Nemesis in the 21st century draft 15 - 3 june 2013

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NEMESIS: OIL AND MISSILES IN THE 21st
CENTURY
“The country that faced down the tyranny of fascism and communism
is now called to challenge the tyranny of oil”, Barack Obama, Detroit
Economic Club, May 2007.
Introduction
Strangulation of the ‘umbilical cord’, our essential global oil supply conduit from the
Arabian Gulf to major oil-consuming nations in SE Asia, could gradually choke out
our life on our vulnerable planet. Are we already doomed?
This paper undertakes a brief historical analysis as to how oil supply contingency
was initially perceived, mentions the Oil Tanker War, and discusses the global oil
supply chain. The paper focuses on the increasing militarism amongst those oil
consumer nations dependent largely upon Middle East hydrocarbons supply. The oil
consumer nations discussed include: India, Taiwan, Japan, and South Korea. The
“Arab Spring” is highlighted together with an abbreviated analysis of the civil war in
Syria. The paper reviews the missile and anti-missile shield arms race, and the
geopolitical, economic and military implications for the West before the end of the
21st Century. Chinese perspectives are stated, analysed and broadly critiqued.
Cursory findings and conclusions are advanced including suggested reforms to the
United Nations Security Council (UNSC).
Recent history has portrayed the never ending struggle for oil supply. In earlier
times, the battle for oil supply amongst competing oil-consumer nations was often
backed up by intrusive gunboat diplomacy and naval blockade. Today, it is under a
much greater threat from missile deployments, and from high speed offshore patrol
vessels (OPV) armed with limited-theatre anti-ship missiles (ASBM) and other
sophisticated weapons.
Anti-West, nationalistic political leaders, deliberately disrupted oil supply in the past.
These included: Mohammad Mosaddegh (nationalised the Anglo-Iranian Oil
Company: May 1951), Gamal Nasser (nationalised and closed the Suez Canal: July
1956), Saddam Hussein (seized international oil interests, later precipitating the
‘1973 energy crisis’: June 1972), and Muammer Gaddafi (nationalised Libya’s oil
industry: September 1973). These despotic Islamic leaders were once linked by an
often expressed common sentiment: “The imperialistic West is stealing our oil”.
Today, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad menaces the West with potential nuclear
proliferation and threatens to block the Strait of Hormuz.1 North Korea threatens oil
deliveries to Japan and South Korea with new SRBM missiles. China disputes newly
discovered oil and gas reserves undersea in the Nan Hai and Dong Hai.
1 See Crash_Watcher,“If the Straitof Hormuz Closed,Which Oil ImportingRegion Would Suffer the Greatest
Loss?” Wednesday 18 July 2012. See also “StraitAnswer: Iran prepares to closeHormuz”, on
tv.globalresearch.ca (RTV video interview and article), Googlesearch on title, 3 July 2012

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Oil diplomacy will continue into the future and beyond the end of the 21st Century.
In the Middle East, the Gulf littoral Arab oil-producing states, largely unencumbered
by political intransigence in the past, include Bahrain, Kuwait (except for a brief Iraqi
occupation period), Oman, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, and the UAE.
Oil supply from the Arabian Gulf to Europe and the North American continent is not
discussed in this paper. These oil supply routes are relatively free from political
transgression, terrorist, or military action; apart from sporadic piracy off Somalia in
the northern Indian Ocean and from past closure of the Suez Canal. Nonetheless, if
the Strait of Hormuz is blocked, then very little Middle East oil would get through to
Europe and North America.
Historical Analysis
Professor Geoffrey Kemp in his “Limited Contingency Study” at the Pentagon first
recognised this fundamental problem in 1976. The encroachment of Soviet military
bases in Cuba, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, St Helena, and Mozambique; new bases
close to the Strait of Hormuz, Maldive Islands, and elsewhere sent strategic shivers
through defense analysts. Between 1965 and 1975, the Soviet military juggernaut
‘upstart-strongholds’ (built quickly, unexpectedly, to thus catch the West by surprise),
at so many diverse locations, severely tested the patience of Western military
analysts.
These locations are depicted in a book entitled “The Communist Challenge to Africa”
authored by Ian Greig2. The relevant maps are detailed at the beginning of the first
Chapter. The maps detail the locations of the Soviet bases positioned adjacent to the
major sea routes for the transit of crude oil.
In 1978, President Jimmy Carter’s “World Energy Crisis” Campaign had begun in
earnest. The Campaign in reality continues today and will effectively continue for
many decades to come. It will vacillate frequently in tune to the insatiable demand-
driven, thirsty oil consumer nations, and the world’s economic climate.
Suffice to say; in 1979 a Soviet cruiser took up station in the Gulf of Oman. Soviet
warship deployments had entered the Indian Ocean to effectively replace the former
presence of the omnipotent British Navy. Soviet maritime intentions were clear.
In the same year, Ayatollah Khomeini threatened to put the US hostages captured at
the US Embassy in Tehran on trial as spies. President Carter immediately warned
the Iranian Government through back channels that if any such “trials” took place
Iran would suffer dire consequences. To back up his threat, Carter ordered an
aircraft carrier battle group to take up station off the coast of Iran. The USS “Kitty
Hawk”: (CV-63) joined with another aircraft carrier already on station, the USS
“Midway” (CVB-41), to form one of the largest US naval forces ever to be assembled
in the region.
2 Greg, Ian,“The Communist Challenge to Africa”, Foreign Affairs PublishingCompany,1977,ISBN 0 900380217

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Further retaliation by the West was immediate. Mirror image naval bases with
upgraded infrastructure were quickly positioned at Bahrain, Diego Garcia, Djibouti,
Seychelles, and elsewhere. US pre-positioning strategy for materiel soon became
the norm. Rapid response initiatives were put into place. For the first time, since the
phased withdrawal of the UK’s military presence east of Suez3, British warships were
deployed on permanent station in the Gulf of Oman.
Many believed a Soviet encirclement of the Middle East oilfields was imminent. The
Soviet invasion of Afghanistan reinforced this sagacious perception. Today, military
analysts perceive the long term objective of the Sino-Russian bloc is to encircle and
capture the same vital oilfields.
In 1979, the future air-sea-battle lines were drawn athwart oil supply routes.
These routes were around the Cape of Good Hope, in the Arabian Gulf, the northern
Indian Ocean, and further afield in the southern Atlantic. The largest-volume oil
routes were westward to North America, and Europe. Significantly less oil
(conservatively estimated at roughly 28% of that shipped to Europe and the US) was
shipped eastward to ASEAN countries, Australasia, India, Pakistan, Japan, and
China. China’s oil consumption was not high, relatively, as most of the oil shipped
eastward was to support manufacturing activity in Japan. The latter was, at the time,
destined to become the world’s second-largest net oil importer.
Oil Tanker War (1984-88)
The oil battle was joined in September 1984.
Oil supply military interdiction first occurred when Iraqi aircraft attacked the oil
terminal and Iranian tankers at Kharg Island. The hitherto unexpected ‘Gulf Tanker
War’ broke out, catching the West by surprise, and was to last for some four
desperate years until July 1988. Sometimes it is called the “forgotten” war, largely
because it was overlooked by military historians, as a subsidiary war hidden within
the much larger Iraq-Iran conflict.
Oil tankers were steaming at full speed through the Strait of Hormuz (“Suicide Alley”)
at the rate of one tanker every two minutes4. In the upper reaches of the Arabian
Gulf, the multi-nation tankers, including Kuwaiti tankers protected by the American
flag, dodged Exocet missiles, hostile gunboats, Boghammar fast patrol boats, and
sea mines. Several oil tankers were damaged, including the supertanker al-Rekkah,
renamed as the Bridgeton, which struck a mine whilst in a northbound convey.
Air-to-ship missiles used in the Tanker War included eight categories of missiles:
namely the French Exocet (AM-39), the US Harpoon (AGM-84A) and Maverick
(AGM-65BC); and the Soviet Kipper (AS-2), Kitchen (AS-4), Kelt (AS-5), Kingfish
(AS-6) and Sea Killer. Many tankers received direct and tangential hits. It was a
miracle only three oil tankers were abandoned and declared total losses.
Nonetheless on less damaged tankers, crew members were killed or badly injured
3 British phased military withdrawal commenced in 1968,thus abandoningthe Arabian Gulf and Indian Ocean
4 Some 80 or 90 merchant ships were daily transitingtheStraitof Hormuz

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and numerous fires occurred in engine rooms. Fortunately, the fires were quickly
brought under control.
In total, between 1984 and 1987, an estimated 259 oil tankers/product carriers, and
52 cargo/freighter vessels were attacked. Another 39 vessels including tugs were
also attacked. It is amazing that only a mere 2 to 4% of the total shipping traffic
(estimate) in the Arabian Gulf was sunk (total loss), in spite of the constant rain down
of missiles during the war.
At the height of hostilities, four US Navy carrier battle groups were rotated in the
region. These were the “Ranger” (CV-61) and “Midway” (CVB-41) in the Bay of
Bengal and the “Enterprise” (CVN-65) and “Forrestal” (CV-59) in the Arabian Sea.
The media immediately drew world attention to the emergency and its projected
consequences for the West.
Chinese involvement in the Tanker War soon manifested itself. Towards the end of
the war, China supplied around three hundred HY-2 “Silkworm” anti-ship missiles to
Iran. This missile has a 96 km range and carries a 450 kg explosive warhead. It is a
Chinese version of the Soviet “Styx” anti-ship missile. Iran unashamedly used these
missiles against Kuwaiti tankers and offshore oil platforms.
Threat Analysis
The Gulf Tanker War is a dire warning as to what may happen on a wider scale later
this century in other oil chokepoints around the world. In 2011, total world oil
production amounted to approximately 87 million barrels per day (MMbbl/d) and over
one-half was moved by tankers on fixed maritime routes. By volume of oil transit, the
Strait of Hormuz, leading out of the Arabian Gulf, and the Strait of Malacca, linking
the Indian and Pacific Oceans, are two of the world’s most strategic chokepoints.
Other chokepoints are the Bab el-Mandab (Red Sea), Suez Canal and SUMED
Relief Pipeline, Turkish Straits, Danish Straits, and Panama Canal.
Global oil supply is obviously vulnerable. Impediments, military or otherwise, to oil
tankers transiting the seven world chokepoints will serve to reduce oil flow through
the umbilical cord. World oil chokepoints for maritime transit of oil are a critical part of
global energy security (US Energy Information Administration).
Iran has often threatened to block the Strait of Hormuz. During the Tanker War, Iran
laid magnetic mines in the Arabian Gulf, attacked Iraqi warships and oil installations.
Worst Case Scenarios
At this juncture, it is useful to describe a couple of worst case scenarios:
“A ‘blockship’ or ‘fireship’, such as an innocuous looking dredge or barge, flying a
disarming flag of convenience, devoid of the correct international code signals or
flags, displaying phony navigation lights at nighttime, loaded with high explosives,
mines, or destructive ordnance, towed by a powerful tug, suddenly and unexpectedly
positioned in the direct path of an unsuspecting outgoing fully laden ULCC unable to
change course quickly enough in the narrow channel to avoid a collision. The

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resultant conflagration and fireball is the worst possible outcome. Such a heinous act
is not beyond the present day capability of insurgents, political dissidents, or a rogue
state.”
“Another potential scenario could be an old WWII submarine or present day Yono
Class midget submarine, clandestinely positioned without detection by depth finder
or radar, to lie innately and inconspicuously on the bottom of the shallowest part of
the channel, likewise loaded with high explosives, set to ascend using remote control
radio signals, under the keel of a passing ULCC. Such interdiction is not beyond the
capability of those determined to disrupt oil supply to the West.”
There are many other options – surface or sub-surface UASs, modern midget or
normal electric submarines, aircraft, or airborne RPV suicide collision, and others.
Iran may possess secret weapons unknown to the West.
Mankind has often demonstrated gross wanton destruction using the slightest of
political whims as an unforgivable weak excuse. History tells us so. We may well
pray that these scenarios might never eventuate.
From the Iranian point of view, the operational success or otherwise of these
postulated worst case scenarios will greatly depend upon the viability of Western
detection methods. For instance, those vested in Omani offshore patrol vessels
(OPV) and helicopter surveillance, together with regular channel sweeps conducted
by US naval assets attached to the US Fifth Fleet on patrol from NSA Bahrain.
Detection methods, which could also concern the Iranian Navy, include new
electronic detection methodologies undertaken by using RSAF/USAF airborne
AWACS. 5
The eyes of the world are now and forever cast upon the Strait of Hormuz.
Approximately forty per cent of the world’s oil supply transits the Strait. Every
intelligence officer is sadly remiss if unable to understand the implications for the
West. The logistics of global oil supply are at stake. Never before in the history of
mankind has there been such an urgent (energy) issue.
However, it may be virtually impossible for terrorists, pirates, political groups, or
rogue nations to interdict oil supply in the Strait without early detection by the West.
Missile Threat
Notwithstanding this assertion, it can be said no amount of maritime surveillance can
protect oil tankers from the ultimate missile threat especially if the warheads are
nuclear. In view of the lessons learnt from the Oil Tanker War, the question is
whether Iran (or North Korea) is irresponsible enough to use these deadly weapons
to greater destructive effect with no regard for maintaining world peace. The Islamic
Republic of Iran Navy (IRIN) and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps Navy
(IRGCN) now have an estimated thirteen classes of missile6. China, Russia, and
5The Royal Saudi Air Force (RSAF) using5X Boeing 707 modified E-3 Sentry aircraftand the United States Air
Force (USAF) both undertake AWACS surveillanceof maritimesources in the Arabian Gulf,Straitof Hormuz,
and Gulf of Oman. These assets arebased atPrinceSultan Air Base(Al Kharj) and Al Udeid Air Base (Doha)
respectively.
6 Iran’s missiles include:Nasr 1 and 2 Victory battlefield range ballisticmissile(BRBM), virtually identical to the
C704 Chinese supplied cruisemissile,Ra’d Thunder, SS N 22 Sunburn P270 Moskit, Ghadir,Fateh-110, Mehrab
(Altar), Meshkat (Lantern), Noor/Yinji (Hawk) C-801/2 ASBM, Seersucker CSS-C-2, Qader (Mighty), Zafar,and

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North Korea have combined to supply Iran’s missiles7. Iran continues to insist its
defence doctrine is based upon deterrence.
Potentially, North Korea is able to interdict oil deliveries to Taiwan, Japan and South
Korea using offensive missile strikes.
A number of latent thoughts arise at this juncture.
Russia has abundant oil. Iran currently needs to sell oil to defeat international
embargoes. China needs to buy large quantities of Middle East oil including from
Iran. If and when China obtains sufficient quantities of additional oil from Russia
(Siberian crude), from the Caspian Region, from Africa, Venezuela, or elsewhere;
then China will be correspondingly less dependent upon oil sourced from the Arabian
Gulf littoral. In the longer term, ceteris paribus, China with support from Russia could
conceivably encourage Iran to block the Strait of Hormuz.
This argument is probably fallacious.
If China obtained sufficient oil coming from elsewhere and it does not need oil from
the Arabian Gulf, then why would Iran cede to China to block the Strait of Hormuz?
Obviously Iran still needs to export oil to generate income or to meet its internal
domestic public sector expenditures. If the Strait is blocked, Iran will be unable to
export much of its oil production. Pipelines/road tankers alone will not suffice.
The US is reducing its dependence upon Middle East oil (recently estimated at close
to 30 per cent once new pipelines and infrastructure come on stream).
Oil Volumes Transited Today
Tonnages of oil shipped through the Strait have increased exponentially in recent
years pari passu with the growth in VLCC and ULCC gigantic size tankers. Although
mammoths such as “Oriental Nicety” (“Exxon Valdez”), “Seawise Giant”, “Pierre
Guillaumat”, “Batillus”, Bellamya”, and “Prairial” are now scrapped (many are
scrapped at the Alang breakers yard in India); they have been replaced by even
larger tankers. For example, Iran has procured the world’s largest tanker (with 2.2
million barrels capacity) to add to its 49 tanker national fleet.8 “Sirius Star”, “Hua
San”, and “Yangtze Star” although very large, are not quite in the same class.
China is building the largest oil tanker fleet in the world (Poten and Partners,
Houston, TX) and the world’s largest merchant marine navy.
Increased oil tonnages have greatly hastened the ‘pulse, throb and flow’ of crude oil
passing through the umbilical cord global oil supply.
Changes in Volume Oil Supply
Nour (Light). Some of these arenuclear capable.Some were successfully tested duringthe Velayat91 naval
manoeuvres held December 2012. The Nour missilecan be launched from an estimated fleet of 10,000 plus
speedboats constitutinga hard to defend “swarm attack” on Western transit shipping.China has opened a
missileproduction plantfacility in Iran for the mass production of the Nasr 1 missile.Iran isbuildinga secret
missileinstallation in Venezuela.
7 Lincy, Valerie,“More Talks with Iran setfor January”, Iran Watch Status Report, Wisconsin Projecton Nuclear
Arms Control, 1701 K Street NW, Suite 805, Washington DC, December 2012
8 Recently builtin China (Internet source)

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Today, the prevailing exigencies associated with the need for consistent global oil
supply have greatly increased the volume of oil transported worldwide for immediate
consumption and for government strategic reserves. China has overtaken Japan and
is now the world’s second largest net oil importer. The US, still the number one net
importer, has retreated somewhat and desires to become self-sufficient in
hydrocarbons supply (using new technology to extract “kerogen”, not actually oil, but
an organic matter, from indigenous shale oilfields).
The US, long recognising its own vulnerability to sustained oil supply from the Middle
East, is now determined to reduce its dependence upon imported oil. Increased
prospecting and oil exploration activities are on the US mainland.9 The US is also
looking to Canada for sources of new oil supply (known as ‘Tight Oil’), such as from
new shale oil fields using improved extraction technology. These new oil fields
include the New Brunswick Albert and Devonian Kettle Point Formations, and the
lesser known Ordovician Collingwood Shale. The shale oil boom has given the US
the means to slash its oil import dependency using the new Keystone XL pipeline
delivering substantial crude from carbon-heavy Canadian tar sands.
US crude oil production is set to rise to its highest level in 25 years by 201410
A note of caution prevails here. David Hughes, an independent geologist, has written
an exhaustive 178-page research paper published by the Post Carbon Institute in
February 2013. The paper examines 65,000 existing US shale and gas wells. The
main finding is thus: “... the challenges and costs of 21st Century fossil fuel
production suggest that vastly increased supplies will not be easily achieved or even
possible”.11 Similarly, research by the US Geological Survey casts doubt upon wildly
optimistic production assumptions relied on by listed US companies when raising
equity and debt capital.
Gervaise Heddle, a little-known Australian investor, has circulated a private report
claiming that US shale companies’ profits bear little relation to actual cash earnings.
Heddle states: “Every model of US growth has been tweaked to recognise the
accepted ‘fact’ that shale oil will rescue North America from its indebtedness. If the
new shale oil and gas drilling techniques are genuinely a revolution that will unlock
boundless energy, it’s fair to assume that the companies capitalising on them can
generate attractive cash returns. But the evidence suggests otherwise”.
9 Innovativedrillingtechnology has greatly improved US prospects for indigenous oil production.“The
Octopus” multi-well pad drillingsystemis up to eight times faster than conventional methods. The US may
eclipseSaudi oil production by 2015 or earlier. US crude imports have already fallen by 11 per cent. US based
exploration companies include:Continental Resources,BrighamExploration,Devon Energy, EnCana, and North
Dakota Mineral Resources.Some of these companies areoperating on the Bakken shaleoilfield.Costper well
usingmulti-pad technology is reduced to U$2.5M from the conventional costof US$6M. Source: “Oil and Gas
Trader”, downloaded Monday, 3 June, 2013 (10.30 hrs. AEST, Australia).
NOTES: (a) The US anticipates total world oil production dominanceby (say) 2025 or earlier,(b) Also refer to
the report entitled “550% Windfall fromBakken Octopus Technology”, produced by the “Oil and Gas Trader” in
2013,(c) It is perceived by some that Saudi Arabia will ceaseexportingoil by 2030.Further research is needed.
10 Potter, Ben, The Australian Financial Review,Thursday 10 January 2013, www.afr.com
11 “The real oil on US shalemay be elusive”,press articlewritten by Christopher Joyce, Smart Money, ”The
Australian Financial Review”, 25-26 May 2013, www.afr.com

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Thus, it could be that a predicted US ‘second oil boom’ may be nothing more than an
ephemeral mirage. The initial euphoria might easily dispel by 2017 when some oil
industry experts believe Tight Oil (shale oil) will peak to eventually collapse back to
2012 levels by 2019.
If these dire predictions are to run true, the implications for the US economy are self-
evident. The US dollar could weaken and fall back to 2012 exchange rates. The US
economy may once again totter on the edge of the fiscal cliff. The US will still be
dependent on Middle East oil.
The paradigm of global oil supply has significantly changed. The oil still flows
westward around the Cape of Good Hope, but compared with 2003 patterns, much
more oil now flows eastwards to India, Pakistan, ASEAN countries, Australasia,
China12, South Korea, and Japan. Additional quantitative research is useful here.
The rampant Chinese Dragon has replaced the Soviet Bear in the quest for military
control over the oil supply chain. Less obviously today, rather than openly displaying
military prowess over oil transit routes, the Bear lurks in the background, supplying
Siberian crude at below market price to the Dragon.
Looking at the hitherto described oil routes, it is now apparent that more oil flows
eastward than flows westward. Based upon a simple extrapolation from The World
Factbook13, oil imports expressed in millions of barrels of oil per day14 (MMbbl/day)
for India (3.06), ASEAN (4.60), Taiwan (0.88), China (5.08), Japan (4.39), and South
Korea (2.50), when combined add to approximately 20.48 MMbbl/day. The US (10.3)
and European Union (8.61) together total approximately 18.91 MMbbl/day.15 This
represents a difference of some 1.6 MMbbl/day.16 The real figure is probably close
to 3 million barrels per day when Australasia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka
are included in the eastward flow.
More accurate extrapolation should be undertaken for improved research into
worldwide oil flows, using more recent figures and estimates.
This is a quantum change in the global pattern of oil supply to that depicted in the US
Pacific Command (USPACCOM) strategic map, released to Middlebury College,
Middlebury, in Vermont in 2003. USLANTCOM, USCENCOM and USPACCOM
12 There are approximately 400 oil terminals on mainland China
13 Listof Countries by oil imports,compiled by Wikipedia,and based upon The World Factbook, refer to
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2175rank.html
14 An oil barrel (abbreviated as bbl) is a unitof volume whose definition has notbeen universally standardized.
In the United States and Canada,an oil barrel is defined as 42 US gallons which is equivalentto 158.987294928
litres (L) exactly or approximately 34.9723 imperial gallons.Depending on the context, it can also bedefined as
35 imperial gallonsor as 159 liters.Oil companies thatarelisted on American stock exchanges typically report
their production in terms of volume and use the units of bbl, Mbbl (one thousand barrels),or MMbbl (one
million barrels).Source:Wikipedia,accessed March 2013
15 Figures in parenthesis areexpressed as millions of barrelsper day (MMbbl/day)
16 Not all countries areincluded in the extrapolated figures (mostly 2009,but also inclusiveof some 2010 and
2011 figures).Some bias obtains.Oil flows fromall sourcesareincluded.Pakistan,Sri Lanka,Bangladesh,South
Korea, Australasia and thePacific Islandsareexcluded. Estimates arefor illustrativepurposes only

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strategic maps (classified) continue to detail the major crude oil trade flows for
military logistic analysis.17
Increasing Militarism
Nonetheless, given these changes, the same geo-strategic principles (military
posturing: prepositioning materiel: rapid response: infrastructure development) that
were highlighted by Professor Geoffrey Kemp in 1976 are equally present today.
Again, the potential adversaries have taken up new positions with renewed vigour.
Military bases are again crowding the oil supply umbilical cord. The adversaries will
face-off each other across many millions of sq. kms of ocean. In tandem with
obvious threats of military interdiction to the umbilical cord, there are illegal
(UNCLOS and EEZ) competing claims for undersea oil and gas reserves in coastal
seas close to ASEAN countries, Japan, South Korea and China.
To state the obvious truth, there is a clear dichotomy between East and West. The
predominant powers are irreversibly aligned into two main camps. The Sino-Russian
bloc, supported by Iran and North Korea; and the US-Europe bloc, supported by
India, ASEAN, Japan, and Australasia. This is a simplistic analysis. It does not
consider emerging loyalties from smaller nations, and surrogate rogue states. Yet to
be fully committed third-world countries play the political odds both ways to
precipitate a desirable outcome for themselves.
Chen Yuming, Chinese ambassador to Australia, “has branded Australia’s decision
to strengthen military ties with the US ... as demonstrating a Cold War-style
“confrontation or containment” mentality towards Beijing”.18
Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan have also been chastised by Chinese diplomats for
purchasing US weapons and materiel. Likewise have the Western sympathetic Arab
oil producing states in the Arabian Gulf littoral.
The Sino-Russian and US-Europe power entities are constantly aligning their
respective political, economic and military strengths in anticipation of a potential
East-West conflict as to who ultimately secures absolute oil supply.
It is as if the would-be adversaries are deliberately rushing selfishly to guard the
precious oil flow for their own consumption. Indeed, this on closer examination
proves to be the case.
China and Iran
For example, the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) intends to construct new
naval bases and associated infrastructure at Gwadar (Pakistan), Hambantota (Sri
Lanka), Marao (Maldives), Small and Great Coco Islands (Myanmar), Chittagong
(Bangladesh), Sittwe, Kyuakpu, Mergui, and Hainggyi Island. These are constituent
17 A declassified strategic map was released by USPACCOM to Middlebury College in 2003. It can be
downloaded from The South China Sea Virtual Library at www.middlebury.edu/~scs
18 “China Warns on US Ties”, Front Page and Page 2, Australian Financial Review, 16 January 2013

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elements in China’s so-called “String of Pearls” (Booz, Allen Hamilton) strategic
policy to protect its sea lines of communication19.
It is theoretically possible China may yet construct a naval base in the Arabian Gulf.
The rogue state, Iran, may provide fortuitous assistance with a revamp of the port of
Bandar Abbas, directly opposite the Musandam Peninsula, at the very throat of the
jugular Strait of Hormuz.
A Chinese naval presence in an Iranian port or in a southern Arabian port (i.e. Aden
and/or Bashayer Harbour at Port Sudan) would be a very interesting development.
China needs to keep its trade routes to Arabia and Africa open and safe from
blockade or military interdiction.
Iran has announced the inauguration of its newest naval base, located near Bandar-
e-Lengah, only some 200 kms from the main naval base at Bandar Abbas20. Iran has
stated the new base is being used to place reciprocal pressure on Western
Governments. Public statements by Iranian Navy officials suggest that the IRIN is
endeavouring to extend its reach within the area bounded by four strategic maritime
chokepoints: the Strait of Hormuz, the Strait of Malacca, the Bab al-Mandeb, and the
Suez Canal (Middle East Institute). Iran’s expanded maritime capacity might be
enough to economically disrupt the West.
Given the massive US and other Western Naval fleet presence in the area, it would
be difficult for the Iranian Navy to extend its influence beyond the Arabian Gulf, or
even its territorial waters.
Nonetheless, the Iranian Navy is likely to be supplied from Russia with advanced
cruise missiles with a range of 300 km. In late April this year, Iranian Defence
Minister, Brigadier General Ahmad Vahidi announced plans to unveil new ballistic
and cruise missiles as well as other new military achievements within the next five
months.21
The increasing militarism within Iran has accelerated a new arms race in the Arabian
Gulf region.
Iran continues to defy the West with its perceived intention to develop enriched
uranium and the capability to manufacture nuclear weapons. In assessing the
ballistic missile threat, a key issue is estimating how long it may take countries like
Iran (and North Korea) to build missiles that could carry a nuclear warhead sized
payload to the US.22
19 Hayward (Rtd), CAPT David L O, “China in the Indian Ocean – A Case of Uncharted Waters”, Strategic Analysis
Paper (SAP), Future Directions International (FDI),2010-7-05.Posted/archived to www.futuredirections.org.au
20 Mendiolaza,Gustavo; “Aggression or Defence? New Iranian Naval Basein Straitof Hormuz”, Strategic
Weekly Analysis,FutureDirections International (FDI),14 Nov 2012, www.futuredirections.org.au
21 “Iran Navy to Get Advanced CruiseMissiles”,Ria Novosti,posted in “MissileThreat”, George C. Marshall and
Claremont Institutes,by Editor on 13 May, 2013.Downloaded and printed 19.00 hrs.AEST, Australia.
22 Economist Reader, “Timeline for an Iranian solid-fuel ICBM”,accessed through Linkedin, 12 February 2013

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Steven Hildreth, an expert in missile defence, has closely examined Iran’s ballistic
missile and space launch capabilities.23
Expanding Chinese Navy
China is deep into the process of creating its strongest navy since that built and
commanded by Zheng He, the famous admiral who led seven major expeditions to
the far reaches of the Indian Ocean in the early 16th century. In fact, PLAN
composition and capabilities are markedly different from previous major naval
construction programs conducted by emerging world powers. China’s new navy
relies more on unmanned cruise and ballistic missiles than on manned aircraft, and
more on submarines than surface vessels.24
Storm warnings have been sounded by VADM Doug Crowder, US Navy (Rtd): “...
the PLAN has begun to operate more as a blue-water navy, moving surely and
steadily beyond its coastal roots and demonstrating concepts of operations to go
along with technologies that result in a clear focus on anti-access and area denial in
the Western Pacific.”25
Aided by increased budgets and improved domestic shipbuilding capabilities, the
PLAN is making significant progress in its modernization efforts. This includes
unprecedented procurement in recent years of seven classes of modern destroyers
and frigates, five classes of submarines (two of which are nuclear powered), and
other force enhancements such as three types of capable maritime interdiction
aircraft, fast missile boats, and amphibious warfare ships.
The present deployment of the Chinese Navy in ASEAN and Northern Indian Ocean
waters is not discussed here. However, PLAN initiatives to protect its oil umbilical
from the Middle East are discussed in another paper.26
In its own backyard, PLAN developments at Yulin Navy Base (Hainan Island) and at
Sansha (prefecture-level city) to administer more than 200 islets in the Spratly
(Nansha), Macclesfield Bank (Zhongsha), and the Paracel Islands (Xisha) are not
treated in this paper.27 Nor is the present conflict between China and Japan over the
disputed Senkaku/Diaoyu islands in the Dong Hai (East China Sea) discussed.
Chinese Missiles
The Pentagon has issued a strategic map detailing China’s new “Circles of
‘Influence’” in SE Asia and beyond, that is the ultimate ranges of the People’s
Liberation Army’s short, medium, and long range missiles (i.e. DF-11 and DF-15
23 Hildreth, Steven A., “Iran’s Ballistic Missileand SpaceLaunch Programs”, 66-pages,Congressional Research
Service (CRS), 6 December 2012,7-5700,www.crs.gov Email: shildreth@crs.loc.gov ,7-7635. Refer to Figures 2
and 4, pages 16 and 22 respectively,for SRBM and MRBM Sites and Ranges
24 Saunders,Phillip;Young,Christopher; Swaine, Michael,and Yang, Andrew Nien-Dzu; “The Chinese Navy –
ExpandingCapabilities,EvolvingRoles”,National Defense University Press,Institutefor National Strategic
Studies, WASHINGTON DC, December 2011
25 Crowder, VADM Doug, “Storm Warnings”,posted (Blog) by US Naval Institute(USNI), Proceedings Magazine,
2012-4-15,refer to www.usni.org
26 Ibid,see footnote 17
27 Cole, Michael J, “China Deploying Military Garrison to South China Sea?”, The Diplomat (Blogs), Flashpoints,
2012-07-23

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SRBM (375 miles), DF-21 ASBM and MRBM, CJ-10 LACM, FB-7 and B-6 both with
ASCM (900 miles); and DF-3 and B-6 with LACM (2,000 miles.)28.
Short and medium range missiles are referred to as “theatre” ballistic missiles
presumably earmarked for usage in the Sea of Japan, Huang Hai (Yellow Sea),
Dong Hai (East China Sea), Western Pacific, Nan Hai (South China Sea), and Strait
of Malacca.
China’s new found ability to reach and strike designated targets within its declared
2,000 mile radius limit also includes the Arabian Gulf, Strait of Hormuz, Gulf of
Oman, Bay of Bengal, and northern Indian Ocean.
China will not, of course, interrupt its own oil supply, but will if necessary attack
Western naval assets (warships, OPV, and port infrastructure). This is not entirely
logical. If China were to attack a US/Allied ship in the Indian Ocean, it could not only
result in its oil from Arabia being blocked, but also in a potential blockade on
all/much trade. China can do far more damage/apply influence with cyber-leverage,
trade embargoes and financial disruption.
China imports significant oil from Iran and wants to keep the Strait of Hormuz open
to its own transit shipments. Some military analysts assert that the Chinese airforce
and navy defence ‘umbrella’ does not extend to protecting its global oil supply west
of the Strait of Malacca.29 Missiles, however, make up for the shortfall.
It is difficult to comprehensively assess the full inventory of Chinese missiles.
Conflicting statistics for missile classes and numbers obtain, namely from the
International Institute of Strategic Studies (IISS) and the US DOD Annual PRC
Military Report - both sources were released in 2010.
It must be said that in addition to the missile classes mentioned above, China
definitely has at least seven classes of land-based and submarine launched inter-
continental range ballistic missiles (ICBMs).30 Defence analysts believe China is
currently in the middle of a major strategic nuclear forces build-up that includes four
new ICBMs – the DF-41, JL-2 (Julang-2), DF-31A, and another road-mobile missile
called the DF-31. Some of these lethal missiles can be armed with multiple,
independently-targetable warheads (MIRVs). The modified DF-5A ICBM is thought to
have a range of 15,000 km and is capable of striking targets in continental US,
Russia and Europe: quoted in Russian media 2012-12-04.
Recent secret missile tests held in the Wuzhai Space and Missile Test Centre in
Shanxi Province represent a new level of capability for China’s nuclear forces. The
total number of missile classes held by China is not known. Estimates of missile
numbers wildly fluctuate from 1,300 to over 4,000 missiles. It is believed at least
1,000 SRBM, MRBM, and ASCM are directly aimed at Taiwan and a similar class
28 Source, Office of the US Secretary of Defense
29 PLAN has deployed warships to the Gulf of Aden, to assistin combatingSomali pirates
30 Seven classes of ChineseICBM includeDF-41 (new), DF-31A, DF-31, DF-5A, DF-5, DF-4, and Julang-2
(submarinelaunched);plus three classes of intermediate range missiles DF-16,DF-3A, and DF-3.

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mix of some 800 missiles aimed at ASEAN countries, Japan and South Korea.
Numbers of missiles targeted at India are not known.
Oil supply to India, ASEAN countries, Australasia, Japan and South Korea is thus
gravely threatened by missile interdiction. Australasia is not beyond the range of
Chinese ICBM missiles.
China is ranked second worldwide by its oil imports.
“Arab Spring”: Impact upon Oil Supply
To digress from China briefly, the “Arab Spring” merits attention. The political unrest
in the Middle East has marginally reduced global oil supply. This has led to mixed
results amongst Arab countries.
In the wake of the Arab Spring, the non-oil economies of Egypt and Tunisia have
suffered through budgetary constraints, slower growth, political uncertainty, and
declining tourism. The same thing has happened, but to a lesser extent, to Jordan,
Lebanon, and Morocco. Higher oil prices have impacted upon household budgets.
Outside help for these economies is forthcoming from the IMF, and the World Bank,
as well as from bilateral lenders such as the EU, US, and oil rich Saudi Arabia.
In contrast to the generally depressed picture across the Arab world’s non-oil
economies, oil producers such as Algeria, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, Sudan,
Saudi Arabia, and UAE have benefited from increases in oil prices. Nowhere has this
been more apparent than in Saudi Arabia. King Abdullah bin Abdel-Aziz al-Saud
recently announced ‘giveaway’ largesse totalling a huge US$ 129 billion (equivalent
to 30% of GDP). Kuwait has provided a smaller handout worth US$3,700 to every
citizen and has distributed free food.
Other oil producers, such as Bahrain, Syria, Yemen, and Libya are facing twelve
months or more of economic hardship in the wake of widespread domestic unrest.
For instance, the Yemeni economy has contracted in the face of mass protests,
worsening violence, and the ongoing interruption to oil supplies caused by sabotage
and staff strikes. In Libya, oil production has shut down. Libya’s loss is likely to be
Iraq’s gain. With Libya sidelined, and oil prices set to remain elevated, Iraq, which
has already signed a host of large deals to develop and repair its underdeveloped oil
resources, is now poised to take up the slack. Iran has by-passed the US and
European trade sanctions by supplying more oil to China.
Syria is the only significant crude oil producing Arab state in the Eastern
Mediterranean region, which includes Gaza, Lebanon, Israel, the West Bank and
Jordan. BP Plc estimates Syria holds the ninth-largest oil reserves in the Middle East
(approximately 2.5 billion barrels as of January 2010). Crude production peaked at
0.596 MMbbl/day in 1995, but declined to less than 0.140 MMbbl/day in August
2012.
As stated elsewhere, Iran is an ever present threat to political and military stability in
the Middle East. Funded by increasing oil revenues from China, Iran is progressing

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towards greatly increased militarism. In direct retaliation to US hosted multi-nation
war games in the Gulf of Oman/Arabian Sea, Iran decided to stage massive military
manoeuvres of its own. Not to be outdone, Iran showcased its exercises as the
biggest air defence war game in the Islamic Republic’s history.
The current deployment of the Iranian Navy is not discussed in detail in this paper.
It would be appropriate to take a snapshot of Middle East oil production before and
after the Arab Spring. Pluses and minuses would be apparent for the oil producers,
but in the main it is assumed total oil supply was slightly reduced at the onset of the
Arab Spring. It is theoretically possible that Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, and the UAE will
now have increased oil production to compensate for Libya, Iraq, Syria, and perhaps
Sudan, to return global oil supply to status quo.
Some valuable research work has been undertaken by the Oxford Institute for
Energy Studies. A recent paper closely examines the implications of the Arab
uprisings for oil and gas markets.31
Syrian Civil War
The civil war in Syria has reached genocidal proportions. It has disrupted, if not shut
down, oil flow through the pipelines transiting the country. Some oil terminals,
pumping stations, fuel depots and service stations are damaged or beyond
immediate repair. Very little petrol is available at bowsers. Rebels have captured two
major oilfields in the south-eastern province of Deir al-Zour. Syria has two major
refineries: at Homs and Banias. The Homs refinery and its feeder pipelines have
been attacked at least three times by “terrorist’ groups, and allegedly by the Syrian
Army. Production is severely curtailed. Total chaos prevails.
Several proposals to build new oil refineries in Syria have been recently mooted by
Iran and Venezuela (Agreement signed in Tehran); by Noor, a Kuwait company, and
by the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC). The Chinese corporation
commenced construction near Abu Khashab in 2011, but work is delayed due to the
civil war.
Conjecture as to why China and Russia continue to protect Syria from Western
intervention is open to question.
Russia considers Syria to be one of its last Middle East footholds where Syria hosts
a repair and maintenance facility for the Russian Navy on its coast. Russia has
remained silent on the issue of a recent oil-for-oil products swap deal which implies
economic support for the Assad regime. There is also the prospect of new oil and
gas field discoveries. Again, Russia has supplied copious quantities of light arms,
heavy weapons, missiles, and munitions to the Syrian government. Arms contracts
with Russia are worth at least $4 billion. Iran, China and North Korea have also
supplied missiles.
31 Hakim Darboucheand BassamFattouh, paper entitled “The Implicationsof the Arab Uprisings for Oil and
Gas Markets”, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, University of Oxford,September 2011, ISBN 978-1-907555 –
33 - 6

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China, Iran and Russia have substantial economic interests in Syria.
Syria has at least six main classes of ballistic missile for which there are an
estimated eleven variants. These include three variants of the Scud missile: (1)
Scud-B (Russia: R17 “Elbrus”/NATO: SS-1-C) from North Korea, (2) Scud-C (SS-1-
D), and (3) Scud-D (Russia: R-17VTO/NATO: SS-1-E/DPRK Hwasong 7. The Scud-
D has a guidance system and a range of 700 km. Additionally Syria has two Chinese
made road-mobile SRBMs: the Dong Feng-15 and the Dong Feng-11. The DF-15
has a range of 600 to 800 km and is Syria’s most strategically important ballistic
missile. Other missiles in the arsenal include the Fateh-110 (Iran), SS-21 (North
Korea), and a small number of Russian anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCM) designed
for coastal defence. All Syria’s ballistic missiles are capable of carrying chemical
warheads.
The precise attributes of these missile classes are beyond the scope of this paper.
It is impossible to exactly calculate the classes, variants and numbers of missiles
possessed by Syria. Unknown to the West, the Assad regime may have concealed
secret inventories hidden away in remote silos, tunnels, and caves.
In addition to missile systems, Syria is thought to have substantial inventories of
220mm and 302mm rocket systems. Syria has supplied 25 per cent of its rocket
arsenal to Hezbollah in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah has now emerged as a non-
state rocket superpower.32
During the civil war, at least twenty launches of ballistic missiles have been detected
by NATO radar installations in nearby Turkey.
Syria has one of the most active rocket and missile programs in the Middle East
today. The country is of real concern to Western military analysts. Once the Assad
regime is in its death throes, it could act irrationally: strike out at neighbouring oil
refineries, oil infrastructure, pipelines, oil tankers and the Suez Canal.
Israel
In January 2013, Israeli Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu warned his government
of the dangers of Syria’s growing missile inventories, that Syria is rapidly
fragmenting, and its political system is falling apart. In response, in the same month,
the Israeli air force launched a pre-emptive air strike on a military site within Syria.
The target was a truck convey believed to contain a shipment of Russian-made SA-
17 anti-aircraft missiles. Collateral damage was also sustained to a military research
centre located at Jamraya close to the Turkish border.33 Iran has vowed revenge for
this attack.
For its part, Israel may be forced to launch additional pre-emptive air strikes.
32 Eisenstadt,Michael,“The MiddleEastMissileEnvironment”, Defense Dossier,American Foreign policy
Council (AFPC), Issue6, January 2013,subscribed to and downloaded from AFPC
33 Hubbard, Ben, “Israeli air strikeinsideSyriatargets missiles”,World,page37, Australian Financial Review,
Friday 1 February 2013

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Theoretical Outcomes
The West has not been able to stop the carnage in Syria by means of a political,
economic, or military solution.
Theoretical outcomes from the civil war include: (1) birth of a new pro-Iran Islamic
state; or (2) creation of a new politically weak state with no discernible allegiance to
either East or West; or (3) a new totalitarian state contrived by a strong
Iranian/Russian comprehensive political, economic, and military takeover; or (4) a
Middle East State troops deployment within Syria to act as arbitrator (possibly from
Saudi Arabia, or Kuwait or UAE, or a combination of Gulf Cooperative Council (GCC)
States) for a one/two year period, or (5) coupled with the establishment of a “No Fly”
Zone, deployment of UN peacekeeper troops to separate and quell the rebel
fractions and possibly to support the Syrian Armed Forces; or (6) legal censure of
the war crimes committed by all fractions and commencement of due international
legal process to charge, arrest, and intern offenders; or (7) escalation of the civil war
into a new conflict with Israel, partly encircled as it is with SRBM/MRBM based on
the Gaza Strip, in South Lebanon, Syria, and Iran; or (8) further conflict with Turkey if
more inaccurate Scud missiles launched in Syria stray over the border into refugee
camps or Turkish villages. Turkish troops could well take reprisals and (9) potential
for a civil war to break out in Turkey destabilizing the current regime.
Whatever the outcome, the West believes the Assad regime will soon be toppled and
the present incumbents charged with war crimes. This could be regarded as a deus
ex machina solution. It is idealistic and it may never happen.
All of the possible outcomes, except for (4) above, are disadvantageous to the West
especially the potential for outbreaks of unwanted new regional wars. Thus far it has
not been possible to instigate a “No Fly” Zone. China and Russia have constantly
vetoed this pro tem solution. The crisis constitutes a “flashpoint” which could embroil
the entire Middle East and ultimately lead to WWIII. Political dialogue/negotiations
must and are continuing in an urgent attempt to solve the internal multi-faceted
issues and to foster a moratorium to put a stop to the civil war.
The West must do something. Some military analysts suggest France, Germany,
and the UK should go it alone, invade Syria, and put ‘boots on the ground’. This
hardline action would be disastrous and is evocative of the Suez crisis in 1956.
A NATO or European Union ‘boots on the ground’ option is a no-go for many
reasons: not the least the lessons learned from Iraq, Afghanistan and Libya – no
more ‘infidel invader’ options. The Syrian Crisis must be resolved by the countries in
the region with ‘minimal crusader’ support. The West needs to find a ‘smart power’
solution without committing combat troops.
In Washington DC, the American Foreign Policy Council (AFPC) is working hard with
members of US Congress, the Executive Branch, the US policymaking community,
other government agencies and Western governments to come up with a satisfactory
answer to mitigate the Syrian crisis.

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Russia and the US between them might yet save the day with their proposed Peace
Conference, but this now seems unlikely. The imminent deployment of Russian
surface to air (SAM) S-300 missiles to Syria has heightened tension.34 Likewise the
possibility that France and the UK will supply weapons to the Syrian opposition
coalition/rebels may bring peace negotiations to an abrupt halt.
Perhaps the West is powerless to solve the deepening crisis situation? Is it game,
set and match to Syria, Iran, Russia and China?
Substantial research on the Syrian Crisis is currently being prepared by The
Intelligence Community LLC located in Washington DC.35
Western Reaction
Just as before as in the late 1970’s, the West has again reacted angrily to increasing
militarism and political unrest alongside the main oil transit routes from the Arabian
Gulf eastwards to India, ASEAN, China, Taiwan, Japan, South Korea, Australasia,
and other oil-consumer nations in the Western Pacific .
New air-sea-battle lines are emerging to counter Iran’s continued intransigence in
areas such as nuclear weapons proliferation, China’s “String of Pearls”, ‘anti-
access’, and ‘area-denial’ maritime stratagems.
Counter measures include: (1) the deployment of supercarriers by the US Fifth Fleet
to the Middle East, (2) upgrades to Diego Garcia, and to Bahrain36
, (3) procurement
by Arab states of 100 plus Euro Typhoon fighter aircraft to counter IRIN and IRGCN
initiatives to gain maritime sea control in the Strait of Hormuz; (4) the future
deployment of additional supercarriers by the US Seventh Fleet in SE Asia37
, (5)
reactivation of Cam Ranh Bay naval base in Vietnam38
, (6) construction of INS
Kadamba in India39
, (7) improved ship repair facilities at Changi naval base in
Singapore40
, (8) deployment of US marines to Darwin, (9) redeployment of 80,000
34 Some academics assertthe Russian SAMmissileshavealready been deployed. For example in the article:
“Russia’s S-300 Surfaceto Air Missiles already deployed and functional in Syria”,by Professor Michel
Chossudovsky,Global research,30 May,2013. Refer to Web site: globalresearch.ca.This may not be strictly
true for the designated missilevariant.However, Moscow announced in June 2006 that it would deploy the
older S-300PMU air defense to protect its maintenancenaval baseatTartus in southern Syria.
See also:”Israel could swoop on S-300 missiles in Syria,butwith more risks”,by Don Williams,Reuters,
Jerusalem, on Thursday,30 May, 2013.
35 “Syria Policy Playbook”contains enough material to write two entire books. Deadlinefor additional
submissions fromLinkedin members has now been extended by The IntelligenceCommunity to Tuesday 4
June, 2013. Refer to www.TheIntelligenceCommunity.com
36 Bahrain is nowcalled Naval SupportActivity Bahrain (NSA Bahrain).Itis home to US Naval forces Central
Command and the US Fifth Fleet.
37 This intended deployment represents about 60% of total US naval assets.Deployment will bein the
Northern Indian Ocean,Nan Hai,Dong Hai, YellowSea, Sea of Japan, and Western Pacific
38 Redeveloped to permit entry and bunkering facilities for Western warships.Dominates the Nan Hai and
effectively replaces the abandoned US Subic Bay naval basein the Philippines
39 New naval baseon the Indian sub Continent, south of Goa
40 Changi naval baseis nowableto berth US Nimitz Class supercarriers.In the future, the basemay be ableto
accommodate the new Ford Class supercarriers.The “Gerald R Ford” (CVN-78) is under construction and is due
to be commissioned in 2015.

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US troops to Guam, and (10) supply of a new missile defence X-Brand radar system
to Japan and possibly elsewhere in SE Asia41
.
The impending global deployment of X-Brand radar systems is treated in more detail
later in this paper.
US Navy Deployment
Just as in the Gulf Tanker War, the US Navy has urgently deployed carrier battle
groups to the Arabian Gulf, and to the Gulf of Oman. It was decided recently that the
US Navy should always have at least two rotational carrier battle groups in the area.
Given the drive by the US to become less reliant on imported oil, its fiscal pressures
on the military (defence budget sequestration), refits, and the rising focus around the
‘China Seas’ (viz, ‘Asia-Pivot’ diplomacy), it may not be possible to ramp up US Navy
assets in the Arabian Gulf, and Indian Ocean. Greater use of airborne, surface and
sub-surface RPVs would provide more flexible, persistent and wider-area ISTAR
capability to keep the ‘oil umbilical’ under surveillance.
With the current diplomatic impasse between Israel and Iran, the stakes have risen.
Warships from 25 nations recently converged on the Strait of Hormuz as Israel and
Iran moved towards the brink of war. Ostensibly, the deployment was for the largest
war games ever held in the region. Three US supercarrier battle groups took part in
the war games, comprising USS “Abraham Lincoln” (CVN-72), USS “John C Stennis”
(CVN-74) and USS “Carl Vinson” (CV-65). The three Nimitz Class supercarriers
each have more than the entire complement of the Iranian airforce.
Earlier in 2012, there were four US carrier groups in the region when the USS
“Enterprise” (CV-65) visited the Arabian Gulf.
The US Navy’s recently announced intention to deploy additional supercarriers in SE
Asian and Western Pacific waters may yet prove to be nothing more than media
rhetoric. Severe “sequestration” cuts to the US defense budget proposed for January
2013 may obviate the intended deployment.42 At the present time, only two carriers
are deployed, namely the “George Washington” (CVN-71) and “John C. Stennis”
(CVN-74) in the Western Pacific.43
Official sources at the US DOD in Washington deny there will be any cut back in the
future deployment of supercarriers to the Western Pacific. But to the contrary,
Cesare Marchetti in his mathematical model suggests post-sequestration funding
shortfalls will prevent the US from successfully ramping-up to support the next war
41 To contain threats from North Korea and counter China’s growingmissilecapabilities,theUS has announced
its intention to deploy a new missiledefence shield in Japan and Asia.The resultingradar arc would cover
North Korea, China,Taiwan,and possibly someASEAN countries.Michael Moore, “The Telegraph”, 2012-11-02
and Shaun waterman, “Washington Times”, 2012-9-17
42To quote: ‘... the US DOD will cutmore than $1 trillion outof the defense budget over the next decade’.
Carroll,Chris,“Stars and Stripes”, reporting for “Stripes Central”, Washington,2012-11-02
43 Stratfor, Naval Update, 2012-09-26

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funding effort possibly in 2027 or earlier.44 It remains to be seen if the US Navy will
be able to assume a dominant presence in the Western Pacific in future decades.
This month the “Washington Times” reported US Marines will serve long
deployments for the next few years because of ongoing crises in the Middle East and
a shrinking number of US carriers available for deployment. The USS “Enterprise”
(CV-65) was deactivated last December, and the USS “Abraham Lincoln” (CVN-72)
is undergoing a four year overhaul to increase its life span. This has reduced the US
fleet of carriers from eleven to nine, as the US Navy struggles to maintain a two
carrier presence in the Middle East as required by the Obama administration since
2010.45
To further comment, Diego Garcia and Guam are too far removed and provide
insufficient defence assets to fully protect the global oil supply chain. Nevertheless,
Diego Garcia has been upgraded to assume “fullest capability soonest” and troops
have been re-deployed to Guam (from Japan) and to Darwin (Australia). More
importantly, Cam Ranh Bay naval base in Vietnam is being modernised as a
substitute for the previous loss of Subic Bay. Singapore has ‘de facto’ become the
new “hub” of the US Navy’s Seventh Fleet operational capability in SE Asia.
Manama (Bahrain) is now the home of the US Fifth Fleet. The latter’s area of
responsibility includes about 6.5 million sq. kms. of blue-water spanning the
coastlines of 27 countries.
Bahrain, virtually at the ‘fountain head’ of the global oil supply, has taken on a much
more significant role. On 27 May 2010, the Pentagon announced that NSA Bahrain
is to receive US$580 million to double the size of the naval station. The ASRY
floating dock and other infrastructure is to be upgraded.
If necessary the US could cut off crude oil supply from the Arabian Gulf littoral to its
perceived adversaries (i.e. China and North Korea). This would be a drastic last
resort step with dire consequences for world peace.
US Missile Defence Agency (MDA)
The US is well aware of the increasing offensive rocket and ballistic missile threat to
the oil supply chain, stemming from Iran, China, North Korea, and rogue States. The
very real threat pertains to the so-called “axis of resistance” comprising Iran, Syria,
and the non-states Hezbollah, Hamas, and Palestinian Islamic Jihad. In March 2012,
the Pentagon Missile Defense Agency announced a new watershed defense policy:
the US is seeking to build regional shields against ballistic missiles in both Asia and
the Middle East.
44 Marchetti, Cesare, Victor Strategy Inc.(Southern Pines NC), see his findings usinga logistic/diffusion
mathematical model, posted in “Composites World (CW), Industry News, 2012-11-02,refer to www.vector-
strategy.com
45 Wong, Kristina,“Navy to stretch deployments; aircraftcarrier fleetdown to 9”, The Washington Times,
Thursday,10 January,2013.

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At present, the US and its allies (except for Israel) lack the ability to counter the
rocket threat as well as facing the danger of being numerically overwhelmed by the
ballistic missile threat.
Apart from a few defensive gaps, Israel is better prepared than the US and its other
regional allies. Israel has fielded the ‘Iron Dome’ system to defend against
short/medium range rockets from Gaza, and has used Patriot PAC-2/GEM and
Arrow II/III interceptors to counter short/medium range ballistic missiles from Syria
and Iran. However, Israel does not have enough Iron Dome batteries to defend
against high volume attacks of short/medium range rockets. The anticipated
deployment of the David’s Sling interceptor in 2014 will enable Israel to deal with
Hezbollah’s long range rockets.46
The US has yet to allocate resources to develop improved counter rocket systems.
The existing Phalanx Counter Rocket, Artillery, and Mortar System/C-RAM is largely
ineffective.
According to the MDA, there are some seven/eight main missile defence programs.
The Obama administration has expanded some and recast or cut others.47 Technical
details for each program can be accessed at the Arms Control Association.48
The Pentagon has disclosed the US is seeking to build regional shields against
ballistic missiles in both (1) Asia and (2) the Middle East. The US has stated the
systems are designed to protect against states like Iran and North Korea.
For (1), the US has already deployed powerful early-warning X-Band radar in
northern Japan and plans to install a second system on an unnamed southern
Japanese island. The system is described as a “large, phased-array fire control
sensor, featuring precision discrimination and interceptor support”.49 Regional
powers, particularly ASEAN countries, Japan, South Korea, and Australasia would
be protected. In the longer term, the reality is the Japan-based system is looking at
the ‘elephant in the room’, which is China. The missile defense requirements for Asia
are comprehensively outlined by Klinger.50
This paper separately examines operational/proposed missile defense systems for
India, Taiwan, Japan and South Korea in some detail below.
For (2), the US also intends to deploy two X-Band systems to the United Arab
Emirates (UAE), and one to Qatar to deter any Iran missile attack. Again, the US
intends to sell more than US$4.2 billion in missile defence systems to Kuwait
46 Ibid,Eisenstadt,“The MiddleEast Environment”, Defense Dossier,AFPC
47 The eight main US missiledefence programs are: (1) Ground-Based Midcourse“kinetic kill”EKV/CE-II, (2)
Aegis ship-based Ballistic MissileDefense (BMD), (3) Theatre High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD), (4) Patriot
Advanced Capability-3 (PAC-3),(5) Space Trackingand SurveillanceSystem (STSS), (6) Space-Based Infrared
System-high (SBIRS-high), (7) Airborne Laser (ABL), and (8) Kinetic Energy Interceptor (KEI) – now temporarily
scrapped.
48 Refer to www.armscontrol.org
49 As described by its manufacturer, Raytheon Company
50 Klinger,Bruce, “MissileDefense Requirements of the Asia Pivot”, Defense Dossier, American Foreign Policy
Council (AFPC), Issue6, January 2013,subscribed to/downloaded/retrieved from the Internet

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including sixty Patriot Advanced Capability missiles, twenty launching platforms, and
four X-Band radars.
Saudi Arabia has bought a large arsenal of Patriot systems, the latest being US$1.7
billion in upgrades in 2011.
The US is also set to supply two missile defence launchers for a THAAD system to
be located in the United Arab Emirates.
US Navy warships on continuous deployment in the Arabian Gulf are equipped with
Aegis missile defense systems including advanced tracking radars and interceptor
missiles.
It is ascertained there may be some partial protection for incoming enemy ICBMs
targeted at the Gulf littoral states once advanced capability missile shields are
operational.
These advanced systems do not guarantee 100% effectiveness especially as Iran is
increasing both the type and number of missiles fielded in the region. The Iranian
Republican Guard has allegedly pointed 1,000 missiles at US bases in the Middle
East. “There will be war and we will win” says the Republican Guard. There are
some historic rivalries and political constraints preventing the US from applying a
homogenous approach to a comprehensive “umbrella” defense solution for the
Arabian Gulf littoral states.
Indian Navy
India has taken a positive stand in protecting its maritime interests. The new naval
base of INS Kadamba (near Goa) in southern India is rapidly expanding, together
with enhancements to the existing Indian naval bases. ADM Sureesh Mehta, India’s
Navy Chief, has asserted “... each pearl in the (PLAN) string is a link in a chain of the
Chinese maritime presence”.
The Indian Navy’s expansion and increased ‘Blue Water’ capability is a significant
player in ‘keeping the oil umbilical’ game. As India’s economic powers and
aspirations increase, it will require more energy and oil. However, the West also
needs to understand its naval crew capability. There are often sidewards glances to
Pakistan and other neighbours. Pakistan’s close links to China will be especially
important to watch as it plays ‘catch up with the Jones’s’ with China’s support.
If PLAN sources perceive Indian intentions to be aimed at containing China, they
also see India rapidly building the capabilities necessary to do so. Modern Navy has
covered India’s naval build-up fairly extensively. In April 2003, it ran an article titled:
“Will the South China Sea Become the ‘Second Persian Gulf?’” that laid out India’s
2003 plan to spend $62 billion over the next 22 years to modernize the navy and
also detailed India’s growing interactions with ASEAN.
In a December 2005 article, National Defense asserted that India seeks to have a
top four navy by 2010.51 An October 2005 article in the PLA Daily described the
51
Gao Xinsheng, “Zhongguo haifangfazhan mianlin dezhuyao tiaozhan yu duice” [The Main Challenges

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efforts India is making as part of its new strategy to “destroy the enemy in distant
seas” (远海歼敌). As part of this effort, India spent $3.5 billion buying submarines
from France, and plans under “Project 75” to build 20 nuclear attack submarines
equipped with long distance cruise missiles over the next 30 years. In addition, India
is building aircraft carriers, with the first locally constructed aircraft carrier expected
to be operational in 2012.52
Indeed, the PLA Daily also reported that India wants to develop an aircraft carrier
fleet on a par with England’s - this new fleet will allow it to move into the Pacific. 53
Indian Missile Developments
India is surprisingly advanced in developing missile defence shield systems. Phase 1
of the planned development to initially protect two major cities, New Delhi and
Mumbai, has been largely completed according to the Indian Defence Research and
Development Organisation (DRDO) located at Bhawan, near New Delhi. The system
will eventually be extended to cover other major cities in India. The Phase 1
development is comparable to the US Patriot PAC-3 system.
The new two-tiered BMD system will require minimum human intervention due to the
complex automation of tracking devices and counter-measures. Human intervention
will be required only to abort the mission. To ensure maximum protection against air-
borne threats, DRDO intends to put together a mix of counter-attack missiles, which
will be able to shoot down enemy missiles, both within earth’s atmosphere (endo-
atmospheric) and outside it (exo-atmospheric). The shield has undergone a series of
successful tests. It can destroy an incoming ballistic missile with a range of up to
2,000 km.
The BMD system comprises two components: (1) Prithvi Air Defence (PAD) or
Pradyumna Ballistic Missile Interceptor, and (2) Advanced Air Defence (AAD) or
Ashwin Ballistic Missile Interceptor.
PAD is an anti-ballistic missile developed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles
outside of the atmosphere (exo-atmospheric). Based on the Prithvi missile, PAD is a
two stage missile with a maximum interception altitude of 50 to 80 km. PAD has
capability to engage 300 to 2,000 km class of ballistic missiles at a speed of Mach 5.
LRTR is the target acquisition and fire control radar for the PAD missile. It is an
‘active phased-array radar’ able to track 200 targets at a range of 600 km.
AAD is an anti-ballistic missile designed to intercept incoming ballistic missiles in the
endo-atmosphere at an altitude of 30 km. AAD is a single stage missile. Guidance is
and Answers to the Development of China’s MaritimeDefense and Policy Countermeasures], Guofang,
no. 11 (2005), The author is from the Shenyang Artillery Academy, Basic MaritimeDefense Tactics
Teaching and Research Office (沈阳炮兵学院基础部海防战术教研室).
52
Jiefangjun Bao, “Yindu tuijin yuanhai jianmiede xin zhanlue”[India Pushes a New Strategy of
Destroying the Enemy in DistantSeas],November 9, 2005,12.
53
Jiefangjun Bao, “Hangmu youyixia deYatai zhanlueqiju”[Asia’s Strategic Chessboard of Aircraft
Carriers], July 20, 2005, 9.

P a g e | 23
similar to that of PAD: it has an inertial navigation system, midcourse updates from
ground based radar and interactive homing in the terminal phase.
Successful testings have been conducted by launching modified Prithvi missiles from
Launch Complex III at Chandipur Orissa. Radars located at Konark and at Paradip
(these townships are 112 kms apart) detected the missile and continuously tracked
it. Target information was conveyed to an AAD battery located on Wheeler Island,
some 70 km across the sea from Chandipur. The AAD was launched when the
Prithvi reached an apogee of 110 km. The AAD made a direct hit at an altitude of 15
km and at a speed of Mach 4.54
“Swordfish” long range tracking radar (LRTR) is the target acquisition and fire control
radar for the BMD system. The LRTR has a range of 600 to 1,500 km and can spot
objects as small as a cricket ball.
Phase 2 of the BMD system is to develop two new anti-ballistic missiles, namely AD-
1 and AD-2. These missiles are able to intercept IRBMs. The two new missiles have
a range of 5,000 km and are similar to the US THAAD system. India is also
developing a new advanced missile codenamed PDV, designed to be operational by
2013. Phase 2 is to be completed by 2016.
Currently, India has little or no protection from incoming ICBMs.
The US and India are likely to cooperate to fully develop the BMD shield system
according to a senior US diplomat when visiting India in July 2012.
Some early doubts have been expressed within India as to the viability of the BMD
system.55 These are likely to be discounted in the light of recent progress and a
future US-India strategic partnership.
Currently, India is also moving ahead with plans to test a new, submarine-launched
ballistic missile. Once operational, the K-15 – which has a range of 435 miles – will
be capable of being outfitted with either a conventional payload or a tactical nuclear
warhead.56
Both Pakistan and China are angered by India’s forthcoming success. China is
developing its own missile defence system to counter the missile arsenals of India
and others. China is likely to assist Pakistan, one of its closest allies in Asia, by
helping Islamabad match India’s BMD capability. Pakistan is reported to be
developing manoeuvrable re-entry vehicles to maintain a credible strategic deterrent
in the face of Indian countermeasures.
India is ranked fourth in the world by its oil imports. Consumption is in excess of 3.1
MMbbl/day.
Taiwan (Republic of China)
54 Wikipedia,“Indian BallisticMissileDefence Programme”, see page 3 (of 8 pages), retrieved from
http://e..wikipedia.org/wiki/Indian_Ballistic_Missile_Defence_Programme , 15 January 2013
55 Debak Das,“India:How Credible is its Ballistic MissileDefence?”, research intern, NSP, IPCS,29 November
2012, email debak.d@gmail.com
56 “Global Security” Newswire, 18 December 2012

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Taiwan’s military is developing an offensive surface-to-surface (MRBM) missile with
a 1,200 km range. Codenamed “Cloud Peak” (Yunfeng), the missile is outfitted with a
ramjet engine capable of Mach 3 speed. Production of the missile is to begin in
2014. Taiwan has also deployed other offensive missiles on the island such as the
Hsiung Feng (Brave Wind) 2E land attack cruise missile (LACM), and other variants
of the Hsiung Feng missile family. The Taiwanese Ministry of National Defense
(MND) has expanded its defense budget to modernize its SAM missile inventories, to
procure rocket boosters for the AIM-120 air-to-air missile, to obtain new rocket
motors to equip its Standard Missile 1, to conduct efficiency tests for is aging MIM23
Hawk SAM missiles, and plans to acquire AGM-65G Maverick, AGM-84L Harpoon,
and Magic II missiles. The MND will also increase production of the domestically
produced Tien Chien II missiles.
Taiwan will be partially covered by a US anti-missile shield resulting from current and
proposed deployments of X-Band radar in Japan and elsewhere in SE Asia.57 To
quote from the Wall Street Journal (WSJ): “” If you’re putting one in southern Japan
and one in the Philippines, you’re sort of bracketing Taiwan ... “ Mr. Lewis said, “So
it does look like you’re making sure that you can put a missile defence cap over the
Taiwanese.”” (WSJ: “US Plans to foster missile defence in Asia”: 23 August 2012).
In addition, Taiwan is building a missile defence shield in direct response to Chinese
missiles pointed in its direction. It is estimated up to 1,500 Chinese short/median-
range missiles (some equipped with advanced GPS systems), plus another 500
cruise missiles (CM), are now aimed at Taiwan.58 The Taiwanese shield comprises
six Patriot III missile batteries and an early warning radar, based on the indigenously
developed Tien Kung II (Sky Bow) SAM system and Patriot III (PAC-3) missiles.
Specifically, the early warning radar component is the new Raytheon long-range
early warning and surveillance UHF radar system.
In taking delivery of the new Raytheon early warning radar system, which provides
360 degrees coverage, and a 3,000 nautical mile reconnaissance capability, Taiwan
is able to detect North Korean and Chinese missile launches. The system was
installed in late December 2012 at Loshan air force base in Hsinchu County. The
radar can collect information of offensive military activity in some areas in Northeast
Asia and Southeast Asia, including in the disputed Diaoyutai Islands (Dong Hai) and
the Taiping Island in the Spratly Island Group (Nan Hai). The new radar system can
give Taiwan six minutes warning of a hostile missile launch.
The US Seventh Fleet, when deployed near Taiwan, is able to provide
supplementary cover from SM-3 missiles installed on vessels equipped with the
Aegis system.
Beyond this intermediate cover, Taiwan urgently needs Terminal High Altitude Air
Defense (THAAD) units. 59 The US Government may not supply Taiwan with THAAD
units as this would greatly anger the Chinese and North Korean Governments. For
57 Thim, Michael,“Taiwan in the Context of US MissileDefense Infrastructurein Asia”,Wordpress,24 August
2013,retrieved from http://michalthim.wordpress.com/2012/08/24/taiwan-in-the-context-of-us-missile-
defence , 13 February 2013
58 Taiwan is the principal receiver of missilethreatfrom China,refer to “Report on Chinese Military Power”,
prepared annually by the US Department of Defense (DOD)
59 “Taiwan Builds MissileDefence Shield in faceof ChineseMissileBuild Up”, Defence Tech, retrieved 6 August
2012

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similar reasons, Taiwan is not likely to acquire the new X-Brand radar system either
now or in the foreseeable future.
Lockheed Martin was awarded a contract in January 2013 to product 168 Patriot
Advanced Capability (PAC-3) missiles for the US Government and Taiwan. The new
contract is worth US$755 million. Taiwan is the fifth international customer for the
PAC-3. 60
Yin Zhou, a Beijing based military expert, has stated “the US will not spend so much
energy on Taiwan, to implement ballistic missiles, interceptor missiles and GPS
radars everywhere. ... Just a GPS radar costs more than US$1 billion ... And to
‘protect’ Taiwan is just a move for the US to deal with China, not an ultimate goal.” 61
MAJGEN Xu Guangyu, senior researcher at the China Arms Control and
Disarmament Association (Beijing) recently suggested that both sides urgently
needed to put aside their political disagreements and work together to tackle the
territorial problem amid an escalation of tensions with Japan.62
Useful background reading in reference to the Taiwan flashpoint is to be found in a
17-page research paper produced by Mumin Chen at the University of Denver.63
Taiwan is ranked fifteenth in the world by its oil imports. Its consumption is
approximately 0.88 MMbbl/day.
Japan
The Japan Maritime Self-Defence Force (JMSDF) is primarily tasked with the
defense of Japan. The JMSD has a large fleet with significant blue-water operating
capabilities. Whilst based strictly on defensive armament, main tasks to be
undertaken by the force are to maintain control of sea lines of communication
(SLOCs) and to patrol territorial waters. Oil tanker and mercantile shipments to
Japan will thus be protected.
The JMSD operates some 150 major warships. These include: four helicopter
destroyers (DDH: “helicopter carriers”) comprising Shirane and Hyuga Classes, eight
guided-missile destroyers (DDG: Hatakaze, Kongo, and Atago Classes), 33
destroyers (DD: Hatsuyuki, Asagiri, Murasame, Takanami, and Akizuki Classes), 6
destroyer escorts or frigates (DE: Abukuma Class), and many other supportive
vessels in JMSD fleet. Some of the DDG are equipped with Aegis combat
capability.64
60 “Taiwan MissileThreat”, a project of the George C Marshall and ClaremontInstitutes:11 January,2013
61 Xiaokun Li, in Beijingand Yingzi Tan, in Washington,“US insistsmissiledefensetargets DPRK, not China”
China Daily,updated: 2012-08-25,at00:29
62 Chan, Minnie,“Taiwan’s Ma Ying-Jeou urged to pursue higher level military exchanges”,South China
MorningPost, source URL retrieved 12 February 2013,refer to Web site
http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1139693/taiwans-ma-ying-jeou-urged-pursue-higher-level-military-
exchanges
63 Chen, Mumin, “Theatre MissileDefense and Cross-StraitRelations”,GraduateSchool of International
Studies, University of Denver, email address: muchen@du.edu
64 See “List of Active Japanese Navy Ships 2012”, You Tube video, 17 March 2012,downloaded and retrieved
from www.youtube.com/watch?v=cHTu9g54WMA , 17 February 2013

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Current JMSDF strength and capabilities have been designed to support US Navy
operations in the East Asia region. Defense analysts believe the JMSD, in terms of
its capability to conduct non-nuclear operations, is possibly second only to the US.
Indeed, some assert the size and non-strike defensive operations capabilities are
almost two times as large as that of the US Seventh Fleet. The JMSD and US
Seventh Fleet combine effectively together as a formidable force to neutralise PLAN
maritime strategies.
James Hardy has recently appraised the evolving power of the Japanese Navy.65
Klinger states “Tokyo has long pursued a minimalist security policy. Even when
faced with growing regional security threats, Japan has reduced its overall defense
budget for ten consecutive years. Despite this, Japan has significantly augmented its
missile defence program, spurred by concerns over North Korea’s growing missile
and nuclear capabilities”.66
Again, Klinger explains “Japan has developed and deployed a layered integrated
missile defense system consisting of Kongo Class Aegis destroyers with Standard
Missile-3 (SM-3) interceptors for high altitude missile defense and land based Patriot
Advance Capability-3 (PAC-3) units for terminal phase interception”.67
“For the future, Japan announced it will equip two Atago Class destroyers with Aegis
systems; expand PAC-3 deployment from three anti-aircraft groups to six anti-aircraft
groups, and develop an additional fire unit of PAC-3”.68
In 2012, land-based PAC-3 missile batteries were deployed to Okinawa, Miyako, and
Ishigaki Islands bordering the Dong Hai in the south east.
Additional missile inventories held by Japan include AAM variants (Types 04, 69, 90,
99), ASM (Types 80, 91, 93), ATM’s (six variants), SAM approximately nine
variants), SSM (three variants), and SM-3 Block-II/IIA (joint development with the
US).69
The US has deployed two forward-based (FBM) AN/TPY2 X-Band early warning
radar systems in Japan. These are located at Shariki base in Tsugaru City, on the
coast of Aomori prefecture in northern Japan (Honshu Island), and at an undisclosed
location in southern Japan. These systems constitute a vital component of the anti-
missile shield system and are integrated with localised Joint Tactical Ground
Stations (JTAG). The northern based JTAG is located at the remote Misawa Air
Base in Japan, one of only four in the world. It is thought the US operates three other
JTAGs in Germany, Qatar and South Korea. BRIGEN John Seward, a former deputy
commanding general of operations for the US Army Space and Missile Defense
65 Hardy, James, “Japan’s Navy: SailingTowards the Future”, The Diplomat,21 January 2013,refer to
http://thediplomat.com/2013/01/21/japans-navy-steaming-towards-the-future
66 Ibid,Klinger,page 18
67 Ibid
68 Ibid
69 Wikipedia,“Listof Missilesby Country”, downloaded and extrapolated from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_missiles_by_country

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Command, stated in January 2008 “Japan is one of our strongest allies in the
ballistic missile defense arena”.70
Some defense analysts assert the US may deploy another X-Band radar system in
the Philippines, but this is not confirmed.
Steve Hildreth, a missile defence expert with the Congressional Research Service,
an advisory arm of Congress, has stated “the US was laying the foundations for a
region wide missile defense system that would combine US ballistic missile defences
with those of regional powers, particularly Japan, South Korea, and Australia”.71
It is not known if the US intends to deploy a Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) anti-missile battery in Japan. However, the AN/TPY2 X-Band early warning
radar system is designed to interface with THAAD batteries just as easily as with
other components of the missile shield system. THAAD includes its own radar along
with interceptors, communications, and fire control units.72 (Two THAAD systems
have been ordered by the United Arab Emirates (UAE)).
The northern and western Pacific is also defended by a Raytheon sea-based X-Band
(SBX) radar system. This system is a floating, self-propelled, mobile radar station
designed to operate in high winds and heavy seas.73 This state-of-the-art radar
station, costing US$1 billion, can be deployed anywhere in the northern Pacific
Ocean. The SBX homeport is Adak, Alaska, which is located approximately midway
along the Aleutian Islands chain. The SBX has often been deployed to Pearl Harbor
and elsewhere.
Under the current constitutional interpretation, Japanese missile defense systems
would not be allowed to intercept missiles attacking the United States. Likewise
these systems are unable to protect a US naval vessel defending Japan from missile
attack, even if the US vessel was adjacent to a Japanese destroyer equipped with
Aegis capability.
Japan is almost wholly dependent upon oil supply from the Middle East. According to
the Energy Information Administration (EIA), Japan’s crude imports from the Middle
East were estimated at 82 per cent in 2011.74 Currently, Japan is seeking to reduce
its oil imports from Iran, whilst increasing oil imports from the Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar,
Saudi Arabia, and UAE in compensation.
70 Associated Press,“Japan,US rush to build anti-missileshield”,updated 28 January 2008,retrieved from
www.nbcnews.com/id/22886176/ on 18 February 2013. Statement made by Brigadier General John E. Seward
71 Nicholson,Brendan,Defence Editor, “Anti-ballisticmissiles could belinked to Australian systems”,The
Australian,24 August, 2013,retrieved from http://www.theaustralian.com.au/national-affairs on 18 Feb 2013
72 THAAD is a US Army system designed to shootdown SRBM/MRBM/IRBM with an interceptor that slams into
its target. It can accept cues from Lockheed’s Aegis weapons system, satellites,and other external sensors.It
can work in tandem with the PatriotPAC-3 air-defense missilesystem
73 Wikipedia,“Sea-based X-Band Radar”, retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sea-based_X-band_Radar
on 18 February 2013. See also “Raytheon: Sea-Based X-Band Radar (SBX) for MissileDefence”, retrieved from
www.raytheon.com/newsroom/feature/.../cms04_018157.pdf on 18 February 2013. Other Internet sources
apply.The latter .pdf fileprovides an excellent schematic as to how SBX operates as a cornerstone of the US
multi-tiered missiledefense shield in the northern PacificOcean.Other systems are detailed.
74 EIA, “Japan’s crude imports by source2011”, Country Analysis Briefs,4 June 2012, www.eia.doe.gov

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Japan has increased oil infrastructure investments in the Middle East over past years
to improve its own prospects for energy security.75
The ongoing dispute between Japan and China (and Taiwan) over the sovereignty of
the gas reserves contained in (1) the Shirakaba/Chunxiao and (2) the
Asunaro/Longjing undersea oil/gas fields in the Dong Hai have nearly led to a local
conflict.76 (Japanese names for these gas fields are denoted first, followed by the
Chinese name).
This seems to be the larger stress point – China and Japan conflict over ‘close oil
and gas facilities’ to reduce both China and Japan reliance on Middle East oil.
Alternative oil/gas and other mineral resources on/under the seabed will become a
stress issue if compromise cannot be achieved for mutual benefit. China is more
likely to use its cash to buy, via Sovereign Wealth Funds and other acquisition
means (sometimes using Sinopec as a frontline ‘scout’), to gain ‘covert influence’ to
use non-Chinese companies in which it has controlling interests (e.g. Husky Oil).
These shadow companies will undertake exploitation on China’s behalf.
For (1) above, the Chunxiao gas field is barely seven minutes flying time from the
new Chinese air base at Shuimen in Fujian province. The base is equipped with S-
300 SAM missiles, the J-10, and the Sukhoi Su-30 jet fighter, plus unmanned ground
attack drones. China has established air supremacy over the Dong Hai. Shuimen
base is only 246 km from Taipei and 380 km from the uninhabited Tianyutai islands.
The latter are claimed by China and Japan as the Diaoyuta and Senkaku islands
respectively.
For (2) above, the Asunaro/Longjing gas field is located further north, practically due
east from Shanghai and Ningbo on the Chinese mainland. Okinawa is situated
further to the east in the western Pacific. This is the general area more hotly disputed
between Japan and China and of less interest to Taiwan.
A comprehensive account of these disputes in the Dong Hai has been given by
Professor Guo Rongxing at the Brookings Institute in Washington DC.77
Japan is ranked third in the world in terms of its oil imports. Consumption is greater
than 4.4 MMbbl/day.
It is to be noted that current disputes between China and ASEAN countries, pertinent
to undersea oil/gas reserves in the Nan Hai (disputed Paracel and Spratly Islands),
are not detailed in this paper. The ASEAN countries involved in the disputes include
Brunei, Singapore, Malaysia, the Philippines and Vietnam. Taken collectively, these
countries (except for Singapore) are not relatively significant oil importers when
compared with Japan78: Brunei (0.13), Singapore (2.1), Malaysia (0.35), Philippines
(0.34), and Vietnam (0.27).
75 Toichi,Dr. Tsutomu, “Japan-GCC States Interdependence through Energy Security and Investment”, Institute
of Energy Economics,Japan (IEEJ), December 2007, www.iee.or.jp , email report@tky.ieej.or.jp
76 Staff Reporter, “Prepare for War in 2013,PLA Forces told”, www.WantChinaTimes.com , 15 January, 2013
77 Guo, Professor Rongxing,“Territorial Disputes and seabed petroleum exploitation:some options for the east
China Sea”, Peking University,Spring2010,released atthe Brookings Institution,Washington,September 2010
78 Figures in parenthesis areexpressed in million barrels of oil per day (MMbbl/day).

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South Korea (Republic of Korea) and North Korea (DPRK)
South Korea (ROK) has a much smaller Navy than that of Japan. The ROK Navy
comprises 170 commissioned ships and is larger by some 20 vessels than those
commissioned in the JMSDF naval force. The total displacement of the ROK fleet
amounts to only some 180,000 tons.
The ROK Navy includes some 20 destroyers and frigates, 14 submarines, 100
corvettes and fast attack craft, amphibious and mine warfare ships, auxiliary ships,
plus other supportive vessels.
These include: three modern guided-missile destroyers (DDG: King Sejong the Great
Class), six ASW destroyers (DD: Chungmugong Yi Sunshin Class), three destroyers
armed with SAM missiles (DD: Kwanggaeto the Great Class), and eight older
destroyers. The King Sejong Class features the Aegis combat system combined with
AN/SPY-1D multi-function radar antennae. This Class is one of the most heavily
armed warships in the world.79 The amphibious and assault ships include one
landing transport helicopter carrier (LPH: Dokdo Class). The submarine fleet
includes nine 1,200 ton SS (KSS-I) Chang Bogo Class, three (KSS-II) Sohn Wonyil
Class, and two SSM Dolgorae Class midget class boats.
As is the case with the JMSDF, the ROK Navy interfaces and works well with the US
Seventh Fleet.
North Korea (DPRK) is known to have deployed some 800 Scud short-range tactical
ballistic missiles pointed at targets in South Korea (ROK). These targets include
Seoul, ROK defence assets and US military infrastructure.
In addition to SRBM, MRBM, IRBM, the DPRK is thought to be developing ICBM
capability. This is of grave concern to the West. The Sino-Russian bloc is providing
technological assistance to the DPRK.
North Korea missile inventories include: Scud missiles (as above), 300 NoDong
MRBM, and 200 Musudan IRBM. The Paektusan-2 (commonly known as the
Taepodong-2) is thought to be not longer operational. The Scud missiles have an
approximate range of 320 to 500 km and can target all of South Korea. The NoDong
can target all of Japan with a range of 1,300 km. The Musudan, with a range up to
some 4,000 km can strike US bases in Okinawa and Guam.
The DPRK is thought to have at least 200 mobile missile launchers. These are
perceived to be the so-called transport erector launchers (TEL), including up to one
hundred for short range Scud missiles, fifty for medium-range NoDong missiles, and
fifty for long-range Musudan missiles. This assessment was undertaken by the State
run Korea Institute for Defense Analyses (KDA) in Seoul.80
It is to be noted that China has the largest offensive missiles inventory in SE Asia.
Discussion on China’s missiles and emerging anti-missiles is beyond the scope of
79 Wikipedia,“Listof Ships of the Republic of Korea Navy”, retrieved from
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_ships_of_the_Republic_of_Korea_Navy on 18 February 2013
80 “N. Korea thought to have 200 mobile missilelaunchers:report”, Yonhap, “MissileThreat”, posted by the
Editor, 17 May, 2013,Seoul, downloaded and printed 19.15 hrs.AEST Australia,3 June 2013.

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this paper, but the threat remains to Australasia, India, ASEAN countries, Taiwan,
Japan, South Korea, and to the US.
ROK has a limited missiles inventory. This comprises an offensive capability inherent
in the following missile classes: Cheolmae-2 (KM-SAM) surface-to-air missiles,
Chiron surface-to-air missiles, C-Star ship-to-ship missiles, Haeseong anti-ship
missiles, Hyunmoo III cruise missiles, and Pegasus SAM.81 This is not a complete
list and actual numbers are not known. The Hyunmoo III is made entirely with ROK
developed components.
In order to diffuse the situation with North Korea, the ROK has stepped back from
joining a regional homogeneous defense network with the US. Instead, the ROK has
sought to go it alone with expressions of interest in Israel’s “Iron Dome” rocket
interceptor system, with development of an independent Air and Missile Defense Cell
(AMD-Cell) in Osan, with reliance on older PAC-2 technology, and with indigenous
manufacture of the new Cheongung MRBM destined for operational deployment
commencing in 2015.
Last year, ROK Defense Minister Kim Kwan-jin indicated the South is working toward
initial defense architecture and will implement the anti-missile web ”within the next
few years”. The ROK military also declared its intention to wrap up work on a missile
shield by 2015 capable of shooting down SRBM/MRBM fired from the North.
“In contrast with Japan’s strong development and deployment of missile defense
systems, South Korea’s efforts have been disappointing. Despite the steadily
increasing North Korean missile threat, progressive South Korean Presidents ...
deliberately downplayed the danger to South Korea in order to garner domestic
support for their attempts to foster reconciliation with Pyongyang”82.
“They were fearful that deploying a missile defense system – or even criticizing North
Korea over its military provocations and human rights abuses – would anger
Pyongyang, lead to a collapse of the inter-Korean engagement policy and strain
relations with China”.83
South Korea needs to improve its capabilities while Japan needs to improve its
abilities (e.g. the will to use its existing capabilities).
According to Klinger, South Korea should: (1) deploy a multi-layered missile defense
system that is interoperable with a US regional missile network to provide for a more
coherent and effective defense of allied military facilities and the South Korean
populace; (2) purchase and deploy PAC-3 ground based missiles and SM-3 missiles;
(3) augment missile defense planning and exercises with US forces and initiate
trilateral missile defense cooperation and exercises with the US and Japan; (4)
Implement and establish a regional missile defense network with Japan and (5)
establish new military relationships, including sharing security information. For
81Ibid, Wikipedia,“Listof Missiles by Country”
82 Ibid,Klinger
83 Ibid,page 18

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example, linking sensors would improve defense capabilities against short range
ballistic missiles.84
South Korea is ranked seventh in the world by its oil imports. Its consumption is
around 2.5 MMbbl/day.
In both the Middle East and SE Asia, the developing missile race between many
nations is reaching a damaging crescendo – a ‘perfect storm’ crisis for humanity?
Chinese Perspectives
Chen Zhou has recently given valuable insight on Chinese perspectives as to the
world’s most important bilateral relationship.85 That is the China-US equation. To
quote: “... the US has been using missile defense systems as one of its effective
measures to break the global strategic balance. It declares that the purpose of
establishing missile defense systems currently in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East
is to deal with the threats from Iran and North Korea.” This all embracing statement,
rightly or wrongly, provides a convenient backcloth to Zhou’s more complex and
detailed perspectives enunciated elsewhere. However, to support this statement,
Zhou plays down the ever increasing threat of ICBMs by asserting very few countries
have this capability. This argument is fallacious.
It only takes one country to successfully launch lethal multiple nuclear warheads
from a single ICBM. It is not the relatively small number of countries that matters, but
the ability for just a single ICBM to enter outer space by satellite or ground launch, to
follow its trajectory path to final destructive impact. It is unwise to simply negate the
very real missile threat be it regional or global.
To quote again: “ The Asia-Pacific Anti-Ballistic Missile Programs is an important part
of US new Asia-Pacific strategy, but it brings negative influences on Asia-Pacific
peace, security and stability, and increases complex factors in solving relevant
regional issues. ... The Asia-Pacific Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems will raise the
overall offensive and defensive level of US-Japan and other military alliances ... .“
This second statement implies the US is the villain in bringing negative influences to
the Asia-Pacific region. This is not true. China has outlined its strategic position in
Asia and the Western Pacific in a plethora of official and semi-official publications
published in Mandarin on mainland China. The “hawkish” views of Senior Colonel
Professor Liu Mingfu are well known.86 In his book, Professor Mingfu refers to rivalry
between China and the US as a competition to be the leading country, a conflict over
who rises and falls to dominate the world “... to save itself, to save the world, China
must prepare to become (sic: world’s) helmsman.” Similar views are published in
Mandarin/Cantonese documents prevailing throughout China.
Nowhere is it more evident than demonstrated by China’s expanding militarism.
84 Ibid,Klinger,page 18
85 Chen Zhou, Major General, “Anti-BallisticMissileProgram:Does No Good to World Peace and Security”,
China-US Focus, General Chen Zhou is Director of the Center for National Defense Policy atthe Academy of
Military Sciences,People’s Liberation Army (PLA), China,24 August 2012
86Liu Mingfu, Senior Colonel Professor,“The China Dream”, 303-page book in Mandarin,Professor Mingfu is at
the elite National Defense University in Beijing,book was published in China in March 2010

Nemesis in the 21st century draft 15 - 3 june 2013

Nemesis in the 21st century draft 15 - 3 june 2013

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Nemesis in the 21st century draft 15 - 3 june 2013