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EMBEDDING REGULATORY
POLICY IN LAW AND
PRACTICE
7th
OECD Meeting
on Measuring Regulatory
Performance
POLICY FINDINGS AND WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS
Reykjavik, Iceland
18-19 June 2015
For more details:
www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/measuring-regulatory-performance.htm
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INTRODUCTION
1. On 18-19 June 2015, the 7th expert meeting on Measuring Regulatory Performance brought
together around 60 participants from 22 countries. These included delegates to the Regulatory Policy
Committee (RPC) from OECD member and non-member countries, OECD officials, the Business and
Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC), as well as academics and experts from the field of regulatory
policy. It was chaired by Professor Gary Banks, Chair of the OECD Regulatory Policy Committee and
Dean of the Australia and New Zealand School of Government. This was the seventh in a series of expert
meetings hosted by OECD countries that focuses on a substantive regulatory policy issue of concern to
OECD countries.
2. According to the 2012 Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance,
OECD member countries have agreed to adhere to principles of open government and evidence-based
policy-making. Regulatory policy, alongside the ability to tax and spend is the key method by which
governments are able to make a positive difference to the lives of their citizens and improve social welfare.
While most OECD countries now have an explicit published regulatory policy and formal requirements in
place for key practices of regulatory policy such as Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) and consultation,
significant challenges in the consistent implementation of regulatory policy in practice remain (OECD,
forthcoming). This meeting aimed to identify these challenges and the practices that can help ensure that
regulatory policy is embedded in both law and practice.
3. Mr. Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Iceland, opened the
meeting with a keynote speech, followed by opening remarks by Luiz de Mello, Deputy Director of the
OECD Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate. Subsequently, Gary Banks shared
some reflections on the sustainability of regulatory policy, and Tony Prosser, Professor of Public Law at
the University of Bristol, gave a presentation on the options to embed regulatory policy in law. The first
part of the workshop was concluded by a panel discussion with representatives from OECD countries,
BIAC, and the OECD Secretariat, moderated by Luiz de Mello. In a closed-door workshop, OECD
delegates and experts then worked together to identify ways to measure the implementation of regulatory
policy in practice.
4. The Secretariat would like to thank Prime Minister Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson and express
their gratitude to the Icelandic Government and the Prime Minister’s Office for hosting the workshop. The
Secretariat would like to thank the Steering Group on Measuring Regulatory Performance for their
invaluable support in the preparation of the workshop. The OECD Secretariat would especially like to
thank Mr. Páll Thórhallsson, Director-General of the Prime Minister´s Office for the excellent co-operation
in the organisation of the workshop.
Keynote speech by Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, Prime Minister of the Republic of Iceland
5. Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson welcomed participants to the workshop. The Prime Minister
described the importance of a strong regulatory system and identified the successful implementation of
regulatory policy as a ‘top priority’. He mentioned several mechanisms which help ensure regulation
achieves better outcomes for the economy and society. First, a clear rule not to increase the regulatory
burden may foster transparency in regulatory proposals. Second, targeted projects can help simplifying
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regulation in selected fields, e.g. tourism. Third, one stop shops may lift regulatory burdens for businesses
and thus benefit the overall economy. Finally the Prime minister emphasized the need to explore new ways
of consultation that go beyond traditional parliamentary hearings and that take place before a regulation is
being tabled in parliament.
6. The Prime Minister described the potential danger of focusing only on introducing further
regulation rather than reviewing existing regulation, and increasing the cost of administrative burdens. He
highlighted the risk of losing oversight of the regulatory process. He also spoke of the importance of good
relations between parliament and government for implementing regulatory policy. Strengthening the
relationship between parliament and the executive can make the process more open and democratic. To
ensure both democratic legitimacy and efficiency of the public administration, the parliament should focus
on giving the broad political direction while the administration focuses on policy detail.
Opening remarks by Luiz de Mello, Deputy Director, OECD Public Governance and Territorial
Development Directorate
7. The opening remarks described the progress made by OECD countries in their efforts to improve
regulatory quality through the systematic adoption of the principles and tools of regulatory policy. The
forthcoming OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2015 demonstrates that most countries have an explicit
published regulatory policy; there remains however a gap between what countries commit to do by law and
what they do in practice. Embedding regulatory policy in law and statutory requirements encourages its
systematic adoption across the whole of government. It can also help insulate regulatory policy
requirements from being inconsistently applied over time. However, there is no blue print or a model legal
text to embed regulatory policies into law.
8. The persisting gap between formal requirements and actual practice may be addressed in
different ways. First, continuous high-level policy commitment is crucial in ensuring consistent
implementation of regulatory policy as political attention might shift away. Also, the key institutional
actors – the executive and parliament – need to be engaged in regulatory reform. Yet, while key practices
such as RIA and consultation are now well-established in the executive, there is an untapped potential for
parliament to promote regulatory reform and enhance the quality of regulations. In addition publically
available reports, indicators and statistics can help demonstrate to the public whether commitments are
being met, identify areas for improvement and inform subsequent reforms. According to the recent OECD
2014 Regulatory Indicators Survey there is still progress to be made in this area, for example the majority
of countries still do not regularly publish reports on the performance of RIA systems, and only one country
reported regularly publishing performance reports on consultation practices.
Reflections on sustainability of regulatory policy, Gary Banks, Chair of the OECD Regulatory Policy
Committee and Dean of the Australia and New Zealand School of Government, Australia
9. Gary Banks highlighted the importance of good regulation which is one of the three key tools
alongside fiscal and monetary policy at the disposal of governments to strengthen economic development
and social wellbeing. Good regulation improves the performance of economic productivity which directly
impacts a country’s standards of living. Implementing rigorous evidence-based processes of development
and oversight mechanisms help ensure high regulatory quality is maintained.
10. The speech set out the three factors for success of regulatory policy: design, implementation, and
the link to better outcomes. First, a good design presupposes that key elements of process and governance
across the whole of the regulatory cycle (decision – design – delivery – review) are covered and that the
regulatory policy is clear and administrable from the regulators’ perspective. The review of regulation
often does not get the same amount of attention as the development of new regulation despite the fact that
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the stock of regulations is many times bigger than the flow of new regulation. Ongoing review processes
ensure the existing stock of regulation is still performing effectively. Strong feedback mechanisms between
those who regulate and those who are regulated allows modifications either in the regulations or the
process of delivery. It can be the case that the method of implementing a regulation can be as important as
the quality of regulation itself.
11. Second, there needs to be coherence between requirements and practice i.e. requirements for
regulatory policy need to be actually followed in practice. Third, a successful regulatory policy can be
expected to deliver better outcomes (the ‘endgame’). It is important to judge the success of the regulatory
policy in achieving these outcomes, including the level of compliance achieved, i.e. whether the
regulations are followed in practice.
12. Sustainability is a potential issue for regulatory policy for different reasons. As cycles of
enthusiasm and indifference are commonplace, interest in regulatory reform might fade after some initial
progress. In addition, the ‘natural forces’ of government militate against sustained good practice:
governments are exposed to pressure to ‘act first, ask questions later’; bureaucrats involved in the existing
regime may not want to see it changed and preserve the power of the status quo; in the absence of
commitment and strong will of compliance procedures may be ignored.
13. Sustainability of regulatory policy can only be ensured if certain preconditions are in place. The
recognition by government – at political as well as at the bureaucratic level – that good process matters is
essential. However, ‘failsafe’ systems are needed too, which entrench good intentions in regulatory
practice and constrain the ‘regulatory reflex’. Rules, incentives and sanctions, and transparency (oversight
and reporting) complement each other in achieving this.
14. The key mechanisms governments can consider are:
 Rules – of varying formality and prescriptiveness – may be introduced at different levels. This
can include published policies, e.g. including the policy in an election mandate, administrative
codes on ‘best/better practice’, legislation specifying procedures and institutions, or a
constitutional provision.
 Supporting institutions including: ministerial responsibility for regulatory reform (ideally placed
at Cabinet level), default systems such as post-implementation reviews and ‘sunsetting’ clauses;
and oversight bodies involved in the scrutiny of new regulation (flow) and reporting on existing
regulation (stock); and oversight bodies which can focus on both process and impacts.
15. Finally, leadership is needed to drive improvements and remains the key to ‘sustainability’ of
regulatory policy. Whilst prescribed processes and institutions are essential, sustainability depends also on
the spirit in which requirements are implemented. In this view ‘culture’ can be as important to behaviour
as rules. Culture itself is as much a function of history as of institutions and leadership.
Options to embed regulatory policy in law - an academic perspective, Tony Prosser, Professor of
Public Law, University of Bristol
16. Tony Prosser focussed on the most appropriate institutions for a transparent, open and responsive
design of regulatory governance. He also reminded the audience that nowadays, alongside domestic
institutions, international obligations such as EU legislation, trade treaties or OECD recommendations
have a prominent role in shaping the regulatory environment.
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17. Calling for a ‘360⁰ accountability’, Professor Prosser argued that the most important task is to
clarify the roles of different institutional actors in order to curb the danger of incoherence and identified
potential roles and limitations of the following key institutions including:
 Legislation – Legislation may be used to create procedural principles for rule making or to set
basic administrative standards for regulators. However, as legislation is likely to be the result of
compromise, it might not lead to unambiguous regulatory duties and force regulators to decide on
the balance of competing goals (e.g. competition and sustainability). Also, a credible
commitment is unrealistic in a democracy because values and ideas are likely to evolve. Finally
legislation is difficult to change as parliamentary time is scarce and it is subject to executive
dominance where ministers have the power to repeal statutes by ministerial order.
 Parliament – Parliament may play a prominent role in reviewing regulations ex post through the
work done by parliamentary committees. In addition, parliamentary bodies such as the UK’s
National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee provide audit and value for money
analysis, while in some countries this is done by semi-judicial institutions such as the French
Cour des Comptes). Yet, the weakness of legislative scrutiny due to party discipline and a lack of
expertise in a politicised process may be limitations for the involvement of Parliament.
 Executive – The executive has strong financial and political incentives, especially at times of
budgetary constraints, to seek cheaper regulation Centrally operating bodies within the executive
and independent commissions may act here as regulators of regulatory principles or process.
There is a risk different institutions can fail to communicate with each other and, it may be
possible to easily bypass procedural requirements.
 Courts – The courts play an increasingly important role in policing legislation, especially where
rights are concerned. While courts have the advantage of a public process, they might not be user
friendly and delays might induce additional costs. In addition, courts might lack economic
expertise and in public administration.
18. Finally, while institutional design and incentives are crucial, shaping the regulatory culture is
equally important. It was suggested in the subsequent discussion members of parliaments might have a
preference to protect political independence and thus have no desire for experts.
Panel discussion: Sustainable regulatory policy: from law to practice
Moderator: Luiz de Mello, Deputy Director, Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate,
OECD
19. The panel discussion identified ways to sustain high-level policy commitment and ensure
regulatory policy is implemented in practice. It discussed the importance of systematically collecting
evidence to track progress in implementing regulatory policy and to identify areas for reform, and explored
the role that parliaments may play in improving regulatory policy.
20. While most OECD countries have published an explicit regulatory policy and adopted formal
requirements for the use of key regulatory policy tools, there is a gap between countries’ general
commitment to regulatory policy and its implementation in practice. Regulatory processes can be neglected
or occur too late in the decision-making process to have a substantial impact. Regulatory policy is not
currently a topic of great public interest in many countries and thus can be less of a priority for political
decision makers. Therefore, in addition to improving transparency, accessibility and engagement with
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stakeholders in the development of specific regulations, countries should aim to improve transparency and
public understanding of the overall regulatory framework.
21. A cultural change in the perception by responsible administrations of the importance of
regulatory policy, as well as hands-on guidance on the implementation of formal requirements, is essential
for improving the implementation of regulatory policy. One of the key steps towards this culture change is
communicating to the public why regulatory policy is an important issue. Information needs to be put
forward in a way that the public and business understand it.
22. The panellists also highlighted the value of a proportionate approach with regards to
requirements and discussed provisions for flexibility in case of emergency in order to ensure regulatory
policy is implemented in an efficient way. A ‘triage’ by level of expected impacts might help direct
resources where they are used most efficiently and prevent regulatory policy from being perceived as an
additional burden. Emergency procedures could potentially provide flexibility to bypass certain
requirements in cases of emergency. However, to prevent misuse of such arrangements, it is important to
put in place strong systems of monitoring and review to allow these regulations to be revised thoroughly ex
post.
23. To sustain commitment for regulatory policy, it is important to collect information on existing
practices to be able to track progress and monitor the impact of regulations and regulatory policy. If it can
be demonstrated that regulatory policy is helping to render regulations more effective and efficient, this
will generate sustained attention of the public and elected politicians. Building an evidence base on the
performance of regulatory policy is also useful for the public to hold governments accountable for their
actions, and sends important signals to markets and investors, which helps to enhance their trust in the
regulatory framework. Panellists pointed to several kinds of evidence and ways to collect information that
may be useful to track the systematic implementation of regulatory policy. Although some evidence
already exists, available information currently remains scattered and most governments do not seem to
systematically collect data on their use of regulatory policy tools.
24. Panellists emphasised the importance of collecting information on the inputs and design of
regulatory policy to understand where needs are and to inform stakeholders about governments’ efforts.
Regular reports and score cards on existing regulatory policy practices may help to maintain momentum;
however while this seems to work well for efforts on administrative burden reduction, few countries
monitor efforts in other fields such as reviewing individual regulations. Cross-country comparisons like
those done by the OECD were also cited as helpful to take stock of which practices work well and which
do not.
25. Data on the strategic outcomes of regulation is also very useful to evaluate whether the
implementation of regulatory policies is being done in an effective manner, but much more difficult to
obtain. When reviewing the outcomes of regulation this should include assessing the benefits and costs of
regulation, as well as their unintended consequences to understand how effective regulations are. Panellists
suggested that governments could work together with those affected by regulation to gather information,
and that the OECD could play a role in providing guidelines on how to collect information on the
implementation of regulatory policy.
26. Finally, panellists discussed the role of parliaments in embedding regulatory policy in law and
practice. Panellists considered that parliament and the executive tend to work separately due to political
resistance and called for stronger co-operation to achieve better policy outcomes. At the same time, the
independence of parliament should be ensured. Parliaments already play a role in regulatory policy in some
countries, e.g. studying the implementation of regulation and consulting with stakeholders. Co-operation in
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the area of stakeholder engagement may be particularly useful, as the information provided in the
consultation process is equally relevant for parliament and the executive.
Tracking progress in implementing regulatory policy
27. Measuring the implementation of regulatory policy is useful to evaluate if regulatory policy is
implemented effectively and if reforms have the desired impact, to target scarce resources to those reforms
that result in the greatest improvements, and to generate the political support needed to implement
regulatory policy reforms by showing that they are a valuable long-term investment. While in most OECD
countries, the formal requirements for key tools of regulatory policy are in place, few countries
systematically monitor the implementation of these tools. For instance, according to the OECD Framework
for Regulatory Policy Evaluation (2014), only 8 OECD countries publish performance reports on
consultation on draft regulations and only 4 on the ex post analysis of existing regulations while 20 OECD
countries publish such reports on their RIA system. These reports tend to be published ad-hoc rather than
on a regular basis, and few indicators on the performance of regulatory policy exist in OECD countries.
28. Three breakout sessions helped identify which evidence is needed to systematically track
progress in implementing regulatory policy, as well as the benefits and challenges of collecting and using
this information in the areas of RIA, stakeholder engagement and ex post evaluation respectively. Results
of the breakout sessions were shared subsequently in a plenary session that discussed commonalities across
the three areas in which data may be useful to collect, the challenges in collecting this data, and who would
be suitable actors to collect data on the implementation of regulatory policy.
29. Workshop participants identified various challenges to collect and review information on the
implementation of regulatory policy. The collection of data is often hampered by a lack of resources
available, the absence of clearly assigned responsibilities for regulatory policy, and a lack of understanding
about the elements of regulatory policy to be implemented. In addition, there may be technical difficulties,
for example a lack of suitable indicators to measure implementation. In order to ensure that data is
collected as efficiently and as easily as possible, participants emphasised that the effort necessary to collect
evidence on the implementation of regulatory policy should be proportional to its utility.
30. Participants discussed which bodies should collect and analyse data on the implementation of
regulatory policy. As ministries and regulatory agencies are the agents that implement regulatory policy in
practice in their daily work, it may be comparatively easy for them to gather this data without exorbitant
effort. Some public officials, however, might perceive the obligation to collect data on their activities in the
field of regulatory policy as additional administrative burden. A central body with a degree of
independence from the government and with enough resources and competences to perform its task could
review the data from an outside perspective, and ensure that information is processed and analysed
accurately and consistently. National audit offices, statistical offices, and the central government were
named as potentially suitable bodies for undertaking such work. At the same time, participants underlined
that the detailed governance arrangements for a body to collect and analyse evidence on the
implementation of regulatory policy needs to be adapted to the country-specific context to work effectively
and efficiently.
31. Most countries with experience in evaluating the implementation of regulatory policy focus on
process and output indicators, such as the level of compliance with formal requirements. Participants
indicated that it would be desirable to also take into account some outcome indicators that measure the
impact of regulatory policy. Outcome indicators, however, are usually very difficult to measure.
Participants suggested that a solution to this dilemma may lie in focusing on intermediate outcome
indicators, for example by using perception surveys on the usefulness or quality of regulatory policy.
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32. If an analysis of the implementation of regulatory policy is likely to show up existing gaps in
government performance in the area of regulatory policy, this may result in some additional political
obstacles to introducing the systematic collection and review of information. Countries should consider
how to overcome these obstacles and retain political support for review.
Improving evidence based policy making through RIA
33. RIA is a powerful tool to support evidence-based policy. Its use could be enhanced. There are
several benefits to collecting information on both the design and implementation of the RIA system as well
as the outcomes. Measuring the design and implementation can demonstrate whether processes are being
conducted correctly, which improves transparency and accountability. This can help build trust both
between regulators and citizens and also between the executive and parliament. Monitoring the level of
implementation can also contribute to change in the working culture and act as a mechanism for
enforcement. Collecting information on the effectiveness of a RIA system helps establish whether it is
working, whether it justifies the resources spent on it and whether changes need to be made.
34. Participants suggested that the OECD Framework for Regulatory Policy Evaluation (2014)
provides a good starting point for helping organise different areas of information, making the distinction
between information regarding the design of regulatory policies, its implementation and the outcomes. It
was agreed that the forthcoming composite indicators on RIA would provide valuable information
regarding design and implementation. In addition a number of countries were already collecting and
publishing information on the number of RIAs actually performed. There was however a significant gap
regarding the measurement and linking of outcomes to the implementation of processes, the most
important of which was identified as ‘whether the presence of high-quality impact assessments has
improved the quality of regulations’.
35. It was also noted that countries are at different stages in developing their regulatory systems and
need to consider what their priorities for monitoring are given limited resources. Participants suggested that
countries may want to build up their monitoring framework on a step by step basis.
36. A number of challenges were identified, the first being finding the resources to collect
information. Central databases and IT solutions can help log when a RIA is started or completed making it
easier to keep track of the total number of RIAs. The second challenge is ensuring the information
collected is of good quality, for example is it reliable, does it provide sufficient detail, e.g. has a RIA been
fully completed. The final challenge is engagement fatigue, if governments are asking their departments to
collect this information, they must be able to provide a clear explanation of how this information will be
used, and the benefit of the resulting analysis.
Supporting open regulatory policy
37. Collecting and evaluating information on stakeholder engagement does not only help to increase
the effectiveness of existing practices and to guide reforms, but it also enhances the transparency and
accountability of the administration’s efforts to involve stakeholders and thereby reinforces trust in
government. Collecting information on the implementation of stakeholder engagement is furthermore an
important means to support the inclusiveness of regulatory practices, since it provides an opportunity to
check if all those affected by regulation have been consulted adequately or not.
38. Participants expressed some doubts on the usefulness of quantitative indicators for analysing the
implementation of stakeholder engagement. Their statistical validity and practical relevance may be
questionable, as for example a high number of comments received during a consultation does not imply
that all comments received were helpful for improving the quality of the regulation, and a great number of
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changes in the regulatory draft that are based on stakeholders’ comments may signify a low quality of the
original proposal rather than great utility of the inputs received. Qualitative indicators, e.g. on how the
feedback received from stakeholders has been put to use, on the other hand, may contribute to the
accountability and effectiveness of consultations.
39. Participants of the breakout session highlighted the following challenges to collecting and
analysing evidence on the implementation of stakeholder engagement: While in some countries obligations
existed for reporting on stakeholder engagement activities, information is mostly collected in disaggregated
forms, i.e. reports are published individually by ministries or regulating agencies, but not consistently for
the whole government. Secondly, some stakeholders may wish not to take part in a consultation, e.g. due to
a lack of knowledge or interest, making it difficult to interpret information on stakeholder engagement
adequately.
Closing the regulatory governance cycle through ex post evaluation
40. All regulations are “experiments” and many will not have been done well. Given that the stock of
regulation is much larger than the flow, the net gains from reforming it are potentially very large. For
example, it was reported that regulatory reforms in Australia to the stock from 1980-90s led to a gain in
GDP by 5%. Yet there is not a single approach to ex post evaluation. Policy-makers have a broad range of
approaches at their disposal including ad-hoc reviews, programmed reviews such as sunsetting and
ongoing management such as one-in one out rules. Collecting information on their functioning can help
identify which methods are most cost-effective and inform decisions and policy makers on impacts, costs
and benefits (see for example Productivity Commission, 2011).
41. Evaluating the ex post evaluation system per se helps to understand whether the ex post
evaluation system is well designed in principle, being properly utilized in practice (e.g. have evaluations
actually been conducted and with due process?) and has had an impact (e.g. changes in regulation’s
benefits and costs, changes in volume of regulation). It provides feedback for better regulation and laws
and better regulators and increases buy-in from stakeholders. The OECD Framework for Regulatory Policy
Evaluation (2014) provides an overview of evaluations of the functioning of the ex-post analysis system in
OECD countries. For example, the European Commission has evaluated its ex post evaluation system
drawing upon a consultation with stakeholders and makes recommendations on how to improve it
(European Commission, 2013).
42. Evaluation of the system requires data and statistical information. Statistics and information that
should be available include i) the number of ex post evaluations undertaken by type, depth and chosen
approach, ii) the cost and time of doing reviews and iii) information on compliance with requirements for
ex post evaluation, e.g. has there been an evaluation of the following: appropriate (valid rationale for
regulating?), effective (realised the intended outcome?), efficient (any unnecessary costs or impacts?) and
alternative (is there a better alternative?). In addition, information should be available on iv) lessons learnt
(information, consequences and impact of ex post evaluations), v) timing of ex post evaluation and vi)
comparison of ex ante RIA and ex post RIA including the objectives (are objectives still valid? Have
targets been met?).
43. A “tick a box” monitoring and central storage of data based on the following questions was
suggested to systematically collect information: Have evaluations actually been conducted when they
should? Were they adequately resourced? Were the reviewers appropriate? Was due process (including
consultation) followed? Evidence may also be collected from individual evaluations to provide information
on changes in regulations’ benefits and costs as a result of ex post evaluations.
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44. Collecting data and information enables oversight and has the potential to change politics. At the
same time, there are a number of challenges: Collecting data can be extra work and there might be
evaluation fatigues. It is therefore necessary to ensure the value added and use of the information and to
clearly identify which data is really needed. Countries also need to decide who collects the information,
who evaluates it and who has oversight of the progress. The degree and nature of independence of the
institutional setting may strongly influence the quality and impact of results. Furthermore, it may not be
straightforward to evaluate whether the toolkit or approach used is the correct one and identify which mix
of approaches and tools is the best combination.
45. Participants concluded that the ex post analysis system as a whole should be reviewed
periodically. Evaluation should be regularly conducted independent of the political process, with
appropriate independence and expertise. Results should be transparent and publicly available.
Communicating the benefits of regulatory policy
46. The importance of being aware of the different reasons to communicate was highlighted. For
governments, communication is the basis for accountability, transparency and participation, and thus a key
element for democratic legitimation. However, governments also communicate in order to reach specific
outcomes in form of knowledge, action or interaction.
47. When formulating the message it is crucial to bear in mind the different types of audiences that
are important for our work. These may include political decision makers and parliamentarians, the general
public, the business community or interested journalists. Different types of information are relevant for
each of these and the message needs to be adapted accordingly. When communicating the benefits of
regulatory policy, it is useful to link the achievements to real-life impacts for the respective addressees
rather than elaborating solely on the evaluation of regulatory practice implementation.
48. It was emphasised that it is important to convey the message in an appealing and concise fashion.
The use of simple and short messages makes it easier to communicate success and challenges to political
decision makers and the general public. It has been suggested that the use of country profiles in the
Regulatory Policy Outlook and available online can play a major role in this. In addition, different types of
statistics may be useful in order to provide evidence for the message.
49. Finally, it was also pointed to the choice of the sender of the message, which can potentially
increase the credibility. In the context of communicating regulatory policy, the sender could be the minister
in charge, the national statistical office or the OECD itself.
Key conclusions
50. The workshop discussions highlighted the importance of embedding regulatory policy both in
law and in practice. Whilst the first stages of regulatory reform have now been largely completed in OECD
countries by adopting an explicit regulatory policy, there is a persisting gap in implementing these formal
requirements. Yet, the success of regulatory policy and link to better policy outcomes depends on
implementation.
51. Measuring the implementation of regulatory policy may be a useful way of ensuring formal
requirements are consistently implemented in practice. Both process and output indicators (e.g. on the level
of compliance with formal requirements) as well as intermediate outcome indicators (e.g. by using
perception surveys) could be used to measure the success of implementation. The participants stressed that
both ministries and central oversight bodies with a certain degree of independence need to be involved in
the process of collecting the required data. The use of central databases and IT solutions may facilitate this
process. In addition, making findings of the performance indicators publically available in a report is also a
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means of strengthening transparency and communicating progress. It was suggested the OECD give
guidance on how to collect information on the implementation of regulatory policy.
52. The workshop also emphasised the importance of an appropriate institutional design as a
prerequisite for successfully embedding regulatory policy in law and in practice. Whilst there is no silver
bullet with regards to the specific institutional settings, it is crucial that the roles of different institutional
actors be clearly specified in order to achieve coherent implementation of regulatory practices. The
discussions have also shown that there is much potential for the role that parliaments can play in regulatory
reform. Generally, the co-operation between the executive and parliament on regulatory reform needs to be
strengthened to achieve better policy outcomes. Finally, in addition to the appropriate institutional set up,
speakers stressed the need for a change of culture within public administration in order to make sure
requirements are implemented in good spirit.
Closing remarks
53. The Chair and Secretariat thanked the Icelandic government for their excellent organisation of
the meeting and their hospitality. The workshop proved to be extremely useful with a good mix of concrete
and academic discussions and the OECD Secretariat is very thankful to all those who presented or took
part in the panel discussions.
54. The OECD Secretariat is looking forward to planning the 8th expert meeting on Measuring
Regulatory Performance which will take place in the course of 2016 and would be grateful for volunteers
to host the meeting.
55. The Secretariat announced the launch of the flagship publication 2015 Regulatory Policy Outlook
at the OECD Public Governance Ministerial Meeting in Helsinki, 28 October 2015. The launch will be
accompanied by an official press release and other promotional material. Participants were invited to
provide concrete examples on the impact of regulatory policy to the Secretariat to communicate the
benefits of regulatory policy.
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REFERENCE LIST
 European Commission (2013), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament,
the Council, the European Social and Economic Committee and the Committee of the Regions:
Strengthening the foundations of Smart Regulation – improving evaluation, COM(2013) 686 final.
 OECD (forthcoming 2015), OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2015, OECD Publishing.
 OECD (2015), 2012 OECD Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and
Governance, OECD Publishing, Paris.
 Lunn, P. (2014), Regulatory Policy and Behavioural Economics, OECD Publishing.
 OECD (2014), OECD Framework for Regulatory Policy Evaluation, OECD Publishing.
 OECD (2014), International Regulatory Co-operation and International Organisations: The Cases
of the OECD and the IMO, OECD Publishing.
 OECD (2014), OECD Regulatory Compliance Cost Assessment Guidance, OECD Publishing.
 OECD (2014), OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy, OECD Publishing.
 OECD (2014), The Governance of Regulators, OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory
Policy, OECD Publishing.
 OECD (2013), International Regulatory Co-operation: Addressing Global Challenges, OECD
Publishing.
 OECD (2013), International Regulatory Co-operation: Case Studies, Vol. 1: Chemicals, Consumer
Products, Tax and Competition, OECD Publishing.
 Productivity Commission (2011), Identifying and Evaluating Regulation Reforms, Research
Report, Canberra.
The full agenda, discussion notes, list of participants, speaker profiles and workshop presentations are
available on the workshop website.
EMBEDDING REGULATORY
POLICY IN LAW AND
PRACTICE
7th
OECD Meeting
on Measuring Regulatory
Performance
POLICY FINDINGS AND WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS
Reykjavik, Iceland
18-19 June 2015
For more details:
www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/measuring-regulatory-performance.htm

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Workshop Proceedings: Embedding Regulatory Policy in Law and Practice

  • 1. EMBEDDING REGULATORY POLICY IN LAW AND PRACTICE 7th OECD Meeting on Measuring Regulatory Performance POLICY FINDINGS AND WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS Reykjavik, Iceland 18-19 June 2015 For more details: www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/measuring-regulatory-performance.htm
  • 2. 2 INTRODUCTION 1. On 18-19 June 2015, the 7th expert meeting on Measuring Regulatory Performance brought together around 60 participants from 22 countries. These included delegates to the Regulatory Policy Committee (RPC) from OECD member and non-member countries, OECD officials, the Business and Industry Advisory Committee (BIAC), as well as academics and experts from the field of regulatory policy. It was chaired by Professor Gary Banks, Chair of the OECD Regulatory Policy Committee and Dean of the Australia and New Zealand School of Government. This was the seventh in a series of expert meetings hosted by OECD countries that focuses on a substantive regulatory policy issue of concern to OECD countries. 2. According to the 2012 Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance, OECD member countries have agreed to adhere to principles of open government and evidence-based policy-making. Regulatory policy, alongside the ability to tax and spend is the key method by which governments are able to make a positive difference to the lives of their citizens and improve social welfare. While most OECD countries now have an explicit published regulatory policy and formal requirements in place for key practices of regulatory policy such as Regulatory Impact Analysis (RIA) and consultation, significant challenges in the consistent implementation of regulatory policy in practice remain (OECD, forthcoming). This meeting aimed to identify these challenges and the practices that can help ensure that regulatory policy is embedded in both law and practice. 3. Mr. Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Iceland, opened the meeting with a keynote speech, followed by opening remarks by Luiz de Mello, Deputy Director of the OECD Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate. Subsequently, Gary Banks shared some reflections on the sustainability of regulatory policy, and Tony Prosser, Professor of Public Law at the University of Bristol, gave a presentation on the options to embed regulatory policy in law. The first part of the workshop was concluded by a panel discussion with representatives from OECD countries, BIAC, and the OECD Secretariat, moderated by Luiz de Mello. In a closed-door workshop, OECD delegates and experts then worked together to identify ways to measure the implementation of regulatory policy in practice. 4. The Secretariat would like to thank Prime Minister Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson and express their gratitude to the Icelandic Government and the Prime Minister’s Office for hosting the workshop. The Secretariat would like to thank the Steering Group on Measuring Regulatory Performance for their invaluable support in the preparation of the workshop. The OECD Secretariat would especially like to thank Mr. Páll Thórhallsson, Director-General of the Prime Minister´s Office for the excellent co-operation in the organisation of the workshop. Keynote speech by Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson, Prime Minister of the Republic of Iceland 5. Sigmundur Davíð Gunnlaugsson welcomed participants to the workshop. The Prime Minister described the importance of a strong regulatory system and identified the successful implementation of regulatory policy as a ‘top priority’. He mentioned several mechanisms which help ensure regulation achieves better outcomes for the economy and society. First, a clear rule not to increase the regulatory burden may foster transparency in regulatory proposals. Second, targeted projects can help simplifying
  • 3. 3 regulation in selected fields, e.g. tourism. Third, one stop shops may lift regulatory burdens for businesses and thus benefit the overall economy. Finally the Prime minister emphasized the need to explore new ways of consultation that go beyond traditional parliamentary hearings and that take place before a regulation is being tabled in parliament. 6. The Prime Minister described the potential danger of focusing only on introducing further regulation rather than reviewing existing regulation, and increasing the cost of administrative burdens. He highlighted the risk of losing oversight of the regulatory process. He also spoke of the importance of good relations between parliament and government for implementing regulatory policy. Strengthening the relationship between parliament and the executive can make the process more open and democratic. To ensure both democratic legitimacy and efficiency of the public administration, the parliament should focus on giving the broad political direction while the administration focuses on policy detail. Opening remarks by Luiz de Mello, Deputy Director, OECD Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate 7. The opening remarks described the progress made by OECD countries in their efforts to improve regulatory quality through the systematic adoption of the principles and tools of regulatory policy. The forthcoming OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2015 demonstrates that most countries have an explicit published regulatory policy; there remains however a gap between what countries commit to do by law and what they do in practice. Embedding regulatory policy in law and statutory requirements encourages its systematic adoption across the whole of government. It can also help insulate regulatory policy requirements from being inconsistently applied over time. However, there is no blue print or a model legal text to embed regulatory policies into law. 8. The persisting gap between formal requirements and actual practice may be addressed in different ways. First, continuous high-level policy commitment is crucial in ensuring consistent implementation of regulatory policy as political attention might shift away. Also, the key institutional actors – the executive and parliament – need to be engaged in regulatory reform. Yet, while key practices such as RIA and consultation are now well-established in the executive, there is an untapped potential for parliament to promote regulatory reform and enhance the quality of regulations. In addition publically available reports, indicators and statistics can help demonstrate to the public whether commitments are being met, identify areas for improvement and inform subsequent reforms. According to the recent OECD 2014 Regulatory Indicators Survey there is still progress to be made in this area, for example the majority of countries still do not regularly publish reports on the performance of RIA systems, and only one country reported regularly publishing performance reports on consultation practices. Reflections on sustainability of regulatory policy, Gary Banks, Chair of the OECD Regulatory Policy Committee and Dean of the Australia and New Zealand School of Government, Australia 9. Gary Banks highlighted the importance of good regulation which is one of the three key tools alongside fiscal and monetary policy at the disposal of governments to strengthen economic development and social wellbeing. Good regulation improves the performance of economic productivity which directly impacts a country’s standards of living. Implementing rigorous evidence-based processes of development and oversight mechanisms help ensure high regulatory quality is maintained. 10. The speech set out the three factors for success of regulatory policy: design, implementation, and the link to better outcomes. First, a good design presupposes that key elements of process and governance across the whole of the regulatory cycle (decision – design – delivery – review) are covered and that the regulatory policy is clear and administrable from the regulators’ perspective. The review of regulation often does not get the same amount of attention as the development of new regulation despite the fact that
  • 4. 4 the stock of regulations is many times bigger than the flow of new regulation. Ongoing review processes ensure the existing stock of regulation is still performing effectively. Strong feedback mechanisms between those who regulate and those who are regulated allows modifications either in the regulations or the process of delivery. It can be the case that the method of implementing a regulation can be as important as the quality of regulation itself. 11. Second, there needs to be coherence between requirements and practice i.e. requirements for regulatory policy need to be actually followed in practice. Third, a successful regulatory policy can be expected to deliver better outcomes (the ‘endgame’). It is important to judge the success of the regulatory policy in achieving these outcomes, including the level of compliance achieved, i.e. whether the regulations are followed in practice. 12. Sustainability is a potential issue for regulatory policy for different reasons. As cycles of enthusiasm and indifference are commonplace, interest in regulatory reform might fade after some initial progress. In addition, the ‘natural forces’ of government militate against sustained good practice: governments are exposed to pressure to ‘act first, ask questions later’; bureaucrats involved in the existing regime may not want to see it changed and preserve the power of the status quo; in the absence of commitment and strong will of compliance procedures may be ignored. 13. Sustainability of regulatory policy can only be ensured if certain preconditions are in place. The recognition by government – at political as well as at the bureaucratic level – that good process matters is essential. However, ‘failsafe’ systems are needed too, which entrench good intentions in regulatory practice and constrain the ‘regulatory reflex’. Rules, incentives and sanctions, and transparency (oversight and reporting) complement each other in achieving this. 14. The key mechanisms governments can consider are:  Rules – of varying formality and prescriptiveness – may be introduced at different levels. This can include published policies, e.g. including the policy in an election mandate, administrative codes on ‘best/better practice’, legislation specifying procedures and institutions, or a constitutional provision.  Supporting institutions including: ministerial responsibility for regulatory reform (ideally placed at Cabinet level), default systems such as post-implementation reviews and ‘sunsetting’ clauses; and oversight bodies involved in the scrutiny of new regulation (flow) and reporting on existing regulation (stock); and oversight bodies which can focus on both process and impacts. 15. Finally, leadership is needed to drive improvements and remains the key to ‘sustainability’ of regulatory policy. Whilst prescribed processes and institutions are essential, sustainability depends also on the spirit in which requirements are implemented. In this view ‘culture’ can be as important to behaviour as rules. Culture itself is as much a function of history as of institutions and leadership. Options to embed regulatory policy in law - an academic perspective, Tony Prosser, Professor of Public Law, University of Bristol 16. Tony Prosser focussed on the most appropriate institutions for a transparent, open and responsive design of regulatory governance. He also reminded the audience that nowadays, alongside domestic institutions, international obligations such as EU legislation, trade treaties or OECD recommendations have a prominent role in shaping the regulatory environment.
  • 5. 5 17. Calling for a ‘360⁰ accountability’, Professor Prosser argued that the most important task is to clarify the roles of different institutional actors in order to curb the danger of incoherence and identified potential roles and limitations of the following key institutions including:  Legislation – Legislation may be used to create procedural principles for rule making or to set basic administrative standards for regulators. However, as legislation is likely to be the result of compromise, it might not lead to unambiguous regulatory duties and force regulators to decide on the balance of competing goals (e.g. competition and sustainability). Also, a credible commitment is unrealistic in a democracy because values and ideas are likely to evolve. Finally legislation is difficult to change as parliamentary time is scarce and it is subject to executive dominance where ministers have the power to repeal statutes by ministerial order.  Parliament – Parliament may play a prominent role in reviewing regulations ex post through the work done by parliamentary committees. In addition, parliamentary bodies such as the UK’s National Audit Office and the Public Accounts Committee provide audit and value for money analysis, while in some countries this is done by semi-judicial institutions such as the French Cour des Comptes). Yet, the weakness of legislative scrutiny due to party discipline and a lack of expertise in a politicised process may be limitations for the involvement of Parliament.  Executive – The executive has strong financial and political incentives, especially at times of budgetary constraints, to seek cheaper regulation Centrally operating bodies within the executive and independent commissions may act here as regulators of regulatory principles or process. There is a risk different institutions can fail to communicate with each other and, it may be possible to easily bypass procedural requirements.  Courts – The courts play an increasingly important role in policing legislation, especially where rights are concerned. While courts have the advantage of a public process, they might not be user friendly and delays might induce additional costs. In addition, courts might lack economic expertise and in public administration. 18. Finally, while institutional design and incentives are crucial, shaping the regulatory culture is equally important. It was suggested in the subsequent discussion members of parliaments might have a preference to protect political independence and thus have no desire for experts. Panel discussion: Sustainable regulatory policy: from law to practice Moderator: Luiz de Mello, Deputy Director, Public Governance and Territorial Development Directorate, OECD 19. The panel discussion identified ways to sustain high-level policy commitment and ensure regulatory policy is implemented in practice. It discussed the importance of systematically collecting evidence to track progress in implementing regulatory policy and to identify areas for reform, and explored the role that parliaments may play in improving regulatory policy. 20. While most OECD countries have published an explicit regulatory policy and adopted formal requirements for the use of key regulatory policy tools, there is a gap between countries’ general commitment to regulatory policy and its implementation in practice. Regulatory processes can be neglected or occur too late in the decision-making process to have a substantial impact. Regulatory policy is not currently a topic of great public interest in many countries and thus can be less of a priority for political decision makers. Therefore, in addition to improving transparency, accessibility and engagement with
  • 6. 6 stakeholders in the development of specific regulations, countries should aim to improve transparency and public understanding of the overall regulatory framework. 21. A cultural change in the perception by responsible administrations of the importance of regulatory policy, as well as hands-on guidance on the implementation of formal requirements, is essential for improving the implementation of regulatory policy. One of the key steps towards this culture change is communicating to the public why regulatory policy is an important issue. Information needs to be put forward in a way that the public and business understand it. 22. The panellists also highlighted the value of a proportionate approach with regards to requirements and discussed provisions for flexibility in case of emergency in order to ensure regulatory policy is implemented in an efficient way. A ‘triage’ by level of expected impacts might help direct resources where they are used most efficiently and prevent regulatory policy from being perceived as an additional burden. Emergency procedures could potentially provide flexibility to bypass certain requirements in cases of emergency. However, to prevent misuse of such arrangements, it is important to put in place strong systems of monitoring and review to allow these regulations to be revised thoroughly ex post. 23. To sustain commitment for regulatory policy, it is important to collect information on existing practices to be able to track progress and monitor the impact of regulations and regulatory policy. If it can be demonstrated that regulatory policy is helping to render regulations more effective and efficient, this will generate sustained attention of the public and elected politicians. Building an evidence base on the performance of regulatory policy is also useful for the public to hold governments accountable for their actions, and sends important signals to markets and investors, which helps to enhance their trust in the regulatory framework. Panellists pointed to several kinds of evidence and ways to collect information that may be useful to track the systematic implementation of regulatory policy. Although some evidence already exists, available information currently remains scattered and most governments do not seem to systematically collect data on their use of regulatory policy tools. 24. Panellists emphasised the importance of collecting information on the inputs and design of regulatory policy to understand where needs are and to inform stakeholders about governments’ efforts. Regular reports and score cards on existing regulatory policy practices may help to maintain momentum; however while this seems to work well for efforts on administrative burden reduction, few countries monitor efforts in other fields such as reviewing individual regulations. Cross-country comparisons like those done by the OECD were also cited as helpful to take stock of which practices work well and which do not. 25. Data on the strategic outcomes of regulation is also very useful to evaluate whether the implementation of regulatory policies is being done in an effective manner, but much more difficult to obtain. When reviewing the outcomes of regulation this should include assessing the benefits and costs of regulation, as well as their unintended consequences to understand how effective regulations are. Panellists suggested that governments could work together with those affected by regulation to gather information, and that the OECD could play a role in providing guidelines on how to collect information on the implementation of regulatory policy. 26. Finally, panellists discussed the role of parliaments in embedding regulatory policy in law and practice. Panellists considered that parliament and the executive tend to work separately due to political resistance and called for stronger co-operation to achieve better policy outcomes. At the same time, the independence of parliament should be ensured. Parliaments already play a role in regulatory policy in some countries, e.g. studying the implementation of regulation and consulting with stakeholders. Co-operation in
  • 7. 7 the area of stakeholder engagement may be particularly useful, as the information provided in the consultation process is equally relevant for parliament and the executive. Tracking progress in implementing regulatory policy 27. Measuring the implementation of regulatory policy is useful to evaluate if regulatory policy is implemented effectively and if reforms have the desired impact, to target scarce resources to those reforms that result in the greatest improvements, and to generate the political support needed to implement regulatory policy reforms by showing that they are a valuable long-term investment. While in most OECD countries, the formal requirements for key tools of regulatory policy are in place, few countries systematically monitor the implementation of these tools. For instance, according to the OECD Framework for Regulatory Policy Evaluation (2014), only 8 OECD countries publish performance reports on consultation on draft regulations and only 4 on the ex post analysis of existing regulations while 20 OECD countries publish such reports on their RIA system. These reports tend to be published ad-hoc rather than on a regular basis, and few indicators on the performance of regulatory policy exist in OECD countries. 28. Three breakout sessions helped identify which evidence is needed to systematically track progress in implementing regulatory policy, as well as the benefits and challenges of collecting and using this information in the areas of RIA, stakeholder engagement and ex post evaluation respectively. Results of the breakout sessions were shared subsequently in a plenary session that discussed commonalities across the three areas in which data may be useful to collect, the challenges in collecting this data, and who would be suitable actors to collect data on the implementation of regulatory policy. 29. Workshop participants identified various challenges to collect and review information on the implementation of regulatory policy. The collection of data is often hampered by a lack of resources available, the absence of clearly assigned responsibilities for regulatory policy, and a lack of understanding about the elements of regulatory policy to be implemented. In addition, there may be technical difficulties, for example a lack of suitable indicators to measure implementation. In order to ensure that data is collected as efficiently and as easily as possible, participants emphasised that the effort necessary to collect evidence on the implementation of regulatory policy should be proportional to its utility. 30. Participants discussed which bodies should collect and analyse data on the implementation of regulatory policy. As ministries and regulatory agencies are the agents that implement regulatory policy in practice in their daily work, it may be comparatively easy for them to gather this data without exorbitant effort. Some public officials, however, might perceive the obligation to collect data on their activities in the field of regulatory policy as additional administrative burden. A central body with a degree of independence from the government and with enough resources and competences to perform its task could review the data from an outside perspective, and ensure that information is processed and analysed accurately and consistently. National audit offices, statistical offices, and the central government were named as potentially suitable bodies for undertaking such work. At the same time, participants underlined that the detailed governance arrangements for a body to collect and analyse evidence on the implementation of regulatory policy needs to be adapted to the country-specific context to work effectively and efficiently. 31. Most countries with experience in evaluating the implementation of regulatory policy focus on process and output indicators, such as the level of compliance with formal requirements. Participants indicated that it would be desirable to also take into account some outcome indicators that measure the impact of regulatory policy. Outcome indicators, however, are usually very difficult to measure. Participants suggested that a solution to this dilemma may lie in focusing on intermediate outcome indicators, for example by using perception surveys on the usefulness or quality of regulatory policy.
  • 8. 8 32. If an analysis of the implementation of regulatory policy is likely to show up existing gaps in government performance in the area of regulatory policy, this may result in some additional political obstacles to introducing the systematic collection and review of information. Countries should consider how to overcome these obstacles and retain political support for review. Improving evidence based policy making through RIA 33. RIA is a powerful tool to support evidence-based policy. Its use could be enhanced. There are several benefits to collecting information on both the design and implementation of the RIA system as well as the outcomes. Measuring the design and implementation can demonstrate whether processes are being conducted correctly, which improves transparency and accountability. This can help build trust both between regulators and citizens and also between the executive and parliament. Monitoring the level of implementation can also contribute to change in the working culture and act as a mechanism for enforcement. Collecting information on the effectiveness of a RIA system helps establish whether it is working, whether it justifies the resources spent on it and whether changes need to be made. 34. Participants suggested that the OECD Framework for Regulatory Policy Evaluation (2014) provides a good starting point for helping organise different areas of information, making the distinction between information regarding the design of regulatory policies, its implementation and the outcomes. It was agreed that the forthcoming composite indicators on RIA would provide valuable information regarding design and implementation. In addition a number of countries were already collecting and publishing information on the number of RIAs actually performed. There was however a significant gap regarding the measurement and linking of outcomes to the implementation of processes, the most important of which was identified as ‘whether the presence of high-quality impact assessments has improved the quality of regulations’. 35. It was also noted that countries are at different stages in developing their regulatory systems and need to consider what their priorities for monitoring are given limited resources. Participants suggested that countries may want to build up their monitoring framework on a step by step basis. 36. A number of challenges were identified, the first being finding the resources to collect information. Central databases and IT solutions can help log when a RIA is started or completed making it easier to keep track of the total number of RIAs. The second challenge is ensuring the information collected is of good quality, for example is it reliable, does it provide sufficient detail, e.g. has a RIA been fully completed. The final challenge is engagement fatigue, if governments are asking their departments to collect this information, they must be able to provide a clear explanation of how this information will be used, and the benefit of the resulting analysis. Supporting open regulatory policy 37. Collecting and evaluating information on stakeholder engagement does not only help to increase the effectiveness of existing practices and to guide reforms, but it also enhances the transparency and accountability of the administration’s efforts to involve stakeholders and thereby reinforces trust in government. Collecting information on the implementation of stakeholder engagement is furthermore an important means to support the inclusiveness of regulatory practices, since it provides an opportunity to check if all those affected by regulation have been consulted adequately or not. 38. Participants expressed some doubts on the usefulness of quantitative indicators for analysing the implementation of stakeholder engagement. Their statistical validity and practical relevance may be questionable, as for example a high number of comments received during a consultation does not imply that all comments received were helpful for improving the quality of the regulation, and a great number of
  • 9. 9 changes in the regulatory draft that are based on stakeholders’ comments may signify a low quality of the original proposal rather than great utility of the inputs received. Qualitative indicators, e.g. on how the feedback received from stakeholders has been put to use, on the other hand, may contribute to the accountability and effectiveness of consultations. 39. Participants of the breakout session highlighted the following challenges to collecting and analysing evidence on the implementation of stakeholder engagement: While in some countries obligations existed for reporting on stakeholder engagement activities, information is mostly collected in disaggregated forms, i.e. reports are published individually by ministries or regulating agencies, but not consistently for the whole government. Secondly, some stakeholders may wish not to take part in a consultation, e.g. due to a lack of knowledge or interest, making it difficult to interpret information on stakeholder engagement adequately. Closing the regulatory governance cycle through ex post evaluation 40. All regulations are “experiments” and many will not have been done well. Given that the stock of regulation is much larger than the flow, the net gains from reforming it are potentially very large. For example, it was reported that regulatory reforms in Australia to the stock from 1980-90s led to a gain in GDP by 5%. Yet there is not a single approach to ex post evaluation. Policy-makers have a broad range of approaches at their disposal including ad-hoc reviews, programmed reviews such as sunsetting and ongoing management such as one-in one out rules. Collecting information on their functioning can help identify which methods are most cost-effective and inform decisions and policy makers on impacts, costs and benefits (see for example Productivity Commission, 2011). 41. Evaluating the ex post evaluation system per se helps to understand whether the ex post evaluation system is well designed in principle, being properly utilized in practice (e.g. have evaluations actually been conducted and with due process?) and has had an impact (e.g. changes in regulation’s benefits and costs, changes in volume of regulation). It provides feedback for better regulation and laws and better regulators and increases buy-in from stakeholders. The OECD Framework for Regulatory Policy Evaluation (2014) provides an overview of evaluations of the functioning of the ex-post analysis system in OECD countries. For example, the European Commission has evaluated its ex post evaluation system drawing upon a consultation with stakeholders and makes recommendations on how to improve it (European Commission, 2013). 42. Evaluation of the system requires data and statistical information. Statistics and information that should be available include i) the number of ex post evaluations undertaken by type, depth and chosen approach, ii) the cost and time of doing reviews and iii) information on compliance with requirements for ex post evaluation, e.g. has there been an evaluation of the following: appropriate (valid rationale for regulating?), effective (realised the intended outcome?), efficient (any unnecessary costs or impacts?) and alternative (is there a better alternative?). In addition, information should be available on iv) lessons learnt (information, consequences and impact of ex post evaluations), v) timing of ex post evaluation and vi) comparison of ex ante RIA and ex post RIA including the objectives (are objectives still valid? Have targets been met?). 43. A “tick a box” monitoring and central storage of data based on the following questions was suggested to systematically collect information: Have evaluations actually been conducted when they should? Were they adequately resourced? Were the reviewers appropriate? Was due process (including consultation) followed? Evidence may also be collected from individual evaluations to provide information on changes in regulations’ benefits and costs as a result of ex post evaluations.
  • 10. 10 44. Collecting data and information enables oversight and has the potential to change politics. At the same time, there are a number of challenges: Collecting data can be extra work and there might be evaluation fatigues. It is therefore necessary to ensure the value added and use of the information and to clearly identify which data is really needed. Countries also need to decide who collects the information, who evaluates it and who has oversight of the progress. The degree and nature of independence of the institutional setting may strongly influence the quality and impact of results. Furthermore, it may not be straightforward to evaluate whether the toolkit or approach used is the correct one and identify which mix of approaches and tools is the best combination. 45. Participants concluded that the ex post analysis system as a whole should be reviewed periodically. Evaluation should be regularly conducted independent of the political process, with appropriate independence and expertise. Results should be transparent and publicly available. Communicating the benefits of regulatory policy 46. The importance of being aware of the different reasons to communicate was highlighted. For governments, communication is the basis for accountability, transparency and participation, and thus a key element for democratic legitimation. However, governments also communicate in order to reach specific outcomes in form of knowledge, action or interaction. 47. When formulating the message it is crucial to bear in mind the different types of audiences that are important for our work. These may include political decision makers and parliamentarians, the general public, the business community or interested journalists. Different types of information are relevant for each of these and the message needs to be adapted accordingly. When communicating the benefits of regulatory policy, it is useful to link the achievements to real-life impacts for the respective addressees rather than elaborating solely on the evaluation of regulatory practice implementation. 48. It was emphasised that it is important to convey the message in an appealing and concise fashion. The use of simple and short messages makes it easier to communicate success and challenges to political decision makers and the general public. It has been suggested that the use of country profiles in the Regulatory Policy Outlook and available online can play a major role in this. In addition, different types of statistics may be useful in order to provide evidence for the message. 49. Finally, it was also pointed to the choice of the sender of the message, which can potentially increase the credibility. In the context of communicating regulatory policy, the sender could be the minister in charge, the national statistical office or the OECD itself. Key conclusions 50. The workshop discussions highlighted the importance of embedding regulatory policy both in law and in practice. Whilst the first stages of regulatory reform have now been largely completed in OECD countries by adopting an explicit regulatory policy, there is a persisting gap in implementing these formal requirements. Yet, the success of regulatory policy and link to better policy outcomes depends on implementation. 51. Measuring the implementation of regulatory policy may be a useful way of ensuring formal requirements are consistently implemented in practice. Both process and output indicators (e.g. on the level of compliance with formal requirements) as well as intermediate outcome indicators (e.g. by using perception surveys) could be used to measure the success of implementation. The participants stressed that both ministries and central oversight bodies with a certain degree of independence need to be involved in the process of collecting the required data. The use of central databases and IT solutions may facilitate this process. In addition, making findings of the performance indicators publically available in a report is also a
  • 11. 11 means of strengthening transparency and communicating progress. It was suggested the OECD give guidance on how to collect information on the implementation of regulatory policy. 52. The workshop also emphasised the importance of an appropriate institutional design as a prerequisite for successfully embedding regulatory policy in law and in practice. Whilst there is no silver bullet with regards to the specific institutional settings, it is crucial that the roles of different institutional actors be clearly specified in order to achieve coherent implementation of regulatory practices. The discussions have also shown that there is much potential for the role that parliaments can play in regulatory reform. Generally, the co-operation between the executive and parliament on regulatory reform needs to be strengthened to achieve better policy outcomes. Finally, in addition to the appropriate institutional set up, speakers stressed the need for a change of culture within public administration in order to make sure requirements are implemented in good spirit. Closing remarks 53. The Chair and Secretariat thanked the Icelandic government for their excellent organisation of the meeting and their hospitality. The workshop proved to be extremely useful with a good mix of concrete and academic discussions and the OECD Secretariat is very thankful to all those who presented or took part in the panel discussions. 54. The OECD Secretariat is looking forward to planning the 8th expert meeting on Measuring Regulatory Performance which will take place in the course of 2016 and would be grateful for volunteers to host the meeting. 55. The Secretariat announced the launch of the flagship publication 2015 Regulatory Policy Outlook at the OECD Public Governance Ministerial Meeting in Helsinki, 28 October 2015. The launch will be accompanied by an official press release and other promotional material. Participants were invited to provide concrete examples on the impact of regulatory policy to the Secretariat to communicate the benefits of regulatory policy.
  • 12. 12 REFERENCE LIST  European Commission (2013), Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Social and Economic Committee and the Committee of the Regions: Strengthening the foundations of Smart Regulation – improving evaluation, COM(2013) 686 final.  OECD (forthcoming 2015), OECD Regulatory Policy Outlook 2015, OECD Publishing.  OECD (2015), 2012 OECD Recommendation of the Council on Regulatory Policy and Governance, OECD Publishing, Paris.  Lunn, P. (2014), Regulatory Policy and Behavioural Economics, OECD Publishing.  OECD (2014), OECD Framework for Regulatory Policy Evaluation, OECD Publishing.  OECD (2014), International Regulatory Co-operation and International Organisations: The Cases of the OECD and the IMO, OECD Publishing.  OECD (2014), OECD Regulatory Compliance Cost Assessment Guidance, OECD Publishing.  OECD (2014), OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy, OECD Publishing.  OECD (2014), The Governance of Regulators, OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Policy, OECD Publishing.  OECD (2013), International Regulatory Co-operation: Addressing Global Challenges, OECD Publishing.  OECD (2013), International Regulatory Co-operation: Case Studies, Vol. 1: Chemicals, Consumer Products, Tax and Competition, OECD Publishing.  Productivity Commission (2011), Identifying and Evaluating Regulation Reforms, Research Report, Canberra. The full agenda, discussion notes, list of participants, speaker profiles and workshop presentations are available on the workshop website.
  • 13. EMBEDDING REGULATORY POLICY IN LAW AND PRACTICE 7th OECD Meeting on Measuring Regulatory Performance POLICY FINDINGS AND WORKSHOP PROCEEDINGS Reykjavik, Iceland 18-19 June 2015 For more details: www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/measuring-regulatory-performance.htm