US and the new great game in Central Asia

1. United States And The New Great Game In Central Asia
Qulb e Abbas

2. ‘The Great Game’ is a term originally coined by Arthur Connolly, a Captain in the
British East India Company, but immortalized by Rudyard Kipling in his novel Kim at
the turn of the nineteenth century1
. It refers to the battle between Tsarist Russia and
Imperial Britain to establish hegemony over Central Asia.
Central Asia occupied strategic importance as the gateway to India2
; an opportunity for
Russia to extend its empire to the lucrative British “crown jewel”, and a challenge for
Britain to defend and preserve it. The compulsions of Empire made it a critical
possession; without it, survival – let alone supremacy – in Asia seemed impossible.
Afghanistan served as the violent battleground for the frequent collision of two empires.
The British failed twice in their attempts to invade Afghanistan, ultimately reconciling to
a default buffer zone beyond the Durand line3
.
The original Great Game gradually faded away as the global order restructured itself
amidst the World Wars; a debilitated British empire withdrew, and Tsarist Russia turned
red with revolution. As the age of empire receded, it took with it much of the significance
previously associated with the Caspian region. In subsequent years this region was
firmly, even ruthlessly, incorporated into the Soviet sphere; serving as the source of raw
materials and nuclear dumping ground for a budding superpower4
. The Cold War toppled
the Great Game on the global political chessboard.
1
Hopkirk, Peter, 2002, p61
2
Dettmer, Jamie, 06/12/2000, p24
3
Fromkin, David, Spring80, p0
4
ahmed rashid

3. Although Central Asia had been relegated to the fringes of political and academic
discourse, radical shifts in global economic and technological trends forced it, once
again, into the limelight. Progress in industrial technology and the oil boom in the nearby
Middle-East were to have far reaching ramifications for the region. When the OPEC
cartel demonstrated its ability to produce ripples across the globe through the oil-shocks
of the 70s, it became glaringly evident: oil, quite literally, fueled the global economy. The
elevation of oil from the status of just another mineral to a devastating weapon meant that
simply its possession made a region significant – or a significant target. Central Asia was
back on the map.
The Caspian Sea boasts the world’s largest untapped fossil fuel resources. While it does
not rival the reserves of the Arabian basin, it is expected to far exceed those of the North
Sea. Various estimates project the crude from 85 to 219 barrels; significant at either
extreme. Conservative estimates determine the net value to be around US$ 4 trillion.
Kazakhstan and Azerbaijan alone could contain more than 110 billion barrels, more than
three times the US reserves5
. Furthermore, Kazakhstan’s Tenghiz oil field by itself
contains between 6-9 billion barrels of oil6
. The potential oil production of the region is
forecast to shoot up to 4.7 million barrels per day (bpd) by 20107
.
The dramatic collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and the reluctant emergence of five
new nation-states in the Central Asian region thrust history into full circle; a new Great
Game was on. This time, however, the stakes are higher; the struggle rages not for the
5
Kleveman, Lutz, 2/16/2004, p11
6
http://www.eia.doe.gov/emeu/cabs/kazaproj.html
7
Kleveman, Lutz, 2/16/2004, p11

4. grandeur of empire, but for the custody of the lifeblood flowing through the veins of the
international economy. The rather simple, bipolar Anglo-Russian rivalry has been
replaced by a complex web of competing powers vying for supremacy: the United States,
Russia, Turkey, Iran, China, and even the European Union. This time the battle is not for
Asia, but for the World.
As the undisputed leader of the industrialized world, the United States has developed an
insatiable addiction to oil. In 2002, of the 77 million bpd of crude consumed on a global
level, the US accounted for nearly 19.66 million bpd on average – more than one quarter
of the entire world’s consumption8
. Oil consumption alone represents nearly 2.5% of the
US GDP. It is by far the largest importer as well as the consumer of the world’s oil. It
produces only 48% of the oil it consumes, a figure expected to drop to 38% by 20209
.
Considering the central role of fuel in nearly every component of the manufacturing,
services, or even mechanized agriculture sectors; oil lubricates the entire economic
machinery and forms a cornerstone of growth. Considering the critical importance of oil
to the United States, it assumes a strategic rather than a purely economic concern.
Evidently, oil has dangerous potential to be the United States’ Achilles heel.
The supply shocks of the 1970s drove home the lesson that reliance on single source
produced inevitable dependence which undermined domestic and international interests
of the United States10
. The rising power of the OPEC cartel and the heightened instability
8
http://www.scaruffi.com/politics/oil.html
9
YELENA KALYUZHNOVA, AMYMYERS JAFFE, DOV LYNCH and ROBIN C. SICKLES (eds),
Energy in the Caspian Region (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002), 266 pp., - page 214
10
Reid, Keith, Aug2004, p18

5. of the Middle-East represented potential threats. Middle-Eastern political uncertainty
translated into wild fluctuations of international oil prices, disseminating anxiety and
stifling investment. The association with authoritarian Arab regimes represented a
perennial embarrassment as it contradicted the stated American ideals of worldwide
democracy. The anti-American sentiment emerging from the Middle-Eastern masses
posed the persistent threat of overthrow of friendly regimes and instant cessation of oil
supplies11
. Raging Islamic fanaticism and perceptions of an impending “Clash of
Civilizations” complicated matters even further. On the domestic front, opposition to
close ties with counter-ideological Arab states reoriented the issue from an international-
strategic to a domestic-political dimension.
In order to circumvent potential hazards and reduce its dependence on Middle-Eastern
oil, the United States has been actively pursuing the policy of diversifying its energy
supplies12
. The Caspian region and West Africa have quite naturally acquired
significance in this respect since they possess the largest reserves of fossil fuel outside the
Middle-East13
. Soon after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Western oil firms backed by
their respective governments poured into the newly formed Central Asian Republics
(CARs) in order to negotiate contracts for oil exploration and drilling14
.
Since the September 11th
attacks on the World Trade Centre, the United States has
stepped up efforts to consolidate its presence in the Caspian region. A series of bilateral
11
Kleveman, Lutz, 2/16/2004, p11
12
YELENA KALYUZHNOVA, AMYMYERS JAFFE, DOV LYNCH and ROBIN C. SICKLES (eds),
Energy in the Caspian Region (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002), 266 pp., - page 218
13
Kleveman, Lutz, 2/16/2004, p11
14
Bassman, Robert S.. Europe, Feb2002 Issue 413, p14, 1/2p, 1c

6. and multilateral agreements with the CARs have surreptitiously incorporated economic
objectives, hidden beneath the pomp and clamor of the “War on Terror.” Since December
2001, the United States has built up an overwhelming military presence in Central Asia
and adjoining regions. It has established an airbase in Uzbekistan with 1500 troops
stationed there, a virtual buy-out as it provides Uzbekistan $160 million of aid in
exchange, and political support for the authoritarian dictator Islam Karimov15
. The US
has built another airbase in Kyrgyzstan with an expected troop deployment of 300016
. It
has also consolidated its position in Afghanistan with the presence of around 5000 troops
since the end of the war, not to mention a compliant government and nominated head-of-
state who also happens to be a former advisor to American oil giant Unocal17
. Georgia
has around 500 American elite troops and a financial incentive of $100 million of aid18
.
American capability for maneuvering has been extended further by the grant of
permission for military overflights by Turkmenistan19
. An extensive military presence in
the region serves the strategic objective of containing Russian, Chinese and Iranian
influence in the region; all major players of the new Great Game. The presence of US
troops on the Russian “near abroad” has dramatically altered the geo-strategic power
balance in the region.
More complicated than the issue of securing access to and drilling oil from the Caspian
basin is the medium of its shipment to markets located in the West20
. Since Central Asia
15
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/1593736.stm
16
Kellogg, Paul. Contemporary Politics, Mar2003, Vol. 9 Issue 1, p75, 8p;
17
Rasizade, Alec. Contemporary Review, May2002, Vol. 280 Issue 1636, p257, 14p;
18
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/1848521.stm
19
Rasizade, Alec. Contemporary Review, May2002, Vol. 280 Issue 1636, p257, 14p;
20
Bassman, Robert S.. Europe, Feb2002 Issue 413, p14, 1/2p, 1c

7. is a landlocked region, oil pipelines have to necessarily pass through neighboring states
before being shipped off to Western ports. This proves to be problematic since nearly all
states adjoining Central Asia are either too unstable to ensure security for the pipelines,
or are themselves stakeholders in the Great Game. Currently, most of the oil
infrastructure of Central Asia passes through their former benefactor, Russia. China and
Iran provide the most economical alternatives for routing the pipelines. However, dictates
of political and strategic realities prohibit any such plans as anathema21
. Pipeline politics
has become the new diplomatic – and sometimes even military – challenge for the
Americans.
The United States has consistently supported plans for the construction of pipelines
which avoid territories of all three competing powers22
. Although these are not as
economically viable, they somewhat ensure stability of supplies with minimum
unidirectional dependency. One, advocated by Unocal for the past decade, passes through
Turkmenistan, Afghanistan, Baloch regions of Pakistan and then finally ends at the newly
constructed port at Gwadar23
. Even though initial steps were taken to materialize this
arrangement, violent instability in Afghanistan and incidents of pipeline blasts in parts of
Balochistan have stalled any progress24
. Even though efforts and plans are frequently
resurrected, the absence of order precludes any chances of construction and smooth
operation.
21
YELENA KALYUZHNOVA, AMYMYERS JAFFE, DOV LYNCH and ROBIN C. SICKLES (eds),
Energy in the Caspian Region (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2002), 266 pp., - page 214
22
AHMED RASHID, Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in Central
Asia (Yale University Press, New Haven, 2000), 288 pp., ISBN 0-300-08340-8 (hb) – pg 146
23
Kleveman, Lutz, 2/16/2004, p11
24
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/south_asia/156497.stm

8. The most politically viable but economically costly proposal has been for the
construction of a pipeline which starts at Azerbaijan’s capital Baku, passes through
relatively stable and Western-oriented territories of Georgia and Turkey, and then finally
concludes at Ceyhan25
. The unhindered operation of the pipeline is ensured since it passes
through the territories of NATO ally Turkey and Georgia – where US intervention is
relatively easier.
However, concerns have been expressed at the plan since the direction of the pipeline is
considered to be contrary to emerging trends in the world energy market. The pipeline is
headed towards the West in the direction of Europe, where the market for energy is
virtually saturated. The booming markets projected for the future are exactly in the
opposite direction towards China and India where rapid growth is creating an appetite for
energy26
. Here again, US strategic and military objectives prevail over economic
considerations.
Although the United States has entered the region as the sole superpower – some would
say ‘hyperpower’ – of the world, it faces considerable challenges from other actors
engaged in the region for centuries. Russia still consider Central Asia its “near-abroad”
and is not willing to cede its influence easily. It is aided by the fact that the CARs cannot
afford to liberate themselves from its control. Years of Soviet rule have ensured that the
25
HOOMAN PEIMANI, The Caspian Pipeline Dilemma: Political Games and Economic
Losses (Praeger, Westport, CT, 2001), 134 pp., - pg 66
26
HOOMAN PEIMANI, The Caspian Pipeline Dilemma: Political Games and Economic
Losses (Praeger, Westport, CT, 2001), 134 pp.,

9. infrastructure of all the five republics is oriented towards Russia27
. While the Soviet
Union might have fallen, the dependency relationship persists. Additionally, the presence
of a large number of Russians is these republics – serving in vital sectors of the economy
– ensures that domestic pressures will also prevent any major shift away from Russian
aspirations28
. Irritated by Western ambitions, Russia has also flexed its military muscle
and established a military base in Kyrgyzstan, separated by mere miles from the
American airbase29
. China, concerned about the fate of its Central Asian province of
Xinjiang with separatist tendencies, has initiated military activity in its region to ensure
minimal American influence or attempts at interference. It has also extended economic
assistance to Kazakhstan to the tune of $600 million, nudging it onto the path of a “multi-
vector” foreign policy30
. US-Iran relations have been further strained by accusations and
counter accusations of involvement in clandestine activities for destabilizing Afghanistan
in particular and the entire region in general31
.
It is obvious that Central Asia is not going to be an easy ride for the United States. If
instability and Islamic militancy are the chief causes for US disenchantment with the
Middle-East, it will be confronting precisely the same problems in the Caspian region as
well32
. Heightening volatility characterizes the region where conflicting ideologies of
Islam, nationalism and regionalism clash frequently for dominance. Poverty and
underdevelopment have fueled the flames of simmering discontent, contained only by
27
28
29
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/3206385.stm
30
Rasizade, Alec. Contemporary Review, May2002, Vol. 280 Issue 1636, p257, 14p;
31
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/2222214.stm
32
Kleveman, Lutz, 2/16/2004, p11

10. ruthless authoritarianism. While the iron men who rule Central Asia appear to clamp
down on violence with violence of even greater magnitude; their actions can only
postpone the impending turmoil, not prevent it. In the final analysis stability in Central
Asia – whether for oil, pipelines, trade, or simply for its own sake – cannot simply be
forcefully imposed from abroad. This unfortunate region which has endured conflict and
chaos for centuries can only stabilize when reform is initiated from within, transforming
the conditions of the masses and permitting them to live according to their will. It is time
to realize that the region itself is the biggest player in the new Great Game.