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Yandex reward program
ONsec experience

DEFCON Russia, DCG-7812
21/02/2013 Saint-Petersburg, Yandex
History of Yandex rewards
● 2011, October - November: Yandex's Month
  of Security Bugs
● Prizes:
  ○ 1-st @d0znpp (@ONsec_Lab)
  ○ 2-nd @ASintsov
  ○ 3-rd @kyprizel (now in Yandex team)
History of Yandex rewards
● 2011, October - November: Yandex's Month
  of Security Bugs
● Bugs:
  ○ 1-st Massive XXE
  ○ 2-nd Auth bypass at mail service
  ○ 3-rd CSRF/XSS collection at auth system
What about now?

● Bug bounty program every time
● http://company.yandex.com/security/
● From $100 (A06,10) to $1000 (A01) per bug
● OWASP Top-10 based rating
@ONsec_Lab bugs stats
Only server-side - only hardcode!!!
● 20 bugs accepted
● 1 reject as a double
● 11 qualified bugs
● 9 bugs at progress
● 240'000 rub approved, 80'000 paid rewards
● 21'818 rub per bug average ($715)
What about bugs?

All our bugs are server-side:
● XXE against - nothing interesting
● Memcached injections through SSRF
● Nice "RCE" story
● Great SSRFs for HITB2013AMS (not now)
Memcached injection
through SSRF
● All theory described at our ZeroNights
    report: www.slideshare.net/d0znpp/ssrf-attacks-and-sockets-smorgasbord-of-
    vulnerabilities

● Find possibility to write in sockets:
ANYPREFIXnyoudatanANYPOSTFIX
●   Write it to localhost 11211 port - easy!
Memcached injection
through SSRF
Nice "RCE" story: stages
●   Determine target
●   Find information leaks
●   Find vulns
●   Find SSRF to exploit vulns
●   Exploit vuln through SSRF
Determine target

●   Have connections from anywhere in
    infrastructure
●   Have information about all infrastructure
●   Monitoring system!
Find information leaks
●   Use Yandex to hack Yandex:




●   This presentation contain info about Zabbix
Find information leaks
●   Use Google to hack Yandex:




              ●   This ticket contained intranet
                  host of Zabbix in Yandex
Find vulns in Zabbix
●   Zabbix RCE vulnerability were found
●   Presented at ZeroNights 0day show
Find SSRF and exploit it!
●   SSRF attack from host which can establish
    connections to Zabbix host
●   SSRF restrictions to make exploitation
    possible
●   And...
Fail!
Not this time ;(
●   Our Zabbix RCE exploit doesn't work at
    Debian systems
●   Yandex's zabbix was based on Debian or
    manually configured
●   But we have come a long way and it is
    worth a look!
We did not give up!

●   More exploits and
    vulns later
●   Follow us at
    HITB2013AMS
???
@ONsec_Lab [http://lab.ONsec.ru]
@d0znpp

d0znpp@onsec.ru

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Yandex rewards. ONsec experience

  • 1. Yandex reward program ONsec experience DEFCON Russia, DCG-7812 21/02/2013 Saint-Petersburg, Yandex
  • 2. History of Yandex rewards ● 2011, October - November: Yandex's Month of Security Bugs ● Prizes: ○ 1-st @d0znpp (@ONsec_Lab) ○ 2-nd @ASintsov ○ 3-rd @kyprizel (now in Yandex team)
  • 3. History of Yandex rewards ● 2011, October - November: Yandex's Month of Security Bugs ● Bugs: ○ 1-st Massive XXE ○ 2-nd Auth bypass at mail service ○ 3-rd CSRF/XSS collection at auth system
  • 4. What about now? ● Bug bounty program every time ● http://company.yandex.com/security/ ● From $100 (A06,10) to $1000 (A01) per bug ● OWASP Top-10 based rating
  • 5. @ONsec_Lab bugs stats Only server-side - only hardcode!!! ● 20 bugs accepted ● 1 reject as a double ● 11 qualified bugs ● 9 bugs at progress ● 240'000 rub approved, 80'000 paid rewards ● 21'818 rub per bug average ($715)
  • 6. What about bugs? All our bugs are server-side: ● XXE against - nothing interesting ● Memcached injections through SSRF ● Nice "RCE" story ● Great SSRFs for HITB2013AMS (not now)
  • 7. Memcached injection through SSRF ● All theory described at our ZeroNights report: www.slideshare.net/d0znpp/ssrf-attacks-and-sockets-smorgasbord-of- vulnerabilities ● Find possibility to write in sockets: ANYPREFIXnyoudatanANYPOSTFIX ● Write it to localhost 11211 port - easy!
  • 9. Nice "RCE" story: stages ● Determine target ● Find information leaks ● Find vulns ● Find SSRF to exploit vulns ● Exploit vuln through SSRF
  • 10. Determine target ● Have connections from anywhere in infrastructure ● Have information about all infrastructure ● Monitoring system!
  • 11. Find information leaks ● Use Yandex to hack Yandex: ● This presentation contain info about Zabbix
  • 12. Find information leaks ● Use Google to hack Yandex: ● This ticket contained intranet host of Zabbix in Yandex
  • 13. Find vulns in Zabbix ● Zabbix RCE vulnerability were found ● Presented at ZeroNights 0day show
  • 14. Find SSRF and exploit it! ● SSRF attack from host which can establish connections to Zabbix host ● SSRF restrictions to make exploitation possible ● And...
  • 15. Fail!
  • 16. Not this time ;( ● Our Zabbix RCE exploit doesn't work at Debian systems ● Yandex's zabbix was based on Debian or manually configured ● But we have come a long way and it is worth a look!
  • 17. We did not give up! ● More exploits and vulns later ● Follow us at HITB2013AMS