Representation of Interests MatrixPOL443 Version 31Univer.docx

Representation of Interests Matrix
POL/443 Version 3
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Representation of Interests Matrix
Follow the instructions below to complete the matrix:
· Identify, in the first column, a minimum of five interests that
are affected by public policy decisions, one per row of the table.
· List, in the second column, any groups or organizations that
support the interests you identified in column one.
· List, in the third column, any groups or organizations that
oppose the interests you identified in column one.
· Identify classes or groups affected by policies related to the
interests you identified in column one.
· Identifyclasses or groups who have an interest in the outcomes
of policies related to the interests you identified in column one.
Interests affected by Public Policy
Groups and Organizations Supporting the Interest
Groups and Organizations Opposing the Interest
Classes or Groups Affected by the Interest
Classes or Groups Interested in Policy Outcomes

Recalling anti-racism
Ghassan Hage
School of Social and Political Sciences, University of
Melbourne, Melbourne, Australia
ABSTRACT
Despite its many achievements and some remarkable victories
against the forces
of racism in their variety of forms, it cannot be said that anti-
racism has been
particularly successful as a social, cultural, and political force.
This essay uses
Bruno Latour’s figure of the ‘recall’ to rethink certain elements
of the anti-
racist tradition. Latour sees the figure as combining both
‘recalling’ in the
sense of remembering, but also ‘recalling’ in the way a
company recalls a
product when it realises it has some defect. In much the same
way, the essay
uses the idea of ‘recalling anti-racism’, firstly, in order to stay
in touch with
anti-racism’s ‘founding principles’, to develop a sense of the
cumulative gain
that has been made throughout its history, and, secondly, in
order to critically
re-examine how it can be modified and made more efficient.

ARTICLE HISTORY Received 5 January 2015; Accepted 27
April 2015
KEYWORDS Anti-racism; neo-liberalism; reciprocity;
mutuality; critical anthropology; racism
Introduction
There is little doubt that the ‘re-configuring’ of anti-racism is
an urgent task
today. As a current of thought and as a social movement, anti-
racism has a
long history. From the opposition to slavery, to the anti-colonial
struggles,
to the civil rights movement in the USA, to the anti-apartheid
movement in
South Africa, to today – where anti-racism is most notably
present in the
struggles in support of asylum seekers and against the Israeli
treatment of
Palestinians in Israel/Palestine – anti-racism has been and
remains a vital
and important current of thought and social movement. It
embodies the
noblest of all human values – at the very least, a belief in the
right of all
human beings to be treated with dignity and respect regardless
of where
they come from and how they happen to be classified.
Yet, despite this long history and some remarkable victories
against the
forces of racism in their variety of forms, it cannot be said that
anti-racism
has been particularly successful as a social, cultural, and

political force. Every-
where we look today, racism is on the rise. In Australia, and
also in the USA and
© 2015 Taylor & Francis
CONTACT Ghassan Hage [email protected]
ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES, 2016
VOL. 39, NO. 1, 123–133
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2016.1096412
mailto:[email protected]
Canada, if we look at the treatment of Indigenous people and
the immigrant
populations originating from the Third World, or at the rate of
imprisonment
of black populations, all remain marked by excessive racism.
Likewise is the
treatment of asylum seekers everywhere around the world. Most
importantly,
we are seeing a massive rise in virulently racist and intolerant
forms of ethno-
religious nationalism, with Zionist nationalism in Israel being
an extreme case
of what is fast becoming the rule rather than the exception. But
perhaps,
nowhere is the salience of racism made clearer than in the case
of South
Africa, the country where the forces of anti-racism have
registered what is
undoubtedly their greatest victory. For there, and despite the
undeniable
victory, racism remains an enduring social force, leaving its
imprint on

many facets of South African life. It is with all of the above in
mind that I
want to investigate the need to reconfigure anti-racism through
the process
of ‘recalling’ it.
‘Recalling’ has been put forward by Latour (2007) as a critical
way of reflect-
ing on modernity. It combines both recalling in the sense of
remembering to
ensure we build on past achievements, but also recalling in the
way a
company recalls a product when it realises it has some defect.
As Latour
(2007) highlights:
In no way does this recall aim to damage the product, nor, of
course, to lose
market share. Rather, it has quite the opposite strategy. By
showing consumers
the care it takes with the quality control of its goods and the
safety of their users,
it wants to demonstrate initiative, rebuild media confidence,
and, if possible,
recommence the production that was too quickly halted. (11)
It is in this spirit, then, that I want to initiate a recalling of anti-
racism.
The functions of anti-racism
More so than ‘modernity’, anti-racism is a ‘product’ with a well
defined func-
tion, and it is important, indeed, to recall, in the usual sense of
the word, what
these functions are. First, in order to stay in touch with its

‘founding principles’
and also in order to develop a sense of the cumulative gain that
– despite the
shortcomings – has nonetheless been made in the history of
anti-racism, I
want to highlight six central functions. Although these clearly
overlap in prac-
tice, I will list them for the purpose of exposition.
(1) Reducing the incidence of racist practices: Anti-racists have
struggled
throughout history to create social and legal pressures that make
it diffi-
cult for racists to externalize their racism whether in society at
large
(everyday racism) or within institutions (structural racism).
(2) Fostering a non-racist culture: This differs from the cultural
work needed to
stop racists externalizing their racism as it involves the more
difficult work
of using municipal, educational, and artistic forums and
institutions,
aiming to ensure that people are not racist in the first place.
124 G. HAGE
(3) Supporting the victims of racism: This includes the various
modes of pro-
tecting and offering shelter and counselling to victims of racist
violence
and racist abuse.
(4) Empowering racialized subjects: The struggles to bring

about anti-racist
laws and to create networks of solidarity do not only have the
effect of
stopping racists and helping victims; they can also be directed
at
making the racialized more autonomous and more able to
withstand
and fight back against racism. Such work has a more lasting
effect in
the long run and, as such, is more important than helping
victims.
(5) Transforming racist relations into better relations: Like
feminism, anti-racism
is an ambivalent struggle. It involves by necessity a war-like
sentiment of
enmity towards the racists as a dominant, oppressive, and
sometimes
violent group, but, at the same time, such enmity cannot be left
unchecked such as to include an ethos of extermination. Instead,
anti-
racists need to offer those who are racializing them, in the same
way fem-
inist women offer sexist men, modes of coexisting and relating
that con-
stitute an alternative to the dominant racist or sexist relation.
(6) Fostering an a-racist culture: Finally, and perhaps
ultimately, anti-racists
aim to create a society in which race has no significance as a
criterion
of identification. As a long critical intellectual anti-racist
tradition has
taught us, we do not need – and it could still be described as
racist –
to settle for a society that naturalizes racial identification. We

can and
should aim where appropriate for a state of affairs in which
racial identi-
fication is no longer a relevant or salient mode of identification.
The a-
racial is thus an ideal of a social space characterised by a
radical indiffer-
ence to race.
It is when looking at these functions and objectives that the
necessity of ‘recal-
ling’ anti-racism in its full Latourian sense becomes clear.
While anti-racism has
had some notable successes at achieving its goals, it has been,
as already
mentioned, far from an efficient, fault-free product. It has often
failed to
perform and rise to the situations it is confronting. Indeed, if we
are to
compare racism and anti-racism as products, we can say that
across history
racism has been far more successfully ‘recalled’ and made
operationally suit-
able for a variety of socioeconomic and cultural environments.
It has morphed
and shown a capacity to target a variety of people, sometimes
many at the
same time: blacks, Asians, Arabs, Jews, Roma, and Muslims. It
has been used
as a tool of segregation, a tool of conditional integration, and,
most dramati-
cally, a tool of extermination. It has efficiently constructed its
object, success-
fully adapting to the dominant modes of classification of the
time, be they
phenotypical, biological, cultural, or a combination of these and

more.
Comparatively speaking, anti-racism has been conceptually
rather ossified
and is always trying to catch up with the racists’ fluid modes of
classification.
Anti-racist academics have certainly contributed to this
ossification, perhaps
ETHNIC AND RACIAL STUDIES 125
more so than activists. While racists have happily moved from
one form of
racism to another, caring little about logical contradictions,
inconsistencies,
and discrepancies in their argumentations, too many anti-racist
academics
spend an inordinate amount of time trying to judge racists on
precisely
such grounds. In a classical case of what Pierre Bourdieu (1990)
calls ‘project-
ing into the object one’s relation to the object’ (27), they
criticise racists as if
the racists are fellow academics with whom they are having
disagreements in
a tutorial room about how to interpret reality. The
performativity of racist
statements and more obviously racist practices, which is what is
most impor-
tant to the racists themselves, is given far less attention than
needed. Instead,
the racists’ greatest sins are made to be
interpretative/intellectual ones. They
are accused of being bad thinkers: they are ‘essentialists’, they

deviate from
‘classical’ biological racism, or they are making false
statements about
reality that the anti-racist academics can empirically correct by
highlighting
a lot of statistical data that proves them incorrect: ‘No, there
aren’t that
many asylum seekers trying to get into the country’ or ‘No,
there are no ghet-
toes here. Look at the demographic data’-type argumentation.
It is because of such tendencies that recalling anti-racism is a
crucial task. It
is particularly so since racism for the last couple of decades or
so has yet again
been undergoing an important reconfiguration, becoming
intimately fused
with the logic and needs of neo-liberal capitalist accumulation.
To recall
anti-racism now, in the midst of this transformation, might
allow us to
develop an anti-racism that is evolving in continual response to,
rather than
trying to catch up with, the racisms it is trying to oppose.
The neo-liberal recalling of racism
One of the most important transformations that have shaped the
new ‘neo-
liberal racism’ is the increasingly important role that nationalist
ideologies
play in securing the relative cohesion of most nation states.
Economic globa-
lization has meant that very few nations are left with a national
economic
structure that works as a solid base for securing the

togetherness of the
nation regardless of what people within the nation thought. This
has
meant, among other things, a relative increase in the importance
of the func-
tion of the ideological (e.g. national values, national histories)
as a centripetal
force securing both the practical and the ideological unity of the
nation-state.
Because of this centrality, the social forces that take on the task
of protecting
ethno-national ideologies develop an increased racist
intolerance towards the
plurality of ideas and identities that not long ago marked the
most benign
forms of multiculturalism. Such pluralities are increasingly
constructed as cen-
trifugal forces of disintegration and are systematically attacked
as a national
threat.
126 G. HAGE
The second feature of neo-liberal globalization that is having an
impor-
tant impact on shaping the dominant forms of racism in the
West is the
increasing move towards a de-industrialized landscape. The
current figure
of the unwanted asylum seeker as opposed to the liminal but
included
migrant workers of the post-World War II is metonymic of a
changing
economy characterized by more prevalent figures of

undesirability and dis-
posability. Despite the plurality of forms that racism has taken
throughout
history, it has always fluctuated between two tendencies: the
racism of
exploitation and the racism of extermination. The first is
deployed when
the racialized are considered as valuable such as in the case of
slavery or
migrant workers. The second dominates when the racialized are
considered
harmful, or at least when they are evaluated as more harmful
than they are
useful, such as in the case of anti-semitism, as well as in certain
instances of
colonial encounters. In the first case, racism works to
marginalize people in
society, ensuring they have a place in it even if it is a
precarious place. In the
second, racism aims to marginalize people from society,
ensuring they have
no social or even physical presence in it whatsoever – this could
be through
active physical extermination, or through passive extermination:
letting
people rot through a strategy of total neglect the way one lets an
old
truck rust away on one’s property, or, in a similar manner,
through ensuring
the targeted people remain on the outer side of the borders they
are aiming
to cross, as with asylum seekers.
The third feature is the rise of particularist anti-racism. This is
the anti-
racism of those who are racialized and are as such struggling

against their
racialisation. But in their struggle, what is important to them is
not that
‘racism is wrong’. Rather, it is that racism against them is
wrong. Such
people don’t mind racism as such, they mind being subjected to
it themselves.
Indeed, they often are happy to dispense racism themselves.
Nowhere is this
racist particularist anti-racism, with its capacity to racialize
others in the name
of fighting against one’s racialisation, more powerfully present
and institutio-
nalized than in the state of Israel today. But it can even be said
that this par-
ticularism has become a generalized cultural form with so much
racism today
being dispensed by racists claiming to be racialized themselves.
Even white
populations in Europe, the USA, Canada, and Australia, with
their long
history of colonization, have happily taken it on board, often
arguing that
they are subject to ‘reverse racism’.
This particularist anti-racism raises what is perhaps the most
crucial point
that needs to be considered in the process of recalling racism: to
what
extent is anti-racism wedded to an ‘alter-political’ conception
of society?
That is, to what extent does it not only work on opposing
existing
racism, but also work on thinking through and working for a
non-racist
society.

Anti-racism and anthropology’s three modes human of
existence
Perhaps one of the richest and most critical dimensions of
anthropology,
which makes it so particularly suitable for thinking alter-
political questions,
is its long tradition of dealing with cultures that the colonial
expansion of
our capitalist modernity has put us in touch with, but which
nonetheless
remain outside it in a variety of ways. Anthropology
investigates modes of
thinking and existing that strike us to begin with as radically
different from
our own. Yet, at the same time, it invites us to note how this
radical difference
actually speaks to us; that is, we come to realise that there are
nonetheless
certain commonalities between our own lives and those
seemingly exotic
modes of existence that have been depicted and analysed. This
is precisely
when anthropology becomes critical: it invites us to see that
there are
whole realities or dimensions of realities that were hidden from
us, even
though they have always been constitutive elements of our
lifeworld. As
such, critical anthropology helps us become conscious of the
fact that our

reality is far more layered and differentiated than we thought
and that, just
as there are dominant and dominated forces within a reality,
there are also
dominant and dominated realities.
The anthropological tradition has highlighted two human modes
of exist-
ence that I want to introduce here, not only because of their
intrinsic impor-
tance but also because they speak in particular to the question
of racism and
anti-racism before us. These are what I will refer to as the
reciprocal and the
mutualist modes of existence. They can be differentiated from
the mode of
existence that dominates our own modernity, what I will call the
domesticat-
ing mode of existence. To speak of human modes of existence is
to speak of a
human mode of inhabiting, being enmeshed in and relating to
the world that
is part and parcel of constituting the world. I will define each of
these modes
of existence through their way of conceiving, creating, and
relating to other-
ness since this is what concerns us most here.
The domesticating mode of existence, with which we are most
familiar, is a
world dominated – although, one must stress, far from saturated
– by an
instrumentalization of one’s surroundings. It creates an
otherness that is
mostly conceived as an object that needs to be dominated for
utilitarian pur-

poses. A logic of extraction of value, physical and symbolic,
prevails through-
out this world. All differences that are articulated to
domestication become a
form of polarization: human–animal, man–woman, white–black.
The bound-
ary between self and other is characterized by the problem of
how to domi-
nate and maintain sovereignty over the other.
The reciprocal mode of existence offers a different relationality,
grounded in
the logic of the gift. The radical difference that is inherent in
gift exchange was
initially and classically highlighted in the work of Marcel
Mauss ([1925] 2000)
128 G. HAGE
on the subject. What is difficult about the order of the gift is
that, in the first
instance, it is hard to see how the logic of the gift is any
different from the
instrumental reason that rules in the realm of domestication. For
indeed, at
one level, it does not take particularly sharp analytical skills to
uncover a calcu-
lative logic of self-interest that is a feature of gift exchange.
The brilliance of
Mauss’s work was to insist that if one sees in the gift only this
logic of self-inter-
est, one misses a different dimension, which is precisely the
space of radical
difference where it takes us. In that space, things are not merely

‘offered’ as
gifts in a strategically motivated act. Rather, the reciprocal gift
relation is a
relation that is always a surplus to the instrumental calculative
relation.
People, animals, plants, and objects stand as gifts towards each
other. Their
mere presence before each other is constituted by a kind of
inter-giftness.
The exclamations of joy that accompany a child entering a room
is a good
example of the way someone’s presence by itself is experienced
as an offering.
Some forms of religious thought capture this dimension by
making life and
everything that exists a gift of God requiring to be recognized
as such, and
where the very recognition of this giftness, the sentiment of
gratitude, is
itself a form of reciprocating the gift. Mauss’s analysis of gift
exchange
showed that while this reciprocal gift-based mode of existence
is minor in
our society, and indeed tends to become negligible with the
increased domi-
nance of calculative instrumental logic, there are societies
where this dimension
remains far more pronounced. If the order of domestication
invites an experi-
ence of the boundary as an intrinsic component of defining and
consolidating
one’s sovereignty, in the order of reciprocity the border
between self and other
is primarily perceived as the site of exchange and inter-
relationality.

The mutualist mode of existence is also about inter-
relationality. But it is in
an inter-relationality of a different order. I am borrowing the
concept of
mutuality here from recent work by Sahlins (2012) on kinship.
It highlights
an order of existence where people (and animals, plants,
objects, and so
on) exist in each other. ‘He is from us and in us,’ the Lebanese
say to empha-
size that someone is strongly connected to them. Mutualism is
this sense that
others are ‘in us’ rather than just outside us. It can be argued
that anthropol-
ogy’s research on mutualist forms of existence begins with the
earliest works
of Tylor (1976) on animism. But its critical anthropological
ramifications
became more developed with Lucien Lévy-Bruhl’s work on
‘participation’: a
mode of living and thinking where we sense ourselves and
others as partici-
pating in each other’s existence, where the life force of the
humans and the
non-humans that surround us are felt to be contributing to our
own life
force (Keck 2005). If the domesticating mode of existence
stresses a sense
of boundaries concerned with the delineation of a space of
sovereignty,
and the reciprocal mode of existence highlights boundaries and
borders as
a zone of exchange, the mutualist mode of existence
underscores a reality
where boundaries between self and other, human and animal,
and so on,

are far less absolute and even non-existent, where we
experience an interpe-
netration between self and other.
In order to grasp what this means for our understanding of
racism and anti-
racism, it is important to stress again the critical
anthropological reach of these
modes of existence. Despite some facile claims to the contrary
by people eager
to attack anthropology’s supposed colonial exoticization of
otherness, neither
Marcel Mauss nor Lévy-Bruhl, nor any of the anthropologists
who took their
work seriously, claimed something as simplistic as ‘Look at us.
We are
modern and rational, and look at those others who are so
different from us
that they live in a world of gift exchange, or in a world of
mutuality.’ Both
emphasized that rational instrumental calculative forms of
thinking and
living existed in the societies they were examining. They
respectively
argued, however, that the logic of the gift and the logic of
participation
were more pronounced in those societies than they were in our
own. Thus,
they were also claiming right from the start that the logic of
participation
and the logic of gift exchange were not as foreign to us as we

might first
think. Our world must be made out of a multiplicity of modes of
existence,
and if those modes of existence like gift exchange and mutuality
speak to
us, it is because they are always already one of our many modes
of creating/
relating to the world. We can say that Mauss and Lévy-Bruhl
were multi-realists
well before Viveiros de Castro (2014) introduced the concept. It
is in this sense
that their anthropology was a critical anthropology: it works
like a sociocultural
archaeology, digging up and making apparent modes of
existence that, while
less salient in our lives, are nonetheless very much part of them.
The domesti-
cating, reciprocal, and mutualist modes of existence are
concurrently part of
everyone’s lives even if one dominates over others in certain
social, historical,
or personal circumstances. Thus, I might see in a tree something
I need to
instrumentalize, to cut in order to ‘extract’ its wood and build
myself a
house, and in that sense the tree exists for me in the
domesticating order of
reality. What Mauss and others would insist upon, however, is
that there is
another mode of relating to the tree, which occurs concurrently,
where its
mere presence, regardless of the value of its wood, is a gift: I
look at it and I
say, ‘Thank you for existing, even though I am sorry that I need
to cut you
down.’ Likewise, I might consciously or unconsciously feel that

the being of
the tree and its life force is participating in my own existence
and enhancing
my own life force, and when I cut the tree I might, also
consciously or uncon-
sciously, feel that my own life force has been diminished when
I cut it down. I
am living and relating to things in all these three forms of
existence at the same
time, and perhaps many others of which I am not conscious.
With this in mind, I want now to move to show the relevance of
this for a
recalling of anti-racism. The crucial point that needs to be
emphasized here is
that racists, like all of us, are multi-realists in practice, while it
is only we, the
anti-racists, who have clung to a mono-realist ‘rationalist’ mode
of existence
130 G. HAGE
in theory for too long. When, for example, racists classify
someone as extermin-
able, they don’t only do so from an instrumentalist/calculative
rationality point
of view. To be sure, they do classify them in this way,
perceiving them as super-
fluous and harmful. But this is not enough to explain the lethal
and visceral
nature of exterminability. Racists also experience and classify
the racialized
within the realm of reciprocity. As I have argued above, the way
we greet a

child entering a room is a good example of treating someone’s
presence as a
gift in itself. What is crucial to add here is that it is precisely
through this
process that we instil in children a healthy narcissistic sense of
self-worth. It
goes without saying that we might under- or over-do it
sometimes, but it
remains true nonetheless that it is good for us to walk around
knowing sublim-
inally that our worthiness is not merely relative to how ‘useful’
others think we
are.
It is precisely this intrinsic sense of worthiness inherent to our
very pres-
ence, and that is beyond or outside instrumental reason, that the
racists try
to withhold from those they are racializing and in so doing try
to remove
them from the reciprocal mode of existence. It is this removal
that adds an
important layer to what it means to be exterminable. Indeed, in
the case of
asylum seekers, the withholding of this intrinsic giftness, and
the symbolic/
psychological injury this entails, is one of the most important
dimensions of
the racist encounter.
While this already adds depth and complexity to our
understanding of the
racism of extermination, it is by understanding the way racism
also draws on
the experience of mutuality that the true murderous intent of
this racism can

be more fully understood. As has been made clear above, the
mutualist order
of existence involves a sense of inter-penetration of existence
whereby the
other is seen as participating in our very existence and vice
versa. In exempli-
fying this, I used the positive example of the life force of others
enhancing our
own life force. Yet one of the vilest expressions of racism
emanates from a
negative experience of this mutuality, an experience akin to
forms of black
magic and sorcery: seeing in the existence of the other malefic
forces that
are diminishing rather than enhancing one’s own life force. This
is indeed
one of the most unpleasant and visceral forms that racism takes.
Here, the
racist conceives of the other in the figure of the ‘dementor’ in
Rowling’s
Harry Potter novels: the mere proximity of someone they
classify as black,
Asian, Arab, or Jew is seen as sucking one’s life and soul away
from them,
leaving them drained. Not only is the presence of the other not a
gift, it is
also an actual ‘existential threat’ that animates our
exterminatory impulses.
Writing anti-racism
What I have tried to show in the above is that by taking the
many dimensions
of the racism of extermination on board we can begin to think
of an anti-

racism that can rise to its multi-realist complexity. For if racism
constitutes
itself within the domesticating, reciprocal, and mutualist modes
of existence,
this certainly does not mean that these modes of existences are
intrinsically
racist. Modes of existence are like all social worlds, spaces of
struggle. Just
as racism finds resources in them to thrive, so can anti-racism
and – most
importantly – the alter-politics confronting racism. Just as the
order of the
gift implies a move away from the domesticating order of
instrumental valor-
ization, the reciprocal mode of existence offers us an anti-
racism that moves
beyond the ‘valorization of the other’ that characterizes
multicultural anti-
racism. Anti-racism, then, without vacating the
empirical/rational ground in
which it has been mostly grounded, can productively move to
think of itself
as affective, and even as magical, in ways that speak to the
racist sentiments
and affects generated in the realm of reciprocity and mutuality.
More impor-
tantly, the mutualist mode of existence offers us experiences
where the very
distinction between self and other disappears, and as such offers
one of the
most important grounds for setting the utopia of the a-racial on
secure

grounds.
It is here that we come to the question of anti-racist writing. For
what is
true about anti-racist practices in general is also true of the
particularities of
anti-racist writing as a practice. For writing, like any other
practice, is also
enmeshed in a multiplicity of worlds, with their corresponding
forms of
otherness. One can write ‘about’ the racialized, treating them as
passive sub-
jects of analysis. There is no doubt that such a form of anti-
racist writing can
be over-analytical, treating racism, racists, and the racialized as
objects of
what amounts to analytical domestication. This is when all
writing aims to
do is to ‘capture’ reality, a concept with an impeccable
domesticating pedi-
gree. But this is not all that anti-racist writing does or can do.
One’s writing
can take the form of a gift to the racialized. There is a long
tradition of
sociological and anthropological writing reflecting on how to
write ‘with’
rather than just ‘about’ one’s informants. This is particularly
true of ethno-
graphies of indigenous people, where anthropologists have a
long history
of being sensitive to questions of reciprocity. Anti-racist writers
can learn
a lot from these ethnographies. Finally, a piece of anti-racist
writing can
be in itself a form of life that participates in enhancing the
being of the

racialized, aiming to speak to them in the sense of speaking into
them.
Sometimes this can be a question of style: it is hardly a
revelation for
anti-racist activists that one can write something like ‘1-in-3
African Ameri-
cans will go to prison’ as either a mere ‘depressive’
confirmation of margin-
alization or as an invigorating call to arms stressing the
racialized’s agency
and capacity for resistance. I think that the
poetic/phenomenological tra-
dition, such as what one finds in the work of Michael Jackson
(see for
instance Jackson 2009), can offer an inspiration for a more
consciously
mutualist writing in this domain.
132 G. HAGE
The question then becomes: what does it mean to become more
conscious
of anti-racist writing as enmeshed in this plurality of modes of
existence? I
would like to think that, at the very least, such consciousness
would widen
the writer’s anti-racist strategic capacities and render anti-racist
thought
more efficient at combatting racism. This is crucial as anti-
racist political
forces face the lethal neo-liberal forms of exclusion meted out
on the racia-
lized today. For example, the ease with which asylum seekers
are radically

expelled and disallowed to set a footing in society appears at
one level as a
form of instrumental/rational/bureaucratic decision making,
even if judged
as extremely harsh. Yet such extremism is impossible without a
culture of dis-
posability and exterminability in which this exclusion is
grounded, and that is
far from being entirely instrumental/rational/bureaucratic. It
goes without
saying that from a disciplinary perspective it is this culture that
is by definition
the appropriate domain of anthropological investigation and
writing. It so
happens that, politically and ethically, it is also the most
important to
address, understand, and struggle to transform.
References
Bourdieu, Pierre. 1990. The Logic of Practice. Cambridge:
Polity Press.
Jackson, Michael. 2009. The Palm at the End of the Mind:
Relatedness, Religiosity and the
Real. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Keck, Frédéric. 2005. “Causalité mentale et perception de
l’invisible: Le concept de par-
ticipation chez Lucien Lévy-Bruhl.” Revue Philosophique de la
France et de l’Etranger
130: 303–322.
Latour, Bruno. 2007. “The Recall of Modernity:
Anthropological Approaches.” Cultural
Studies Review 13: 11–30.

Mauss, Marcel. [1925] 2000. The Gift: Forms and Functions of
Exchange in Archaic
Societies. Translated by W. D. Halls. New York: W. W. Norton
& Company.
Sahlins, Marshall. 2012. What Kinship is – And is Not.
Chicago: University of Chicago
Press.
Tylor, Edward B. 1976. Primitive Culture: Researches into the
Development of Mythology,
Philosophy, Religion, Language, Art, and Custom. New York:
Gordon Press.
Viveiros de Castro, Eduardo. 2014. Métaphysiques Cannibales
[Cannibal Metaphysics].
Edited and translated by Peter Skafish. Minneapolis: University
of Minnesota Press.
AbstractIntroductionThe functions of anti-racismThe neo-liberal
recalling of racismAnti-racism and anthropology's three modes
human of existenceWriting anti-racismReferences
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Patterns of minority and majority identification in
a multicultural society
Alita Nandi and Lucinda Platt
(Received 2 October 2014; accepted 20 April 2015)
There has been increasing investigation of the national and
ethnic identification of minority
populations in Western societies and how far they raise
questions about the success or
failure of multicultural societies. Much of the political and
academic discussion has,
however, been premised on two assumptions. First, that ethnic
minority and national identi-
fication are mutually exclusive, and, second, that national
identification forms an overarch-
ing majority identity that represents consensus values. In this
paper, using a large-scale
nationally representative UK survey with a varied set of identity
questions, and drawing

on an extension of Berry’s acculturation framework, we
empirically test these two assump-
tions. We find that, among minorities, strong British national
and minority identities often
coincide and are not on an opposing axis. We also find that
adherence to a British national
identity shows cleavages within the white majority population.
We further identify vari-
ation in these patterns by generation and political orientation.
Keywords: identity; UK; British; ethno-religious group;
acculturation; second generation
Introduction
There has been extensive recent debate on the success or
otherwise of ‘multicultural-
ism’. On one side has been the claim that the multiculturalist
project can incorporate
diverse populations within a common framework (Kymlicka
1996; Modood 2007;
Parekh 2000). On the other, there has been an explicit anxiety
about the extent to
which multicultural responses to diversity foster exclusive
minority and religious
identities and undermine common cause (Cameron 2011;
Huntington 1993). The
endorsement of national identity by minorities is often taken to
be an indicator of
their incorporation into the receiving country society, and to
represent both accep-
tance of shared national values and implicit rejection of ethnic
or cultural distinctive-
ness (Reeskens and Wright 2013). Conversely, maintenance of
strong ethnic identities
is read as problematic for an integrated society and a challenge

to a national
consensus.
There are, however, two features of this second narrative that
merit further interrog-
ation. First, ethnic and national identities are not mutually
exclusive, since identities are
not necessarily binary or oppositional (Verkuyten and Yildiz
2007). Moreover, the evi-
dence is unclear on whether greater diversity reduces national
belonging (Masella
2013). Second, the emphasis on the significance of national
identification assumes
that such an identity is endorsed by the population as a whole
and represents a
Ethnic and Racial Studies, 2015
Vol. 38, No. 15, 2615–2634,
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2015.1077986
© 2015 Taylor & Francis
consensus of values. This assumption is also open to question
(Kiely, McCrone and
Bechhofer 2005).
This paper explores both of these assumptions using the case of
the UK, capitalizing
on a unique, nationally representative data source to analyse
identification of both min-
orities and the majority. We utilize and extend Berry’s (1997)
acculturation framework,
applying the concept of identity acculturation not only to the
extent to which minorities

maintain single or dual identities, but also to diversity in
identities among the white
majority population. We exploit the fact that the UK’s majority
population comprises
English, Welsh, Scots and Northern Irish, and investigate
variation in identification
with each of these identities and/or with an overarching British
national identity. We
are thus able to advance understanding of ethnic and national
identities across the
whole population.
We also aim to expand the quantitative evidence base on
correlates of variations in
national identity across ethnic groups and generations,
particularly given debates
around how education and socio-economic status vary with
national identification
(Kesler and Schwartzman 2015). We argue that when people
have other secure
sources of identification, such as those offered through higher
education or occu-
pational status, they may feel less invested in national identities
(Nandi and Platt
2012). We also evaluate how far age, sex, immigrant generation
(for minorities) and
within-UK country of birth (for the majority) influence the
extent to which national
and ethnic identities are experienced as salient (Bechhofer and
McCrone 2012;
Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Jaspal and Cinnirella 2013;
Maxwell 2006; Platt
2014). We additionally test for the contributory role of
experience of harassment
among minorities, since feelings of acceptance have been shown
to correlate with feel-

ings of belonging (Crul and Schneider 2010; Fischer-Neuman
2014; Georgiadis and
Manning 2013; Maxwell 2006); and we address the role of
political engagement in
contributing to identity expression (Heath et al. 2013;
Verkuyten and Reijerse 2008).
We find that, after controlling for relevant factors, second-
generation minorities
typically have stronger British identities than the white
majority, and in a number
of cases so also do the first generation. Minorities most
commonly have strong
dual ethnic and national identities. UK-born minorities are less
likely to hold min-
ority-only identities than their immigrant counterparts and more
likely to hold
British-only identities, while the shares with both weak
minority and British and
strong dual identities remain relatively constant across the
generations. There is
some variation across ethno-religious groups, with the largest
share of strong dual
identities being among Indian Sikhs and the smallest among
other white and Carib-
bean Christian groups.
Among the white majority, single English, Scottish, Welsh and
Northern Irish iden-
tities are the most common, with certain exceptions: a sole
British identity is dominant
among Northern Irish Protestants. Political commitment has no
substantial indepen-
dent influence on elective identities, unlike socio-demographic
factors, possibly
suggesting that such attachments represent less civic and more

‘ethnic’ nationalism
(Smith 1991).
We return to these points in our conclusion, where we consider
their implications and
reflect on the extent to which the specific UK case may also
hold lessons for other
countries.
2616 A. Nandi and L. Platt
Background
In the context of increasing immigration and the changing
composition of European
populations, there has been extensive debate on the
consequences of increasingly
multicultural societies and the success or otherwise of
‘multiculturalism’ as a political
project (Koopmans 2013; Kymlicka 1996). Modood (2007)
regards multiculturalism
as combining recognition of groups’ difference with assertion of
a common national
identity, implying the possibility of harmonious dual identities.
However, there have
been ongoing debates about the extent to which group
recognition is compatible with
the egalitarian principles of liberal democracies (Barry 2001).
Huntington’s (1993)
claim that there are limits to the extent that it is possible for
different ‘cultures’ to
coexist has found resonance in the political retreat from
multiculturalism (Koopmans
2013) and anxiety about a fundamental incompatibility between

difference and shared
identity (Verkuyten and Zaremba 2005). For example, in UK
political discourse,
multiculturalism has been linked with separatism, religious
fundamentalism and
alienation from core national values (Cameron 2011), with
failure to accede to
British national identity seen as a particular issue for the second
generation of
minorities.
In the face of strong academic as well as political conviction
that national identity is
central to social cohesion (Moran 2011; Reeskens and Wright
2014), the quantitative
evidence base relating to minority or immigrant national
identification and its correlates
and consequences has been growing (e.g. Diehl and Schnell
2006; Fischer-Neuman
2014; Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Kesler and Schwartzman
2015; Lam and
Smith 2009). Much of the focus has been on the experience of
minorities specifically
and their in-group or out-group identification. Additionally,
some studies have also
compared minorities with the majority, and these suggest that
immigrant minorities’
national identification is as great as that of the majority, albeit
with some variation
across groups (Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Karlsen and
Nazroo 2013; Manning
and Roy 2009; Masella 2013; Reeskens and Wright 2014). A
nascent literature on gen-
erational change in identity in the UK suggests that across
minority groups, the ten-
dency is for national identity to increase with time and

generation, while minority
identity declines (Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Guveli and
Platt 2011; Karlsen and
Nazroo 2013; Manning and Roy 2010; Platt 2014).
However, despite these suggestive insights, existing research,
both qualitative and
quantitative, often includes only partial coverage of ethnic
groups, with much of the
current literature focusing on Muslim groups and single
generations (e.g. Jacobson
1997; Lam and Smith 2009; Vadher and Barrett 2009).
Moreover, the focus on minority
identity integration or assimilation has tended to obscure the
analysis of national iden-
tity among the dominant group itself, which has, instead, been
the focus of separate
study (see e.g. Bechhofer and McCrone 2012; Kiely, McCrone
and Bechhofer
2005). However, majority identification is a critical part of the
context for minorities:
the extent to which minority groups’ identity claims are
accepted may impact on the
degree to which they feel able to make them (Crul and
Schneider 2010). At the
same time, shifts in the meaning of national identity resulting
from changing national
composition may be implicated in the extent to which the
majority themselves identify
with an overarching polity (Gong 2007).
Ethnic and Racial Studies 2617
It is therefore pertinent to contextualize minority diversity

within the diversity of the
majority population identification. Identity acculturation is not
a one-sided process
(Berry 1997), and the relations implied within the process of
assimilation are not singu-
lar (Brubaker 2001). The potential of national identity to
effectively accommodate min-
ority or immigrant groups is an important component of the
extent to which minorities
can and will identify with it (Moran 2011). While Scottish
identity is being recast as a
more ‘inclusive’ identity (Bechhofer and McCrone 2012), the
‘rise’ of English identity
(Wyn Jones et al. 2012) may herald a redrawing of national
boundaries to a more
‘ethnic’ conception of nation (Smith 1991), with consequences
for its inclusivity
(Reeskens and Wright 2013).
We therefore conceptualize minority and majority identity
within an acculturation
framework that describes the changes that take place in cultural
patterns for either
group when two differentiated groups come into contact (Berry
1997). In this paper
we focus on Berry’s model of psychological acculturation at the
level of individual
identity, which distinguishes between assimilation, integration,
separation and
marginalization.
While there is considerable debate around concepts of
assimilation and integration
(Alba and Nee 1997; Brubaker 2001; Rumbaut 1997), whether
in relation to structural
or cultural domains, Berry’s four-way categorization provides

us with a widely
accepted nomenclature for describing particular intersections on
the two axes of
ethnic and national identity. Much of the discussion around
assimilation has been con-
cerned either with distinguishing its normative from its
descriptive aspects (see e.g.
Brubaker 2001), or assessing whether its predictions do indeed
materialize (e.g.
Rumbaut 1997). In this paper we use the term assimilation
descriptively to define
those for whom British national identity predominates.
Integration has been subject
to similar critiques as ‘assimilation’, although, following
Berry’s terminology, we
are operationalizing it as representing dual identity. In the same
way, separation and
marginalization are used as descriptors of predominantly strong
ethnic identity, and
low national and ethnic identification, respectively.
While Berry’s framework is well recognized and has been used
in other work on
ethnic identity and multiculturalism (see e.g. Diehl and Schnell
2006; Fischer-
Neumann 2014; Heath and Demireva 2014), our approach
extends existing research
in two ways. First, for analysing minority group acculturation,
we utilize comparable
scaled measures of both national and ethnic identity that are
collected independently
and tap into affective but individualized dimensions of identity
(Phinney 1990). We
are thus able to develop previous literature exploring binary
measures of national iden-
tity that may be associated with legal citizenship (Manning and

Roy 2010; Platt 2014),
and capture a more affective component (Reeskens and Wright
2014). We also are able
to focus on identity rather than related concepts such as
belonging (Burton, Nandi and
Platt 2010), as used, for example by Georgiadis and Manning
(2013) and Maxwell
(2006), or connection to a particular country (Fischer-Neumann
2014).
In operationalizing this framework and investigating patterns of
identification, we
are adopting a concept of identity that is deemed to be stable at
the point of analysis,
even though we recognize that identity is contingent and subject
to interpretation and
hence is differentially adopted and adapted (see e.g. the
discussion in Lam and Smith
2009; Verkuyten and Reijerse 2008). As noted by Tajfel (1981),
social identity is
formed and expressed under specific historical, cultural and
ideological conditions, and
the current configuration in the UK marks an interesting case
for investigating
identities.
The second innovation is that we introduce a comparative
analysis of the majority
population within the same framework as that for minorities.
This allows us to
engage with the heterogeneity of the majority rather than

representing it as a mono-
lithic, normative reference point. It takes seriously the
imperatives of the new assimila-
tion theory (Alba and Nee 1997) and of acculturation theory to
acknowledge that these
processes are two-sided.
From the extant literature, we hypothesize that minorities in the
UK will have
national identities as strong as or stronger than the majority, but
that they will vary
by group (Georgiadis and Manning 2013; Jaspal and Cinnirella
2013; Manning and
Roy 2010; Maxwell 2006). We expect that British national
identity will be stronger
in the second generation, but will also be sensitive to the
responses of the majority
(Heath et al. 2013) and hence be reduced by harassment. We
also anticipate that
national and ethnic identities will be reinforcing, leading to an
over-representation of
‘integrated’ (dual) identities. We expect separated (ethnic-only)
identities to decline
across generations with a commensurate increase in assimilated
(British-only)
identities.
Among the majority, we expect that the key influence on the
patterning of identity
will be country-specific national-religious origins. Specifically,
we anticipate strongest
‘separated’ identification among Scots (Bechhofer and McCrone
2012) and greater
attachment to British (integrated or assimilated) identities
among Northern Irish
Protestants.

We nevertheless anticipate that socio-demographics will be
associated with different
identity patterns across both minorities and the majority.
Among minorities, those with
lower socio-economic status and lower educational levels and
those who are older
would be expected to have more invested in national (British)
identity (Georgiadis
and Manning 2013; Maxwell 2006), as those with more
privileged positions have
had more opportunities to ‘select’ their identities (Kesler and
Schwartzman 2015;
Nandi and Platt 2012). Among the majority, we anticipate that
lower socio-economic
status and being older will instead be linked to country-level
identities as a more local
point of validation. We anticipate that mainstream political
engagement is liable to
increase investment in assimilated and integrated identities
among minorities; while,
in the face of greater debate over devolution and country
identities (Bechhofer and
McCrone 2012), it will be more closely linked to separated
identities among the
majority.
Data and measures
Data
We use data from Understanding Society, a UK longitudinal
survey of a nationally
representative sample of approximately 28,000 households, with
an additional ethnic
minority boost sample (EMB) of around 4,000 households

(Knies 2014). The EMB
contributed around 1,000 adult interviews of five target ethnic
minority groups
(Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, black African, Caribbean) in
addition to those covered
in the main sample. Every year the adult (16+) household
members are asked about
their lives. In addition to questions on socio-demographic
characteristics, the survey
includes questions on attitudes and identity, including political
beliefs, Britishness,
strength of identification with parents’ ethnic group and
national identity. Some of
these questions (which we call ‘extra questions’) are asked only
of (a) the EMB, (b)
a comparison sample of 500 households from the main sample,
and (c) ethnic min-
orities living in ‘low-density’ areas not covered by the EMB.
This rich set of identity
questions, the representative UK coverage, the large sample size
and the EMB makes
Understanding Society uniquely suited for this analysis.
We use the UK 2011 census question to identify the white
majority (as those choos-
ing white: British/English/Scottish/Welsh/Northern Irish
category) and minority (those
choosing any of the other categories) groups.
Dependent variables: British, ethnic and national identity

National identity: The entire sample was asked a standard
census question on national
identity: respondents selected one or more national identities
from English, Welsh,
Scottish, Northern Irish, British, Irish and Other. Each could be
chosen singly or in
combination.
British identity: Those eligible for the ‘extra questions’ were
asked ‘how important
being British’ was to them. They were shown an eleven-point-
scale where higher on
the scale was ‘more important’ and chose their position on it.
Ethnic identity: Minority group members eligible for ‘extra
questions’ were
additionally asked to give the strength of identification with
their father’s ethnic
group and with their mother’s ethnic group (if different), using
a similar format and
eleven-point scale. We use this as our measure of minority
ethnic identity, prioritizing
the highest score where responses on mother and father
differed.
Independent variables
Ethno-religious group: The ethnic group categories in the 2011
census questions are
widely used, but have been criticized for conflating groups with
different migration
and settlement histories and different patterns of association
that are often linked in
practice to religious distinctions: for example, Muslims, Sikhs
and Hindus of Indian
origin (see e.g. Longhi, Nicoletti, and Platt 2013). An

alternative is to construct
ethno-religious groups, which has the additional advantage that
it enables the concur-
rent incorporation of ethnicity and religious affiliation into the
measure. We use reli-
gion (current religion or, if no current religion was reported, the
religion respondents
reported being brought up in) alongside the census ethnic group
categories to construct
a seventeen-category measure of ethno-religious group.1
Country-community origin: For majority group analysis, we
constructed a measure
of country-community origins that combined country of birth
(whether England, Scot-
land, Wales, Northern Ireland or elsewhere2) with religious
affiliation/community of
upbringing (Catholic, Protestant, or other or none). From this
we derived a nine-cat-
egory measure that distinguished religion/religious community
for Scotland and
Northern Ireland, where it is most likely to be salient for
national identity, but not for
England, Wales or Other.
Other covariates
Demographic variables: We include age measured in six bands,
and sex, along with
marital/cohabitation status, measured as single never married,
cohabiting, married or

in a civil partnership, separated, widowed or divorced. We also
include region of
residence.
UK-born: We include a measure of immigrant generation,
identified by whether
UK-born (second or subsequent generation) or not (first
generation) in the minority
group analysis.
Socio-economic position: To investigate whether identity varied
with socio-econ-
omic position, we included measures of highest qualification
(four categories), employ-
ment status, and occupational class as measured by the eight-
category National
Statistics Socio-economic Classification (Rose, Pevalin and
O’Reilly 2005).
Political engagement: We utilize a measure of political party
affiliation, both strong
and weak, to capture political engagement in the minority group
analysis. Given that
the vast majority affiliate to one of the UK-wide national
parties (see Heath et al.
2013), this takes the form of a seven-category variable of
none/not eligible to vote,
and strong and weak Conservative, Labour and Other party
supporter. In the majority
analysis, given that different political parties operate in the
different countries of the
UK, we use a three-category general measure of political
support – whether supporting
any party strongly, weakly, or not at all.
Harassment: In the minority group analyses, we include a three-
category measure of

no harassment, direct experience of physical or verbal
harassment, and feeling unsafe.
Analytical approach
We first examine our hypotheses that strength of British identity
is as great or greater
among minorities as among the majority, but with some
diversity across groups. As this
question was one of the ‘extra questions’, we are left with a
sample (Sample 1) of N =
7,762 of whom 14% are white majority. We regress British
identity on ethno-religious
group and the full set of covariates using ordinary least squares
(OLS) regression.
Using Sample 1, our reference population for ethno-religious
group is white Christian
majority.
For the analysis of both minority and majority acculturation, we
adopt – and adapt –
Berry’s four-way acculturation framework. Berry (1997)
identified four potential path-
ways that behavioural and identity acculturation could take:
assimilation, integration,
separation and marginalization. As noted, we use these labels as
analytical descriptors
of particular positions on the two axes of national and ethnic
identity rather than as nor-
mative categories (see Brubaker 2001). The framework with
these labels is illustrated
schematically in the top panel of Figure 1.
For the analysis of minority acculturation, we allocate minority
group individuals to

the four levels of the quadrant based on the measures of ethnic
and British identity. We
distinguish strong and weak identification by whether responses
fall above or below the
median value. These questions were part of the ‘extra questions’
and we are thus left
with a minority-only sample (Sample 2) of N = 6,490. This
allocation and the ensuing
distribution are illustrated in the second panel of Figure 1.3
While the use of the median
is essentially arbitrary (Berry and Sabatier 2010), the fact that it
splits the population
equally means that if there were no association between the
strength of the two iden-
tities, we would expect to find 25% of the sample in each cell.
If there were a negative
relationship between the two identities, there would be over-
representation in the
assimilated and separated cells. In fact, it is the integrated cell
that shows over-rep-
resentation, indicating that those who identify strongly on one
measure are more
likely to identify strongly on the other.
We model these four outcomes by estimating a multinomial
logistic regression
model on our second sample, with ‘separated’ as the reference
category, and including
the full set of covariates.
Figure 1. Measurement of identity acculturation outcomes.

To model the white majority’s identity acculturation, we utilize
responses to the mul-
ticode measure of national identity, described above. We are
thus left with a sample
(Sample 3) of N = 35,617 white majority respondents.
Respondents are allocated to
the integrated category if they claim both a British and
(English/Welsh/Scottish/North-
ern Irish) country-level identity, as separated if they claim a
country identity only,
assimilated if they claim a British identity only, and
marginalized if they do not
claim any UK country or British identity. This last group is a
small residual group,
as the third panel of Figure 1 shows, and includes those who
describe their national
identity as Irish as well as some who identify with another
country, despite claiming
white – British/English/Scottish/Welsh/Northern Irish as their
ethnic group. Since
the allocation is based on a different measure and cannot be
constructed to be evenly
split across the two axes, it is not directly comparable with the
measure of acculturation
used in the minority group analysis. Nevertheless, it indicates
the priority accorded by
the majority to different identity options, which provides
important context for the min-
ority choices. It also allows investigation of whether predictors
of different accultura-
tion outcomes are consistent or differ across minorities and the

majority.
We again estimate multinomial logit models for the relative
chance of being in the
integrated, assimilated, or marginalized categories relative to
being in the separated
group, exploring differences between country-community
origins compared to the
reference category of English origins.
To facilitate interpretation of the multinomial logistic
regressions, we provide tables
of predicted probabilities of the four outcomes to illustrate the
average marginal effects
of certain key predictors of interest, including ethno-religious
group and country-com-
munity origin.
All estimations are weighted using household design weights,
and standard errors
estimated correctly by accounting for the complex survey
design. Descriptive statistics
of all variables used in the analysis for each of the three
samples are provided in the
supplemental material (see Appendix: Table A1).
Minority ethnic identity and acculturation
We first address the question of how British identity varies
across ethno-religious
groups. Table 1 shows the results from the full OLS model.
After adjusting for covariates, Caribbean Christians, those of
mixed ethnicity and the
various ‘other’ groups, were not significantly different from the
white Christian

majority in their strength of British identification. Only the
other white group had a sig-
nificantly less strong British identity while all other ethno-
religious groups expressed a
stronger British identity. A difference of more than one point on
the eleven-point scale
was found for Indian, Pakistani, Bangladeshi, black African
Muslims and Indian Sikhs
and less than one point for Indian Hindus and black African
Christians. These differ-
ences are consistent with our hypotheses derived from related
literature using different
data and measures. Notably, however, here we use a direct
measure of national identity
that better reflects its conceptualization in the literature, and a
more fine-grained and
comprehensive ethnic group categorization that reveals
consistency but also differ-
ences within the Indian population as well as the high British
identification of black
African Christians. Some of the difference in British
identification between ethno-
Table 1. OLS estimates of a model of strength of British
identity.
With political
affiliation
Without political
affiliation

Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Age group (omitted: 40–49 years)
16–19 years −0.44* 0.25 −0.57** 0.25
20–29 years −0.66*** 0.16 −0.76*** 0.17
30–39 years −0.25* 0.14 −0.30** 0.14
50–59 years 0.54*** 0.16 0.60*** 0.16
60+ years 0.53*** 0.18 0.73*** 0.18
Female 0.01 0.09 −0.03 0.10
Region of residence (omitted: London)
North −0.13 0.14 −0.15 0.14
Midlands −0.19 0.14 −0.22 0.14
East, South −0.49*** 0.14 −0.49*** 0.14
Wales −0.29 0.36 −0.29 0.37
Scotland −1.68*** 0.30 −1.74*** 0.31
Area of low ethnic minority density −0.08 0.13 −0.13 0.14
Current marital status (omitted: never married)
Cohabiting as a couple 0.12 0.22 0.16 0.22
Married or in a civil partnership 0.18 0.14 0.22 0.14
Separated, divorced or widowed 0.00 0.18 0.03 0.19
Highest educational qualification (omitted: university degree or
higher)
No educational qualifications 0.56*** 0.16 0.48*** 0.17
O levels or equivalent 0.44*** 0.14 0.41*** 0.14
A levels or equivalent, diploma 0.38*** 0.13 0.39*** 0.14
Current employment or main activity status (omitted: employed)
Not employed 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.14
Taking care of family −0.29 0.18 −0.27 0.18
Full-time student −0.38* 0.20 −0.34 0.21
NS-SEC (omitted: routine)
Large employers and higher management −0.19 0.28 −0.09 0.29
Higher professional −0.48** 0.24 −0.44* 0.24
Lower management and professional 0.01 0.19 0.05 0.19
Intermediate −0.16 0.20 −0.09 0.20
Small employers and own account −0.15 0.24 −0.14 0.25
Lower supervisory and technical −0.17 0.24 −0.17 0.24

Semi-routine 0.28* 0.17 0.27 0.17
Never worked and long-term unemployed 0.38** 0.18 0.32*
0.18
Political beliefs (omitted: none, don’t know or can’t vote)
Conservative party, strong supporter 1.42*** 0.21
Conservative party, not very strong supporter 0.99*** 0.16
Labour party, strong supporter 1.03*** 0.13
Labour party, not very strong supporter 0.58*** 0.12
Other party, strong supporter 0.13 0.27
Other party, not very strong supporter 0.26 0.17
Harassment experience last year (omitted: none)
Was physically attacked or verbally insulted −0.28** 0.12
−0.24** 0.12
Avoided or felt unsafe −0.02 0.11 0.00 0.11
Born in UK 0.74*** 0.13 0.80*** 0.14
(Continued)
religious groups is explained by differences in their political
affiliation and support.
Once the political support variable was included, ethno-
religious group coefficients
were attenuated. Political support, whether strong or weak, for
either of the two
main political parties (Labour and Conservative) was positively
associated with
British identification, although this was not the case for support
for an alternative
party. This suggests that engagement with national politics
reinforces feelings of
being part of the nation, but only when that engagement is
mainstream.

Being UK-born was positively associated with British
identification, as expected. In
addition, higher qualifications,4 being from a professional
occupation, being younger
and being a student were negatively associated with Britishness,
while a semi-
routine or routine occupation or being long-term unemployed
were positively associ-
ated, illustrating the greater salience of national identity in the
absence of competing
professional identities, in line with our hypotheses. Congruent
with expectations,
experience of harassment was negatively associated with British
identity.
This analysis is not, however, informative about the relationship
between British and
ethnic identity. For that, we turn to our multinomial logit model
of identity accultura-
tion among the minority groups.
Table 2 illustrates predicted probabilities of the four
acculturation outcomes deriving
from the average marginal effects of the multinomial logit of
certain key characteristics
of interest.5 (Full model estimates available on request.)
Table 1. Continued.
With political
affiliation
Without political
affiliation

Coefficient SE Coefficient SE
Ethno-religious groups (omitted: white Christian majority)
Caribbean Christian 0.09 0.20 0.03 0.20
African Christian 0.51** 0.24 0.60** 0.25
Other ethnic group Christian −0.37 0.29 −0.4 0.30
Indian Muslim 1.33*** 0.30 1.36*** 0.30
Pakistani Muslim 1.14*** 0.20 1.15*** 0.20
Bangladeshi Muslim 1.10*** 0.21 1.14*** 0.22
African Muslim 1.14*** 0.29 1.15*** 0.29
Arab-Turkey Muslim 0.69 0.52 0.54 0.55
Indian Hindu 0.72*** 0.22 0.70*** 0.23
Indian Sikh 1.15*** 0.24 1.23*** 0.25
White majority, No religion −0.17 0.24 −0.3 0.25
Chinese no religion −0.11 0.42 −0.32 0.43
Other ethnic group no religion −0.18 0.38 −0.34 0.38
Other ethnic/religious combinations 0.25 0.20 0.14 0.21
Mixed −0.07 0.22 −0.13 0.22
Other white −1.50*** 0.40 −1.61*** 0.41
Constant 5.86*** 0.30 6.35*** 0.30
N 7,762 7,762
Notes: NS-SEC, National Statistics Socio-economic
Cassification. Weighted using household design weights;
standard errors estimated correctly by accounting for the
complex survey design. NS-SEC: National Statistics
Socio-economic classification.
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
Table 2 shows that across ethnic groups and generations,
integrated (dual identity) is
the most common outcome in almost all cases. The full table

(not illustrated) showed
that integrated outcomes also tend to be associated with those
factors that we hypoth-
esized would be particularly associated with positive national
identification, such as
lower qualifications levels and a poorer employment situation,
and which were
found to be associated with British identity in the initial
analysis. Despite the substan-
tial focus in the literature on Muslim identities (see e.g. Guveli
and Platt 2011; Karlsen
and Nazroo 2013; Koopmans 2013; Verkuyten and Yildiz 2007),
there is no evidence
that Pakistani Muslims are more likely to have a separated
identity or less likely to have
an integrated identity than other groups.
The exception to predominance of integrated identities is among
those of other white
backgrounds, for which ‘marginalized’ (weak ethnic and British
identity) is the most
frequent outcome. Other white is a composite group that
contains multiple ‘white’
origins. Nevertheless, these findings speak to the greater
independence from commit-
ment to ethnic or national identity offered by the greater
flexibility and transnational
opportunities experienced by those of most other white
backgrounds, whether of
EU, North American or Antipodean origins.
Caribbeans, although coming from a very different migration
context, have a similar
pattern of relatively low integrated acculturation outcomes to
the other white group
(although for them it is still the most likely outcome) and

relatively high rates of mar-
ginalized identities across generations, higher than would come
from random allo-
cation. This is consistent with the findings on relative alienation
found by Heath and
Demireva (2014), and is a potential concern if strong identity in
at least in one of
the domains is important for psychological well-being.
Having a solely strong British identity (‘assimilated’) is less
common, as expected,
among first-generation minorities, but increases in the second
generation to around
one in five for most groups. Correspondingly, separated (strong
ethnic only) identities
are more common in the first generation and decline among the
UK-born, although
they still constitute between one in eight and one in five of most
groups. These indi-
viduals are those who, controlling for background
characteristics, might be con-
sidered to have failed to take on and accord with the ‘national
story’ of their
country of birth and residence. However, the overall
distributions are partly an arte-
fact of the distinction between ‘high’ and ‘low’ at the median:
and the rates are still
lower than would be expected from random allocation (which
would give 25% in
each category).
For those second generation minorities who are ‘separated’,
there is no particu-
larly ethno-religious group pattern, with Caribbean and African
Christians, Indian
Hindus and Chinese with no religion the most likely to be in

this position. While
the rates of marginalization show variation across groups, there
is relative stability
over generations. Against expectations, marginalization does
not therefore appear to
be a particular issue of the second generation but is more group-
than generation-
specific.
Table 2 also illustrates the extent to which identity
acculturation varies with political
engagement. Both strong Labour and Conservative support are
associated with higher
rates of integrated identities, other things being equal. Having
no political beliefs or
engagement is, conversely, associated with higher rates of
separated identities. This
Table 2. Estimates of acculturation outcomes from fully
adjusted multinomial model, by ethno-
religious group and (migrant) generation and political affiliation
and sex (N = 6,490).
Separated Integrated Assimilated Marginalized
First generation
Pakistani Muslim (ref) 0.19 0.51 0.10 0.20
African Christian 0.29 0.43 0.10 0.17
Other ethnic group Christian 0.29 0.36 0.08 0.27
Indian Muslim 0.17 0.48 0.18 0.16
Bangladeshi Muslim 0.22 0.49 0.10 0.18

African Muslim 0.24 0.49 0.09 0.18
Indian Hindu 0.28 0.48 0.08 0.16
Indian Sikh 0.23 0.55 0.10 0.12
Chinese no religion 0.32 0.41 0.04 0.23
Other ethnic group No religion 0.22 0.28 0.10 0.41
Other ethnic/religious combinations 0.29 0.37 0.12 0.22
Mixed parentage 0.19 0.34 0.11 0.37
Other white 0.32 0.26 0.04 0.38
UK-born minorities
Pakistani Muslim (ref) 0.13 0.49 0.19 0.19
African Christian 0.21 0.42 0.20 0.17
Other ethnic group Christian 0.21 0.36 0.17 0.26
Indian Muslim 0.11 0.43 0.32 0.14
Bangladeshi Muslim 0.16 0.47 0.20 0.18
African Muslim 0.17 0.48 0.17 0.18
Indian Hindu 0.20 0.48 0.16 0.15
Indian Sikh 0.16 0.54 0.18 0.12
Chinese no religion 0.24 0.44 0.08 0.24
Other ethnic group No religion 0.15 0.27 0.18 0.39
Other ethnic-religious combinations 0.20 0.36 0.23 0.21
Mixed parentage 0.13 0.32 0.20 0.35
Other white 0.24 0.27 0.09 0.40
Men
No beliefs, don’t know, cannot vote (ref) 0.25 0.36 0.12 0.27
Conservative, strong support 0.15 0.49 0.14 0.21
Conservative, not very strong support 0.16 0.37 0.19 0.28
Labour, strong support 0.20 0.47 0.16 0.17
Labour, not very strong support 0.23 0.42 0.13 0.23
Other party, strong support 0.12 0.42 0.11 0.34
Other, not very strong support 0.17 0.34 0.17 0.32
Women
No beliefs, don’t know, cannot vote (ref) 0.29 0.39 0.09 0.24
Conservative, strong support 0.17 0.53 0.11 0.19

Conservative, not very strong support 0.19 0.41 0.15 0.25
Labour, strong support 0.23 0.51 0.12 0.14
Labour, not very strong support 0.26 0.45 0.10 0.20
(Continued)
enhances the findings from the British identity analysis, since it
shows how it is primar-
ily strong dual identities, rather than simply strong British
identities, that are associated
with political commitment and engagement.
We now turn to the patterns among the white majority.
Majority population and identity acculturation
Table 3 shows predicted probabilities for particular
characteristics from the full multi-
nomial logit model of white majority identity acculturation.
(Full model estimates
available on request.)
Table 3 shows that, controlling for covariates, almost all
country-community groups
select a separated (country-only) identity as their modal choice.
That is, given the
option to select a single British or country identity or a multiple
identity, most selected
a single country. The exception, in line with expectations, is
Northern Irish Protestants,
Table 2. Continued.

Other party, strong support 0.14 0.46 0.09 0.31
Other, not very strong support 0.20 0.38 0.13 0.29
Note: Estimates derived from full model and at mean values of
other covariates. Weighted using household design
weights; standard errors estimated correctly by accounting for
the complex survey design. Statistics indicated
in bold are differences from (italicized) reference categories
that are statistically significant at the 5% level of
significance.
Table 3. Acculturation patterns among the white majority by
country/community of origin and
political support and sex (N = 35,617).
English (ref) 0.52 0.24 0.23 0.004
Scottish Protestant 0.60 0.27 0.13 0.003
Scottish Catholic 0.65 0.25 0.10 0.002
Welsh 0.63 0.24 0.13 0.000
Northern Irish Protestant 0.30 0.22 0.48 0.004
Northern Irish Catholic 0.72 0.05 0.17 0.053
Other country of birth 0.39 0.13 0.45 0.032
Men
No political affiliation, cannot vote (ref) 0.59 0.21 0.20 0.004
Not strong political party support 0.56 0.24 0.20 0.004
Strong political party support 0.57 0.22 0.21 0.004
Women
No political affiliation, cannot vote (ref) 0.53 0.23 0.24 0.003
Not strong political party support 0.50 0.26 0.23 0.003
Strong political party support 0.51 0.24 0.25 0.003
Note: Estimates at mean values of other covariates, deriving

from full model, weighted using household design
weights; standard errors estimated correctly by accounting for
the complex survey design. Statistics indicated
in bold are differences from (italicized) reference categories
that are statistically significant at the 5% level of
significance.
for whom the modal category is, rather, assimilated (British
only). This was also the
preferred option for those who had a non-UK country of birth,
who had a fairly
bimodal distribution, being very unlikely to select two UK
identities. Contrary to
expectations deriving from the closely fought referendum on
independence, the
Scots were no more likely than the Welsh to have separated
identities, and slightly
less likely than Northern Irish Catholics.
While English-born are just as likely to have integrated (British
and English) as
assimilated identities, Scots (both Protestant and Catholic) and
Welsh have lower
rates of assimilated identities. However, interestingly, Northern
Irish Catholics are
more likely to have assimilated than integrated identities. They
are also the only
group with a non-negligible share (5%) in the marginalized
(neither identity) category.
This tends to be because these respondents select Irish, so it
should not be interpreted as
lacking an ethnic/country identity, but rather as not holding any

UK identity. Neverthe-
less, the proportion maintaining this ‘alternative’ identity is
still small, perhaps surpris-
ingly given historical ties to the republic.
Turning to other covariates (not illustrated), higher educational
qualifications were
associated with a greater chance of selecting a British identity
(whether integrated or
assimilated) relative to holding a country-only identity
(separated). Thus, as hypoth-
esized, country identities would seem to offer more to the
majority population in the
absence of external validation offered by higher socio-economic
status, whereas for
minorities, it was British identity that seemed to invite greater
investment among the
less privileged.
Political engagement (illustrated in Table 3) was less strongly
associated with
majority identity choices, despite the intensity of political
debate around devolution
(and independence). In fact, while (any) party support was
significantly associated
with a lower likelihood of an integrated relative to a separated
identity, compared to
those without any party affiliation the differences were small.
No other political affilia-
tion differences were statistically significant. Thus, political
engagement and identity
do not seem as closely interconnected as they were for
minorities, although the inability
to distinguish parties in this multi-country framework may have
somewhat disguised
the relationship with specific party support.

Summary and conclusions
Minorities’ identification with the majority society in which
they live is widely
regarded as an important indicator of cohesion and of
successfully integrated societies.
There have been claims that multiculturalist policies have
inhibited such identification
and thus created alienation and exacerbated cultural conflict.
However, these claims
involve assumptions both about the incompatibility of ethnic
and national identities,
and about the coherence of national identity claims. Minorities
have been the explicit
targets of concerns about lack of national identification and the
failure of multicultur-
alist policies to create a coherent sense of national belonging
(Heath and Demireva
2014; Huntington 1993; Koopmans 2013; Verkuyten and
Zaremba 2005), yet it is
not clear that majorities themselves sign up to national identity
in systematic or consist-
ent ways.
We therefore set out to investigate these two issues by
analysing British national
identity across the UK’s minority and majority groups, taking
into account other rel-
evant influences. Competing identities for the majority in a
context such as the UK
are offered by country-level identities, which can be considered

more ethnic than
civic national identities. By using a similar framework for
analysing majority dual
and single identification as for minorities, we shed greater light
on the extent to
which national identity is or is not central to majority society.
We hypothesized that minority groups’ British identity would be
as strong as or
stronger than the majority population; and we found that this
was the case. In particular,
minorities were likely to hold strong dual (ethnic minority and
British national) iden-
tities. We also expected differences across ethnic groups, and
we found substantial
differences in identity, but without any systematic pattern, other
than the greater ten-
dency of other white and Caribbean groups to lack strong ethnic
or national
identification.
Amid increasing interest in the ‘second generation’ (Crul and
Vermeulen 2003;
Heath, Rothon and Kilpi 2008), we demonstrated that while
generational change in
the patterning of identities was more of a continuum than a step
change, it was
clearly in the direction of maintaining majority identities more
and minority ones
less, while dual identities were relatively stable.
There is substantial heterogeneity in identity formation and
strength across ethnic
minority groups and within the UK majority. Minorities are,
nevertheless, largely
signed up to the ‘national story’ represented by British identity.

However, as around
half of the majority population endorses solely country-specific
identities when
given the choice, this national story may in fact be less unitary
and more fractured.
We further revealed how lower socio-economic status
influences identity patterns
across both the majority and minorities, but is linked more to
British identity among
minorities and more to ‘ethnic’ country-level identities among
the majority. The impli-
cation is that over time, as educational levels increase, we
might expect some conver-
gence in levels of British identification. But questions over the
overarching coherence
of the category will remain.
For the majority, political investment is positively associated
with country-specific
rather than British identities and thus the mutual reinforcement
is in the direction of
ethnic rather than civic conceptions of nation, while the civic
nation increasingly cap-
tures the endorsement of minority groups. Rather than stressing
national identity as a
marker of cohesion, a more productive path in the medium term
towards enhancing
common points of identification may be to focus on the civic
inclusiveness of sub-
national categories (Crul and Schneider 2010).
While our analysis was specific to the UK context, our results
may be relevant to
Europe-wide analysis of identity. First, we have contributed to
the evidence base
around the relationship between education/socio-economic

position and national and
ethnic identity, which has been subject to debate and different
findings across
studies. Second, we show how there is a clear shift across
immigrant generations in pat-
terns of identity acculturation, even given differences between
groups. Third, we show
how this strengthening of national identity over generations is
occurring in the context
of an apparent retreat among the majority population from an
overarching national
identification. While this may in some part be due to the
specific context of devolution
in the UK, it indicates the broader need to reconsider national
identification as a
straightforward marker of cohesion (Reeskins and Wright 2013),
and instead to
debate how it is ‘owned’ across populations.
Acknowledgements
We are grateful to Simon Burgess, Stephen Jivraj, Stephanie
McFall and Ayse Uskul for helpful
comments on an earlier draft. We would also like to thank
participants at the BSPS September
2013 conference, Swansea, the Norface Migration Conference,
Berlin 2013, the Research
Methods Festival, Oxford 2012, and seminars at INED, Paris,
2013, Institute of Education,
London 2012 for their feedback on earlier versions of the paper.
Finally, we would like to

acknowledge the valuable comments and suggestions from two
anonymous referees and the
journal editor.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Supplemental data
Supplemental data for this article can be accessed at
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2015.
1077986.
Notes
1. More detailed information on the construction of this variable
is available on request.
2. Given the focus on those who identified as White majority,
the number born outside the UK
was relatively small, around 2% of this sample.
3. We tried an alternative definition of strong and weak
identification: using scores of 6 and
above on the 11-point scale to represent strong identification.
More than 50% of individuals
choose scores that are greater than the mid-point of the scale
and, as a result, when we used
this alternative definition, the number of people categorised as
having a strong identification
with their parents’ ethnic group increased by 11 percentage
points and those having a strong
identification with British identity increased by 17 percentage
points. The resulting distribution
of acculturation identities according to Berry’s framework is
shown in the supplemental material
(Appendix: Figure A1). While using this alternative definition

may be beneficial for future inter-
national comparisons based on identity ratings, it does not have
the nice interpretation of the
median cut-off for this paper, which illustrates how far from a
random distribution of responses,
respondents’ identity choices are.
4. We also interact this with an ethnic minority dummy variable
and find that both this result
holds for both the White majority and ethnic minorities; but the
difference across educational
groups (tertiary vs others) is higher among the White majority
than ethnic minorities (see
Appendix: Table A2).
5. Results based on the model using the alternative definition of
strength of identification
showed that the pattern remained almost the same, even though
the exact proportions
differed (see Appendix: Table A3). An exception was that the
probability of choosing a
marginalized identity vis-a-vis a separated identity did not
differ across different political
affiliations.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2015.1077986
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2015.1077986
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ALITA NANDI is Research Fellow in the Institute for Social
and Economic Research
at Essex University.
ADDRESS: ISER, University of Essex, Wivenhoe Park,
Colchester CO4 4SQ, UK.
Email: [email protected]
LUCINDA PLATT is Professor in the Department of Social

Policy at the LSE.
ADDRESS: Department of Social Policy, London School of
Economics and Political
Science, Houghton Street, London, WC2A 2AE, UK.
Email: [email protected]
mailto:[email protected]
mailto:[email protected]AbstractIntroductionBackgroundData
and measuresDataDependent variables: British, ethnic and
national identityIndependent variablesOther
covariatesAnalytical approachMinority ethnic identity and
acculturationMajority population and identity
acculturationSummary and
conclusionsAcknowledgementsDisclosure
statementSupplemental dataNotesReferences

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