This paper argues that the character of trade diplomacy in the 21st century, consisting of multiple actors interacting on multiple agendas in multiple arenas, is better framed by the post-globalist perspective. Contrary to statist narratives, governments have been compelled to “share their space” on trade governance with other actors such as civil society and economic agendas have gained as much importance as political issues. However, the globalist argument depicting the demise of the state is inconsistent with the prevailing situation characterised by governments being the sole legitimate signatories of international trade agreements as well as the principal authorities within the geographical delimitations of trade regimes.

1. WHAT PERSPECTIVE ON
DIPLOMACY BEST DEFINES
THE CHARACTER OF TRADE
DIPLOMACY IN THE 21ST
CENTURY?
AMOUGOU Aristide AGBOR

2. 1
List of Abbreviations
AFTA: ASEAN Free Trade Area
ASEAN: Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CSO: Civil Society Organisation
EAC: East African Community
ECCAS: Economic Community of Central African States
ECOWAS: Economic Community of West African States
EPA: Economic Partnership Agreement
EU: European Union
GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council
GMO: Genetically Modified Organism
MERCOSUR: Southern Common Market
NAFTA: North American Free Trade Area
NGO: Non-Governmental Organisations
RTA: Regional Trade Agreement
SADC: Southern African Development Community
TPP: Trans-Pacific Partnership
WTO: World Trade Organisation

3. 2
Abstract
This paper argues that the character of trade diplomacy in the 21st
century, consisting
of multiple actors interacting on multiple agendas in multiple arenas, is better framed by the
post-globalist perspective. Contrary to statist narratives, governments have been compelled to
“share their space” on trade governance with other actors such as civil society and economic
agendas have gained as much importance as political issues. However, the globalist argument
depicting the demise of the state is inconsistent with the prevailing situation characterised by
governments being the sole legitimate signatories of international trade agreements as well as
the principal authorities within the geographical delimitations of trade regimes.

4. 3
Introduction
“Government diplomats no longer command and control; instead they negotiate.”
This firm conclusion by Diana Tussie on the transformation of global trade diplomacy is
based on accrued involvement of non-state actors such as civil society organisations in the
crafting of trade regimes (Diana, 2013). Indeed, since trade redistributes wealth, assets and
power within and between communities, it creates patterns of social and political change
often culminating in conflicts. As a result, trade amongst nations remains an important pillar
of contemporary global politics. In this paper, trade diplomacy is defined as a process of
institutionalised communication which are intended to mediate estrangement produced by
patterns of economic exchange between communities.
Of the three perspectives on diplomacy; statist, globalist and post-globalist (Hocking,
2013), this paper argues that the post-globalist narrative is the most appropriate in explaining
the character of trade diplomacy in the 21st
century.
On the one hand, the statist perspective frames diplomacy as being focused on the
state and sovereignty. Rooted in positivist approaches, essentially realism and neo-realism, it
limits the agendas of diplomacy to high politics, giving less importance to economic issues
such as trade. In this approach, the state is highly centralised and hierarchical (Hocking,
2013).
On another note, globalist approaches to diplomacy consider trends on globalisation
as implicit of the decline of the state, Indeed, complex interdependencies amongst states
manifested by massive flux of goods, capital and people are reflected by an intellectual focus
on global governance based on broader networks involving transnational and trans-
governmental processes often occurring outside conventional diplomatic channels. To this
effect, the neoliberal agendas on which international politics is mainly articulated since the
1970s are considered in this perspective to be at the origin of the retreat of the state and the
marginalisation of diplomacy (Hocking, 2013).
The post-globalist narrative, considered in this paper as most appropriate in
discoursing trade diplomacy in the 21st
century, modifies and integrates elements of the statist
and globalist approaches which represent extremes on a continuum of global governance
perceptions. Based on this approach, diplomacy is understood as a means of connecting
individuals, groups, economies and states to build and manage social relations. Redefined and

5. 4
framed by post-positivist theories of international relations, diplomacy is perceived as an
open-ended process where diplomatic agency includes a range of non-state actors, rather than
a system which is simply conterminous with the state. Although acknowledging the depth and
complexity of global interdependencies, the post-globalist perspective however concludes
that diplomacy is a tool of global governance and not replaced by it as globalist would
contend.
In the paragraphs that follow, a critical analysis is made of the character of trade
diplomacy in the 21st
century in terms of actors, issues, processes and arenas. The major
trends decrypted justify a pre-eminence of post-globalist narratives over contending
approaches. To this effect, two main aspects appear most relevant; the primacy of networking
over club model in contemporary trade diplomacy (I) and accrued segmentation of global
trade governance (II).
I. The Primacy of Networking over Club Model in 21st Century Trade Diplomacy
Trade diplomacy has witnessed a proliferation of influential actors who more than
ever before scrutinise the state’s foreign trade policy in the 21st
century. By seeking to defend
varied interests, they have advocated the agenda for increased transparency on trade
diplomacy. Two of these actors particularly stand out; the business community and civil
society, both of which sometimes pursue antagonistic objectives upon which states must play
a mediating role. This is particularly the case in the milieu of trade diplomacy wherein
“governing activity is diffused over various social actors with the state increasingly in the
role of facilitating and cooperating partner” (Diana, 2013, p. 637).
A. The defence of business interests in trade diplomacy – Adaptive club
model
“A distinctive feature of trade and economic diplomacy at large is that market actors
are involved in the push-pull of diplomatic efforts either at the forefront or the rear-guard,
either tacitly or explicitly” (Diana, 2013, p. 626).
The interest of a national business community in scrutinising its government’s foreign
trade policy is explained by the impact of trade regimes on market forces. Three main issues
are of interest to businesses in this regard; competitivity, foreign direct investment capture
and market share.

6. 5
Indeed, businesses seek to maintain influence on the orientations of the state’s trade
diplomacy to curtail counterproductive policies that the government could be pressurised to
adopt from a foreign government. In some developing economies, the fear of having to face
direct competition with more effective foreign enterprises incites local business communities
to lobby against free trade and rather advocate protectionism. The affordability of costs of
production resulting from the dismantling of tariff barriers is traded off for competitivity. A
glaring example is the resistance that has been expressed towards the European Union’s
proposed Economic Partnership Agreement (EPA) aimed at establishing free trade with the
nations of the African, Caribbean and Pacific (ACP) group. Fearing that free trade will
“destroy” their nascent industries, the business communities in most of the ACP countries
have mounted pressure on their governments not to sign the EPA.
Furthermore, in an intense era of globalisation of production, characterised by
increasing international value chains, business actors are influential at lobbying their
governments to adopt policies that provide them leverage in international production cycles.
For example, in China’s Zhengzhou region, Foxconn, which is a Taiwanese owned digital
company that produces the iPhone, has been influential at pushing for the Chinese
government to provide specific trade privileges such as a free customs zone in the area which
guarantees lower costs for Apple and attracts investments to the region (Barboza, 2016). Such
practices have infuriated certain political classes in the United States such as the current
Donald Trump Administration which believe that they export jobs abroad and decrease the
competitiveness of the American economy. To that effect, he has promised to slam huge
import taxes on those multinationals that choose to outsource their production cycles abroad.
Equally, the quest to enlarge markets and increase turnover is an important
explanation of why enterprises engage very actively in influencing the trade diplomacy of
states. Increase interconnectedness implies that a market impact anywhere could affect
businesses and states throughout the globe. For example, the standoff between Boeing and
Bombardier over the purchase of the latter’s C-series jets by Delta Airways, and the US
Administration’s decision to hit the deal with a 220% customs rate, demonstrate the influence
which a corporation can have on its country’s trade diplomacy in view of gaining and
securing market shares.
Issues related to markets and trade diplomacy are further complicated by the
intertwines of political and economic stakes. Indeed, it isn’t uncommon for States to employ

7. 6
severe trade restrictions as a retaliatory tool in political crisis, thus affecting businesses. For
example, in 2010, the award of the noble peace prize to Chinese dissent Liu Xiaobao,
triggered a diplomatic crisis between Oslo and Beijing. In retaliation, China issued drastic
quota restrictions on Norwegian salmon fish causing huge reductions in exporters’ turnover.
Faced with pressure from these companies and having learnt the lesson, Norwegian officials
refused meeting the Dalai Lama in 2014. Rapprochement has been made between Norway
and China. Today, the human rights issue is handled with more tact and salmon exports from
Norway to China are rising again (Chen & Garcia, 2016).
Contemporary trade diplomacy cannot be dictated by governments alone. In today’s
interconnected world characterised by overlapping interests, enterprises voices do matter,
even if they contradict the government’s inclination sometimes. However, the rise of civil
society organisations across the spectrum of governance is perhaps the most salient
characteristic of trade diplomacy in the 21st
century.
B. Civil Society as a Key Pillar of Trade Governance Networks
From passionate protesters on “beyond the border” issues…
Global trade governance institutions like the World Trade organisation (WTO) have
faced massive backlash for “taking for granted that what is good for the market is good for
the society at large and presenting outcomes as faits accomplis (Diana, 2013).
The shift from border issues to behind the border issues such as the environment,
ethics, labour standards and health consideration etc. have provided breeding grounds on
which civil society action has been articulated to defend the interests of their constituencies.
As a result, an almost institutionalised anti-globalisation movement of civil protesters
surround WTO meetings with one of the most iconic illustrations being the Seattle gathering
in 1999 which was brought to a demise.
Another illustration is the Trans pacific partnership (TPP) which faced massive
criticism from civil society organisations. In effect, “deals like the TPP do not always have
the social support required due to concerns that they will be “trojan horses” deals that will
allow international corporations to limit the measures that can be taken by national
parliaments to promote public user based intellectual property regimes and transfer labour
and technology (Rimmer, 2016, p. 636).

8. 7
…To suppliers of technical assistance in trade diplomacy
More than just passionate protesters, today’s NGOs have embraced a profound
scientific approach of knowledge generation in defending the interests of certain factions of
society. In fact, during the WTO Hong Kong Ministerial conference in December 2005, 1065
NGOs were accredited and 865 of them effectively participated (Diana, 2013, p. 631). During
multilateral gatherings, these organisations provide insight on issues which might not be of
primary concern to enterprises and states. For example, the North American Free Trade Area
(NAFTA) deal is not limited to trade issues but equally considers environmental and labour
issues which were raised and formulated in the final agreement under the scrutiny of civil
society.
“Diplomacy is always a two-level game: the domestic support and public
coordination can be as hard or harder than global negotiations. Trade diplomats realise that
excluding civil society will devoid deals of inclusiveness and legitimacy. Without legitimacy,
international regimes are harder to make and are often not kept, at least not for long. With
legitimacy, states are arguably more easily bound to their commitments (Diana, 2013).
Governments have learnt to cooperate with national and foreign CSOs by considering their
perspectives and soliciting their views to ensure that their interests are incorporated in the
final agreements. Inclusiveness from the onset helps to mitigate future protests.
Such a perspective has contributed in broadening the scope of government’s
coordination on trade governance. Indeed, while trade diplomacy was essentially handled by
the Foreign Office and Departments of trade in the previous century, the 21st
century has been
marked by the inclusion of other technical departments such as those in charge of the
environment, labour, social affairs, health etc. Considering that diplomacy has become
increasingly knowledge driven, these technical departments can provide further insight to the
government on the revindications of civil society.
II. Multiplicity of Arenas and Dynamisms of Coalitions in Global Trade
Governance
Global trade governance is increasingly segmented along two major lines;
regionalisation and coalition formation in the WTO resulting in its morphing from a tightly
woven compact to a loose net of variegated sites of diplomacy (Diana, 2013).
A. Regional organisations and Global trade diplomacy

9. 8
Global trade governance has to a large extent been tolerant of regional integration
blocs. Indeed, regional institutions are perceived as coherent with the WTO’s long-term
vision of global freeing of trade. These institutions have substantially increased in their
number since the end of the second world war and have imposed themselves as significant
arenas for trade diplomacy across all continents. In a “world of regions”, global trade
governance has transitioned from exclusive focus on the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade/ WTO arena to embrace trends generated within and between regional blocs such as
the EU, ASEAN, NAFTA, MERCOSUR, ECOWAS, ECCAS, SADC, EAC, GCC etc.
The recourse to regional integration reflects some strategic issues linked to trade
policy and the defence of state interest.
Garnering policy support
Within regional organisations, states advocate more effectively for issues to be placed
on the WTO’s agenda as well as for votes in their favour. In this exercise, numbers do matter.
Geographical and cultural proximities within regions can be translated into more effective
communication, agenda reframing and articulation of strategies towards achieving objectives
on the international arena. This explains why on multiple occasions, institutions such as
AFTA have submitted a unified position at the WTO, especially on matters related to trade in
information technology services. According to Diana Tussie, the regionalisation of global
trade diplomacy leads to an expression of regional specificity and projection on the global
scene and contributes towards multipolarity in a world where it is not individual states but
regional congregations which seem to make a difference in trade diplomacy.
Smaller states can utilise the momentum that regional institutions provide to resist
pressures mounted on them by more powerful nations to sign certain agreements. According
to (Selmier & Hoon Oh, 2013, p. 249), “as members of Regional Trade Agreements (RTAs),
less powerful nations can mitigate some of the pressure to accept imports from more
powerful nations”. For example, ASEAN member nations through their economic diplomats’
efforts have been able to engage in more value claiming with more powerful trading partners
than might be expected. RTA structure empowers ASEAN members in economic diplomacy.
In the domestic arena as well, while seeking support for a given policy, states find that
shifting the burden or responsibility to a regional organisation could be an effective means of
curtailing resistances from certain factions. According to (Schiff & Winters, 1998, p. 274), “a

10. 9
developing country in the process of reforming its trade and other policies can benefit from a
regional integration agreement (RIA) with a large developed country or region such as the US
or the EU because the RIA binds the country’s reform in an international treaty, weakens the
groups that stand to lose from and oppose the reforms and raise the reform’s credibility”.
Optimising interests across different regulatory trade regimes
As explained by Diana Tussie, “under a single international regime, it is easier for
member states to recognise when a partner is deviating from the rules. If there are multiple,
conflicting regimes to solve a particular issue, members can argue that they are complying
with the regime that favours their interests the most, even if they are defecting from other
regimes (Diana, 2013). The EU-US dispute over Genetically Modified Organisms as food is
illustriously adequate of a legal stalemate resulting from regime multiplicity. While the US
insists that based on WTO rules the EU is required to prove that GMOs are unsafe before any
restrictions can be validated, the EU on its part is inclined to the Cartagena protocol which
upholds the precautionary principle. Another palpable illustration of such multiple regime
navigation was perceived with the Ecuadorian diplomacy during the 2008 financial crisis. As
part of the Andean rules, the Latin American nation should have restricted its imports in view
of recovering from the crisis. However, contrary to these rules the Ecuadorian government
negotiated a safeguard clause with the WTO which covered all its imports. This move created
a crisis in the regional bloc (Diana, 2013, p. 631).
B. Coalition Diplomacy in Global Trade Governance
Beyond segmentation based on regional integration organisations, states equally resort
to global coalitions in view of achieving their aggregate objectives on the global trade arena.
“The emergence and proliferation of [these] coalitions has added new substantive issues to
the agenda and changed the larger dynamics of building consensus” (Diana, 2013).
Coalitions build up on different issues, most of which are aligned on beyond the “border
concerns”. Examples of such groupings abound and include the ‘Cotton 4’ which is
comprised of the 4 major West-African cotton producers (Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, and
Mali). Other coalitions include the ‘friends of fish’ and the African group. Such coalitions
have overturned the domination that was once exerted by the trilogy of the US, EU and Japan
in the WTO’s governance throughout the 20th
century.

11. 10
Any critical analysis of the character of trade diplomacy in the 21st
century which
ignores the actorness and processes of coalitions will certainly be incomplete. Two main
types of trade diplomatic coalitions exist based on separate motives of formation; alliance
types and bloc types. The former is built in reaction to a specific threat and the latter in view
of negotiating for a policy (Diana, 2013).
An interesting remark is that coalitions are increasing their cooperation with civil
society to advocate for policies that favour better market, and labour conditions for their
respective for producers of their major commodities. The NGOs themselves are arrayed in an
interesting matrix of cooperation characterised by division of lobbying tasks towards
different audiences. Such articulations of trade diplomacy are highly knowledge-centric.
Knowledge is vital to lay the agenda, articulate debate and find consensus. The cotton 4
coalition for example has been able to defend cotton producers’ interests with support from
local and foreign CSOs.
Conclusion
The character of trade diplomacy in the 21st
century, consisting of multiple actors
interacting on multiple agendas in multiple arenas, is better framed by post-globalist
narratives. Contrary to statist narratives, governments have been compelled to “share their
space” on trade governance with other actors such as civil society and economic agendas
have gained as much importance as political issues. However, the globalist argument
depicting the demise of the state is inconsistent with the prevailing situation characterised by
governments being the sole legitimate signatories of international trade agreements as well as
the principal authorities within the geographical delimitations of trade regimes.
A critical holistic analysis of global trade diplomacy warrants the incorporation of
stakeholders’ interests across the broad spectrum of businesses, CSOs, ROs, coalitions and
governments. Furthermore, the shift to “behind the border” issues has broadened the
perspective of trade diplomacy bringing on board departments and actors considered hitherto
as irrelevant on the subject. Finally, the multiplicity of trade diplomacy arenas in the 21st
century, which span across national spaces, regional institutions, ad hoc coalition sites and
the WTO requires a broader perspective for the aggregation of relevant trends than has been
witnessed in previous centuries.

12. 11
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