify trends.
› To improve.
Goal of a Safety Management System SMS:
Continuous safety improvement
Why measure safety?
4
Management
Staff
Corrective
actions from
analysed safety
performance
monitoring data
OIR
SIR
Audit findings
Lessons
learned
Measures for
Improvement
What to measure?
2
Reactive indicators:
› To measure the (long-term) impact of our safety efforts
› To identify hotspots and trends
› To verify/validate assumptions made in pre-assessments
5
› To verify/validate assumptions made in pre-assessments
Difficulties with reactive indicators in ATM:
› Very low numbers for significant events (low probability)
› Direct allocation of impact to efforts
› Creates "bad" feelings and urgency to immediately react
› In most cases only negative data is measured
What to measure?
2
Proactive indicators:
› To measure safety efforts (output)
› To detect week points, possible problems
› To identify drifts into failure
6
› To identify drifts into failure
Difficulties with proactive indicators in ATM:
› Difficulty to argue direct relevance, to justify measures
› Information might be biased
› Building relevant proactive indicators is difficult
What to measure - example for proactive SPI
2
SPI 1a - Safety Maturity Index according ECTL
SRU
Agenda:
Safety culture
SA1 Development of a positive and proactive safety culture
Safety Policy
SA2 Org. and individual safety responsibilities
80
90
SA1
SA2
SA11
7
SA2 Org. and individual safety responsibilities
SA3 Timely compliance with international obligations
Safety Achievement
SA4 Safety standard and procedures
SA5 Competency
SA6 Risk Management
SA7 Safety interfaces
Safety Assurance
SA8 Safety Reporting, Investigation and Improvement
SA9 Safety Performance Monitoring
SA10 Ops. Safety Survey and SMS Audit
Safety Promotion
SA11 Adaptation and sharing of best practices
60
70
SA3
SA4
SA5
SA6
SA7
SA8
SA9
SA10
2011 Interquartile range
What to measure?
2
Sharp-end indicators:
› Measuring failures directly at the impact point
Difficulties with sharp-end indicators in ATM:
8
Difficulties with sharp-end indicators in ATM:
› Have a high potential for blaming operators
› Blaming or even punishing the operators will
reduce the number of reports and the
effectiveness of the SMS
What to measure? Sharp-end vs. blunt-end
2
norms
Blunt end:
unwanted
9
Activity
Workplace
Management
Company
Authority
Government
Morals,
social
norms
Sharp end:
unwanted
outcomes
happen here
and now
unwanted
outcomes
happend
earlier and
somewhere
else
Hollnagel, 2004
What to measure?
2
Blunt-end indicators:
› Measuring things which can contribute to sharp-end
failures
Difficulties with blunt-end indicators in ATM:
10
Difficulties with blunt-end indicators in ATM:
› Sometimes difficult to measure
› Sometimes difficult to allocate the direct relevance
› The further away we go from the sharp end, the
more difficult it gets to take corrective actions (no
direct control)
What to measure - example for blunt-end SPI
2
SPI
Target
2011
Review
Target
2012
3a 100% nil 100%
SPI 3
Definition
Level reached
Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2
Management attention for safety
SSG and SSG-Subgroup meetings
realised vs. planned 100% 100% 100% 100%
11
3b 80% nil 80%
3c 80%
In average, 91% of all SSG and SSG-
Subgroup members or
representatives were present during
the 2nd quarter 2012.
80%
3d 80%
1 of 2 trainings have been hold during
the 2nd quarter 2012.
80%
EM meetings: 5 times 30 minutes and
one time 60 minutes dedicated to
safety matters - realised vs. planned
Attendance SSG and SSG-Subgroup
(presence members or deputy)
Training sessions in SSG and SSG-
Subgroup meetings as planned in
yearly program
100% 100% 100% 100%
78% 72% 80% 91%
100%
50%
100%
50%
What to measure?
2
"Hard" or direct indicators:
› Probabilistic or quantifiable indicators
Difficulties with "hard" or direct indicators in ATM:
12
Difficulties with "hard" or direct indicators in ATM:
› Do we count the right things?
› Relatively easy to apply in technique, much more
difficult to apply for e.g. human factors
What to measure?
2
"Soft" or indirect indicators:
› To measure symptoms
› To get a feeling for the consequences of actions
› To "measure" safety culture
13
› To "measure" safety culture
Difficulties with "soft" or indirect indicators in ATM:
› Considerable effort needed (lots of people involved)
› Individual measurement may not be relevant, but trend
analysis are -> long term indicator
› Needs an open and trustful culture
What to measure - example for "soft" SPI
2
3
4
5
Target Group Survey Results 2Q 2012 (SPI 2a)
14
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2
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Mittelwert Skalen
What to measure - example for "soft" SPI
2
Target Group Survey (N25 deviation against basis N104) (SPI 2a)
Change of Model Parameter after 1st run (2Q 2012)
5%
10%
15%
20%
15
-20%
-15%
-10%
-5%
0%
Parameters
internal
Human
resources
Culture
Motivation
Processes
Risks
SMS
Strategy
Parameters
/
resources
external
Ability
to
respond
Ability
to
monitor
Ability
to
anticipate
Ability
to
learn
Preoccupation
with
failure
Reluctance
to
simplify
Sensitivity
to
operations
Commitment
to
resilience
Deference
to
expertise
Mindfuleness
organizing
scale
S-MIS Resilience engineering HRO
How to measure? 3
› Safety Performance Indicators (KPIs):
› are measuring the output of our safety efforts
› mostly proactive, indirect, blunt end
› tools are surveys, safety improvement reports from staff, analysis
16
Safety indicators (SI):
› are measuring the safety impact of our safety efforts on our system
› mostly reactive, direct, sharp end
› tools are "been counting" data collections, occurrence reports
What to do with the measured data? 4
› We measure a lot of data – which must now be turned into
information, through proper analysis, involving operational experts.
› One measurement cycle is very rarely relevant – but trend analysis
are, over longer periods; therefore it is important to stabilise the KPIs.
› Very often you will not find very significant variations – but this is also
17
› Very often you will not find very significant variations – but this is also
a relevant information.
› The biggest difficulty is to decide when to take corrective actions –
you can over-react, or react too late.
› The further you measure towards the blunt end, the more difficult it
becomes to argue for taking corrective actions.
Conclusions: Why do we need Safety KPIs?
We need to measure safety indicators in order to be able to
improve more effectively.
We have to measure different sets of safety indicators:
reactive – proactive, sharp-end – blunt-end, direct – indirect.
5
18
We have to use a mix of measurement techniques. The
effort is considerable!
The most difficult part is the transition from measured data
to information which is useful for improvement.
Expectations are high – results sometimes not very
significant, but still relevant.
Questions?
19

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KPI .pdf

  • 1. Safety KPI Safety KPI – – what for? what for? Learnings from the attempt to build a Learnings from the attempt to build a Learnings from the attempt to build a Learnings from the attempt to build a meaningful Safety Management Cockpit meaningful Safety Management Cockpit René Aebersold, Deputy Chief Safety Officer skyguide
  • 2. Table of Contents Why measure safety ? What to measure? How to measure ? 1 2 3 2 How to measure ? What to do with the measured data? Conclusions 3 4 5
  • 3. Why measure safety? › To prove how good we are…. Hooray! › Because others do it, too… › To punish. 1 3 › To punish. › For the money (to get a bonus). › To compare with others. › To identify trends. › To improve.
  • 4. Goal of a Safety Management System SMS: Continuous safety improvement Why measure safety? 4 Management Staff Corrective actions from analysed safety performance monitoring data OIR SIR Audit findings Lessons learned Measures for Improvement
  • 5. What to measure? 2 Reactive indicators: › To measure the (long-term) impact of our safety efforts › To identify hotspots and trends › To verify/validate assumptions made in pre-assessments 5 › To verify/validate assumptions made in pre-assessments Difficulties with reactive indicators in ATM: › Very low numbers for significant events (low probability) › Direct allocation of impact to efforts › Creates "bad" feelings and urgency to immediately react › In most cases only negative data is measured
  • 6. What to measure? 2 Proactive indicators: › To measure safety efforts (output) › To detect week points, possible problems › To identify drifts into failure 6 › To identify drifts into failure Difficulties with proactive indicators in ATM: › Difficulty to argue direct relevance, to justify measures › Information might be biased › Building relevant proactive indicators is difficult
  • 7. What to measure - example for proactive SPI 2 SPI 1a - Safety Maturity Index according ECTL SRU Agenda: Safety culture SA1 Development of a positive and proactive safety culture Safety Policy SA2 Org. and individual safety responsibilities 80 90 SA1 SA2 SA11 7 SA2 Org. and individual safety responsibilities SA3 Timely compliance with international obligations Safety Achievement SA4 Safety standard and procedures SA5 Competency SA6 Risk Management SA7 Safety interfaces Safety Assurance SA8 Safety Reporting, Investigation and Improvement SA9 Safety Performance Monitoring SA10 Ops. Safety Survey and SMS Audit Safety Promotion SA11 Adaptation and sharing of best practices 60 70 SA3 SA4 SA5 SA6 SA7 SA8 SA9 SA10 2011 Interquartile range
  • 8. What to measure? 2 Sharp-end indicators: › Measuring failures directly at the impact point Difficulties with sharp-end indicators in ATM: 8 Difficulties with sharp-end indicators in ATM: › Have a high potential for blaming operators › Blaming or even punishing the operators will reduce the number of reports and the effectiveness of the SMS
  • 9. What to measure? Sharp-end vs. blunt-end 2 norms Blunt end: unwanted 9 Activity Workplace Management Company Authority Government Morals, social norms Sharp end: unwanted outcomes happen here and now unwanted outcomes happend earlier and somewhere else Hollnagel, 2004
  • 10. What to measure? 2 Blunt-end indicators: › Measuring things which can contribute to sharp-end failures Difficulties with blunt-end indicators in ATM: 10 Difficulties with blunt-end indicators in ATM: › Sometimes difficult to measure › Sometimes difficult to allocate the direct relevance › The further away we go from the sharp end, the more difficult it gets to take corrective actions (no direct control)
  • 11. What to measure - example for blunt-end SPI 2 SPI Target 2011 Review Target 2012 3a 100% nil 100% SPI 3 Definition Level reached Q3 Q4 Q1 Q2 Management attention for safety SSG and SSG-Subgroup meetings realised vs. planned 100% 100% 100% 100% 11 3b 80% nil 80% 3c 80% In average, 91% of all SSG and SSG- Subgroup members or representatives were present during the 2nd quarter 2012. 80% 3d 80% 1 of 2 trainings have been hold during the 2nd quarter 2012. 80% EM meetings: 5 times 30 minutes and one time 60 minutes dedicated to safety matters - realised vs. planned Attendance SSG and SSG-Subgroup (presence members or deputy) Training sessions in SSG and SSG- Subgroup meetings as planned in yearly program 100% 100% 100% 100% 78% 72% 80% 91% 100% 50% 100% 50%
  • 12. What to measure? 2 "Hard" or direct indicators: › Probabilistic or quantifiable indicators Difficulties with "hard" or direct indicators in ATM: 12 Difficulties with "hard" or direct indicators in ATM: › Do we count the right things? › Relatively easy to apply in technique, much more difficult to apply for e.g. human factors
  • 13. What to measure? 2 "Soft" or indirect indicators: › To measure symptoms › To get a feeling for the consequences of actions › To "measure" safety culture 13 › To "measure" safety culture Difficulties with "soft" or indirect indicators in ATM: › Considerable effort needed (lots of people involved) › Individual measurement may not be relevant, but trend analysis are -> long term indicator › Needs an open and trustful culture
  • 14. What to measure - example for "soft" SPI 2 3 4 5 Target Group Survey Results 2Q 2012 (SPI 2a) 14 1 2 P a r a m e t e r s i n t e r n a l H u m a n r e s o u r c e s C u l t u r e M o t i v a t i o n P r o c e s s e s R i s k s S M S S t r a t e g y P a r a m e t e r s / r e s o u r c e s e x t e r n a l A b i l i t y t o r e s p o n d A b i l i t y t o m o n i t o r A b i l i t y t o a n t i c i p a t e A b i l i t y t o l e a r n P r e o c c u p a t i o n w i t h f a i l u r e R e l u c t a n c e t o s i m p l i f y S e n s i t i v i t y t o o p e r a t i o n s C o m m i t m e n t t o r e s i l i e n c e D e f e r e n c e t o e x p e r t i s e M i n d f u l e n e s s o r g a n i z i n g s c a l e Mittelwert Skalen
  • 15. What to measure - example for "soft" SPI 2 Target Group Survey (N25 deviation against basis N104) (SPI 2a) Change of Model Parameter after 1st run (2Q 2012) 5% 10% 15% 20% 15 -20% -15% -10% -5% 0% Parameters internal Human resources Culture Motivation Processes Risks SMS Strategy Parameters / resources external Ability to respond Ability to monitor Ability to anticipate Ability to learn Preoccupation with failure Reluctance to simplify Sensitivity to operations Commitment to resilience Deference to expertise Mindfuleness organizing scale S-MIS Resilience engineering HRO
  • 16. How to measure? 3 › Safety Performance Indicators (KPIs): › are measuring the output of our safety efforts › mostly proactive, indirect, blunt end › tools are surveys, safety improvement reports from staff, analysis 16 Safety indicators (SI): › are measuring the safety impact of our safety efforts on our system › mostly reactive, direct, sharp end › tools are "been counting" data collections, occurrence reports
  • 17. What to do with the measured data? 4 › We measure a lot of data – which must now be turned into information, through proper analysis, involving operational experts. › One measurement cycle is very rarely relevant – but trend analysis are, over longer periods; therefore it is important to stabilise the KPIs. › Very often you will not find very significant variations – but this is also 17 › Very often you will not find very significant variations – but this is also a relevant information. › The biggest difficulty is to decide when to take corrective actions – you can over-react, or react too late. › The further you measure towards the blunt end, the more difficult it becomes to argue for taking corrective actions.
  • 18. Conclusions: Why do we need Safety KPIs? We need to measure safety indicators in order to be able to improve more effectively. We have to measure different sets of safety indicators: reactive – proactive, sharp-end – blunt-end, direct – indirect. 5 18 We have to use a mix of measurement techniques. The effort is considerable! The most difficult part is the transition from measured data to information which is useful for improvement. Expectations are high – results sometimes not very significant, but still relevant.